1

G.R. No. 171465

June 8, 2007
AAA vs. HON. ANTONIO A. CARBONELL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Branch 27, Regional Trial Court, San Fernando City, La Union and ENGR. JAIME O.
ARZADON
This petition for certiorari1 assails the December 16, 20052 Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 6983, dismissing the
rape case filed against private respondent Jaime O. Arzadon for lack of probable cause;
and its February 3, 20063 Order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from
February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon
asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when she returned
to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she
went inside to get her handbag.
On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told
her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and
forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there
was nobody else in the premises.
Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her
family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape,
she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for
rape against Arzadon.
On September 16, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Imelda Cosalan issued a
Resolution4 finding probable cause and recommending the filing of an information for
rape. Arzadon moved for reconsideration and during the clarificatory hearing held on
October 11, 2002, petitioner testified before the investigating prosecutor. However, she
failed to attend the next hearing hence, the case was provisionally dismissed.
On March 5, 2003, petitioner filed another Affidavit-Complaint5 with a comprehensive
account of the alleged rape incident. The case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner appeared
for clarificatory questioning. On June 11, 2003, the investigating prosecutor issued a
Resolution6 finding that a prima facie case of rape exists and recommending the filing of
the information.

Arzadon moved for reconsideration and requested that a panel of prosecutors be

constituted to review the case. Thus, a panel of prosecutors was created and after the
clarificatory questioning, the panel issued on October 13, 2003 a Resolution 7 finding
probable cause and denying Arzadons motion for reconsideration.
An Information8 for rape was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San
Fernando, La Union on February 6, 2004, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6415.
Thereafter, Arzadon filed a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance All Court Proceedings Including
the Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest and to Determine Probable Cause for the Purpose of
Issuing a Warrant of Arrest."9 On March 18, 2004, respondent Judge Antonio A.
Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her witnesses to take the
witness stand for determination of probable cause.
Arzadon also appealed the Resolution of the panel of prosecutors finding probable cause
before the Department of Justice. On July 9, 2004, then Acting Secretary of Justice
Merceditas Gutierrez found no probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the
Information in Criminal Case No. 6415.10
Upon motion for reconsideration by petitioner, however, Secretary of Justice Raul
Gonzales reversed the July 9, 2004 Resolution and issued another Resolution 11 finding
that probable cause exists. Thus, a new Information12for rape was filed against Arzadon
docketed as Criminal Case No. 6983.
Consequently, Arzadon filed an "Urgent Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause for the Purpose of Issuing a Warrant of Arrest." 13 In an Order dated August 11,
2005, respondent Judge Carbonell granted the motion and directed petitioner and her
witnesses to take the witness stand.
Instead of taking the witness stand, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration claiming
that the documentary evidence sufficiently established the existence of probable cause.
Pending resolution thereof, she likewise filed a petition14 with this Court for the transfer of
venue of Criminal Case No. 6983. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter No.
05-12-756-RTC and entitled Re: Transfer of Venue of Criminal Case No. 6983, formerly
Criminal Case No. 6415, from the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, San Fernando City,
La Union, to any Court in Metro Manila.
In a Resolution15 dated January 18, 2006, the Court granted petitioners request for
transfer of venue. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25,
and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-242289. However, the proceedings have been
suspended pending the resolution of this petition.

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Meanwhile, on December 16, 2005, respondent Judge Carbonell issued the assailed
Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied hence, this petition.

Arzadon claims that the petition should be dismissed outright for being the wrong mode
of appeal, it appearing that the issues raised by petitioner properly fall under an action
for certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, of the Rules of Court.

Petitioner raises the following issues:16

Respondent Judge Carbonell argues in his Comment17 that the finding of probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor is not binding or obligatory, and that he was justified in
requiring petitioner and her witnesses to take the witness stand in order to determine
probable cause.

I
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION
FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FILED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND THE SUBSEQUENT DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

The issues for resolution are 1) whether the petition should be dismissed for being the
wrong mode of appeal; and 2) whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
The petition has merit.

II
RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED FURTHER ACTS CONSTITUTING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT ORDERED THE COMPLAINANT AND WITNESSES TO TAKE THE STAND
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
REFUSED TO INHIBIT FROM FURTHER HANDLING THE CASE DESPITE WHISPERS
OF DOUBT ON HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY
IV
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
ISSUED THE ORDER OF FEBRUARY 3, 2006, DENYING THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, DESPITE THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION OF JANUARY
18, 2006, GRANTING THE TRANSFER OF VENUE
Petitioner contends that the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and her witnesses in satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. She argues that respondent Judge Carbonell should
have taken into consideration the documentary evidence as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes which sufficiently established the existence of probable cause.

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is distinct from a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 in that the former brings up for review errors of judgment while the latter
concerns errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45.
However, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may be considered a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 where it is alleged that the respondents abused their
discretion in their questioned actions, as in the instant case.18 While petitioner claims to
have brought the instant action under Rule 45, the grounds raised herein involve an
alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Carbonell.
Accordingly, the Court shall treat the same as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
However, we must point out the procedural error committed by petitioner in directly filing
the instant petition before this Court instead of the Court of Appeals, thereby violating the
principle of judicial hierarchy of courts. It is well-settled that although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum.19 In this case, however, the gravity of the offense charged and the length of time
that has passed since the filing of the complaint for rape, compel us to resolve the
present controversy in order to avoid further delay.20
We thus proceed to the issue of whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause.
We rule in the affirmative.

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Respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable
cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses failed to comply with his orders to
take the witness stand. Thus

Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.

In RESUME therefore, as indubitably borne out by the case record and considering that
the Private Prosecutor, despite several admonitions contumaciously nay contemptuously
refused to comply/obey this Courts Orders of March 18, 2004, August 11, 2005 and eight
(8) other similar Orders issued in open Court that directed the complainant/witnesses to
take the witness stand to be asked probing/clarificatory questions consonant with cited
jurisprudential rulings of the Supreme Court, this Court in the exercise of its discretion
and sound judgment finds and so holds that NO probable cause was established to
warrant the issuance of an arrest order and the further prosecution of the instant case.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Record also shows in no unclear terms that in all the scheduled hearings of the case, the
accused had always been present. A contrario, the private complainant failed to appear
during the last four (4) consecutive settings despite due notice without giving any
explanation, which to the mind of the Court may indicate an apparent lack of interest in
the further prosecution of this case. That failure may even be construed as a
confirmation of the Defenses contention reflected in the case record, that the only party
interested in this case is the Private prosecutor, prodded by the accuseds alleged hostile
siblings to continue with the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, for utter lack of probable cause, the instant case is
hereby ordered DISMISSED.21
He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause "to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce."
However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar,22 the Court explained that this
constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report
and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses.
Thus:
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers
as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.23
We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon,24 where we held that
before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the
certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to
determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial
determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.25
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of
arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there
is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the
function of the investigating prosecutor.26
True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such
personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when
there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable

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cause.27 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor,
provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof.
Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that
he should not rely solelyon the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v.
Gutierrez,28 we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the
parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the
court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. 29 If the report,
taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable
cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses be conducted.
In this case, respondent Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 without
taking into consideration the June 11, 2003 Resolution of 2nd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Georgina Hidalgo, the October 13, 2003 Resolution of the panel of
prosecutors, and the July 1, 2005 Resolution of the Department of Justice, all of which
sustain a finding of probable cause against Arzadon. Moreover, he failed to evaluate the
evidence in support thereof. Respondent judges finding of lack of probable cause was
premised only on the complainants and her witnesses absence during the hearing
scheduled by the respondent judge for the judicial determination of probable cause.
Petitioner narrated in detail the alleged rape incident both in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay30 dated July 24, 2002 and Complaint-Affidavit31 dated March 5, 2003. She
attended several clarificatory hearings that were conducted in the instant case. The
transcript of stenographic notes32 of the hearing held on October 11, 2002 shows that she
positively identified Arzadon as her assailant, and the specific time and place of the
incident. She also claimed that she bore a child as a result of the rape and, in support of
her contentions, presented the child and her birth certificate as evidence. In contrast,
Arzadon merely relied on the defense of alibi which is the weakest of all defenses.
After a careful examination of the records, we find that there is sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause. The gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused
of the private complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.33 Petitioner has categorically stated that Arzadon
raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary investigations. Taken
with the other evidence presented before the investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient
for purposes of establishing probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt.

Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. 34
It is clear therefore that respondent Judge Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that
petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample
evidence and sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was
unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and her
witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences in the scheduled
hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the case. In fact, the records
show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 35 As it were, the
incidents of this case have been pending for almost five years without having even
passed the preliminary investigation stage. Suffice to say that the credibility of petitioner
may be tested during the trial where the respective allegations and defenses of the
complainant and the accused are properly ventilated. It is only then that the truth as to
Arzadons innocence or guilt can be determined.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
27, San Fernando, La Union dated December 16, 2005, and February 3, 2006
dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and the Information in the said case is hereby REINSTATED. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 25, Manila is DIRECTED to take cognizance of the case and let the
records thereof be REMANDED to the said court for further proceedings. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143591
November 23, 2007
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL,
JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C.
GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON.
MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Bago City
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 20, 2000 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 49666 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners Teodoro C.
Borlongan, Jr., Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo Manuel, Jr., Benjamin de Leon, P. Siervo
Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzalez, Jr., Eric Lee and Ben T. Lim, Jr.

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The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation
and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was
raffled to Branch 62 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 754. Respondent anchored his
claim for compensation on the contract of agency3 allegedly entered into with the
petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any
intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property located along
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 arguing that they
never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion were the
following documents: 1) a letter5 dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and
Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
subject property; 2) an unsigned letter6dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon
Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter7 dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro
Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum 8 dated November 20,
1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show
that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the
petitioners.
In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Pea filed his
Complaint-Affidavit9 with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City.10 He claimed that
said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their
signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of
ISCI.11 Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC
knowing that they were falsified.
In a Resolution12 dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the
petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified
Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that
petitioners knew that the documents were falsified considering that the signatories were
mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754
where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss,
adopted in their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. 13 Subsequently, the
corresponding Informations14 were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and
6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants15 for the arrest of the
petitioners.

On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of

Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation.16 Petitioners insisted that they were denied due
process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on preliminary
investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court. Specifically, they claimed that they were
not afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no
such counter-affidavit and supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the
trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in
issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further
prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause. Lastly, petitioners
posited that the criminal case should have been suspended on the ground that the issue
being threshed out in the civil case is a prejudicial question.
In an Order17 dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily
on the ground that preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case --which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The court, likewise, upheld the validity of
the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules. Besides,
the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since
they already posted bail. The court also believed that the issue involved in the civil case
was not a prejudicial question, and thus, denied the prayer for suspension of the criminal
proceedings. Lastly, the court was convinced that the Informations contained all the facts
necessary to constitute an offense.
Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in
issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in their
omnibus motion.18 They, likewise, questioned the courts conclusion that by posting bail,
petitioners already waived their right to assail the validity of the warrant of arrest.
On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition.19 Hence, the instant petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the
following issues:
A.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, is the finding of probable
cause required for the filing of an Information in court?

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If the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not establish probable cause, should not
the investigating prosecutor dismiss the complaint, or at the very least, require the
respondent to submit his counter-affidavit?

It appears that upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted
bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment being then the officers of Urban Bank. On
the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea,
the court entered a plea of "Not Guilty."

B.
Can a complaint-affidavit containing matters which are not within the personal knowledge
of the complainant be sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause?
C.
Where the offense charged in a criminal complaint is not cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court and not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure, and the record of the
preliminary investigation does not show the existence of probable cause, should not the
judge refuse to issue a warrant of arrest and dismiss the criminal case, or at the very
least, require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit in order to aid the judge in
determining the existence of probable cause?
D.
Can a criminal prosecution be restrained?
E.
Can this Honorable Court itself determine the existence of probable cause?20
On August 2, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 21 enjoining
the judge of the MTCC from proceeding in any manner with Criminal Cases Nos. 6683 to
6686, effective during the entire period that the case is pending before, or until further
orders of, this Court.
With the MTCC proceedings suspended, we now proceed to resolve the issues raised.
Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and academic when
the petitioners posted bail and were arraigned.
We do not agree.

The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to
question the validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, 22 Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused
is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his
objections thereto.23
Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and
warrant of arrest, and for reinvestigation, on the same day that they posted bail. Their
bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right
to question the validity of their arrest.24 On the date of the arraignment, the petitioners
refused to enter their plea, obviously because the issue of the legality of the information
and their arrest was yet to be settled by the Court. This notwithstanding, the court
entered a plea of "Not Guilty." From these circumstances, we cannot reasonably infer a
valid waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to preclude them from raising the issue of
the validity of the arrest before the CA and eventually before this Court.
In their petition filed before this Court, petitioners prayed for a TRO to restrain the MTCC
from proceeding with the criminal cases (which the Court eventually issued on August 2,
2000). Thus, we confront the question of whether a criminal prosecution can be
restrained, to which we answer in the affirmative.
As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or
final, to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the
rule have been recognized: 1) when the injunction is necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is necessary for the
orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when
there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are
without or in excess of authority; 5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7) where the Court
has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; 9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance; and 10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a
motion to quash on that ground has been denied.25

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Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the information and
warrant of arrest, and considering further that no waiver of rights may be attributed to the
petitioners as earlier discussed, we issued a TRO on August 2, 2000 to give the Court
the opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is allowed to continue.
The nature of the crime and the penalty involved (which is less than 4 years of
imprisonment), likewise, necessitate the suspension of the case below in order to
prevent the controversy from being mooted.

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied
by affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of
the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. 33

We now proceed with the main issues, viz.: 1) whether petitioners were deprived of their
right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to preliminary investigation
and to submit their counter-affidavit; 2) whether the Informations charging the petitioners
were validly filed and the warrants for their arrest were properly issued; and 3) whether
this Court can, itself, determine probable cause.

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

As will be discussed below, the petitioners could not validly claim the right to preliminary
investigation. Still, petitioners insist that they were denied due process because they
were not afforded the right to submit counter-affidavits which would have aided the court
in determining the existence of probable cause.26 Petitioners also claim that the
respondents complaint-affidavit was not based on the latters personal knowledge;
hence, it should not have been used by the court as basis in its finding of probable
cause.27 Moreover, petitioners aver that there was no sufficient evidence to prove the
elements of the crime. Specifically, it was not established that the documents in question
were falsified; that petitioners were the ones who presented the documents as evidence;
and that petitioners knew that the documents were indeed falsified.28 Petitioners likewise
assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint-affidavit, they had not yet formally
offered the documents as evidence; hence, they could not have "introduced" the same in
court.29 Considering the foregoing, petitioners pray that this Court, itself, determine
whether or not probable cause exists.30
The pertinent provisions of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, 31 namely, Sections 1, 3
(a) and 9(a) of Rule 112, are relevant to the resolution of the aforesaid issues:
SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. 32
SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The
Fiscal shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting
documents submitted by the complainant.34
Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second
paragraph of Article 17235 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposable is arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Clearly, the case is
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not mandatory.36
Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-affidavit of the
respondent and did not require the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits. The
prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this course of action, because it is sanctioned
by the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with respect to
cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the appropriate action based
on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means
that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason
to proceed with the case, or file the information if he finds probable cause. The
prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable
cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting
documents of the complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.
On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally
determine the existence of probable cause. Again, the petitioners insist that the trial
judge erred in issuing the warrant of arrest without affording them their right to submit
their counter-affidavits.

8
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and
on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may
disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 37
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at
bench, we find nothing wrong with the procedure adopted by the trial judge --- he relied
on the resolution of the prosecutor, as well as the supporting documents submitted by
the respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the
submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can determine whether or
not there exists probable cause to issue the warrant.

circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within
the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he is to be prosecuted.39 A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused.40
On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested.41
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of
practicality, this Court, as a rule, does not interfere with the prosecutors determination of
probable cause. Otherwise, courts would be swamped with petitions to review the
prosecutors findings in such investigations.42 In the same way, the general rule is that
this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 43 It is only in
exceptional cases when this Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and
the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent
the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of
justice.44 The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.
Petitioners were charged with violation of par. 2, Article 172 of the RPC or Introduction of
Falsified Document in a Judicial Proceeding. The elements of the offense are as follows:
1. That the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the
prosecutor in determining probable cause for the filing of the informations, and by the
trial court judge in determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest.
To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of counteraffidavit was not necessary.
1wphi1

However, notwithstanding the proper observance of the procedure laid down by the
Rules, a closer scrutiny of the records reveals that the Informations should not have
been filed and the warrants of arrest should not have been issued, because of lack of
probable cause.
Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.38It is the existence of such facts and

2. That the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any subdivisions No.
1 or 2 of Article 172.
3. That he introduced said document in evidence in any judicial proceeding. 45
The falsity of the document and the defendants knowledge of its falsity are essential
elements of the offense.46
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed the Informations against the petitioners on the
basis of the complaint-affidavit of the respondent, together with the following attached
documents: the motion to dismiss and answer filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No.
754; petitioners pre-trial brief in said case; the alleged falsified documents; a copy of the
minutes of the regular meeting of ISC during the election of the board; and the list of

9
stockholders of ISC.47 On the basis of these documents and on the strength of the
affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable cause
exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in issuing the
warrant of arrest.

that they were the president and corporate secretary of ISCI. Besides, the mere fact that
they were not officers or stockholders of ISCI does not necessarily mean that their
signatures were falsified. They still could have affixed their signatures as authorized
representatives of the corporation.

Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the
complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable
cause. Specifically, the respondent failed to sufficiently establish prima facie that the
alleged documents were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of the documents, the
private respondent stated in his complaint-affidavit that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and
Marilyn Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their
signatures; and that they were not actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. 48 He further
claimed that Enrique Montillas signature appearing in another memorandum addressed
to respondent was forged.49 These are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of
the complaint or the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence,
or on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause requires
less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be more than mere
suspicion.51 While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a
need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential
accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and
to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. 52 It is,
therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and
inconvenience of going through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused.53

It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall
allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent
that the signatures of Ponce, Abad, Ong and Montilla were falsified does not qualify as
personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was present
at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he was familiar
with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that the
signatories were mere dummies of ISCI and they were not in fact officers, stockholders
or representatives of the corporation. At the very least, the affidavit was based on
respondents "personal belief" and not "personal knowledge."50 Considering the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of the respondent, he could have submitted the affidavit
of other persons who are qualified to attest to the falsity of the signatures appearing in
the questioned documents. One cannot just claim that a certain document is falsified
without further stating the basis for such claim, i.e., that he was present at the time of the
execution of the document or he is familiar with the signatures in question. Otherwise,
this could lead to abuse and malicious prosecution. This is actually the reason for the
requirement that affidavits must be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. The
requirement assumes added importance in the instant case where the accused were not
made to rebut the complainants allegation through counter-affidavits.
Neither can the respondent find support in the documents attached to his complaintaffidavit. The minutes of the regular meeting, as well as the list of stockholders, could
have possibly shown that the signatories were not officers or stockholders of the
corporation. However, they did not at all show that the questioned documents were
falsified. In the letter allegedly signed by Ponce and Abad, there was no representation

Considering that the respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim
that the documents were falsified, it follows that the introduction of the questioned
documents in Civil Case No. 754 is not an offense punished by any provision of the
Revised Penal Code or any other law. The petitioners should not be burdened with court
proceedings, more particularly a criminal proceeding, if in the first place, there is no
evidence sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that an offense was committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49666 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Temporary Restraining Order dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made permanent.
Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to DISMISS
Criminal Case Nos. 6683-86. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170233
February 22, 2007
PEOPLE vs. JESUS NUEVAS y GARCIA, REYNALDO DIN y GONZAGA, and
FERNANDO INOCENCIO y ABADEOS
Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was charged1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Olongapo City, Branch 75, with illegal possession of marijuana in violation of Section 8,
Article II of Republic Act No. 64252 as amended.

10
Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga (Din) and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos (Inocencio) were
likewise charged3 with the same crime, before the same court.
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges. 4 As the
evidence in the cases was common and the prosecution would utilize the same
witnesses, the cases were consolidated. After a joint trial on the merits, the RTC
rendered a Decision5 dated 4 April 2002, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding all accused in the above-entitled cases guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, this Court hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
each to pay [a] fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The bricks of marijuana are hereby confiscated and disposed in accordance with existing
regulations. SO ORDERED.6
To put in appropriate context the operative facts on which adjudication of this case
hinges, there is need to recall the factual assertions of the witnesses for both the
prosecution and the defense.
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he and
SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted a stationary surveillance and monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City. They
had received information that a certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30
years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and
maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While stationed thereat,
they saw a male person who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag, later identified as
Jesus Nuevas (Nuevas), alight from a motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and
informed him that they are police officers. Fami asked Nuevas where he was going.
Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards, calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed
in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him that there were other stuff in the possession
of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas
voluntarily pointed to the police officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2) other male persons would make the
delivery of marijuana weighing more or less five (5) kilos.7
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas, then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan,
Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas was where his two (2) companions, Din and
Inocencio, could be located. From there, they saw and approached two (2) persons

along the National Highway, introducing themselves as police officers. Din was carrying a
light blue plastic bag. When asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged to Nuevas. Fami
then took the bag and upon inspection found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein."8 After confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling brought Nuevas,
Din and Inocencio to the police office at Purok III for proper documentation. 9 Fami further
testified that a receipt for the property seized was issued by Cabling and that a field test
was duly conducted on the confiscated items. All three accused were likewise physically
examined on the basis of which corresponding medical certificates were issued. The
corresponding booking sheets and arrest report were also accomplished. Fami stated
that he and Cabling executed a joint affidavit in connection with the arrest of all the
accused and the confiscation of the items.10
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that when the receipt of evidence seized was
prepared, all three (3) accused were not represented by counsel. He likewise disclosed
that he was the one who escorted all the accused during their physical examination. He
also escorted all three to the Fiscals office where the latter were informed of the charges
against them.11
Cabling corroborated Famis testimony. He, however, testified that after he and Fami had
introduced themselves as police officers, Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to Fami
the marijuana dried leaves.12
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip
from Famis informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in
the list of persons under surveillance. Fami then relayed the tip to Cabling. 13 Cabling
restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic bag he was holding and that
after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to him, he admitted his
willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts.14 When Fami and Cabling
proceeded to the identified location of Nuevass cohorts, they chanced upon Din and
Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking into its
contents.15 Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was holding to
the police officers.16
For his defense, Nuevas testified that in the morning of 27 September 1997, he was
walking along Perimeter Street, on his way home from the Barangay Hall, when Fami
called him. Nuevas approached Fami, who was then in front of his house, and asked why
Fami had called him. Fami poked his gun at Nuevas and asked him to go inside the room
where Fami handcuffed Nuevass hands, got Nuevass wallet, took out P1,500.00 and
put it in his (Famis) wallet. Fami then confronted Nuevas with shabu use but the latter
denied the charge. Before leaving the house with Nuevas, Fami brought out a plastic bag

11
and told Nuevas to carry it. Subsequently, they boarded a red ownertype jeep and
proceeded to Station B where Nuevas was put in jail. Nuevas further stated that he did
not know Din or Inocencio.17
Din, on the other hand, stated that at about 10 oclock in the morning of 27 September
1997, while his compare Inocencio was visiting, two (2) men entered his house looking
for a woman. The two (2) introduced themselves as police officers. Then, Din and
Inocencio were immediately handcuffed. They were not informed of the reason for their
arrest and were told that the reason will be explained to them in court. Next, they were
brought to the Cabalan precinct where the investigator asked for their names, and
subsequently to Station B where they were ordered to stand up and be photographed
with Nuevas, who Din first met in jail. Inside the room where they had their fingerprints
taken, he saw marijuana placed on top of the table. 18
Inocencio testified that he went to his compadre Dins house in the morning of 27
September 1997 to sell his fighting cocks as he needed money to redeem his drivers
license. While there, he and Din were arrested by two persons, one of whom pointed a
gun at them while the other searched the house for a lady named Vangie. Afterwards, he
and Din were brought to the Cabalan Police Precinct and then to Station B where he first
came to know Nuevas. He denied that a plastic bag containing marijuana was recovered
from them and claimed that he only saw such evidence on the day he gave his
testimony. He also stated that when a photograph was taken of the three of them, he and
Din were ordered to point to a "wrapped thing." When the photograph was taken, they
were not assisted by counsel. He also does not recall having signed a receipt of property
seized. Afterwards, they were brought to a detention cell. And when they asked the
police what they did wrong, the police replied that they will just explain it in court. 19
All three were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was elevated to
the Court for automatic review. However, on 14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation
and motion to withdraw appeal.20 The Court granted Nuevass withdrawal of appeal and
considered the case closed and terminated as to him, in a Resolution21 dated 25 August
2003.
In a Resolution22 dated 22 September 2004 of the Court in G.R. Nos. 153641-42,23 the
cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Courts ruling in People v.
Efren Mateo.24
Before the Court of Appeals, Din and Inocencio (appellants) argued that the trial court
erred: (1) in finding them guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the testimonies of

the arresting officers; and (2) n not finding that their constitutional rights have been
violated.25
The Court of Appeals in a Decision26 dated 27 May 2005, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00341,
affirmed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 459-97, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.27
The Court of Appeals restated the rule that when the issue involves the credibility of a
witness, the trial courts assessment is entitled to great weight, even finality, unless it is
shown that it was tainted with arbitrariness or there was an oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight or influence. The appellate court found Fami and Cablings
version of how appellants were apprehended to be categorical and clear. Din, at the time
of his apprehension, was seen holding a plastic bag containing marijuana leaves. On the
other hand, Inocencios possession of the marijuana leaves was established by the fact
that he was seen in the act of looking into the plastic bag carried by Din. 28
With respect to appellants claim that their constitutional rights have been violated, the
appellate court stated that the search in the instant case is exempted from the
requirement of a judicial warrant as appellants themselves waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to the appellate court, both Cabling and
Fami testified that Din voluntarily surrendered the bag. Appellants never presented
evidence to rebut the same. Thus, in the instant case, the exclusionary rule does not
apply.29
Din and Inocencio are now before the Court submitting for resolution the same matters
argued before the Court of Appeals. Through their Manifestation (In Lieu of
Supplementary Brief)30 dated 22 March 2006, appellants stated that all the arguments
necessary to support their acquittal have already been discussed in the brief they had
submitted before the appellate court; thus, the filing of a supplemental brief would be a
mere reiteration of the arguments discussed in said brief. 31 The Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it is no longer filing a supplemental brief. 32
The conviction or acquittal of appellants rests on the validity of the warrantless searches
and seizure made by the police officers and the admissibility of the evidence obtained by
virture thereof.

12
In holding that the warrantless searches and seizure are valid, the trial court ruled as
follows:

immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;

While the confiscation of the bricks of marijuana from the accused Jesus Nuevas was
without a search warrant, it was not bereft of a probable cause. The police team received
informations [sic] from an asset that on that day, a male person whom he sufficiently
described will deliver marijuana at the vicinity of Perimeter and Bonifacio S[t]., Pag-asa,
Olongapo City, a known drop point of illegal drugs. They went to the said area upon that
information. Their waiting was fruitful because not long afterwards they saw the accused
Jesus Nuevas alighting from a tricycle carrying a bag and after confronting him, he
voluntarily gave the bag containing bricks of dried marijuana leaves. With respect to the
confiscation of 2 kilos of marijuana and the apprehension of accused Reynaldo Din
and Fernando Inocencio, it was a result of a continued operation by the team which this
time was led by accused Nuevas to get some concession from the team for his own
earlier apprehension. As the apprehension of Nuevas was upon a probable cause, in the
same vein was the apprehension of Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio and the
recovery from them [of] 2 kilos of dried marijuana leaves. The propriety of this
conclusion is necessity [sic] because of the impossibility of getting first a warrant in so
short a time with such cumbersome requirements before one can be issued. Before
getting a warrant, the culprits shall have already gone into hiding. These situations are
not distant to the case of People v[.] Jean Balingan (G.R. No. 105834, 13 Feb. 1995)
where we learned that expediency and practicality are some of the justification[s] in the
warrantless arrest.33 [Emphasis supplied]

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles

inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

Appellants maintain that there was no basis for their questioning and the subsequent
inspection of the plastic bags of Nuevas and Din, as they were not doing anything illegal
at the time.34
Our Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any
evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 35 The
constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.36
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or
when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured.37
The courts below anchor appellants conviction on the ground that the searches and
seizure conducted in the instant case based on a tip from an informant fall under one of
the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily surrendered the
plastic bags containing marijuana to the police officers.38
We differ.
First, the Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first
exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests.
A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. 39 Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed as in this case where the search preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have
probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. 40

13
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an
offense. The searches conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely
incidental to a lawful arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the
accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."41

person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the
defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected
to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and voluntarily given.46

Secondly, neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer,
then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is
such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.42
Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas
and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers.
In Nuevass case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped
inside a blue cloth.43 In Dins case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag
was "packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items
were in plain view which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further
search.45
On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevass case was
made with his consent. In Dins case, there was none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. However, it must be seen that the consent to the
search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e.,
the consent was unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be
shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the

In Nuevass case, the Court is convinced that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the
incriminating bag to the police officers. Fami testified in this wise:
FISCAL BELTRAN:
Q Now, when you saw this accused carrying this Exhibit "D,"47 for your part, what did you
do?
A I just talked to him and asked him where he was going and according to him, he acted
arrogantly, sir.
Q This arrogant action of the accused Jesus Nuevas, when you confronted him did he
resist?
A How did he show his elements, [sic] he said, "So what if you are policeman[?]"
Q And being confronted with that arrogance, what did you do next?
A Later on he kept calm by saying [sic] in Waray dialect, sir.
xxxx
Q What, exactly, did he tell you in Waray dialect?
A "Sir Famir[sic], dont charge me, sir[.] I am planning to go home to Leyte. I was just
earning enough money for my fare, sir."
xxxx
Q So when the accused speak [sic] to you in Waray, what else did you do if you did
anything?
A I pretended that I agree in his [sic] offer but I also asked him where are the other
staffs[sic] sir. 48
xxxx
Q With respect to the bag that you confiscated from him, what did you do?
A He voluntarily pointed it to me and I checked it, the bag, for verification, sir.49
Cabling likewise testified as follows:
Q When Fami got this from the accused, he opened this thing that he got?
A The subject voluntarily submitted the same, sir.
Q Upon the order of Fami to open it?
A Nobody ordered it, sir.50
There is reason to believe that Nuevas indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag with the
incriminating contents to the police officers. It can be seen that in his desperate attempt

14
to exculpate himself from any criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police, gave
them the plastic bag and even revealed his associates, offering himself as an informant.
His actuations were consistent with the lamentable human inclination to find excuses,
blame others and save oneself even at the cost of others lives. Thus, the Court would
have affirmed Nuevass conviction had he not withdrawn his appeal.
However, with respect to the search conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds that no
such consent had actually been given. Fami testified as follows:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q Now, what did you do when you saw Din with that Exhibit "C," the plastic bag?
A Din said that "Oo, Sir, that is owned by Nuevas" [sic] and I took the said plastic bag.
Q When you took this plastic bag from Din.
Was the accused Jesus Nueva [sic] present when Din told you that?
A Yes, sir. Nuevas alighted also [from] the vehicle with Cabling.
Q And what was the reaction of Nuevas when Din told you that the bag belongs to him?
A I did not react, sir.
Q After getting that plastic bag from Reynaldo Din, what did you do with it?
A I inspected the bag and I found out that there is still marijuana packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein, sir.51[Emphasis supplied.]
Cabling, however, gave a different testimony, viz.:
FISCAL BELTRAN
Q And upon siting [sic] the two subject persons you have just indicated in your earlier
testimony, what did you do?
A We approached them and introduced ourselves as police officers, and pinpointed by
Nuevas as the ones who kept suspected prohibited drugs, sir.
Q After you approached these two people, what happened?
A These two people, upon introducing ourselves, [sic] voluntarily surrendered to Fami
those marijuana dry leaves, sir.52
The police officers gave inconsistent, dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner by
which they got hold of the bag. This already raises serious doubts on the voluntariness of
Dins submission of the plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2)
the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 53
The prosecution failed to clearly show that Din intentionally surrendered his right against
unreasonable searches. While it may not be contrary to human nature for one to be
jolted into surrendering something incriminating to authorities, Famis and Cablings
testimonies do not show that Din was in such a state of mind or condition. Fami and
Cabling did not testify on Dins composurewhether he felt surprised or frightened at the

timewhich fact we find necessary to provide basis for the surrender of the bag. There
was no mention of any permission made by the police officers to get or search the bag or
of any consent given by Din for the officers to search it. It is worthy to note that in cases
where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, the police authorities expressly
asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to be searched. And the
consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof.
Neither can Dins silence at the time be construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search. InPeople v. Burgos,54 the Court aptly ruled:
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is
merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.55
Without the dried marijuana leaves as evidence, Dins conviction cannot be sustained
based on the remaining evidence. The Court has repeatedly declared that the conviction
of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution. 56 As such, Din deserves an acquittal.
1awphi1.net

In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite the prosecutions insistence that the
appellants have effectively waived any defect in their arrest by entering their plea and by
their active participation in the trial of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Inspite of any
alleged waiver, the dried marijuana leaves cannot be admitted in evidence against the
appellants, Din more specifically, as they were seized during a warrantless search which
was not lawful. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 57
Turning to Inocencios case, the Court likewise finds that he was wrongly convicted of the
crime charged. Inocencios supposed possession of the dried marijuana leaves was
sought to be shown through his act of looking into the plastic bag that Din was
carrying.58 Taking a look at an object, more so in this case peeping into a bag while held
by another, is not the same as taking possession thereof. To behold is not to hold.
Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is insufficient to establish illegal possession of the
drugs or even conspiracy to illegally possess the same. The prosecution failed to show
by convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired
with Din to possess the illegal items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable in his
testimony that he had no part in any delivery of marijuana dried leaves.

15
Finally, the law enforcers should be reminded of the Courts dated but nevertheless
current exhortation:

The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect
ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and
seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless
of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking
in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of
our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court
appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to
preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the
end never justifies the means.59

Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 4 April 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 458-97 and No. 459-97 is reversed and modified.
Appellants Reynaldo Din y Gonzaga and Fernando Inocencio y Abadeos are hereby
ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is ordered to cause the immediate
release of appellants from confinement, unless they are being held for some other lawful
cause, and to report to this Court compliance herewith within five (5) days from receipt
hereof. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128587
March 16, 2007
PEOPLE vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this
Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated
13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos.
96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen,
granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990
for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case
No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166
(COMELEC Gun Ban).

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known
as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately
29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila,
which is a public place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without first
securing the written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as
provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and
instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by

16
the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered
for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely,
Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal,
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as
shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck,
alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and
company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives
that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for
Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the
following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the
Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for
Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.
Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment
and placed the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of
17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness)
together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that
he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right
pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for

methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in

the amount ofP650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an
unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang
was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to
Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation10 to the effect
that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two
cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang
filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February
1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal
as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the
defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the
herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of
all charges for lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the
accused is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of
Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one
Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch
clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in
Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC,
Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the confiscated
amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered
owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

17
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court
erred I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A
LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS
SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY
THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition,
required the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from
notice. Private respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.

On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply,18 which the Office of
the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions. 19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda,20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial
courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section
2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal
by mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this
Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in
the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule
122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition
against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases
throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is
why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this
general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule
on double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as

18
mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive
jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the
very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be
much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual
cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan
and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those
categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed
against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not
make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of
the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial
of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and
equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools
of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial
justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused
before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to
due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial
of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416
Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy
(Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People
vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of
the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly
recent case of People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the
two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of
court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency
of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the
occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:

19
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double
jeopardy faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In
this case, verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable.
The cases of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v.
Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The
fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy
is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed
in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least
the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
(Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As
held in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the
grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.
(Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgmentbut
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the accuseds acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and
authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively

identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a
petition for certiorari, sustained the CAs power to review the order granting the demurrer
to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the
dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed
thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.
The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the
innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for
"repose", a desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.

20
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while
certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or
set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of
the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of
Justice Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed
with the Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the
distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which
shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained
the simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of

justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court
may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil
action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the
lower court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or
legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as
it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of
certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a
mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is
an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the
rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the
original parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the
aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasijudicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents,
respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of
Court so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for
certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate
remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from
the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely
filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order,
or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for

21
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the
motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon
demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in
double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case,
this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal
order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondents right against
double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari,
which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail
on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and
the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted
as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26However, if there
are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the
accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar,
the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all
the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial
courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:

The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his
warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as
asserted by the defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him
and searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of
his arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he
had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up
Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket
of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an
outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was
done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the
accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession
thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were
not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo
handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no
information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion
that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel
and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?

22
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street,
Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the
accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we
have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also
in Ermita, Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to
open the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and
likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at
the place under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory
examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November
15, 1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS

Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on
May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency,
is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of
the Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your
companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence
Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time
searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?
A. He was outside, Sir.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it
not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him,
Mr. Witness?
A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside
his car.
xxx xxx xxx

23
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell
us the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.
COURT: The same date?
A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck
mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.
COURT: Why were these people, arrested?
A. For violation of R.A. 6425.
COURT: How were they arrested?
A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another
previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2
Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested
they divulged the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the
name of the person from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them
call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order
another supply of shabu.
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of
the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.
COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa
Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?

A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car
together with his driver.
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
A. Probably, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside
the compartment of the car.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do
with that?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one
who inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 1524, December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has
gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team
arrested. One of whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated
from them?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover
that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were
confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also
these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your
team?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A: I was the one whom investigated them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them
at the time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working
for the accused.

24
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu
scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is
scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the
matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you
and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead
(led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was
carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun
is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed
to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do
something unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from
searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and
the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did
not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional
right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the
search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental
search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence
thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.

Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch
as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the
regulated drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly
made upon probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless
arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the
occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore
constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful."28In effect, the People now
contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case
falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid
search and seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent
to open his BMW cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a
matter of credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in
an appeal of a criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in
the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding
upon the Court. Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest
preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal basis for this Court to
possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to
evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless
arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless
arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily

25
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.29
1awphi1.nt

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police
operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open
the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David
Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was
arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.
Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu
they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a
delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few
hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence
Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish

the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph

(b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana
found in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been
illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any
of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the
informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a
suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his
arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the
officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his
arrest and the search on his person and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33 Moreover, the continuing objection to
the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters
Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I
think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.34

26
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191366
December 13, 2010
PEOPLE vs. ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y NGELES, EDGAR DIZON Y FERRER, REZIN
MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN
This is an appeal from the August 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CAG.R. HC-NO. 03269, which affirmed the February 13, 2008 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2006-0525-D, finding
the accused guilty of violating Section 13, in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 for Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings.
The Facts
The Information indicting the accused reads:

As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused Orlando
Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested him. Inside the
house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez), Edgar
Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were surprised by
the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items found in the
room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory
Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory examination on the seized
items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49
pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The
accused were subjected to a drug test and, except for Doria, they were found to be
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Version of the Defense

That on or about the 2nd day of September 2006, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARNOLD
MARTINEZ y ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ y CAROLINO,
ROLAND DORIA y DIAZ and RAFAEL GONZALES y CUNANAN, without authority of
law, confederating together, acting jointly and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, sniff and possess dangerous drugs (shabu residues)
contained in empty plastic sachets and rolled aluminum foil, during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) person[s].

The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez,
claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along Arellano
Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain Apper who bumped
the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the materials for the painting of
said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision looking for Apper, they saw
Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he noticed a person pass by. While they
were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that five to seven policemen emerged and
apprehended them. They were handcuffed and brought to the police station in Perez,
Dagupan City, where they were incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.

Contrary to Section 13, Article II, R.A. 9165.3

The Ruling of the RTC

Version of the Prosecution

The case against Doria was dismissed on a demurrer to evidence.

As culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Police Officer 1 Bernard

Azardon (PO1 Azardon), one of the apprehending officers, and Police Inspector Lady
Ellen Maranion (P/Insp. Maranion), the forensic chemical officer, it appears that on
September 2, 2006, at around 12:45 oclock in the afternoon, PO1 Azardon was on duty
at the Police Community Precinct II along Arellano Street, Dagupan City, when a
concerned citizen entered the precinct and reported that a pot session was going on in
the house of accused Rafael Gonzales (Gonzales) in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan
City. Upon receipt of the report, PO1 Azardon, PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz (PO1 Dela
Cruz), and members of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team hied to Trinidad
Subdivision, Dagupan City. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of Gonzales
was located.

On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
ARNOLD MARTINEZ y Angeles, EDGAR DIZON y Ferrer, REZIN MARTINEZ y Carolino,
and RAFAEL GONZALES y Cunanan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings defined
and penalized under Section 13 in relation to Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165,
and each of them is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the
fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and to pay the cost of suit.

27
The subject items are hereby forfeited in favor of the government and to be disposed of
in accordance with the law.

5. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellants.

For accused Rafael Gonzales

SO ORDERED.4
I
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness PO1
Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the defenses of
denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have been in
constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found present as
there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO OVERTHROW THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
II

The Ruling of the CA

The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of the RTC as to
the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It further held that
although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of evidence prescribed by
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied with, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence were nonetheless safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not sufficiently
controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court praying for
the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
For accused Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon and Rezin Martinez
1. The lower court erred in finding the accused-appellants to be having a
pot session at the time of their arrest;
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the police to
plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of the accusedappellants without warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has not been
sufficiently established;
4. The lower court erred in not finding the uncorroborated testimony of PO1
Azardon insufficient to convict the accused-appellants of the crime
charged;

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY
OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUG.
After an assiduous assessment of the evidentiary records, the Court finds that the
prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused. The principal reasons are 1] that the
evidence against the accused are inadmissible; and 2] that granting the same to be
admissible, the chain of custody has not been duly established.
Illegal Arrest, Search and Seizure
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he fails to raise
such issue before arraignment.5 However, this waiver is limited only to the arrest. The
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. 6
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the accused, it
has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if unassigned, if
such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,7especially when the transcendental
matter of life and liberty is at stake.8 While it is true that rules of procedure are intended
to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they nevertheless must not be met at
the expense of substantial justice. Time and again, this Court has reiterated the doctrine
that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitate the attainment of justice,
rather than frustrate it. Technicalities should never be used to defeat substantive
rights.9 Thus, despite the procedural lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the
admissibility of the evidence in the case at bench. The clear infringement of the
accuseds right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
ignored.

28
The State cannot, in a manner contrary to its constitutional guarantee, intrude into the
persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. 10 Sec. 2, Art. III, of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 2. - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee, however, is not a blanket prohibition against all searches
and seizures without warrant. Arrests and seizures in the following instances are allowed
even in the absence of a warrant (i) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest;11 (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) stop and frisk; and (vii) exigent
and emergency circumstances.12
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order to be
considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a warrantless
arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the subject
items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony of PO1
Azardon and his Joint Affidavit13 with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to, and entered, the
house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a concerned citizen that a pot
session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: I go back to the information referred to you by the informant, did he not tell you how
many persons were actually conducting the pot session?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not armed with a
search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you did not know
personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an] ongoing pot session
in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report to you placed in the police blotter before
you proceeded to the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or identity of the
person who told you that he was allegedly informed that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he does not
want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an ongoing pot
session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately formed a
group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you could not
see what is happening inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic sachet of shabu
on the table while you were outside the premises of the property of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them, sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who told you that he
was informed by another person that there was an ongoing pot session going on inside
the house of Rafael Gonzales?

29
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael Gonzales
and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.14
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a) and (b), on
the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be present in
order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to signify a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged.15
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases 16 that tipped information
is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,17 such rulings cannot be
applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a buy-bust operation or
drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole tip of an informer as basis
for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a house without
warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informers tip. The case of People
v. Bolasa18 is informative on this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man and a woman
were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police immediately proceeded to
the house of the suspects. They walked towards the house accompanied by their
informer. When they reached the house, they peeped inside through a small window and
saw a man and woman repacking marijuana. They then entered the house, introduced
themselves as police officers, confiscated the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the
suspects. This Court ruled:
The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of
the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants
had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they
have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third,
accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.
Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view. First, there was no valid
intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the
evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently
discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they
saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner,
the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under

exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such
showing.
On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search
warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the
illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must
follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law.19
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be
based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that
is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 20
As to paragraph (a) of Section 5 of Rule 113, the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that at the time of the arrest, accused had just committed, were committing,
or were about to commit a crime, as they had no probable cause to enter the house of
accused Rafael Gonzales in order to arrest them. As to paragraph (b), the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that the accused had just committed an offense. As admitted in the testimony of
PO1 Azardon, the tip originated from a concerned citizen who himself had no personal
knowledge of the information that was reported to the police:
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the accused was based
on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What exactly [did] that informant tell you?
A: He told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session in the house
of one of the accused Rafael Gonzales, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the information
originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was going on? [No
Answer]
Q: Did you[r] informant particularly pinpointed [sic] to where the alleged pot session was
going on?
A: No more because he did not go with us, sir.

30
Q: So you merely relied on what he said that something or a pot session was going on
somewhere in Arellano but you dont know the exact place where the pot session was
going on?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And your informant has no personal knowledge as to the veracity of the alleged
pot session because he claimed that he derived that information from somebody else?
A: This is what he told us that somebody told him that there was an ongoing pot session,
sir.
Q: Despite of [sic] that information you proceeded to where?
A: Trinidad Subdivision, sir.
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was really
happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session there,
sir.21 [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The elements of
plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.22
The evidence was not inadvertently discovered as the police officers intentionally entered
the house with no prior surveillance or investigation before they discovered the accused
with the subject items. If the prior peeking of the police officers in Bolasa was held to be
insufficient to constitute plain view, then more so should the warrantless search in this
case be struck down. Neither can the search be considered as a search of a moving
vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, a stop and frisk, or one
under exigent and emergency circumstances.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that
the identity and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After
conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause, then a
search warrant should have been secured prior to effecting arrest and seizure. The
arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise illegal. Evidence
procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. 23 The subject items
seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the verycorpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus
precludes conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.

As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and judges have
glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers are able to
present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by which they were
obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed rights in the name of law
enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law fosters the breakdown of our
system of justice and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace
and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.24
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the
accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the
chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established with moral
certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the authorities having failed
to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and Dangerous Drug
Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by Board Regulation No. 2,
Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency(PDEA), no inventory of the confiscated items conducted at the
crime scene, no photograph of the items taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the
accused to sign the inventory and to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how
the items were handled from the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the
crime laboratory for testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby
producing reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of
innocence in their favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i) the
accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not authorized
by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous
drug.25 Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9165, an
additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the dangerous drug must have
occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company
of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction. In order to establish
the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be sufficiently established. The chain
of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the
evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the

31
seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the
court.26 Malillin v. People was the first in a growing number of cases to explain the
importance of chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 27
Section 1(b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,28 defines chain of custody as
follows:
b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as
evidence, and the final disposition;
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards for the
protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the

media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody of seized or
confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their identity and integrity,
as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for
testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession of the substance changes hand a number
of times, it is imperative for the officer who seized the substance from the suspect to
place his marking on its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive
tape that cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the trial,
the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure he observed to
preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the substance is not in a plastic container, the officer should put it in one and seal the
same. In this way the substance would assuredly reach the laboratory in the same
condition it was seized from the accused. Further, after the laboratory technician tests
and verifies the nature of the substance in the container, he should put his own mark on
the plastic container and seal it again with a new seal since the police officers seal has
been broken. At the trial, the technician can then describe the sealed condition of the
plastic container when it was handed to him and testify on the procedure he took
afterwards to preserve its integrity.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the prosecution would have to
present every police officer, messenger, laboratory technician, and storage personnel,
the entire chain of custody, no matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of
them has to testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with or
substituted while in his care.29
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further
elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that
the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search
warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the

32
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided that (i)
there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case, however, no justifiable
ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a failure to properly preserve
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus
delicti from the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. A review of the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary records of the case
reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of custody.
According to the apprehending police officers in their Joint Affidavit, the following were
confiscated from the accused, to wit:
a) Several pcs of used empty plastic sachets containing suspected shabu
residues.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2) pcs
colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white ).
c) Several pcs of used rolled aluminum foil containing suspected shabu
residues.
d) Several pcs of used cut aluminum foil containing suspected shabu residues.
e) One (1) pc glass tube containing suspected shabu residues.30
[Emphases supplied]
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items were
indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr. (SPO1 Urbano)
for proper disposition.31 A letter-request for laboratory examination was prepared by
Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the following items:
a) Pieces of used empty small plastic sachets with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-1."

b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-2."
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked "DC&A-3."32
[Emphases supplied]
The letter-request and above-mentioned items were submitted to P/Insp. Maranion by
SPO3 Froilan Esteban (SPO3 Esteban). Final Chemistry Report No. D-042-06L listed the
specimens which were submitted for testing, to wit:
SPECIMENS SUBMITTED:
A A1 to A115 One Hundred fifteen (115) open transparent plastic sachet with
tag each containing suspected shabu residue without markings.
B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residuewithout markings.
C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residuewithout markings.33
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a Confiscation
Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which reads:
DCPS AID SOTG 05 September 2006
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on or about 12:45 noon of September 4, 2006, we together
with our precinct supervisor, SPO4 Pedro Belen Jr., and SWAT members composed of
SPO1 Marlon Decano, PO3 Manuel Garcia, PO2 Adriano Cepiroto and PO1 Aldrin
Guarin apprehended the following names of persons of ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
ANGELES, 37 yrs old, married, jobless, a resident of Lucao Dist., this city; EDGAR
DIZON Y FERRER, 36 yrs old, single, tricycle driver, a resident of 471 Lucao Dist., this
city. REZIN MARTINEZ Y CAROLINO, 44 yrs old, married, jitney driver, a resident of

33
Lucao Disttrict this city; ROLAND DORIA Y DIAZ, 39 yrs old, married, businessman,
resident of Cabeldatan, Malasiqui, Pangasinan and RAFAEL GONZALES Y CUNANAN,
49 yrs old, separated, jobless and a resident of Trinidad Subd., Arellano-Bani this city.

testimony,36admitted that no photographs were taken. The only discernable reason

proffered by him for the failure to comply with the prescribed procedure was that the
situation happened so suddenly. Thus:

Suspects were duly informed of their constitutional rights and were brought to Dagupan
City Police Station, Perez Market Site Dagupan City and indorsed to Duty Desk Officer to
record the incident andthe sachet of suspected Shabu Paraphernalias were brought
to PNP Crime Laboratory, Lingayen, Pangasinan for Laboratory Examination.

Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you immediately
formed a group and went to the place of Rafael Gonzales?

Seizing Officer:

Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that place
of Rafael Gonzales?

(sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon
Affiant

(sgd.)
PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant

Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed34
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil, and 27
(of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as identified in the
Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as Exhibits "H" and series,
"I" and series, and "J" and series, respectively. Said items were identified by PO1
Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.35
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized from the
accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for examination, as
shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination.
A review of the chain of custody indicates, however, that the CA is mistaken.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. After
seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory was conducted in the
presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus, no inventory was prepared,
signed, and provided to the accused in the manner required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his

A: Yes, sir.

A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.

Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures taken, is
that correct?
A: Yes, sir.37
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-compliance. The
suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with the requirements. The
police officers were not prevented from preparing an inventory and taking photographs.
In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides specifically that in case of
warrantless seizures, the inventory and photographs shall be done at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the
suddenness of the situation may have had should have dissipated by the time they
reached the police station, as the suspects had already been arrested and the items
seized. Moreover, it has been held that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents
the apprehending officer from immediately conducting the physical inventory and
photography of the items at their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws
intent to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. 38
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases arePeople v. Garcia,39 People v. Dela
Cruz,40 People v. Dela Cruz,41 People v. Santos, Jr.,42 People v. Nazareno,43People v.
Orteza,44 Zarraga v. People,45 and People v. Kimura.46
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v. Sanchez is
instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:

34
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is
the matter of "marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the
evidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and
photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of
the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and
are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.This step initiates the
process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft.
For greater specificity, "marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the item/s seized. x x x Thereafter,
the seized items shall be placed in an envelope or an evidence bag unless the type and
quantity of the seized items require a different type of handling and/or container. The
evidence bag or container shall accordingly be signed by the handling officer and turned
over to the next officer in the chain of custody.47 [Emphasis in the original]
Nowhere in the testimony of PO1 Azardon or in his Joint Affidavit with PO1 Dela Cruz
does it appear that the subject items were at all marked. It was only in the letter-request
for laboratory examination that the subject items were indicated to have been marked
with "DC&A-1," "DC&A-2" and "DC&A-3." There is no showing, however, as to who made
those markings and when they were made. Moreover, those purported markings were
never mentioned when the subject items were identified by the prosecution witnesses
when they took the stand.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic sachets, rolled
and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not specifically pertain to any
individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only in the Chemistry Report 48 that the
precise number of each type of item was indicated and enumerated. The Court notes
that in all documents prior to said report, the subject items were never accurately
quantified but only described as "pieces,"49 "several pcs,"50 and "shabu
paraphernallas."51 Strangely, the Chemistry Report indicates that all the subject items had
"no markings," although each item was reported to have been marked by P/Insp.
Maranion in the course of processing the subject items during laboratory examination
and testing.52 Doubt, therefore, arises as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be
determined with moral certainty that the subject items seized from the accused were the
same ones subjected to the laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the marking of
seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v. People,53 People v.
Kimura,54 and People v. Laxa.55

Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts below
gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the seizure of the
items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the receipt did not even
indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their quantity. These are basic
information that a confiscation receipt should provide. The only information contained in
the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest of the accused and the general
description of the subject items as "the sachet of suspected Shabu paraphernallas were
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory." The receipt is made even more dubious by PO1
Azardons admission in his testimony56 that he did not personally prepare the
Confiscation Receipt and he did not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification57 issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the subject
items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano for proper
disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp. Maranion. There
is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were transferred from SPO1
Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No witness
testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to their
presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings in People v.
Cervantes,58 People v. Garcia,59 People v. Sanchez,60 and Malillin v. People.61
More irregularities further darken the cloud as to the guilt of the accused. Contrary to
PO1 Azardons testimony62that they were tipped off by a concerned citizen while at the
police station, the Letter63 to the Executive Director of the DDB states that the
apprehending officers were tipped off "while conducting monitoring/surveillance." Said
letter also indicates, as does the Confiscation Receipt, that the arrest and seizure
occurred on September 4, 2006, and not September 2, 2006, as alleged in the
Information. It was also mentioned in the aforementioned Certification of the Dagupan
Police and Joint Affidavit of the police officers that a glass tube suspected to contain
shabu residue was also confiscated from the accused. Interestingly, no glass tube was
submitted for laboratory examination.
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the prosecutions
position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were properly
preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the Confiscation Receipt
and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been shown to be grossly
insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in dangerous
drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means that proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the identity of the prohibited drug is essential before the accused can be found guilty.64
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section 86 of R.A.
No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,65 this Court held that said section was silent as to the

35
consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be interpreted as a legislative
intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the
PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related
cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar
functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the
latter.
Let it be stressed that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not affect
the admissibility of the evidence but only its weight.66 Thus, had the subject items in this
case been admissible, their evidentiary merit and probative value would be insufficient to
warrant conviction.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police officers, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should prevail. However,
such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from the regular performance
of duty.67 Where the official act in question is irregular on its face, the presumption of
regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and proven to be
irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of custody, the
presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence of the
accused.68
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for dangerous
drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper arrest, search and
seizure procedure under the law.69 Some bona fidearrests and seizures in dangerous
drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because drug enforcement operatives
compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized items. It behooves this
Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert greater effort to apply the rules and
procedures governing the custody, control, and handling of seized drugs.
It is recognized that strict compliance with the legal prescriptions of R.A. No. 9165 may
not always be possible. Thus, as earlier stated, non-compliance therewith is not
necessarily fatal. However, the lapses in procedure must be recognized, addressed and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary value of
the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.70
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec.
1171 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 1572 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A.
No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This Court notes the
practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the presence of
dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in the form of residue, being

subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more
in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order to
rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory
test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of
Sec. 11 for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while
the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and
provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of residue
on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of dangerous
drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained admissible, and the
chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A.
No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should
have been charged under Sec. 1473 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or
Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under Sec. 12 74(Possession of
Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the
maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under
the same section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is
prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
1avvphi1

In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus
calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in
the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of
dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the
filing of charges for or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done
when another separate quantity of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in
the possession of the accused as provided for in Sec. 15.
WHEREFORE, the August 7, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. HC-NO.
03269 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment entered ACQUITTING the
accused and ordering their immediate release from detention, unless they are confined
for any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections
is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this decision the action

36
he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director-General, Philippine National
Police, and the Director-General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their
information and guidance.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over the seized
items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.