CAUDAL VS CA (1989) (CA)

FACTS:
- Dionisio Cu and his family lived in Quezon City. Cu bought a parcel of land in QC with an apartment
building
- Caudal was a tenant in one of the units in that building. Cu notified him of the termination of the lease
contract and told him to vacate soon. But Caudal did not comply.
- the MTC held in favor of Caudal. Cu appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the decision under the basis
that he has a right to own the property after purchasing it from Esguerra.
- Caudal then appealed to the CA. CA ruled in favor of Cu. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Can Cu eject Caudal? YES!
RULING:
- As an intrinsic aid in fully appreciating the term "residential unit," we must refer to the Rental Law
Batas Pambansa 877. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the whole statute.
Clauses and phrases of the statutes should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the
whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
- According to Sec 2(b) of Rental Law BP 877, a residential unit is an apartment, house and or land which
another's dwelling is located used for residential purposes... But also used for home industries, retailes
stores or other business purposes IF THE OWNER AND HIS FAMILY ACTUALLY LIVE THEREIN
AND USE IT PRINCIPALLY FOR DWELLING PURPOSES.
- the law does not strictly confine the meaning of the word "residence" mainly for habitation purposes as
restrictedly interpreted by petitioner. In a way, the definition admits a measure of liberality, albeit limited,
since a residence may also be the site of a home industry, or a retail store or be used for business purposes
so long as it is principally used for dwelling purposes. The law in giving greater importance to the abode
being used principally for dwelling purposes, has set the limitation on the maximum amount of
capitalization to P5,000.00, which is small by present standards.
- Thus, if an abode can be used for limited business purposes, we see no reason why it cannot be used as
an abode for persons rendering services usually necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment
of a home and who personally minister to the personal comfort and convenience of the members of the
household.
- The ejectment of petitioner should not be taken in isolation of Cu's plan. Cu has explicitly stated that he
himself would be transferring to the adjoining units and would merge the latter with petitioner's unit to
form one conjugal dwelling. Indeed, the character of Cu's occupancy is mainly for dwelling purposes. A
different conclusion would have been arrived at if a lessee like petitioner herein, was ejected on the sole
ratiocination that the premises would be exclusively used as maid/driver's quarters autonomously of any
adjoining conjugal dwelling.
- The argument that the maids/drivers are not covered by the term immediate members of the family of
the lessor 21 has no leg to stand on because Cu himself, his spouse and family are transferring to the
adjoining premises, of which petitioner's unit would become an auxiliary part of the main conjugal
dwelling.
- the law disallows the ejectment of the lessee merely on the ground that the leased premises had been
sold or mortgaged. Aside from the fact that there is nothing under the law to prevent a vendee, who steps
into the shoes of the original owner from ejecting said lessee on grounds expressly provided for by the
Rental Laws, it has already been settled that the subsequent owner who has established that he bought the
leased premises in question for his and his family's own use may recover possession of the said premises.
22 Hence, in the case at bar Cu the present owner is within his rights in ejecting Caudal to enable the
former to use the premises, a ground undisputably allowed under Sec. 5(c) of B.P. 877.
- Verily, the law could not have intended to prevent bona fide sales from owners/lessors who wish to
dispose of their property to third persons in need of their own residence. This would be an absurd

interpretation contrary to the basic philosophy underlying the right to property. To give preferential right
to a tenant over and above a new owner's need for the premises for his use and that of his family as
propounded in the Tan Tok Lee Case 26 is arbitrary and unreasonable.

CITY OF BAGUIO VS MARCOS

Facts:
- In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of cadastral
proceedings.
- In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved was the Baguio Townsite which
was declared public land.
- In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds:
1) he and his predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish
times;
2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim.
- On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes reopening on the
following grounds:
1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931;
2) the petition to reopen the case was not published; and
3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the petition was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA
931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953
Held: The Supreme Court granted the reopening of cadastral proceedings
Ratio: The title of RA 931 was An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain Conditions,
of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land, by Virtue of Judicial
Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of this Act. Section 1 of the
Act reads as ..in case such parcels of land, on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or
about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the
40 years next preceding the approval of this act. If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the
date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be
followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would
be invalid.
StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in
the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.
PEOPLE VS PURISIMA
Facts:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and
joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question
of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar
Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of Illegal
Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the defense filed
motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed their own orders
quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not allege facts constituting
ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential element of the crime, which is, that the
carrying outside of the accuseds residence of a bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on
the occasion of, connected with, or related to to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized
lawlessness or public disorder.
The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081which seeks to maintain
law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms of lawless violence.
The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished from other legislation related
to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in particular, reasoned that the information
must allege that the purpose of possession of the weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the
conditions of criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of
subversion is not necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is
an action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of
statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is enough.
Issue:
Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of
Illegal possession of deadly weapon penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?
Held:
1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must
state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare
his defense accordingly.
3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is to penalize
the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts, and
the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The
preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

Florentino v. PNB G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956
Facts:
- Florentino et al are indebted to the respondent bank in the amount of P6,800 plus interest, incurred on
January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954.
- The said loan is secured by a mortgage of real properties.

- Florentino is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in the amount of
P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897 approved on June 20, 1953.
- On December 27, 1953, petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
backpay certificate but PNB refused to accept petitioners offer to pay the said indebtedness with the
latters backpay certificate.
Issue: Whether or not, Philippine National Bank be compelled to accept the backpay certificate of
petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino issued to him by the Republic of the Philippines, to pay an
indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank
Held: Appellee is ordered to accept the backpay certificate.
Ratio: Section 2 of RA 304 reads as obligations subsisting at the time of the approval of this
amendatory Act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the Government or to any of its branches
or instrumentalities, or the corporations owned or control by the Government, or to any citizen of the
Philippines, or to any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be
willing to accept the same for such settlement. SC held that the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines. It should be noted that there is a comma before the words or to any citizen,
etc., which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. Hence, who may be willing to accept the
same for settlement applies only to the last antecedent.
StatCon maxim: An argument based upon punctuation alone is not persuasive, and the courts will not
hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary, to give the statute the effect intended by the
legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks and inserting others where necessary.

People v. Yabut G.R. No. 85472 September 27, 1993

Facts: Defendant was convicted for homicide. While serving sentence, he killed another prisoner. He was
consequently charged for murder. Yabut alleged that it was Villanueva and not him who has given the
fatal blow. However, the court found him guilty. After conviction, he was punished with the maximum
period for murder, in accordance with Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in applying Art. 160.
Held: No
Ratio: Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code states that Besides the provisions of rule 5 of article 62,
any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to
serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
StatCon maxim: Where the text of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the text, especially where
such epigraphs or headings are mere catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text
that follows.

Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs [GR 30264, 12 March 1929]
En Banc, Malcolm (p): 6 concur
Facts: Paragraph 141 of the Tariff Law of 1909 provides that the manufactures of wool, not otherwise
provided for are subject to 40% ad valorem tax, while paragraph 197 provides that vehicles for use on
railways, and detached parts thereof, are subject to 10% ad valorem. Dust shield are manufactured of
mixed wool and hair, and are used in railroad cabins of the Manila Railroad Company. The Insular
Collector of Customs decided that dust shields should be classified as manufactures of wool, not
otherwise provided for.
Judge del Rosario overruled the decision of the Collector of Customs and held that dust shields should be
classified as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge was correct in classifying dust shields under paragraph 197 of
section 8 of the Tariff Law of 1909, and in refusing to classify them under paragraph 141 of the same
section of the law. It thus affirmed the appealed judgment in its entirety, without special taxation of costs
in either instance.
1. Nature of dust shields
Dust shields are manufactured of wool and hair mixed. The component material of chief value is the
wool. The purpose of the dust shield is to cover the axle box in order to protect from dust the oil deposited
therein which serves to lubricate the bearings of the wheel. Dust guard, which is the same as dust
shield, is defined in the work Car Builders Cyclopedia of American Practice, 10th ed., 1922, p. 41, as
follows: A thin piece of wood, leather, felt, asbestos or other material inserted in the dust guard chamber
at the back of a journal box, and fitting closely around the dust guard bearing of the axle. Its purpose is to
exclude dust and to prevent the escape of oil and waste. Sometimes called axle packing or box packing.
2. Burden of proof on the validity of a legal collection of duties upon who questions it
The burden is upon the importer to overcome the presumption of a legal collection of duties by proof that
their exaction was unlawful. The question to be decided is not whether the Collector was wrong but
whether the importer was right.
3. Interpretation of statutes levying taxes do not extend their provisions; in case of doubt
It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions
beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most
strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. In the case at bar, taking
account the purpose of the article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it is used as a detached part of
railway vehicles.
4. Particular enactment must be operative over the general one in the same statute
Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the
same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would
include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general
language are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.

DAVID VS CA (1988)
FACTS:
- Patricio David owned land in Pampanga and the private respondents were tenants of this land where
they milled and processed sugar in PASUDECO
- David advanced expenses of production. He took charge of transporting sugarcane from fields to
millers, etc
- so the respondent tenants, on the other hand, provided labor.
- With regard to the share of the land, they shared 50-50 for the net proceeds
- in 1979, Patricio David leased the sugarland to his son, Petitioner Wilfredo David. They still followed
the 50-50 arrangement
- but then the private respondents notified Wilfredo of their intention to elect the leasehold tenancy
system
- Wilfredo objected, because he knew that the tenants were financially incapable to elect the system
because of the stop of the cutting of canes
- private respondents then filed a complaint in court. David said that they were not entitled to automatic
conversion to leasehold tenancy according to Sec 4 of RA 3844.
- Private respondents, on the other hand, invoke RA 1199 which states that tenants have he right to change
the tenancy
- sugarlands are not mentioned among the areas covered by the Agricultural Land Reform Code! they
only enumerated fishponds, coconuts, coffee, and other permanent trees
ISSUE: can the tenants elect the leasehold system? YES!
RULING:
- The policy of the law is clear. Share tenancy is contrary to public policy and must be abolished. Any
interpretation of the law which tends to prolong any share tenancy can be indulged only when it is
inescapable
- David's contention was that lands devoted to crops should be included if there is a separate proclamation
by the president
- Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible to two or more constructions, that should be adopted
which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object for
which the statute was enacted and a construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive
other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its
enactment
- In the instant case, We can do no less than to apply a liberal interpretation of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code to give full force and effect to its clear intent which, under Section 2[2] and [6] of said
Code, is "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers" and to make them "more dependent, selfreliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society."
-

The plain and ordinary meaning of "business" is restricted to activities- or affairs where profit is
the purpose, or livelihood is the motive . As the term "business" is used without any qualification
in the aforementioned sections of the Tax Code, it should be construed in its plain and ordinary
meaning. Thus, in the case at bar the respondent club cannot be considered as engaged in the
"business" of selling liquor and tobacco because, in pursuance of its purpose as a fraternal social
club, it sells on retail at its clubhouse, liquor, cigars and cigarettes, on a very limited scale only to
its members and their guests, providing just enough margin to cover operational expenses without
intention to obtain profit. Hence, it cannot be held liable for of the privilege taxes required by
section 193 of the Tax Code. Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Lodge No. 761 of the
Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks and the CTA, 105 Phil. 983, No. L-11176 June 29, 1959

Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970 (general words construed generally)
General words construed generally
Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the Philippines, COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that donations of billboards to the Commission by
foreigners or companies or corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code. The body also issued Resolution RR-731 which
states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, does not cover campaign
funds and other contributions by the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the 120 days immediately
preceding a regular or special election.
Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, filed a complaint
with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both resolutions, alleging that both are violative of
Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to influence in any
manner any elections.
The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of:
(1)
aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;
(2)
taking part in any election; and
(3)
influencing in any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioners motion, declaring "that contributions by foreigners to
the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not
made in aid or support of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space
for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result of the election, ... .He
then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said order of the COMELEC is null and void as
contrary to law or having been issued in excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave
abuse of its discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent injunction. No
restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself did not implement the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term any elections, foreigner, and any candidate; as well as the terms aid,
take part, and influence, as contemplated In Section 56 of the Revised Election Code, had other
meanings
Held:
The term any elections definitely comprehends or applies to election of delegates Constitutional
Convention. Foreigner, on the other hand, refers to both natural and juridical persons or associations or
organized groups, as provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the
application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only. Any candidate likewise
comprehends some candidates or all candidates. The terms aid, to take part, and influence, were
also construed in their general sense- with aid referring to, to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen
or to act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and "influence" means to
use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the
nature or behaviour of, or affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to

have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon physically, especially in some
gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or
sway by modifications, feelings or conduct.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly prescribes a different
meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should be understood in their general sense. There was
likewise no manifest or expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be restricted or limited.
Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their general meaning, unless it is
expressed that they have acquired a special and restricted meaning. Hence, in this case, generalia verba
sunt generaliter intelligenda applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the effect that all candidates
benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance greater than the aid that may be given to one
candidate. Allowing such undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the laws
protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the COMELEC in the subject
resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the Revised Election Code. The law penalizing corrupt
election practices should be given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections.
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated respectively on
August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are therefore declared illegal and null and void.
Constitutional Law; Elections; Statutes; Constitutional Convention Law; Term any elections includes
election of delegates to the constitutional convention.The term any elections as used in Sec. 56 of the
Revised Election Code as amended, includes the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention
under Resolution of both Houses No. 2 of March 16, 1967, as amended by Resolution of both Houses No.
4 of June 17, 1969, as implemented by R.A. No. 6132.
Same; Same; Same; Term foreigner includes both natural and juridical persons.Under Sec. 39 of Art.
III of the Revised Election Code, the term person includes an individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation and any other organization or group of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Term any candidate comprehends some or all candidates.The term any
candidate should be construed also to mean some or all candidates.
Same; Same; Same; Comelec Resolution No. RR-707 null and void.It would indeed be a myopic view
and the height of naivete to believe that donations for Comelec billboards will not aid the candidates nor
in any way influence the elections, no matter how small the contributions may be; the fact that alien
donors have no direct participation in the distribution or allocation of the Comelec billboards does not
inevitably mean that they have no participation in the election nor exercise any influence in the same, nor
give assistance to any candidate. Gatchalian vs. Commission on Elections, 35 SCRA 435, Nos. L-32560
61 October 22, 1970
GEOTINA VS CTA (use of generic words include things that arise after enactment of the lawprogressive interpretation)
- a vessel arrived in Manila carrying apples consigned to Geotina.
- while the goods were being unloaded, the Collector of Customs issued warrants of seizure because the
unloading violated Central Bank Circulars. But before the whole shipment was unloaded, the Collector of
Customs apparently changed his mind and ordered that the goods already unloaded be returned to the
vessel

- Petitioner requested the Collector of Customs to have the goods discharged, but the Collector denied the
request.
- according to the Tarriff and Customs Code, the Collector has the right to either prevent the importation
of the cargo or require the compliance with the requirements if the importation is prohibited.
- CTA ruled that the apples are not prohibited to be imported in the Phils, but the petitioner is still liable
for forfeiture for failing to secure a release certificate from the Central Bank
- the apples were then released given that the company gave a bond
ISSUE: was the CTA authorized to release the apples even without the required Central Bank release
certificate?
RULING:
- Central Bank Circular No. 295 states that no-dollar imports cannot be released if they are not covered by
Circular No. 247.
- Section 2 of said Circular No. 295, however, provides certain conditions for the issuance of release
certificates for "no-dollar imports which arrived on or before February 21, 1970", the date that the
floating rate system and foreign exchange restrictions were instituted under Circular No. 289 of the same
date.
- ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered annulling and setting aside the decision dated April 23,
1971 and the resolution dated May 3, 1971 of the court of tax appeals. The decision of petitioner
commissioner of customs appealed from by private respondent is instead affirmed and the petition of said
respondent in the lower court is dismissed, with costs in both instances against said respondent.
Revised Administrative Code; Interpretation, merchandise of prohibited importation.It must be
remembered that the Revised Administrative Code is a general legislation. As such, it must have been
intended to meet not only the peculiar conditions obtaining at the time of its enactment but also designed
to comprehend those that may normally arise after its approval. The term merchandise of prohibited
exportation used in the code is broad enough to embrace not only those already declared prohibited at
the time of its adoption but also goods, commodities or articles that may be the subject of activities
undertaken in violation of subsequent laws. Geotina vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 40 SCRA 362, No. L33500 August 30, 1971
CLAUDIO VS COMELEC (words and phrases construed in relation to other provisions)
FACTS:
LGU concerned: Pasay City
Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City
-

Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of
convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor
Claudio for loss of confidence.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio
as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the
petition were in public areas throughout the City.
Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall
was filed within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that

the PRA was convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local
Government Code. The COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a
process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall and since the petition was filed
exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption of office, the petition was filed on time.
Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the
Local Government Code
HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC
The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election itself)
which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to
such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA.
RATIO:
Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly
or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then
proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by
means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.
Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power
vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official
into office, the limitations in 74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the
PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at
least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall.
Any steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall.
The limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered
voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which
paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall
It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A
recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he
can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not
produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the
confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one
year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the
preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a
local official.
Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the
purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day
of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one
of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will
always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in
the incumbent.
The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period
Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not
only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.
The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is included
for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely
limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be
held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30
following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the
middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period
to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall
which is designed to make local government units" more responsive and accountable."
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The law is unambiguous in providing that no recall
shall take place within one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, and if Congress
intended the limitation to refer to the campaign period, it could have expressly said so.Petitioner
contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second period
of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase regular local elections in paragraph (b) does
not only mean the day of the regular local election which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the day of the election.
Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held. This contention is
untenable. The law is unambiguous in providing that [n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the
campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To construe the second limitation in par. (b) of 74 of the Local Government
Code as including the campaign period would reduce the period for recall to eight months, an

interpretation that would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units
more responsive and accountable.Petitioners interpretation would severely limit the period during
which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after
the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the
free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the
succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second
limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months.
Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed
to make local government units more responsive and accountable. Claudio vs. Commission on
Elections, 331 SCRA 388, G.R. No. 140560, G.R. No. 140714 May 4, 2000

PILAR VS COMELEC (where the law does not distinguish)

Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner
withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and
expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days
after its filing. Petitioner speculates that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost".
Issue:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he
has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy.
Held:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is
not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all
too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.
Same: Same; The rule is well recognized that where the law does not distinguish courts should not
distinguish.Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf. Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA
741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated.

Same; Same; The term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued
his campaign but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.In the case at bench, as the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the
term every candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
Same; Same: Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their
certificate of candidacy."The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
(The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in
implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy.
Same; Same; Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or
the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, it is provided that [t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate
of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred. Petitioners withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for the
administrative fine.

MANILA HERALD PUBLISHING VS SIMEON RAMOS (use of technical terms)

FACTS:
- Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against editors and reporters of the Daily Record demanding for
damages. The Sherriff of Manila then levied an attachment on office and printing equipment
- Manila Herald Publishing Co. then filed separate third-party claims, saying that they were the owners of
the property attached. So the Sheriff then required new bonds for the damages
- Manila Herald then commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance
Inc to stop defendants from proceeding with the attachment on the properties
- Judge Ramos was the prosecutor assigned, and he dismissed a case when it was thrown out of court.
ISSUE: does Judge Ramos have jurisdiction over the case?
RULING:
- It was a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction granted by Judge Pecson restraining the sheriff
from proceeding with the attachment in case No. 11531. The question of dismissal was suggested by
Judge Ramos on a ground perceived by His Honor. To all intents and purposes, the dismissal was decreed
by the court on its own initiative.
- the court held that the court did not have the power to dismiss the case.
- The only instance in which, according to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion
an action is, when the "plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court."
- None of what has been said is to be construed as implying that the setting aside of the attachment prayed
for by the plaintiffs in Case No. 12263 should be granted. The preceding discussion is intended merely to
point out that the court has jurisdiction to act in the premises, not the way the jurisdiction should be

exercised. The granting or denial, as the case may be, of the prayer for the dissolution of the attachment
would be a proper subject of a new proceeding if the party adversely affected should be dissatisfied.
The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the respondents except the respondent Judge.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ATTACHMENT; THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; "PROPER ACTION" IN
SECTION 14, RULE 59, INTERPRETED.Section 14 of Rule 59, which treats of the steps to be taken
when property attached is claimed by any other person than the defendant or his agent, contains the
proviso that "Nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from vindicating his claim to the
property by any proper action." What is "proper action"? It would be strange indeed if the framers of the
Rules of Court or the Legislature should have employed the term "proper action" instead of "intervention"
or equivalent expression if the intention had been just that. It was all the easier, simpler and the more
natural to say "intervention" if that had been the purpose.
ID.; ID.; INDEPENDENT ACTION OR INTERVENTION.Separate action was the correct and only
procedure available to the third-party claimant. The right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new
action, is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the court to allow. This qualification makes
intervention less preferable to an independent action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least.
Because availability of intervention depends upon the court in which the main case is pending, there
would be no assurance for the herein petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case.
ID. ; INTERFERENCE WITH PROPERTY ATTACHED; PROPERTY ATTACHED is IN "CUSTODIA
LEGIS"; ATTACHMENT OF STRANGER'S PROPERTY PRINCIPLE DOES NOT APPLY.It is true of
course that property in custody of the law cannot be interfered with without the permission of the proper
court, and property legally attached is property in custodia legis. But for the reason just stated, this rule is
confined 'to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in which the defendant has
proprietary interest. When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property,
the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference With another court's order of
attachment.

BUENASEDA VS FLAVIER (use of associated words)

FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of
the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al.
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply
with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) The authority
of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b)
Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there
are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in
the instant case

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working
in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative
complaints filed against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g.
removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension should be
given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the
company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The
preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the
investigation of the administrative charges.
Statutory Construction; Noscitor a Sociis; Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various
meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it
is found or with which it is associated.When the Constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to
recommend the suspension of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to suspension, as
a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to
penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a
sociis, the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction
may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc. v. Palomar, 18
SCRA 247 [1966]).
Same; Interpretation of Laws; Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally
construed.Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed
(Crawford. Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the punishment of
a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford,
Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure in criminal cases is not a penal
statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y. 331; 35 N.E. 644).
Same; Interpretation of Laws; A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should
be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created.The
purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform efficiently
the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute, particularly its provisions
dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and
objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be

avoided. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed
for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of Public
Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v. Feehan, 206
Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]). Buenaseda vs. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645, G.R. No. 106719 September 21,
1993

MUTUC VS COMELEC (use of associated words)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a candidate to be a delegate to the Constitutional Commission and he alleges that the
Comelec informed him via telegram that his COC was given due course but prohibited him from using
jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to
the petitioner is violative of his freedom of speech.
Comelec premised its prohibition on the Constitutional Convention Act which made it unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets
such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets,
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. Comelec
said that the jingle proposed by the petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a
tangible propaganda material, under the above statue subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a jingle is part of the prohibited propaganda material
HELD:
The phrase, and the like does not include jingles. Based on the principle of ejusdem generis, the general
words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those
specifically referred to.
The act referred to the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a
favorable vote.
Statutes should also be interpreted to ensure that it is in consonance with the constitution. Including
jingles as part of the prohibited propaganda material infringes on the freedom of speech of the petitioner.
By interpreting the said provision in such manner, Comelec failed to reconcile the Constitution and the
Constitutional Convention Act.
Furthermore, the Comelec is is limited to its power to decide administrative questions. Comelec cant
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the
constitution.

CAGAYAN VALLEY ENTERPRISES vs CA (use of associated words)

FACTS:
La Toneda, Inc. registered with the Philippine Patent Office its white flint bottles used for gin known as
Ginebra San Miguel.

LTI filed a complaint against Cagayan Valley Enterprises for using the said bottles with the mark La
Toneda, Inc. and Ginebra San Miguel for its own product named Sonny Boy without the consent of
La Toneda.
The court issues a TRO against Cagayan. Upon trial, the trial court rendered a decision favoring Cagayan.
LTI appealed to the CA and the CA favored LTI. Cagayan filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said bottles complied with the necessary patent requirement to bar petitioner
from using them without permission.
HELD:
Only exception to the permission needed in using patented bottles if for using the containers for sisi,
bagoong, patis and similar native products.
It is an admitted fact that Cagayan buys said bottles from junk dealers.
The contention of Cagayan that said bottles didn't mention property of is untenable. RA 623 merely
requires that the bottles, in order to be eligible for registration, must be stamped or marked with the
names of the manufacturers or the names of their principals or products, or other marks of ownership.
Name or mark of ownership means the name of the applicant or his principal or the product or any other
mark of ownership.
The claim of petitioner that hard liquor is not included in the term, other lawful beverages as provided
by Sec 1 of RA 623 is without merit. The title, An Act to regulate the use of duly stamped or marked
bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels and other similar containers clearly shows the legislative intent to
give protection to all marked bottles and containers of all lawful beverages regardless if the nature of
content. Hard liquor, even if regulated is not prohibited by law.
The contention that RA 623 protects only containers of soft drinks enumerated and those similar thereto is
unwarranted. The rule of ejusdem generis is not applicable in this case. Limiting the coverage to those
enumerated by the law will defeat the purpose of the law. Ejusdem generis is to be resorted to only for the
purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If the intent is clear, and
such intent is contrary to the result reached by ejusdem generis, the latter must give way.
Even if LTI failed to give notice of its patent, this will not bar a civil action. notice is not a requirement
sine qua non for the filing of a civil action. at most, failure to notify will bar recovery of damages but
since petitioner is in bad faith, he has to pay damages. Petitioner was involved in a another case where it
admitted that the bottles marked with La Tondena, Inc and Ginebra San Miguel are registered bottles
of LTI.

SARMIENTO III vs MISON (express mentions and implied exclusion)

FACTS:
Petitioners are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional Law seek to stop
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and to
stop Carague, as Secretary of Dept of Budget from giving disbursements in payment of Misons salaries.

Petitioners claim that Mison was appointment by the president without the being confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments.
Under the 1987 constitution, the president can appoint 4 groups:
1. Heads of executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution
2. All other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law
3. Whose whom the president may be authorized by law to appoint
4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the congress may by law vest in the president alone
The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the COA
ISSUE: do groups 2-3 need the consent of COA?
HELD:
By following the rule of stat con that an express enumeration of subjects excludes other not enumerated,
it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent of COA. But we can also refer to the intent of the Constitutional Commission to determine with
more accuracy.
1935 Constitution: almost all presidential appointments needed consent of COA
1973: absolute power of appointment was on President
1987: middle ground of 1935 and 1973
original text of sec 16, art 7 included heads of bureaus but this was edited out.
It is clear that the second and 3rd group need not the consent of COA. Since the position of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs is not those in the 1st paragraph, the consent of the COA is not required.
Sec 601 of RA 1937 was also amended by PD 34 which gave the president the power to appoint the
commissioner and deputy commissioner of customs. RA 1937 was made with the 1935 constitution but
when the 1987 constitution was made, it has to be read in harmony with the new constitution.
President acted within her authority in appointing Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs without
submitting his nomination to COA. Mison is entitled to receive salaries and emoluments.

PEPSI COLA vs SECRETARY OF LABOR (necessary implication)

FACTS:
Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (PCEU) filed a petition for certification election with the
Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines
(Pepsi). The petition was granted, but with the explicit statement that PCEU was affiliated with Union de
Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) and 2 other rank-and-file unions, the PCLU and the PEUP.
Pepsi then filed a petition for cancellation with the BLR against PCEU, on the grounds that: (a) the
members of PCEU were managers and (b) a supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a federation whose

members include the rank and file union of the same company. It also filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
suspend the certification election.
PCEU argued that Art. 245 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, did not prohibit a local union
composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with
rank-and-file members as affiliates. Furthermore, Book V, Rule II, Section 7 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides the grounds for cancellation of the registration certificate of a
labor organization, and the inclusion of managerial employees is not one of the grounds.
However, on 1992, or before the SC decision, the PCEU issued a resolution withdrawing from the UOEF.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PCEU may be affiliated with the rank-and-file unions.
HELD:
PCEU's withdrawal from the affiliation made the case moot and academic. But for the guidance of others
similarly situated, the Court ruled No.
If the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank and file or
where the supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting interests, then a local supervisors'
union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file employees
where that federation actively participates in union activity in the company.
The limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the
members of which include local unions of rank and file employees. The intent of the law is clear
especially where, as in this case at bar, the supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom
they directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
While article 245 singles out managerial employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication, confidential employees are similarly
disqualified. This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as what which
is expressed.
One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and
purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including
all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms.
In the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to be on the side of the
employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected. The employer is
not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union members. It is the same reason
that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the
disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the
provision. Said employees may act as spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.