G.R. No.

201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage
contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total

of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never
issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the
Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated
warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case
submitted for decision.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy
status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who
were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part
of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase
"married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally
failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally
was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two
condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and
the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties
under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of
Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate
proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos.
N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan,
Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634,
194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and
Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City
and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioners
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except
for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared
by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of
Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case,
all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence
on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no

evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of
bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by
the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and
common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial
court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the
date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin
who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of
witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally
could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at
her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present
her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally
was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the
trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked
this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to"
her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that
Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar
of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the
marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig; 13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief
of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office. 15 The
documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by
the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate
which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married
on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and
void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial courts
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands." 22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage

against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage
of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of
respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to
petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena. 23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x." 25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally 28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code. 30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of
the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued
refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing
the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the
case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

G.R. Nos. 175279-80

June 5, 2013

SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,

vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated April 20, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No.
01154) and granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).

The factual background is as follows:

On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with
respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the amount of P500,000.00 as
monthly support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here
and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite,
as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos
would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five
(P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes
which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is
payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the
hearing of the support pendente lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from September,
2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos.
Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly
support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each corresponding
month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly support
of P250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court may grant plaintiff as the
circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action
for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that
she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children and respondent has continued to support the
family for their sustenance and well-being in accordance with familys social and financial standing. As to
the P250,000.00 granted by the trial court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as theP1,750,000.00 retroactive
support, respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the needs of
the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final and executory since
respondents motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for violation of the threeday notice period
under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of
the period to appeal. Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the
court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite. 8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondents contention that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner without evidence to prove his actual income.
The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed Orders dated March 31,
2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a
new one is entered ordering herein petitioner:

a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005
and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number of months starting
from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private
respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance 11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy
of a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA
decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA
-- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him
to his children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner asserted that none of the
expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order 13 granting petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of execution as
it rejected respondents interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently
also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued
an Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration
is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of
plaintiff as against defendant for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua").
Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon. Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim
Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the
assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu
City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua
and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting
from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deductions aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondents act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the
issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different interpretation by the trial court of the
appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint
obligation of spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF
PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL
SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in
arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and
their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or
in keeping them alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said
items which it deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (P115,000.00) was fixed on the
basis of the documentary evidence of respondents alleged income from various businesses and petitioners testimony that
she needed P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses excluding
the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus
making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the children resided in one residence, the groceries
and dry goods purchased by the children using respondents credit card, totalling P594,151.58 for the period September
2003 to June 2005 were not consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle

and BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua, respectively, these, too,
are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that
being children of parents belonging to the upper-class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life
commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance
are indispensable to the childrens day-to-day living, the value of which were properly deducted from the arrearages in
support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to
give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. 18 Such
support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable
marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified
application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to
the rendition of judgment or final order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and
amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. 20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was determined after due
hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced
on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for
the sustenance of petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other
household expenses. Petitioners testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her scoliosis and
vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
A Presently, Sir?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a month for the food alone.
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir.
Q How much other expenses do you incur?
WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.

Q Why do you incur that much amount?

A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to
straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a driver, but I cannot still afford it now.
Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go
marketing because for my age, I cannot carry anymore heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver,
am I correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00.
Thats quite
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another which I will give a compensation of P5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:

Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you would like to add so I can
tell my client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3)
times a week.
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins
from excel that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for the operation of that
scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost P60,000.00 and the other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00 is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondents counsel manifested during the same hearing that
respondent was willing to grant the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the children and
petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court unmistakably show how much
respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different matter altogether.
Rejecting petitioners prayer for P500,000.00 monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly support offered by
respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the
supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and
registration documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are owned not by him but his parents and
siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente lite toP115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by
both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondents compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he
deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two
cars for the children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained
that the deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and their two childrens
monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by
receipts22:

Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne -

Php1,350,000.00

and Daniel Ryan -

613,472.86

Car Maintenance fees of Angelli Suzanne

51,232.50

Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan -

348,682.28

Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan -

118,960.52
Php2,482,348.16

After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting
that the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be considered as additional advances given to petitioner and
the children23:
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

14,611.15

Credit card purchases of Angelli

Suzanne

408,891.08

Salon and travel expenses of Angelli

Suzanne

87,112.70

School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua

260,900.00

Cash given to Daniel and Angelli

121,000.00

TOTAL GRAND TOTAL -

Php 946,465.64
Php 3,428,813.80

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in
equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and the
two children. Said court also noted the absence of petitioners contribution to the joint obligation of support for their
children.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.
Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on Provisional Orders 24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period of time as the court may
deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian
of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time
necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate

employment, and that spouses future earning capacity; (3) the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative
financial resources of the spouses, including their comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs
and obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in
home-making, child care, education, and career building of the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses;
(8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support,
taking into account that spouses earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and standard of living;
and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the
support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial
resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the
child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the nonmonetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no
controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling
the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant the following
rulings by US courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his
child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage
figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him to the children
themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine
amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not
entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given
to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother, the
father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will
meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be
credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the
children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah
1935). In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been made
as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We do not
believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the
manner in which she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give
them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating them
right the courts are open to the father for redress." 26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a divorce decree to make
child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children.
However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness
to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her.

The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the
support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as
a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra;
Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such
payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The
courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed. 28 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support
pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for
food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses
of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have
been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the
dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in
arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate
courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her
children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with
the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to
petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from
the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via
their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the
plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the
defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to
extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it
nevertheless held that considering respondents financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for
the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to
be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of
their two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for
various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of
more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous
expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses
incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of P100,000.00
each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the
present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs.
This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One
Hundred ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support
of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as
the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main
action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. 30 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente
lite for petitioner and her children:

1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua

Php 42,450.71

Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan

11,500.00

Credit card purchases of Angelli

365,282.20

(Groceries and Dry Goods)

Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan

228,869.38

TOTAL

Php 648,102.29

As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of
justice.31 To constitute contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 32 The good
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered. 33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which
is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that respondents act was not contumacious considering that he
had not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued
shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with the familys social
status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon equitable grounds, would
allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own because she presently
maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same time engages in the business of lending
money. He also claims that the two children have finished their education and are now employed in the family business
earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the trial court in which the
action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a trier of facts. The amount of support may be
reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support. 34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially
provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or
altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as
subject to final determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim
Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are
hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in arrears of
Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos starting
from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.

G.R. No. 183896

January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in
Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the
CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and
raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1
of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite
on January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this
case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they
were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz
St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the
marriage license number could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification
on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on
January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought
documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas
Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and
that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of
the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract
and copy of the marriage license with that office. 17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of
the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained. 20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at
the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. 22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the
Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person
went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three days later, the same person went back to their house,
showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed
at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could
identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of
the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several
days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned
with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
around them at the time were Chinese.31

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage
license had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is
hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property
was acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby
ordered to cancel from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE
PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value. 36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic]
Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE,
WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. 42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of
the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It
was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by
his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license, the Court held:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 44

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number
of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and
Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and
thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to
not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license
was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The

case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became
the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that
would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was
proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A
certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several pictures
were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of
appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against
him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready
to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without
a marriage license, is void ab initio.1wphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008
and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 030382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

G.R. No. 181089

October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES, Complainant,

vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the Order 1 dated September 24, 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which dismissed the
lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution 2 dated
January 2, 2008 denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo, Aklan. 3 On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna. 4 In 2001,
respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and
void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003. 6
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, Silverios daughter from the first marriage, filed with the
Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit 8 (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August
23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio
that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an Information 10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent
with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information
reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a

second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES
FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities. 11
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and
Dismissal of the Criminal Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio
in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic
element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the second
marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment 13 arguing that
the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the
law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting
and has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found respondent's argument that with the declaration
of nullity of her first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid marriages in
bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan 15 where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the
crime had already been consummated by then. x x x16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took
place in 1983, or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was only
discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent
contracted her first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and became
final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any
retroactive effect because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new one be entered quashing the information.
Accordingly, let the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before
the effectivity of the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of
the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of
respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on
the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle
that laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity should not prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of
her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.

Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated
January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's
marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason,
her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering
into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage
before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the
annulment of the first without incurring criminal liability.19
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by
private complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all
judicial proceedings filed before us.20
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, 21 the offended
party (private complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the Information for
bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should
have been filed in behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed criminal
cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given due course to a number of actions even when the respective
interests of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal
case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted
not to dismiss the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we had
done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as its own the instant
petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) 22
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, which it did, praying that the petition be
granted in effect, such Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the Information for
bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. 24
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with
Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent
authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she
alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab
initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was
never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been
declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other words, there was only one
marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. 25
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003.
The question now is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial,
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a
second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be
subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. 28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.29
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that
children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is,
therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital

contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while
beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment. 31
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling
that the moment the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage,
the accuseds first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been
legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged were
sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came
after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the information was filed.
We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. 34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 35
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered
into before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act
3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
before a person may contract a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall
have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain,
thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that
he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws.1wphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family
Code, to wit:

In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to
invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise,
all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void
for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and thereafter
contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.

G.R. No. 165166

August 15, 2012

CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004
decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision
ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied
the petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin,
Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father
of her child Gliffze.4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze. 5 For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute,
the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. 6 Trial on the merits ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she
met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte
branch where she had been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. 7 The
petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the last
week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on Valentines Day
and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he was ill. 9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented
room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle, on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern
Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994. 11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was
pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the respondent. 13 They in fact
applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal
gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans. 16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages
against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry.17 Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled
the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. 19 When the petitioner did not show up and failed to
provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of and support for
their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory
recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed paternity, 22 claiming that he first had
sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12)
weeks (or three (3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994. 23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents motion, 24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING

In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It
found the respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with the
petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony,
and her reason for engaging in sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage proposal. It
ordered the respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA. 27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that
the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the
petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one
boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the RTC decision and
ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting a P 2,000.00 monthly
child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the present petition for review
on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the respondents
testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondents testimony was due to an
incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was
her lover and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and
Gliffzes birth on March 9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered
the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden
of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child." 31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other

means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares supported
by corroborative proof that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts
to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. 37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. 38Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. 39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a
much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have been three
(3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed
to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the respondents clear and categorical
assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondents direct testimony regarding their first
sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact
was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the
respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained.
Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of

stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel)
but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead
of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a
conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct,
cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered." 43 Evidently, the totality of the respondent's testimony
positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has consistently asserted that she
started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993. 44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. 46 Thus, the amount
of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. 47 It may be reduced or increased
proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion
in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency
of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 195670

December 3, 2012

WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the October 8, 2009
Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which affirmed the
February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case No. I 2884.
The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores
(respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the said property regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision 5 dated November 10, 2000 on the basis
of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership 6 dated December 14, 2000 praying for the
distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage,
to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential
house constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a
residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT
No. 21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.

By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m.
(the area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the
area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.). 7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and
petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal
money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of
inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot
2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition
for dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses. 11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability benefit 12 since
respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they
submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family Code, hence,
invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her personal
funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. 14 She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second house
and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She
alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of P500,000.00. 15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties conjugal
partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor
of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties, the
dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was previously
annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974,
21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact
that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a
foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by Willem from the
conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are hereby declared to
be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their marital union and since there is
no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner and respondent are, thereby, directed
to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two houses aforementioned.

The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees considering the well
settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are likewise denied
for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not have
acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his
knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. 17 This was made evident by the
sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land were purchased from the
exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent. 18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to
purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come to court with clean
hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of
respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and
that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the purchase of the
said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife. 19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC of Negros
Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to
acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to the following
error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS ATTEMPT
AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE
USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22 (Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura
Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of
Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura Muller. It
held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land 24enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition" 25 and even
asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the basis of
such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioners
claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a
litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest,
or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land
dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same.
Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean
hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no
right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as
a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner
cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. 32 Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. 33 As held in Frenzel v.
Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause
has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by
the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from
filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as
between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake,
however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff." 34(Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship. 35 Precisely, it is the Constitution
itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban
against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two
(2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition.

Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony 36 and it is this policy which the
Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.