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[10]
[11]
Six (6) days after the issuance of P.D. No. 582, or on November 20, 1974, at the instigation
of respondent Cojuangco, Jr., AII, represented by respondent Cojuangco, Jr. as Chairman and
President, and NIDC, represented by its Senior Vice-President, Augusto E. Orosa, entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Cojuangco had an exclusive contract with Dr. Yann
Fremond of the Research Institute for Oil and Oilseeds, granting the former the exclusive right to
establish and operate a seed garden for the production of Ivory Coast Hybrid Seednuts, a hybrid
developed by Dr. Fremond, and supposedly most suitable for Philippine soil and climate. AII
and NIDC stipulated, in fine, that AII shall develop the Bugsuk property for the growing of
hybrid seednuts and sell the entire production to NIDC, which shall in turn pay AII part of the
costs in the development and operation of the seed garden and the support facilities.
[12]
[13]
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1468, otherwise known as the Revised
Coconut Industry Code, substituting the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) for the NIDC as
administrator-trustee of the CIDF. UCPB is a commercial bank acquired by the government
through the CCSF for the benefit of the coconut farmers. On August 27, 1982, President Marcos
lifted the coconut levy. With the only financial source of the CIDF depleted, UCPB had no
choice but to terminate the agreement with the AII effective December 31, 1982.
Adversely affected by this turn of events, AII demanded arbitration. A Board of Arbitrators
was created pursuant to the arbitration clause in the MOA. AII nominated Atty. Esteban Bautista
while UCPB designated Atty. Anacleto Dideles. In turn, the two appointed Atty. Bartolome
Carale, a professor at the UP College of Law, as third member and Chairman of the Board.
On March 29, 1983, the Board of Arbitrators rendered a decision awarding to AII liquidated
damages for Nine Hundred Fifty-Eight Million Six Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P958,650,000.00) from the CIDF. From this award was deducted the Four Hundred Twenty-Six
Million Two Hundred Sixty-One Thousand Six Hundred Forty Pesos (P426,261,640.00)
advanced by the NIDC for the development of the seed garden, leaving a balance due to AII
amounting to Five Hundred Thirty-Two Million Three Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty-Four Pesos (P532,388,354.00). Costs of arbitration and the arbitrators fee of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) were also taken from the CIDF.
[14]
On April 19, 1983, the UCPB Board of Directors, composed of respondents Cojuangco, Jr.,
as President, Enrile as Chairman, Dela Cuesta, Zayco, Ursua and Pineda as members, adopted
Resolution No. 111-83, resolving to note the decision of the Board of Arbitrators, allowing the
arbitral award to lapse with finality.
[23]
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not,
the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable
only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason
and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
[24]
Statutes regulating procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that context and in view of the retroactive
application of procedural laws, the instant petition should thus be considered timely filed.
[25]
On the matter of prescription, before B.P. Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982,
the prescription period for violation of the Anti-Graft Practices Act was ten (10) years. The
complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 was filed before the PCGG on February 12, 1990 or
more than fifteen (15) years after the birth of the allegedly illegal contract.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions
were made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to
perpetrate fraud against the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could
only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the
original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior
to said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those
transactions. Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the
date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after
the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.
[35]
We do not subscribe to the Ombudsmans view that P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 ipso facto served
to insulate the private respondents from prosecution. The legislative imprimatur allegedly
granted by the then President Marcos to the MOA is not necessarily inconsistent with the
existence of a violation of R.A. No. 3019. Thus, Section 1, Article III of P.D. No. 961,
promulgated in 1976, reads:
[37]
[38]
The task to determine and find whether probable cause to charge the private respondents
exists properly belongs to the Ombudsman. We only rule that the Office of the Ombudsman
should not have dismissed the complaint on the basis of prescription which is erroneous as
hereinabove discussed. The Ombudsman should have given the Solicitor General the opportunity
to present his evidence and then resolve the case for purposes of preliminary
investigation. Failing to do so, the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.