Craig Geness Lawsuit Complaint

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 1 of 29
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
CRAIG A. GENESS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF FAYETTE,
CITY OF UNIONTOWN,
JASON COX, JAMES MCVEY and
JEAN MCVEY,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Electronically Filed.
COMPLAINT IN A CIVIL ACTION

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, CRAIG A. GENESS, by and through his attorneys,
LAW OFFICES OF JOEL SANSONE, JOEL S. SANSONE, ESQUIRE, and
MASSIMO A. TERZIGNI, ESQUIRE, and hereby files this Complaint in a Civil Action as
follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.
This is an action for the redress of grievances and in vindication of civil rights guaranteed
to the Plaintiff under the Constitution of the United States and the laws enacted in furtherance
thereof.
2.
This action is brought against the Defendants for violating Plaintiffs rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Americans with
Disability Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985.
3.
Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343(3). Supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiffs state law claim is also proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 1367.
4.
Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C.A. 1391(b). All claims set forth herein arose in the
Western District of Pennsylvania and the Plaintiff resides in the Western District of
Pennsylvania.
PARTIES
5.
Plaintiff, Craig A. Geness, is an adult individual who resides in Fayette County,
Pennsylvania.
6.
Defendant, County of Fayette (Fayette), is a political subdivision of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with administrative offices located at 61 East Main Street,

Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401, and, at all times relevant to this complaint, acted by and
through its officials. The Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, also located at 61 East Main
Street, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401, is a division of Defendant Fayette, empowered to create
and enforce county policy, including but not limited to local rules, customs and practices of
criminal procedure.
7.
Defendant, City of Uniontown (Uniontown), is now, and was at all times relevant to
this Complaint, a municipal corporation existing by laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

with administrative offices located at 20 North Gallatin Avenue, Uniontown, Pennsylvania
15401. The Uniontown Police Department, located at 80 North Beeson Avenue, Uniontown,
Pennsylvania 15401, is a division of Defendant Uniontown, empowered to create and enforce
municipal policy including, but not limited to, charging individuals with crimes.
8.
Defendant, Jason Cox (Cox), was at all times relevant to this Complaint, a detective
and now the chief of the Uniontown Police Department, purporting to act within the full scope of
his authority and office and under color of state law and pursuant to the statutes, ordinances,
regulations and customs and usages of Defendant, City of Uniontown.
2

9.
Defendant, James McVey, was at all times relevant to this Complaint, the owner and
operator of McVeys Personal Care Home, which is currently located at 235 North Gallatin
Avenue, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401 and previously located at 103 Lincoln Street,
Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401.
10.
Defendant, Jean McVey, was at all times relevant to this Complaint, the owner and
operator of McVeys Personal Care Home, which is currently located at 235 North Gallatin
Avenue, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401 and previously located at 103 Lincoln Street,
Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401.
11.
The actions of the Defendants, and each of them, described herein are part of an unlawful
pattern and course of conduct intended to harm the Plaintiff. Each and all of the acts described
below were committed with reckless disregard and/or deliberate indifference to the constitutional
and statutory rights of the Plaintiff. As a direct and proximate result thereof, the Defendants
violated the Plaintiffs constitutional rights as stated herein.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
12.
Plaintiff is a 49-year-old male who has a permanent mental health disability. Plaintiff has
been diagnosed with mental retardation possessing a full scale IQ of 51, verbal IQ of 56 and
performance IQ of 55, all of which fall in the extremely low range.
13.
In or about October, 2006, Plaintiff was residing at McVeys Personal Care Home
(McVeys), which was at the time located at 103 Lincoln Street, Uniontown, Pennsylvania
15401.
14.
McVeys is owned and operated by Defendants James and Jean McVey.
15.
On or about October 27, 2006, at approximately 4:00 p.m., another resident of McVeys,
Ronald Fiffik (Fiffik) fell down the stairs of the front porch of the home.
3

16.
Prior to the fall, Mr. Fiffik was on the porch with his wife. Mr. Fiffiks wife is the only
known eyewitness to the fall.

17.
Mr. Fiffiks wife made statements to medical personnel after his fall that Mr. Fiffik fell
down the porch stairs. (See Paragraphs 54 and 55 infra).

18.
After Mr. Fiffiks fall, he was transported to Uniontown Hospital by ambulance. The
ambulance was dispatched at approximately 4:03 p.m. and arrived at McVeys at approximately
4:04 p.m.
19.
Uniontown police officer Thomas Kolencik (Kolencik) responded to a report of a man
that had fallen down stairs and arrived on the scene with the ambulance. Officer Kolencik wrote
in his initial report that the only information provided at the scene was that Mr. Fiffik fell off of
the porch.
20.
That day, Plaintiff left Oak House, a mental health services facility located at 31
Connellsville Street, # C, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401, at approximately 4:00 pm and was

transported to McVeys. Therefore, Plaintiff returned to McVeys after Mr. Fiffiks fall.
21.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that James and/or Jean McVey contacted the
Defendant Uniontown police and stated the Plaintiff was suspected of pushing Mr. Fiffik.
Sometime thereafter, Defendant Cox was assigned as the lead detective to investigate Mr.
Fiffiks fall.
22.
On or about November 16, 2006, Defendant Cox interviewed James McVey, owner of
McVeys, regarding the October 27, 2006, incident. Defendant Cox reported that James McVey
told him that, at the time of Mr. Fiffiks fall, he was standing in the kitchen of the residence,
approximately 25 to 30 feet from the front door, when he heard Plaintiff yell shut up and enter
the house and proceed to his bedroom. James McVey stated that he then walked outside to find
Mr. Fiffik lying on the ground. Defendant Cox reported that James McVey felt that Plaintiff
shoved Mr. Fiffik off of the porch. Sometime thereafter, James McVey had Plaintiff
involuntarily committed to Highlands Hospitals psychiatric ward located at 401 East Murphy
Avenue, Connellsville, Pennsylvania 15425.
23.
On or about November 16, 2006, Defendant Cox interviewed Plaintiff at Highlands
Hospital regarding Mr. Fiffiks fall.

24.
Despite Plaintiffs obvious limited mental capacity, as well as his commitment to a
psychiatric ward, Defendant Cox had Plaintiff sign an acknowledgment of his Miranda rights, as
well as a waiver of his right to have an attorney present during questioning.
25.
Plaintiff avers that Defendant Cox coerced him into making a false admission that he
pushed Mr. Fiffik over the wall of the porch.

26.
Plaintiff avers that Defendant Cox was aware or should have been aware that Plaintiff
was not competent to waive his rights and that Plaintiffs coerced admission was insufficient to
establish probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.
27.
Nevertheless, on or about November 17, 2006, Defendant Cox charged Plaintiff with
Aggravated Assault for Mr. Fiffiks fall. That same day, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Fayette
County Prison.
28.
On or about November 17, 2006, Mr. Fiffik died as a result of his injuries from the fall.
29.
Following Mr. Fiffiks death, on or about November 20, 2006, Defendant Cox charged
Plaintiff with homicide.

30.
Contrary to the initial statement given by James McVey, in the Affidavit of Probable
Cause, Defendant Cox wrote that James McVey stated that Mr. Fiffik told him that he was
pushed off of the wall.
31.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendants James and Jean McVey and Cox
entered into a conspiracy to falsely arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff.
32.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendants James and Jean McVey engaged in
the aforementioned conspiracy in order to avoid potential liability for Mr. Fiffiks fall and death
as the owners of the property where the fall occurred.
33.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendant Cox was motivated in the conspiracy
by a discriminatory animus against mentally disabled people.

34.
On or about June 18, 2007, Fayette County Court of Common Pleas Judge John Wagner
(Wagner) deemed Plaintiff incompetent to stand trial, but not severely mentally disabled.
Judge Wagner also ordered that Plaintiff be transferred to Mayview State Hospital (Mayview),
a psychiatric hospital, for no more than 60 days, at which time Mayview was to provide the court
Plaintiffs capacity to stand trial, as well as whether the probability exists that Plaintiff will
regain competency within a reasonable period of time.
35.
Despite Judge Wagners Order, on or about August 21, 2007, Fayette County Court of
Common Pleas Judge Ralph Warman (Warman) deemed Plaintiff incompetent to stand trial
and directed that a motion be filed when Plaintiff was deemed competent to proceed.
36.
A psychiatric evaluation was completed by Mayview on September 25, 2007, and
concluded that Plaintiff was not competent to stand trial. The evaluation also included Plaintiffs
IQ scores referenced in Paragraph 12 above. Nothing in the evaluation indicated that Plaintiff
would be able to gain competency to stand trial. In fact, the report mentioned the possibility of
Plaintiff decompensating.
37.
Despite Plaintiffs condition, Defendant Jean McVey provided a statement for purposes
of the Mayview evaluation in which she claims that she did not know why Plaintiff needed to
live in a personal care home and that she would like to see Plaintiff work on his aggression.
38.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendant Jean McVey made this statement in
furtherance of the conspiracy involving Defendant James McVey and Defendant Cox to falsely
arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff.
39.
After the Mayview evaluation was completed, Plaintiff was transferred back to Fayette
County Prison.
40.
Despite the Mayview evaluation of the Plaintiff and the results thereof, an Order was not
entered regarding Plaintiffs competency to stand trial until on or about November 29, 2010.
41.
On or about November 29, 2010, Judge Wagner ordered that Plaintiff be transferred from
Fayette County Prison to Torrance State Hospital (Torrance) for a period not to exceed 90 days
to again determine Plaintiffs capacity to stand trial, as well as whether the probability exists that
Plaintiff will regain competency within a reasonable period of time. Plaintiff was never
transported to Torrance in accordance with Judge Wagners Order.
42.
On or about August 17, 2011, Fayette County Court of Common Pleas Judge Gerald R.
Solomon (Solomon) ordered that it should be determined whether Defendant is competent to

function in society.
43.
On or about September 4, 2011, a forensic psychiatric assessment of the Plaintiff was
performed at Fayette County Prison. The reason provided for the assessment was Judge
Wagners November 29, 2010, Order. This was the first psychiatric evaluation performed since
Plaintiffs evaluation at Mayview.
44.
The September 4, 2011, evaluation concluded that Plaintiff was not competent to stand
trial and that he is unable to understand the nature of the charges against him. Additionally, the
evaluation concluded that Plaintiffs condition would not likely improve with any additional
treatment or intervention.
45.
On or about September 21, 2011, Judge Wagner ordered that Plaintiff was not competent
to stand trial and released him to be involuntarily committed to a Long Term Structured
Residence (LTSR), there to remain without contact with the general public and to be returned
to Fayette County Prison upon completion of his therapeutic program or a determination that he
is competent to stand trial.
46.
On or about September 22, 2011, Plaintiff was released from the Fayette County Prison
and transferred to LTSR and fitted with an ankle monitor.

47.
On or about December 10, 2015, Fayette County Court of Common Pleas Judge Stephen
P. Leskinen entered an Order nolle prosequi all charges against Plaintiff.

48.
Plaintiff was subsequently released from confinement.
49.
Plaintiff was incarcerated for 1,769 days and spent 1,540 days at LTSR with an ankle
monitor, for a total of 3,309 days in custody.

50.
During that time, four Motions for Habeas Corpus relief and/or Motions to Dismiss
charges were filed on Plaintiffs behalf. No hearings were held or rulings made by the Fayette
County Court of Common Pleas regarding those motions.
51.
Plaintiff avers that Defendant Fayette, through the Fayette Court of Common Pleas,
discriminated against him because of his disability by depriving him of normal benefits of
criminal procedure and due process of the law.
52.
Moreover, despite numerous requests from Plaintiffs criminal defense counsel, Plaintiff
did not receive pertinent discovery materials until on or about June 18, 2014 and June 22, 2015.
53.
On or about June 18, 2014, Plaintiffs criminal defense counsel received a Uniontown
Firemans Ambulance report, dated October 27, 2006, regarding Mr. Fiffiks fall.
54.
The report states that Mr. Fiffiks wife said that Mr. Fiffik walked out on the porch and
fell down approximately five steps head first and was unresponsive for approximately two
minutes. The report also states that when the ambulance arrived, Mr. Fiffik was sitting on the
porch steps. Plaintiff is not mentioned in the report.
55.
Plaintiffs criminal defense counsel also received Mr. Fiffiks Uniontown Hospital
medical records, which state that on October 27, 2006, Mr. Fiffik fell down approximately five
stairs, that he was unsteady and not supposed to go near stairs and that someone witnessed the
fall. Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that the witness indicated in the record is Mr. Fiffiks
wife. The records also indicate that, at the time of his hospital visit after the fall, Mr. Fiffik was
alert and cooperative. A notation on the medical records indicate that they were printed on
November 16, 2006, the day prior to Plaintiffs arrest.
56.
Plaintiffs criminal defense counsel did not receive the psychiatric evaluations referenced
in Paragraphs 35 and 42, until on or about June 22, 2015.

57.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that the aforementioned evidence was intentionally
withheld in order to cover up the unlawful acts of the Defendants described herein.
58.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendant Cox, as the lead detective, was in
possession of the October 27, 2014, Uniontown Firemans Ambulance report, as well as Mr.
Fiifiks medical records, and intentionally and/or recklessly disregarded material evidence in the
investigation of Mr. Fiffiks fall, specifically the fact that Mr. Fiffik fell on his own accord and
that the fall was witnessed by Mr. Fiffiks wife.
59.
Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly failed to interview the only witness to Mr.
Fiffiks fall, Mr. Fiffiks wife.

60.
Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly disregarded Officer Kolenciks initial
report that the only information provided at the scene was that Mr. Fiffek fell off of the porch.
61.
Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly disregarded evidence that it would have
been physically impossible for Plaintiff to be able to push Mr. Fiffik over the wall, due to the
height of the wall in proportion to the size of Mr. Fiffik.
62.
Moreover, there was no physical evidence that Mr. Fiffik fell from the wall of the porch.
Specifically, the bushes and dirt underneath the wall, where Mr. Fiffik would have landed if he
was pushed over the wall, were undisturbed, and there were no reports of Mr. Fiffik having dirt
on his clothing.
63.
Plaintiff avers that Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly excluded the
exculpatory evidence mentioned hereinbefore above in his Affidavit of Probable Cause for the
purpose of effectuating Plaintiffs unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as to deny
Plaintiff equal protection of the laws because of Plaintiffs disability.
64.
Defendant Cox further unlawfully coerced the Plaintiff into waiving his rights, as well as
into an admission, for the purpose of effectuating Plaintiffs unlawful arrest and malicious
prosecution, as well as to deny Plaintiff equal protection of the laws because of Plaintiffs
disability.
65.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that at some point Defendant Cox was required to
seek the approval of Defendant Uniontowns Chief of Police, Kyle Sneddon (Sneddon), to
10

arrest the Plaintiff. Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Chief Sneddon permitted the filing
of the subject criminal charges without properly questioning Defendant Cox regarding the facts
of the case, and the existence of probable cause. Chief Sneddon, thereby, failed to properly
supervise the conduct of his junior officer and, thereby, ratified the improper and illegal actions
of Defendant Cox, which actions led to the violation of Plaintiffs constitutional and statutory
rights, as described hereinafter below.
66.
Defendant Uniontown, by ratifying the conduct of Defendant Cox and allowing him to
unlawfully arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff, contributed to the
discriminatory and unlawful actions taken against the Plaintiff.
67.
Defendant Uniontowns failure to properly train, control and/or supervise its officers has
led to incidents of discriminatory and inadequate investigations against citizens in the City of
Uniontown perpetrated by police officers for Defendant Uniontown, as evidenced by the actions
of Defendant Cox.
68.
Defendant Uniontown has failed to correct these deficiencies in training, supervision
and/or discipline.
COUNT I:
PLAINTIFF v. FAYETTE, UNIONTOWN
VIOLATION OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 42 U.S.C.S. 12131
69.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 68 as though fully set forth at
length herein.
70.
The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.S. 12131 et seq., provides disabled
individuals redress for discrimination by a public entity, which includes state or local
governments, as well as their agencies and instrumentalities.
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71.
Pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.S. 12131 et seq.,
Plaintiff had the right to all services, programs, and activities provided or made available by
Defendants Fayette and Uniontown.
72.
Plaintiff has a permanent mental health disability under the ADA.
73.
Plaintiff was unlawfully investigated, arrested and prosecuted by Defendant Cox, an
officer of Defendant Uniontown, because of his disability.

74.
Defendant Uniontown ratified the conduct of Defendant Cox by allowing him to
unlawfully arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff and contributed to the
discriminatory and unlawful actions taken against the Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendant
Uniontown failed to properly train, control and/or supervise its officers in investigating and
arresting mentally handicapped individuals.
75.
After Plaintiffs arrest, Defendant Fayette, through the Fayette County Court of Common
Pleas, discriminated against him because of his disability by depriving him of normal benefits of
criminal procedure and due process of law. Specifically, Defendant Fayette Judges repeatedly
issued orders based on the possibility of Plaintiff regaining competency to stand trial when
medical evidence clearly demonstrated that Plaintiffs disability was permanent and not treatable.
76.
As such, Plaintiff was deprived of his right to the justice system provided by Defendant
Fayette, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
77.
The discriminatory acts of Defendants Fayette and Uniontown deprived Plaintiff of his
right to due process of law.

78.
As a direct and proximate result of the acts mentioned hereinbefore above, perpetrated by
Defendants Fayette and Uniontown, Plaintiff suffered the following injuries and damages:
a.
violation of his rights under the ADA to be free from discrimination based on his
disability;
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b.
physical and psychological pain and suffering;
c.
fright, horror and shock;
d.
deprivation of freedom for 3,309 days;
e.
emotional trauma and suffering; and
f.
economic damages related to any and all medical and/or other consequential
costs.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands compensatory general damages against Defendants

Fayette and Uniontown in the amount proven at trial; compensatory special damages including,
but not limited to, medical expenses and lost income; costs of suit; reasonable attorneys fees as
permitted by law; pre- and post-judgment interest as permitted by law; and such other relief,
including injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as this Court may deem proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COUNT II:
PLAINTIFF v. COX, UNIONTOWN
VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
79.
length herein.
80.
Defendant Cox intentionally seized and arrested Plaintiff without probable cause.
Defendant Cox therefore initiated the prosecution of the Plaintiff and assisted in that prosecution.
13

81.
As described more fully in Count VIII below, Defendant Uniontown ratified the conduct
of Defendant Cox by allowing him to unlawfully arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute
the Plaintiff.
82.
Defendants knew, or should have known through the exercise of reasonable caution, that
no reasonable basis existed for the aforementioned criminal charge to be brought against
Plaintiff.
83.
The absence of probable cause, as well as the discriminatory conduct against the Plaintiff,
constituted malice on the part of the Defendants.

84.
The Defendant Cox acted under the color of law and his actions constituted an arbitrary
and unconscionable abuse of government authority.

85.
The arrest, seizure and subsequent prosecution of the Plaintiff constitute a malicious
prosecution by the Defendants in violation of Plaintiffs rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
86.
The actions of the Defendants constituted malicious prosecution in that:

a.
the Defendants initiated criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff;
b.
the criminal proceedings ended in the Plaintiffs favor;
c.
the investigation, arrest, seizure and prosecution of the Plaintiff were initiated
without probable cause;
d.
the Defendants acted maliciously and/or for purposes other than bringing the
Plaintiff to justice; and
e.
Plaintiff suffered an unlawful seizure of his person in violation of Plaintiffs

rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
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87.
The actions of the individual Defendants were willful, wanton and/or done with a
reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff, thereby subjecting Defendant Cox to punitive
damages.
88.
As a direct and proximate result of the acts mentioned hereinbefore above perpetrated by
the Defendants, Plaintiff suffered the following injuries and damages:

a.
violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from unreasonable
seizure of their persons and to be afforded the equal protection of the law;
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands compensatory general damages against the

Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in the amount proven at trial; compensatory
special damages including, but not limited to, medical expenses and lost income; costs of suit;
reasonable attorneys fees as permitted by law; pre- and post-judgment interest as permitted by
law; punitive damages against Defendant Cox; and such other relief, including injunctive and/or
declaratory relief, as this Court may deem proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
15

COUNT III:
VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FALSE ARREST
89.
length herein.
90.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Plaintiff had the right to be free from the unreasonable seizure of his person and
arrest without probable cause.
91.
The unreasonable seizure of Plaintiffs person by Defendant Cox and his subsequent false
arrest constituted a denial of the equal protection of the laws and/or equal privileges and
immunities under the law and, therefore, constituted a violation of the Plaintiffs rights
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
92.
the Plaintiff.
93.
The seizure by Defendant Cox was an unreasonable deprivation of the Plaintiffs liberty
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and at all times
was done without probable cause to believe that the Plaintiff had committed any act which would
justify his arrest.
94.
Defendant Cox arrested the Plaintiff without having the requisite probable cause to do so.
16

95.
The conduct of the Defendant Cox, acting intentionally or in reckless disregard as
aforementioned, deprived the Plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable and unlawful
detention and arrest.
96.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Defendants had a duty and/or were required to avoid the use of unlawful
detention and arrest against the Plaintiff, which duty was deliberately and continuously violated
by the Defendant, who arrested the Plaintiff without probable cause.
97.
Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly excluded the exculpatory evidence
mentioned hereinbefore above in his Affidavit of Probable Cause for the purpose of effectuating
Plaintiffs unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as to deny Plaintiff equal protection
of the laws.
98.
Defendant Cox further unlawfully coerced the Plaintiff into waiving his rights, as well as
into an admission, for the purpose of effectuating Plaintiffs unlawful arrest and malicious
prosecution, as well as to deny Plaintiff equal protection of the laws.
99.
The actions of the Defendant Cox were willful, wanton and/or done with a reckless
disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff, thereby subjecting Defendant Cox to punitive damages.
100.

a.
b.
c.
d.

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e.
f.
costs.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COUNT IV:
PLAINTIFFS v. PLAINTIFF v. COX, UNIONTOWN
SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
101.
Plaintiffs incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 100 as though fully set forth at
length herein.
102.
The subsequent detainment of Plaintiff pursuant to his false arrest, as more fully
described hereinbefore above, constituted false imprisonment of the Plaintiff and violated the
Plaintiffs rights as guaranteed to him by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
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103.
The actions of the Defendant Cox in arresting and imprisoning the Plaintiff constituted an
arbitrary and unconscionable abuse of government authority.

104.
the Plaintiff.
105.
The conduct of Defendant Cox, acting intentionally or in reckless disregard as
aforementioned, deprived the Plaintiff of his right to be free from unreasonable and unlawful
detention and arrest, as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
106.
107.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COUNT V:
VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C.A 1983 AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMEDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
RECKLESS INVESTIGATION
108.
length herein.
109.
The aforementioned actions of Defendants Cox and Uniontown violated Plaintiffs
constitutionally protected right to be free from reckless investigation in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution to the United States of
America.
110.
Defendant Cox unlawfully charged Plaintiff for crimes he did not commit without
conducting a sufficient investigation into the incident.

111.
As described more fully in Count VIII, Defendant Uniontown ratified the conduct of
Defendant Cox by allowing him to unlawfully arrest and imprison and maliciously prosecute the
Plaintiff.
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112.
Defendant Coxs investigation was intentionally and/or recklessly deficient for the
reasons described in Paragraphs 58 to 64 above.

113.
Had Defendant Cox properly investigated the alleged incident, he would have found that
Plaintiff was not at fault for Mr. Fiffiks fall.

114.
In a manner that shocks the conscience, Defendant Cox acted intentionally and/or
recklessly in his failure to investigate the incident for which criminal charges were brought
against the Plaintiff, as well as in coercing Plaintiff into waiving his rights and admitting to the
commission of a crime that he did not commit.
115.
116.

a.
violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from reckless
investigation and to be afforded the equal protection and due process of the law;
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.

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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
COUNT VI:
PLAINTIFF V. COX, FAYETTE
SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
EQUAL PROTECTION
117.
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 116
as though fully set forth at length herein.

118.
The aforementioned actions of Defendants Cox and Uniontown violated Plaintiffs
constitutionally protected right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution to the United States of America.
119.
Plaintiff is a member of a protected class because of his disability, mental retardation.
120.
Defendant Cox acted willfully, wantonly and/or with a reckless disregard for Plaintiffs
right to equal protection of the law by unlawfully arresting and imprisoning and maliciously
prosecuting the Plaintiff for a crime that he did not commit.
121.
Defendant Cox engaged in the unlawful actions described herein against Plaintiff because
of Plaintiffs disability.
122.
the Plaintiff.
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123.
124.

a.
violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution to be free from reckless
investigation and to be afforded the equal protection and due process of the law;
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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COUNT VII:
PLAINTIFF v. COX, JAMES MCVEY, JEAN MCVEY
VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFFS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND 42 U.S.C. 1985
CONSPIRACY
125.
length herein.
126.
Defendants James and Jean McVey and Cox entered into a conspiracy to falsely arrest
and imprison and maliciously prosecute the Plaintiff.

127.
Defendants James and Jean McVey engaged in the aforementioned conspiracy in order to
avoid potential liability for Mr. Fiffiks fall and death.

128.
In order to effectuate the conspiracy and avoid the aforementioned liability, Defendant
James McVey made false statements regarding Plaintiff pushing Mr. Fiffik over the wall of the
porch, and Defendant Jean McVey falsely asserted during Plaintiffs Mayview evaluation that
she did not know why Plaintiff needed to live in a personal care home and that she would like to
see Plaintiff work on his aggression.
129.
Plaintiff believes and therefore avers that Defendant Cox was motivated in the conspiracy
by a discriminatory animus against mentally disabled people.

130.
In order to carry out the conspiracy, Defendant Cox substituted the judgment of James
and Jean McVey that Plaintiff pushed Mr. Fiffik rather than exercising his own duty and
authority to lawfully investigate Mr. Fiffiks fall.
131.
The actions of the individual Defendants were willful, wanton and/or done with a
reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff, thereby subjecting them to punitive damages.
24

132.

a.
violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985
and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.

law; punitive damages against the individual Defendants; and such other relief, including
injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as this Court may deem proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
25

COUNT VIII:
PLAINTIFF v. UNIONTOWN
SPECIFICALLY, 42 U.S.C. 1983 AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
133.
length herein.
134.
Plaintiff claims damages for the injuries set forth herein under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against
Defendant Uniontown for violations of Plaintiffs constitutional rights under color of law.
135.
At all times relevant hereto, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff had the right to be free from unlawful
arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, discrimination, reckless investigation and
afforded equal protection of the law.
136.
Defendant Uniontown has a duty to properly train, control and/or supervise its officers on
the proper way to conduct a nondiscriminatory investigation.

137.
By the failure of Defendant Uniontown to properly train, control and/or supervise,
Defendant Uniontown created a substantial risk of the constitutional violation identified herein,
as evidenced by the actions of Defendant Cox.
138.
Defendant Uniontown failed to properly train, control and/or supervise its officers on the
proper way to conduct an investigation and deprived Plaintiff of constitutional and statutory
rights, as described herein.
139.
Moreover, Defendant Uniontown, through its police chief Sneddon, ratified the conduct
26

the Plaintiff, and therefore, contributed to the discriminatory and unlawful actions taken against
the Plaintiff.
140.
Defendant Uniontown, Plaintiff suffered the following injuries and damages:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands compensatory general damages against Defendant

Uniontown in the amount proven at trial; compensatory special damages; costs of suit;
law; and such other relief, including injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as this Court may deem
proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
27

COUNT IX:
PLAINTIFF v. COX, JAMES MCVEY, JEAN MCVEY
VIOLATIONS OF PLAINTIFFS PENNSYLVANIA
COMMON LAW RIGHTS
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
141.
length herein.
142.
The willful conduct of Defendants Cox and John and Jean McVey was extreme and
outrageous. As a direct and proximate result of said conduct Plaintiff suffered, and continues to
suffer, severe emotional distress.
143.
The actions of Defendants Cox and John and Jean McVey were willful, wanton and /or
done with a reckless disregard for the rights of Plaintiff, thereby subjecting Defendants to
punitive damages.
144.

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
costs.
28


law; punitive damages against the individual Defendants; and such other relief, including
injunctive and/or declaratory relief, as this Court may deem proper.
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICES OF JOEL SANSONE
s/ Joel S. Sansone
PA ID No. 41008
Three Gateway Center, Suite 1700
401 Liberty Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
412.281.9194
s/ Massimo A. Terzigni
PA ID No. 317165
Three Gateway Center, Suite 1700
401 Liberty Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222
412.281.9194
Dated: June 17, 2016

29

Craig Geness Lawsuit Complaint

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Craig Geness Lawsuit Complaint

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Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 1 of 29

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL ACTION NO.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT IN A CIVIL ACTION

Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1343(3). Supplemental jurisdiction

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 2 of 29

Plaintiff, Craig A. Geness, is an adult individual who resides in Fayette County,

Defendant, County of Fayette (Fayette), is a political subdivision of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania with administrative offices located at 61 East Main Street,

this Complaint, a municipal corporation existing by laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 3 of 29

McVeys is owned and operated by Defendants James and Jean McVey.

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 4 of 29

known eyewitness to the fall.

down the porch stairs. (See Paragraphs 54 and 55 infra).

Uniontown police officer Thomas Kolencik (Kolencik) responded to a report of a man

Connellsville Street, # C, Uniontown, Pennsylvania 15401, at approximately 4:00 pm and was

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 5 of 29

On or about November 16, 2006, Defendant Cox interviewed Plaintiff at Highlands

Hospital regarding Mr. Fiffiks fall.

Despite Plaintiffs obvious limited mental capacity, as well as his commitment to a

pushed Mr. Fiffik over the wall of the porch.

Plaintiff with homicide.

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 6 of 29

by a discriminatory animus against mentally disabled people.

A psychiatric evaluation was completed by Mayview on September 25, 2007, and

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 7 of 29

Solomon (Solomon) ordered that it should be determined whether Defendant is competent to

On or about September 4, 2011, a forensic psychiatric assessment of the Plaintiff was

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 8 of 29

and transferred to LTSR and fitted with an ankle monitor.

P. Leskinen entered an Order nolle prosequi all charges against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff was subsequently released from confinement.

monitor, for a total of 3,309 days in custody.

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 9 of 29

in Paragraphs 35 and 42, until on or about June 22, 2015.

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 10 of 29

Fiffiks fall, Mr. Fiffiks wife.

Defendant Cox intentionally and/or recklessly disregarded Officer Kolenciks initial

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 11 of 29

Defendant Uniontown has failed to correct these deficiencies in training, supervision

Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 68 as though fully set forth at

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 12 of 29

Plaintiff has a permanent mental health disability under the ADA.

Plaintiff was unlawfully investigated, arrested and prosecuted by Defendant Cox, an

officer of Defendant Uniontown, because of his disability.

Defendant Uniontown ratified the conduct of Defendant Cox by allowing him to

right to due process of law.

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 13 of 29

physical and psychological pain and suffering;

fright, horror and shock;

deprivation of freedom for 3,309 days;

emotional trauma and suffering; and

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff demands compensatory general damages against Defendants

Plaintiff incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 78 as though fully set forth at

Case 2:16-cv-00876-MAK Document 1 Filed 06/17/16 Page 14 of 29

constituted malice on the part of the Defendants.

and unconscionable abuse of government authority.

The actions of the Defendants constituted malicious prosecution in that:

the Defendants initiated criminal proceedings against the Plaintiff;

the criminal proceedings ended in the Plaintiffs favor;

Plaintiff suffered an unlawful seizure of his person in violation of Plaintiffs