when they were dismissed without a

written notice and a hearing, as required

by law. Hence, this petition.

in Private Sector
15.9 Conti versus NLRC
F:

Petitioner

Amor

Conti

was

employed by respondent Corfarm as

cashier. Petitioner Leopoldo Cruz was
employed by the same respondent
corporation as a warehouseman In their
respective employment contracts with
Corfarm, it was stipulated that their
employment shall be coterminous with the
effectivity of the contract executed by and
between Corfarm and MERALCO for the
management of the latter's commissary.
On 13 January 1993, petitioners
received a memorandum, from private
respondents terminating their services
allegedly for two reasons: 1) the expiration
of their employment contracts, these being
coterminous
with
the
management
contract
between
Corfarm
and
MERALCO, and; 2) the on-going
evaluation of their past performances, and
investigation of the internal auditor of
Corfarm
of
certain
anomalous
transactions involving them
Petitioners filed with the arbitration
branch of the NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal against private respondents
which declared the complainants to have
been
illegally
dismissed
and
the
respondents ordered to reinstate them
immediately.
Private
respondents
appealed the aforementioned decision of
the labor arbiter. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC decision,
which motion was denied. Petitioners
contend that they were denied due process

I:

Were the petitioners illegally

R:

YES. This Court has consistently

dismissed?

held that the twin requirements of notice

and hearing constitute essential elements
of due process in the dismissal of
employees. As to the requirement of notice,
it has been held that the employer must
furnish the worker with two written
notices before termination of employment
can be legally effected: (a) notice which
apprises

the

employee

of

the

and;

(b)

particular acts or omissions for which

his

dismissal

is

sought,

subsequent notice which informs the

employee of the employer's decision
to dismiss him.

In the case at bar, neither notice nor

hearing was afforded the petitioners.
Petitioners had been employed with
private respondent Corfarm since 1991.
They had been discharging their functions
as head of commissary and store
supervisor, respectively, for more than one
(1) year. Under the law therefore, they are
deemed regular employees and thus
entitled to security of tenure.

18.9 Lazo vs CSC 236 SCRA 469

Facts: On November 11, 1988 the Civil

Ruling: NO, While it is true as a general

Service Commission received a letter

proposition that the CSC cannot motu

reporting that petitioner Dennis C. Lazo

propio revoke a certificate of eligibility

had boasted to him that he had bought his

without

career service (subprofessional) eligibility

examinees concerned, in the context of

from the Civil Service Commission for P7,

this case, which simply involves the

000.00, P4, 500.00 of which had been paid

to the examiner.The CSC ordered the
examination answer sheets of petitioner to
be retrieved and hand-checked by the
Office of Recruitment, Examination and
Placement.The rechecking disclosed that
petitioner's actual score was 34.48%, not
76.46% as indicated in his certificate of
eligibility.The
dismissed

the

CSC

filed,

but

administrative

later

to the

irregularity.

However, it revoked his eligibility for being

null and void.When the CSC denied his
motion for reconsideration, he filed a
petition for certiorari alleging that the
CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion
and denied petitioner's right to due
process

by

unilaterally

and

hearing

to

the

rechecking of examination papers and

nothing more than a reevaluation of
documents already in the records of the
CSC according to a standard answer key
previously set by it, notice and hearing
was not required. Instead, what applied
was the rule of res ipsa loquitur (the thing
speaks for itself)

charges

against petitioner for lack of evidence

linking petitioner

notice

revoking

petitioner's eligibility without a formal

investigation or an opportunity given to
him to examine and go over his answer
sheet in the Civil Service Examination

2.14 Rivera v. CSC 240 SCRA 43

F:

This

petition

for certiorari assails

the

resolution, dated 25 March 1993, of respondent

Civil Service Commission ("CSC") relative to an
administrative case, entitled "Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. George I. Rivera," as well as its
resolution, dated 03 March 1994, denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of
Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of
the Philippines ("LBP"). On the basis of the
affidavits of William Lao and Jesus C. Perez,
petitioner was charged, on 01 February 1988, by
the LBP President with having committed the
following offenses:

Issues: W/N petitioners right to due

process was violated when his certificate
of eligibility was revoked without notice or
hearing

(1) Dishonesty;
(2) Receiving for personal use of
fee, gift or other valuable thing, in
the course of official duties or in
connection therewith when such

fee, gift, or other valuable thing is

given by any person in the hope or
expectation of receiving a favor or

3.19 US v. Toribio 15 Phil. 85

better

G.R. No. L-5060 January 26, 1910 THE

UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
LUIS TORIBIO, defendant-appellant.

treatment

than

that

accorded other persons;

(3) Committing acts punishable
under the Anti-Graft laws;
(4) Pursuit of private business
vocation or profession without the
permission

required

by

Civil

Service Rules and regulations;

(5) Violation of Res. 87-A, R.A.
No. 337; resulting to misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. 1

I:
R: Given the circumstances in the case at bench,
it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde
to inhibit herself totally from any participation
in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to
give

full

meaning

fundamental

aspect

and
of

consequence
due

process.

to

The

argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not

participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August
1990 is unacceptable. It is not denied that she
did participate, indeed has concurred, in MSPB's
resolution of 03 March 1994, denying the motion
for reconsideration of MSPB's decision of 29
August 1990.
WHEREFORE, CSC Resolution No. 94-1276 is
SET ASIDE, and the case is REMANDED to
respondent Civil Service Commission for the
resolution, sans the

participation

of

Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, of herein

petitioner's motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 93-1189. No costs.

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of

carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in
the province of Bohol. The trial court of
Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality
wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act
regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle. The act
prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit
for agricultural work or other draft
purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that

what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal
slaughter house without a permit given by
the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen
has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling,
(2) the act constitutes a taking of property
for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of owners, and it is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police
power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.
3

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147,

regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power

of the state.

Facts: The Supreme court Said sections 30

and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered
for human consumption of large cattle at
any place without the permit provided for
in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly
susceptible of two or more constructions,
that construction should be adopted which
will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute
was enacted, and a construction should be
rejected which would tend to render
abortive other provisions of the statute
and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its
enactment

The Supreme Court also said that if they

will follow the contention of Toribio it will
defeat the purpose of the law.

The police power rests upon necessity and

the right of self-protection and if ever the
invasion of private property by police
regulation can be justified, The Supreme
Court
think that the reasonable
restriction placed upon the use of carabaos
by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized
as a reasonable and proper exercise of that
power.

The Supreme Court cited events that

happen in the Philippines like an epidemic
that wiped 70-100% of the population of
carabaos.. The Supreme Court also said
that these animals are vested with public
interest for they are fundamental use for
the production of crops. These reasons
satisfy the requesites of a valid exercise of
police power

The Supreme court finally said that article

1147 is not an exercise of the inherent
power of eminent domain. The said law
does not constitute the taking of caraboes
for public purpose; it just serve as a mere
regulation for the consumption of these
private properties for the protection of
general welfare and public interest.

5. 14. Chavez v. Romulo 431 SCRA

534 (2004)

FACTS: Acting on President Arroyos

directive in her speech on the need for a
4

nationwide gun ban in all public places to

avert
the
rising
crime
incidents,
respondent Ebdane issued the assailed
Guidelines in the Implementation of the
Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside
of Residence. Francisco I. Chavez, a
licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR
has been issued, requested the DILG to
reconsider the implementation of the
assailed Guidelines. However, his request
was denied.
Thus, he filed the present petition
impleading public respondents. The
Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of
the petition pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts and contends that (1)
the PNP Chief is authorized to issue the
assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not
have a constitutional right to own and
carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines
do not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution; and (4) the assailed
Guidelines do not constitute an ex post
facto law.
ISSUE: Whether the said guidelines
violates the due process clause
RULING: In evaluating a due process
claim, the first and foremost consideration
must be whether life, liberty or property
interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence
is that a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a
property nor property right. In Tan vs.
The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a
license is merely a permit or privilege to
do what otherwise would be unlawful, and
is not a contract between the authority

granting it and the person to whom it is

granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested
right.
In
a
more
emphatic
pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr. that: Needless to say, all
licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded
by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by
the
due
process
clause
of
the
Constitution. All property in the state is
held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general
welfare

6.19 WHITE LIGHT V. CITY OF MANILA

(Police Power Not Validly Exercised
Infringement of Private Rights)
FACTS: In 1992, then Mayor Lim signed
an Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila.
White Light Corp is an operator of mini
hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance is nullified as the said
Ordinance infringes on the private rights
of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes
at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed by the Constitution. The City
maintains that the ordinance is valid as it
is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to
regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance
of
cafes,
restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
5

houses, lodging houses and other similar

establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. The CA ruled in favor of
the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said
ordinance is null and void as it indeed
infringes upon individual liberty. It also
violates the due process clause which
serves as a guaranty for protection against
arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said
ordinance invades private rights. Note
that not all who goes into motels and
hotels for wash up rate are really there for
obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to wash up or to
freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to
be avoided by the said ordinance is more
or less subjected only to a limited group of
people. The SC reiterates that individual
rights may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by
the legitimate demands of public interest
or public welfare

.14 Himagan vs, People 237 SCRA 538

Facts: Himagan is a policeman assigned in
Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was
charged for the murder of and attempted
murder. Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975,
Himagan was placed into suspension
pending the murder case. The law
provides that Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty

imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1)

day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be
subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused. Himagan
assailed the suspension averring that Sec
42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree,
that his suspension should be limited to
ninety (90) days. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over
90 days is contrary to the Civil Service
Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of
laws.
Issue: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975
violates equal protection guaranteed by
the Constitution
Ruling: No. The reason why members of
the PNP are treated differently from the
other classes of persons charged criminally
or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen
carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought
out
in
the
legislative
discussions. If a suspended policeman
criminally charged with a serious offense
is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses
against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to
silence by the mere fact that the accused is
in uniform and armed. The imposition of
preventive suspension for over 90 days
6

under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate

the suspended policemans constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws.
9.19 Nicolas v. Romulo 578 SCRA 438
Facts: On the 1st of November 2005,
Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape
against Nicole. He was convicted of the
said crime and was ordered by the court to
suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US
serviceman convicted of a crime against
our penal laws and the crime was
committed
within
the
countrys
jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a
treaty between the US and Philippines,
the US embassy was granted custody over
Smith. Nicole, together with the other
petitioners appealed before the SC
assailing the validity of the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA). Their contention is that
the VFA was not ratified by the US senate
in the same way our senate ratified the
VFA.
ISSUE:

Is

the

VFA

void

and

unconstitutional & whether or not it is

self-executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing
Agreement because the parties intend its
provisions to be enforceable, precisely
because the VFA is intended to carry out
obligations and undertakings under the
RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. As a
matter of fact, the VFA has been
implemented and executed, with the US
faithfully complying with its obligation to

produce Smith before the court during the

trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing
legislation inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress
that executive agreements registered
under this Act within 60 days from their
ratification be immediately implemented.
The SC noted that the VFA is not like
other treaties that need implementing
legislation such as the Vienna Convention.
As regards the implementation of the RPUS Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and
this
can
only
be
done
through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is
another form of implementation of its
provisions.
.14 Sto. Tomas vs. Paneda
FACTS: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted
RA 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for
among
other
purposes,
sets
the
Governments
policies
on
overseas
employment and establishes a higher
standard of protection and promotion of
the welfare of migrant workers, their
families, and overseas Filipinos in
distress. Petitioners seek to annul Sections
6, 7, and 9 of RA 8042 for being
unconstitutional.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 as
unconstitutional for the reason that it
gives undue advantage to the non-licensed
recruiters in violation of the right to equal
7

protection of those that operate with

government licenses or authorities. The
RTC also declared Section 7 as
unconstitutional on the ground that its
sweeping application of the penalties
failed to make any distinction as to the
seriousness of the act committed for the
application of the penalty imposed on such
violation. Hence, petitioners seek to
reverse the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: WON Sections 6, 7, and 9 of RA
8042 are unconstitutional.
RULING: No. The SC sets aside the
decision of the RTC of Manila and declares
Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042
valid and constitutional. As the Court held
in People v. Ventura, the State under its
police power may prescribe such
regulations as in its judgment will secure
or tend to secure the general welfare of the
people, to protect them against the
consequence of ignorance and incapacity
as well as of deception and fraud. Police
power is that inherent and plenary power
of the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and
welfare of society.

II Who determines Probable Cause

12.19 PEOPLE V. CA GR 126005 JAN. 21,
1999
Facts: Jonathan Cerbo was charged in an
information for murder in connection with
the fatal shooting of Rosalinda Dy inside
the oce of his father, Billy Cerbo. The
information was amended to include Billy

Cerbo as one of the accused and a warrant

for his arrest was correspondingly issued.
Respondent judge, in a motion to quash
warrant of arrest, dismissed the case
against Billy for insuciency of evidence,
recalled the warrant issued, and ordered
the prosecution to withdraw its amended
information and to file a new one charging
Jonathan Cerbo only. The private
prosecutor's motion for reconsideration
was denied, hence, his resort to the Court
of Appeals. The appellate court, in
arming the trial court held that the trial
court RTC has authority to reverse the
prosecutor's finding of probable cause and
dismiss the information on the ground
that the evidence presented did not
substantiate the charge.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred
in finding that no probable cause exists to
merit the filing of charges against private
respondent Billy Cerbo.
Ruling:
Yes. The determination of
probable cause to hold a person for trial is
a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. It is an executive function, the
correctness of the exercise of which is a
matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The judge should not override the public
prosecutor's determination of probable
cause on the ground that the evidence
presented to substantiate the issuance of a
warrant of arrest was insufficient. As a
general rule, if the information is valid on
its face and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or
prejudice on the part of the public
8

prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for

want of evidence because evidentiary
matters should be presented and heard
during the trial.

GR 140946

Agent Samiano failed to present during

the preliminary examination conclusive
evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold
the counterfeit products. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the sales receipt
NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence
that he bought the products from
Maxicorp was in the name of a certain
"Joel Diaz."

FACTS : This case involves the issuance of

ISSUE: Whether or not theres a probable

III. Kinds of Evidence Needed to Establish

Probable Cause
12.20 MICROSOFT CORP. V. MAXICORP,

search warrant to the respondent

MAXICORP Inc for alleged violation of
Section 29 of Intellectual Property and
Article 189 of the RPC (unfair
competition). Armed with the search
warrants, NBI agents conducted a search
of Maxicorps premises and seized
property fitting the description stated in
the search warrants. Maxicorp filed a
motion to quash the search warrants
alleging that there was no probable cause
for their issuance and that the warrants
are in the form of "general warrants."
Where the RTC denied the motion and at
the same time denied their motion for
reconsideration. According to RTC theyve
found a probable cause to issue such
warrant after examining the NBI agent
and the computer technician who visited
Maxicorp. Maxicorp filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTCs order. The
Court of Appeals reversed the RTCs order
denying Maxicorps motion to quash the
search warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners motion on 29 November
1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI

cause on the part of CA to quash the

search warrants issued by RTC
RULING: Probable cause means "such
reasons,
supported
by
facts
and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious
man in the belief that his action and the
means taken in prosecuting it are legally
just and proper."Thus, probable cause for a
search warrant requires such facts and
circumstances
that
would
lead
a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with that
offense are in the place to be searched. The
testimonies of these two witnesses,
coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to
establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is
reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in
copyright
infringement
and
unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners.
Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were
clear and insistent that the counterfeit
software were not only displayed and sold
within Maxicorps premises, they were
also produced, packaged and in some
cases, installed there. The determination
9

of probable cause does not call for the

application of rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires
after trial on the merits. As implied by the
words themselves, "probable cause" is
concerned with probability, not absolute or
even moral certainty. The prosecution
need not present at this stage proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably
prudent man, not the exacting calibrations
of a judge after a full-blown trial. No law
or rule states that probable cause requires
a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists.
Probable cause is determined in the light
of conditions obtaining in a given
situation.26 Thus, it was improper for the
Court of Appeals to reverse the RTCs
findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samianos purchase
of counterfeit goods is not in his name. For
purposes of determining probable cause,
the sales receipt is not the only proof that
the sale of petitioners software occurred.
During the search warrant application
proceedings,
NBI
Agent
Samiano
presented to the judge the computer unit
that he purchased from Maxicorp, in
which computer unit Maxicorp had preinstalled petitioners software.

14.14 LUNA vs. PLAZA (26 SCRA 310)

Facts: Luna was charged with the crime of
murder before the court of respondentjudge Lorenzo Plaza. Supporting the
complaint were sworn statements of the

witnesses for the prosecution, in the form

of questions and answers taken by
investigator T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscribed
and sworn to before the respondent Judge
at the time of the filing of the complaint.
The respondent Judge examined the
prosecution witnesses by reading to them
"all over again the questions and answers"
in their statements in writing, and the
witnesses-affiants declared before said
Judge that the questions were propounded
by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the
answers were made by them. Considering
the answers of the affiants to the questions
contained in their sworn statements,
together with the post-mortem and
autopsy report on the dead body of the
victim, the respondent Judge opined that
there was reasonable ground to believe
that the crime of murder had been
committed and the accused was probably
guilty thereof. Respondent Judge issued
the order and warrant of arrest, specifying
therein that no bail should be accepted for
the provisional release of the accused.
Petitioner contends that Republic Act No.
3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before
he can issue a warrant of arrest, two
specific duties, to wit: (1) he must

examine the witnesses personally; (2)

the examination must be under oath; and
(3) the examination must be reduced to
writing in the form of searching questions
and answers. The record of the instant
case, according to petitioner, does not show
that said examination was performed by
respondent Judge.

10

ISSUE: Did the respondent judge violate

the above-mentioned requisites for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest?
HELD:

The

first

condition

was

fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact

that "the respondent judge personally

examined
the
witnesses
for
the
prosecution;
that
respondent
judge
adopted as his own personal examination
the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa
appearing in the written statements,
which he read over again the witnesses
together with the answers given therein,
asking the witnesses whether said
answers were theirs, and whether the
same answers were true, to which the
witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit
the municipal Judge from adopting the
questions asked by a previous investigator.
The second condition for the issuance

of a warrant of arrest was also

fulfilled. The trial court found that the
complaint was "supported by statements of
the witnesses under oath." The third
condition
fulfilled.

requiredwas
The

examination

likewise
of

the

witnesses was written down, in the form of

searching questions and answers.
Additional notes: The term "searching
questions and answers" means only,
taking into consideration the purpose of
the preliminary examination which is to
determine "whether there is a reasonable
ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest

may be issued and the accused held for

trial. What would be searching questions
would depend on what is sought to be
inquired into, such as: the nature of the
offense, the date, time, and place of its
commission, the possible motives for its
commission; the subject, his age,
education, status, financial and social
circumstances, his attitude toward the
investigation,
social
attitudes,
opportunities to commit the offense; the
victim,
his
age,
status,
family
responsibilities, financial and social
circumstances, characteristics, etc. The
points that are the subject of inquiry may
differ from case to case. The questions,
therefore, must to a great degree depend
upon the Judge making the investigation.
At any rate, the court a quo found that
respondent Judge was "satisfied that the
questions and answers contained in the
sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa
partake of the nature of his searching
questions and answers as required by law,"
so the respondent Judge adopted them.
Frank Uy versus BIR
F:

In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a

former employee of UPC reported to the

BIR that Uy Chin Ho aka Frank Uy,
manager of UPC, was selling thousands of
cartons of canned cartons without issuing
a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 &
263 of the Internal Revenue Code. In Oct
1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu
to issue a search warrant. Judge GozoDadole issued a warrant on the same day.
A second warrant was issued which
11

contains the same substance but has only

one page, the same was dated Oct 1st
2003. These warrants were issued for the
alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A third
warrant was issued on the same day for
the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of
these warrants, agents of the BIR,
accompanied by members of the PNP, on 2
Oct 1993, searched the premises of the
UPC. They seized, among other things, the
records and documents of UPC. A return
of said search was duly made by Labaria
with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion
to quash the warrants which was denied
by the RTC. They appealed before the CA
via certiorari. The CA dismissed the
appeal for a certiorari is not the proper
remedy.
I:

Whether there was a valid search

warrant issued?
R:

NO. The SC ruled in favor of UPC

and Uy in a way for it ordered the return

of the seized items but sustained the
validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that
the search warrant issued has not met
some basic requisites of validity. A search
warrant must conform strictly to the
requirements
of
the
foregoing
constitutional and statutory provisions.
These requirements, in outline form,
are

(1) the warrant must be issued upon

probable cause;
(2)

the

probable

cause

must

be

determined by the judge himself and

not by the applicant or any other

person;

(3) in the determination of probable

cause, the judge must examine, under

oath or affirmation, the complainant

and such witnesses as the latter may
produce; and
(4)

the

warrant

issued

must

particularly describe the place to be

searched and persons or things to be
seized.
The SC noted that there has been
inconsistencies in the description of the
place to be searched as indicated in the
said warrants. Also the thing to be seized
was not clearly defined by the judge. He
used generic itineraries. The warrants
were also inconsistent as to who should be
searched. One warrant was directed only
against Uy and the other was against Uy
and UPC. The SC however noted that the
inconsistencies were cured by the issuance
of the latter warrant as it has revoked the
two others.
17.15 Oklahoma Press v. Walling, 327
US 186
Facts: The provisions of Section 11(a) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, authorizing
the
Administrator
to
investigate
conditions and practices of employment in
any industry subject to the Act, and of
Section 9, incorporating the provisions of
Section 9 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act authorizing the issuance
and judicial enforcement of subpoenas,
were challenge by the petitioners,
12

contending
that
they
violate
the
prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment
against
unreasonable searches
and
seizures or any other provision of the
Constitution. Said law applies to business
of publishing and distributing newspapers
like the herein petitioners. Respondent
conducted an investigation pursuant to the
above-mentioned
law
against
the
petitioners.
Issue: Whether the Fair Labor Standard
Act violates the fourth amendment.
Ruling: No. The Fourth Amendment, if
applicable, guards against abuse only by
way of too much indefiniteness or breadth
in the things required to be particularly
described, if the inquiry is one the
demanding agency is authorized by law to
make and the materials specified are
relevant, the gist of the protection being
the requirement that the disclosure sought
shall not be unreasonable. There was no
violation of petitioners rights in these
cases, since both petitioners were
corporations;
the
only
records
or
documents sought were corporate ones; no
element
of
self-incrimination
was
presented or claimed; all the records
sought were relevant to an inquiry for the
purpose
of
determining
whether
petitioners were subject to the Act and, if
so, whether they were violating it; and
such an inquiry was authorized by Section
11 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
18.20 People v. Cuenco GR 128277, Nov.
16, 1998

FACTS: Ferdinand Cueno y Mata was

accused for the sale of Marijuana, a
prohibited drug. A surveillance operations
was ordered to be conducted on the alleged
drug pushing activities of herein accused.
During the operation, a sale of marijuana
has been consummated. They reported the
result of their surveillance to their
commanding officer who instructed them
to apply for a search warrant. They were
issued a search warrant which ordered the
search of the premises of Ferdie and the
seizure of dried marijuana leaves allegedly
in the possession of aforesaid person.
However, they were instructed that a buybust operation be conducted on the
accused first before the implementation of
the search warrant. After the operation,
they arrested Ferdie. The policemen
announced that they had with them a
search warrant for the search and seizure
of marijuana. Before the raiders proceeded
to search the house of the accused, they
called for barangay officials in the area to
witness the conduct of the search.
Appellant questioned his conviction
because of the illegality of the search made
in his house. He contends that the
policemen showed the barangay officials
the search warrant which was not shown
to the them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search made
in the house of the accused was illegal
RULING: The arrest of appellant has been made in the
course of a buy-bust operation, thus, in flagrante
delicto. A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment
which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means
of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law - is
far variant from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests, it

13

becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending

officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect but also in the permissible area
within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the

effective control of the person arrested, or that which

may furnish him with the means of committing violence
or of escaping.

14