Muego, Diane

Case Digests (Set 9)

League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Congress enacted into law R.A. 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million in order to restrain "the mad rush" of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities had city hood bills pending in
Congress but 24 of them were not converted during the 11th Congress. The House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 to exempt the
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress but it
was adjourned without the Senate's approval.

The 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed

between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009.- The City of x x x shall be exempted from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.

These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present
petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution and as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will
reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Cityhood Bills is a violation to Article X, Section 10 of the

Constitution and the equal protection clause of the Constitution

RULING:

Affirmative. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared
as constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities
into cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was
that the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income
requirement of PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would
not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The
conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not
its property as such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the
sixteen municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.

The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the
enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after
what they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair.

People vs. Vera

65 Phil. 56
FACTS:

This is an original action instituted in this court for the issuance of the writ of certiorari
and of prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Manila so that this court may review
the actuations of the aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649
entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.",

Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which
was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new
trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent
of the crime he was convicted of.

Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The
IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner
allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that
Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec.
11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Act No 4221 is unconstitutional

RULING:
The Court rules on the affirmative.The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11
which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be

appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the
Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for
a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean
to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of
their right to probation.

The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a
way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no
set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a
system

United States vs. Ang Tang Ho

43 Phil. 1
FACTS:

Act No. 2868 was passed, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and
speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making
an appropriation for this purpose. Thus, August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging
him with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines for allegedly voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold
to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a
price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the
Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No.
2868.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, assailing the
constitutionality of Act No. 2868.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Act no 2868 unduly delegated powers to the Governor General.

RULING:

Legislative power and the power to make laws is vested in the legislature and cannot be
delegated. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more
that to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law
into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power
and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself doe s not define a crime, and is
not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the
doing of which is vested in the Governor-General , then the Act is a delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
Act No. 2868 constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized
the Governor-General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect
the law. The said Act was not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify
what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act
states for any cause.

Francisco Tatad et al vs Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 114222
April 6, 1995
FACTS:
Downstream Oil Deregulation Act of 1996 or RA 8180 was passeed. This law allows that
any person or entity may import or purchase any quantity of crude oil and petroleum
products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or own and operate refineries and
other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or use the same for his own
requirement, subject only to monitoring by the Department of Energy.
Petitioner Tatad assails the constitutionality of the law. He claims, among others, that
the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. They opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a
foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot
own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the
nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his
capacity as DOTC Secretary.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 8180 is constitutional

RULING:
RA 8180 is unconstitutional for violating Sec 19 of Art 12 of the Constitution. It violated
that provision because it only strengthens oligopoly which is contrary to free
competition. It cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and
controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as
the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian
league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of
various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit..

RA 8180 is unconstitutional on the ground inter alia that it discriminated against the
new players insofar as it placed them at a competitive disadvantage vis--vis the

established oil companies by requiring them to meet certain conditions already being
observed by the latter.

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr.

G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
FACTS:
Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate
for a period of one (1) year. Later on, LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or
minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25%
limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as
the basis for the expanded fare range."
Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus
25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and
without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%)
percent of the existing fares.
On March 16, 1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the
upward adjustment of bus fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the constitutionality of certain memoranda,
circulars and/ or orders of the Department of Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the above memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the DOTC and the
LTFRB in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of
Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be just and reasonable

RULING:
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing.
The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with
the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned
and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates,

tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage

kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed
thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion,
approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication
and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in
case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for
the promotion of a private business, the net profits of said private business shall be
considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing
the rates.

LTFRB is authorized under EO 202, s. 1987 to determine, prescribe, approve and

periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges,
relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized
vehicles but not authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport
operator, or other public service authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus
operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and
invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority.
In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to
set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non
delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based
on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment
and not through the intervening mind of another.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
FACTS:

R.A. No. 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely,

House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Before
R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition
for prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and
6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6
imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective
January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:

That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2)
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not RA No. 9337 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Since the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the
Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House
bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the
alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the
legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will
is to take effect
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must
do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently
the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may
not be done, and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid objection can be made.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent.

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Purisima

562 SCRA 251
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and
enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It
provides a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR
and BOC officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service,
regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that the limiting the
scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no
valid basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to
officials and employees of all other government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries
is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with
the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC
because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government
agencies and instrumentalities.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not RA 9335 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate RA 9335 based on petitioners baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also
of the executive which approved it.
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot
be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the
Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance a declared
public policy.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded
for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the
set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of public
accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry, efficiency
and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing
revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law.
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected
respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC
and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the
determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

LAMP v. Secretary of DBM

G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
This is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the
implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in
Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004).

Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers who have
banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social
monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators
and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members
of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of
PDAF.

For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the
Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority
to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a nonlegislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and
must be considered nothing less than malfeasance.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is
unconstitutional and illegal.

RULING:
The Court rules in the negative.
In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight
of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the
nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not
a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate

[a law] based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.

The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented
showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress,
who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent
evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a
common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the
petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable of lawful
enforcement.

The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects
and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. As applied to this case, the petition
is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and
thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct
participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional
boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain
intact.

Greco Belgica v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922.
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of
the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel
to the latest Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the
pork barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain
cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department
provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator
concerned.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The socalled presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential
Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around
since about 1983.
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In
July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles.
Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20
bogus NGOs (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to
ghost projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the
results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions
before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.

ISSUE: Whether or not the congressional and presidential pork barrel system is
constitutional.

The congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because

it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers

As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power
of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the
GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but
under the pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law,
was enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds
should be allocated to a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. This is also highlighted by the fact that in
realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator
concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that
which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his
PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative
power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses
comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in
the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already
being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can
now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is
made after the approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.
The presidential pork barrel is valid. The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the
presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs
charter, provided for the appropriation. These are sufficient laws which met the
requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated
therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general
appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III

G.R. No. 209287 February 3, 2015
FACTS:
DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects
instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was
that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn,
these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the
economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP. Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from
the General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.

Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only
realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were
also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation
Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon
Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the
Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Th alleged that DAP is
unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the DAP is constitutional.
RULING:

On the first issue:

DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or
realignment should only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
There is also no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to
the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason. Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case
at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were
within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned
because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is
without legal basis.

Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue

targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds
were used.

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
FACTS:
Petitioners herein assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the
Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said
Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance
would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and
are not allowed to go out with customers.
Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to ra 938 which reads an act
granting municipal or city boards and councils the power to regulate the establishment,
maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective
territorial jurisdictions. paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power
to promote general welfare. de la cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of
due process.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

RULING:
The SC ruled on the negative. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the
laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a
lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by
a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face
is characterized by overbreadth.
The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue
should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Republic vs. COCOFED

372 SCRA 462
FACTS:
Immediately after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Executive Orders 1, 5 2 6 and 14. On the explicit premise that vast resources of the
government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad, the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was created by Executive Order 1 to assist
the President in the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth thus accumulated whether located
in the Philippines or abroad.
Executive Order 2 stated that the ill-gotten assets and properties are in the form of bank
accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers,
condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal
properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world. Executive Order 14,
on the other hand, empowered the PCGG, with the assistance of the Office of the
Solicitor General and other government agencies, inter alia, to file and prosecute all
cases investigated by it under EOs 1 and 2. Pursuant to these laws, the PCGG issued
and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and provisional takeovers of
allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal.

Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged one
million coconut farmers, the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies
(CIIF companies) and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of
the said UCPB shares, the PCGG, on 31 July 1987, instituted an action for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages (Case 0033) in the
Sandiganbayan. On 15 November 1990, upon Motion of COCOFED, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution lifting the sequestration of the subject UCPB
shares on the ground that COCOFED and the so-called CIIF companies had not been
impleaded by the PCGG as parties-defendants in its 31 July 1987 Complaint for
reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages. The Sandiganbayan
ruled that the Writ of Sequestration issued by the Commission was automatically lifted
for PCGGs failure to commence the corresponding judicial action within the six-month
period ending on 2 August 1987 provided under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. The anti-graft court noted that though these entities were listed in an

annex appended to the Complaint, they had not been named as parties-respondents.
The Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari
(GR 96073) in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft
court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the
PCGG applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining the
holding of the election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered
the UCPB to proceed with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed
the sequestered shares to be voted by their registered owners. The victory of the
registered shareholders was fleeting because the Court, acting on the solicitor generals
Motion for Clarification/Manifestation, issued a Resolution on 16 February 1993,
declaring that the right of COCOFED, et. al. to vote stock in their names at the
meetings of the UCPB cannot be conceded at this time. That right still has to be
established by them before the Sandiganbayan. Until that is done, they cannot be
deemed legitimate owners of UCPB stock and cannot be accorded the right to vote
them. On 23 January 1995, the Court rendered its final Decision in GR 96073, nullifying
and setting aside the 15 November 1990 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which lifted
the sequestration of the subject UCPB shares.
This is a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking
to set aside the February 28, 2001 Order2 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan3
in Civil Case Nos. 0033-A, 0033-B and 0033-F.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the PCGG can vote the sequestered UCPB shares while case is
pending

RULING:
The Petition is Granted.
The registered owner of the shares of a corporation exercises the right and the privilege
of voting. This principle applies even to shares that are sequestered by the government,
over which the PCGG as a mere conservator cannot, as a general rule, exercise acts of
dominion. On the other hand, it is authorized to vote these sequestered shares
registered in the names of private persons and acquired with allegedly ill-gotten wealth,
if it is able to satisfy the two-tiered test devised by the Court in Cojuangco v. Calpo and
PCGG v. Cojuangco Jr. Two clear public character exceptions under which the

government is granted the authority to vote the shares exist (1) Where government
shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their
own names, and (2) Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public
funds somehow landed in private hands.
The exceptions are based on the common-sense principle that legal fiction must yield to
truth; that public property registered in the names of non-owners is affected with trust
relations; and that the prima facie beneficial owner should be given the privilege of
enjoying the rights flowing from the prima facie fact of ownership. In short, when
sequestered shares registered in the names of private individuals or entities are alleged
to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth, then the two-tiered test is applied.
However, when the sequestered shares in the name of private individuals or entities are
shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally government shares, or (2) purchased
with public funds or those affected with public interest, then the two-tiered test does not
apply. Rather, the public character exceptions in Baseco v. PCGG and Cojuangco Jr. v.
Roxas prevail; that is, the government shall vote the shares. Herein, the money used to
purchase the sequestered UCPB shares came from the Coconut Consumer
Stabilization Fund (CCSF), otherwise known as the coconut levy funds.
The sequestered UCPB shares are confirmed to have been acquired with coco levies,
not with alleged ill-gotten wealth. As the coconut levy funds are not only affected with
public interest, but are in fact prima facie public funds, the Court believes that the
government should be allowed to vote the questioned shares, because they belong to it
as the prima facie beneficial and true owner.
The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in grossly contradicting and
effectively reversing existing jurisprudence, and in depriving the government of its right
to vote the sequestered UCPB shares which are prima facie public in character.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994
FACTS:
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino et al assailed the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the

Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24,
Article 6 of the Constitution.
Furthermore, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st
reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it w/ the text
of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just
becomes the text of the HB.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the
Constitution.

RULING:
It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not
only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed,
what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local
application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in

the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
It did not pass three reading because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
The court dismissed the petition.

Gonzales vs. Macaraig

191 SCRA 452
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Prohibition or Mandamus assailing mainly the constitutionality or
legality of Presidential veto of Section 55.
When Congress passed House Bill 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the
Fiscal Year 1989, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed
budget submitted by the President. Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the
passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President for consideration and
approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared
the same to have become RA 6688. In the process, 7 Special Provisions and Section
55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.

On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in Resolution 381 ("Authorizing and Directing the
Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the Proper
Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the
Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the
General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes") was
adopted.

On 11 April 1989, the Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed by Gonzales,
together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of Section 55
of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred the
following:
(1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and
does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed
Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision;
(2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot
exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill;
(3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and

(4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has
to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution
(Whether the President has the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill).

RULING:
The Veto is Upheld and the Petition is Dismissed.
NO. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if
exercised would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is
what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise
of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In
other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an
Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve
the remaining portion of the same item.
Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of
any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President's veto power as
previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the
eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable
part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto. The restrictive interpretation urged
by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire
bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may
be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular
appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates. In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because
they nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of
government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective

offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by

Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Noteworthy is the fact that the power to
augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Sections 55 (FY '89)
and 16 (FY '90) prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations
disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory
authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of
such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the
Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being delimited to
transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from
savings.
More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the
same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is
"one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the
public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a
legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from
savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of
money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.

Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) vs. Enriquez

235 SCRA 506
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. The subject
Bill imposes conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the
proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of
Congress to propose and identify projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating budgets.

Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and
approval.

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR
THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY
ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered
his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on
which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:

1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be
validly done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public
debt, whether foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the
Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26,
Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.

2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges
(SUCs),

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the
Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).

5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the
modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which
requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release of the corresponding
modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3 on the Specific
Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150
armored personnel carriers

5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment
pension and gratuity funds.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and
CHR, the Congress.

Petitioners assail the validity of RA 7663: The General Appropriations Act for
1994.Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of
Congress themselves.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994
are constitutional.

RULING:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an
attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No.
292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the
repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when
the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other
government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income
and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as
exceptions to the one-fund policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D.
No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the
Department of Budget and Managements Procurement Service).

The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH
is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision
which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
70% by administrative and 30% by contract.

Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed. The requirement in Special
Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization program that the
President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval,
is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been
contracted for by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of
laws that impair the obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered
into by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation

Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution.

Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000
CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation
law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-inChief and there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.

On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to

appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the
DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures
shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be
determined whether they are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take necessary and proper steps to carry into
execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps are the
ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of
the special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall
be used for payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness"
prohibiting the use of the said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board
of Liquidators", which is GRANTED.

Senate vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 169777. April 20, 2006
FACTS:
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well
as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted
that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to
pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent
a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were
sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently,
GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive
privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive
privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the
National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other
officers as may be determined by the President, from appearing in such hearings
conducted by Congress without first securing the presidents approval. The department
heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked
EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with
only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military
personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it
infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464 is valid and constitutional.

RULING:
The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain
information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public
interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it
is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it
must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive
branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting
a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking
said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

The petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464
(series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive

Bengzon, Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee

G.R. No. 89914. November 20, 1991
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Romualdez. The complaint alleged that
Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in
unlawful concert with then President Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, and taking
undue advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter spouses,
engaged in devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people.
Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez corporations were
carried in various newspapers. Other newspapers declared that shortly after the 1986
EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez companies were sold for P5million, without PCGG
approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the
Presidents brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firm. In the Senate, Senator
Enrile delivered a speech on the alleged take over by Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated, the
flagship of the First Manila Management of Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator
Enrile also called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law,
particularly with regard to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
matter was referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has valid legislative
purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21.

RULING:
The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both Houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or unlimited. As provided under Art.
VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill
of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be
compelled to testify against ones self.

The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided in the

Senate Rules of Procedure. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or reexamination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation
of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
The Petition is Granted.

Arnault vs. Nazareno

G.R. No. L-3820. July 18, 1950
FACTS:
The controversy arose out of the Governments purchase of 2 estates. The purchase
was effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate adopted
Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity of the purchase
and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said Senate investigation,
petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered.
Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt
for contumacious acts and ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant atarms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to
the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the
P440,000 and to answer questions pertinent thereto.
It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from
the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract through
which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. The committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the
Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered
to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for
P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with
PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
Hence, this petitionfor habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in
the New Bilibid Prison.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt
HELD:
The Petition is Denied.

Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to
time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert
the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their power and keep the witness in
prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded, Court is always open to those whose
rights might thus be transgressed.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative
body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to
make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the
investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent
to the subject of the inquiry or investigation.
The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form
and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information to
be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.