Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 57227

May 14, 1992

AMELITA CONSTANTINO and MICHAEL CONSTANTINO, the latter represented herein by

the former, his mother and natural guardian, petitioners,
vs.
IVAN MENDEZ and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioners.
Bienvinido D. Cariaga for private respondent.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision 1 dated April 30, 1981 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61552-R which dismissed petitioner's complaint and set aside
the resolution 2 dated October 21, 1976 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, 16t
h
Judicial District, amending the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 and
ordering private respondent Ivan Mendez: (1) to acknowledge the minor Michael Constantino as
his illegitimate child; (2) to give a monthly support of P300.00 to the minor child; (3) to pay
complainant Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,200.00 as actual and moral damages; and (4) to
pay attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 plus costs.
It appears on record that on June 5, 1975, petitioner Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against private respondent Ivan Mendez. The case was
filed with the then CFI of Davao, 10th Judicial District and docketed as Civil Case No. 8881. In
her complaint, Amelita Constantino alleges, among others, that sometime in the month of
August, 1974, she met Ivan Mendez at Tony's Restaurant located at Sta. Cruz, Manila, where she
worked as a waitress; that the day following their first meeting, Ivan invited Amelita to dine with
him at Hotel Enrico where he was billeted; that while dining, Ivan professed his love and courted
Amelita; that Amelita asked for time to think about Ivan's proposal; that at about 11:00 o'clock in
the evening, Amelita asked Ivan to bring her home to which the latter agreed, that on the pretext
of getting something, Ivan brought Amelita inside his hotel room and through a promise of
marriage succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the latter; that after the sexual contact,
Ivan confessed to Amelita that he is a married man; that they repeated their sexual contact in the
months of September and November, 1974, whenever Ivan is in Manila, as a result of which
Amelita got pregnant; that her pleas for help and support fell on deaf ears; that Amelita had no
sexual relations with any other man except Ivan who is the father of the child yet to be born at

the time of the filing of the complaint; that because of her pregnancy, Amelita was forced to
leave her work as a waitress; that Ivan is a prosperous businessman of Davao City with
a
monthly income of P5,000 to P8,000. As relief, Amelita prayed for the recognition of the unborn
child, the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees plus costs.
In his answer dated August 5, 1975, Ivan admitted that he met Amelita at Tony's Cocktai
l
Lounge but denied having sexual knowledge or illicit relations with her. He prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action. By way of counterclaim, he further prayed
for the payment of exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorney's fees for the
filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita Constantino filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint
impleading as co-plaintiff her son Michael Constantino who was born on August 3, 1975. In its
order dated September 4, 1975, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
On September 11, 1975, Ivan Mendez filed his answer to the amended complaint reiterating his
previous answer denying that Michael Constantino is his illegitimate son.
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision dated June 21, 1976, the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and against defendant Ivan Mendez, ordering the latter to pay Amelita
Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages; and, the sum
of
P3,000.00, as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
From the above decision, both parties filed their separate motion for reconsideration. Ivan
Mendez anchored his motion on the ground that the award of damages was not supported by
evidence. Amelita Constantino, on the other hand, sought the recognition and support of her son
Michael Constantino as the illegitimate son of Ivan Mendez.
In its resolution dated October 21, 1976, the trial court granted Amelita Constantino's motion for
reconsideration, and amended the dispositive portion of its decision dated June 21, 1976 to read
as follows, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff
Amelita Constantino and plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino, and against defendant Ivan
Mendez ordering the latter to pay Amelita Constantino the sum of P8,000.00 by way of actual
and moral damages and the sum of P200.00 as and by way of payment of the hospital an
d
medical bills incurred during the delivery of plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino; to recognize as
his own illegitimate child the plaintiff-minor Michael Constantino who shall be entitled to all the

rights, privileges and benefits appertaining to a child of such status; to give a permanent monthly
support in favor of plaintiff Michael Constantino the amount of P300.00; and the sum o
f
P5,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees. The defendant shall pay the costs of this suit.
Let this Order form part of the decision dated June 21, 1976.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the above amended decision was set aside and the complaint
was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review.
Basically, the issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not the Court of Appeal
s
committed a reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court and in dismissing the
complaint.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the factual findings of the trial
and in not affirming the decision of the trial court. They also pointed out that the appellate court
committed a misapprehension of facts when it concluded that Ivan did not have sexual access
with Amelita during the first or second week of November, 1976 (should be 1974), the time of
the conception of the child.
It must be stressed at the outset that factual findings of the trial court have only a persuasive and
not a conclusive effect on the Court of Appeals. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it is
the duty of the Court of Appeals to review the factual findings of the trial court and rectify the
errors it committed as may have been properly assigned and as could be established by a reexamination of the evidence on record. It is the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, not
those of the trial court, that as a rule are considered final and conclusive even on this Cour
t
(Hermo v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 155 SCRA 24 [1987]). This being a petition f
or
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court will review only errors of la
w
committed by the Court of Appeals. It is not the function of this Court to re-examine all over
again the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties unless the findings of facts of
the Court of Appeals is not supported by the evidence on record or the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts (Remalante v. Tibe, et al., 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Hernandez v. Court
of Appeals, et al., 149 SCRA 97 [1987]).
It is the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, based on the evidence on record, that Amelit
a
Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence her claim that Ivan Mendez is the
father of her son Michael Constantino. Such conclusion based on the evaluation of the evidence
on record is controlling on this Court as the same is supported by the evidence on record. Even
the trial court initially entertained such posture. It ordered the recognition of Michael as the
illegitimate son of Ivan only when acting on the motions for reconsideration, it reconsidered, on

October 21, 1976, its earlier decision dated June 21, 1976. Amelita's testimony on cross
examination that she had sexual contact with Ivan in Manila in the first or second week o
f
November, 1974 (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 108) is inconsistent with her response that she
could not remember the date of their last sexual intercourse in November, 1974 (Ibid, p. 106).
Sexual contact of Ivan and Amelita in the first or second week of November, 1974 is the crucial
point that was not even established on direct examination as she merely testified that she had
sexual intercourse with Ivan in the months of September, October and November, 1974.
Michael Constantino is a full-term baby born on August 3, 1975 (Exhibit 6) so that as correctly
pointed out by private respondent's counsel, citing medical science (Williams Obstetrics, Tenth
Ed., p. 198) to the effect that "the mean duration of actual pregnancy, counting from the day of
conception must be close to 267 days", the conception of the child (Michael) must have taken
place about 267 days before August 3, 1975 or sometime in the second week of November,
1974. While Amelita testified that she had sexual contact with Ivan in November, 1974
,
nevertheless said testimony is contradicted by her own evidence (Exh. F), the letter dated
February 11, 1975, addressed to Ivan Mendez requesting for a conference, prepared by her own
counsel Atty. Roberto Sarenas to whom she must have confided the attendant circumstances of
her pregnancy while still fresh in her memory, informing Ivan that Amelita is four (4) months
pregnant so that applying the period of the duration of actual pregnancy, the child was conceived
on or about October 11, 1974.
Petitioner's assertion that Ivan is her first and only boyfriend (TSN, December 8, 1975, p. 65) is
belied by Exhibit 2, her own letter addressed to Mrs. Mendez where she revealed the reason for
her attachment to Ivan who possessed certain traits not possessed by her boyfriend. She also
confided that she had a quarrel with her boyfriend because of gossips so she left her work. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome atmosphere or may be an irritant
in the family or lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation
is
established by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof is on Amelita to establish her
affirmative allegations that Ivan is the father of her son. Consequently, in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence establishing paternity or filiation, the complaint must be dismissed.
As regards Amelita's claim for damages which is based on Articles 19 3 & 21 4 of the Civil Code
on the theory that through Ivan's promise of marriage, she surrendered her virginity, we cannot
but agree with the Court of Appeals that more sexual intercourse is not by itself a basis fo
r
recovery. Damages could only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of voluntariness
and mutual desire. At the time she met Ivan at Tony's Restaurant, Amelita was already 28 years
old and she admitted that she was attracted to Ivan (TSN, December 3, 1975, p. 83). H
er
attraction to Ivan is the reason why she surrendered her womanhood. Had she been induced or
deceived because of a promise of marriage, she could have immediately severed her relation with
Ivan when she was informed after their first sexual contact sometime in August, 1974, that he
was a married man. Her declaration that in the months of September, October and November,
1974, they repeated their sexual intercourse only indicates that passion and not the alleged

promise of marriage was the moving force that made her submit herself to Ivan.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is Dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132980. March 25, 1999]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLADYS C. LABRADOR, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Summary proceedings provided under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of the
Civil Code may be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process i
s
observed.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on certiorari seeking to set aside the March 5, 1998 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Special Proceedings No. 6861-CEB.[1] The assailed
Decision[2] ordered the civil registrar of Cebu City to make the necessary corrections in the birth
certificate of Sarah Zita Caon Erasmo in the local civil registry, viz.:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the petition. Accordingly, the erroneous
entry with respect to the name of [the] child appearing in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita Caon
Erasmo is hereby ordered corrected from SARAH ZITA CAON ERASMO to SARAH ZITA
CAON and the erroneous entry in said birth certificate with respect to the name of [the] mother
is likewise hereby ordered corrected from ROSEMARIE B. CAON to MARIA ROSARIO
CAON.
"The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is hereby ordered to make the foregoing corrections in
the birth records of SARAH ZITA CAON ERASMO and to issue a birth certificate reflecting
said corrections.
"Furnish a copy of this Decision to the petitioner, her counsel, the Solicitor General, Asst. City
Prosecutor Generosa C. Labra and the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City."
Disagreeing with the above disposition, the solicitor general brought this Petition directly to this
Court on a pure question of law.[3]
The Facts
Respondent Gladys C. Labrador filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City on September

26, 1997, a Petition for the correction of entries in the record of birth of Sarah Zita Erasmo, her
niece. In her Petition, respondent alleged the following:
"1. Petitioner is of legal age, married, a resident of 493-17, Archbishop Reyes Ave., Barrio Luz,
Cebu City, where she can be served with the processes of this Honorable Court;
"2. Respondent Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is impleaded herein in his official capacity; he
can be served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Court in his office at the City
Health Department, Cebu City;
"3. Petitioner is the sister of Maria Rosario Caon who is presently residing in the United States
of America;
"4. Sometime in 1986, petitioner's sister, Maria Rosario Caon, had a common law relationship
with a certain Degoberto Erasmo, and during such cohabitation, petitioner's sister begot two (2)
illegitimate children, one of which is SARAH ZITA B. ERASMO, who was born on April 27,
1988, as shown in her birth certificate, a copy of which is hereto attached as ANNEX "A";
"5. During the registration of the birth of SARAH ZITA, petitioner's sister told the respondent
Local Civil Registrar that she was not legally married to the father of SARAH ZITA;
"6. However, herein respondent erroneously entered the name of Sarah Zita in her birth record as
SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO, instead of SARAH ZITA CAON. Not only that, the name of
petitioner's sister, being the mother, was also erroneously written by the herein respondent as
Rosemarie Caon, instead of Maria Rosario Caon,
"7. In order to straighten the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO and pursuant to Article
176 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
the mother xxx
[t]here is a need to correct the entry in the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO t
o
SARAH ZITA CAON and to correct the name of her mother as appearing in her birt
h
certificate from ROSEMARIE CAON to MARIA ROSARIO CAON.
xxx

xxx

xxx"[4]

On September 17, 1997, the trial court set the case for hearing on October 29, 1997. It als
o
directed the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu
City once a week for three consecutive weeks.[5]
On October 29, 1997, evidence was presented to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court to
hear the petition.[6] Respondent Labrador was represented by Atty. Bienvenido V. Baring; the

Republic, by Assistant City Prosecutor Generosa C. Labra.

When Respondent Labrador testified on January 8, 1998, she repeated the allegations in her
Petition. She stated that Sarah Zita Erasmo was her niece because Maria Rosario Caon, the
mother of the child, was her (respondent's) sister. On cross-examination, respondent explained
that she was the one who had reported the birth of Sarah to the local civil registrar, to whom she
had erroneously given "Rosemarie" as the first name of the child's mother, instead of the real
one, "Maria Rosario." Labrador explained that her sister was more familiarly known a
s
Rosemarie; thus, the error. Respondent likewise averred that Rosemarie and Maria Rosario were
one and the same person, and that she had no other sister named Rosemarie. She added that
Maria Rosario was abroad where she lived with her foreigner husband.[7]
Labrador then formally offered her evidence which included Maria Rosario's birth certificate[8]
and a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it had no record of marriag
e
between Maria Rosario Caon and Degoberto Erasmo.[9] Prosecutor Labra, who conducted the
cross-examination, did not object to the evidence offered.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court granted Respondent Labrador's Petition, ratiocinating as follows:
"From the evidence adduced, the Court is convinced that the allegations in the petition have been
satisfactorily substantiated, the requisites for the publication have been complied with, and there
is a need for the correction of the erroneous entries in the birth certificate of Sarah Zita Caon
Erasmo. The entry in said birth certificate with respect to the name of the child should b
e
corrected from SARAH ZITA CAON ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAON and the entry with
respect to the name of the mother should be corrected from ROSEMARIE B. CAON t
o
MARIA ROSARIO CAON."
The Issues
Petitioner posits the following issues:
"(a) Whether or not a change in the record of birth in a civil registry, which affects the civi
l
status of a person, from legitimate to illegitimate may be granted in a summary proceeding;
(b) Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child.
The main issue is whether Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be used to changed the entry in a
birth certificate regarding the filiation of a child.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious. The lower court erred in ordering the corrections.
Main Issue: Rule 108 Inapplicable
Petitioner contends that the summary proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of court and
Article 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors.
It argues that Rule 108 "cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as
those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which respondent desires to do. The
change sought will result not only in substantial correction in the child's record of birth but also
in the child's rights which cannot be effected in a summary action."[10] We Agree.
This issue has been resolved in Leonor v. Court of Appeals.[11] In that case, Responden
t
Mauricio Leonor filed a petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration
of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal
vows arising from the "non-observance of the legal requirements for a valid marriage." In
debunking the trial court's ruling granting such petition, the Court held as follows:
"On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regardin
g
"marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the
purpose. However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can b
e
canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material o
r
substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible
to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless an
d
innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis-statement of
the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-10226, Feb. 14, 1958).
"Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and
her children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in a
n
adversarial proceeding. xxx
"Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under
Article 412 of the Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginia's civil status
from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to illegitimate. xxx" (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a
person from "legitimate" to "illegitimate," as in Sarah Zita's case, the same cannot be granted in
summary proceedings.

In Republic v. Valencia,[12] we likewise held that corrections involving the nationality or

citizenship of a person were substantial and could not be effected except in adversari
al
proceedings.
"It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving the nationality or citizenship, which
is indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true fact
s
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"What is meant by 'appropriate adversary proceeding?' Black's Law Dictionary define

s
'adversary proceeding' as follows:
'One having opposing parties, contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one [in]
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding. (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p.716,
718, 11 0 Was. 39)'.
xxx

xxx

xxx"[13]

Thus, Valencia requires that a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil
registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. It further mandates that a full hearing,
not merely a summary proceeding, be conducted.
In the present case, the changes sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly substantial:
first, she sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate changed from "Sarah Zita
Erasmo" to "Sarah Zita Caon, thereby transforming the filiation of the child from legitimate to
illegitimate. Second, she likewise sought to have the name of Sarah Zita's mother, which
appeared as "Rosemarie" in the child's birth record, changed to "Maria Rosario." Pursuant to
Valencia, an adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in
respondent's petition.
Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it
would affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights. In fact, the change may
also embarrass her because of the social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. The rights of her
parents over her and over each other would also be affected. Furthermore, a change of name
would affect not only the mother but possibly creditors, if any. Finally, no sufficient legal
explanation has been given why an aunt, who had no appointment as guardian of the minor, was

the party-petitioner.
True, it would seem that an adversarial proceeding was conducted -- the trial court set the case
for hearing and had the notice of hearing published in a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu
City once a week for three consecutive weeks; a hearing was actually conducted, during which
the respondent and the petitioner were represented: the respondent was able to testify and be
cross-examined by the petitioner's representative.
But such proceeding does not suffice. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,[14] Emperatriz LabayoRowe filed a petition seeking to change an entry in her child Victoria Miclats birth certificate.
Alleging that she had never been married to her daughters father, she wanted her civil status
appearing on the certificate changed from married to single. This Court ruled that the trial
court erred in granting Labayo-Rowes petition, because the proper parties had not bee
n
impleaded; nor had the proceedings been sufficiently adversarial, viz.:
In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the onl
y
respondent, the proceedings taken, which [are] summary in nature, [are] short of what is required
in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General,
all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the
declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,
as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be
affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained under an
adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper
of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules 'shall not diminish, increase or modif
y
substantive rights.' Said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would

tend to increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Artic
le
412 of the Civil Code.
xxx

xxx

xxx"[15]

Even granting that the proceedings held to hear and resolve the petition before the lower co
urt
were adversarial, it must be noted that the evidence presented by the respondent wa
s not
enough to fully substantiate her claim that Sarah Zita was illegitimate. Her evidence consist
ed
mainly of her testimony and a certification from the civil registry of Cebu City that such offi
ce
had no record of a marriage between Rosemarie/Maria Rosario Caon and Degoberto Erasm
o.
Unlike in other cases where Valencia was applied,[16] Respondent Labrador was not abl
e to
prove the allegations in her petition.
Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of the Family Code, which states that "illegitima
te
children shall use the surname[s] xxx of their mothers." But to enforce such provision, the prop
er
recourse is an adversarial contest. It must be stressed that Rule 108 does not contempla
te an
ordinary civil action but a special proceeding. By its nature, this recourse seeks merely to corr
ect
clerical errors, and not to grant or deny substantial rights. To hold otherwise is tantamount t
oa
denial of due process to third parties and the whole world.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Tri
al
Court of Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 6861-CEB is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
No
costs.
Let a copy of this Decision be served upon the local civil registrar of Cebu City.
SO ORDERED.