ON TOLLING OF PRESCRIPTION

1. LUZ M. ZALDIVIA vs HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR. and THE PEOPLE, G.R. No. 102342
July 3, 1992
FACTS OF THE CASE: The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the
Province of Rizal.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the
motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the
respondent judge.
ISSUE: What tolls the prescriptive period in cases of violations of municipal ordinances?
HELD AND RATIO: Institution of judicial proceedings tolls the prescriptive for violations of
municipal ordinances. The petitioner argues that the charge against her is governed by the
following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:
Sec. 1. Scope This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal
Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
B. Criminal Cases:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. How commenced. The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall
be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and
chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That when the
offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and sworn to
before the fiscal by the offended party.
She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for
Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall
Begin to Run," reading as follows:
Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance
with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two
months.
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations of law
not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Under Rule 110 specifically the last paragraph, which the SolGen and Respondent cited, that section
meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary
procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses
which are subject to summary procedure.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it
covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge
against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial
proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of
the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on
October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
PETITION GRANTED. CASE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.

2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CLEMENTE BAUTISTA, G.R NO. 168641, APRIL 27,
2007

FACTS OF THE CASE: On June 12, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his coaccused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other.
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a
Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. The Information
was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only
on June 20, 2000.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the
Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime,
that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet
prescribed. RTC concurred. CA, however, reversed and concluded that the offense had prescribed
by the time the Information was filed
ISSUE: Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutors
recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by the City
Prosecutor.
HELD AND RATIO: NO. It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively
interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight
physical injuries.

The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's
recommendation for the filing of an information against respondent, the period of prescription began to
run again. The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with
the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period.
The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the
investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive
period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such
time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court.
PETITION GRANTED.
3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, G.R NO. 152662, JUNE
13, 2012
FACTS OF THE CASE: On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges
that respondent issued nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred FiftyEight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of private complainant which
were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Respondent subsequently filed a motion to suspend the proceedings (which was granted) by reason of
the civil case she filed on December, 1997. This decision by the City Prosecutor of QC was reversed by
the DOJ Secretary. Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999,
were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk
of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City.
Respondent moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription. MeTC granted such. RTC
reversed. CA, however, reversed again and held that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already
prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against
respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the
period of prescription of such offense.
HELD AND RATIO: YES. We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part of
1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of prescription for violations of BP Blg. 22, such
being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of
dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed. The private respondent
then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom or until the latter part
of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the Act No. 3326.1 The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be
tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the
Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should,
and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the

1 SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more
than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not
known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again
if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling was broadened by the
Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v.Court of Appeals, et. al. when it held that the filing of the
complaint with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense.
Respondents contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving special laws is bereft
of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by
special laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling
in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws.
In the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, which is in all fours with the instant
case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted
the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22.
PETITION GRANTED. CA DECISION REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. RE-FILING OF INFORMATIONS FOR
VIOLATION OF BP 22 IS ORDERED.

4. JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION VS HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR.,

et.al, G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and
manage the parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized
under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Respondents acts in removing the wheel clamps on the wheels of the cars involved in these cases and
their failure to pay the prescribed fees, according to the Resolution of the City Prosecutor, were found
to be a violation of Sec. 21 of Baguio City Ordinance No. 003-2000.
The Resolution for filing of corresponding Informations was issued on July 25, 2003. On October 2,
2003, two criminal Informations were filed with the MTC Baguio.
Respondents Balajadia and the others, through their counsel, filed a motion to quash the two
Informations on the ground of extinguishment of criminal action or liability due to prescription, among
others. They argued that
x x x x Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3763, provides: "Section 1. x x x Violations
penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribed [sic] after two months."
x x x x As alleged in the Information, the offense charged in this case was committed on May
7, 2003. x x x x As can be seen from the right hand corner of the Information, the latter was
filed with this Honorable Court on October 2, 2003, almost five (5) months after the alleged
commission of the offense charged. Hence, criminal liability of the accused in this case, if any,
was already extinguished by prescription when the Information was filed.
Judge Lidua of MTC Baguio granted the motion. Jadewell filed an MFR alleging that the offenses
charged have not yet prescribed. They argued that, under the law, the period of prescription of
offenses shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information. While it may be true that the
Informations in these cases have been filed only on October 2, 2003, the private complainant has,
however, filed its criminal complaint on May 23, 2003, well within the prescribed period.

The judge upheld the grant of the M2Q.

A petition for certiorari was filed by Jadewell with the RTC of Baguio which the RTC dismissed. The
Court held that since cases of city ordinance violations may only be commenced by the filing of an
Information, then the two-month prescription period may only be interrupted by the filing of
Informations (for violation of City Ordinance 003-2000) against the respondents in court. An MFR was
denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003
tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against respondents Balajadia,
Ang, "John Does," and "Peter Does."
HELD AND RATIO: NO. In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of
prescription: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.
FIRST, with regard to the period of prescription, it is now without question that it is two months for the
offense charged under City Ordinance 003-2000.
SECOND, the offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the
petitioner on the same day. These actions effectively commenced the running of the
prescription period.
The procedural rules that govern this case are the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. As
provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the
prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was
correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are
violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which
is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
110.
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who
then files the Information in court, this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The
recent People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not controlling as far as special
laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the
doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
LASTLY, there is no distinction between the filing of the Information contemplated in the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and in the Rules of Summary Procedure. When the representatives of the petitioner
filed the Complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It
continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information and
institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of
the preliminary investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the
violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within which to file the Information. Respondents
were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and commission of
the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period
had already prescribed. Thus, respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the
dismissal of the case against respondents. DOJ- NPS Manual provides that: xxx for an offense
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure, the period of prescription is interrupted only
by the filing of the complaint or information in court. x x x x

For violation of a special law or ordinance, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day of the commission of the violation, and if the same is not known at the time, from the discovery
and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall
be interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court and shall begin to run again if
the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied).
The failure of the prosecutor to seasonably file the Information is unfortunate as it resulted in the
dismissal of the case against the private respondents. It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia is
applicable to ordinances and their prescription period. It also upholds the necessity of filing the
Information in court in order to toll the period.
PETITION DENIED.

DUPLICITY OF THE OFFENSE; EXCEPTIONS

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HON. MARCIAL EMPLEO and DANTE MAH, G.R. No.
148547, September 27, 2006

FACTS OF THE CASE: Private respondent Mah was charged, under two criminal complaints, for
violation of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) after police officers seized several grams of shabu
and marijuana from his possession. Two informations were filed by the prosecutors office before RTC
Dipolog, one for shabu (regulated drug) and the other for marijuana (prohibited drug).
Mah filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the single act of possession of drugs committed at
the same time and at the same place cannot be the subject of two separate Informations as it is
tantamount to splitting a single cause of action into two separate cases. Judge Empleo released a
Resolution dismissing the cases. The prosecution sought reconsideration which was denied. CA likewise
dismissed the petition for certiorari raised by the People on the ground that the filing of only one
Information is proper because only one violation was committed possession of dangerous drugs as
penalized by RA 6425.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution should file only one Information for illegal possession of shabu and
marijuana.
HELD AND RATIO: NO. The SC cannot subscribe to the CAs ruling. RA 6425 enumerates the
punishable acts and its corresponding penalty. RA 6425 also specifies the particular drugs and the
corresponding quantity in the imposition of penalty.
The prosecution was correct in filing two separate Informations for the crimes of illegal possession
of shabu and illegal possession of marijuana.
Multiple offenses can be committed under RA 6425 even if the crimes are committed in the same
place, at the same time, and by the same person. Thus, this Court has upheld rulings of the lower
courts convicting an accused charged with two separate crimes of illegal possession of shabu and
illegal possession of marijuana, even if the crimes were committed at the same time and in the same
place.
In People v. Tira, we have already ruled that illegal possession of shabu and marijuana constitutes
two separate crimes and therefore, two Informations should be filed. We held:

The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to Section
20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts
that the appellants should be convicted of violating Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG. We find and so hold
that the appellants are guilty of two separate crimes: (a) possession of
regulated drugs under Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No.
6425, as amended, for their possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of
the law, for their possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug. Although only
one Information was filed against the appellants, nevertheless, they could be tried and
convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved by the prosecution. In this case,
the appellants were charged for violation of possession of marijuana and shabu in one
Information.
Although the Information is defective because it charges two crimes, the
appellants should have filed a motion to quash the Information under Section 3, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Court before their arraignment. They failed to do so.
Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of
the crimes charged.

Just like Tira, this case involves illegal possession of both shabu and marijuana. Hence, it was only
proper for the prosecution to file two separate Informations since there were two distinct and separate
crimes involved. This is in accordance with the rule that a complaint or information must charge only
one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for various offenses.
Decision of CA was set aside. Resolution of Judge Empleo was annulled and the SC ordered the
respondent judge to continue with the proceedings of both criminal cases.

EVIDENCE CASES

I.

Applicability of Rules on Electronic Evidence to Criminal Actions: Rustan Ang vs CA in

comparison to People vs Enojas, both penned by Justice Roberto Abad

In Rustan Ang vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010, This case concerns a claim
of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the
picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent
to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated
by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
First, the SC held that The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the
picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already
waived such ground for objection.
The SC further held that Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The
Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative
proceedings. (The Court cited A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, Rule 1, Section 2.)

The 2014 case of People vs Noel Enojas allowed Justice Abad to rectify his erroneous interpretation of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence, particularly Rule 1, Section 2.
1.

People of the Philippines vs Noel Enojas, et. al, G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014

FACTS OF THE CASE: Appellants Enojas, et.al were charged with murder before RTC Las Pias for
shooting and killing PO2 Pangillinan in the course of an attempted robbery. Enojas was previously
apprehended on a taxi. After Pangilinan was shot, the police officers searched the abandoned taxi and
found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torre instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3
Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.
During trial, PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused
Enojas mobile phone and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then
conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni.
Subsequently, the police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
RTC convicted appellants for murder which the CA affirmed in toto, except for the finding of evident
premeditation which the court of appeals found wanting.
ISSUE: Whether the text messages are admissible as evidence
HELD AND RATIO: YES. The Court ruled that the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Courts
earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC,
Re: Expansion of the Coverage of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, September 24, 2002: Rule 1, Sec.
2. Cases covered. - These Rules shall apply to the criminal and civil actions and proceeding, as well as
quasi-judicial and administrative cases.)
Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text
messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those
messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such
messages
and
was
competent
to
testify
on
them.
Note: Rule 11, Section 2:
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. - Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof.
In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.
II.

Marital Disqualification/ Marital Privileged

1. THE UNITED STATES VS DALMACEO ANTIPOLO, G.R. No. L-13109, March 6, 1918
FACTS OF THE CASE: The appellant was convicted by the trial court of Batangas of homicide of one
Fortunato Dinal.
Antipolo appealed assigning as one of the errors the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana
Ezpeleta, the widow of Dinal, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain alleged
dying declarations of Dinal. The trial court sustained the objection of the fiscal on the ground that the
widow of Dinal is not competent to testify by reason of the marital disqualification rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of the widow is admissible in evidence

HELD AND RATIO: YES. Section 58 of General Orders No. 58 (1900) reads as follows: Except with
the consent of both, or except in cases of crime committed by one against the other, neither husband
nor wife shall be a competent witness for or against the other in a criminal action or proceeding to
which one or both shall be parties.
This case does not fall with the text of the statute or the reason upon which it is based. The purpose of
section 58 is to protect accused persons against statements made in the confidence engendered by
the marital relation, and to relieve the husband or wife to whom such confidential communications
might have been made from the obligation of revealing them to the prejudice of the other spouse.
Obviously, when a person at the point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes
a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the communication
so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the
express purpose that it may be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities
concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.
The declarations of a deceased person while in anticipation of certain impending death, concerning the
circumstances leading up to the death, are admissible in a prosecution of the person charged with
killing the declarant. (U. S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil., Rep., 530.) Such dying declarations are admissible in favor
of the defendant as well as against him. (Mattox vs. U. S., 146 U. S., 140.) It has been expressly held in
several jurisdictions in the United States that the widow of the deceased may testify regarding his
dying declarations.
We are therefore of the opinion that the court below erred in excluding the testimony of
the witness Susana Ezpeleta, and that by reason of such exclusion, the accused was
deprived of one of his essential rights. That being the case, a new trial must be granted.
For the reason stated, the judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and a new trial is granted at
which the testimony of the witness Susana Ezpeleta will be admitted, together with any additional
evidence which may be offered on the part of the prosecution or the defense. At the new trial granted
the accused, the testimony taken at the former hearing shall be considered. The costs of this appeal
shall be de officio. So ordered.
III.

Formal Offer of Evidence: What is the rule for Object, Documentary and Testimonial
Evidence?

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROMIL MARCOS, G.R. No. 91646, August 21, 1992
FACTS OF THE CASE: Accused Romil Marcos was charged before RTC Zamboanga for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for selling six sticks of marijuana cigarettes to a poseur-buyer NARCOM
agent Sgt. Amado Ani. After trial on the merits, the appellant was found by the court guilty on the
basis of the testimonies of the agents who conducted the buy-bust operation against Marcos and one
Ballena as well as the marijuana sticks as real evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused based on the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and the real evidence consisting of six sticks of marijuana which were not
offered in evidence
HELD AND RATIO: NO. The trial court correctly found the accused guilty of the offense as charged.
Rule 132, Secs 34 and 35 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 34. Offer of Evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be
made at the time the witness is called to testify. xxx xxx xxx
Contrary to the assertion of the appellant, Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was formally offered by the
prosecution. Hence, when Sgt. Ani was called to testify for the prosecution, Prosecuting Fiscal

Deogracias Avecilla said that Sgt. Amado Ani's testimony was being offered "to the effect that he was
the poseur-buyer of this case." (TSN October 23, 1989, p. 15)
As regards the other mentioned prosecution witnesses, we agree with the appellant that their
testimonies were not formally offered at the time the said witnesses were called to testify. However,
the records reveal that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were offered during the formal
offer of documentary evidence by the prosecuting Fiscal. The appellant did not object to such offer. In
such a case we rule that the appellant is now estopped from questioning the inclusion of the subject
testimonies by the trial court in convicting him of the crime charged.
At any rate, the appellant was not deprived of any of his constitutional rights in the inclusion of the
subject testimonies. The appellant was not deprived of his right to cross-examine all these prosecution
witnesses.
The appellant also faults the trial court for considering the six (6) marijuana sticks as evidence for the
prosecution despite the fact that they were not offered as evidence.
The record reveals that when the prosecuting Fiscal offered the prosecution's documentary evidence
among these offered was Inhibit "E" which was described as "the wrapper containing the six (6) sticks
handrolled cigarette which were sold by the accused Romil Marcos to the poseur-buyer Sgt. Ani, and as
part of the testimony of the Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Belarga and also Sgt.
Mihasun" Marcos alleges that nowhere in the offer of documentary evidence is there a mention as
regards the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation.
Under these circumstances, the appellant argues that the appellant should be acquitted for failure of
the prosecution to offer the six (6) sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
This argument is not well taken.
We rule that Exhibit "E" does not refer to the wrapper alone but also refers to the six (6) marijuana
sticks sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation. It is to be noted that Exhibit "E"
was offered as evidence in relation to the testimonies of Sgt. Belarga, Forensic Chemist
Athena Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun. The record is clear to the effect that in their testimonies, Sgt.
Belarga, Forensic Chemist Athena Anderson and Sgt. Mihasun referred to Exhibit "E" as the six (6)
sticks of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani during the buy-bust operation conducted by the
Narcom agents led by Sgt. Belarga at Talon-Talon, Zamboanga City on June 7, 1989.
2.

EMERITU BARUT VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 167454, September 24,
2014

FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Barut, a guard of the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC), was tried for and found guilty of homicide by the RTC Muntinlupa. The incident sprung from an
altercation between another guard of the PNCC, Conrado Ancheta and SPO4 Vicente Ucag (who is the
father of the deceased, 16-year old Vincent Ucag). Gunshots were fired by Ancheta from a .38 caliber
gun, who was irked after having been confronted by SPO4 Ucag for confiscating the drivers license of
one Rico Villas. (Villas was driving the vehicle where the wife and deceased son of Vicente were then
riding) Vicente fired back from a .45 caliber gun while Vincent rushed to his father. He was
unfortunately shot by Barut in the chest.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the trial court in toto. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Barut

HELD AND RATIO: NO, the trial court correctly convicted Barut with homicide. Villas and
Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had shot Vincent;
and that Baruts bare denial of firing at Vincent did not prevail over their positive and categorical

identification

of

him

as

the

perpetrator.

Furthermore, Baruts contention that Villas testimony was ambiguous and gave rise to the doubt as to
who really shot and killed Vincent as it was inconsistent with his extrajudicial sworn statement, the
Court
noted
that
neither Ucag nor Ancheta could have had shot Vincent, as the former could not anymore fire his gun at
Vincent not only because Vincent was his own son but also because he himself had already been lying
on the ground after being hit in his lower extremities; and that the latter could not have fired at
Vincent at all because he, too, had been already wounded and lying on the ground and profusedly
bleeding
from
his
own
gunshot
wounds.
The CA likewise observed that the RTC could not take the declaration of Villas into
consideration because Villas extra-judicial sworn statement containing the declaration
had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either side. The CA stressed that only
evidence that was formally offered and made part of the records could be considered; and
that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the extra-judicial sworn statement
and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the latter.

The CAs negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas extra-judicial sworn statement was
in accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC as the trial court could consider only the evidence that had been formally offered;
towards that end, the offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being
offered. The rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the
adverse party would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly
counter the impact of evidence not formally offered.

The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is
relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in the records of the
case. Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative
facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial
admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their
credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence.
The Court affirmed the conviction of Barut with modifications as to the sentence, civil liability and
damages.

3. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SUSANA NAPAT-A, G.R. No. 84951, November 14,
1989
FACTS OF THE CASE: Susana Napat-a was convicted of drug pushing by RTC Baguio. She was
arrested following a buy bust operation where a group of narcotics agents posed as buyers of Napatas marijuana leaves.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction was proper notwithstanding the fact that the real evidence
constituting the brown carton box of marijuana leaves was not presented by the prosecution in court
HELD AND RATIO: The conviction was proper. Appellant's contention that the trial court erred in
convicting her in view of the prosecution's failure to present to the Court the brown carton box (Exh. B)
and its contents (dried marijuana leaves) (Exhs. C, D, E and F) is not well taken. Carlos V. Figueroa,
Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, testified that the box and its contents were presented,
Identified and marked as exhibits in court (t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 3-8). The subsequent loss of
these exhibits did not affect the case for the trial court had described the evidence in the records

(t.s.n. April 13, 1988, p. 2). In People vs. Mate, 103 SCRA 484, we ruled that "(e)ven without the
exhibits which have been incorporated into the records of the case, the prosecution can still establish
the case because the witnesses properly Identified those exhibits and their testimonies are recorded."
Furthermore, in this case, appellant's counsel had cross- examined the prosecution witnesses who
testified on those exhibits (t.s.n. November 6, 1985, pp. 8-9).
Conviction affirmed.

IV.

Parol Evidence Rule

1. VICTORIA LECHUGAS VS COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, et.al, G.R. No. L-39972
& L-40300 August 6, 1986
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages and an
action recovery and possession of the disputed property against the private respondents before CFI
Iloilo. The trial court dismissed the two cases. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for review.
Lechugas alleged that she bought the land now subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue as
evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which was thumbmarked by Leoncia. Private
respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the land which plaintiff bought from Leoncia Lasangue
in 1950 as evidenced by the deed (Exhibit A), is different from the land now subject of this action.
Private respondents predecessors-in-interest purchased a parcel of land from one Victorina Limor.
Subsequently, Hugo Loza (one of their predecessors) bought from Emeterio Lasangue (father of
Leoncia) a parcel of land with an area of four hectares more or less, adjoining the land he (Loza) had
earlier bought from Victoria Limor. These two parcels of land (that purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941
from Emeterio Lasangue, and a portion of that bought by him from Victoria Limor sometime in 1931)
were consolidated and designated, during the cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot No.
5456; while the remaining portion of the lot bought from Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the
east, was designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the Heirs of Hugo Loza. Defendants claim that the
lot bought by plaintiff from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by exhibit A, is situated south of the land
now subject of this action and designated during cadastral survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the
name of Victoria Lechugas.
From the former 36 hectare land of Emeterio, only 12 hectares remained which was inherited by
Leoncia. 6 hectares were sold to Lechugas (Leoncias first cousin). The private respondents presented
Leoncia Lasangue herself to testify regarding the identity of the land which plaintiff bought from
Lasangue.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in considering parol evidence in order to identify the land sold to
Lechugas
HELD AND RATIO: NO. The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in
admitting the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to
the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of
Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private
respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what
she really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to
read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her
thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of
land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.

As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply,
and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at least one
of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S.
79.)
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
...and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a written agreement, or their privies, parol
evidence cannot be received to contradict or vary its terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not
bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic evidence in the construction of writings is inapplicable in
such cases; and it is relaxed where either one of the parties between whom the question arises is a
stranger to the written agreement, and does not claim under or through one who is party to it. In such
case the rule is binding upon neither. ...
Through the testimony of Lasangue it was found that she did not intend to sell as she could not have
sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. The
respondents have timely questioned the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed
Exhibit "A" does not reflect the true intention of the vendor.
There is strong, clear, and convincing evidence as to which lot was actually sold to her. The
"reformation" which the petitioner questioned was, in fact, intended to favor her. Instead of declaring
the deed of sale null and void for all purposes, the Court upheld its having passed ownership of Lot No.
5522 to the petitioner.
Petition dismissed.

V.

Judicial Notice of Proceedings In Another Case

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MELENCIO BAROC MENDOZA, G.R. No. 96397,

November 21, 1991
FACTS OF THE CASE: Mendoza was charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Serious
Physical Injuries before the RTC Valenzuela. The accused-appellant, along with Romeo Esquillo, Roberto
Marquez and Jose Ramos robbed spouses Felipe Alkuino and Eufrocina Trajano-Alkuino and was able to
take a handbag containing cash amounting to P30,545.00 and checks with total face value of
P18,167.85 or a grand total of P48,712.85, belonging to the said spouses. In the course of the robbery,
the spouses were shot. Felipe sustained a gunshot wound to his chest which caused his death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in having taken judicial notice of the testimonies made by
accused-appellants co-conspirators in previous criminal cases filed against them
HELD AND RATIO: NO. The accused-appellant maintained that the court erred in taking judicial
notice of Esquillo's testimony in another case despite its not having been offered nor admitted because
Mendoza was not an accused therein and he did not conform to the adoption of said testimonies in this
case. He further contends that granting it were admitted as part of the prosecution's evidence in this
case, it cannot be considered as it was repudiated by Esquillo himself. Such contention must fail.
It is noted that when a motion to adopt the said testimonies of witnesses was made by the
prosecution, the appellant and his counsel did not object but instead gave their consent. Moreover,
Esquillo was confronted with portions of his testimonies in the previous cases which he merely denied
or refused to explain. Said portions, thus, became part of his testimony which were duly subjected to
cross-examination by the defense counsel.

When confronted with statements given in his previous testimony, it became apparent that Esquillo
was trying to hide something but which he was not able to do when cornered by the judge. Thus, the
appellant admitted:
Q Are you telling this court that you never testified in the sala of Judge
Constantino or you testified but you were not asked those questions,
so you did not give those answer?
A I testified, your Honor.
Q Since you have testified, are you trying to tell this Court that you
were not asked those questions and those were not your answers, is
that what you want this Court to believe?
A Those were the questions asked of me, your Honor.
Q How about the answers, were those your answers?
A Yes, your Honor. (TSN., May 31, 1985, p. 42)

The records show that Mrs. Alkuino and the accused-appellant knew each other well as the latter was a
bookkeper in the bank where the Alkuinos maintained an account.
Mendoza knew that the Alkuino couple would be depositing a big amount in the bank on the day the
robbery took place.
Portions of Esquillo's testimony described in detail how appellant and his group hatched their plan. The
same was corroborated by the testimonies of Mrs. Alkuino and other prosecution witnesses who had no
known grudge against him.
Decision is affirmed with modifications.

VI.

Self-serving evidence

1. ALVIN TUASON VS COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No.
113779-80 February 23, 1995
FACTS OF THE CASE: Petitioner Tuason, along with three other persons (remained at large), were
charged with Robbery and Carnapping (RA 6539) before the RTC of QC. Petitioner was subsequently
convicted.
The incident transpired when four men pretending to buy ice forcefully barged in Cipriana Torres
residence. Her maid, Jovina Madaraog Torres, was tied up and gagged. Petitioner was allegedly the
lookout. The robbers successfully looted the house with valuable items and escaped using Torres car.
Madaraog and another neighbor, Quintal, described the robbers. One of those drawn was a person with
large mole between his eyebrows.
Tuason was arrested one month after the robbery. He was surprised when an NBI agent, whose identity
was unknown to him, pointed to him as one of the suspects in the robbery in the presence of Madaraog
and the other prosecution witnesses.

CA affirmed the conviction of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting Tuason
HELD AND RATIO: YES. SC reversed the decision of the RTC and CA.
There were serious discrepancies in the testimonies of the witness as to the identity of the accused.
Tuason had a scar between his eyebrows and not a mole as described by prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, accused was not spontaneously identified by the witnesses in the police line-up. The agents
identified him before the witnesses could have pointed him themselves.
The respondent appellate court, however, dismissed these claims of petitioner as self-serving. Again,
the ruling misconstrues the meaning of self-serving evidence. Self-serving evidence is not to be
literally taken as evidence that serves one's selfish interest. Under our law of evidence, self-serving
evidence is one made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a
witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of
opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission
would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a party's testimony in
court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination. Clearly, petitioner's
testimony in court on how he was identified by the prosecution witnesses in the NBI headquarters is
not self-serving.
Petitioner's main defense is alibi. He professed that on July 19, 1988 he was mixing dough at TipTop
Bakeshop from 7:00 o'clock in the morning till 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. With the usual traffic jam,
it takes him two (2) hours to commute from Lagro to Tondo. It was thus physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis. He said he learned about the robbery thru his neighbor three (3) days
thereafter. He did not flee. He was arrested by the NBI agents more than one (1) month after the
crimes were perpetrated. Angeli Tuason's corroborative testimony established that her brother had an
eye examination on July 17, 1988 35and she reminded him to work early on July 19, 1988 which he did.
In People vs. Omega, we held: Although alibi is known to be the weakest of all defenses for it is easy
to concoct and difficult to disprove, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and
betrays lack of concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the crime
charged, the defense of alibi assumes importance.
RTC decision set aside. Tuason was acquitted.
VII.

Judicial Admissions; exceptions

ELPIDIO JAVELLANA VS D.O PLAZA ENTERPRISES, INC., G.R. No. L-28297, March 30, 1970
FACTS OF THE CASE: The original complaint for this case was for collection of the sum of P43,017.32
representing balance due on purchases of wire ropes, tractors and diesel parts made by defendant D.
O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc., from the plaintiff Elpidio Javellana. The complaint prayed that the defendant
be ordered to pay the said sum of P43,017.32, with legal interest, plus attorney's fees in the sum of
P5,000.00; it also prayed for a writ of preliminary attachment.
On 3 November 1966, the plaintiff filed a motion to admit his amended complaint, which the court
granted. In this amended complaint, the plaintiff averred that of the sum of P43,017.32 alleged in the
original complaint, the defendant has paid P3,900.00, thereby leaving a balance of P39,117.32 unpaid,
but that, as indicated by invoices, defendant's purchases were payable within thirty (30) days and
were to bear interest of 12% per annum plus 25% attorney's fees. The amended complaint
accordingly prayed for the increased amounts. Defendant did not answer this amended
complaint.
The defendant contended that the issuance of the writ of attachment was improper and sought
damages. The court a quo, upon reconsideration, granted damages to defendant, awarded interest

(based on mere legal interest and not the 12%) as well as attorneys fees of 5,000 (and not the 25%
based on the amended complaint). Hence this appeal by plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo erred in reducing the interest and attorneys fees based on the
original complaint which was never formally offered in evidence
HELD AND RATIO: YES. The court a quo reduced the interest stated in its previous decision from 12%
to mere legal interest and the attorney's fees from 25% to P5,000.00 on the basis of estoppel, the
ground therefor being that the reduced amounts were those alleged, hence admitted, by the plaintiff in
his original complaint. The original complaint was not formally offered in evidence. Having
been amended, the original complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which
would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, requires its formal offer.
Pleadings superseded or amended disappear from the record as judicial admissions.
However, any statement contained therein may be considered as an extrajudicial
admission, and as such, in order that the court may take it into consideration, it should
be offered formality in evidence. (5 Moran 58, citing Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 148;
Bastida v. Menzi, 58 Phil. 188.)
Where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings can
have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence. (Jones on Evidence, Sec. 273.)
Since the record does not show that the complaint (marked as Exhibit 115) was admitted in
evidence, there is no proof of estoppel on the part of the plaintiff on his allegations in the
complaint. Not only this, but since the stipulation for 12% interest on balance due and the 25%
counsel fees appear on the invoices themselves, appellee Plaza Enterprises cannot fairly claim that it
was deceived or misled by the pleadings of appellant. Even more, the original plea for P5,000.00 as
attorney's fees is only contained in the prayer of the original complaint, and it is a well established rule
that the prayer for relief, although part of the complaint, is no part of the cause of action and does not
give character, the plaintiff being entitled to as much relief as the facts warrant (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25
Phil. 495; Aguilar vs. Rubiato, 40 Phil. 470).
Order is reversed as to interest and attorneys fees.
AIR FRANCE VS RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-21438
September 28, 1966
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid;
plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From
Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be
taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento,
"many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr.
Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to
Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" (Transcript, p. 12,
Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. 3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court
of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the
issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based". 5 This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case
shall state "clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision
of the Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of
evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts"which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is
but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the
decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error
for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere
failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to
believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law
and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the
findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or
even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not
vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or
each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has
overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that
official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid
before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the
determinative facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.

3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?

It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in
the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements
upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by
such a reasoning. We cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It
received the corresponding amount in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course
of business that the company should know whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be
honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's
own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx

xxx

xxx

Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a
first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class"
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the

Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of
Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all
questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been raised are to be
regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the decision
of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at war with
those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or grounds
different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have?
It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations
in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a
schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform
language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations
between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case
here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the
ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was
entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the
flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its
position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat and
because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a first
class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to
make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant,
under which said contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff,
First Class passage on defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe
with Hongkong as starting point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff
has been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths
at Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American
World Airways plane on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx

xxx

xxx

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was
breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there
was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that
there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is
there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was averred
to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence
of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the
petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in
the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by
the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by
the purser of the plane in his notebook which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The
captain of the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to
intervene even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to
present its manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all
the seats had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being
ejected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the
improvidence committed by defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic
step of ousting the plaintiff who was then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are
strengthened in our belief that this probably was what happened there, by the testimony of
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:

"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the
passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better
right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant
airline did not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the
"First class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued
a corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok,
the defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said
Manager by deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court];
and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the
Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the
plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because
the said Manager wanted to accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did
not use the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to
bad faith? The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with
plaintiff in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in
Bangkok went to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many
passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he
was occupying to, again using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white
man" whom he (defendant's Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant has
not proven that this "white man" had any "better right" to occupy the "first class" seat
that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding "first
class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well
settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is

mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter
an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract
and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was
not insulting and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and
carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be
also a tort". 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came
to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and
told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor in using
insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina
there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said passenger.1awphl.nt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action
as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she
said, "We will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That
is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything
there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg
room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He
told me, "I have recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me
because it was recorded in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence
would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony.

49

Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebook reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is
incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident.
Testimony on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of
the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the
purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as
attorneys' fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of
Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
VIII.

Extrajudicial confession must be coupled with Corpus delicti to sustain criminal conviction

1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JONATHAN BARLIS, et. al, G.R. No. L-101003 March
24, 1994
FACTS OF THE CASE: Barlis admitted to have participated in the killing of one Honorina Ballerda
inside her house in Novaliches, QC. He also admitted that one of his companions, "Buboy" (Eduardo
Nining), took three men's watches while his other companion, Ferdie (Ferdinand Lopez) took some
money which they later divided among themselves. Thereafter, assisted by Atty. Confesor B. Sansano,
Chairman of the Legal Assistance Office of the IBP-Quezon City Chapter, Jonathan signed an
extrajudicial confession (in the form of a sworn statement/ salaysay) wherein he narrated in detail
how the crime was committed and the extent of his participation therein.
An information for robbery with homicide was filed with the RTC of Quezon City. Trial proceeded Barlis
alone because the two other accused remained at large. Barlis was convicted by the RTC. He appealed
said judgment to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of robbery with homicide was duly proven
HELD AND RATIO: NO, the robbery was not conclusively proved.
The information alleged that the appellant took one ladies' gold necklace, one ladies' Seiko watch, one
diamond stone worth P800.00, cash in the amount of P3,000.00, and assorted pieces of jewelry of
undetermined value, "all belonging to the victim." However, the only evidence of such taking is
the appellant's sworn statement wherein he admitted that his companions took three
men's watches and about P1,200.00 in cash which they divided among themselves.
To sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be
proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or
using force upon things are the essential elements of robbery. There is robbery with homicide when by
reason or on occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of person, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed.
As shown above, the only evidence of the taking of the personal property of the victim is the
extrajudicial confession of the appellant. Under Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, "an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be sufficient ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."
Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the
corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it
means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a
certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died or a building has been burned; and (b)
that some person is criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 does not mean that every
element of the crime charged must be clearly established by independent evidence apart from the
confession. It means merely that there should be some evidence tending to show the
commission of the crime apart from the confession.
The prosecution failed to corroborate the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on the robbery with
evidence of corpus delicti. The instant case should be distinguished from People vs. Mones. In Mones,
the four accused who were charged with robbery with homicide executed separate confessions of the
crime charged. Their confessions were also corroborated by the testimony of a witness. We held
therein:
[W]here the accusation of robbery fails, but multiple homicide or murder is proved, the accused must
be sentenced for the several separate offenses of homicide or murder (U.S. vs. Lahoylahoy and
Madanlog, 38 Phil., 330); and in this case, if the proof should be held insufficient as to the robbery, the
result would be, under the Revised Penal Code, that each of the accused would be sentenced for the
four murders committed by them.
In Mones, the conviction of the four accused for robbery with homicide is sustainable under the
doctrine of interlocking confessions: "extra-judicial confessions independently made without
collusion which are identical with each other in their essential details and are corroborated by other
evidence on record are admissible, as circumstantial evidence, against the person implicated to show
the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime." Clearly, the
doctrine is inapplicable here for we only have the solitary confession of the appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as earlier observed, concedes that there was no proof of robbery. It
argues, however, that such is not fatal because the unrebutted fact remains that Adela Argate lost a
wrist watch and cash of less than P100.00 on the occasion of the robbery. We cannot sustain this
proposition because of the rule enumerated in United States vs. Lahoylahoy, to wit:
To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge of robbing one person when the proof shows that
he robbed an entirely different person, when the first was not present, is violative of the rudimentary
principles of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism that the defendant is thereby placed

in a position where he could not be protected from a future prosecution by a plea of former conviction
or acquittal. If we should convict or acquit these defendants to-day of the robbery which is alleged to
have been committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is perfectly clear that they could be
prosecuted tomorrow for robbery committed upon the property of Juana; and the plea of former
jeopardy would be of no avail.
The death of the victim has been sufficiently established by evidence independent of the appellant's
extrajudicial confession, namely, the unrebutted testimonies of prosecution witnesses Adela Argate, Dr.
Dario Gajardo, and Wilma Ballerda.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS JUDGE RUBEN AYSON AND FELIPE RAMOS, G.R. No.
85215, July 7, 1989

What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of the right of an
individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of
the Constitution, with the right of any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . .
to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The
relevant facts are not disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at
its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the
matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten
notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.)
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s)
Felipe
Ramos
(Printed
)
F.
Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio City,
Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the
Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing.
Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets
mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although
he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by)
shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next
investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by

"Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would
seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime
of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29,
1987. In that place and during that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said
accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers
for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express
obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those
unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with
intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the
value of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ...
failed and refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter
ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and
supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June
21, 1988, 6which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on
February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
"handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been
marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards
the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was
taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same
reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth,"
except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it
appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear
that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and
that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a
counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused Felipe
J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since
it does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by Order dated September
14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v.
Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219,
and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation
"cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed out that the
investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one "for the offense of allegedly
misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the
coverage of the constitutional provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or
the investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit
of the constitutional provision cited."

These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the petition for certiorari
and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the People of the
Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to
comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING
the respondents from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R
(People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid
case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also subsequently required the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition. The comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have
all been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the
petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside respondent Judge's
Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has
thereby removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the instant action in the
name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action
in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it was grave
abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now
proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, 11 to which respondent
Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section,
namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled
to be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect
"under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness
of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more
explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena,
in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness,
whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e.,
one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It

cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer
questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional
guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on the judge, or
other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a
witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of
the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness
can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows
that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate
time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better said, group of
rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the commission of an offense," i.e.,
"suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from
that embodied in the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was not in the 1935
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v.
Arizona, 19 a decision described as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense"-1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in
police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary
proceeding against the suspect.24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a
result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 25

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-custody
interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already stated, by custodial interrogation is
meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation contemplated has
also been more precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation
arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp
or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but
as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself
in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers
hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to
extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere
overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this
imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went
to a police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving
himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or
witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that against selfincrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons under preliminary
investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not under
custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been would already have been
ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence,
with respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's
office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the
second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious
reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in
the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a
specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of giving testimony
or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness."
Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as witness in his own behalf;
but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any other witness; however, his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself'
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is

the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other
process or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a
co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil
action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal action can
refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any
question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
manner prejudice or be used against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right. But if he does
testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may be cross-examined as to any
matters stated in his direct examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will
produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a question which
might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for some other crime, distinct
from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of
the right against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for
murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer
any question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to
answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,
estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its
commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to
wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary
investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected
to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will;
and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT

37

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the
prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which
tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken
them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has
grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be
cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the
constitutional and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him
tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under
custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the
administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have
had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry.
It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the
administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed
against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to
his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability
in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be
excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of the right of
any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining parties,
complaining companies, or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or
zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements
under an atmosphere of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw
attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be
imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been accorded due
process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and
afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the making of
statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense,
with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may,
of course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt
to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements,
whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to
silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position
paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly
considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's expressed
apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure or influence be brought
to bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by
another whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from
the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect
vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but
simply on the general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in
justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary
value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent
Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby
ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R,
and thereafter proceed with the trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of
October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.