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Raquiza vs. Bradford, 75 Phil.

50 (1948)
FACTS: By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur,
petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security commitment
petitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with Espionage activity
with the Japanese, active collaboration with the enemy respectively. Power for
Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based
proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance to
the US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas Corpus.
1. whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation?
[Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation
providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino
citizens who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy,
RULING: No. The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the
same time of, some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to
proclaim it. It is the province of the political department, and not the judicial
department, to determine if war has ended. The fact that delivery of certain persons
under custody of the US Army has already begun does not mean that the war has,
in the legal sense, already terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the
power of military authorities to make even before was terminates.
2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the
petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being
RULING: No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march
through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction
over troops during passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by
our civil Courts to exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our
countrys faith. On the other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997







The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December
1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as
the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by
Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel
sent a managers check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused
to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded

the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came
to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII
Section 10, are self-executing.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of
the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing
constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such
a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a
convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination
thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere
fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of
any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily
an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a selfexecuting provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution,
further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent
legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional
provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past,
modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and
have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly
upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the
function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a
legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In
fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
U.S. Supreme Court
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)
Head Money Cases
Argued November 19, 20, 1884
Decided December 8, 1884
112 U.S. 580
The act of Congress of August 8, 1882, "to regulate immigration," which imposes
upon the owners of steam or sailing vessels who shall bring passengers from a
foreign port into a port of the United States, a duty of fifty
Page 112 U. S. 581
cents for every such passenger not a citizen of this country, is a valid exercise of the
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.

Though the previous cases in this court on that subject related to State statutes
only, they held those statutes void on the ground that authority to enact them was
vested exclusively in Congress by the Constitution, and necessarily decided that,
when Congress did pass such a statute, which it has done in this case, it would be
The contribution levied on the ship owner by this statue is designed to mitigate the
evils incident to immigration from abroad by raising a fund for that purpose, and it
is not, in the sense of the Constitution, a tax subject to the limitations imposed by
that instrument on the general taxing power of Congress.
A tax is uniform, within the meaning of the constitutional provision on that subject,
when it operates with the same effect in all places where the subject of it is found,
and is not wanting in such uniformity because the thing taxed is not equally
distributed in all parts of the United States.
A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations, and depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the honor and the interest of the governments
which are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of
international reclamation and negotiation, which may lead to war to enforce them.
With this, judicial courts have nothing to do.
But a treaty may also confer private rights on citizens or subjects of the contracting
powers which are of a nature to be enforced in n court of justice, and which, in
cases otherwise cognizable in such courts, furnish rules of decision. The Constitution
of the United States makes the treaty, while in force, a part of the supreme law of
the land in all courts where such rights are to be tried.
But in this respect, so far as the provisions of a treaty can become the subject of
judicial cognizance in the courts of the country, they are subject to such acts as
Congress may pass for their enforcement, modification, or repeal.
These suits were brought to recover back sums collected at various times as duties
on immigrants arriving in the United States, under the provision of the act of August
3, 1882, 23 Stat. 21,
"that there shall be levied, collected, and paid a duty of fifty cents for each and
every passenger not a citizen of the United States, who shall come by steam or sail
vessel from a foreign port to any port within the United States."
Protests were filed against each payment, and all other steps required as
foundations for the actions were taken. In the Edye Case, there was a trial, jury
being waived, a finding of facts, a judgment, and exceptions. 18 Fed.Rep. 13. In the
Cunard Cases, judgment was entered in favor of the collector
Page 112 U. S. 582
on demurrer to the complaints. The causes were brought here on writs of error.
124 U.S. 190 (1888)
U.S. Supreme Court
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888)
Whitney v. Robertson
Argued December 13-14, 1887
Decided January 9, 1888
124 U.S. 190
The Treaty of February 8, 1861, with the Dominican Republic (art. 9) provides that
"No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United states
of any article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of
her fisheries, than are or shall be payable on the like articles the growth, produce,
or manufacture of any other foreign country or of its fisheries."
The Convention of January 30, 1575, with the King of the Hawaiian Islands provides
for the importation into the United States, free of duty, of various articles, the
produce and manufacture of those islands (among which were sugars), in
consideration of certain concessions made by the King of the Hawaiian Islands to
the United States. Held that this provision in the treaty with the Dominican Republic

did not authorize the admission into the United States, duty free, of similar sugars,
the growth, produce, or manufacture of that republic as a consequence of the
agreement made with the King of the Hawaiian Islands, and that there was no
distinction in principle between this case and Bartram v. Robertson,122 U. S. 116.
By the Constitution of the United States, a treaty and a statute are placed on the
same footing, and if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control,
provided the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.
This was an action to recover back duties alleged to have been illegally exacted.
Verdict for the defendant and judgment on the verdict. The plaintiffs sued out this
writ of error.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiffs are merchants doing business in the City of New York, and in August,
1882, they imported a large quantity
Page 124 U. S. 191
of "centrifugal and molasses sugars," the produce and manufacture of the Island of
San Domingo. These goods were similar in kind to sugars produced in the Hawaiian
Islands, which are admitted free of duty under the treaty with the King of those
islands and the act of Congress passed to carry the treaty into effect. They were
duly entered at the custom house at the port of New York, the plaintiffs claiming
that by the treaty with the Republic of San Domingo, the goods should be admitted
on the same terms -- that is, free of duty -- as similar articles the produce and
manufacture of the Hawaiian Islands. The defendant, who was at the time collector
of the port, refused to allow this claim, treated the goods as dutiable articles under
the acts of Congress, and exacted duties on them to the amount of $21,936. The
plaintiffs appealed from the collector's decision to the Secretary of the Treasury, by
whom the appeal was denied. They then paid, under protest, the duties exacted,
and brought the present action to recover the amount.
The complaint set forth the facts as to the importation of the goods; the claim of the
plaintiffs that they should be admitted free of duty, because like articles from the
Hawaiian Islands were thus admitted; the refusal of the collector to allow the claim;
the appeal from his decision to the Secretary of the Treasury, and its denial by him,
and the payment, under protest, of the duties exacted, and concluded with a prayer
for judgment for the amount. The defendant demurred to the complaint, the
demurrer was sustained, and final judgment was entered in his favor; to review
which the case is brought here.
The treaty with the King of the Hawaiian Islands provides for the importation into
the United States, free of duty, of various articles, the produce and manufacture of
those islands, in consideration, among other things, of like exemption from duty on
the importation into that country of sundry specified articles which are the produce
and manufacture of the United States. 19 Stat. 625. The language of the first two
articles of the treaty, which recite the reciprocal engagements of the two countries,
declares that they are made in consideration
Page 124 U. S. 192
"of the rights and privileges," and "as an equivalent therefor," which one concedes
to the other.
The plaintiffs rely for a like exemption of the sugars imported by them from San
Domingo upon the ninth article of the treaty with the Dominican Republic, which is
as follows:
"No higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into the United States
of any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the Dominican Republic, or of
her fisheries, and no higher or other duty shall be imposed on the importation into
the Dominican Republic of any article, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the
United States, or their fisheries, than are or shall be payable on the like articles, the
growth, produce, or manufacture of any other foreign country, or its fisheries."
15 Stat. 475.
In Bartram v. Robertson, decided at the last term, 122 U. S. 116, we held that brown
and unrefined sugars, the produce and manufacture of the Island of St. Croix, which
is part of the dominions of the King of Denmark, were not exempt from duty by
force of the treaty with that country, because similar goods from the Hawaiian
Islands were thus exempt. The first article of the treaty with Denmark provided that
the contracting parties should not grant "any particular favor" to other nations in

respect to commerce and navigation which should not immediately become

common to the other party, who should "enjoy the same freely if the concession
were freely made, and upon allowing the same compensation if the concession were
conditional." 11 Stat. 719. The fourth article provided that no "higher or other
duties" should be imposed by either party on the importation of any article which is
its produce or manufacture into the country of the other party than is payable on
like articles, being the produce or manufacture of any other foreign country. And we
held in the case mentioned that
"Those stipulations, even if conceded to be self-executing by the way of a proviso or
exception to the general law imposing the duties, do not cover concessions like
those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable consideration. They were pledges
of the two contracting parties, the United States and the King of
Page 124 U. S. 193
Denmark, to each other that, in the imposition of duties on goods imported into one
of the countries which were the produce or manufacture of the other, there should
be no discrimination against them in favor of goods of like character imported from
any other country. They imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile
legislation in that respect, but they were not intended to interfere with special
arrangements with other countries founded upon a concession of special privileges."
The counsel for the plaintiffs meet this position by pointing to the omission in the
treaty with the Republic of San Domingo of the provision as to free concessions, and
concessions upon compensation, contending that the omission precludes any
concession, in respect of commerce and navigation, by our government to another
country without that concession's being at once extended to San Domingo. We do
not think that the absence of this provision changes the obligations of the United
States. The ninth article of the treaty with that republic, in the clause quoted, is
substantially like the fourth article in the treaty with the King of Denmark, and as we
said of the latter, we may say of the former -- that it is a pledge of the contracting
parties that there shall be no discriminating legislation, against the importation of
articles which are the growth, produce, or manufacture of their respective countries,
in favor of articles of like character imported from any other country. It has no
greater extent. It was never designed to prevent special concessions, upon
sufficient considerations, touching the importation of specific articles into the
country of the other. It would require the clearest language to justify a conclusion
that our government intended to preclude itself from such engagements with other
countries which might in the future be of the highest importance to its interests.
But independently of considerations of this nature, there is another and complete
answer to the pretensions of the plaintiffs. The act of Congress under which the
duties were collected authorized their exaction. It is of general application, making
no exception in favor of goods of any country. It was passed
Page 124 U. S. 194
after the treaty with the Dominican Republic, and, if there be any conflict between
the stipulations of the treaty and the requirements of the law, the latter must
control. A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations,
and is so regarded by writers on public law. For the infraction of its provisions, a
remedy must be sought by the injured party through reclamations upon the other.
When the stipulations are not self-executing, they can only be enforced pursuant to
legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much subject to
modification and repeal by Congress as legislation upon any other subject. If the
treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing -- that is, require no legislation
to make them operative -- to that extent they have the force and effect of a
legislative enactment. Congress may modify such provisions so far as they bind the
United States, or supersede them altogether. By the Constitution, a treaty is placed
on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are
declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior
efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that
can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent,
the one last in date will control the other, provided always the stipulation of the
treaty on the subject is self-executing. If the country with which the treaty is made
is dissatisfied with the action of the legislative department, it may present its

complaint to the executive head of the government and take such other measures
as it may deem essential for the protection of its interests. The courts can afford no
redress. Whether the complaining nation has just cause of complaint or our country
was justified in its legislation are not matters for judicial cognizance. In Taylor v.
Morton, 2 Curtis 454, 459, this subject was very elaborately considered at the circuit
by Mr. Justice Curtis of this Court, and he held that whether a treaty with a foreign
sovereign had been violated by him; whether the consideration of a particular
stipulation of the treaty had been voluntarily withdrawn by
Page 124 U. S. 195
one party so that it was no longer obligatory on the other; whether the views and
acts of a foreign sovereign had given just occasion to the legislative department of
our government to withhold the execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to
act in direct contravention of such promise were not judicial questions; that the
power to determine these matters had not been confided to the judiciary, which has
no suitable means to exercise it, but to the executive and legislative departments of
our government, and that they belong to diplomacy and legislation, and not to the
administration of the laws. And he justly observed as a necessary consequence of
these views that if the power to determine these matters is vested in Congress, it is
wholly immaterial to inquire whether by the act assailed it has departed from the
treaty or not, or whether such departure was by accident or design, and if the latter,
whether the reasons were good or bad.
In these views we fully concur. It follows, therefore, that when a law is clear in its
provisions, its validity cannot be assailed before the courts for want of conformity to
stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that
character belong to another department of the government. The duty of the courts
is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will. In Head
Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, it was objected to an act of Congress that it violated
provisions contained in treaties with foreign nations, but the Court replied that so
far as the provisions of the act were in conflict with any treaty, they must prevail in
all the courts of the country, and after a full and elaborate consideration of the
subject it held that
"so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can be the
subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts
as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal."
Judgment affirmed.