Process Dynamics and Control

H83PDC
Coursework Spring 2015-2016

CONTENTS:
1. FUNCTIONAL DESIGN SPECIFICATION & CONTROL STRATEGY
2.HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION WORKSHEET
3.PIPING AND INSTRUMENTATION DIAGRAM

Student name: Cosmin-Florin Florea

Student ID: 4183794

Functional Design Specification

Sulphuric acid plant

Plant description
This document's scope is describing the logic, control loops and instrumentation used in the process control of a
sulphuric acid production plant. In describing the control logic, the plant will be divided in three individual but
interconnected sections: Furnace, Waste heat boiler and Storage tank.
The four main streams entering the plant in the furnace section are: the combustion fuel(natural gas),
combustion air, waste gas containing sulphur dioxide and liquid sulphur. The amount of sulphuric acid produced is
determined by the total amount of sulphur entering the process at this stage.
The second stage in the plant is cooling down the gases exiting the furnace and recovering the heat by producing
steam. A waste heat boiler is employed in this process, along with a steam drum.
The third and last stage of the process revolves around storing and delivering the sulphuric acid to further usage
downstream.
A Hazard Identification exercise has been completed in order to help devise an appropriate control strategy for
the process plant. Following the identification of the risks associated with the sulphuric acid production and storage,
several control loops have been put in place.
Several assumptions have been made in order to devise an appropriate control strategy for this plant:
1. No information regarding the SO2 amount in the waste gas( fed to the furnace) is provided and this amount can vary
unpredictably.
2.There is a continuous (or close to continuous) demand of sulphuric acid downstream of the production process.
3. The composition of the natural gas used as fuel in the furnace is known(to be used in calibrating instruments).

CONTROL STRATEGY SUMMARY

The control logic of the process plant revolves around meeting the demand of sulphuric acid for further
usage in processes downstream, maximizing the plant efficiency. The total amount of sulphur fed to the
furnace will be determined by the demand of H2SO4, maintaining a steady level in the storage tank.
The temperature in the furnace is controlled by varying the fuel/air mixture ratio, with the goal of
maintaining a good thermal efficiency.
Going through the waste heat recovery stage, the temperature of the process is controlled by
bypassing a fraction of the process stream around the boiler. The level in the steam drum connected to the
boiler is accurately controlled by adjusting the feed water flow based on level and steam flow measurements.
The level in the storage tank is indirectly controlled by matching the production and demand of
sulphuric acid. However, the level in the tank is monitored and several alarms and trips are associated with
level variations inside it.

Description of Control Loops and Instrumentation

Waste heat boiler

Controller Control Controller Set

Variable Action
Point
ID

Manipulated Measured Sensor Type

Variable
Variable

Alarms

Trips

Comments

TC02

F in B_002

L 430

LL 420

Temperature control of
boiler outlet using a
bypass around the waste
heat boiler .
LL trip - send gas to stack

N/A

Reverse

440

T in B_007 Resistance

H 460

LC01

P in
SD01

Reverse

FC02

P in
B_003

Reverse

80%

Water F into L in SD01 Differential

SD01
pressure level
sensor
Water F into L in SD01 Orifice plate
SD01
Steam F in steam flow
B_006
meter
Ultrasonic
FM(water flow)

LL - open Part of the threeL alarm CV-04

element control of the
H alarm
Steam Drum level.
Level control in SD01. PID
controller with great
accuracy (trimming level
measurement
with
differential flow signal).

Steam drum level control

The level in the boiler steam drum has to be accurately monitored and maintained, therefore the method chosen for the
level control in the steam drum is a three element feed-water control method. The method is developed by improving
on more basic control schemes such as:
-Basic one element control (Level measurement only) -This control method cannot correct the drum level if there is a
small controller gain error(non-linearities between valve demand and actual flow), or if things are not set up correctly at
the start-up (initial error).
-Traditionally a two element feed-water control (Level + steam flow measurement) is used if there is no need for great
accuracy. However, this control method cannot correct the drum level if there are any disturbances in the feed water
flow (pressure changes).
-The three element feed-water control (Level+Steam flow + Water feed flow measurement) corrects any error
introduced by the feed valve. A cascade control technique is applied ; The drum level-controller, compares the
measured level signal with a set value and produces a bipolar output proportional to the error. The feedwater flow
control valve is adjusted based on this output together with the estimated feedwater demand (based on current steam
flow) and current feedwater flow conditions.

Process stream temperature control

Since the temperature of the process stream leaving the Waste Heat Boiler cannot go below 420C without
causing high economical losses, a temperature control method is required to ensure good plant turndown. Since both
the process stream flow and steam flow ( +/- 20%) are set by process requirements, a bypass method is recommended.
In our case, a proportion of the process stream (hot stream) will be sent through the boiler, while the remainder will be
bypassed around the heat exchanger. The temperature of the mixed stream is controlled by the ratio between the
bypassed and the cold stream. This system provides very tight temperature control (fast response), since the dynamics
of mixing a cold and hot stream are very fast.

Furnace

Controller Control Controller Set

Variable Action
Point
ID

Manipulated Measured Sensor Type

Variable
Variable

Fr C 01

T in
F_005

Reverse

Input
from
TC01

F01

T in

FT01- Thermal
mass FM
FT02-DP Flow
Meter

TC01

N/A

Direct

1200

Setpoint of
Fr C 01

T in

Online Infrared
L 1100
Pyrometer
H 1300

Fr C 02

N/A

Direct

Input
from
FT07

F in F_003

F in F01

Mass Flow
Meter
SOLA II Sulphur
content
analyzer

Alarms

Trips

Comments

Air/Fuel Ratio control to

keep T constant. (acts as
slave to TC01)

HH Temperature control
process for furnace exit. (acts
shutdown as master to Fr C 01)
Ratio control for total
sulphur input into the
furnace. Matches H2SO4
production
with
downstream
requirements.

FURNACE CONTROL
The control of the furnace air/fuel mixture and outlet temperature will employ a ratio control method. Since the
air flow rate is fixed, the fuel (natural gas) flow will be the manipulated variable. This will be done using a flow ratio
controller with input from the Air flow rate transmitter. The flow ratio controller will output a signal representing the
fuel demand to the Fuel flow controller, which determines the action of the control valve based on input from the flow
transmitter upstream. Instead of having a user-input set point for the Flow Ratio, a 'cascade'-like type of system will be
used. A temperature controller will provide the remote input(feedback) to our Ratio Controller, such that the outlet
temperature from the furnace is controlled by the fuel/air mixture ratio. Having this temperature control in place will

help diminish the disturbances on the downstream waste heat boiler, diminishing the variance in the flow rate of steam
produced.
Since the amount of sulphuric acid produced in the plant depends on the total amount of sulphur fed into the
furnace, a ratio control loop will be employed to make sure we are producing as much H2SO4 as it is required.
The amount of sulphur in the waste gas is unknown, therefore we cannot control the sulphur input using this
stream. A sulphur content analyzer and flow rate transmitter will be mounted on the waste gas line. The sulphur
analyzer will periodically sample the waste gas line and determine the composition of the gas in regards to sulphur. The
instruments will produce a signal ( XT serves as sulphur concentration compensation) which is then sent to the ratio
control relay. The ratio control relay will take its setpoint from the flow transmitter on the outlet from the storage tank(
sulphuric acid downstream demand). The flow ratio controller manipulates the flow of liquid sulphur going into the
furnace, ultimately controlling the amount of sulphuric acid produced. This control method assumes that there is a
steady demand of sulphuric acid downstream of the storage tank.

Storage tank

Controller Control Controller Set

Variable Action
Point
ID
LC02

FC03

F in
Direct
ST_001

P in
ST01

Direct

Manipulated Measured Sensor Type

Variable
Variable

Dependent F out of ST01 L in ST01 D/P Cell

on
downstream
demand
Depending F out of ST01 L in ST01
on
downstream
demand

Alarms Trips

L 20%
H 90%

Comments

LL 10% No action under normal

operation. Closes CV-05
HH92% if tank level is extremely
low as well as stops P01.
Used to control sulphuric
acid flow to further
usage. Set point can be
sent from downstream
control
system
or
selected by operator.

STORAGE TANK CONTROL

A differential pressure cell is used to measure the level of fluid in the Storage Tank ST01. The level controller
LC02 sends a signal to FC03 to take corrective action when the level in the tank is very low. Under normal operation, the
plant operator selects the setpoint for FC03 in order to match the downstream requirements for sulphuric acid. A series
of trips and alarms are associated with LC02. A low level in the storage tank will prompt the operator to check if furnace
operation is normal (enough sulphur is fed into process to match the acid demand). A very low level in the tank will
automatically shut down P01 and close CV-05. A high level in the tank will prompt the operator to check if FR C 02 is
adequately controlling the sulphur fed into the furnace(manual adjustment of the Fr C 02 Setpoint is possible to reduce
production of H2SO4) and also check if downstream demand is above the production capacity of the plant. A very high
level in the tank will shutdown the process.

List of control valves

Valve ID

Type

Controller Material

Fail open/close Comments

CV-01

Sliding stem globe Fr C01

style control valve

CS body
Teflon packing

CLOSE

Fuel control valve.

Fugitive emission packing.
Pneumatic actuator.

CV-02

Globe style control Fr C02

valve

CS body
Teflon packing

CLOSE

Liquid sulphur control valve.

Pneumatic actuator.

CV-03

Globe style control TC-02

valve

CS body
Teflon packing

CLOSE

Boiler bypass valve.

Pneumatic actuator.

CV-04

Globe style control FC02

valve

CS body
Teflon packing

OPEN

Boiler feed water control valve.

Pneumatic actuator.

CV-05

Globe style control FC03

valve

SS body
Teflon packing

OPEN

Storage tank outlet control valve.

Pneumatic actuator.

LINE ID
F_001
F_002
F_003
F_004
F_005
B_001
B_002
B_003
B_004
B_005
B_006
B_007
ST_001
ST_002

Fuel (natural gas) feed to furnace

Combustion air
Liquid sulphur feed to furnace
Waste gas feed to furnace
Outlet from furnace
Process stream through boiler
Process stream bypassed around boiler
Boiler feed water to steam drum
Water flow to boiler
Vapor flow to steam drum
Steam outlet
Process stream outlet from waste heat boiler
Sulphuric acid flow into Storage Tank
Sulphuric acid flow out of Storage Tank

UNIT ID
F01
SD01
HX1
ST01

Furnace
Steam drum
Waste heat boiler
Storage Tank

PROJECT:

PDC Coursework

HAZID Date:

18/04/2016

Drawing No.:

A1

Participants:

Cosmin-Florin Florea

Facility Section No.:

H2SO4 Production

Participants Signatures:

CFF

Facility Section Description:

H2SO4 Production

Rev

Hazard Consequence Ranking Assuming Controls

in Place

No.

Specific Hazard

Potential Mechanism(s) for

Hazard Exposure

Potential Hazard Consequences

Internal corrosion of piping

Iron contamination of sulphuric acid

Flammable and explosive substances (natural

gas)

Leaking due to equipment failure and/or

contact with ignition/heat source

Risk
Rating

1. Economic: High- depending on extent could cause more

1
than 20% of the cost of the plant as more than one unit
could be severly damaged 2. Human: High- Lives are at risk
3. Environmental: Medium- Potential formation of toxic
Use of approriate materials; pressure control in order to
susbtances which would be local and remidiable 4.
prevent
bursting pipes; No ignition sources in the vecinity of the
Product specifications: High- might not be able to be
processes
involving flammable/explosive materials.(use of
delivered until damage is repaired which could be a critical
pneumatic actuators).
amount of time 5. Image damage:High-

1. Economic: Medium- piping would have to be

replaced more often. 2. Human: Medium : Health
risks if corrosion causes gas leaks 3. EnvironmentalLow When discharged in very high quantities, may
contribute to greenhouse effect 4. Product
specification:Medium: Product purity can be
affected by poorly mainted piping

Improper material selection

Likelihood
Severity
(Dropdown) (Dropdown)
1

Corrosive substances are present

Proposed Mitigation Controls In Place

Appropriate materials used for piping ( 316SS / Alloy 20); piping

is formally externally inspected visually every five years,
and ultrasonic thickness tested biennially; Extra attention should
be paid to elbows, tees, valves and any other places in the piping
where flow
disturbances (and erosion/corrosion) could occur.

Iron contamination is an issue when Carbon Steel is used for

H2SO4 piping, therefore Stainless Steel will be used.

Appropriate materials used for piping ( 316SS / Alloy 20)

An evaluation version of novaPDF was used to create this PDF file.

Purchase a license to generate PDF files without this notice.

Gases at high pressure

Liquids under high pressure

Hot fluids

Rotational equipment/Moving parts

1. Economic:High- Could have catastrophic economic

consequences depending on extent 2. Human: HighPoses a sever threat to human lifes 3.
Overpresurization of pipe/ vessel could lead Environmental: Medium- Can lead to formation of
to explosion. Gas can leak (refer to
toxic substances, sudden release of high
flammable gases row for safety
concentration of greenhouse gases which are serious
considerations on leaking)
but temporary 4. Product secification: High- Plant
would not be able to meet product specification until
damage was completely repaired 5. Image damage:
High- Company's image would be seriously damaged.

1. Economic:High- Could have catastrophic economic

consequences depending on extent 2. Human: HighOverpresurization of pipe/ vessel could lead
Poses a sever threat to human lifes 3.
to explosion. Gas can leak (refer to
Environmental: Medium- Can lead to formation of
flammable gases row for safety
toxic substances. 4. Product secification: High- Plant
considerations on leaking)
would not be able to meet product specification until
damage was completely repaired

Pressure sensors along with appropriate process control to

prevent overpresurization; apropriate materials used.

Pressure sensors along with appropriate process control to

prevent overpresurization; apropriate materials used.

1. Economic: Medium: Medical care for potential

injuries / Damaged equipment due to high
temperature. 2. Human: Medium Risk to plant
Adequate insulation for piping in easy accessible areas; Proper
A piece of equipment/pipe not adequatly operators to suffer skin burns 3. Environmental:Low staff training; Providing protective personal equipment to plant
insulated; the hot surface can represent an
No environmental risk in this pathway 4. Product
operators; Acces routes should be away from heat/ignition
ignition source.
specification: Low Does not affect product
sources; Temperature indicators/transmitters and automatic
specification 5. Image damage: High If plant
shut-down if any temperatures go beyond safe values.
operators are seriously injuered can affect safety
image of company

1. Economic: Medium Medical care for

injuries/Damaged equipment due to tampering with
moving parts 2. Human: High Risk to plant operators
to suffer injuries such as a damaged limbs, specially
fingers 3. Environmental:Low Not and
Operators could be injured if they come into
environmenatl risk in this pathway 4. Product
direct contact with any moving parts in acid
specification: Low Does not affect product
pumps / air compressor.
specification, unless process has to be stopped
because mehcnism of moving part os damaged as a
result of operator coming in contact with it 5. Image
damage: High If plant operators are seriously
injuered can affect reputation of company.

An evaluation version of novaPDF was used to create this PDF file.

Purchase a license to generate PDF files without this notice.

Proper staff training; Adequate housing for the

pumps/compressors where needed.

10

Equipment at high temperature

Poisonous substances (Sulphuric Acid)

High pressure in Steam Drum

Outlet stream from waste heat boiler too

cold

1. Economic: Medium: Medical care for potential

injuries / Damaged equipment due to high
temperature. 2. Human: Medium Risk to plant
A piece of equipment/pipe not adequatly operators to suffer skin burns 3. Environmental:Low
insulated; the hot surface can represent an
No environmental risk in this pathway 4. Product
ignition source.
specification: Low Does not affect product
specification 5. Image damage: High If plant
operators are seriously injuered can affect safety
image of company

Leakages, improper handling

No downstream demand / Very high

production rate

Very high demand / Low (No) Production

rate

1.Economic: High Processed gas sent to stack.

2.Human : No risk 3.Environmental: Low: Natural
gas/ SO2 sent to stack 4.Product specification: High:

Wrong fuel to air ratio / Fuel composition

not correct

Bypass control of the outlet process stream temperature

1.Economic: Medium 2.Human : Medium

3.Environmental: Medium

Alarm for high tank level. Automatic shutdown if level in the

tank is extremely high.

1.Economic: Medium 2.Human : No risk

3.Environmental: No risk

Alarm for low tank level. Pump shutdown procedure for very
low level in tank.

13
Temperature too high in Furnace

Pressure relief valve installed on the steam drum

outlet;Accurate level control in the steam drum;

12
Storage tank running empty

Temperature control as well as adequate insulation of such

equipment.

11
Storage tank overfilling

Proper staff training; adequate protective equipment is provided

Human: High : VERY TOXIC, Fatal if inhaled, Reacts
to the plant operators. No Sulphuric Acid vessel exposed to
violently with water,corrosive.
atmosphere.

1. Economic: Medium: Potential damage to

equipment 2. Human: Medium Risk to plant
operators to suffer injuries 3. Environmental:Low No
Higher temperature process stream than
environmental risk in this pathway 4. Product
usual; Failure of level control in Steam Drum;
specification: Low Does not affect product
specification 5. Image damage: High If plant
operators are seriously injuered can affect safety
image of company

Low process stream temperature / Low

process stream flow.

1.Economic: High 2.Human : Medium

3.Environmental: Medium

An evaluation version of novaPDF was used to create this PDF file.

Purchase a license to generate PDF files without this notice.

Flow Ratio control for fuel/air mixture with temperature

feedback; Natural gas composition tested

10

B
F_002

B_006

FT
02

FT
06

B_003

PRV-01

FC
02

LC
01

FT
05

LT
01

SD01
CV-04

FT
01

F_001

TT
01

F01

CV-01

B_005

B_004

TC
01
Fr
C
01

ST01

HX1

H2SO4 Processing

B_001

F_005

HH Shutdown
H Alarm
L Alarm
LL STOP P01 &
Close CV

B_007

LT
02

ST_001

TT
02

E
TC
02
ST_002

LC
02

B_002

CV-05

FT
04

CV-03

FC
03

XT
01
CV-02

P01

Fr C
02

F_003

FT
03

FT
07

Control P&ID

18/4/16

CFF

F_004

UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM
University Park Nottingham
CFF

Control P&ID

18/03/2016

Cosmin-Florin Florea

A1

10