Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 146322

December 6, 2006

ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS

UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique
tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give
everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the
underlying principles of law and order in society. We reaffirm
them in this petition for review on certiorari assailing the July
26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, 2000 resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571.
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by
Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and Raul Generoso to
amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for
robbery3 filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to
him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its
certificate of registration. Respondent asked for the original
certificate of registration but the three accused never came
to see him again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in
an open space inside respondents business establishment,
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible
to the public.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had been
sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas
Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed
by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching. To secure its

payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner

corporation.4
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments.
In September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the
remaining installments and told petitioner corporations
collector, Wilfredo Verao, that the motorcycle had allegedly
been "taken by respondents men."
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner Uypitching,
accompanied by policemen,5 went to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the
police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the clerk in
charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Vendiola and
the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back and
forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of
a motorcycle."
On learning that respondent was not in Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises, the policemen left to look for respondent in his
residence while petitioner Uypitching stayed in the
establishment to take photographs of the motorcycle. Unable
to find respondent, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on petitioner Uypitchings instruction and
over the clerks objection, took the motorcycle.
On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a criminal
complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the AntiFencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved for
dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as
he had neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office
of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint8 and denied
petitioner Uypitchings subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners in
the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch 37.9 He
sought to hold the petitioners liable for the following: (1)
unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2) utterance of a
defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief) and (3)

precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint.

These acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and
injured his reputation and integrity.
On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 10 finding
that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with malice and ill
will when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in
an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
Petitioners acts were found to be contrary to Articles
1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court held
petitioners liable to respondent for P500,000 moral
damages, P200,000 exemplary damages and P50,000
attorneys fees plus costs.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed
the trial courts decision with modification, reducing the
award of moral and exemplary damages to P300,000
and P100,000, respectively.13 Petitioners sought
reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that
the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether the
filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor
warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs in favor of respondent.
Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were held liable
for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint
against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark
and for taking the motorcycle from respondents
establishment in an abusive manner.
Correctness of the Findings of the RTC and CA
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA that
malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of
a crime to respondent14 but also the taking of the motorcycle,
petitioners were deemed to have accepted the correctness of
such findings. This alone was sufficient to hold petitioners
liable for damages to respondent.

Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we also find

that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the
filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad faith.
Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a
"precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on portraying
respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with
approval the following findings of the RTC, as adopted by the
CA:
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the
complaint before the City Prosecutors Office] because
Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have
known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable
cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and fencing activity against [respondent]. Atty.
Uypitching had no personal knowledge that
[respondent] stole the motorcycle in question. He was
merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the bill collector
of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo Verao[,]
that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the remaining
installment(s) for the motorcycle because the
motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It
must be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao
in informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the
refusal of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining
installment was []taken[], not []unlawfully taken[]
or stolen. Yet, despite the double hearsay, Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not only executed the
[complaint-affidavit] wherein he named [respondent]
as the suspect of the stolen motorcycle but also
charged [respondent] of qualified theft and fencing
activity before the City [Prosecutors] Office of
Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause
necessarily signifies the presence of malice. What is
deplorable in all these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner
of the motorcycle, did not accuse [respondent] or the
latters men of stealing the motorcycle[,] much less
bother[ed] to file a case for qualified theft before the
authorities. That Atty. Uypitchings act in charging
[respondent] with qualified theft and fencing activity
is tainted with malice is also shown by his answer to
the question of Cupid Gonzaga16 [during one of their
conversations] - "why should you still file a complaint?
You have already recovered the motorcycle"[:] "Aron

motagam ang kawatan ug motor." ("To teach a lesson

to the thief of motorcycle.")17
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a
factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this
Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the findings of
the RTC and the CA.
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as
Mortgagee(s)
Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
petitioner corporations exercise of its right as sellermortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to
the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the mortgage in
case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged
property to enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure
right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined procedure for
the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a
mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged
property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil
action either to recover such possession as a preliminary
step to the sale, or to obtain judicial foreclosure.18
Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action
necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of
the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle,
petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its copetitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. Petitioners acts violated the law as well as
public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article

19 of the Civil Code, provides:
Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give every one his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or
contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens
himself to liability.19 It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust
ends.
There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise of a right must be
in accordance with the purpose for which it was established
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no
intention to harm another.21 Otherwise, liability for damages
to the injured party will attach.
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken
at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith
but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law.
Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement,
petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged
vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.
On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded
complaint could not in any way be considered to be in
accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute
a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners
actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate
and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to
respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The July 26,
2000 decision and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED.

Triple costs against petitioners, considering that petitioner

Ernesto Ramas Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the
court, for his improper behavior.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and
Garcia, JJ., concur.

Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother
opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the
reason why That would only create a
scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED

RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA
PAPA LOVE .

EN BANC
PAKING
G.R. No. L-20089

December 26, 1964

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams
and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse,
complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was

declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the
clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from
orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial
and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the
court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore
at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at
an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail
to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto
will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court.

Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to
defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for
relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence
on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted
two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks
given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the
court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their
attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however,
defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying
defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to
this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a
quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that
defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable
settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a
valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's
affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955
stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against
plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as
scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like
this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is
not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951;
Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29,
1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of

merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and
void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the
clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519,
October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure
of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive
evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules
of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure,
the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas,
40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557,
October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The
reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code
authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.
Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a
promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out
that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which
acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is
not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any
person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and
defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was
set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5;
Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other
apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 78). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.

Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh.

E). And then, with but two days before the wedding,
defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for
plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My
mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he
wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from
again.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated

modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.

As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.

G.R. No. 154259

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages

awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the
award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert
hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil
Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned
in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages,
defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil
Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly
acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner."
This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the
particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY

LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for
damages brought under the human relations provisions of
the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein)
Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the
evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at
the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of
several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the
hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if

she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of
course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present
for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their
picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat
with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when
the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet
table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he
was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to
speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a
loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other
guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby
Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain,
hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to
explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was
within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him
thus adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after,
while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience,
a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of
the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of
the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes
asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million
Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to
leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance
painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the
Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20)
years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday
party of the hotels former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list
and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was
limited to approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest
friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not
one of those invited.21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr.
Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr.
Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim
approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as
to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller

replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr.

Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with
another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she
inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes
to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes,
however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms.
Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When
Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Captain Batung whom she later approached.28 Believing that
Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim
requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was
not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted
Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him
herself as there were no other guests in the immediate
vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself
to the food, she decided to wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a
corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said:
"alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 She then
turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough
decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food
on her.331awphi1.nt
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before
the lower court, also gave her version of the story to the
effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the
party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he
was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse
but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she
reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly
dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that
Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and
she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She

was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that
she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the
complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was
not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a
party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no
recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and
Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court
of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party
of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her
and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His
action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must
therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the
trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a
loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling
him that he should not finish his food and to leave the place
within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is
contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees
should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by
the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil
Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in
themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or
good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal
right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage
to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43

The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms.

Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the
presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was
uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart first
and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have
been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs.
Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in
private that the latter should leave the party as the celebrant
only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs.
Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she
who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs.
Filarts invitation, appellant could not have suffered such
humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are
predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of
one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity
but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil
Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al.,
309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel
Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation
to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000);
and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised
in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in
the decision sought to be reconsidered."46

Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby
Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT
INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS,
AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES
SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT
HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT
FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION"
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED
UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING
THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE
WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE
DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being

asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the

process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person
assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to selfinflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes
the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by petitioners,
however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at
bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19
and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to
treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary
ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted
abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to
leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so
liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is
solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent
and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and
evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to
use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed,
the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of
law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however,
obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled
that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly.
The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is
liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes
by telling him not to finish his food and to leave the place
within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts,
however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation
that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.

The consequential question then is: Which version is

credible?

Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was

that close and she shouted?

From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more

credible the lower courts findings of fact.

A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado

dito, bumaba ka na lang."

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.

Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud

voice?

We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star

hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was
clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could not just
disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being
an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of
the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest
list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant was aware of his
presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to
keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of
the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not
to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair
and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her
former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence
of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability
to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his
close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes,
upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim
loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any
satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk
ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate
by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was very
close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim
approached you while you were at the buffet table?
How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.

...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim
to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame,
it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very
close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for
twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to
be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
Thus, the lower court was correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when
the request for the latter to leave the party was made such
that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to
be heard by him only and there could have been no intention
on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no
need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the
story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases
that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not
presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses
Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the
party.57

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made
liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel
Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all
human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.1awphi1.nt
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set
certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones
duties.61 These standards are the following: act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith
or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is
a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not
obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the
following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but

which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or

public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that
is, the act complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes
has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against
him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had
nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being
"single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in
her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen." 69 The
lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it
to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr.
Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms.
Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first
verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes)
gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls
not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms.
Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive
conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filarts
companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment
which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad
faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither
can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held

Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt
because of the latters lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This
has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit
must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal
provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency
and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of
example or correction for public good and to avert further
commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be
imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that
it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the
evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the
time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of
long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a
Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO)
chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz
Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an
awardee of a number of humanitarian organizations of the
Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr.
Reyes stressed that he had income75 and nowhere did he say
otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any
information as to the social and economic standing of
petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached
by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is
without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are
concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear
alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by
Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1 of the
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38
(Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to
marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a

complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged

violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in
said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on
the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on
the condition that they would get married; they therefore
agreed to get married after the end of the school semester,
which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live
with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before
she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result
of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to
live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married
to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief
and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only
the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the
complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for
lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither sought the

consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in

his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to
stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally,
no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the
complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result
thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and
compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety
and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as
moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial
court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic)
of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and
resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig,
Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at
Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College
of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at
Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,
Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present
and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each
other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the
defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21
of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a

decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was

thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees;
the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play
the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation
expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and
conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals
or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and
false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the
end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such
acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality,
good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to
come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public
scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the

detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent
in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court
as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she
was a virgin at the time and that she never had
a boyfriend before, defendant started courting
her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and
she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of
Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to
meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married.
The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of
plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken
that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that
he intended to marry her during the semestral
break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him,
they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him
to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff
during the few days that they were in Bugallon.
When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together
in defendant's apartment. However, in the
early days of October, 1987, defendant would
tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4
o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the
whole day and night until the following day. As
a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff
continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her

until he told her that he could not do so

because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and
thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in
Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the
barangay captain went to talk to defendant to
still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated
by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant
is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed
that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the
respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CAG.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial
court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual
and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the
challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling
of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of
fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old
when she met defendant who was already 29
years old at the time, does not appear to be a
girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that
she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate

experience with defendant and never had

boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower
court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed
to trend of modern urban life", and certainly
would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if
there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with
the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have
allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and
tender poses as those depicted in the pictures
Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe,
therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff
was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in
fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's
hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at
least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February
27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on
March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1,
1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's
mother who told him to marry her daughter
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the
serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there
was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship
must indeed have led to defendant's insincere
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated
not only to her but also to her parents, and
(sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and
where defendant first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love affair and

defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff,

which she declared was the reason why
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant
after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not
appear to be a man of good moral character
and must think so low and have so little respect
and regard for Filipino women that he openly
admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S.
Biology before he came to Dagupan City to
study medicine, he had a common-law wife in
Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with
another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to
plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt
so little compunction or remorse in pretending
to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a
young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order
to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold
that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her
surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it
was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as
these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and
public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming
as they do from a foreigner who has been

enjoying the hospitality of our people and

taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning, defendantappellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to
compensate for the moral damages and injury
that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court
ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant
petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue
of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable
because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes
the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not
familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that
even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent
failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and
concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his
legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful
cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims
that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the livein relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that
he had professed his love to the private respondent and had
also promised to marry her, such acts would not be

actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case.

The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed
her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his
Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda,
which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the
petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that
questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the
credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter
court having heard the witnesses and having had the
opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner
of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked
facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect
the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the
appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by
the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina
vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257
[1953]); (2) When the inference made is

manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible

(Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.
People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings
of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellate and
appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v.
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is
contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence
of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate
courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per
se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the
provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is

set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the

Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed.
That breach of promise to marry is not
actionable has been definitely decided in the
case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of
breach of promise suits in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action
lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther
than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the

foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year
old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be
proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is
above nineteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage
be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and family have suffered incalculable moral
damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed
article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the
forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which it is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in
the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasidelict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known
in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well

such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and

deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by
the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums
are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21,
would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered

her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example
earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time
of the seduction.

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We

are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy.

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that

petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not
only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant who was
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school
teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be when she became intimate
with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot,
but, also, because the court of first instance
found that, complainant "surrendered herself"
to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by
having a fruit of their engagement even before
they had the benefit of clergy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the

petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21

may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise

hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were
not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the
said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked
that the example set forth in the Code

Commission's memorandum refers to a tort

upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach
of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case
(supra) that
To constitute seduction there
must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or
inducementand the woman must
yield because of the promise or
other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust
and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56) She must be
induced to depart from the path
of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and
wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and
which result in her person to
ultimately submitting her person
to the sexual embraces of her
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action
by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere

proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a
recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction
where the willingness arises out
of sexual desire of curiosity of
the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would
tend to the demoralization of the
female sex, and would be a
reward for unchastity by which a
class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the
fact stand out that for one whole year, from
1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman
of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations
with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with
the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces,
much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is
made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error

was committed by the Court of First Instance

in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice
Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had
been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but
not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr.,
L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In
other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be
the other way around, there can be no recovery
of moral damages, because here mutual lust
has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any,
such as the expenses for the wedding presentations
(See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino

29

is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra

vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding
the incorporation of the present article 31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the
vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual
act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority
or influence, but the woman, already of age,
has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot

be said that there is an injury which can be the

basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is
characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the
degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the
woman under the circumstances, because an
act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of
age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so
long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative
proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1)
of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any
injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because
of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as
the latter will become a doctor sooner or later.
Take notice that she is a plain high school
graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C")
or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in
a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of
a man who can give her economic security. Her
family is in dire need of financial assistance.
(TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the

petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background,
poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a
woman so circumstances could not have even remotely
occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe,
entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing
that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner
clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed
such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the
Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while
indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found
out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all,
she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less

guilty of the parties, where his transgression
has been brought about by the imposition of
undue influence of the party on whom the
burden of the original wrong principally rests,
or where his consent to the transaction was
itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud,

37

We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties

being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code).
This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and
the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private
respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the
deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse
upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged
decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

appearing that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being

aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried
to win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing
the complaint.1wph1.t
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the
ground that the issues involved are purely of law.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17396

May 30, 1962

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of
P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the
complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged therein,
even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had
carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman, being a married man himself, declared that
defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it

The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the
parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of
her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old
and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as
agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to
stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with
his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents
in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a
Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's
father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family
name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded
him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine trysts not only in the town of Gasan but also in
Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They
exchanged love notes with each other the contents of which
reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the
extent to which they had carried their relationship. The
rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's
parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing
Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair
between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers
and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa Extension,
Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said
house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked up her
thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However,
plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of paper inside

Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper

approximately 4" by 3" in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and
that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on
the 14th, that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police
authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil
Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is
based on the fact that defendant, being a married man,
carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing
plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that
plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was
carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great
damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her
parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their
complaint not actionable for the reason that they failed to
prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said: "In the
absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume
that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such
relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties
and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human

emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita

simply fell in love with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against their better judgment
and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of them.
This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried
woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any
other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious
scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making
her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because
of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was
allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and
was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love
affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used
to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their
illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents,
defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even
from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation
proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita
until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no
other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than
that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever
strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita
to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he
has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in
Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed.
Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,

Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and
HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by
petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant to the engineering operations
manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost
several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually
discovered the anomalies and reported them on November
10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent

Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by
stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him
to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the
office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office
keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias
returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry
went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler."
Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was
also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators
submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a
private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on
December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding
Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry
issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila
Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other
documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions,
submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B")
reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other
documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not
those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on Tobias
also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias

from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private
investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete,
petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal
complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for
estafa through Falsification of commercial document while
the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code
(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lwph1.t Two of these complaints were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which
however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six
criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners
appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the
criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who,
however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a
notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has
been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon,
Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor
arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor
arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on
petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated the
labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of
Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the
pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and
private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal
dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to
the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages
anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and

abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming

illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners
appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the
other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages.
However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August
31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are
liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for
damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss
private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because
of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as
for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners
must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is
the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings
and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE
CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking
to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the
effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to
serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may

approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance

of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself
legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a
right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation
of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did
not violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent.

This does not, however, leave private respondent with no

relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material
and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in
the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA 237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights
may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied.
While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether
the legal and factual circumstances called for its application
[See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil.
186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket,
Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94
SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106
SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No.
50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been
violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the
Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to
private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact
that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner

Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private

respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and
to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his
keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p.
2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But
regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's
reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies
was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that
an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in
taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave.
Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be
expected from such employer. But the high-handed treatment
accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for.
And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue
when private respondent returned to work on November 20,
1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for
work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said. "Tobby, you
are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that
the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the
statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of
harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the
Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the right of the
employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with
the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v.
Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088,
August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining
Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18
SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the
petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner
their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to
recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of
the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias.

Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners
against Tobias after the latter's termination from work.
Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of
the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter
talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In
response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling
him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred
more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added
that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked
petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against
Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about
Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias
being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias'
personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the
writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974,
stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY
due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain
employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias
remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this
further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise
be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a
"moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other employers of the
kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein)
was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim
that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every
man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger
to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes
warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in
dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose
honesty and integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments,
rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming
obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even after
almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six
criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that
there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and

that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and

prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the
commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous
transactions which defrauded them of substantial sums of
money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding

that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the
Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6)
criminal cases, five (5) of which were for estafa
thru falsification of commercial document and
one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised
Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of
correspondence," and all were dismissed for
insufficiency or lack of evidence." The
dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed
to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases.
As above adverted to, two of these cases were
refiled with the Judge Advocate General's
Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the
military stockade, but this was frustrated by a
presidential decree transferring criminal cases
involving civilians to the civil courts.

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate

that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of
wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto.
Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad
faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971,
38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R.
No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that
the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a
weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To
do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the
criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And
in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536
the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees after making a
finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six
criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were
dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that
the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by
the defendant knowing that the charges were false and
groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a
suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358,
May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal
of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent
evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith
[Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA
60].

xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police
reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro
Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of the Manila
Police Department, clearing plaintiff of
participation or involvement in the fraudulent
transactions complained of, despite the
negative results of the lie detector tests which
defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and
although the police investigation was "still
under follow-up and a supplementary report
will be submitted after all the evidence has
been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6)
criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of
Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of

commercial document and one (1) for violation

of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much
so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases
were dismissed, with one of the investigating
fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one
case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this case
was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is
the flurry and haste in the filing of this case
against respondent Tobias," there can be no
mistaking that defendants would not but be
motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the
Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were
filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by
Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which
the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted.
But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact
that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they
could have allegedly filed one hundred cases, considering the
number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE
MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied by the
threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint
that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias.
In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was
made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of
Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal
complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the
pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the
threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed
notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias
from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE
MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases,
the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners
were motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal
complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was

excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias
prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand
pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court,
after making a computation of the damages incurred by
Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551,
awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be
underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing
several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in
which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the
investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as
well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter
sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible
employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal
complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought
on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners'
contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was
reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was
improper, invoking the principle of damnum absqueinjuria. It
is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that
plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was
a direct result of his having been dismissed from his
employment, which was a valid and legal act of the
defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lwph1.t "
[Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria,
damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a
legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable
[Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100
SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915);

The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August

14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in
this case. It bears repeating that even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from
work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised
amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not
only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was
dismissed but was also the result of several other quasidelictual acts committed by petitioners.

Feliciano, J., took no part.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages.

However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez,
G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653,
that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New
Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of
Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to
Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by
petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides
that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court,
in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with
more reason is its imposition justified when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith.
As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the wrongful acts shown
to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is
sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the
latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344

February 17, 2000

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,

vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

May an educational institution be held liable for damages for

misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not
the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for review
premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by
the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals (CA),1 to
wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of
Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his
last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take
the regular final examination in Practice Court I for
which he was given an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2",
also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester
as fourth year law student (Exhibit "A") and on
February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the
removal of the incomplete grade given him by
Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit
"2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson
after payment of the required fee. He took the
examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988,
Professor Carlos Ortega submitted his grade. It was a
grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L",
"2-N").1wphi1.nt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members
of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among
the fourth year students should be allowed to
graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the
Tentative List of Candidates for graduation for the
Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second
Semester (1987-1988) with the following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I
Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O.
(Exhibits "3", "3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies
for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled

on the 16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the

afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the
name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the
candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot
of the list of the names of the candidates there
appeared however the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be
conferred upon these candidates who
satisfactorily complete requirements as stated
in the University Bulletin and as approved of
the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (Exhibit "B-7-A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F.
dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the
program of which he went up the stage when his
name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his
eldest brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and
his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was
thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a rolled white
sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His
relatives took pictures of the occasion (Exhibits "C" to
"C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was
attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who
wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar
examination. There were pictures taken too during the
blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar
examination. He took a leave of absence without pay
from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30,
1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review
class in Far Eastern University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2").
Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.2

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages

alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed
for an award of moral and exemplary damages, unrealized
income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability
arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he
completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree
when his name was included in the tentative list of
graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the
sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid, the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive portion of the
CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower
Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition
to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of
plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiffappellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND

(P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against

defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner
UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no
liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the
proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages
incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not
verifying from the professor concerned the result of his
removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning
institution, a contract of education is entered into between
said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or
instructors hired by the school are considered merely as
agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's
commitment under the contract. Since the contracting
parties are the school and the student, the latter is not dutybound to deal with the former's agents, such as the
professors with respect to the status or result of his grades,
although nothing prevents either professors or students from
sharing with each other such information. The Court takes
judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational
institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her
students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of the
school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or
she had already complied with all the requirements for the
conferment of a degree or whether they would be included
among those who will graduate. Although commencement
exercises are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an
ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational
institution's way of announcing to the whole world that the
students included in the list of those who will be conferred a
degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all
the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the

ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform

the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and
performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for
remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of
the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had
already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must
be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19
of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though
the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the
transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access
to those information and it is only the school that can compel
its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations
and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much
less influence, over the way an educational institution should
run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and
teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's
rules and orders. Being the party that hired them, it is the
school that exercises general supervision and exclusive
control over the professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control
means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the
operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules and
regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student
services.7 He must see to it that his own professors and
teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the
university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The
negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of
the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is
an act of the school, being his employer.

Considering further, that the institution of learning involved

herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it
should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in
Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men
must be able to assume that others will do them no intended
injury that others will commit no internal aggressions
upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively
will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding
and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with
whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is
justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized
society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for
granted and be indifferent to them, for without the latter, the
former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not wait for the latter
to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a
person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who
may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim
for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard of
civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the
cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that
time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation

to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance

that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams
since that is precisely the immediate concern after
graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any
time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines
set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements
for taking the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure
to promptly inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter into believing that
he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth
quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson
that defendant-appellee University had been informed
during the deliberation that the professor in Practice
Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet,
defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiffappellant of his failure to complete the requirements
for the degree nor did they remove his name from the
tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse,
defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge
that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court
I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the
"tentative list of candidates for graduation which was
prepared after the deliberation and which became the
basis for the commencement rites program. Dean
Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name
was allowed to remain in the tentative list of
candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter
would still be able to remedy the situation in the
remaining few days before graduation day. Dean
Tiongson, however, did not explain how plaintiff
appellant Jader could have done something to
complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiffappellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to
justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties

must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must

bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for
damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when
the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts
can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby,
with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.
A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with
prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus
liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold
that respondent should not have been awarded moral
damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' findings
that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he
was informed that he could not graduate and will not be
allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it
behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the
bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should
have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement,
are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how
respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in
attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review
classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the
bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has
satisfied all the requirements including his school records,
before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly,
taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also
prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED
to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of
6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the

complaint until fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos

(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The
award of moral damages is DELEIED.1wphi1.nt

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 151866

September 9, 2004

SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner,

vs.
LEONORA A. VALMONTE, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for review is the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69537,1promulgated
on 17 January 2002.2 The appellate court reversed the trial
courts decision denying respondents claim for damages
against petitioner and ordered the latter to pay moral
damages to the former in the amount ofP100,000.00.
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding coordinator.
Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for
their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30 p.m.
on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the
bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite
326-A, several persons were already there including the
bride, the brides parents and relatives, the make-up artist
and his assistant, the official photographers, and the fashion
designer. Among those present was petitioner Soledad
Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up
for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite
carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts
from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila
Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She paid the

suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and went

back to the suite. Upon entering the suite, Valmonte noticed
the people staring at her. It was at this juncture that
petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang
dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas
ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered one of
the ladies to search Valmontes bag. It turned out that after
Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner
discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside
the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. The jewelry
pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set of
diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of
about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to
help in the search. The bags and personal belongings of all
the people inside the room were searched. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by a
security guard throughout the evening. Later, police officers
arrived and interviewed all persons who had access to the
suite and fingerprinted them including Valmonte. During all
the time Valmonte was being interrogated by the police
officers, petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto." Valmontes car which was parked at the
hotel premises was also searched but the search yielded
nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter
from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which
she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and
guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of
petitioners imputations against her. Petitioner did not
respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997, Valmonte
filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint,
Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having
uttered words or done any act to confront or single out
Valmonte during the investigation and claimed that
everything that transpired after the theft incident was purely

a police matter in which she had no participation. Petitioner

prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the court to
adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000,
dismissing Valmontes complaint for damages. It ruled that
when petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her
jewelry, she was merely exercising her right and if damage
results from a person exercising his legal right, it is damnum
absque injuria. It added that no proof was presented by
Valmonte to show that petitioner acted maliciously and in bad
faith in pointing to her as the culprit. The court said that
Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety,
moral shock, social humiliation, or that her reputation was
besmirched due to petitioners wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander
her good name and reputation and in disregarding the
evidence she presented.
The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that
Valmonte has clearly established that she was singled out by
petitioner as the one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It
cited the testimony of Serena Manding, corroborating
Valmontes claim that petitioner confronted her and uttered
words to the effect that she was the only one who went out of
the room and that she was the one who took the jewelry. The
appellate court held that Valmontes claim for damages is not
predicated on the fact that she was subjected to body search
and interrogation by the police but rather petitioners act of
publicly accusing her of taking the missing jewelry. It
categorized petitioners utterance defamatory considering
that it imputed upon Valmonte the crime of theft. The court
concluded that petitioners verbal assault upon Valmonte was
done with malice and in bad faith since it was made in the
presence of many people without any solid proof except
petitioners suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles
Valmonte to an award of moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 for she was publicly humiliated, deeply

insulted, and embarrassed. However, the court found no

sufficient evidence to justify the award of actual damages.

over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on

affirmative matters.6

Hence, this petition.

Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioners

testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great detail her
distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to
how rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she
returned to the room. Petitioner immediately confronted her
and uttered the words "Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto.
Nasaan ang dala mong bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw ang
kumuha." Thereafter, her body was searched including her
bag and her car. Worse, during the reception, she was once
more asked by the hotel security to go to the ladies room and
she was again bodily searched.7

Petitioner contends that the appellate courts conclusion that

she publicly humiliated respondent does not conform to the
evidence presented. She adds that even on the assumption
that she uttered the words complained of, it was not shown
that she did so with malice and in bad faith.
In essence, petitioner would want this Court to review the
factual conclusions reached by the appellate court. The
cardinal rule adhered to in this jurisdiction is that a petition
for review must raise only questions of law,3 and judicial
review under Rule 45 does not extend to an evaluation of the
sufficiency of evidence unless there is a showing that the
findings complained of are totally devoid of support in the
record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
serious abuse of discretion.4 This Court, while not a trier of
facts, may review the evidence in order to arrive at the
correct factual conclusion based on the record especially so
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at
variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference
drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly
mistaken.5

Serea Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated

respondents testimony. She testified that petitioner
confronted respondent in the presence of all the people
inside the suite accusing her of being the only one who went
out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry.
Manding added that respondent was embarrassed because
everybody else in the room thought she was a thief.8 If only to
debunk petitioners assertion that she did not utter the
accusatory remarks in question publicly and with malice,
Mandings testimony on the point deserves to be reproduced.
Thus,

Contrary to the trial courts finding, we find sufficient

evidence on record tending to prove that petitioners
imputations against respondent was made with malice and in
bad faith.

Q After that what did she do?

Petitioners testimony was shorn of substance and consists

mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered the words
imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have
mentioned the latters name to the authorities as the one
responsible for the loss of her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule
that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value

Q Now, what exact word (sic) were said by Mrs.

Carpio on that matter?

A Then Leo came out from the other room she said,
she is (sic) the one I only saw from the comfort room.

A She said "siya lang yung nakita kong galing sa C.R."

Q And who was Mrs. Carpio or the defendant
referring to?

A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did she say anything else, the defendant?
A Her jewelry were lost and Leo was the only one she
saw in the C.R. After that she get (sic) the paper bag
then the jewelry were already gone.

Q Who was the person you [were] alleging "na

nakakahiya" whose (sic) being accused or being
somebody who stole those item of jewelry?
A "Nakakahiya para kay Leo kasi pinagbibintangan
siya. Sa dami namin doon siya yung napagbintangan."
Q And who is Leo, what is her full name?

Q Did she confront the plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte

regarding that fact?
A Yes.
Q What did the defendant Mrs. Carpio tell the
plaintiff, Mrs. Valmonte?
A "Ikaw yung nakita ko sa C.R. nawawala yung alahas
ko."

A Leo Valmonte.
Q Did the defendant tell this matter to other people
inside the room?
A Yes, the mother of the bride.
Q And who else did she talk to?
A The father of the bride also.

Q When the defendant Mrs. Carpio said that to

plaintiff Mrs. Valmonte were there other people inside
the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were they able to hear what Mrs. Carpio said to
Mrs. Valmonte?

Q And what did the defendant tell the mother

regarding this matter?
A "Nawawala yung alahas ko." Sabi naman nung
mother baka naman hindi mo dala tignan mo munang
mabuti.
Q Who was that other person that she talked to?

A Yes, sir.
A Father of the bride.9
Q What was your thinking at that time that Mrs.
Carpio said that to Mrs. Valmonte?
A "Nakakahiya kasi akala ng iba doon na talagang
magnanakaw siya. Kasi marami na kaming
nandodoon, dumating na yung couturier pati yung
video man and we sir.

Significantly, petitioners counsel elected not to pursue her

cross-examination of the witness on this point following her
terse and firm declaration that she remembered petitioners
exact defamatory words in answer to the counsels
question.10
Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise
contradicted petitioners allegation that she did not suspect

or mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss

of the jewelry.11
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right
of action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the
damage resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action.12
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or
negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to
obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of
equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed
to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for
human conduct.13 First of these fundamental precepts is the
principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article
19 of the Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith." To find the existence of an abuse of
right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.14 When a
right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms
resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed
for which the actor can be held accountable.15 One is not
allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause
unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby
offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but
not when he acts with negligence or abuse.16
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read,
thus:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or

negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the
award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some
legal provision, or an act which though not
constituting a transgression of positive law,
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the
party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her
own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and
amount of jewelry inside the paper bag.17 This being the case,
she had no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly accusatory.
By openly accusing respondent as the only person who went
out of the room before the loss of the jewelry in the presence
of all the guests therein, and ordering that she be
immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded
respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to
ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who
actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or
principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully
caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to
morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to find
her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for
apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to
prejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the
provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she
should be held accountable.

Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given
to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm
those of the trial court,18 we sustain the findings of the trial
court and the appellate court that respondents claim for
actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory
evidence during the trial and must therefore be denied. To be
recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork.19
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral
damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendants wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause
of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury 20 in the
cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.21Though no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be adjudicated,
courts are mandated to take into account all the
circumstances obtaining in the case and assess damages
according to their discretion.22 Worthy of note is that moral
damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant,23 or to
enrich a complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain
means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of
defendants culpable action. In any case, award of moral
damages must be proportionate to the sufferings inflicted.24
Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we
rule that the appellate court did not err in awarding moral
damages. Considering respondents social standing, and the
fact that her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in
her by her clients, the seriousness of the imputations made
by petitioner has greatly tarnished her reputation and will in
one way or the other, affect her future dealings with her
clients, the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages appears
to be a fair and reasonable assessment of respondents
damages.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs

against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez*, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario,
JJ., concur.
Footnotes
21

Art.2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the

following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical
injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other
lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of
defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 165661 August 28, 2006
SPS. MARIO & CORAZON VILLALVA, Petitioners,
vs.
RCBC SAVINGS BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to
reverse the decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 76574.
The facts.
In June 1993, petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48)
checks totaling P547,392.00 to cover installment payments
due on promissory notes executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon
Avenue (TQA) for the purchase of a 93 Toyota Corolla. 1 The
promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage
executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of
TQA. 2 Under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage, petitioner
spouses were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage by
accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies
to the mortgagor, viz.:
The MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees that he/it will cause
the property(ies) hereinabove mortgaged to be insured
against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire for a period
of one year from date hereof with an insurance company or
companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE in an amount not
less than the outstanding balance of the mortgage

obligations and that he/it will make all loss, if any, under such
policy or policies, payable to the MORTGAGEE or its assigns
as its interest may appear and deliver such policy to the
MORTGAGEE forthwith. The said MORTGAGOR further
covenants and agrees that in default of his/its effecting such
insurance and delivering the policies so endorsed to the
MORTGAGEE on the day of the execution of this mortgage,
the MORTGAGEE may at its option, but without any
obligation to do so, effect such insurance for the account of
the MORTGAGOR and that any money so disbursed by the
MORTGAGEE shall be added to the principal indebtedness,
hereby secured and shall become due and payable at the
time for the payment of the first installment to be due under
the note aforesaid after the date of such insurance and shall
bear interest and/or finance charge at the same rate as the
principal indebtedness. The MORTGAGOR hereby irrevocably
authorizes the MORTGAGEE or its assigns to procure for the
account of the MORTGAGOR the insurance coverage every
year thereafter until the mortgage obligation is fully paid and
any money so disbursed shall be payable and shall bear
interest and/or finance charge in the same manner as
stipulated in the next preceding sentence. It is understood
that MORTGAGEE has no obligation to carry out
aforementioned authority to procure insurance for the
account of the MORTGAGOR. 3
On June 22, 1993, the promissory notes and chattel mortgage
were assigned to Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
(RCBC). 4 They were later assigned by RCBC to RCBC
Savings Bank. 5 In time, all forty-eight (48) checks issued by
the petitioner spouses were encashed by respondent RCBC
Savings Bank. 6
The evidence shows that the petitioner spouses faithfully
complied with the obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle
from 1993 until 1996. 7 For the period of August 14, 1996 to
August 14, 1997, 8 petitioner spouses procured the necessary
insurance but did not deliver the same to the respondent
until January 17, 1997. 9 As a consequence, respondent had
the mortgaged vehicle insured for the period of October 21,
1996 to October 21, 1997 and paid a P14,523.36 insurance

premium. 10 The insurance policy obtained by respondent was

later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by
petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and
respondent bank was reimbursed P10,939.86 by Malayan
Insurance Company. 11 The premium paid by respondent bank
exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by Malayan Insurance
Company by P3,583.50.
On February 10, 1999, respondent sent a letter of demand to
the petitioners for P12,361.02 allegedly representing unpaid
obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage as of
January 31, 1999. In lieu thereof, respondent demanded that
petitioner spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within
five days from notice. 12 The petitioner spouses ignored the
demand letter.
On April 5, 1999, respondent, in order to get the 93 Toyota
Corolla, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Replevin with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City,
which was raffled to Branch 45 thereof. 13 Two weeks later, or
on April 19, 1999, the respondent caused the enforcement of
a writ of replevin and recovered possession of the mortgaged
vehicle. 14 On June 18, 1999, petitioner spouses filed their
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. 15 Petitioners
asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in
compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
On June 28, 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a
decision in favor of petitioners and ordered respondent to
pay petitioner spouses P100,000.00 in moral
damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, P25,000.00 in
attorneys fees, and the costs and expenses of
litigation. 16 Respondents Motion for Reconsideration was
denied on September 16, 2002. 17
Respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court
of Pasay City on October 3, 2002. 18 The case was raffled to
Branch 114. On March 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court
affirmed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court in
toto. 19

Undaunted, the respondent filed a petition for review with

the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the March 21, 2003 decision of
the Regional Trial Court. 20 On July 8, 2004, the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It
ordered petitioner spouses to pay respondentP3,583.50
within thirty days of finality of the decision, and issued a writ
of replevin as regards the mortgaged vehicle. 21 Petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence, the present
petition for certiorari.
The petitioners alleged that in ruling against them, the Court
of Appeals erred when it failed to consider two pieces of
evidence: (1) an Acknowledgment Receipt dated January 17,
1997, which shows that the premium for the second
insurance policy had been refunded to the respondent bank;
and (2) an Endorsement by the Malayan Insurance Company
dated June 11, 1997, which shows that petitioners handed
the required insurance policy to the respondent. The
petitioners also point out that the respondent was furnished a
copy of the insurance policy on January 17, 1997. 22
On the other hand, respondent contends that petitioners seek
a review of factual findings which the Supreme Court cannot
do as it is not a trier of facts. 23 It further argues that no
reversible errors were made by the Court of Appeals, and to
set aside its decision would result in the unjust enrichment of
the petitioners. 24
We rule for the petitioners.
The key issue is whether petitioners failed to comply with
their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the Deed
of Chattel Mortgage. The Deed of Chattel Mortgage requires
that the petitioners (1) secure the necessary insurance and
(2) deliver the policies so endorsed to the respondent on the
day of the execution of this mortgage.
We hold that petitioners did not default in the performance of
their obligation. As a rule, demand is required before a party
may be considered in default. 25 However, demand by a

creditor is not necessary in order that delay may exist: (1)

when the obligation or the law expressly so declares; (2)
when from the nature and the circumstances of the
obligation it appears that the designation of the time when
the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered
was a controlling motive for the establishment of the
contract; or (3) when demand would be useless, as when the
obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. None of
the exceptions are present in this case. It is clear from the
records that the first and third exceptions are inapplicable.
The second exception cannot also be applied in light of our
ruling in Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated v. Court of
Appeals. 26 In that case, this Court observed that the Deed of
Chattel Mortgage required that two conditions should be met
before the mortgagee could secure the required insurance:
(1) default by the mortgagors in effecting renewal of the
insurance, and (2) failure to deliver the policy with
endorsement to mortgagee. The mortgagee contended that
notice was not required due to the nature of the obligation,
and that it was entitled to renew the insurance for the
account of the mortgagors without notice to the latter should
the mortgagors fail to renew the insurance coverage. To
substantiate its claim, the mortgagee relied on the Chattel
Mortgage provision that the car be insured at all times. This
Court rebuffed the mortgagees arguments:
If petitioner was aware that the insurance coverage was
inadequate, why did it not inform private respondent about
it? After all, since petitioner was under no obligation to effect
renewal thereof, it is but logical that it should relay to private
respondents any defect of the insurance coverage before
itself assuming the same. 27
Due to the mortgagees failure to notify the mortgagors prior
to application of the latters payments to the insurance
premiums, this Court held that the mortgagors had not
defaulted on their obligation to secure insurance over the
mortgaged vehicle, and affirmed the Regional Trial Courts
decision dismissing the mortgagees complaint for replevin.

In the case at bar, the respondent failed to demand that

petitioners comply with their obligation to secure insurance
coverage for the mortgaged vehicle. Following settled
jurisprudence, we rule that the petitioners had not defaulted
on their obligation to insure the mortgaged vehicle and the
condition sine qua non for respondent to exercise its right to
pay the insurance premiums over the subject vehicle has not
been established.
The respondent further contends that its payment of the
insurance premiums on behalf of the petitioners unjustly
enriched the latter. Respondent adverts to the provisions on
quasi-contractual obligations in the New Civil
Code. 28Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or
moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may
also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other
indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person. It may
also include the prevention of a loss or injury. 29 In the case at
bar, petitioner spouses were not enriched when respondent
obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as
the petitioner spouses had already obtained the required
insurance coverage for the vehicle from August 14, 1996 to
August 14, 1997. 30
Finally, we are aware of the rule that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are given great weight by this Court.
Nevertheless, it is this Courts duty to carefully review
factual findings where the appreciation of the appellate court
and the trial court differ from each other. In the case at bar,
the findings of the appellate court are clearly not borne out
by the evidence of the parties and necessarily, we have to
reject to them.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision
of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on July 8, 2004 and its resolution promulgated on September
28, 2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The June 28, 2002
decision and September 16, 2002 resolution of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 45, as well as
the March 21, 2003 decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Pasay City, Branch 114, are REINSTATED.

No costs.

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the

judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil
Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,
Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the
defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all
surnamed "Escao," respectively.2

SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the

following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in
the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta
Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a
"sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and
of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in
the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage
was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil register.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19671

November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the

marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love.
Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and
go-between, they had planned out their marital future
whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born;
they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks
before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken;
Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another
suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she
pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they
planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the
elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the
room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual
trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage,
the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where

she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto

and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never
asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of
the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would
provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning,
the Escao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be
an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due
to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish
priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage.
The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February
1948 Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name
he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming
from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous
relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;
Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter
would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met
that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter,
Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor
returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948
(Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was
not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was
aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable
disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her
being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her
parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"),
but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of
June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental,
to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by
then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She
did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed
without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the
hearing (Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied
for a passport, indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled
in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the United
States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for

divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial

District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the
Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought
papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in
California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired
American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings
at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her
parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her
husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan
Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked
for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally
valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran;
while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced
their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but
freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the
plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff
resorted directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the
following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding

defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto
Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for
damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him
to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the
relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor
Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil
law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise
qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the
presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to
solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization
from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by
Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of
the separation of Church and State but also because Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage
law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for
marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting
parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only
a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give
the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section
27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements.

No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements
of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or
one of them believed in good faith that the person who
solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to
do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence
the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739,
745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the
solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the
archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in
abandoning her original action for annulment and
subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her
marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted
the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with
appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent
was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and
the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's
suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
was dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage
between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,
notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife
sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second
Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on
grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like
her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the
time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the

status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in
fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its
restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act
2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only
provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to
108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the
marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or
effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared
public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the
following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such
foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy
citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor

Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce
court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be
nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam
quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a
non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the
court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a
necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to
recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff
Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved.
It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely
duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding
indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated
charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging
immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her
claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically
"intercourse with a person not her husband" from the
standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on
the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a
marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the
previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,
particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to
the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our
statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,
when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code
of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect
merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing
before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code
of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully
applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42
Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that
case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be

ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and
Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not
legalize their relations; and the circumstance that
they afterwards passed for husband and wife in
Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the very children to
participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must
therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural
children. The children of adulterous relations are
wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to
include illegitimates born of adulterous relations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the
children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran
after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,
the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such
union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore,
justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the
innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands
undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial
court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations
where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies
of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the
Philippine Islands are well known to the members of
the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they
are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that
such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore,
sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's

parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa
Mena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and
influenced her conduct toward her husband are not
supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor
Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes
us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied
by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun
(Exh. "2-Escao" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274).
In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for
"misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by
his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and
audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to
visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to
prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente
had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and
breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine
marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event,
the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the
marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons
of their religion upon advice that the previous one was
canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage
ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto
Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed
with it. That the spouses Escao did not seek to compel or
induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but
respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve,
does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither
does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she
was in the United States; for it was natural that they should
not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not
concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of
improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have
acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be
respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be
charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith
being always presumed until the contrary is proved.

SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin.

The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and
the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in
such affairs. However, such distinction between the
liability of parents and that of strangers is only in
regard to what will justify interference. A parent
isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his
own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully
entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse,
but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without
justification and from unworthy motives. He is not
liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith
with respect to his child's marital relations in the
interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his
child not terminating his right and liberty to interest
himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's
welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and
advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or
where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or
unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent
is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness.
He may in good faith take his child into his home and
afford him or her protection and support, so long as
he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does
not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay
away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more
frequently been applied in the case of advice given to
a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the
case of advice given to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not
have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were
certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and
circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties
to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by

appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao,
it is proper to take into account, against his patently
unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a)
the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not
characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on
appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and
(c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed
to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise
was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88,
Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our
law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character
of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with
open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second
marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should
recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and
attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the
defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the
court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the
filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said
defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could
in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a
common occurrence in present society. What is important,
and has been correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any
improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court,
therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
(Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with
another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than the lawful husband
entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably
to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce

decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the

parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.

In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains

(Art. 53).
She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8
August 1958.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified

as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to
a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay
plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the

appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and
attorneys' fees.

SECOND DIVISION

Neither party to recover costs.

G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J.
ARAMIL, respondents.

Footnotes
1

The latter was substituted by her heirs when she

died during the pendency of the case in the trial court.

Romeo Z. Comia for petitioner.

Roman R. Bersamin for private respondent.
AQUINO, J.:

The original complaint included the Roman Catholic

Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined from
acting on a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of
the marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escao; the case against the defendant Church was
dismissed on a joint motion.

This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful

advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty
Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor
Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.

St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission

of Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor
Aramil) in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15,
1968 an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE
HEART IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the
residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family and then
below the photograph was the following write-up:
Home is where the heart is. And the hearts of
MR. AND MRS. ARCADIO S. ARCADIO and
their family have been captured by
BROOKSIDE HILLS. They used to rent a small
2-bedroom house in a cramped neighborhood,
sadly inadequate and unwholesome for the
needs of a large family. They dream(ed) of a
more pleasant place free from the din and dust
of city life yet near all facilities. Plans took
shape when they heard of BROOKSIDE HILLS.
With thrift and determination, they bought a lot
and built their dream house ... for P31,000. The
Arcadios are now part of the friendly, thriving
community of BROOKSIDE HILLS... a beautiful
first-class subdivision planned for wholesome
family living.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated
January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a
member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay
Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake. On that same date,
he wrote St. Louis Realty the following letter of protest:
Dear Sirs:
This is anent to your advertisements appearing
in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969
issues of the Sunday Times which boldly
depicted my house at the above-mentioned
address and implying that it belonged to
another person. I am not aware of
any permission or authority on my partfor the
use of my house for such publicity.

This unauthorized use of my house for your

promotional gain and much more the apparent
distortions therein are I believe not only
transgression to my private property but also
damaging to my prestige in the medical
profession I have had invited in several
occasions numerous medical colleagues,
medical students and friends to my house and
after reading your December 15 advertisement
some of them have uttered some remarks
purporting doubts as to my professional and
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although
in light vein as "it looks like your house," "how
much are you renting from the Arcadios?", "
like your wife portrayed in the papers as
belonging to another husband," etc., have
resulted in no little mental anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel
of the Philippine Medical Association and their
final advice is pending upon my submission of
supporting ownership papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court
action against your corporation unless you
could satisfactorily explain this matter within a
week upon receipt of this letter.
The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto, an officer of St.
Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication
of the advertisement. He contacted Doctor Aramil and
offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology
was published.
On February 20, 1969, Aramil's counsel demanded from St.
Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of
P110,000 (Exh. D). In its answer dated March 10, St. Louis
Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if
Aramil so desired, rectification would be published in
the Manila Times (Exh. 3).

It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18,

1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their
real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor
Aramil and an explanation of the error.
On March 29, Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St.
Louis Realty published in the issue of the Manila Times of
April 15, 1969 the following "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION"
in a space 4 by 3 inches:
This will serve as a notice that our print ad
'Where the Heart is' which appeared in
the Manila Timesissue of March 18, 1969 is a
rectification of the same ad that appeared in
the Manila Times issues rectification of the
same ad that appeal of December 15, 1968 and
January 5, 1969 wherein a photo of the house
of another Brookside Homeowner (Dr. Aramilprivate respondent) was mistakenly used as a
background for the featured homeowner's the
Arcadio family.
The ad of March 18, 1969 shows the Arcadio
family with their real house in the background,
as was intended all along.
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should
have immediately published a rectification and apology. He
found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified
by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental
anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to
P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's
right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,
P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St.
Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting

Presiding Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and
Justices Sixto A. Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and
26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements
pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio
but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that
contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate
Court ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and
conjectures. This contention is unwarranted. The Appellate
Court adopted the facts found by the trial court. Those
factual findings are binding on this Court.
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to
law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity
with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not
covered by article 26 which provides that "every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons". "Prying into the privacy of
another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts",
"though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by
Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219
allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in
Article 26. As lengthily explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the
acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing
up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated
publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it
never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were

confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was
renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased
it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and
unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and
mental anguish.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is

affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of

bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in
an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. MedinaCapili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G.
Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMOCAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings

alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration
of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo
City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by
the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision
declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the
ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the

husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the
beginning.

SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and

Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal
case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the
second marriage between him and private respondent had
already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City
granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to
wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case
should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004
had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled:
"Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and
Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of
marriage) nullifying the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is
already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the
motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in
the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue
in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the
issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and
arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion
that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the
accused as it appears that the second marriage between
James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been
nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo
City which has declared "the voidness, non-existent or
incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As such, this
Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.

Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed

and set aside the RTCs decision. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July
2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in
Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against
said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution[7]
dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE
THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY,
BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE
CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER,
INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID
ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR
FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE
CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE
SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER
PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE
TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE

MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER

P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G.
TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS
DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE
GROUND THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE,
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS
OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY
CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING
IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE
CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS
SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS
APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN THE
SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS
FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS
WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE
4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT

SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS

ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043
DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY
G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME FINAL AND
UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY
RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE
CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent
declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes
the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the
offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 9

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the

crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed
on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused
may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is
a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting
when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds
conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners

marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the
aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability
attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time
he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated

July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.

30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:

SO ORDERED.
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap
(private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal
Case No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon
City).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20 March
2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear

before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72
(RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 047392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito
Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the
ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and
the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil
Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May
20053 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the
suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415
are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the
case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners
marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon
City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to

Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence of a
Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the

action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.4
The Ruling of this Court
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August
2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure6 provides:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether
the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the
acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the
issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that
even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the
criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that
all that is required for the charge of frustrated parricide is
that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage
is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court
assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of

a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first
before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August
2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004
as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The
RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pretrial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served
summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February
2005.8 Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was
dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004.
Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing
of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the
requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was
filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial

question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal
action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil
action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before
the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key
element in the crime of parricide,12 which punishes any
person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse."13 The relationship between the
offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide
from murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the
annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the

accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was

charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioners will.16 At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition
in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on
the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage
between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner
could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to
respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals17 that "the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as
the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x." First,
the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of
nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy.
There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
Second, the Court ruled inTenebro that "[t]here is x x x a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in that case that
"a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned." 19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of
the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-04130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil
Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20

March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758

February 18, 2004

VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the
effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We
hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar
as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable
for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted

marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of
the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas
lived together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of
a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was
going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the aforenamed accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without
the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or
subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with
Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.

However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly

married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony
took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he
signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the
allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to
verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was
any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there
was no record of said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST
MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY
DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND
EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of

the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered
defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first
marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that
his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the
elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his
acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary
evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a
marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated
November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was
solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres,
a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas
that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner
presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics

Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued

by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on
November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would
already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public
documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to
public documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the
marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a
public record. When the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its
contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage
contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage
contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986,
and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.

Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification

issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on
February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document
attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage
celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents
merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the
absence of a record is quite different from documentary
evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves
as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to
absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a
marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar
as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The
mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity
are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense
that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the
self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced
against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the
valid first marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which
would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the
requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to
verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported nonexistence, it is significant to note that the certifications
issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February
3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated
after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private
respondent in this case.

As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence

presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects
of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to
Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime
of bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What
petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.

Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was

celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null
and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as
criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition
of the sacrosanct character of this special contract between
spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of
the permanent character of the special bond between
spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity
of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent
freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and
formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license,
and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally
declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under
Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the
validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be

considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition

written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void
ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in
some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant

petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting
petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the
crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez,

Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on

record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still
subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of
the accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look kindly on
such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of
the States basic social institution, the States criminal laws
on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which
has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which
has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the
decision of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

SEPARATE OPINION>
VITUG, J.:
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for
contracting, while still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a
second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas.
Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas
has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of
the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted
for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings".1 Bigamy presupposes a
valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted
during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have
been binding were it not for its being bigamous.

Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second

marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void,
constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy?
I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so
hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and
no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity. 2As
early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has
underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does
not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the
judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before
it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for
bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court,
" an express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts)
are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal
statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally
exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense
in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted
prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity,
however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab
initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an
indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family
Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first
marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time
the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage. 5 I
maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the
Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may
be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has
expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage
may be invoked "on the basis solely of the final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." It may not be amiss
to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the

Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held

that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior
void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it
were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been
abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of
Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt
the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is
just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be
considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that
the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the
Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.8
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class
by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to
reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law
with those of church laws.9 The "psychological incapacity to
comply" with the essential marital obligations of the spouses
is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which
are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a
marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of
the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a
marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological
incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to
have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage,
remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a
nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children
conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial
declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a
voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to
assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, property
regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as
if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage
is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First,
psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity
of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the
essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages; 10 and
second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e.,
relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake
in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively
easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being

a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11 It would

have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a
marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for
apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon
Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity
appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that,
unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation
or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act
No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or
defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article
36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could
prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family
Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of
prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the
framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly
meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the
fact that a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity
remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and
efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such
marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise
dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy.
Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first
marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same
way that a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage
(being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other
than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has
declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is
committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be
held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown
that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements
of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union.
Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has
been contracted without the necessary license and thus
void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the
second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the
crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances,
however, the lapses refers to the elements required for

contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for

the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily
entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for
bigamy can unassailably arise.
Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand,
does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either
essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the
declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous
marriage due to that ground, without more, would be
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The
judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies
theeffects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact
of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent
declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses
but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection
of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on
the part of the offender who had entered into it.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.
25

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are

incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the
relationship between the parties be legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of
any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or half-blood.
26

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from

the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives; whether
legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil
degree;
(2) Between step-parents and stepchildren;

(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the

solemnizing officer. (53a)

(4) Between the adopting parent and the

adopted child;

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(5) Between the surviving spouse of the

adopting parent and the adopted child;

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in
the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and

(6) Between the surviving spouse of the

adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate
child of the adopter;

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes

place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take other as
husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age.
(53a, 55a)

(8) Between adopted children of the same

adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the
intention to marry the other, killed that other
persons spouse or his or her own spouse.

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or

formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

VITUG,
8

I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a

judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage even
for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to
cases when it can be said that the marriage, at least
ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such
judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required
when either or both parties have not at all given
consent thereto that verily results in a "no" marriage
situation or when the prior "marriage" is between
persons of the same sex.
9

Deliberations of the family Code Revision

Committee, 9 August 1996.
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these
essential requisites are present:
10

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties

who must be a male and a female; and

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall

not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable. (n)
11

One might observe that insanity, which could be

worse than psychological incapacity merely renders a
marriage voidable, not void.
12

De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6

November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et.
Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al.,
144 Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246;
People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079.
13

People vs. Lara, supra.

14

De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon.

Diez, supra.

not live together after the marriage although they would

meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent
gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped
visiting her.3
On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent
was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with
a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).4
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private
respondent sometime in June 1990, when she learned about
petitioners marriage to Santella, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.5 This case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126746

November 29, 2000

ARTHUR TE, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division,
dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 239711 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 261782 and the Resolution dated October 18, 1996
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa
were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of

Quezon City an action for the annulment of his marriage to
private respondent on the ground that he was forced to
marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed her
pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and
that she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her
essential marital obligations.7
On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative
case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of
their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they
committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge
that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
married to private respondent. With respect to petitioner,
private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella
that he was still single.8
After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for
bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of
court and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing
antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel
during the hearings of said case.

The trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence in an

Order dated November 28, 1990 which stated that the same
could not be granted because the prosecution had sufficiently
established a prima facie case against the accused.9 The RTC
also denied petitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal
basis.10
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C. Peralejo, for (1)
exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioners
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by
denying petitioners [motion for reconsideration and]
demurrer to evidence even before the filing of the same; (3)
disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court;
and (4) ruling that in a criminal case only "prima facie
evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.11
Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the
PRC (PRC Board), where the administrative case for the
revocation of his engineering license was pending, a motion
to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106
and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.12 When the
Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July 16,
1991,13 petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another
petition for certiorari, contending that the Board gravely
abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution
of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome of the
administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the
continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could
render nugatory petitioners right against self-incrimination
in this criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making
an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of the
Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice
of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the
pendency of criminal and/or administrative proceedings
against the same respondent involving the same set of facts
in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they

arose from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division,
rendered the assailed decision in the consolidated petitions.
The appellate court upheld the RTCs denial of the motion to
inhibit due to petitioners failure to show any concrete
evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and
had prejudged the case. It also ruled that the denial of
petitioners motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground
of prejudicial question was in accord with law.15 The Court of
Appeals likewise affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to
evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth
persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the
prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing the
existence of the elements of bigamy.16
Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Boards Order denying petitioners motion
to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the
ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court held that no
prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.17
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Court of Appeals but the same was denied.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the
following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS
ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL
[CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW

IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO

EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE
COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS
LEGAL ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
HIMSELF.19
The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for
annulment of petitioners marriage to private respondent has
rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the
criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of
petitioners engineering license before the PRC Board moot
and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of prejudicial
question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts
and rules.20
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a
fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would
be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.21 The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.22
The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the
pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by
petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the
criminal case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is
terminated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners

marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.23 Petitioners argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the
civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue,
because a declaration that their marriage was voidab
initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is
untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza24 andPeople vs.
Aragon25 cited by petitioner that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is
found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in
effect at the time of petitioners marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said article states that the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Thus, under the law, a
marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.26 In Landicho vs. Relova,27 we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of a
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage
exists.28
It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question which
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission
of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment
necessitate the suspension of the administrative proceedings
before the PRC Board. As discussed above, the concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We

have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question

where one case is administrative and the other is civil.29

there was no witness presented to show that a second

marriage ceremony participated in by him ever took place.31

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations

Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the
PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding
the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the
respondent involving the same facts as the administrative
case:

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to

evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of such discretion.32 In this case, the Court
of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer
on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a prima
facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and second,
petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to
justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the
appellate court will not review in a special civil action
for certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.33 In view of the
trial courts finding that a prima facie case against petitioner
exists, his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his
defense.34

The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the

courts or an administrative case in another judicial body
against an examinee or registered professional involving the
same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed
before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the
proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed
independently with the investigation of the case and shall
render therein its decision without awaiting for the final
decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the
administrative complaint before the PRC Board are not
confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage
contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also
charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to
perform his obligations as husband to private respondent and
as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella
without the benefit of marriage.30 The existence of these
other charges justified the continuation of the proceedings
before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the trial courts denial of his demurrer to evidence
in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the prosecution
failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that
the original copy of marriage contract between him and
private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein
were not properly identified and there was no showing that
the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He
alleges further that the original copy of the marriage
contract between him and Santella was not presented, that
no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and that

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioners

misimpression that by denying his demurrer to evidence in
view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the
trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is
liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court
of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was
not an adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of
the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to determine
whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to
resolve the case.35 The RTCs observation that there was
a prima facie case against petitioner only meant that the
prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its
proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of
bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the
same, such would be the conclusion.36 Said declaration by the
RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of
petitioners guilt. It was precisely because of such finding
that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that
petitioner may present evidence in his defense and allow said
court to resolve the case based on the evidence adduced by
both parties.

Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge

Peralejo in Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been
granted since said judge exhibited partiality and bias against
him in several instances. First, when petitioner manifested
that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial
of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the
judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied
even though the motion for reconsideration had not yet been
filed. Second, when petitioners counsel manifested that he
had just recovered from an accident and was not physically
fit for trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely
trying to delay the case and required said counsel to produce
a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to
evidence, the judge characterized the same as dilatory and
declared that he would deny the same. According to
petitioner, the judges hostile attitude towards petitioners
counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the
grant of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by
petitioner against Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show
that the latter was biased and had prejudged the
case.37 In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,38this
Court held that while bias and prejudice have been
recognized as valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of a
judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule is that
the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the
charge of bias and partiality.39

guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in

any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself
from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by
respondent judge in denying petitioners motion to inhibit.
The test for determining the propriety of the denial of said
motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and
impartial trial.40 The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or
his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial.
As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners
motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer
to evidence are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Neither was there anything unreasonable in the requirement
that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to
support his claim that he suffered an accident which
rendered him unprepared for trial. Such requirement was
evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure that
the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary
and unjustified delays, in keeping with the judges duty to
disposing of the courts business promptly.41

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his

motion to inhibit are not among those expressly mentioned in
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of
Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of

merit.

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial

officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise,
or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

SO ORDERED.

Footnotes

23

The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:

(1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved; (3) the
offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS B. THE
REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2 ,
Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 137110

August 1, 2000

VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G.

MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is
necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted.

One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first

obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by
statute as "void."
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
July 14, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-GR
CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution denying
reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 13848, which convicted herein petitioner of bigamy
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul
G. Mercado a.k.a. Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of
Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt, [the
court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison
term of three (3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days
of prision correccional, as minimum of his indeterminate
sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21) days of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties
provided by law.
Costs against accused."2
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial
courts judgment, as follows: "From the evidence adduced by
the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr. Vincent
Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on
June 27, 1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge
Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage Contract
was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in
said document, the status of accused was single. There is no
dispute either that at the time of the celebration of the
wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married
man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in
a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge
Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage

Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony

was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October
10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu
City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused
and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on
June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial
Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were
consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma
Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul,
Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed
by complainant through counsel with the City Prosecutor of
Bacolod City, which eventually resulted [in] the institution of
the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information
dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the
bigamy case was lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused
filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against
Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a
Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G.
Mercado and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
"Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code for having contracted a second marriage
with herein complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991
when at that time he was previously united in lawful
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu
City, without said first marriage having been legally
dissolved. As shown by the evidence and admitted by
accused, all the essential elements of the crime are present,
namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or in case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage;
and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the
essential requisites for validity. x x x

"While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s],

accused posited the defense that his previous marriage ha[d]
been judicially declared null and void and that the private
complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of accused.
"It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was
entered into with Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991,
accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was
subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any
judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior
marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva. Since no declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been made at the
time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with
complainant on June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly
married to his first wife."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
"Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. But here, the final judgment
declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came
not before the celebration of the second marriage, but after,
when the case for bigamy against accused was already tried
in court. And what constitutes the crime of bigamy is the act
of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved."4
Hence, this Petition.5
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"A

Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage

is present in order to convict petitioner.
"B
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of
petitioner of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of
the Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
"C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on
the basis of reasonable doubt."6
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
"The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings."
The elements of this crime are as follows:
"1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the

essential requisites for validity."7
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the
elements of bigamy were present. It is undisputed that
petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu
City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a
second marriage, this time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo
Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab initio. Unlike
voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside
by a competent court, he argues that a void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all.8 Thus, he concludes
that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also
quotes the commentaries9 of former Justice Luis Reyes that
"it is now settled that if the first marriage is void from the
beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first
marriage is voidable, it is not a defense."
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage
was declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. She argues that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent
time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage has been
characterized as "conflicting."10 In People v. Mendoza,11 a
bigamy case involving an accused who married three times,
the Court ruled that there was no need for such declaration.
In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage
during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died,
he married for the third time. The second wife then charged
him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that the
second marriage was void ab initio because it had been

contracted while the first marriage was still in effect. Since

the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the Court
ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its
nullity. Hence, the accused did not commit bigamy when he
married for the third time. This ruling was affirmed by the
Court in People v. Aragon,12which involved substantially the
same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v.
GSIS,13 Jose Consuegra married for the second time while the
first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court
awarded one half of the proceeds of his retirement benefits
to the first wife and the other half to the second wife and her
children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second
marriage. It held: "And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observes that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be voidab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,14 however, the Court again held that
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage was not
necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his Death
Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving
spouse. The first wife then filed a Petition to correct the said
entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor of the
first wife, holding that "the second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of the
first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no
force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish
the invalidity of a void marriage."
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,15 the Court stressed the need for
such declaration. In that case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an
action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia
Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior
existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia asked that she be
allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her
first husband had previously been married to another woman.
In holding that there was no need for such evidence, the
Court ruled: "x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first
husband at the time they married each other, for then such a

marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a

judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at
the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel; x x x."
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,16 the Court reverted to the ruling
in People v. Mendoza, holding that there was no need for
such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,17 the issue raised was whether a judicial
declaration of nullity was still necessary for the recovery and
the separation of properties of erstwhile spouses. Ruling in
the affirmative, the Court declared: "The Family Code has
settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the
nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy."18
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other
cases herein cited was not a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new
provision of the Family Code, which came into effect several
years after the promulgation ofMendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act
No. 3613 (Marriage Law), which provided:
"Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted
by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the

absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally

considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage as contracted
being valid in either case until declared null and void
by a competent court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision
"plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable
marriages."19
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under
Article 83 of the 1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family
Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a new
provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity
of the previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final
judgment declaring such marriage void was necessary. Verily,
the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier ruling
in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the
Civil Code Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the
Supreme Court that the marriage of a person may be null and
void but there is need of a judicial declaration of such fact
before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86,
143 SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA
315). This provision changes the old rule that where a
marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033)."20
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling
in Mendoza and Aragon that there is no need for a judicial

declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside

by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now
necessary before one can contract a second marriage. Absent
that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement
in Terre v. Terre,21 which involved an administrative
Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting
the lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second
marriage because the first one was void ab initio, the Court
ruled: "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and voidab
initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule
was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family
Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage,
contracted without a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in
character."
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose
earlier work was cited by petitioner, changed his view on the
subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code and wrote in
1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
subsequent marriage:22
"It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void
from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As
with a voidable marriage, there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x
x. The Code Commission believes that the parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage
before they should be allowed to marry again. x x x."
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage
although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the
first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed
a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting

a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he

committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his
view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of
bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to
declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of
the charge against him.

"Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case

where she was fully conscious of the consequences of her act.
She should have known that she would suffer humiliation in
the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in this case,
ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are
indeed damages caused to her reputation, they are of her
own willful making."25
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.

Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set
aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals insofar as it denied
her claim of damages and attorneys fees.23

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

VITUG, J.:

Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the
CA against her; hence, she cannot obtain affirmative relief
from this Court.24 In any event, we find no reason to reverse
or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point,
which we quote hereunder:

At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute

nullity of a previous marriage in an indictment for bigamy.
The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed brother, Mr.
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a
judicially decreed prior void marriage which can constitute a
defense against the criminal charge.

"We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented

in this case that Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that
she claims to be; she was well aware of the existence of the
previous marriage when she contracted matrimony with Dr.
Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.

The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a

given but I have strong reservations on its application beyond
what appears to be its expressed context. The subject of the
instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and
the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul
G. Mercado for bigamy.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of
his previous marriage does not inspire belief, especially as
she had seen that Dr. Mercado had two (2) children with him.
We are convinced that she took the plunge anyway, relying on
the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.

Article 40 of the Family code reads:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."

The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all

insignificant. Void marriages, like void contracts, are
inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of
exception that the Family code requires a judicial declaration
of nullity of the previous marriage before a subsequent
marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity
and the full legal consequence of the subsequent marriage
would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article 53, in
relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I
would daresay that the necessity of a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage
should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said
that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such
judicial declaration of nullity, in my view, should still be
deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance, is
between persons of the same sex or when either or both
parties had not at all given consent to the "marriage."
Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been
meant and intended to refer only to marriages declared void
under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have
the effect of overturning the rule in criminal law and related
jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
"Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not
void, prior marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be,
for instance, a voidable marriage, it obviously being valid and
subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as
People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:

"xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had

the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring
judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void
marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we
are bound by said rule of strict interpretation."
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until
judicially annulled (and therefore not a defense in bigamy if
the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree
of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a
previously contracted marriage, being a total nullity
and inexistent, should be capable of being independently
raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see
no incongruence between this rule in criminal law and that of
the Family Code, and each may be applied within the
respective spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226

February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the
decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated
August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison
term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.
Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion
for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as
follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were
boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four
(4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card

from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former
replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left
again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and
proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada.
Both agreed to get married, thus they were married
on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her
work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario
Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the
declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage with
Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with
Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on
the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the

bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently

denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution.
When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its
judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1)
Day ofPrision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted
petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure
a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before
they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court
cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in
which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted
by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the
second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that his act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from
the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of

Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No.
20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed
decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the
appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020
could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to
be punished by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact
that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a
valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree
obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the
Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign
jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts
decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the

motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in
the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to
speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes
of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our
resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF
CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT
EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN
INTO ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not

petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense
of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for
relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues
that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like
other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code,
is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal
intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that
there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime
and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second
marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur,
stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is
of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The
OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No.
6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and
lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all
the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In MarbellaBobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved,
or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent

spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively

dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that
during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil
Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and
Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and
further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar,
Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage
contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere
signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held
that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 322 and 423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes,
reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law,
never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken
from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020,
hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,

legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia

Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under
the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal
effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal
purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence
and the validity of the first marriage being an essential
element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is
no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished
from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage
was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before
a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all
was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage
and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held

liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration

of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be

proved during trial.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to

liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner
has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good
faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.

"Acts committed contrary to the provisions of

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying
herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that
his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.

12

ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision

mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
13

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or

to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.
14

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,

wills, and other public instruments shall be governed
by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before
the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
the solemnities established by Philippine laws
shall be observed in their execution.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga,

JJ., concur.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts

or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in
a foreign country.

The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in

Records, p. 1, reads:
"That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992,
in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused being previously
united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete
on August 23, 1990 and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with
Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and

19

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage

may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
22

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place
with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other
as husband and wife in the presence of not less
than two witnesses of legal age.
23

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal

requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio,except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall

render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall
not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity
shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
liable.