10.

Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary

GR No. 83896 February 22, 1991
Facts:
These two (2) petitions were consolidated per resolution dated August 9, 1988 1 and are being resolved jointly
as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C.
Aquino on July 25, 1987. The pertinent provisions of the assailed Executive Order are:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in
addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall
not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the
Chairman.
Sec. 2. If a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive official of
the Executive Department holds more positions than what is allowed in Section 1 hereof, they (sic) must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall
any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Sec. 3. In order to fully protect the interest of the government in government-owned or controlled
corporations, at least one-third (1/3) of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a
secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, 2 which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate
in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office.
Issue:
Whether Executive Order No. 284 violates Section 13, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
Yes.
1) This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. In
fact, the holding of multiple offices in government was strongly denounced on the floor of the Batasang
Pambansa. 12 This condemnation came in reaction to the published report of the Commission on Audit,
entitled "1983 Summary Annual Audit Report on: Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations,

Self-Governing Boards and Commissions" which carried as its Figure No. 4 a "Roaster of Membership
in Governing Boards of Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations as of December 31, 1983."
2) Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the
privilege of holding multiple government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in
the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. 21 The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the VicePresident being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of
Justice being ex-officiomember of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
3) The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required 22 by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. 23 To characterize these posts otherwise
would lead to absurd consequences, among which are: The President of the Philippines cannot chair the
National Security Council reorganized under Executive Order No. 115 (December 24, 1986). Neither
can the Vice-President, the Executive Secretary, and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice, Labor
and Employment and Local Government sit in this Council, which would then have no reason to exist
for lack of a chairperson and members. The respective undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, would
also be prohibited.

11. De La Cruz v. Commission on Audit

371 SCRA 157

FACTS:
The COA issued Memorandum No. 97-038[2] directing all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national
government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of any
form of additional compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries, their deputies and assistants, or their
representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple positions, to (a) immediately cause the disallowance of such
additional compensation or remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the
refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated
cases ofCivil Liberties Union vs. Exexcutive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.[3] The COA Memorandum further
stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and executory on August 19, 1991,[4] declared
Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to
hold other offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor.

ISSUE: Whether Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants can hold other offices, in addition to their
primary offices, and to receive compensation
HELD:
To reiterate, the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering positions held
without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of the concerned officials office. The term ex-officio means from office; by virtue of office. It refers to
an authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but
rather annexed to the official position. Ex-officio likewise denotes an act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. An exofficio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and
Communications is the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the Light Rail
Transit Authority.
The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached
to his principal office. It should be obvious that if, say, the Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the
Monetary Board as an ex-officio member thereof, he is actually and in legal contemplation performing
the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in monetary banking matters, which come
under the jurisdiction of his department. For such attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any
extra compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowance, or some
other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated, such additional compensation is prohibited by
the Constitution.
Since the Executive Department Secretaries, as ex-oficio members of the NHA Board, are prohibited from
receiving extra (additional) compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an
allowance, or some other such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as their alternates cannot likewise
be entitled to receive such compensation. A contrary rule would give petitioners a better right than their
principals.
12. Funa vs. Agra, G.R. No. 191644
FACTS:
Funa challenged the constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations,
wherein President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice and
subsequently as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity. Accordingly, such appointments are
prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly prohibits the President,
vice-President, the Members of the cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution. Respondents
contend, that Agras concurrent, designations were only in a temporary capacity as the onlyeffect of
which was to confer additional dutiesto him. Thus, as the acting solicitor General and actingSecretary of
Justicewas not holding both offices in the strict Constitutional sense which must be regular and permanent and
not a mere designation.

ISSUE:
Wether or not the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice violated the
Constitutional prohibition

RULINGS:
Pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure. To claim exception from this prohibition on double or multiple
holding of offices involving the executive officials mentioned, one needs to establish that the concurrent
designations and assumptions are expressly allowed by the Constitution itself. The only two exceptions against
the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII,
authorizing the Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive
officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the officials offices.
However, none of these exceptions as embodied in the Constitution apply to justify the concurrent
assumption of one as DOJ Secretary (DOJ) and Solicitor General (OSG). The appointment to the post of
Solicitor General cannot not merely be by virtue of ones office (ex-officio) as DOJ Secretary, and vice versa.
Similarly, the concurrent designations cannot be justified by arguing that the powers and functions of the OSG
are required by the primary functions or included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. By law and by the
nature of their powers and functions, these two offices are independent and distinct from each other. The OSG,
while attached to the DOJ, is not a constituent unit of the latter, as, in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987
decrees that the OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the
Solicitor General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals.
The prohibition on double or multiple appointments applies regardless of whether either or both the
appointments are merely temporary or in acting capacity.This is so because the constitution does not make a
distinction as to the nature of appointment. Secondly, the purpose of the prohibition is to prevent the
concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet and their deputies and assistants.To construe differently is to open the veritable
floodgates of circumvention of an important constitutional disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the Presidents power of appointment in the guise of temporary designations
of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of government agencies,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations.
13. Cicero Punsalan vs Estelito Mendoza
Cicero Punsalan and Estelito Mendoza were the vice governor and the governor of Pampanga respectively. Both
belong to KBL. On 17 May 1984, Mendoza tendered his resignation as the governor but the same should only
be effective at the Presidents pleasure. On 30 June 1984, Mendoza was appointed as the Minister of Justice
by the president. On 14 July 1984, he was concurrently appointed as a member of the Batasan Pambansa. On 16
July 1984, he filed a request to the Minister of Local Government (MLG) to consider him as the governor-onleave of Pampanga while the President was considering his resignation. The request was subsequently approved
by the MLG. Mendoza advised Punsalan to take the governorship temporarily while his resignation is being

considered. Punsalan subsequently took his oath of office not as the acting governor but as the governor and
thereafter assumed office. About 6 months later however, Mendoza resigned from his Batasan Membership and
upon the result of the KBLs caucus, he returned to Pampanga to assume his governorship. Punsalan denounced
Mendozas return claiming that he has already vacated his office by virtue of his resignation which was
impliedly approved by the President. Punsalan also pointed out that when Mendoza was a member of the
Batasan, he was barred from holding governorship because there is an inhibition against Batasan Members
from holding two elective positions; this is a constitutional provision which cannot be compromised. Further,
Punsalan claimed that Mendoza had forfeited his right and title to the office when he accepted his appointment
as Minister of Justice and that of appointive Batasan Member because of the incompatibility of the positions
with the Governors office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza can still return to his governorship.
HELD: Section 10, Article 8 of the 1973 Constitution provides:
A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall not hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations,
during his tenure except that of Prime Minister, Member of the Cabinet or Deputy Minister. Neither shall he,
during the term for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office which may have been created or
emoluments thereof increased while he was a Member of the Batasang Pambansa.
Punsalan anchored his contention upon the above provision but he failed to ascertain that the Constitution made
a distinction. The Constitution itself divided the Batasan membership into three categories: The elective
provincial/city/district representative; the sectoral representatives who are either elected or selected as may be
provided by law; and those chosen from Members of the Cabinet. It is the SCs opinion that the prohibition
in question does not extend to the third group of members, those chosen from the Cabinet. The prohibitions,
undoubtedly, deal with a Member who enters the Batasan primarily as a legislator voted into office by the
electorate of his constituency, the elected provincial or city or district representative with a fixed term (6
years) of office i.e an elected governor who, while in office, was elected as a member of the Batasan cannot
concurrently hold those two elective positions. Mendoza was elected as the governor but was not elected as a
member of the Batasan; he was appointed. Punsalans contention that Mendozas resignation was impliedly
approved by the president is not tenable. The president in fact needed more time to consider the validity of the
resignation and upon the KBLs recommendation; he instead chose to approve Mendozas return to his
governorship.
14. HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent.
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who
likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986.On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1 and since then he has discharged
the functions of said office.On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis
Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25,
1984.Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be

the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the
context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or
resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas
Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the
Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office
of governor.
Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue
serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
Held The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had
no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains
that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-governorship when he
filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984,
Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from
office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed
his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The reason the position of vice-governor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is
explained by the following interchange between Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on
said legislation:
MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly the proposed amendment it would cover only
governors and members of the different sanggunians? Mayor, governors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunian or barangay officials.
A vice-governor is a member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan.
MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use the word, "Local officials?
MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your humble representation ...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we include the vice-governor, the vice-mayors?
MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They are covered
by the provision on members of sanggunian.
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was
acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid.
15. AYTONA VS CASTILLO
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner DominadorAytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect
DiosdadoMacapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all,
350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President

Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo
warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to
Castillo by the new President, should be considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration
was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority
the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the
policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political
warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up
vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful
consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted.
But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours
before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse
Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions
irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to
make the corresponding appointments.
16. IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF HON. VALENZUELA AND HON. VALLARTA
A.M. NO. 98-5-01-SC NOVEMBER 9, 1998
FACTS: On March 30, 1998, The President signed appointments of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as Judges of RTC-Bago City and Cabanatuan City, respectively. These appointments were deliberated,
as it seemed to be expressly prohibited by Art 7 Sec 15 of the Constitution:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
A meeting was held on March 9, 1998 by the Judicial and Bar Council to discuss the constitutionality of
appointments to the Court of Appeals (CA) in light of the forthcoming 1998 Presidential elections. Senior
Associate Justice FlorenzRegalado, Consultant of the Council and Member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, was in the position that election ban had no application to the CA based on the Commissions
records. This hypothesis was then submitted to the President for consideration together with the Councils
nominations for 8 vacancies in the CA.
The Chief Justice (CJ) received on April 6, 1998, an official communication from the Executive Secretary
transmitting the appointments of 8 Associate Justices of CA duly signed on March 11, 1998 (day immediately
before the commencement of the ban on appointments), which implies that the Presidents Office did not agree
with the hypothesis.
The President, addressed to the JBC, requested on May 4, 1998 the transmission of the list of final nominees
for the vacancy in view of the 90 days imposed by the Constitution (from Feb 13, date present vacancy
occurred). In behalf of the JBC, CJ sent the reply on May 6 that no session has been scheduled after the May
elections for the reason that they apparently did not share the same view (hypothesis) proposed by the JBC

shown by the uniformly dated March 11, 1998 appointments. However, it appeared that the Justice Secretary
and the other members of the Council took action without waiting for the CJ reply. This prompted CJ to call for
a meeting on May 7. On this day, CJ received a letter from the President in reply of the May 6 letter where the
President expressed his view that Article 7 Sec 15 only applied to executive appointments, the whole article
being entitled EXECUTIVE DEPT. He posited that appointments in the Judiciary have special and specific
provisions, as follows:
Article 8 Sec 4The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Article 8 Sec 9
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President
from the list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.
On May 12, CJ received from Malacaang, the appointments of the 2 Judges of the RTC mentioned.
Considering the pending proceedings and deliberations on this matter, the Court resolved by refraining the
appointees from taking their oaths. However, Judge Valenzuela took oath in May 14, 1998 claiming he did so
without knowledge on the on-going deliberations. It should be noted that the originals of the appointments for
both judges had been sent to and received by the CJ on May 12 and is still in the latters office and had not been
transmitted yet. According to Judge Valenzuela, he did so because of the May 7 Malacaang copy of his
appointment.
In construing Article 7 and 8: when there are no presidential elections, Art. 8 shall apply where vacancies in SC
shall be filled within 90 days otherwise prohibition in Art. 7 must be considered where the President shall not
make any appointments. According to Fr. Bernas, the reason for prohibition is in order not to tie the hands of
the incoming Pres through midnight appointments.
ISSUE: Whether, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by Section 15, Article VII of the,
Constitution, the President is nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Sections 4(1) and
9 of Article VIII; whether he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest
of public service.
HELD: The provisions of the Constitution material to the inquiry at bar read as follows: 3
Sec. 15, Article VII:
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or Acting President shall not make appointments,except temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Sec. 4 (1), Article VIII :
The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Sec. 9, Article VIII :

The members of the Supreme Court and judges in lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for, every vacancy. Such
appointments need no confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission
of the list.
During the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution (t)wo months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end his term the President is neither required to make appointments
to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII simply mean that the President is
required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15
of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on appointments comes into effect only once every six
years.
Section 15, Article VI is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2)
those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months
preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared elections offenses in the Omnibus
Election Code, viz.:
Sec. 261.Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. (1) Any person who gives, offer or promises money or anything of value
gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or makes or offers to make an
expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation,
entity, or community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or against any candidate or
withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for thenomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.
xxxxxxxxx
(g) Appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. During
the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a regular election and thirty days
before a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned or controlled corporations, who
appoints or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary, or casual, or creates and fills any new
position, except upon prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought
unless, it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency
concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a manner thatmay influence the election.
The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consist of the so-called midnight
appointments. There may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the
proclamations of a new President. Such appointments, so long as they are few and so spaced as to afford some
assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointees
qualifications, can be made by the outgoing President.
Section 15 may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only midnight appointments those made
obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making but also appointments
of the Presidential election.

The exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII allows only the making oftemporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban.
Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on
the Presidents power of appointments, it is the Supreme Courts view that, as a general proposition, in case of
conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs
the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary
vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only
once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation.
But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out,
their making is considered an election offense.
To be sure, instances may be conceived of the imperative need for an appointment, during the period of the ban,
not only in the executive but also in the Supreme Court. This may be the case should the membership of the
Court be so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particularly important question
requiring expeditious resolution be evenly divided. Such a case, however, is covered by neither Section 15 of
Article VII nor Sections 4 (1) and 9 of Article VIII.
17. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010.
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in
relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof
from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also
considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or
Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the
position of Chief Justice.
Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate
Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice ConchitaCarpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through
letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.

The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition
under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section
4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition
found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the
framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the Presidents power to appoint

members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from
political pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified
period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being
an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has
occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until
the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the
President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an
Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in
conflict.
The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately
before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, aPresident or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein
will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of
three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.
Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the
President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive
Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion
is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that
every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the
whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14

and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their
intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
18. De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council (April 20, 2010)
Facts:
The case is about a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Supreme Court wherein
it directs the Judicial and Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of Candidates to fill the
vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato Puno by May 17,2010, just days after
the coming presidential elections on May 10,2010. It also required preparing a short list of nominees and
submitting it to the incumbent President.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice within two months before the next
presedential election.
Held:
Yes. The President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice within two months before the next
presedential election.

If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice,
then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution. They could not have ignored the meticulous
ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section
15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII
itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the
prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.