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Analogous Circumstances
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166
pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for
him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which
he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight
check
dates,
which
he
did
not
report
to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge
for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is
being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered
terminated effective immediately.
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the
nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be complied
with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the performance of his
duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious
that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that
they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. The
dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my
weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the
company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended,
Kristine Joy G. Delos Santos
Labor Law Review
FACTS:
Felicito Ibanez (tireman), Elmer Gacula (Crane Operator), ElmerDagotdot (Welder),
Aligwas Carolino (Welder), Ruel Calda (Warehouseman)filed a complaint at the NLRC
for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages. The
group alleged that the contract they have is good for three months, subject to
automatic renewal if there is no notice of termination from Hanjin, and that the
contract would automatically terminate upon the completion of the project. They
further averred that during the time they were dismissed, the project was still ongoing
and Hanjin hired people for the positions that they had vacated. Lastly, they also
allege that they are entitled to a completion bonus as part of the industry practice and
this was substantiated by past payroll payments. Hanjin failed to furnish a copy of the
contract agreements withthe dismissed group. Instead it showed the quitclaims that
had been executed by the group that released Hanjin and its representatives from any
claims with their employment. It contained clearance certificates thats how that
respondents are free from accountability.
ISSUE:
Kristine Joy G. Delos Santos
Labor Law Review
HELD:
No, Hanjin was unable to prove they were not regular employees. The rehiring of
construction workers on a project to project basis does not confer upon them regular
employment status, since their re-hiring is only a natural consequence of the fact that
experienced construction workers are preferred. Employees who are hired for carrying
out a separate job, distinct from the other undertakings of the company, the scope and
duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time
of the employment , are properly treated as project employees and their services may
be lawfully terminated upon the completion of a project. Should the terms of their
employment fail to comply with this standard, they cannot be considered project
employees. Hanjin was unable to show the written contracts it had with the workers.
White the absence of the contract does not grant permanent status it is the burden of
the employer to prove that the employees were aware that their contract with the
company is for per project only. While Hanjin submitted a termination report including
the workers names to prove that the services of their services were only contracted for
a per project basis, Hanjin only submitted one report. It was unable to disprove the
allegation of the workers that they were part of a pool that Hanjin contacts once a
project is to be completed. Employers cannot mislead their employees, whose work is
necessary and desirable in the former's line of business, by treating them as though
they are part of a work pool from which workers could be continually drawn and then
assigned to various projects and thereafter denied regular status at any time by the
expedient act of filing a Termination Report. This would constitute a practice in which
an employee is unjustly precluded from acquiring security of tenure, contrary to public
policy, morals, good customs and public order. Hanjin alleged that per Department
Order 19, Series of 1993 of DOLE, the payment of completion bonus is further proof
that the workers were only project employees as Hanjin is mandated by law to pay it to
the temporary workers whose contracts are about to end upon the completion of the
project. SC views the completion bonus terminology here reflects the fact that the
project has already been completed and that is the premium they wished to pay.
Quitclaims are viewed with disfavor, especially when (a.) There is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person (b.) Where the terms are
unconscionable in its face. For quitclaims to be valid, it must constitute a reasonable
settlement commensurate to their legal rights. It does not preclude them from seeking
benefits they were entitled to such as back wages. The respondents were also not
granted the twin requirements of notice and hearing.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision declaring that the dismissal of Hollero is
valid and legal and ordered her to pay U-Bix the reimbursement of her training. It
dismissed Holleros complaint for lack of merit. On appeal before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), the NLRC reversed the LAs decision. A Motion for
Reconsideration was filed but subsequently denied by NLRC. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower courts decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not Hollero was illegally dismissed by U-Bix
HELD: An employer who seeks to dismiss an employee must afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if
he so desires.
U-Bix failed to discharge the burden of proof that Holleros dismissal is for a valid and
just cause
In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal is for
a valid and just cause. While an employer enjoys a wider latitude of discretion in
terminating the employment of managerial employees, managerial employees are also
entitled to security of tenure and cannot be arbitrarily dismissed at any time and
without cause as reasonably established in an appropriate investigation.
In the case at bar, U-Bix failed to substantiate their allegations of Holleros habitual
absenteeism, habitual tardiness, neglect of duties, and lack of interest. Daily time
records, attendance records, or other documentary evidence attesting to these grounds
could have readily been presented to support the allegations but none was.
The merits of a complaint for illegal dismissal do not depend on its prayer but on
whether the employer discharges its burden of proving that the dismissal is valid.
U-Bix failed to comply with the procedural due process of dismissing an employee In
another vein, the Court finds that U-Bix and Bravo failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid dismissal. Hollero being a manager did not excuse
them from observing such procedural requirements.
The notice does not inform outright the employee that an investigation will be
conducted on the charges particularized therein which, if proven, will result to her
dismissal. It does not contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or
misfeasance nor categorically state the effect on her employment if the charges are
proven to be true. It does not apprise Hollero of possible dismissal should her
explanation prove unsatisfactory. Besides, the U-Bix and Bravo did not even establish
that Hollero received the memorandum.
Neither did U-Bix and Bravo show that they conducted a hearing or conference during
which Hollero, with the assistance of counsel if she so desired, had opportunity to
respond to the charge, present her evidence, or rebut the evidence presented against
her. The meeting with Hollero on December 23, 1996 did not satisfy the hearing
requirement, for Hollero was not given the opportunity to avail herself of counsel.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that an employer who seeks to dismiss an
employee must afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires. Expounding on this
provision, the Court held that '[a]mple opportunity' connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense including legal representation.
responsive pleadings, Labor Arbiter Pablo Espiritu Jr. found in favor of Alba, holding
that while she violated the meal policy of McDonald s, dismissal was too harsh a
penalty, and suspension without pay would have sufficed. Mc Donald s appealed the
finding of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which denied the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the violation of the meal policy amounts to serious or wil lful
misconduct which would justify dismissal
HELD:
There is no dispute that Alba violated McDonald s meal policy. The only issue is
whether such violation amounts to or borders on "serious or willful" misconduct or
willful disobedience, as petitioners posit, to call for respondent s dismissal. By any
measure, the Supreme Court holds not. With respect to serious misconduct, it is not
sufficient that the act or the con duct complained of must have violated some
established rules or policies. It must have been performed with wrongful intent.
McDonald s, on which the onus of proving lawful cause in sustaining the dismissal of
Alba lies, failed to prove that her misconduct was induced by a perverse and wrongful
intent, they having merely anchored their claim that she was on her knowledge of the
meal policy. While McDonalds wields a wide latitude of discretion in the promulgation
of policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities of its employees, these
must, however, be fair and reasonable at all times, and the corresponding sanction s
for violations thereof, when prescribed, must be commensurate thereto as well as to
the degree of the infraction. Given Alba s claim that she was having stomach pains
due to hunger, which is not implausible, the same should have been properly taken
into account in the imposition of the appropriate penalty for violation of the meal
policy. McDonald s suspension for five days sufficed. With that penal ty, the necessity
of cautioning other employees who may be wont to violate the same policy was not
compromised. Moreover, McDonald s likewise failed to prove any resultant material
damage or prejudice on their part as a consequence of respondent's questioned act.
Their claim that the act would cause "irremediable harm to the company s business"
is too vague to merit consideration.
FACTS:
Herein petitioner RBC Cable Master System (petitioner RBC) is a cable firm engaged in
the business of providing home cable service. Sometime in March 1996, petitioner
RBC hired herein private respondent Marcial Baluyot as a Lineman.
In the middle part of the year 2000, private respondent learned that his outstanding
loan from cash advances accumulated to P18,000.00. The cash advances he made
[were] pursuant to a long time practice for the employees of petitioner RBC to advance
amounts of money in the form of cash vales with the condition that the same be
deducted from their monthly salaries on a staggered or periodic basis. Respondent
alleged that he delivered his motorcycle as a security for said loans. But petitioner
avers that such motorcycle was actually leased, which lease only ceased when
respondent no longer owned said vehicle because of non-payment of its financing.
On February 1, 2001, when private respondent reported for work, he was informed
that no blank official receipts could be issued to him for his collection job for that day
or for a month because he is being suspended. Thus, for one month, he did not report
for work and when he reported back to duty, he was told by petitioner RBC that he is
now out of job and is considered terminated.
Petitioner RBC denied dismissing private respondent by contending that it was private
respondent who abandoned his work when, sometime in March 2001, he left without
any notice and never returned back for work. They also alleged that respondent
committed several infractions such
of
documents.
LABOR ARBITER ruled that private respondent abandoned his job and committed acts
of dishonesty such as theft of company funds and property.
NLRC ruled that private respondent did not abandon his job but was illegally
dismissed.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES
After respondent was punished with suspension by petitioners, he was admitted back
to work on the condition that he will not repeat the same violations and he will pay
back the sums he owed. This proved that petitioners had condoned the infractions
previously committed by the respondent.
To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur:
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second
element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
Mere absence is not sufficient. The employer has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment without
any intention of returning.
In the case at bar, the charge of abandonment is belied by the following
circumstances: First, the high improbability of private respondent to intentionally
abandon his work considering that he had already served a penalty of suspension for
his infractions and violations as well as the petitioners tacit condonation of the
infractions he committed, by permitting him to go back to work and by asking him to
execute a promissory note. It is incongruent to human nature, that after having ironed
things out with his employer, an employee would just not report for work for no
apparent reason. Secondly, there was no proof that petitioner sent private respondent
a notice of termination on the ground of abandonment, if indeed it is true that he
really failed to go back to work. Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V, Rules and regulations
implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission
constituting the ground for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice
shall be served at the workers last known address. For this reason, We are
constrained to give credence to private respondents assertion that he attempted to
report back to work but he was just asked to leave as he was considered terminated.
And lastly, private respondents filing of a case for illegal dismissal with the labor
arbiter negates abandonment. As held by the Supreme Court, a charge of
abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.
Finally, an employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full
backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not viable, separation pay is awarded
to the employee. In awarding separation pay to an illegally dismissed employee, in lieu
of reinstatement, the amount to be awarded shall be equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service.
1 These practices include: (i) that copra making activities are done quarterly; (ii)
that the workers can contract with other farms; and (iii) that the workers are
independent from the land owner on all work aspects.
2 G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005
Kristine Joy G. Delos Santos
Labor Law Review
the underloading to Tabogader, who was then in charge of the subsidence area where
the alleged anomaly was happening.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Abel was guilty of
gross and habitual neglect of duty as he approved the operations even with the gross
underloading; and that he did not act on Lupegas report concerning certain
irregularities. Abels failure to perform his duty of inspecting ANSECAs operations and
vacillation on certain matters during the company investigation, among other things,
constituted sufficient basis for Philexs loss of trust and confidence. Abel appealed to
the Court of Appeals via certiorari which dismissed the motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Abel is valid
HELD:
The law mandates that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests with the employer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden
would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal.
Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide
legal justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be
resolved in favor of labor pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the
Constitution.
The first requisite for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is that
the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence. Verily, the
Court must first determine if Abel holds such a position.
The second requisite is that there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust
and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, to be a valid cause for dismissal, must
be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. The
basis for the dismissal must be clearly and convincingly established but proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not necessary. Philex Mining Corporations evidence against Abel
fails to meet this standard. The Labor Arbiter correctly found that the alleged
telephone conversations between Abel and Didith Caballero of ANSECA would not
suffice to lay the basis for Philex Mining Corporations loss of trust and confidence in
Abel.
Internal Audit Group (IAG) found that Maralit violated Bank policies which resulted in
the return of unfunded checks amounting to P54,950,000.00. IAG recommended thata
Maralit be required to submit her written explanation under oath. Later, Maralit filed
her application for early retirement. However, PNB charged her with serious
misconduct, gross violation of bank rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the bank. PNB directed her to submit her written answer under
oath and explain why she should not be punished under Article 282 of the Labor Code
for serious misconduct, wilful breach of trust, gross violation of bank rules and
regulations. PNB placed Maralit under preventive suspension. Moreover, PNB
conditionally approved Maralits application for early retirement provided that the
decision in said investigation does not disqualify her from such benefits. Subsequently,
PNB found Maralit guilty of serious misconduct, gross violation of bank rules and
regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the bank. PNB dismissed
her from service with forfeiture of her retirement benefits. Maralit filed a complaint for
non-payment of retirement benefits and separation pay and for damages against PNB.
Labor Arbiter held that Maralit is entitled for the retirement benefits since she was not
under preliminary investigation when she filed her application for early retirement and
when PNB approved it, there was still no decision on the administrative case against
her. PNB illegally dismissed her. PNB appealed to NLRC but the latter affirmed Labor
Arbiters decision. The Court of Appeals set aside NLRCs decision and found that
Maralit was under preliminary investigation when she filed her application for early
retirement.
Issue:
Whether or not Maralit was illegally dismissed by Philippine National Bank and
entitled to retirement benefits.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. PNB may rightfully
terminate Maralits services for a just cause including serious misconduct. Serious
misconduct is improper conduct, a transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, a forbidden act, or a dereliction of duty. Maralit violated bank policies which
resulted in the return of unfunded checks. Having been dismissed for a just cause,
Maralit is not entitled to her retirement benefits.
G.R. No. 163270, September 11, 2009
Eduardo M. Tomada Sr. v. RFM Corporation-Bakery Flour Division and Jose
Maria Concepcion III
Kristine Joy G. Delos Santos
Labor Law Review
FACTS:
Sometime in 1998, Eduardo Tomada Sr. filed a complaint against RFM Corporation
Bakery Flour Division and Jose Ma. Concepcion Jr. for illegal dismissal before Labor
Arbiter. Tomada stated that the company dismissed him from work because he was
allegedly sleeping on his job during his working time and failed to detect the fire which
was taking place inside his work area. He argued that he was not sleeping and never
negligent in his job. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Tomada`s case for lack of merit and
found that Tomada was grossly remiss in performing his assigned duties and his
separation from work was justified. Tomada appealed before the NLRC but the latter
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC reiterated the Labor Arbiter`s findings
that Tomada was not only absent from his are of responsibility at the time of fire but
was also sleeping in the screen room. Tomada appealed to Court of Appeals which
ruled that Tomada`s dismissal from employment was valid since leaving his post and
sleeping while on duty rendered Tomada unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. The Court of Appeals agreed with the NLRC`s award of
separation pay since he serve 20 years to RFM Corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tomada was negligent in his job and validly dismissed by his employer.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. Tomada`s acts constitute serious misconduct and a just
cause of dismissal under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code. By sleeping on the job and
leaving his work area without prior authorization, Tomada did not merely disregard
company rules but also failed to live up to his company`s reasonable expectations.
Tomada was validly dismissed by RFM Corporation since he is guilty of serious
misconduct under dereliction of duty and gross negligence and he is not entitled to
financial assistance or separation pay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espaderos infraction constitutes serious misconduct.
RULING:
The Supreme granted the petition.
Espadero`s position as a cashier is one that requires a high degree of trust and
confidence, and that her infraction reasonably taints such trust and confidence
reposed upon her by her employer. In the instant case, the petitioners cannot be
faulted for losing their trust in Espadero. An employee occupying a job which requires
utmost fidelity to her employers, she failed to report to her immediate supervisor the
tampering of her time card. Moreover, the peculiar nature of Espadero`s position
Kristine Joy G. Delos Santos
Labor Law Review
aggravates her misconduct. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct must
be serious, must be of such a grave character, and not merely trivial or unimportant.
To constitute just cause for termination, it must be in connection with the employee`s
work.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The misconduct of Berbano is not serious of nature as to warrant respondent`s
dismissal from service. The records of this case are bereft of any showing that the
alleged misconduct was performed by respondent with wrongful intent. Moreover,
respondent`s misconduct did not result in any economic loss on the part of petitioner
since the service features were not yet available in the market at the time respondent
caused its unauthorized installation.
Arbiter`s decision. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner`s complaint for illegal
dismissal must be dismissed having been terminated from employment for a valid
cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, Romeo Ventura was terminated for a just cause.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
Under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is one of the just
causes for dismissing an employee, where the employees is entrusted with duties of
confidence on delicate matters, such as care and protection and handling or custody of
the employer`s property.
The basis of terminating the employment of petitioner actually came from petitioner
himself due to the substantial and irreconcilable inconsistencies in the narration of
facts in his Audit Report and his ``Sagot na Sinumpaang Salaysay`` filed before the
company, and his pleadings before the lower tribunals and before the Supreme Court.
It cannot be denied that he withheld this information from his immediate supervisor
and from the company, a clear breach of trust and confidence the company had
reposed in him as one of its Auditors.
Court of Appeals held that petitioens were validly dismissed for wilful breach of
confidence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed and entitled to back wages.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
By obtaining an altered police report and medical certificate, petitioners deliberately
attempt to cover up the fact that Sales was under the influence of liquor. In so doing,
they committed acts which are inimical to respondent`s interests and stability not only
of management but of the company itself through deceitful means and methods.
Thus, they committed a work-related wilful breach of the trust and confidence reposed
in them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner were illegally dismissed by the respondents.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The Court rules that there is valid cause for petitioners` dismissal from eight day sof
July and for days of August 2002. As a result, Estacio`s improper accounting and
records keeping the amount of P123,807.14 remains unremitted to PELCO I. On the
other hand, Manliclic committed a breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer
as a bill collector by misappropriating the payment collection which provides the
respondent with financial resources to continue its operations. PELCO I cannot afford
to continue in its employ dishonest bill collectors. Thus, this constitutes valid cause of
dismissal from service.