Rabindranath S.

Polito
USC Law
Constitutional Law I
Case Digests: Constitutional Questions Raised at Earliest Opportunity
Umali v Guingona (March 29, 1999)
Facts:
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
However on 1 August 1994, a confidential memorandum against him was sent to President
Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption for
investigation (malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance). Umali complied with the pleadings
and hearings set by PCAGC.
Umali and his lawyer did not raise clarficatory questions during the hearing. The hearing was
reset to August 30, 1994, during which the parties were given a chance to ask clarificatory
questions. Petitioner and his counsel did not ask any question on the genuineness and authenticity
of the documents attached as annexes to the Complaint. PCAGC foud prima facie evidence to
support the charges and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He appealed to the
Office of the President but was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging that he was not accorded
due process and deprived of security of tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the
decision and was elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of PCAGC
as a government agency.
Issue:
Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the earliest opportunity?
Held:
No. In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding the constitutionality of
PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the RTC. It was
certainly too late to raise the said issue for the first time at such a late stage of the
proceedings.
It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against
the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the
PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman.
Tijam v Sibonghanoy (April 15, 1968)
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses Sibonghanoy to
recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the
court against the defendants properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executory,
the court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of the writ of execution against the Suretys bond. Subsequently,
the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without summary
hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA, which was denied. This

time, the surety just asked for an extension inorder for them to file the motion for reconsideration.
But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it filed a motion to dismiss saying that
by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948, section 88 of which
placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil action where the value
of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00. The Court of First Instance therefore has no
jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the Surety only 15 years from
the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.
The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of
Appeals' adverse decision.
ISSUE:
WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK OF JURISDICTION.
HELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits,
it is too late for the party to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law and as
the lack of it affect the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances
of the present cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea for the first time on
appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done in the case. A party cannot invoke a courts
jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a penalty.
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length
of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the
case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the
court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important
in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not
be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Ballesteros v Abion (Feb. 9, 2006)
Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the July 15, 1999 decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37,
in Civil Case No. 2917. The property subject of the petition is a two-door, three-story commercial
building and the 229sq.m. parcel of land on which it stands. The property was originally owned

by Ruperto Ensano, as evidenced by TCT No. 6178. Ownership was subsequently transferred to
the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) which, in turn, sold the property to Dr. Rodolfo
Vargas in a deed of absolute sale dated March 30, 1988. Despite these transfers of ownership,
however, the property was registered in the names of DBP and Dr. Vargas (TCT Nos. 941 and
942, respectively) only on February 21, 1996.
On March 14, 1991, petitioner entered into a contract of lease for one door of the building
with Ronald Vargas, son of Dr. Vargas, who represented himself as the absolute owner of the
property. Under the agreement (which was not registered in the Register of Deeds), the lease was
to run until April 1, 1996.
On September 27, 1995, Dr. Vargas sold the property to respondent. This was evidenced by a
deed of absolute sale of even date. TCT No. 949 in the name of the respondent was subsequently
issued on April 10, 1996.
In the meantime, on October 30, 1995, petitioner entered into a new contract of lease with
Ronald Vargas who again misrepresented himself as the absolute owner of the property. This new
agreement extended the term of the original contract of lease between the parties and included the
remaining door of the building in its coverage. It was to be effective for a period of five years
from November 1, 1995, or until November 1, 2000.
Since respondent had not yet taken possession of the building, petitioner immediately
occupied the additional door upon the execution of the new contract of lease. He made advance
payments for the rent of the two doors until June 1997. He also sought to register the new contract
of lease with the Register of Deeds of Iriga City. However, the contract was entered only in the
primary book because it could not be registered for several reasons: (a) the requisite tax had not
been paid (b) the contract lacked a documentary stamp and (c) the tax declaration of the property
was not in the name of the lessor.
On April 30, 1996, petitioner received respondents April 25, 1996 letter demanding that he
vacate the property and surrender its possession. On June 20, 1996, petitioner received another
letter from respondents counsel reiterating the demand for him to vacate the property. All this
notwithstanding, petitioner refused to vacate the premises.
On September 4, 1996, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer with damages
against petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iriga City, Branch 2. It was,
however, dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
On appeal, the RTC of Iriga City, Branch 37, reversed the decision of the MTCC and ordered
petitioner to vacate the property and surrender its possession to respondent. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay respondent P50,000 as attorneys fees and P7,000 per month as rental for the
property from September 1995 until petitioner vacated the premises. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the RTC decision but the motion was denied.
The CA held that petitioners possession of the property from the date of purchase by
respondent was merely by tolerance. Such possession became unlawful from the time respondent
made a demand on petitioner to vacate it.
The CA further ruled that petitioner could not pretend ignorance of the ownership of the
property when he entered into the second lease agreement. The property was registered with the
Register of Deeds and such registration constituted notice to the whole world.
Petitioner asserts that the Municipal Trial Court in the Cities (MTCC) had no jurisdiction to
try the case because the complaint did not allege that he was withholding possession of the
property beyond the expiration of the lease period and that, in violation of Rule 70, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court, respondent failed to establish a cause of action by omitting to allege that
demand to vacate was made for failure to pay the rent or comply with the conditions of the
contract.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court (MTCC of Iriga City, Br. 2) had jurisdiction to try the case.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court said that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over the case. In
the motion for reconsideration of the RTC decision, petitioner explicitly prayed that the MTCCs
decision be affirmed. In effect, he recognized the jurisdiction of the said court and should be
estopped from challenging the questioning of the MTCCs jurisdiction. The actual participation
of the petitioner would also be a strong manifestation of his recognition of the courts
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any
stage, a partys active participation in the proceeding before a court without jurisdiction
will estoppe such party from assailing suck lack of jurisdiction.The petition was denied by the
court, while the decision of the court of appeals was affirmedwith modification as the attorneys
fees were deleted.
The settled rule is that a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it contains the
allegation that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful, without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law. The complaint must aver facts showing that the
inferior court has jurisdiction to try the case, such as how defendants possession started or
continued. Thus, the allegation in a complaint that the "plaintiff verbally asked the defendants to
remove their houses on the lot of the former but the latter refused and still refuse to do so without
just and lawful grounds" was held to be more than sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements.
Mangaliag v Pastoral (Oct. 25, 2005)
Facts:
On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The complaint
alleges that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., private respondent, together with
Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a tricycle driven by
Jayson Laforte; while in Pagal, San Carlos City, a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and
driven by her employee, petitioner Solano, coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake
and bypass a tricycle in front of it and thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the tricycle
ridden by private respondent; due to the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of
petitioner Solano in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers sustained serious
injuries and permanent deformities; petitioner Mangaliag failed to exercise due diligence required
by law in the selection and supervision of her employee; private respondent was hospitalized and
spent P71,392.00 as medical expenses; private respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity
due to a fractured nose and suffers from severe depression as a result thereof, for which he should
be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral damages; as a further result of his
hospitalization, private respondent lost income of P25,000.00; private respondent engaged the
services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to 25% of the total award.
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private
respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or negligence in the vehicular
accident on the tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte, who was allegedly driving without license.
Following pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. When private respondent rested his
case, petitioner Solano testified in his defense.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000, petitioners, assisted by a new counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for,
in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction. Private respondent opposed petitioners

motion to dismiss. On March 24, 2000, petitioners filed a supplement in support of their motion
to dismiss.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTCs lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
No. In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact,
as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or
neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches
to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the present controversy. Instead, the
general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994, provides
inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases exceeds P100,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive
jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where the
amount of the demand in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court. The jurisdictional amount was increased to P200,000.00, effective March 20, 1999,
pursuant to Section 528 of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court specified the
guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular provides:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to
cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action.
However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes
of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.