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G.R. No. 181132

TodayisTuesday,September20,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
THIRDDIVISION
G.R.No.181132June5,2009
HEIRSOFLORETOC.MARAMAG,representedbysurvivingspouseVICENTAPANGILINANMARAMAG,
Petitioners,
vs.
EVAVERNADEGUZMANMARAMAG,ODESSADEGUZMANMARAMAG,KARLBRIANDEGUZMAN
MARAMAG,TRISHAANGELIEMARAMAG,THEINSULARLIFEASSURANCECOMPANY,LTD.,andGREAT
PACIFICLIFEASSURANCECORPORATION,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA,J.:
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules, seeking to reverse and set aside the
Resolution2datedJanuary8,2008oftheCourtofAppeals(CA),inCAG.R.CVNo.85948,dismissingpetitioners
appealforlackofjurisdiction.
Thecasestemsfromapetition3filedagainstrespondentswiththeRegionalTrialCourt,Branch29,forrevocation
and/or reduction of insurance proceeds for being void and/or inofficious, with prayer for a temporary restraining
order(TRO)andawritofpreliminaryinjunction.
The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag (Loreto), while
respondentswereLoretosillegitimatefamily(2)EvadeGuzmanMaramag(Eva)wasaconcubineofLoretoanda
suspectinthekillingofthelatter,thus,sheisdisqualifiedtoreceiveanyproceedsfromhisinsurancepoliciesfrom
InsularLifeAssuranceCompany,Ltd.(Insular)4andGreatPacificLifeAssuranceCorporation(Grepalife)5(3)the
illegitimatechildrenofLoretoOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngeliewereentitledonlytoonehalfofthelegitime
ofthelegitimatechildren,thus,theproceedsreleasedtoOdessaandthosetobereleasedtoKarlBrianandTrisha
Angeliewereinofficiousandshouldbereducedand(4)petitionerscouldnotbedeprivedoftheirlegitimes,which
shouldbesatisfiedfirst.
InsupportoftheprayerforTROandwritofpreliminaryinjunction,petitionersalleged,amongothers,thatpartofthe
insuranceproceedshadalreadybeenreleasedinfavorofOdessa,whiletherestoftheproceedsaretobereleased
infavorofKarlBrianandTrishaAngelie,bothminors,upontheappointmentoftheirlegalguardian.Petitionersalso
prayedforthetotalamountofP320,000.00asactuallitigationexpensesandattorneysfees.
In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl Brian, and
TrishaAngelieashislegitimatechildren,andthattheyfiledtheirclaimsfortheinsuranceproceedsoftheinsurance
policiesthatwhenitascertainedthatEvawasnotthelegalwifeofLoreto,itdisqualifiedherasabeneficiaryand
dividedtheproceedsamongOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngelie,astheremainingdesignatedbeneficiariesand
thatitreleasedOdessasshareasshewasofage,butwithheldthereleaseofthesharesofminorsKarlBrianand
TrishaAngeliependingsubmissionoflettersofguardianship.Insularallegedthatthecomplaintorpetitionfailedto
stateacauseofactioninsofarasitsoughttodeclareasvoidthedesignationofEvaasbeneficiary,becauseLoreto
revokedherdesignationassuchinPolicyNo.A001544070anditdisqualifiedherinPolicyNo.A001693029and
insofarasitsoughttodeclareasinofficiousthesharesofOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngelie,consideringthat
nosettlementofLoretosestatehadbeenfilednorhadtherespectivesharesoftheheirsbeendetermined.Insular
further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies designating the children of Loreto with Eva as
beneficiariespursuanttoSection53oftheInsuranceCode.
Initsownanswer7withcompulsorycounterclaim,GrepalifeallegedthatEvawasnotdesignatedasaninsurance
policybeneficiarythattheclaimsfiledbyOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngelieweredeniedbecauseLoretowas
ineligibleforinsuranceduetoamisrepresentationinhisapplicationformthathewasbornonDecember10,1936
and, thus, not morethan65yearsoldwhenhesigneditinSeptember2001that the case was premature, there
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being no claim filed by the legitimate family of Loreto and that the law on succession does not apply where the
designationofinsurancebeneficiariesisclear.
As the whereabouts of Eva, Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were not known to petitioners, summons by
publication was resorted to. Still, the illegitimate family of Loreto failed to file their answer. Hence, the trial court,
uponmotionofpetitioners,declaredthemindefaultinitsOrderdatedMay7,2004.
During the pretrial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the issues raised in their respective
answersberesolvedfirst.Thetrialcourtorderedpetitionerstocommentwithin15days.
Intheircomment,petitionersallegedthattheissueraisedbyInsularandGrepalifewaspurelylegalwhetherthe
complaintitselfwasproperornotandthatthedesignationofabeneficiaryisanactofliberalityoradonationand,
therefore,subjecttotheprovisionsofArticles7528and7729oftheCivilCode.
In reply, both Insular and Grepalife countered that the insurance proceeds belong exclusively to the designated
beneficiaries in the policies, not to the estate or to the heirs of the insured. Grepalife also reiterated that it had
disqualified Eva as a beneficiary when it ascertained that Loreto was legally married to Vicenta Pangilinan
Maramag.
OnSeptember21,2004,thetrialcourtissuedaResolution,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads
WHEREFORE,themotiontodismissincorporatedintheanswerofdefendantsInsularLifeandGrepalifeisgranted
with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Maramag. The action shall proceed with respect to the
otherdefendantsEvaVernadeGuzman,InsularLifeandGrepalife.
SOORDERED.10
Insoruling,thetrialcourtratiocinatedthus
Art.2011oftheCivilCodeprovidesthatthecontractofinsuranceisgovernedbythe(sic)speciallaws.Mattersnot
expresslyprovidedforinsuchspeciallawsshallberegulatedbythisCode.Theprincipallawoninsuranceisthe
InsuranceCode,asamended.OnlyincaseofdeficiencyintheInsuranceCodethattheCivilCodemayberesorted
to.(Enriquezv.SunLifeAssuranceCo.,41Phil.269.)
TheInsuranceCode,asamended,containsaprovisionregardingtowhomtheinsuranceproceedsshallbepaid.It
isveryclearunderSec.53thereofthattheinsuranceproceedsshallbeappliedexclusivelytotheproperinterestof
the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise specified in the policy. Since the
defendants are the ones named as the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the deceased
LoretoC.Maramagandthereisnoshowingthathereinplaintiffswerealsoincludedasbeneficiary(sic)thereinthe
insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them. This is because the beneficiary has a vested right to the
indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of
Canada,48Phil.[sic]63).
Neither could the plaintiffs invoked (sic) the law on donations or the rules on testamentary succession in order to
defeattherightofhereindefendantstocollecttheinsuranceindemnity.Thebeneficiaryinacontractofinsuranceis
not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on testamentary succession cannot apply here, for the
insuranceindemnitydoesnotpartakeofadonation.Assuch,theinsuranceindemnitycannotbeconsideredasan
advance of the inheritance which can be subject to collation (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534). In the case of
SouthernLuzonEmployeesAssociationv.JuanitaGolpeo,etal.,theHonorableSupremeCourtmadethefollowing
pronouncements[:]
"WiththefindingofthetrialcourtthattheproceedstotheLifeInsurancePolicybelongsexclusivelytothedefendant
ashisindividualandseparateproperty,weagreethattheproceedsofaninsurancepolicybelongexclusivelytothe
beneficiaryandnottotheestateofthepersonwhoselifewasinsured,andthatsuchproceedsaretheseparateand
individual property of the beneficiary and not of the heirs of the person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in
America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains in these Islands by virtue of Section 428 of the Code of
Commercexxx."
In[the]lightoftheabovepronouncements,itisveryclearthattheplaintiffshas(sic)nosufficientcauseofaction
against defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie Maramag for the reduction and/or declaration of
inofficiousnessofdonationasprimarybeneficiary(sic)intheinsurances(sic)ofthelateLoretoC.Maramag.
However, herein plaintiffs are not totally bereft of any cause of action. One of the named beneficiary (sic) in the
insurances(sic)takenbythelateLoretoC.MaramagishisconcubineEvaVernaDeGuzman.Anypersonwhois
forbiddenfromreceivinganydonationunderArticle739cannotbenamedbeneficiaryofalifeinsurancepolicyofthe
person who cannot make any donation to him, according to said article (Art. 2012, Civil Code). If a concubine is
madethebeneficiary,itisbelievedthattheinsurancecontractwillstillremainvalid,buttheindemnitymustgotothe
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legalheirsandnottotheconcubine,forevidently,whatisprohibitedunderArt.2012isthenamingoftheimproper
beneficiary. In such case, the action for the declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or
donee, and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action
(CommentofEdgardoL.Paras,CivilCodeofthePhilippines,page897).SincethedesignationofdefendantEva
Verna de Guzman as one of the primary beneficiary (sic) in the insurances (sic) taken by the late Loreto C.
MaramagisvoidunderArt.739oftheCivilCode,theinsuranceindemnitythatshouldbepaidtohermustgotothe
legalheirsofthedeceasedwhichthiscourtmayproperlytakecognizanceastheactionforthedeclarationforthe
nullityofavoiddonationfallswithinthegeneraljurisdictionofthisCourt.11
Insular12 and Grepalife13 filed their respective motions for reconsideration, arguing, in the main, that the petition
failedtostateacauseofaction.Insularfurtheraverredthattheproceedsweredividedamongthethreechildrenas
the remaining named beneficiaries. Grepalife, for its part, also alleged that the premiums paid had already been
refunded.
Petitioners, in their comment, reiterated their earlier arguments and posited that whether the complaint may be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action must be determined solely on the basis of the allegations in the
complaint,suchthatthedefensesofInsularandGrepalifewouldbebetterthreshedoutduringtrial.
1avvphi1

OnJune16,2005,thetrialcourtissuedaResolution,disposing,asfollows:
WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingdisquisitions,theMotionsforReconsiderationfiledbydefendantsGrepalife
andInsularLifeareherebyGRANTED.Accordingly,theportionoftheResolutionofthisCourtdated21September
2004 which ordered the prosecution of the case against defendant Eva Verna De Guzman, Grepalife and Insular
LifeisherebySETASIDE,andthecaseagainstthemisherebyorderedDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.14
In granting the motions for reconsideration of Insular and Grepalife, the trial court considered the allegations of
InsularthatLoretorevokedthedesignationofEvainonepolicyandthatInsulardisqualifiedherasabeneficiaryin
theotherpolicysuchthattheentireproceedswouldbepaidtotheillegitimatechildrenofLoretowithEvapursuant
toSection53oftheInsuranceCode.Itruledthatitisonlyincaseswheretherearenobeneficiariesdesignated,or
whentheonlydesignatedbeneficiaryisdisqualified,thattheproceedsshouldbepaidtotheestateoftheinsured.
AstotheclaimthattheproceedstobepaidtoLoretosillegitimatechildrenshouldbereducedbasedontheruleson
legitime, the trial court held that the distribution of the insurance proceeds is governed primarily by the Insurance
Code,andtheprovisionsoftheCivilCodeareirrelevantandinapplicable.WithrespecttotheGrepalifepolicy,the
trialcourtnotedthatEvawasneverdesignatedasabeneficiary,butonlyOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngelie
thus, it upheld the dismissal of the case as to the illegitimate children. It further held that the matter of Loretos
misrepresentationwasprematuretheappropriateactionmaybefiledonlyupondenialoftheclaimofthenamed
beneficiariesfortheinsuranceproceedsbyGrepalife.
Petitioners appealed the June 16, 2005 Resolution to the CA, but it dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
holdingthatthedecisionofthetrialcourtdismissingthecomplaintforfailuretostateacauseofactioninvolveda
pure question of law. The appellate court also noted that petitioners did not file within the reglementary period a
motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Resolution, dated September 21, 2004, dismissing the complaint as
againstOdessa,KarlBrian,andTrishaAngeliethus,thesaidResolutionhadalreadyattainedfinality.
Hence,thispetitionraisingthefollowingissues:
a. In determining the merits of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, may the Court
considermatterswhichwerenotallegedintheComplaint,particularlythedefensesputupbythedefendants
intheirAnswer?
b.Ingrantingamotionforreconsiderationofamotiontodismissforfailuretostateacauseofaction,didnot
the Regional Trial Court engage in the examination and determination of what were the facts and their
probativevalue,orthetruththereof,whenitpremisedthedismissalonallegationsofthedefendantsintheir
answerwhichhadnotbeenproven?
c.xxx(A)rethemembersofthelegitimatefamilyentitledtotheproceedsoftheinsurancefortheconcubine?
15

In essence, petitioners posit that their petition before the trial court should not have been dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action because the finding that Eva was either disqualified as a beneficiary by the insurance
companies or that her designation was revoked by Loreto, hypothetically admitted as true, was raised only in the
answersandmotionsforreconsiderationofbothInsularandGrepalife.Theyarguethatforamotiontodismissto
prosperonthatground,onlytheallegationsinthecomplaintshouldbeconsidered.Theyfurthercontendthat,even
assumingInsulardisqualifiedEvaasabeneficiary,hershareshouldnothavebeendistributedtoherchildrenwith
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Loreto but, instead, awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of the insured deceased, in accordance with law
andjurisprudence.
Thepetitionshouldbedenied.
Thegrantofthemotiontodismisswasbasedonthetrialcourtsfindingthatthepetitionfailedtostateacauseof
action,asprovidedinRule16,Section1(g),oftheRulesofCourt,whichreads
SECTION 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim,amotiontodismissmaybemadeonanyofthefollowinggrounds:
xxxx
(g)Thatthepleadingassertingtheclaimstatesnocauseofaction.
Acauseofactionistheactoromissionbywhichapartyviolatesarightofanother.16Acomplaintstatesacauseof
action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action(1) the legal right of the plaintiff (2) the
correlativeobligationofthedefendantand(3)theactoromissionofthedefendantinviolationofthelegalright.If
anyoftheseelementsisabsent,thecomplaintbecomesvulnerabletoamotiontodismissonthegroundoffailureto
stateacauseofaction.17
Whenamotiontodismissispremisedonthisground,therulingthereonshouldbebasedonlyonthefactsalleged
inthecomplaint.Thecourtmustresolvetheissueonthestrengthofsuchallegations,assumingthemtobetrue.
The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the
complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint.Thisisthegeneralrule.
However, this rule is subject to wellrecognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the
veracityoftheallegationsif:
1.thefalsityoftheallegationsissubjecttojudicialnotice
2.suchallegationsarelegallyimpossible
3.theallegationsrefertofactswhichareinadmissibleinevidence
4.bytherecordordocumentinthepleading,theallegationsappearunfoundedor
5.thereisevidencewhichhasbeenpresentedtothecourtbystipulationofthepartiesorinthecourseofthe
hearingsrelatedtothecase.18
Inthiscase,itisclearfromthepetitionfiledbeforethetrialcourtthat,althoughpetitionersarethelegitimateheirsof
Loreto,theywerenotnamedasbeneficiariesintheinsurancepoliciesissuedbyInsularandGrepalife.Thebasisof
petitioners claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being
designatedasbeneficiaryoftheinsurancepolicies,andthatEvaschildrenwithLoreto,beingillegitimatechildren,
areentitledtoalessershareoftheproceedsofthepolicies.TheyalsoarguedthatpursuanttoSection12ofthe
InsuranceCode,19Evasshareintheproceedsshouldbeforfeitedintheirfavor,theformerhavingbroughtabout
the death of Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loretos illegitimate
childrenshouldbeawardedtothem,beingthelegitimateheirsofLoretoentitledtotheirrespectivelegitimes.
ItisevidentfromthefaceofthecomplaintthatpetitionersarenotentitledtoafavorablejudgmentinlightofArticle
2011oftheCivilCodewhichexpresslyprovidesthatinsurancecontractsshallbegovernedbyspeciallaws,i.e.,the
InsuranceCode.Section53oftheInsuranceCodestates
SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose
nameorforwhosebenefititismadeunlessotherwisespecifiedinthepolicy.
Pursuantthereto,itisobviousthattheonlypersonsentitledtoclaimtheinsuranceproceedsareeithertheinsured,if
stillaliveorthebeneficiary,iftheinsuredisalreadydeceased,uponthematurationofthepolicy.20Theexceptionto
thisruleisasituationwheretheinsurancecontractwasintendedtobenefitthirdpersonswhoarenotpartiestothe
sameintheformoffavorablestipulationsorindemnity.Insuchacase,thirdpartiesmaydirectlysueandclaimfrom
theinsurer.21
PetitionersarethirdpartiestotheinsurancecontractswithInsularandGrepalifeand,thus,arenotentitledtothe
proceedsthereof.Accordingly,respondentsInsularandGrepalifehavenolegalobligationtoturnovertheinsurance
proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in
another are of no moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos
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insurancepoliciesremainsvalid.Becausenolegalproscriptionexistsinnamingasbeneficiariesthechildrenofillicit
relationshipsbytheinsured,22thesharesofEvaintheinsuranceproceeds,whetherforfeitedbythecourtinviewof
theprohibitionondonationsunderArticle739oftheCivilCodeorbytheinsurersthemselvesforreasonsbasedon
the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the
exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,23 or when the
designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redoundtothebenefitoftheestateoftheinsured.
In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same light, the
Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. Indeed, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the appeal the issue of failure to state a cause of action is a question of law and not of fact,
therebeingnofindingsoffactinthefirstplace.25
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIEDforlackofmerit.Costsagainstpetitioners.
SOORDERED.
ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice
WECONCUR:
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson
ANTONIOT.CARPIO*
AssociateJustice

RENATOC.CORONA**
AssociateJustice
DIOSDADOM.PERALTA
AssociateJustice
ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothe
writeroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision
CERTIFICATION
PursuanttoSection13,ArticleVIIIoftheConstitutionandtheDivisionChairperson'sAttestation,Icertifythatthe
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedtothewriterof
theopinionoftheCourtsDivision.
REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

Footnotes
*AdditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJusticeConchitaCarpioMoralesperSpecialOrderNo.646dated

May15,2009.
**AdditionalmemberinlieuofAssociateJusticeMinitaV.ChicoNazarioperSpecialOrderNo.631dated

April29,2009.
1Rollo,pp.1136.
2PennedbyAssociateJusticeMarinaL.Buzon,withAssociateJusticesRosmariD.CarandangandMariflor

P.PunzalanCastillo,concurringid.at3752.
3Rollo,pp.5964.
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4TwoLifeInsuranceplanswithPolicyNos.A001544070,forthesumofP1,500,000.00and1643029,forthe

sumofP500,000.00.
5 Two Pension Plans with Policy Nos. PTLIG 10003260000, with a maturity value of P1,000,000.00 and

PTLIG 10003440000, with a maturity value of P500,000.00 and a Memorial Plan with Policy No. M0109
1590640000withplanvalueofP50,000.00.
6CitedintheJanuary8,2008ResolutionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.85948rollo,pp.4041.
7Id.at40.
8ART.752.TheprovisionsofArticle750notwithstanding,nopersonmaygiveorreceive,bywayofdonation,

morethanhemaygiveorreceivebywill.
ART. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof,
providedhereserves,infullownershiporinusufruct,sufficientmeansforthesupportofhimself,andof
allrelativeswho,atthetimeoftheacceptanceofthedonation,arebylawentitledtobesupportedby
thedonor.Withoutsuchreservation,thedonationshallbereducedonpetitionofanypersonaffected.
9ART.772.Onlythosewhoatthetimeofthedonorsdeathhavearighttothelegitimeandtheirheirsand

successorsininterestmayaskforthereductionofinofficiousdonations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of the
donor,eitherbyexpressdeclaration,orbyconsentingtothedonation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not entitled to the legitime and the creditors of the
deceasedcanneitheraskforthereductionnoravailthemselvesthereof.
10Rollo,pp.4243.
11Id.at4345.
12Id.at6572.
13Id.at7380.
14Id.at4647.
15Id.at2021.
16RULESONCIVILPROCEDURE,Rule2,Sec.2.
17BankofAmericaNT&SAv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.120135,March31,2003,400SCRA156,167.
18 Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530

SCRA170ChinaRoadandBridgeCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.137898,December15,2000,
348SCRA401,409,412Dabucov.CourtofAppeals,379Phil.939(2000)PeltanDev.,Inc.v.CA,336Phil.
824(1997)CityofCebuv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.109173,July5,1996,258SCRA175,182184United
StatesofAmericav.Reyes,G.R.No.79253,March1,1993,219SCRA192Santiagov.PioneerSavings&
LoanBank,No.L77502,January15,1988,157SCRA100MarcopperMiningCorporationv.Garcia,No.L
55935,July30,1986,143SCRA178,187189Tanv.DirectorofForestry,No.L24548,October27,1983,
125SCRA302,315.
19SECTION12.Theinterestofabeneficiaryinalifeinsurancepolicyshallbeforfeitedwhenthebeneficiary

istheprincipal,accomplice,oraccessoryinwillfullybringingaboutthedeathoftheinsuredinwhichevent,
thenearestrelativeoftheinsuredshallreceivetheproceedsofsaidinsuranceifnototherwisedisqualified.
20SouthernLuzonEmployeesAss.v.Golpeo,etal.,96Phil.83,86(1954),citingDelValv.DelVal,29Phil.

534,540541(1915).
21Coquilav.FieldmensInsuranceCo.,Inc.,No.L23276,November29,1968,26SCRA178,181Guingon

v.DelMonte,No.L22042,August17,1967,20SCRA1043.
22SouthernLuzonEmployeesAss.v.Golpeo,etal.,supranote20,at8788.
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23Vda.deConsuegrav.GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem,No.L28093,January30,1971,37SCRA

315.
24TheInsularLifeAssuranceCompany,Ltd.v.Ebrado,No.L44059,October28,1977,80SCRA181.
25ChinaRoadandBridgeCorporationv.CourtofAppeals,supranote18,at409410.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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