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B.

STATUTE IN DEROGATION OF RIGHTS


Petitioner: Heirs of Alberto Suguitan
Respondent: City of Mandaluyong
Facts:
The respondent issued a resolution authorizing
Mayor Banjamin Abalos to institute
expropriation proceeding over the property of
Alberto Suguitan for the expansion of
Mandaluyong Medical Center. Alberto Suguitan
refused the offer Mayor Abalos in buying his
property. City of Mandaluyong filed a complaint
for expropriation with the RTC of Pasig.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss
filled by Alberto Suguitan and allowed the
expropriation of the subject property.
The petitioner asserted that the respondent may
only exercise its delegated power of eminent
domain by means of an ordinance as required
by Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 and not
by means of a mere resolution.
Petition for review for reversal of the Order by
the RTC of Pasig.
Issue:
Whether a resolution is a sufficient antecedent for the
filling of expropriation proceedings with the RTC.
Ruling:

No. Petition is granted and the decision of RTC of


Pasig is reversed and set aside. An examination of the
applicable law will show that an ordinance is necessary
to authorize the filing of a complaint with the proper
court since, beginning at this point, the power of
eminent domain is already being exercised.
Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. The due process and
equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards
against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental
power. Since exercise of the power of eminent domain
affects an individuals right to private property, a
constitutionally-protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and
intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty
the need for its circumspect operation cannot be
overemphasized.
The exercise of the rights of eminent domain,
whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that
the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and the laws more sedulously, than
the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When
the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the
land of an individual without his consent, the
plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged
by doubt[ful] interpretation.

The statutory power of taking property from the


owner without his consent is one of the most
delicate exercise of governmental authority. It is
to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important
as the power may be to the government, the
inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions
attach to the right of property of the citizens,
constrains the strict observance of substantial
provisions of the law which are prescribed as
mode of the exercise of the power, and to
protect it from abuse....
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative
in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such power
may validly delegated to local government units, other
public entities and public utilities, although the scope
of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and
may only be exercised in strict compliance with the
terms of the delegating law. The basis of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by
local government units is Section 19 of RA 7160:
A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously

made to the owner, and such offer was not


accepted: Provided, further, That the local
government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of
the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by
the proper court, based on the fair market value
at the time of the taking of the property.
- The City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the
power of eminent domain over petitioners
property by means of resolution, in
contravention of the first requisite. The law is
clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the
Code requires an ordinance, not resolution, for
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
- 1st requisite: An ordinance is enacted by the
local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the local
government unit, to exercise the power of
eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular property.
- An ordinance promulgated by the local
legislative body authorizing its local chief
executive to exercise the power of eminent
domain is necessary prior to the filing by the
latter of the complaint with the proper court,
and not only after the court has determined the

amount of just compensation to which the


defendant is entitled.
In inconsistency between the Code (Section 19
of RA 7160) and the IRR (Article 36, Rule VI):
The law itself surely prevails over said rule which
merely seeks to implement it. It is automatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by mere administrative rule issued for its
implementing. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to
indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the

implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof,


also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent
domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act
pursuant to an ordinance.
While we remain conscious of the constitutional policy
of promoting local autonomy, we cannot grant judicial
sanction to local government units exercise of its
delegated power of eminent domain in contravention
of the very law giving it such power.