!!"#!

JOHN CASSIDY

THE LESSONS OF CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION: FROM MOSSADEGH TO
SNOWDEN
By John Cassidy, AUGUST 19, 2013

For connoisseurs of irony, there was much to savor in the timing of Mondays
announcement from the White House that, while it had been notified in
advance of what was likely to happen, it had nothing to do with the British
governments decision to detain David Miranda, the partner of Guardian
journalist Glenn Greenwald, at Heathrow airport, hold him for nine hours, and
strip him of his laptop, cell phone, and various other possessions. Absolutely
nothing to do with us, was the White House line: strictly aa matter
matter for our
British friends. This is a decision they made on their own, said the aptly named
spokesman Josh Earnest.
Across town, meanwhile, the C.I.A.through the conduit of Malcolm Byrne,
the director of research at the National Security Archivewas confirming its
role in what was most definitely a joint U.S.-British intelligence operation: the
August, 1953, coup that overthrew Mohammad Mossadegh, Irans populist
prime minister, and reinstated the Shah, a convenient puppet for Washington
and London who was to remain in power for another twenty-six years, before
fleeing in January of 1979. Six decades to the day since a pro-Shah mob, led by
Iranian agents recruited by the U.S. and the British, marched on Mossadeghs
published
extracts from
from internal
internal
C.I.A.
documents
residence, Byrne published
published extracts
internal C.I.A.
C.I.A. documents
documents that, for the
first time, explicitly acknowledge how the agency masterminded the change of
government in Tehran.
The C.I.A.s involvement in the coup, which served as a model for subsequent

clandestine operations in Guatemala, Cuba, and other countries, has been well
known for decades, and even today it is a source of animosity towards the United
States on the part of many Iranians. The agent who led the coup was Kermit
Roosevelt, the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt. Until recently, though, the
agency hasnt publicly acknowledged the extent of its role, which was code
an internal
internal C.I.A.
C.I.A.
account
named TPAJAX. That has now changed. In an
C.I.A. account
account of the
coup, which was written in the nineteen-seventies and kept secret until Byrne
obtained it, the anonymous author states bluntly:
The military coup that overthrew Mosadeq [a different English translation of the prime
ministers name from Farsi] and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA
direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels
of government.

So much for the the Eisenhower Administrations vigorous denials that it was
behind the coup. And so much for the alternative version of the events,
anclaimed
internalthat
C.I.A.
assiduously promoted in some quarters, which
theaccount
overthrowal of
Mossadegh was a locally-inspired plot that the Americans and the British merely
helped along. The internal C.I.A. historian continues:
It was not an aggressively simplistic solution, clandestinely arrived at, but was instead
an official admission that normal, rational methods of international communication
and commerce had failed. TPJAX was entered into as a last resort.

The newly released account come from one of a series of documents that the
C.I.A. eventually turned over to Byrne after he filed Freedom of Information
requests. It is dierent from another history of the Iranian coup that was written
in 1954 by one of its planners at the C.I.A., Donald N. Wilber, and which the
obtained in
in 2000
2000. Wilbers account was
New York Times reporter James Risen obtained
almost contemporaneous, and it contained many vivid details of the coup
attempt, which almost failed. The new account, portions of which had been
declassified previously, takes a broader and more detached approach. In addition
to confirming that a U.S. President, Dwight Eisenhower, personally approved the
toppling of a foreign government, it contains several other items of interest.
The United States saw the coup essentially as a Cold War maneuver. For the
British, who were also eager to overthrow Mossadegh, the main beef with the
Iranian Prime Minister was that, in May of 1951, he had nationalized the oil
obtained
in 2000
fields controlled by the Anglo Iranian Oil
Company,
the precursor to BP. From
the perspective of Washington, though, as the newly released documents
confirm, Mossadeghs biggest sin was his flirtation with the Soviet Union, which,
like Britain, had colonial ties to Iran. As the animosity between Tehran and
London escalated, the British moved to prevent Iran from selling any oil
internationally, thus depriving the government of much-needed revenues. The
C.I.A. and other U.S. agencies became concerned that Mossadegh would turn to
the Soviets for economic and even military help. From the Agencys history:
Had the British sent in the paratroops and warships, as they were to do a few years later
against the Egyptians at Suez, it was almost certain that the Soviet Union would have
occupied the northern portion of Iran. It was also quite probable that the Soviet army
would have moved south to drive British forces out on behalf of their Iranian allies.
Then not only would Irans oil have been irretrievably lost to the West, but the defense
chain around the Soviet Union which was part of U.S. foreign policy would have been
breached. The Soviets would have had the opportunity to achieve the ancient Russian
dream of a port on the Persian Gulf and to drive a wedge between Turkey and India.
Under such circumstances, the danger of a third world war seemed very real. When it
became apparent that many elements in Iran did not approve of Mosadeqs continuing
gamble or the direction in which he was pushing their country, the execution of a U.S.assisted coup detat seemed a more desirable risk than letting matters run their
unpredictable course.

Evidently, the C.I.A. was a bit bemused by Mossadegh, who hailed from a wellto-do Iranian family, and who refused all entreaties to engage him in a deal with
the British. At any time in 1951 or 1952, he could have had the same
compromise through which his successors gained a nationalized oil industry
eciently run by foreign experts to give Iran the revenues that financed the
Shahs White Revolution, the internal history says. He chose to gamble on
total victory over Britain, the United States, and the international oil industry
and he lost.
In recent decades, some academic historians, such as the late Amos Perlmutter, of
American University, have argued that the C.I.A.s role in Mossadeghs downfall
had been exaggerated, and that, having lost the support of numerous political
factions in Tehran, he would have been pushed from power without the agencys
intervention. In a dierent document that Byrne obtained, which is heavily
redacted, another agency historian, Scott A. Koch, disputes this revisionist
argument, writing:
Perlmutter is correct in saying that Iranian political divisions made the fall of Mossadeq
(this is yet another spelling) possible, but merely because something is possible does
ensure that it will happen. Without Kermit Roosevelts leadership, guidance, and ability
to put some backbone into the key players when they wanted to quit, no one would have
moved against Mossadeq.

At this stage, much of this material might appear to be primarily of historical

interest. But that doesnt mean that it lacks importance. In Iran, Egypt, and other
Middle Eastern countries, history, particularly colonial history, is a living
presence that helps shape many peoples attitudes to the West. For example,
many Americans cant understand why so many Egyptians think that the United
States is secretly orchestrating what is happening in Cairo. But throughout the
Middle East, events like the Iranian coup and the Suez crisis still figure much
larger in the public imagination than they do in this country.
As for us, there are least two lessons to draw. First, we should pay more attention
to history. In watching the events convulsing the Middle East, and thinking
about how to react to them, it is essential to be aware of how we got to this
juncture. Second, the ocial version of history is often very dierent from what
really happened. During the Cold War, as now, the reality of what the U.S.
government was doing was often hidden in classified documents. In the case of
the coup against Mossadegh, its taken sixty years for the full truth to emerge.
Doubtless, it will take almost as long for us to learn everything about the spying
agencies electronic prosecution of the War on Terror. But thanks to Edward
Snowden and journalists like Glenn Greenwald, weve at least had an advance
briefing.
Above: A crowd of demonstrators in Tehran, in 1953. Photograph: AP.
John Cassidy has been a sta writer at The New Yorker since 1995. He also
writes a column about politics, economics, and more for newyorker.com.
MORE:

IRAN

About

EDWARD SNOWDEN

Careers

NSA

Cartoon Bank

Contact

Customer Care

FAQ

Media Kit

On The Town

Press

Reprints

RSS

Site Map

Store

Strongbox

Cond Nast
Digital
2016 Cond
Nast. All rights reserved. Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our user agreement (eective
1/2/2016) and privacy policy (eective 1/2/2016). Your California privacy rights. The material on this site may not be
reproduced, distributed, transmitted, cached or otherwise used, except with prior written permission of Cond Nast.

Our sites

MOST POPULAR
1. The 2016 Presidential Election
Live Blog and Analysis
BY RYAN LIZZA AND BENJAMIN WALLACE-WELLS

2. Cruz Delivers Early Concession

Speech for Trump
BY ANDY BOROWITZ

3.

Glenn Beck Tries Out Decency

BY NICHOLAS SCHMIDLE

4.

Donald Trumps Closing

Message
BY JOHN CASSIDY

5.

Hillary Clinton, on the Eve of

the Presidency
BY BENJAMIN WALLACE-WELLS

OUR THIRTY MOST POPULAR

Where to Go, what to do

See our new Goings On About Town, The
New Yorkers online guide to the citys best
in culture, from ballet to bagels.