Digest Compilation Succession

IV. Principles Affecting the Legitime

1.) Neri v. Akutin
Facts: Testator in his will left all his property by universal to
the children by his second marriage, the respondents, with
preterition of the children by his first marriage, the
etitioners. The court annulled the institution of heirs and
declared total intestacy. Motion for reconsideration was filed
by the respondents on the ground that there is no preterition
and assuming if there was, the effect would not be the
annulment of the institution of heirs but simply the reduction
of bequest made to them.
Issues: Whether receipt in advance of shares in the properties
of the decedent a ground of preterition?
Held: Upon the findings of facts, all the parcels that
corresponds to the decedent is on the hands of the
administrator after the inventory was filed in court thus the
property of the deceased has remained intact and that no
portion has been given to the first marriage. The testator left all
his property by universal title to the children by his second
marriage and that without expressly disinheriting the children
by first marriage, he left nothing to them upon erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than
those given to the children by the second marriage. This is
accordingly a case of preterition governed by Art. 184 of the Civil
Code, which provides that the institution of heirs shall be
annulled and intestate succession should be declared open.
2.) Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
Nature: Direct appeal from judgment of CFI dismissing the
complaint of Tirso Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to
Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu the properties received by his
deceased wife under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano
Barretto.
Parties: Tirso Reyes, guardian of minors Azucena, Flordelis
and Tirso, all surnamed Reyes y Barretto, PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, DEFENDANTAPPELLEE

Facts: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During

their lifetime, they acquired vast estate (real property in Manila,
Pampanga and Bulacan). When Bibiano died (Feb. 18, 1936), he
left his share in a will to Salud Barretto (mother of the minors)
and Lucia Milagros Barretto; and a small portion as legacies to
his sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew
and nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for Maria
(the widow). As appointed administratrix, Maria prepared a
project of partition, signed by her in her own behalf and as
guardian of the minor Milagros. It was approved, and the estate
was distributed and the shares delivered. Salud took immediate
possession of her share and secured the cancellation of OCTs
and issuance of new titles in her name.
Upon Marias death (Mar. 5, 1948), it was discovered that she
executed two wills: in the first, she instituted Salud and
Milagros as her heirs; in the second, she revoked the same and
left all her properties in favor of Milagros alone. The later
will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the first
will presented by Tirso Reyes (as guardian of the children of
Salud Barretto), the TC held that Salud was not the daughter of
the decedent Maria by her husband Bibiano. The SC affirmed
the same.
TC: The project of partition submitted in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano is
null and void ab initio (not merely voidable) because the
distributee (Salud), predecessor of Tirso et. al., was not
a daughter of the Sps. Bibiano and Maria. The nullity of
the project of partition was decreed on the basis of Art.
1081 (OCC) (A partition in which a person was
believed to be an heir, without being so, has been
included, shall be null and void). As Milagros was the
only true heir of Bibiano, she was entitled to recover
from Salud and her successors all the properties
received by her from Bibianos estate, in view of Art.
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1456 (NCC) which states that property acquired by
mistake or fraud is held by its acquirer in implied trust
for the real owner.
Having lost the fight for a share in the estate of Maria as her
legitimate heir, Tirso now falls back upon the remnant of the
estate of Bibiano (the fishpond), which was given in usufruct to
Maria. Hence, this action for the recovery of the one-half
portion thereof. This action afforded Milagros an opportunity
to set up her right of ownership; not only of the fishpond under
litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to
Salud, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in
the estate of Bibiano, thereby directly attacking the validity, not
only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court
based thereon as well.
Issues/Held:
(1) W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond
in question is void ab initio and Salud did not acquire valid
title to it. NO.
(2) W/N Milagros action is barred by the statute of limitations.
YES.
Ratio
(1) Art. 1081 (OCC) is misapplied! Salud admittedly had been
instituted heir in Bibianos last will and testament together
with Milagros. Hence, the partition had between them could
not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an
heir without really being one, and was not null and void
under Art. 1081. The legal precept of Art. 1081 does not
speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and
the fact that Salud did not happen to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs
expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano was at liberty
to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he
chose. While the share () assigned to Salud impinged on

the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease
to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano. Nor does the fact that
Milagros was allotted in her fathers will a share smaller
than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir,
since there was no preterition or total omission of a forced
heir here.
The view that the partition in question is void for being a
compromise on the civil status of Salud, in violation of Art.
1814 (OCC) is erroneous. A compromise presupposes the
settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of
the parties; and the condition of Salud as daughter of the
testator Bibiano, while untrue, was at no time disputed
during the settlement of the estate of testator. There can be
no compromise over issues not in dispute. While a
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere
forbids a settlement by the parties over the share that should
correspond to a claimant to the estate.
At any rate, independently of the project of partition (a mere
proposal for distribution of estate), it is the court alone that
makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled. It is that judicial decree of distribution, once final,
that vests title in the distributees. Where a court has
validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the
project of partition becomes irrelevant.
(2) Milagros contends that as Maria could not have ignored that
Salud was not her child, the act of Maria in agreeing to the
partition and distribution was a fraud on her rights and
entitles her to belief. This contention is unfounded.
First, there is no evidence that when Bibianos estate was
judicially settled and distributed, Salud knew that she was
not Bibianos child. Thus, if fraud was committed, it was
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Maria who was solely responsible; and neither Salud nor her
minor children can be held liable therefor.
Second, granting there was such fraud, relief therefor can be
obtained within 4 years from its discovery, and the record
shows that this period had elapsed a long time ago.
At the time of distribution, Milagros was only 16. She
became of age 5 years later (1944). On that year, her
cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud
the court decree distributing her fathers estate and the
4-year period of limitation started to run, to expire in
1948. Conceding that Milagros only became aware of the
true facts in 1946, her action still became extinct in 1950.
Her action was barred in Aug. 1956, when she filed
her counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of
distribution of Bibianos estate.
There is no evidence of an alleged verbal promise by
Tirso to reconvey the properties received by Salud,
which allegedly induced Milagros to delay the filing of
the action. Granting that there was such promise, it
would not bind Tirsos wards, who are the real partiesin-interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian,
being an act of disposition, and not of administration,
cannot bind his wards, being null and void as to them
unless duly authorized by the proper court
Dispositive: CFI decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
insofar as it orders Tirso to reconvey to Milagros the properties
enumerated in said decision. The same is AFFIRMED, insofar
as it denies any right of Milagros to accounting. The action for
partition of the fishpond must be GIVEN DUE COURSE.
3.) Naguid v. Naguid
JUNE 23, 1966
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid , single, died in December 30,
1962.She was without descendants but was survived by her

parents and siblings. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid,

her sister filed in CFI a holographic will allegedly executed
by Rosario on November 17, 1951 or 11 years ago, said will
instituted Remedios as the universal heir thereby,
compulsory heirs, the ascendants of the decedent, filed their
opposition to the probate proceeding. They contend that
they were illegally preterited and as a consequence, the
institution is void. The courts order held that the will in
question is a complete nullity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compulsory heirs were
preterited , thereby rendering the holographic will void.
Whether the court may rule on the intrinsic validity of the
will.
RULING: The statute we are called upon to apply in article
854 of the civil code which states:
The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct time, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of
the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the d and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious
The forced heirs, parents of the deceased, were received
nothing by the testament. The one-sentence will institutes
petitioner as the universal heir. No specific legacies or
bequest are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we
say that the nullity is complete.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testators will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are
not mentioned therein or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited. Disinheritance is a
testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir
his/her share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law.
On the second issue, the case is for the probate of the will
and the courts area of inquiry is limited to the extrinsic
validity of the will comes after the will has been duly
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authenticated. However if the case is to be remanded for
probate of the will, nothing will be gained. The practical
conditions: time, effort, expenses and added anxiety,
induced us to a belief that we might as well meat head-on
the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.
4.) Acain v. Acain
October 27, 1987
FACTS: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will
of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from
properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother
Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such
property shall be given to Segundos children. Segundo predeceased Nemesio.
The oppositors Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the
deceased, and the latter's widow Rosa filed a motion to dismiss
on the following grounds:
(1) the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings;
(2) he is merely a universal heir and

although she is a compulsory heir. Even if the surviving

spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if
she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the
direct line.
The same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted
person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate
child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal
heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that
both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least
their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition of
the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance.
The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand
valid and respected, except insofar as the legitimes are
concerned.

ISSUE: Was there preterition?

The universal institution of petitioner together with his

brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator
results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification
of such institution of universal heirs - without any other
testamentary disposition in the will - amounts to a
declaration that nothing at all was written.

HELD: Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's

will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article 854 may not
apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,

In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a

probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it.
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or
a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or

(3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been

preterited.

Digest Compilation Succession

real property he is called upon to receive. At the outset, he
appears to have an interest in the will as an heir. However,
intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs,
petitioner is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no
legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by
the deceased.
5.) Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes
FACTS: On September 1988, private respondents filed a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that
Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of
disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents.
Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the
holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of
the deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate easoning
that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can
be considered as a holographic will.
RULING: A holographic will must be written, dated and signed
by the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be
clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it
does not make an affirmative deposition of the latters property,
the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself.
The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in
favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.
With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that
the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the
will. It was Segundos last expression bequeath his estate to all
his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.
B. Reserva Troncal
1.) Gonzales v. CFI
Facts: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y
Tuason, died. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races,
and their seven children: (Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and
Filomena, Benito, Alejandro and Jose). The real properties left

by Benito were partitioned in three equal portions by his

daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F.
Legarda.
Filomena died intestate and without issue. Her sole heiress was
her mother, Filomena Races. Mrs. Legarda executed an affidavit
adjudicating to herself the properties which she inherited from
her deceased daughter, Filomena. As a result, Filomena Races
succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as coowner of the properties held proindiviso by her other six
children.
Mrs. Legarda executed two handwritten Identical documents
wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited
from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). Mrs. Legarda
and her six surviving children partitioned the properties
consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda
y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their
father,
Benito
Legarda
y
De
la
Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will. The decree of probate was affirmed by the CA.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter
of the testatrix, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of
her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable properties which should be inherited
by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not
by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose. That motion was
opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Beatriz filed an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of securing a

Digest Compilation Succession

declaration that the said properties are reservable properties.
Lower court dismissed the action of Beatriz.

which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved by the reservor.

Issue: whether the properties in question are subject

to reserva troncal under art.

Reserva
troncal contemplates
legitimate
relationship.
illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity are
excluded. Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a
transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such
as donacion and succession.

Held: In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired

by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a brother
or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the
said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the
said property for the benefit of relatives who are within the third
degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who
belong to the line from which the said property came.
3 transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by
lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from an ascendant or
brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or
legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la
reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation,
and (3) a third transmissions of the same property (in
consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third
degree from the deceased descendant belonging to the line of
the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased
descendant.
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or
brother or sister from whom the property was received by the
descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the
reservor (reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the
property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the
reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from

The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the

death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival,
at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the property came.
The properties in question were indubitably reservable
properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda. She was a reservor. The
reservation became a certainty when at the time of her death the
reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived
Mrs. Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had
inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as
long as the reservees survived the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties
should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third
degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children
of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary
disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees
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in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in
the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891.
That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
2.) Chua v. CFI
Facts: Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First with Patricia, he
had 3 children- Ignacio, Manuel and Lorenzo. When Patricia
died, he married Consolacion de la Torre and had one childJuanito Frias Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate. After the
intestate proceeding the court adjudicated half of lot in question
to Consolacion and the other half to their only son, Juanito. The
two sons in the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received
P3k and P1550respectively. (Manuel already died).Juanito also
died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la Torre executed a
declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the proindiviso share of her son Juanito in the lot in question. When
dela Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a
complaint praying that the one-half portion of the Lot be
declared as a reservable property for the reason that the lot
in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article
981 NCC. Lower court dismissed complaint.
Issue: WON property in question was acquired by Juanito
Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua gratuitously (as first
requisite of Reserva Troncal).
Held: Yes
Ratio: In order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit:
(1) that the property was acquired by a descendant from
an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2)
that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property
is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4)
that there are relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which said property came.

All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by

the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the second marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his proindiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias Chua who died
intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives
are Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios
Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo
Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein
Per Manresa, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does notgive anything in return." It
matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not
subject to any priorcharges; what is essential is that the
transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any
obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return.
"the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so
gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the
transferee any prestation." It is evident from the record that the
transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua
of the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias
Chua was by means of a hereditary succession and therefore
gratuitous.
As long as the transmission of the property to the heirs is free
from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous
3.) Edroso v. Sablan
G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913
FACTS: Spouses Marcelina Edroso and Victoriano Sablan had
a son named, Pedro who inherited two parcels of land upon the
death of his father. Subsequently, Pedro died, unmarried and
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Digest Compilation Succession

without issue, the two parcels of land passed through
inheritance to his mother. Hence the hereditary title whereupon
is based the application for registration of her ownership. The
two uncles of Pedro, Pablo and Basilio Sablan (legitimate
brothers of Victoriano) opposed the registration claiming that
either the registration be denied or if granted to her, the right
reserved by law to them be recorded in the registration of each
parcel. The Court of Land Registration denied the registration
holding that the land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the
mother and the said two uncles. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: Whether the property in question is a reservable
property. Whether Marcelina Edroso has the absolute title of
the property to cause its registration.
RULING: A very definite conclusions of law is that the
hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration
(gratuitous tile), and it is so characterized in Article 968 of the
Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in
return for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law
also is that the uncles are within the third degree of blood
relationship.
Article 811. The ascendant who
inherits from his descendant
property which the latter
acquired without a valuable
consideration from another
descendant, or form a brother or
sister, is under obligation to
reserve what he has acquired by
operation of law for the relatives
who are within the third degree
and belong to the line where the
property proceeded.

Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from

him the two parcels of land which he had acquired without a
valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another
ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquire them by
operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third
degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita
Fernandez (parents of Victoriano), where the lands proceeded.
The trial courts ruling that they partake of the nature property
required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with
the law.
The conclusion is that the person required by Article 811 to
reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights to use
and usufruct. He has, moreover, the legal title and dominion,
although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has under an
express provision of the law the right to dispose of the property
reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a
condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the one
who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although
a limited and revocable one. In a word, the legal title and
dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while
he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been
assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hadnt, the relatives within the third degree in
whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually or
constructively or formally, in their possession; and moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple
which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only
when the person who must reserve the right should die before
them will they acquire it.
4.) Sienes v. Esparcia
FACTS: The case involves Lot 3368 which originally belonged
to Saturnino Yaeso. According to the cadastral records, upon
Saturninos death, he left the aid land to Francisco, his only son
with his second wife, Andrea Gutang. Because Francisco was a
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Digest Compilation Succession

minor at the time, his mother administered the property for
him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes due thereon. When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the
age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his
sole heir, executed an extrajudicial settlement and sale whereby,
among other things, she sold the property in question to the
appellant, Constancio Sienes. Thereafter, Cipriana and Paulina
Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who had
declared the questioned property in their name, executed a deed
of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes.
The Trial court declared both sale as void and ordered that the
property be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone
surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of
Andrea Gutang.
ISSUE: WON the sale of the property by the ascendant who is
obliged to reserve the property is valid although at the time of
his death, there are still surviving relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
RULING: The land in question was reservable property.
Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without
descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea
Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to
the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses that when Andrea Gutang died, the lone
reservee surviving her is Cipriana Yaeso. The reserve creates
two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the
ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the
line from which the property came. The reservista has the legal
title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a
resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject
to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable

and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired

by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista. The sale
made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore,
subject to the condition that the vendees would definitely
acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor
died without being survived by any person entitled to the
reservable property. When Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso
was still alive; thus, the previous sale made by the former in
favor of appellant became of no legal effect and the reservable
property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana. On the
other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory
condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the
reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the
condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to
the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person
obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of
the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person
obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute
owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. d then
descending to the heir.
6.) Florentino v. Florentino
Doctrine: Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by
the death of ascendants (reservista) together with his own property in
favor of another of his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of
the latters lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the reason that,
as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving same
as an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its
delivery to the relatives, within the third degree, of the predecessor in
interest, without prejudicing the right of the heir to an aliquot part of
property, if he has at the same time the right of reservatorio.
9

Digest Compilation Succession

Note: Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree,
the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property
which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should
return to him, excludes that of the one more remote.
Facts: Apolonio Florentino II married Antonia Faz de leon, they have
11 children. One of the children is Encarnacion, plaintiff in this case.
Apolonio became a widower and married again, he married Severina
Faz de leon, they had 2 children, Mercedez Florentino and Apolinio
III. Mercedez was the defendant in this case. Apolinio Florentino
died.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino executed a will before the notary public of Ilocos Sur,
instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned 11 children, the
posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he
declared, in one of the paragraphs of said will, all his property should
be divided among all of his children of both marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to
Apolonio Florentino III, his posthumos son, the property marked
with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold rosary,
pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some
personal property and other objects mentioned in the complaint.
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second
marriage, died in 1891; that his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a
will instituting as her universal heiress her only living daughter,
Mercedes Florentino
Issue: whether the property left at the death of Apolonio III, the
posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or was not invested with
the character of reservable property when it was received by his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon?
Held: Was invested with the character of reservable property.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their

complaint came, without any doubt whatsoever, from the common

ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of Apolonio III
without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of
his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable
property, in accordance with the provision of article 811 of the Code,
with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of
persons other than those comprehended within the order of person
other than those comprehended within the order of succession traced
by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute
dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his
descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property nor
become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property
only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died
(reservista) in which case said reservable property losses such
character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will
of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes
Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision there is in her
will concerning the reservable property received from her son
Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of
the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews of her
daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said
property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of
fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the
reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes
Florentino.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order
of decision appealed from we should declare, as we hereby do, that
the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased Severina Faz
de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property;
that the plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within
the third degree, are entitled to six-sevenths of said reservable
property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining
seventh part thereof
7.) Cano v. Director of Lands
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Digest Compilation Succession

Doctines: the reservatario receives the property as a
conditional heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property
merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally strayed during the reservista's
lifetime
Reserved property is no part of the estate of the reservista,
and does not even answer for the debts of the latter
reservable property can not be transmitted by a reservista to
her or his own successors mortis causa,(like appellants
herein) so long as a reservatario within the third degree
from the prepositus and belonging to the line whence the
property came, is in existence when the reservista dies
Facts: CFI Sorsogon approved registration of 2 parcels of
land in Juban, Sorsogon with their improvements, in the
name of Maria Cano, Filipina, 71 years of age, widow and
resident of Juban, province of Sorsogon. With the
understanding that Lot No. 1799 shall be subject to the right
of reservation in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. Certificate of
Title were issued in the name of Maria Cano, subject to
reserva troncal in favor of Eustaquia Guerrero. Counsel for
the reserve (reservatorio) Guerrero filed a motion with the
Cadastral Court, alleging the death of the original registered
owner and reservista, Maria Cano, on September 8, 1955.
Cancel OCT and TCT be issued in favor of Guerrero. The
motion was opposed by the sons of reservista Maria Cano,
Jose and Teotimo Fernandez:
contended that the application and operation of the
reserva troncal should be ventilated in an ordinary
contentious proceeding
Registration Court did not have jurisdiction to grant
the motion.
Lower Court: death of the reservista vested the ownership
of the property in the petitioner as the sole reservatorio
troncal. Hence, the TCT was issued in the name of
Eustaquia Guerrero

WON: The title was validly issued to Eustaquia Guerrero,

the reservatorio? -YES
HELD: From the stipulation of facts, it is evident that Lot
No. 1799 was acquired by the Appellant Maria Cano by
inheritance from her deceased daughter, Lourdes Guerrero
Lourdes in turn, inherited the same from her father Evaristo
Guerrero
Hence, falls squarely under the provisions of Article 891 of
the Civil Code; and that each and everyone of the private
oppositors are within the third degree of consaguinity of the
decedent Evaristo Guerrero, and who belonging to the same
line from which the property came
The only requisites for the passing of the title from the
reservista to the appellee, Eustaquia are:
1. the death of the reservista; and
2. the fact that the reservatario has survived the
reservista.
Both facts are admitted, and their existence is nowhere
questioned.
8.) Mendoza v. Delos Santos
FACTS: The properties subject in the instant case are three
parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan are presently in
the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot
No. 1646-B, on the other hand, is also in the name of respondent
but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
11

Digest Compilation Succession

siblings. Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza
(Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Petitioners
alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas
properties that were subject of an oral partition and
subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria.
After Leonors death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992,
Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that
after Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister,
adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole
surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim
that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in
their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article
891
of
the
Civil
Code
on
reserva
troncal.

property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the

benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and belong
to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
RULING:
No,
CA
is
correct.
I.
Reserva
troncal
is
not
applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the
return of a reservable property to the third degree relatives
belonging to the line from which the property originally came,
and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the
inheriting ascendant.

DECISION
OF
LOWER
COURTS:
(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed
the complaint filed by petitioners. CA also denied their motion
for
reconsideration.
ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM
THE FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT
HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE
OF
THE
LAW
ON
RESERVA
TRONCAL.
APPLICABLE LAW: The principle of reserva troncal is
provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code: Art. 891. The
ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties

should be reckoned only from Exequiels as he is the ascendant
from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not
go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in determining
the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and
Dominga or whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is
pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is the
ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came.
Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received the
properties
from
Exequiel
by
gratuitous
title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been
acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an ascendant by
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Digest Compilation Succession

gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return.18 At risk of being repetitious, what was clearly
established in this case is that the properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus)
acquired
the
properties
as
inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias
collateral
relative.
II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as
they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from
whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at
the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in
this case. Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of the prepositus are fourth
degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of
reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from
whom the reservable properties came. The only recognized
exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of the
prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the
prepositus and relatives within the third degree.
OTHER
NOTES:
1. three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title, whether by inheritance or
donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant
called the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation
of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor,

also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is

from the reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must
be relatives within the third degree from which the property
came.
2. The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant or prepositus (propositus) who received the
property;
(3) The reservor (reservista), the other ascendant who obtained
the property from the prepositus by operation of law; and (4)
The reservee (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
the prepositus and who belongs to the (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should be
reserved
by
the
reservor.
3. Art. 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral. A direct line is that constituted by the series
of
degrees
among
ascendants
and
descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but
who
come
from
a
common
ancestor.
4. Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance
with
the
following
articles.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor
children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall
succeed
to
the
estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood.
5. Reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the
reservable character of the property on the title. In reserva
troncal, the reservista who inherits from a prepositus, whether
by the latters wish or by operation of law, acquires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute

13

Digest Compilation Succession

ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him
exclusively.
C. Reserva Adoptiva
1.) Banawa v. Mirano
Facts: Banawa and Mendoza took their niece Maria Mariano to
Mahabang Ludlod, Taa, Batangas. The spouses reared the child
because they were childless. Through a general merchandise,
they were able to generate income to acquire parcel of lands.
Due to an illness, Mariano was survived by her sister Primitiva
and the three children of his brother Martin. Two parcels of land
are in dispute in this case: a parcel of land in Barrio Iba in Taal
Batangas (Iba property) and a parcel of sugar land in Carsuche
(Carsuche property). The petitioners assert that the Iba
property were sold to Maria Mariano. Defendant, on the other
hand, claimed that the money used in buying said land
pertained to the spouses. The Carsuche property brought a
conflict of evidence between petitioners and respondent.
Petitioners assert that the sale of the property was made in a
public instrument in favor of Maria Mariano. The defendants
for their part assert that it was made in writing by Biscocho who
is the original owner of the property. The CFI declared Maria
Mariano the owner of the two parcels of land. Defendants
appeal to the CA but it affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied which led
to this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Maria Mariano is entitled to both Iba
and Carsuche property
Held: If the money used by Mariano in purchasing the property
was given by Banawa and Mendoza, then the money had to
belong to her. The contract entered into by the vendor with
Mariano is not a simulated contract because of the absence of
fraud, concealment or deception. The intention of the spouses
to make Maria Mariano the owner of the parcel of land was

clearly shown by their conduct at the time of the execution of

the deed of sale.
Art. 1448 of the NCC is not applicable in this case because the
deed of sale was executed before its effectivity. Acquisitive
prescription may not likewise be invoked because petitioners
were not able to secure a title.
Sec. 5 of Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court provides that "in
case of death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature,
and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs, except as to
property received or inherited by the adopted child from either
of his parents by adoption, which shall become property of the
latter or their legitime relatives who shall participate in the
order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates"
When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law
must be taken to mean exactly what it says.
Wherefore, the decision of the CA is affirmed as to the Iba
property but reversed as to the Carsuche property which was
acquired by Banawa and Mendoza.
2.) Teotico v. del Val
FACTS: Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving
properties worth P600,000. She executed a will written in
Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before
Notary Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies
made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who was
married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The
usufruct of Marias interest in the Calvo Building were left
to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in
equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of
said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition
for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val
Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca
(deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural
child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was
not executed as required by law and that Maria as physically
14

Digest Compilation Succession

and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or
influence of fear.
ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this
proceeding.
HELD: It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person
may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding is that
he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property
to be affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the
estate and be benefited by such as an heir or one who has a
claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will,
defendant has no right to intervene because she has no such
interest in the estate either as heir, executor or
administrator because it did not appear therein any
provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any portion of
the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a
legal heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL
CODE. Even if her allegations were true, the law does not
give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister
of both Jose and Francisca because being an illegitimate
child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationship established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of
the adopting parents except only as expressly provided by
law. As a consequence, she is an heir of the adopter but not
of the relatives of the adopter.
Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as
testamentary or as legal heir in the probate proceeding.
3.) In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie
Nathy Astorga Garcia

FACTS: Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor

illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to
Catindig, his surname. Trial court granted the petition and
declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and
pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, she is now known as
Stephanie Nathy Catindig. Honorato filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname Garcia as her middle name. The
Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her
relationship with her natural mother should be maintained and
preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future,
and under Article 189 she remains to be an intestate heir of her
mother.
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by
her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name.
RULING: Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child
adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so. Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is
silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the
CC merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the
surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on
the matter. Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother.

15