Make Law Not War

Onat Kibaroglu
Dr. Itty Abraham

Independent Study Module
Fall 2016 / FASS NUS
Make Law Not War

The Hague Tribunal in context and the Impacts
of the South China Sea Conflict on the Global
Multilateral Institutions and the Environment
Abstract:
This paper aims to provide the historical context of the South China Sea dispute and then
move on to explore two distinct aspects surrounding the recent conflict. Both of these
aspects were relatively less featured on the contemporary headlines after the Hague Tribunal
ruling. The paper will investigate how the South China Sea exposed impacted certain rifts
and camps within two major multilateral institutions: The Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU). The analysis will then move on the current
environmental aspect of the conflict. The island building activities of the involved parties on
coral reefs have been framed mostly as a security issue, while fishing disputes have rather
arised concerns of sovereignty, focusing less on the depletion rates of such resources. Both
activities however, among with many others, have been destroying one of the richest natural
habitats in the world. The paper will therefore aim to examine and put out the key drivers of
the environmental devastation under these two categories.
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The South China

Sea is the
Mediterrenean
of Asia. Any one
country
controlling it is
unthinkable.
- John Miksic
The Nine Dash Line, The Hague Tribunal and the context of
the re-ignition of a decades old conflict
The Nine-Dash Line:
The contention for becoming the hegemonic power over the largest body of sea in
Asia can be traced back for centuries. China, Vietnam,1 Japan and more recently the US have
all alternated to become the major force in the region ever since their civilisations
developed, enlarged and sought further influence in the Pacific. The contemporary dispute
however can be said to find its contextual roots rather within the ending of the Second
World War.
At the heart of the modern South China Sea dispute is the famousnine-dash line
Beijings contested claim that represents as much as 90% of the vast body of sea as Chinese
sovereign territory. The southern end point of the line is as far as 2,000 kilometres from the
Chinese mainland while running as close as a few hundred kilometres from the mainlands of
the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam. Beijing maintains the assertion that it owns any island
or rock feature contained within the line, which is bestowed upon vaguely expressed
historical maritime rights.2
1
For centuries the South China Sea was known by navigators throughout Asia as the Champa Sea, named for a great empire
that controlled all of central Vietnam, from the northern border of today's Quang Binh Province to roughly the southern border
of Binh Thuan Province. At the peak of the Champa empire, from around the 6th to the 15th centuries, its various kingdoms,
presided over by regional royal families, also included sizable portions of eastern Cambodia and Laos. - The Cham:
Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China Sea Watch Maritime Dispute From Sidelines: http://
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140616-south-china-sea-vietnam-china-cambodia-champa/
2
Chinas nine-dash line, international law, and the Monroe Doctrine analogy - Scott, S. V. - China information - 31.08.2016
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The Chinese territorial claims find their roots on a Chinese map as an 11-dash line in
1947. On this date, the Republic of Chinas navy (the Kuomintang regime) assumed control
of a number of islands in the South China Sea that had been occupied by Japan during the
Second World War. After the communist revolution and the foundation of the Peoples
Republic of China in 1949, the Kuomintang forces fled to Taiwan and the communist
government declared itself the only legitimate representative of Chinese territories, hence
inherited all national maritime claims in the region.3
The Historical Context:

The conflict livened up at certain instances due to various contextual fluctuations
within regional countries mutual relationships throughout the second half of the 20th
Century. During the March of 1988 for example, PLA forces clashed with South Vietnamese
military personnel at Johnson Reef. 64 South Vietnamese were killed in the skirmish. By 1992,
China claimed full sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly islands, awarding a contract
to a multinational energy corporation to exploit oil in Vanguard Bank on Vietnams
continental shelf. In 1994, China went on to build two concrete structures at Mischief Reef,
about 135 kilometres from the Philippines Palawan island. These developments led to a joint
statement by the foreign ministers of ASEAN, expressing their serious concern over the
developments in the South China Sea.4
3
Chinas nine-dash line, international law, and the Monroe Doctrine analogy - Scott, S. V. - China information - 31.08.2016
ASEAN Studies Centre - Yusof Ishak Institute ISEAS - ASEAN Focus: Special Issue on the South China Sea Arbitration
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University of Texas at Austin Library: Maps of the World
The turn of the millennia however, represented a spin in the momentum of the
multinational conflict regarding how to multilaterally govern the contentious waters. After
years of negotiations, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) on the sidelines of
the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on November 4, 2002.5 This was a relief
for many observers of the issue and the international community in general, given that it
followed a flare up of the dispute between the US and China to the brink of an open
conflict: On April 2001, a US navy EP-3E intelligence aircraft and a PLA Navy J-8II interceptor
fighter collided in mid-air, about 110 km from Hainan Island. This incident caused the death
of the Chinese pilot and the US Navy plane made an emergency landing on the Chinese
mainland and was kept there for 10 days until the pilots release.6
5
More Than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and the Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the
Parties in the South China Sea - WU Shicun and REN Huaifeng* - JIL - 2003
China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications: CRS Report for Congress October 10, 2001 - Library of Congress
6
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The dispute was relatively calmed down and came off the headlines for the next few
years thanks both to the positive aura created with joint declaration and also the Chinese
administrations concentration away from the issue (concurrent with a booming economy
and lack of incentive to flare up any kind of international dispute). The DOC was a nonbinding declaration that is based upon mutual understanding, which never actually aimed to
finish off the tensions once and for all. Rather, it could be seen as a success for multilateral
handling of the issue through diplomatic means instead of resorting to any kind of legal
dispute or militaristic aggression.This document set out four trust and confidence building
measures and five voluntary cooperative activities. The parties to the DOC reaffirmed that
the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability
in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus,towards the eventual attainment of this
objective.7
By 2010, the South China Sea issue began to make its way back into the spotlight. On
April of that year, China placed a sovereignty marker on James Shoal, located 80 kilometres
from the Malaysian coastline, drawing criticisms at the ASEAN Regional Forum by various
parties including the US.8 The reactions were followed by a declaration by the Chinese
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi claiming that China is a big country and the other countries are
small countries on July. The declaration by the Chinese Foreign Minister cannot be dismissed
as a momentary flare-up against the backlash from the international community regarding
the incident. It indeed conveys the fundamental mindset of how the Chinese authorities
implicitly perceive and frame the South China Sea issue: China, as the Middle Kingdom of
the world, is the ultimate hegemonic power of its large neighbourhood, while all other states
are intrinsically inferior when it comes to such potential disputes.
This way of framing diplomatic relations can be traced all the way back to the Ming
Dynasty, the golden age of the Chinese civilisation which also the contemporary rulers of
China seem to embrace with pride.9 The following excerpt explains the dominant position of
the Chinese empire during the 14th Century: The Chinese took for granted that their emperor
7
ASEANS Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building? - Carlyle A. Thayer - The Asia
Pacific Journal - August 19, 2012 Volume 10 | Issue 34 | Number 4
8
The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asias maritime
commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea. We share these interests not only with ASEAN members
or ASEAN Regional Forum participants, but with other maritime nations and the broader international community. - Hillary
Clinton, US Secretary of State at Hanoi, Vietnam - ASEAN Regional Forum - July 2010
9
Chinese President Xi Jinping's quotes in a book - Monday, March 2, 2015 - chinadaily.com.cn
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was everyones overlord and that de facto...rulers of non-Chinese tribes, regions, and states were
properly his feudatories Foreign rulers were thus expected to honour and observe the Ming ritual
calendar and to send periodic missions to the Ming capital to demonstrate fealty and present
tribute of local commodities10 . Ming China felt no serious threat from its neighbours and
unlike Europe of the Middle Ages, where many small states were busy fighting for territory
through unending wars, the Chinese reigned supreme over their region. The Ming also never
really sought well-defined borders, they simply perceived that the totality of East Asia was
under Chinese control, contained within China's "tianxia" or system of rule.11
The South China Sea was therefore always an area to demonstrate the potency and
extent of the Chinese civilisation, but what really turned the issue into a hot topic
internationally in the recent years have been the Hague Tribunal regarding the sovereignty
claims over this contentious body of sea. During April 2012, the tensions between China and
the Philippines rose significantly at the Scarborough Shoal when the Philippine Navy
apprehended 8 Chinese fishing vessels operating in the area. After certain exchanges behind
closed doors, both sides agreed to withdraw from the area although the Chinese later
remained and denied there was such an agreement.12
Images from: http://www.manilalivewire.com/wp-content/uploads/Scarborough-Shoal_2190232b.jpg
10
China and the WTO: The Implications of Membership in Historical Context - Clyde D. Stoltenberg - 2003 Wiley Periodicals
11
Why China cares about the South China Sea - Salvatore Babones - Al Jazeera Opinion - 16 July 2016
12
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The Hague Tribunal Case Filing Process in Context:

The April 2012 confrontation resulted in Philippine fishermen being unable to fish at
the Scarborough Shoal due to the Chinese blockade, hence paved the way for their
government to file a case at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). On
January 2013, the Philippine government, then led by Benigno Aquino III, initiated an
international arbitration under the compulsory dispute mechanism of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), challenging the legality of Chinas
jurisdictional claims in the South China Sea. While China refused to join or accept the case
as a legitimate one, the ITLOS appointed five independent judges to hear the case at the
Arbitral Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration.13 The Benigno government sought
not only to clarify the ambiguities that led to the Scarborough Shoal stand-off in 2012, but
Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea more broadly.
The filing of the case fuelled the Chinese assertiveness in the region, boosting islandbuilding projects in the Spratly area and beyond, with continued militarisation of the Paracel
Islands. One of the major moves by China was also the transformation of the Mischief Reef
into an island during the Spring of 2015. A report by CSIS published from September 2015,
the US based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative reads as follows, illustrating the extent
of the rapidly growing Chinese influence in the region: Over the last year, the world has
watched as China has gone from one airfield in the South China Sea to potentially four. Facilities on
Woody Island in the Paracels already gave China the ability to monitor the northern South China
Sea. Earlier this year, the addition of an airfield on Fiery Cross Reef provided a more southerly
runway capable of handling most if not all Chinese military aircraft14
Within respective interviews, Dr. Ian Storey and Dr. Youna Lyons, renowned academic
experts on the South China Sea, both confirmed that the initiation of the international
arbitration process catalysed and sped up the Chinese activities in the area. This counterproductive nature of the filing of the arbitration case will be explored further in the
upcoming section regarding the environmental devastation in the South China Sea.
13
MISCHIEF REEF. September 8, 2015. A square area approximately 3,000 meters long has been cleared and flattened along
the northern rim of the reef. Some believe an airstrip may be built in this straightaway in the near future. At the western access
channel into the inner reef, an active dredger is visible. To the east, a second concrete plant has been set up on the rim of the
reef. - SPRATLY AIRSTRIP UPDATE: IS MISCHIEF REEF NEXT? September 15, 2015 POTENTIAL NEW RUNWAY PRESENTS
NEW HEADACHES - Gregory Poling - https://amti.csis.org/new-imagery-release/
14
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After almost 3 years of deliberations, on July 12, 2016, the arbitral tribunal hearing
the case of the Philippines v. China at the Hague released its unanimous findings. The ruling
comprehensively supported nearly all of the 15 claims made by the Philippines and
represented a major advancement in interpreting, clarifying, and applying the UNCLOS
worldwide. 15 According to UNCLOS Annex VII, Article 11, The award shall be final and
without appeal It shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute. The arbitral tribunals
findings have wider implications than the region itself due to the fact that UNCLOS is
commonly referred to as the constitution of the worlds oceans.16 These universal
implications of the Hague ruling which go beyond the South China Sea will be investigated in
the following section of this paper which will explore the impact of the issue on global
multilateral institutions around the globe.
15
The Philippines Submissions: The International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/
16
Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, who presided over the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
which gave birth to Unclos, referred to this convention as a "Constitution for the oceans. Worthy of such description, Unclos
prescribes the fundamentals of the present maritime order in a manner that balances the rights of coastal states and the
navigational rights of other states From this viewpoint, countries should unite to persuade China to comply with the award.
- The 'Constitution for the oceans' at stake - Kentaro Nishimoto - The Straits Times - July 20, 2016 - http://
www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-constitution-for-the-oceans-at-stake
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The Arbitral Tribunal Award in 5 Major Categories:

The arbitral tribunals award may be separated into 5 major categories.17 Firstly, the
tribunal ruled that the UNCLOS can comprehensively allocate rights in the maritime
domain, hence the Chinese claim to historical maritime rights in the South China Sea put out
by the famous nine-dash line are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect. 18 The
Nine Dash Line therefore exceeds the limits set by UNCLOS and is internationally
illegitimate. This is due to the fact that UNCLOS declares the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) of any country extend from the edge of the territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles
(370 kilometres; 230 miles) from the baseline. 19 Within this area, the coastal nation has sole
exploitation rights over all natural resources. Consequently the Chinese claims superseded
any historic rights, or other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed.20
Second major issue in the tribunal ruling can be said to be that none of the
contentious rock features in the South China Sea, including Taiwans Taiping, were islands as
defined by UNCLOS Article 121. Therefore these features can not be entitled to a 200
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone or a continental shelf.21 The tribunal examined these
features raised by the Philippines and found that Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Gaven
Reef, Johnson Reef, McKennan Reef and the Scarborough Shoal were rocks and entitled to
only a 12 nautical mile territorial sea but not a 200 nautical mile EEZ. This ruling also meant
that both Mischief Reef fell within the Philippines EEZ, implying Chinas construction of
structures on Mischief Reef was not authorized by the Philippines.
Third, the arbitral tribunal found that the operations of Chinese maritime law
enforcement vessels created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine ships and
After the Ruling: Lawfare in the South China Sea: The historic ruling sets the stage for future diplomatic, political, and
military contestations Carl Thayer - August 03, 2016 - The Diplomat
17
PRESS RELEASE: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. THE PEOPLES
REPUBLIC OF CHINA) - The Hague, 12 July 2016
18
19
"Part V - Exclusive Economic Zone, Article 56". Law of the Sea. United Nations. Retrieved 2011-08-28.
20
The continental shelf is defined as the natural prolongation of the land territory to the continental margin's outer edge, or
200 nautical miles (370km) from the coastal state's baseline, whichever is greater. A state's continental shelf may exceed 200
nautical miles (370 km) until the natural prolongation ends. - "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A
historical perspective)". United Nations Division for Ocean Aairs and the Law of the Sea. Retrieved 30 April 2009.
21
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personnel22 . Chinas maritime law-enforcement vessels violated the Philippines sovereign

rights in its EEZ by blocking oil exploration operations and also failed to prevent Chinese
vessels from fishing illegally and preventing Filipino fishermen from engaging in fishing.
Fourth, the arbitral tribunal ruled that Chinas construction of artificial islands after
the lodging of the case on January 2013 aggravated and diluted the legal dispute. This echoes
the analysis above from the two experts on the issue which noted that the legal dispute
accelerated the island building activities by the Chinese.23 The arbitral tribunal implied in
particular that Chinas construction of a large artificial island on Mischief Reef was an
opportunistic geostrategic move and aimed to permanently destroy any evidence of the natural
condition of Mischief Reef.24
Fifth and most importantly for the following section of this paper, the arbitral tribunal
found that China failed to meet its obligations due to UNCLOS25 regarding the protection
and preservation of the maritime environment in the South China Sea: China was aware of,
tolerated, protected, and failed to prevent Chinese flagged vessels from harvesting endangered
species on a significant scale and harvesting giant clams in a manner that is severely destructive of
the coral reef ecosystem.26 Chinas construction of artificial islands caused severe, irreparable
harm to the coral reef ecosystem and that the Chinese have not cooperated with the
regional countries concerning the protection and preservation of the marine environment.27
22
23
After the Ruling: Lawfare in the South China Sea: The historic ruling sets the stage for future diplomatic, political, and
military contestations Carl Thayer - August 03, 2016 - The Diplomat
24
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides the legal framework within which all activities in
the oceans and seas must be carried out, including for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond
areas of national jurisdiction Marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction - Legal and policy framework Oceans and the Law of the Sea - The United Nations
25
26
27
Harm to Marine Environment: The Tribunal considered the eect on the marine environment of Chinas recent large-scale
land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands and found that China had caused
severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile ecosystems and the
habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species. The Tribunal also found that Chinese authorities were aware that
Chinese fishermen have harvested endangered sea turtles, coral, and giant clams on a substantial scale in the South China
Sea (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop
such activities. - PRESS RELEASE: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. THE
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA) - The Hague, 12 July 2016
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Reactions to the Hague Ruling:

Examining the following reactions from around the world regarding the July 12 verdict will
provide contextual evidence for the section on the impact of the South China Sea issue on
multilateral institutions across the globe.
Response from China: Chinas response to the findings of the arbitral tribunal was a
predictable
denouncing of the legitimacy of the tribunal on its own territories and the
integrity of the judges. On July 12, the state newspaper Xinhua declared the following
regarding the legal proceedings: A belligerent claimant, a biased arbitrator and an absence of
rationality: Hardly fertile ground for impartiality. The arbitration is the sum of its parts, and it was
doomed from the beginning. Thus, rather than setting a precedent, the whole process has left an ugly
scar on the international legal system. 28 Chinas Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement
after the findings of the arbitral tribunal were released echoing the earlier assertions that
the award is null and void and has no binding force. China neither accepts nor recognises it. 29
Although while most of the concentration within the international media has been
given to Chinas seemingly absolute denouncement of the arbitral tribunal, much less
attention has been given to the statement of the Chinese Government issued as an
extensive 143-point White Paper issued by Chinas State Council on 13th of July 2016: China
Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and
the Philippines in the South China Sea (which) aims to clarify the facts and tell the truth behind
the relevant disputes between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea and to reaffirm
China's consistent position and policy on the South China Sea issue, in order to get to the root of the
issue and set the record straight.30
The white paper can be said to imply that China doesnot in fact claim historic rights
over South China Sea solely due to the nine-dash line. An analysis of the white-papers
implications by Andrew Chubb, a researcher at the UWA in Australia, who studies the
interplay between Chinese public opinion and government policy in the South China Sea is
28
China refuses South China Sea arbitration award
Source: Xinhua - 2016-07-12 - http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/
2016-07/12/c_135507844.htm
29
http://publicaairsasia.com/rough-waters-ahead-in-the-south-china-sea/
China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in
the South China Sea - 2016/07/13 - http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1380615.shtml
30
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as follows: Perhaps its greatest significance is found in an extremely subtle piece of language: the
designation of the various islands of the South China Sea as the source of Chinas EEZ and
continental shelf claims... these subtle clarifications raise the possibility of a Chinese maritime
rightsclaim in the South China Sea that looks something more like the UNCLOS-compliant one
Driving attention towards this tough-sounding stance onterritorial sovereigntyprovides goodpolitical
cover for the quiet clarification of Chinasmaritime rightsclaims thatmaybe underway. 31
Response from the South East Asian Countries: The general response by Southeast Asian
states to the award by the arbitral tribunal has been rather mild and muted. The ASEAN did
not issue a joint statement in response to the ruling because there was no consensus. A
critical aspect of how the ASEAN handles such issues is to have unanimous consensus and
there were many members in the association that clearly objected any declaration that
would go against China.
Cambodia, a devoted ally of China within the ASEAN, gave the spoiler before the
rulingby issuing a statement on July 9 by breaking the news that Cambodia will not join in
expressing any common position on the dispute between the Philippines and China. Laos, another
state with close relations with the Middle Kingdom and the ASEAN chairman of 2016,has
not made any public statement of its own about the ruling either. Thailand, likewise, made no
reference to the ruling. The Statement of Thailand was released three hours ahead of the
announcement of the ruling from The Hague and it therefore did not refer to the ruling, in
hopes to render the South China Sea a Sea of Peace, Stability, and Sustainable Development.32
Indonesia also chose not to mention the ruling at all in its statement but called on all
parties to exercise self-restraint and to refrain from any actions that could escalate tensions, as well
as to protect Southeast Asia region particularly from any military activity that could pose a threat to
peace and stability, and to respect international law including UNCLOS 1982. The archipelago
gave a rather calming declaration that aims to protect the status quo rather than banking on
the ruling as an opportunity to push its own claims in the South China Sea regarding the
Natuna Islands.33
31
Did China just clarify the nine-dash line? - 14 July 2016 - Andrew Chubb, UWA - http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/14/
did-china-just-clarify-the-nine-dash-line/
32
No ASEAN Consensus on the South China Sea - By Termsak Chalermpalanupap - July 21, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/
2016/07/no-asean-consensus-on-the-south-china-sea/
Natuna Islands: Indonesia says no 'overlapping' South China Sea claims with China - 22 Jun 2016 - http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2016-06-22/no-overlapping-claims-with-china-in-indonesian-waters-says-fm/7534498
33
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A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam on the other hand
welcomed the fact that, on 12 July 2016, the Tribunal issued its Award in the arbitration between
the Philippines and China. Viet Nam will make a statement on the content of this Award. Myanmar
also took note of the award: We are now studying the impact of the Award and its possible
repercussions within our region and beyond said the statement of their Ministry of Foreign
Affairs released on July 13. 34 In Singapore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the city
statehas taken note of the Award made by the Arbitral Tribunal We are studying the Award and
its implications on Singapore and the wider region. The spokesman urged all parties to fully
respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint, and avoid conducting any activities
that may raise tensions in the region35
Brunei Darussalam was the only one of the four claimants on the ASEAN side which
has also not issued any public statement on the ruling. It has been counted as one of the
claimants because its 200-nautical mile EEZ overlaps Chinas infamous nine-dash line at its
southern end. Malaysia, another claimant regarding on the South China Sea did note the
issuance of the ruling but refrained from expressing any opinion on it: China and all relevant
parties can find constructive ways to develop healthy dialogues, negotiations, and consultations while
upholding the supremacy of the rule of law for the peace, safety, and security for the region.
The victorious Philippines reaction was intentionally reserved and mild one, without
any sign of exaggerated jubilation for the clear arbitration win. In a four-paragraph statement,
Foreign Affairs Secretary stated that The Philippines welcomes the issuance today the Award by
the Arbitral Tribunal Our experts are studying the Award with the care and thoroughness that this
significant arbitral outcome deserves. In the meantime, we call on all those concerned to exercise
restraint and sobriety. The Philippines strongly affirms its respect for this milestone decision as an
important contribution to ongoing efforts in addressing disputes in the South China Sea he added.
The reasons for such a relatively mild and conciliatory statement instead of an aggressive
one which targets China, one that could have been expected from the previous Aquino III
administration, will be examined within the following section of this paper.36
34
No ASEAN Consensus on the South China Sea - By Termsak Chalermpalanupap - July 21, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/
2016/07/no-asean-consensus-on-the-south-china-sea/
35
MFA, Republic of Singapore: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/if/2016/201607/

infocus_20160712_02.html
No ASEAN Consensus on the South China Sea - Dont hold out too much hope for a unified stance at the upcoming ASEAN
Foreign Ministers Meeting in Laos. - By Termsak Chalermpalanupap - July 21, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/noasean-consensus-on-the-south-china-sea/
36
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Responses from the International Community: What significantly stood out from the overall
responses from the Western countries and their allies was the fact that while the US,
Australia and Japan have issued clear statements immediately after the verdict, the EU took
three extra days of intense deliberations behind closed doors to determine the wording of
their statement. The reasons and context for this unexpected delay and the rather oblique
response which followed it will be examined in the next section of this paper.
The U.S. State Department issued a statement on July 12. The statement noted that
the United States strongly supports the rule of law and the resolution of territorial and
maritime disputes peacefully, including through arbitration while urging the parties to
UNCLOS to agree to its compulsory dispute settlement process, asserting that the
Philippines was acting within the Convention in initiating arbitration against China.The
statement also put out clearly that the decision of the arbitral tribunal is final and legally
binding on both China and the Philippines. The award by the arbitral tribunal should serve as
a new opportunity to renew efforts to address maritime disputes peacefully.37
Australias Foreign Minister, issued a media release on July 12 that called on the
Philippines and China to abide by the ruling, which is final and binding on both partiesThis
decision is an important test case for how the region can manage disputes peacefully. It is an
opportunity for the region to come together, and for claimants to re-engage in dialogue with each
other based on greater clarity around maritime rights We urge all claimants to refrain from
coercive behavior and unilateral actions designed to change the status quo in disputed area.
Australia will continue to exercise our international law rights to freedom of navigation and
overflight, and support the right of others to do so. 38
The Japanese Foreign Minister also issued a statement on July 12. The statement
recognised the award by the arbitral tribunal and Japans consistent support for the rule of
law, and called for the use of peaceful means, not the use of force or coercion, in seeking
settlement of maritime dispute in the South China Sea. 39
37
Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration - Press Statement - John Kirby - Assistant Secretary and Department
Spokesperson,Bureau of Public Aairs - Washington, DC - July 12, 2016
38
Australia supports peaceful dispute resolution in the South China Sea - Media release - 12 July 2016 - http://
foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx
China Urges Japan Not to Intervene in South China Sea - China wants Japan to stay out of the South China Sea territorial
disputes during an upcoming ASEAN meeting. - Franz-Stefan Gady - July 25, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/chinaurges-japan-not-to-intervene-in-south-china-sea/
39
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The much anticipated EU declaration came on the July 15th as follows, without any
reference to China and with a clearly mild tone of reconciliation: The European Union and its
Member States, as contracting parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), acknowledge the Award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal, being committed to
maintaining a legal order of the seas and oceans based upon the principles of international law,
UNCLOS, and to the peaceful settlement of disputes The EU does not take a position on
sovereignty aspects relating to claims. It expresses the need for the parties to the dispute to resolve
it through peaceful means, to clarify their claims and pursue them in respect and in accordance with
international law, including the work in the framework of UNCLOS While underlining the
importance of all States working together to protect the marine ecosystem already endangered by
the intensification of maritime traffic and dredging, the EU and its Member States will continue to
organise High Level Dialogues on Maritime Security Cooperation and the exchange of best practices
on joint management and development of shared resources, such as fisheries, as well as on
capacity-building measures.40
Impacts of the South China Sea Conflict on the Global

Multilateral Institutions
The Global Potency and the Rifts within the European Union Exposed:
A day before the EU statement was published, Laurence Norman of the Wall Street
Journal published an investigative piece that featured statements from EU officials. The
following insight is useful to clarify the reasons for the delay regarding the anticipated
response: While the statement has not been made public, diplomats said it was carefully worded.
It did not mention China by name but acknowledged the ruling, made a reference to respecting
international law and called on the parties involved to seek a diplomatic outcome
40
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the Arbitration between the Republic
of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China
Missing Parts: The EU recalls that the dispute settlement mechanisms as provided under UNCLOS contribute to the
maintenance and furthering of the international order based upon the Rule of Law and are essential to settle disputes The
EU also underlines the fundamental importance of upholding the freedoms, rights and duties established in UNCLOS, in
particular the freedoms of navigation and overflight The EU supports the swift conclusion of talks aiming at an eective
Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China implementing the 2002 DOC in the South China Sea Recalling its Statement
of 11 March 2016, the EU calls upon the parties concerned to address remaining and further related issues through
negotiations and other peaceful means and refrain from activities likely to raise tensions. As a member of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) the EU also wishes to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony, and stability in the
region. The EU therefore stands ready to facilitate activities which help to build confidence between the parties concerned.
- 15/07/2016 - http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/15-south-china-sea-arbitration/
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This isnt a statement that would be critical of China said one senior diplomat. It did not take
sides the diplomat said At least two separate statements have been sent for approval by capitals
in an EU process called a silence procedure, diplomats said. They were blocked. Diplomats said
that in discussions Wednesday and Thursday Greece, Hungary and Croatia continued to set out their
opposition. As of Thursday afternoon, officials were still working to find a compromise on several
different versions of the text
Initially, another diplomat said, it was thought concerns were partly driven by the countries
concerns about international arbitration. Greece has territorial disputes with Turkey. Croatia last year
withdrew from an arbitration agreement on a border dispute with Slovenia. Now, we are not so sure
any more if this is the main reason the person said. Maybe they want a little bit to protect their
Chinese interests
Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras returned last week from a five-day official trip to China to
lure investors, where he met the Chinese president and prime minister. A deal for the concession of
a majority stake in the port of Piraeus to Chinas Cosco was ratified by Greeces parliament just
before the trip. Hungarys Prime Minister Viktor Orban has targeted closer economic ties with China
and the two countries have embarked on a range of financial and transport joint projects.41
This excerpt is very critical in understanding how both the Chinese diplomatic and
economic wedge strategy and the maritime disputes between European countries
themselves ended up impairing the EU from issuing a strong statement that mentioned
China clearly, unlike the trilateral of US, Australia and Japan.
In the context of the Chinese wedge strategy, Hungary and Croatia can be
comparable to Laos and Cambodia in terms of their role in watering down or blocking the
criticism against China within their own multilateral platforms. A key similarity lays in the
integration level of these countries into their respective multilateral institutions. Hungary
joined the EU within its 2004 expansion and Croatia became a member just 3 years ago
during the summer of 2013. Both countries are still in their transitioning period from their
ex-socialist institutions towards Western European standards. As much as they receive
significant support in many aspects from the EU itself, both are also very fond of Chinese
investments into their lands as such: Balkan countries are interesting to Chinese investors
EU Response to South China Sea Ruling Blocked by Rift - LAURENCE NORMAN - Jul 14, 2016 - http://blogs.wsj.com/
brussels/2016/07/14/eu-response-to-south-china-sea-ruling-blocked-by-rift/
41
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because they play a major role in transit. But less important to China are the infrastructure and
roads leading into the heartland of the Balkans, which, is the regions chief need As for concrete
projects, the most discussed at the summit was the modernization of the Belgrade-Budapest
railroad, which China, Serbia and Hungary signed agreements on at the meeting.42
Such an example is only one of many that demonstrates the Chinese presence in
Eastern Europe, which can be expected to only grow with the burgeoning One Belt One
Road project that aims to revitalise the ancient Silk Road into a modern economic gateway.43
In an email, Reuben Wong, a political science professor at the National University of
Singapore specialised in EU-ASEAN relations noted that I would not be surprised if Croatia,
Hungary and Greece were involved in watering down the EU statement. You can see that effect in
the 16+1 arrangement that China enjoys with 16 CEEC states. Simply put, such countries,
especially in the case of Hungary and Croatia can be said to be easy prey for the Chinese to
lure into their diplomatic sphere.
In the case of Greece, the role of an historical entente also comes in, given their
diplomatic alliance with Russia. The two nations have deep historic and Orthodox religious
ties and the relationships between members of the Greek ruling party and business elites in
Russia are significantly close. The strong Greco-Russian relations also lies in the strong ties
between their leaders, ever since the once-fringe party Syriza came to administration during
2015. Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras been explicit in his embrace of Vladimir Putin,
playing on a very different tone from the rest of the EU. Indeed, the first foreign official that
Tsipras invited to the prime ministers mansion was the Russian ambassador Andrey Maslov,
who was followed by Putin himself, who travelled to Greece to secure agreements on trade,
China boosts investment in Central and Eastern Europe - Maja Poznatov | EurActiv.rs - 20 December 2014 - https://
www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/china-boosts-investment-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
42
43
Most CEE countries prioritise ties with Europe but after the global financial crises of 2008, and in particular Chinas
recovery and attempt at oering support, CEE countries began to strengthen bilateral trade ties with the Asian giant. Thus, the
trade volume between the PRC and CEE countries experienced significant growth, as Chinas imports from CEE countries
increased by approximately 30% annually. It is not surprising therefore that the EU is Chinas largest trading partner, as
Chinese investment activity in the EU and CEE countries increasingly covers dierent sectors and industries.With the creation
of two direct railway cargo connections launched between Poland and China, Lodz Chengdu and Warsaw-Suzhou in 2013,
economic interests in the form of transport infrastructures are also being extended to Western Europe. The best example of
this is theChongqing-Xinjiang-Duisburg (German) cargo rail route, opened in 2011, seen now as a part of the New Silk Road.
The New Silk Road strategy helps China to diversify export destinations and increase export volume, but also to increase
import volume. The PRC aims to diversify its abundant capital and CEE countries oer a suitable place for investments. The
attractiveness of CEE countries lies in their geo-strategic position, good production base, easy access to the EU market,
educated work force and lower operational costs compared with the EU.- Chinas New Silk Road: what investment
opportunities for Central and Eastern Europe? - Sanja Vajic - http://www.friendsofeurope.org/global-europe/chinas-new-silkroad-what-investment-opportunities-for-central-and-eastern-europe/
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investment, energy and transportation.44 Russia is a key ally in the South China Sea issue for
the Chinese, given their recent bolstering of joint activities in the region and aligned
interests against the West. Between 12 to 19 September 2016, both countries held a joint
naval exercise in the South China Sea, signifying the first time that specific region was chosen
for a Sino-Russian joint military activity. 45 Upon this background of realpolitik and
additionally given the much needed huge amount investment flow from the Middle Kingdom
into its lands, such as the acquisition of the Piraeus Port, it is clear that Greece had little
motivation to cross China regarding the South China Sea issue.46
Another reason why especially Greece and Croatia would be quite uninterested in
pushing for a strong recognition of the Hague verdict is the maritime disputes they have of
their own. In an interview, Dr. Malcolm Cook, an expert on South East Asian politics at
ISEAS, noted that the basis of the ruling is the UNCLOS and it is the first time that is the
case, which theoretically pushes all countries in the world to revisit their maritime claims.
Greece has a decades-old maritime dispute with Turkey, demanding a special concession
from the Turkish Government to increase the Greek territorial waters from 6 nautical miles
to 12 miles, with the sole rationale that the Aegean Sea is Greek.47 Croatia on the other
hand has troubled waters with Slovenia, another EU member: 48
44
Is Russia's Alliance with Greece a Threat to NATO? - Henry Stanekly - July 17, 2016 - http://nationalinterest.org/feature/
russias-alliance-greece-threat-nato-16998
Three ships and two support ships of the Pacific Fleet have left Russian waters to take part in the upcoming RussianChinese naval exercises in the South China Sea. The drills, which are scheduled on Sept. 12-19, will include maritime, land
and air operations. This is the fifth edition of the Sino-Russian Sea Cooperation drills, but its the first time that such an
unstable region was chosen to hold the exercises. - Russia could gain from backing China in South China Sea disputes experts - September 8, 2016 NIKOLAI LITOVKIN, RBTH - http://rbth.com/international/2016/09/08/russia-could-gain-frombacking-china-in-south-china-sea-disputes-experts_628057
45
46
China completes majority purchase of Greece Piraeus port - The China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (Cosco) took
over 51 percent of the Greek state-owned Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) on August 10, making it the controlling shareholder.
Under the deal, Cosco has management and operation rights to run the PPA until 2052 - John Vassilopoulos - 2 September
2016 - https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/09/02/gree-s02.html
47
The Turkish-Greek dispute over territorial claims in the continental shelf areas in the Northeastern and Southwestern
Aegean Sea began in November, 1973, the fundamental source of the tension is Greeces conviction that the Aegean Sea is
Greek. Greeces determination to expand the limit of territorial waters from six to twelve miles would diminish the Turkish and
international share to an unacceptably low level, as would Greeces claim to a ten-mile national air-space limit. The Turks
believe they are seeking only to ensure Turkeys freedom of access to the high seas and international airspace. - Mustafa
Kibaroglu, Turkeys Deterrent, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999, Vol. 55, No. 2, Chicago, Illinois, pp. 3 &
61;
Slovenia, Croatia Awaiting Border Arbitration Ruling - 13 Jun 2015 - A year after the conclusion of oral arguments, Slovenia
and Croatia are still waiting for the arbitration ruling that will demarcate the disputed border. - http://www.sloveniatimes.com/
slovenia-croatia-awaiting-border-arbitration-ruling
48
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The maritime borders in the

Bay of Piran, according to the
Drnovek-Raan agreement,
would grant the disputed area
to Slovenia and provide a
corridor to international waters
(Image: http://
www.sloveniatimes.com/
slovenia-croatia-awaitingborder-arbitration-ruling)
It can be therefore argued that Chinas so called check-book diplomacy seems to

have gave its fruit with the frail EU statement on the South China Sea decision. Even though
only 3 EU member-states stood out by resisting strong language addressing China in this
case, other member-states that benefit from Chinese investment could aim to play a similar
role for China in future discussions within the European Union presenting a clear
opportunity for the Chinese to bank on in any issue that can come up in a similar fashion.
The Hague verdict on the South China Sea can hence be said to have plainly exposed the
rifts and camps that are latent within the European Union while doing little to incite any
enthusiasm for a legal solution regarding the disputed waters of Europe itself.
It must also be noted that the EUs security interests in the South China Sea seem to
be not much of a priority and rather diplomatically exotic at the moment. Maritime disputes
have no significant prospect of climbing up the priority ladder of the European policy makers
anytime soon, given there is so much more going on with Brexit in the north, the economic
troubles in the south and the refugee crisis rooted in the Middle East. EUs main interest in
South China Sea is the sustainability of the Freedom of Navigation in the area, enabling the
incessant flow of trade that is vital for European MNCs - but does it have the willingness and
capability to pursue a strong foreign policy to guarantee this interest?
The answer seems to be a growing no, given the loss of an important member that
had significant influence and soft power in the region: the United Kingdom. Among European
nations, the UK and France can be said to have the strongest influence in the South East Asia
given their colonial legacy. Hence, with Brexit, the EU not only lost a significant member, but
also most of its influence and interest in the South China Sea region. Such phenomena brings
the role of EU as a global peacekeeper or at least a significant global player into question,
serving as another wider implication of the Hague ruling.
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Is the South China Sea conflict a make or break issue for the ASEAN?
Picking up from the remarks on the Brexit, there has been many alarming
publications regarding the prospect of the ASEAN also experiencing a similar shock due to
the disputes in the South China Sea. Cambodia, a staunch ally of China both diplomatically
and economically, have been put out in academic publications and the international media as
the major candidate for such an occasion since especially 2012: Since 2012, Cambodia has
sorely tested ASEANs spirit of consultation and consensus. That year, as ASEAN chair, it blocked the
issuance of a foreign ministers joint communique as there was no agreement on the South China
SeaThere are no existing provisions in the ASEAN Charter regarding the dismissal or withdrawal
of a member state, but the option may be raised again in the future if the grouping cannot agree on
divisive issues Some observers have suggested dismissing Cambodia from the regional grouping so
that ASEAN can move forward on the South China Sea49
In a more sobering and wholistic take though, it can be argued that such a
Cambodia-exit or the possibility of a significant disintegration of the ASEAN-10 is not a
serious prospect within the ASEAN. Firstly, Brexit actually serves more of a wake-up call
rather than a pleasant and inciting precedent for the association. It clearly demonstrated
how it can wreak economic havoc due to extraordinary uncertainty50 and create a huge
setback for the potency of a multilateral institution regarding its influence on effective policy
making. 51
Second, the South East Asian alliance is economically driven and governed with a
consensus-based ASEAN way,52 hence it is indeed not a security pact for example like the
NATO where the foreign and security policies of member states are expected to be very
much aligned. Even within the NATO, there are clear policy rifts and they do not necessarily
How Should ASEAN Deal with Cambodia? - RSIS Publications, Nanyang Technological University - 28 July 2016 - https://
www.rsis.edu.sg/media-highlight/idss/how-should-asean-deal-with-cambodia/#.WB8uumVo-O8
49
50
Pounds plummet to 31-year low not unwelcome, says UK trade under secretary - SCMP - 07 October, 2016 - http://
www.scmp.com/business/money/money-news/article/2025974/pound-hammered-after-hollande-promises-tough-stancebrexit
51
The UK and Europe - Analysing the UK's influence in EU policy making - Doru Frantescu - April 2016 - http://esharp.eu/
debates/the-uk-and-europe/analysing-the-uks-influence-in-eu-policy-making
The ASEAN Way: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement -Logan Masilamani and Jimmy Peterson|
Oct 15, 2014 - http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/10/15/the-asean-way-the-structural-underpinnings-of-constructiveengagement/
52
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spell the end of the Trans-Atlantic Pact.53 ASEAN is not founded nor crafted institutionally to
solve such disputes with third countries, it has other major goals such as poverty reduction,
incitement of intra-regional trade and the sustainability of peace within South East Asia all
of which the association has been significantly successful at since its inception in 1967.
A third argument against the over-blown alarmism against a potential ASEAN
disintegration, is the current political scene within the member states, which has been
changing dramatically with significant implications regarding the South China Sea. The
Duterte administrations coming to power altered the tone of the Filipino government on
the South China Sea issue significantly. Immediately after his inauguration, Duterte opted to
go against the United States to the point of almost severing the ties (or at least weakening
them substantially, especially in terms of partnership in security)54 while openly cursing at
the American president over the drug war issue in the Philippines.55 President Duterte has
therefore shifted his countrys diplomatic trajectory from being a fully-committed ally of the
United States into a blossoming warm relationship with China.56 This shift was reflected in
the mild and non-jubilant tone in the response of the Philippines after the Hague award.
Such a shift will also have reflections for the two other major claimant states in the
region: Vietnam and Malaysia. There were rumours on the media that these nations could
also take China to court over their claims in the South China Sea,57 but given the current
geopolitical climate, that seems quite unlikely. With President Aquino III at the helm, Vietnam
used to be able to could count on the Philippines to stand up against Chinese assertiveness
in the South China Sea. But Manila's turn away from the US under new President Rodrigo
Duterte pretty much isolates Vietnam regarding the issue and complicates its efforts to
strike a balance between China and the US, both of which it has sought to deepen ties.58
53
Middle East Policy Council - Business as Usual: The U.S.-Turkey Security Partnership - Mustafa Kibaroglu and Selim C.
Sazak - Winter 2015, Volume XXII, Number 4 - http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/business-usual-usturkey-security-partnership?print
Philippines' Duterte says 'goodbye' to US ties in Beijing - 20 Oct 2016 - http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
asiapacific/philippines-duterte-says-goodbye-to-us-ties-in-beijing/3219936.html
54
Philippine President Duterte curses Obama over human rights - 5 September 2016 - http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-37274594
55
56
Duterte in China: Deals worth $19b clinched, 1m jobs to be created - 21 October 2016 - The Straits Times.
57
Will Vietnam File a South China Sea Case Against China? - Hanoi may yet take Beijing to court - Shawn W. Crispin August 03, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/will-vietnam-file-a-south-china-sea-case-against-china/
Duterte rattles Vietnam in diplomatic dance with US, China - A. Tomiyama - Nikkei Asian Review - 6 November 2016 http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Duterte-rattles-Vietnam-in-diplomatic-dance-with-US-China?
58
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Malaysia has also been rather interested in boosting its ties with China rather than
fostering hostilities against the Middle Kingdom, given their growing security partnership
with its most recent Navy deal: Najib Razaks current visit to Beijing has been underscored by
what the Malaysian leader described as a landmark decision a two-year defence contract to buy
and build four Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) from China. This deal might have come across as
surprising to many Kuala Lumpurs further geopolitical shift towards Beijing has consequent
ramifications for regional security, especially the United States Asia rebalancing strategy.59
It can therefore be said that the rhetoric of the two camps within the ASEAN:
roughly put out as the claimants in the South China Sea hence diplomatic allies of the US
versus the non-claimants in the South China Sea and hence the diplomatic allies of China,
seems to be out-dated and diluted at the moment. The political scene in the ASEAN is not as
clear-cut as it was during the times when Hague tribunal case was filed. President Aquino III
was staunch pro-US figure and the champion of the Hague Tribunal process, he insisted for
the ASEAN to handle the issue multilaterally, hence increasing tensions within the
association that threatened its unity.
Since then however, the Chinese diplomatic influence has grown significantly in the
region, muddling the prospect of any harsh polarisation within the association. ASEANs
regionalism is rather characterised by a low level of institutionalism and the ASEAN way
places emphasis on quiet diplomacy and informal mechanisms. Given that ASEAN is not fond
of any overruling voting procedures and the emphasis of its mechanisms are rather on the
no objection claim by all its members, it is unlikely that there will be any kind of dramatic
rift caused by a single member in the group in the foreseeable future due to the South China
Sea issue. It must also be noted that the South China Sea remains not an ASEAN-China
issue, but a bilateral one between Beijing and the four Southeast Asian claimant states,
making it pretty implausible for the association to find its key functionality in this specific
dispute. ASEAN-China relations also must not be narrowed down to the frame of the South
China Sea conflict given it actually has a much wider economical scope: In 2014, China
ranked first as the source of imports and as the export market for ASEAN. Meanwhile, ASEAN
ranked first as the source of imports and third as the export market for China.60
59
Malaysias Navy Deal with China: Meeting A Complex Security Challenge - Collin Koh Swee Lean - RSIS Publications - 02
November 2016 - https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/co16271-malaysias-navy-deal-with-china-meeting-a-complexsecurity-challenge/#.WB9HaWVo-O8
60
CHINA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN UPDATE Sarah Y. TONG & LIM Wen Xin EAI Background Brief No. 1081
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The Key Drivers of the Devastation of Coral Reefs and Fish

Stocks in the South China Sea
The island building activities of the involved parties on coral reefs have been framed
mostly as a security issue,61 while fishing disputes have rather arised concerns of sovereignty,
focusing less on the depletion rates of such resources. 62 Both activities however, among with
many others, have been destroying one of the richest natural habitats in the world. This
section of the paper will therefore aim to examine and put out the key drivers of the
environmental devastation under these two categories.
1) Coral Reefs
One of the most prominent environmental issues in the South China Sea is the
transformation of coral reefs into islands by various countries throughout the years,
although more recently by the Chinese. Satellite images of the South China Sea illustrate the
man-made destruction of coral reefs on an unprecedented scale between 2012 and late
2015. The rapid destruction, resulting mostly from widespread and chopping of reefs by
fishermen using propellers of small boats in order to hunt for giant clam shells, is visible
clearly on the images of at least 28 different reefs throughout the Spratly and Paracel
archipelagoes which are territories disputed between Vietnam, the Philippines and China.63
61
Indo-Pacific security links: Mischief Reef, PLA's Second Artillery, China's defence exports, submarines and more: New
satellite images from CSIS show that China has started construction of runway on the contested Mischief Reef in the South
China Sea. This follows the near completion of a 3000m runway on Fiery Cross Reef in July. - The Interpreter (Lowy Institute
for International Policy) https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indo-pacific-security-links-mischief-reef-plas-secondartillery-chinas-defence
Govt to relocate fishermen to Natuna to strengthen sovereignty - Anton Hermansyah The Jakarta Post - August 15, 2016 http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/15/govt-to-relocate-fishermen-to-natuna-to-strengthen-sovereignty.html
62
Satellite Imagery Shows Ecocide in the South China Sea - Victor Robert Lee - January 15, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/
2016/01/satellite-images-show-ecocide-in-the-south-china-sea/
63
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The time interval of the proliferation of coral reefs destruction is key to

understanding the motives behind such activities. The Hague Tribunal was filed on January
2013 with many preceding news regarding its approach. It can be deduced that the moment
the Chinese got aware of this affair, they embarked on a reclamation spree to gain land in the
disputed areas before the verdict was made. According to Dr. Ian Storey, especially the land
reclamations in the Spratlys was a key game changer in the power balance of the South
China Sea conflict: The phrase game changer is often overused in international affairs. However,
Chinas terraforming in the Spratlys may well prove to be a genuine game changer in the longrunning and increasingly contentious dispute. Since mid-2013, China has been undertaking largescale reclamation work on seven features under its control in the disputed Spratly Islands
Extensive infrastructure is being constructed on the reclaimed features, including harbours, radar
and surveillance systems, multi-storey buildings and airstrips these artificial islands will enable
Chinas navy, coast guard and air force to maintain a permanent presence in the Spratlys and
strengthen Beijings ability to enforce its territorial claims within the so-called nine-dash line64
During the three years between 2012 and 2015, Hainanese fishermen mostly from
the town of Tanmen have harvested the valuable giant clam shells on an immensely industrial
scale. The shell of the giant clam, which can grow to more than a meter in length, weigh over
200 kilograms, live more than a hundred years and is dubbed as the white gold of the sea
as its price has risen so dramatically in the past three three years, to the point that many
Chinese fishermen have abandoned pursuing standard fishery practices. These shells are seen
as luxury item in China and a Buddhist cultural treasure while being very difficult to
counterfeit. A high-end pair of the shells is to be able tot sell for as much as a million yuan or
150,000 USD.65 By 2015, Tanmens giant clam industry was supporting nearly 100,000 people,
according to estimates. Although giant clams are considered an endangered species and their
trade is prohibited under both international and Chinese law but the fishermens scraping of
the coral reefs has in many cases occurred under the presence of Chinese Coast Guard
vessels. In many interviews, the Hainanese fishermen have claimed that harvesting giant clams
in the South China Sea is a way of serving their country by ensuring Chinas sovereignty. This
is indeed no hyperbole and the rationale behind their claim is the phenomena of poaching
64
Chinas Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China Sea? - Ian Storey - 23 June 2015 - ISEAS
Satellite Imagery Shows Ecocide in the South China Sea: P - Victor Robert Lee - January 15, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/
65
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for these giant clams as a way to make room66 for the reefs to be permanently buried under
millions of tons of sand to become islands hence the territory of the Chinese.67
66
What I came across on a reef far out in the middle of the South China Sea has left me shocked and confused. I'd been told
that Chinese fishermen were deliberately destroying reefs near a group of Philippine-controlled atolls in the Spratly Islands but
I was not convinced. "It goes on day and night, month after month," a Filipino mayor told me on the island of Palawan. "I
think it is deliberate. It is like they are punishing us by destroying our reefs." I didn't take it seriously. I thought it might be antiChinese bile from a politician keen to blame everything on his disliked neighbour - a neighbour that claims most of the South
China Sea as its own. But then, as our little aircraft descended towards the tiny Philippine-controlled island of Pagasa, I
looked out of my window and saw it. At least a dozen boats were anchored on a nearby reef. Long plumes of sand and gravel
were trailing out behind them. Pale plumes stretch out behind the small boats in the foreground "Look," I said to my
cameraman, Jiro. "That's what the mayor was talking about, that's the reef mining! A Filipino boatman guided his tiny
fishing boat right into the midst of the Chinese poachers. They had chained their boats to the reef and were revving their
engines hard. Clouds of black diesel smoke poured into the air. "What are they doing?" I asked the boatman. "They are using
their propellers to break the reef," he said. Again I was sceptical. The only way to see for sure was to get in the water. It was
murky and filled with dust and sand. I could just make out a steel propeller spinning in the distance on the end of long shaft,
but it was impossible to tell exactly how the destruction was being carried out. The result was clear, though. Complete
devastation. This place had once been a rich coral ecosystem. Now the sea floor was covered in a thick layer of debris,
millions of smashed fragments of coral, white and dead like bits of bone In every direction the destruction stretched for
hundreds of metres, piles and piles of shattered white coral branches. It seemed so illogical. Why would fishermen, even
poachers, destroy a whole coral system like this? I caught sight of what they were carrying - a massive giant clam, at least
1m (3ft) across We motored out to a group of much larger fishing boats anchored just o the reef. These are "mother ships"
to the small poacher boats on the reef. On board the big boats I could see hundreds of clam shells stacked high. On the stern
of each boat, two large Chinese characters spelled out the name, Tanmen It's a fishing port on the large Chinese island of
Hainan. In May 2014 another boat from Tanmen had been caught by Philippine police on another reef close to the Philippines
called Half Moon Shoal. On board, the police had found 500 Hawksbill sea turtles, most of them dead - Rupert Wingfield
Hayes for BBC News, South China Sea - 15 December 2015 - http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35106631
Satellite Imagery Shows Ecocide in the South China Sea: P - Victor Robert Lee - January 15, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/
67
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Also during 2014, the United States and China came together to crack down on the
ivory trade. The two biggest markets for illegal ivory banned the import and export of the
stuff, hoping to save African elephants from being poached for their tusks. This was also a key
driver in increasing the demand for the giant clams, which are bought as a substitute for
ivory jewellery and raises less public outcry (if any) about its fate compared to elephants.68
It must be noted though that, China is not the sole land-reclaimer in the Spratlys and
the South China Sea. Amidst intense international focus on the Chinese activities, Vietnam
has also embarked on its own island-building initiative to counter the Middle Kingdom.
Vietnams reclamations also coincide with the 2012-2015 era, as it added a total of almost
100,000 square meters to its land and built military facilities on coral reefs in Sand Cay and
West Reef on the Spratlys as seen in the images from CSIS of AMTI:69
68
BLAME AN IVORY BAN FOR CHINAS VANISHING GIANT CLAMS: Nic Cavell - Wired Science - 10 February 2016 - https://
www.wired.com/2016/02/blame-an-ivory-ban-for-chinas-vanishing-giant-clams/
69
Asia Maritime Transparency Institute: https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-island-building/
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Sand Cay: August 2011, Concrete Pier with a hotel complex

CSIS, AMTI
Sand Cay: February 2015, New Defensive Structures

installed CSIS, AMTI
28 of 44
The reclamations of land in the South China Sea by prominently the Chinese and the
Vietnamese in the expense of coral reefs have also raised an issue about the indifference of
environmental NGOs such as the Greenpeace regarding the devastation. An hypothesis was
put forward by Dr. Ian Storey, claiming that coral reefs cannot be classified as charismatic
megafauna, unlike pandas, polar bears or tigers, which causes NGOs to not spend their
energy and focus on them, given the public is expected to be not interested in them as
much.70 However in an interview, Dr. Youna Lyons, countered the idea of being a charismatic
megafauna is essential in this case and claimed that the real issue lays in the funding
structures of these NGOs: Greenpeace is not too active in South East Asia, especially the South
China Sea area anyway Funding has to be prioritised, they go by lumps of projects, not touching
on any other issue if they arent going to work on it and attack it fullyWTO on the other hand
has the panda as its logo, hence attacking the origin of this animal (China) would do little more than
diluting their brand. According to Lyons, the main inhibitor in creating a widespread inititative
to save the reefs is rather the fact that there is immense political ambiguity and a chronic
dispute over the territory of the coral reefs, unlike the Arctic ice caps or the habitat of
pandas, where there is not any significant sovereignty claims that surround them.
2) Fisheries
As of 2016, a third ($5.3 trillion of total $16.5 trillion) of annual global trade passes
on 100,000 vessels through the South China Sea,71 among with similar global proportions in
the transportation of energy resources such as oil and natural gas.72 By some estimates, 12%
of the fisheries catch globally is made in the South China Sea, making it a vital protein source
for the billions of people that live in the countries that surround it. Regarding oil and gas
reserves, their amount is difficult to predict even today, mainly because the territorial
disputes have prevented energy companies from conducting the necessary surveys. Although,
the Chinese have estimated that there could be up to 200 billion barrels of oil, making it
70
Charismatic megafauna are large animal species with widespread popular appeal, which are often used by environmental
activists to achieve environmentalist goals
71
Thousands of ships transit the waters daily, connecting markets and goods in East Asia with the Middle East and Europe.
Total annual trade through the South China Sea amounts to $5.3 trillion, with U.S. trade accounting for $1.2 trillion. A third of
the worlds liquefied natural gas passes through the Straits of Malacca and into the South China Sea, much of it bound for
Japan and South Korea - South China Sea Ruling Increases Uncertainty for Shipping, Trade - Sara Schonhardt - July 14,
2016 - http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-china-sea-ruling-increases-uncertainty-for-shipping-trade-1468487095
Roughly two thirds of South Koreas energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japans and Taiwans energy supplies, and 80
per cent of Chinas crude oil imports come through the South China Sea - Robert D. Kaplan, Asias Cauldron"
72
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potentially the number 3 region in the world after Venezuela and the Arabic peninsula. More
important than the actual figures regarding hydrocarbon reserves, the perception itself that
the South China Sea is a rich territory for such resources is a key driver of the dispute
while putting it more in the spotlight in the international media as well73
The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions - Ian Storey, Cheng-Yi Lin, editors - Date of
publication:2016 - Publisher:ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute
73
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As much as the issue can be easily framed as an oil dispute, according to Dr. Storey
and many other scholars, the South China Sea conflict is essentially a fish war. Currently,
there is no prospect of creating a multinational agreement over fish stock in the South
China Sea while the resources are being depleted at a fast rate:
The plight of the fish stocks go back for a long time. Since 1985, China, Vietnam, and
the Philippines have included large-scale explosive and cyanide fishing operations especially
in the Spratlys area and beyond. Marine biologists estimate that fishing will need to drop by
50 per cent an impossible prospect given the rather rising trend to sustain endangered
species.74 Nina Hachigian, the U.S. Ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
notes the current situation as such: This marine bounty, and by extension, the food security of
the people of the region, is under attack. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the
Marine Biodiversity in Southeast Asia: An International Law Guide for Marine Researchers - National University of Singapore
(NUS) - Centre for International Law; Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security - Youna Lyons February 18,
2013 - https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220581
74
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area is widespread. Common methods such as dynamite fishing, cyanide poisoning, and bottom
trawling have wreaked havoc in regional ecosystems and threaten the future of the regional fishing
market. Forth percent of the South China Seas fish stocks have already disappeared and 70
percent of the South China Seas coral reefs are rated to be in fair or poor condition.
According to a World Bank Fisheries Outlook, Fish to 2030: Prospects for Fisheries
and Aquaculture: China will account for 38 percent of global fish consumption by 2030.75
Marine scientists also express concern for the plight of the regions hard and soft corals,
parrot fish, spinner dolphins, sea turtles, groupers, and black-tipped reef sharks as the region
already suffered a decline of 60% in coral life and 50% in fish species respectively. The issue is
not a simple one but indeed a wicked problem as global warming, destruction of reefs,
overfishing, destructive fishing practices, advances fishing technology and population growth
all affect a region that is almost completely disputed politically:76 Wicked problems are an
important concept in public policy.They are pressing and highly complex issues for policy formulation
that involve many causal factors and high levels of disagreement about the nature of a problem and
the best way to handle it Wicked problems involve fundamental differences between stakeholders,
who typically have deeply held convictions about the correctness of their own position. Effective
solutions invariably require stakeholders to change their mindsets and behaviourThe maritime
security environment of the Asia Pacific is awash with wicked problems. These include different
interpretations of the Law of the Sea, providing good order in regional seas, conflicting maritime
claims and managing the risks of greater naval activity in the region. 77
Fishing is a difficult occupation that requires at least 5.4 million people in the region
to leave their homes for sometimes months at a time. Still, the Chinese government is fond
of subsidising their fishermens almost every need from petrol and steel reinforcement for
boats to an annual $4,600 in a so called danger pay scheme make it far easier to earn a
living. The Hainanese fishermen can also press an emergency button on a free satellitenavigation system to summon the Chinese coast guard whenever foreign maritime forces
intervene. Since 2014, tens of thousands of Chinese fishing vessels have been upgraded with
75
Fish to 2030 : prospects for fisheries and aquaculture - 2014 - The World Bank
76
Chinas Reclamations Roil South China Sea - James Borton - 11 April 2015 - http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/04/11/china-sreclamations-roil-south-china-sea/
Solving the "Wicked Problems" of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to theTask? - SAM BATEMAN Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April 2011), pp. 1-28 - Published by: ISEAS - Yosuf Ishak Institute
77
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a satellite system that allows for such distress calls.78 The Chinese authorities consider
fishermen and fishing vessels important tools in expanding Chinas presence and the countrys
claims in the disputed waters Fishermen are increasingly at the front line of the South China Sea
disputes and fishing incidents could trigger even bigger diplomatic and security tensions between
China and regional countries said Zhang Hongzhou, an expert at the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in a statement to the Washington
Post during April 2016. The major service of the fishermen to their nation in this context is
to clear the way in a new territory for the coast guards come in, who are in turn often
followed by land reclamation vessel who bring in the rocks and sands to fill up the
designated reefs and at times militarise them. In the same newspaper article, Alan Dupont,
Professor of International Security, coined the process as: fish, protect, occupy, control79
Chinese fishing boats (Getty Images)

78
The Environment Is the Silent Casualty of Beijings Ambitions in the South China Sea - Hannah Beech - Time Magazine - 1
June 2016 - http://time.com/4353292/south-china-sea-environment-destruction-coral-giant-clams/
79
Here, in the fishing port of Tanmen in the southern island of Hainan, 50-year-old captain Chen Yuguo was in the
wheelhouse of his trawler last week, carrying out minor repairs after a six-week fishing trip to the disputed Spratly Islands. A
portrait of Comrade Mao Zedong hung in a place of honor behind him, alongside an expensive satellite navigation system
supplied by the Chinese government. Chen said catches are much better in the Spratlys than in Chinas depleted inshore
waters, but the captain said he is also fulfilling his patriotic duty. It is our water, he said, but if we dont fish there, how can
we claim it is our territory? - Washington Post - How Chinas fishermen are fighting a covert war in the South China Sea https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fishing-fleet-puts-china-on-collision-course-with-neighbors-in-southchina-sea/2016/04/12/8a6a9e3c-f3-11e5-8bb1-f124a43f84dc_story.html
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The fishing industry in China has risen to 1.9 trillion yuan or $289 billion by 2013,
with fish now the top Chinese agricultural export. There were nearly 10,000 fish processing
companies in China in 2013, employing over 400,000 workers. In all related industries, the
fisheries and marine foodstuffs occupation in China provide nearly 14.5 million jobs. The
China boasted almost 700,000 fishing vessels in 2013, a drastic rose from 52,225 in 1979.
Chinese fishermen on average earn around 50% more than their farmer counterparts, as
their government is spending $4 billion a year in subsidies to the industry. Despites these
immense figures, the Chinese fish processing industry is not even operating full capacity,
failing to reach the full utilisation rates aimed with the 12th Five-Year Plan of 2011-2015.
Under the new Five Year Plan, China aims to produce 77 million tons of fish by 2024. 80
Fish: The Overlooked Destabilizer in the South China Sea - FEBRUARY 12, 2016
analysis/fish-overlooked-destabilizer-south-china-sea
80
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- Stratfor: https://www.stratfor.com/
It goes therefore without saying that the South China Seas fisheries are under
serious pressure. 55% of global marine fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea as the
fish stocks have declined at certain regions by 95% since the 1950s. Destructive fishing
practices such as the use of dynamite and cyanide on reefs, coupled with artificial islandbuilding have decimated the coral reefs of the South China Sea which have been declining at
a rate of 16% per decade. According to a recent report, by 2045, under business as usual,
each of the species groups studied would suffer stock decreases of a further 9% to 59%. 81
Conclusion: What to expect next in the South China Sea?

The South China Sea issue is unlikely to be off the headlines any time soon, given its
complexity and immense reach of implications from Europe to Washington. So what can be
expected next? According to Dr. Malcolm Cook, China will be the key protagonist. The
Middle Kingdom can be said to be the biggest provocateur in the issue as it was their landclaiming in the Scarborough Shoal, which now legally falls under the Filipino EEZ, that pushed
the Philippines to go to the Hague Tribunal in 2013 and make the issue an internationally
debated one. Both according to Dr. Cook and Dr. Storey, China has no signs of changing
stance, given it clearly dismissed it with a white-paper declaration and called it a mere piece
of paper. According to Dr. Storey, The Hague Tribunal award will not necessarily push China
to change its historical claims and how it frames and brands these claims.
Dr. Cook also does not foresee any country to take China to court over a territorial
issue in the South China Sea, as the diplomatic cost is huge and the return for it will not
seem sufficient after this point. Within the interview, he has also noted that the role of the
United States is exaggerated in the conflict, as their only national interest is to conduct
freedom of navigation exercises. He reminded that the US has never taken a strong position
in support of any claims of any country, except upholding the issue of abiding by
international law.
According Dr. Youna Lyons however, even though the Hague ruling cannot be directly
enforced, it will give a solid baseline to form arguments and set the rules of the game. She
noted that international law is there to create pressure and prevent big countries from
bullying the small ones. She was also optimistic about the coral reefs future. Regarding the
Chinas Reclamations Roil South China Sea - James Borton - 11 April 2015 - http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/04/11/china-sreclamations-roil-south-china-sea/
81
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question whether the man-made damage to coral reefs stop, she predicts that as the island
claiming lessen, it indeed will. It can be argued that the more political tension, the more
reclamation will happen and regarding land claims and with the verdict as already awarded,
there is little motivation left for any party to continue on with such activities.
What is victory in South China Sea? It can be inferred from all the occasions that
surround the issue, even China does not know the answer to that. Although, it must be that
the end-game of the whole conflict is to dominate the whole body of water, which is not
feasible for any of the parties involved to actually accomplish. Hence, the conflict will be
driven by how much the related parties can get through their agendas and control as much
as space as they can. Upon this background, it seems therefore that the future of the race to
dominate the South China Sea will be determined by who makes the law and need not go to
war to impose it.
36 of 44
Bibliography:
BOOKS:
Billo, Huang Springer, Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Navigating Rough Waters 9 Dec 2014
Lee, Lai To - China and the South China Sea Dialogues: Greenwood Publishing Group,
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Murray, Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen, Gregory B. Poling Rowman & Littlefield, Perspectives on
the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal, and Security Dimensions of the Dispute 8 Oct 2014
Stoltenberg, Clyde D. China and the WTO: The Implications of Membership in Historical
Context - Wiley Periodicals - 2003
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Strategic Tensions - Publisher:ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute - Date of publication:2016
Thayer, Carlyle A. - ASEANS Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for
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Talmon, Stefan. Bing Bing Jia. The South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective
Bloomsbury Publishing, 1 Nov 2014
Wu, Shichun. Valencia, Mark UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the South China
Sea Routledge, 9 Mar 2016
Zou, Keyuan China-ASEAN Relations and International Law Elsevier, 30 Jan 2009
OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS, STATEMENTS AND REPORTS:

ASEAN DECLARATION ON THE SOUTH CHINA SEA : Adopted by the Foreign Ministers
at the 25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila, Philippines on 22 July 1992
Australia supports peaceful dispute resolution in the South China Sea - Media release - 12
July 2016 - http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/Pages/2016/jb_mr_160712a.aspx
37 of 44
China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications: CRS
Report for Congress - October 10, 2001 - Library of Congress
China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes
Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea - 2016/07/13 - http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1380615.shtml
CHINA-ASEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: AN UPDATE Sarah Y. TONG & LIM Wen Xin
EAI Background Brief No. 1081
Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration - Press Statement - John Kirby - Assistant
Secretaryand Department Spokesperson,Bureau of Public Affairs - Washington, DC - July
12, 2016
Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the Award rendered in the
Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People's Republic of China
Fish to 2030 : prospects for fisheries and aquaculture - 2014 - The World Bank
Fish: The Overlooked Destabilizer in the South China Sea - FEBRUARY 12, 2016 - Stratfor:
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/fish-overlooked-destabilizer-south-china-sea
MFA, Republic of Singapore: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/
if/2016/201607/infocus_20160712_02.html
Statement of the US Secretary of State at Hanoi, Vietnam - ASEAN Regional Forum - July
2010
LEGAL DOCUMENTS:
Legal and policy framework - Oceans and the Law of the Sea - The United Nations
The Philippines Submissions: The International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org/
homepage/
38 of 44
PRESS RELEASE: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION (THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES V. THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA) - The Hague, 12 July 2016
Part V - Exclusive Economic Zone, Article 56". Law of the Sea. United Nations. Retrieved
2011-08-28.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective)". United
Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Retrieved 30 April 2009.
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
ASEAN-China Relations: Realities and Prospects: Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005
ASEAN-Canada Research Partnership Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 7 April
2014: Conflicts in the South China Sea and China-ASEAN Economic Interdependence: A
Challenge to Cooperation
ASEAN Studies Centre - Yusof Ishak Institute ISEAS - ASEAN Focus: Special Issue on the
South China Sea Arbitration
Chinas nine-dash line, international law, and the Monroe Doctrine analogy - Scott, S. V. China information - 31.08.2016
Chinas Terraforming in the Spratlys: A Game Changer in the South China Sea? - Ian Storey 23 June 2015 - ISEAS
How Should ASEAN Deal with Cambodia? - RSIS Publications, Nanyang Technological
University - 28 July 2016 - https://www.rsis.edu.sg/media-highlight/idss/how-should-aseandeal-with-cambodia/#.WB8uumVo-O8
Marine Biodiversity in Southeast Asia: An International Law Guide for Marine Researchers National University of Singapore (NUS) - Centre for International Law; Australian National
Centre for Ocean Resources and Security - Youna Lyons February 18, 2013 - https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220581
39 of 44
Malaysias Navy Deal with China: Meeting A Complex Security Challenge - Collin Koh Swee
Lean - RSIS Publications - 02 November 2016 - https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/
co16271-malaysias-navy-deal-with-china-meeting-a-complex-security-challenge/
#.WB9HaWVo-O8
Middle East Policy Council - Business as Usual: The U.S.-Turkey Security Partnership Mustafa Kibaroglu and Selim C. Sazak - Winter 2015, Volume XXII, Number 4 - http://
www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/business-usual-us-turkey-securitypartnership?print
Mustafa Kibaroglu, Turkeys Deterrent, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 1999, Vol.
55, No. 2, Chicago, Illinois, pp. 3 & 61;
Solving the "Wicked Problems" of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to
theTask? - SAM BATEMAN - Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 1 (April
2011), pp. 1-28 - Published by: ISEAS - Yosuf Ishak Institute
ONLINE ARTICLES:
A Firsthand Glimpse Into The Vietnam And China Conflict - The Daily Catch: http://
theterramarproject.org/thedailycatch/firsthand-glimpse-vietnam-china-conflict/
After the Ruling: Lawfare in the South China Sea: The historic ruling sets the stage for future
diplomatic, political, and military contestations - Carl Thayer - August 03, 2016 - The
Diplomat
BLAME AN IVORY BAN FOR CHINAS VANISHING GIANT CLAMS: Nic Cavell - Wired
Science - 10 February 2016 - https://www.wired.com/2016/02/blame-an-ivory-ban-for-chinasvanishing-giant-clams/
Chinas New Silk Road: what investment opportunities for Central and Eastern Europe? Sanja Vajic - http://www.friendsofeurope.org/global-europe/chinas-new-silk-road-whatinvestment-opportunities-for-central-and-eastern-europe/
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China boosts investment in Central and Eastern Europe - Maja Poznatov | EurActiv.rs - 20
December 2014 - https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/china-boostsinvestment-in-central-and-eastern-europe/
China Urges Japan Not to Intervene in South China Sea - China wants Japan to stay out of
the South China Sea territorial disputes during an upcoming ASEAN meeting. - Franz-Stefan
Gady - July 25, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-urges-japan-not-to-intervene-insouth-china-sea/
Chinas Reclamations Roil South China Sea - James Borton - 11 April 2015 - http://
intpolicydigest.org/2015/04/11/china-s-reclamations-roil-south-china-sea/
Did China just clarify the nine-dash line? - 14 July 2016 - Andrew Chubb, UWA - http://
www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/14/did-china-just-clarify-the-nine-dash-line/
Duterte rattles Vietnam in diplomatic dance with US, China - A. Tomiyama - Nikkei Asian
Review - 6 November 2016 - http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/
Duterte-rattles-Vietnam-in-diplomatic-dance-with-US-China?
EU Response to South China Sea Ruling Blocked by Rift - LAURENCE NORMAN - Jul 14,
2016 - http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2016/07/14/eu-response-to-south-china-sea-rulingblocked-by-rift/
Indo-Pacific security links: Mischief Reef, PLA's Second Artillery, China's defence exports,
submarines and more: New satellite images from CSIS show that China has started
construction of runway on the contested Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. This follows
the near completion of a 3000m runway on Fiery Cross Reef in July. - The Interpreter
(Lowy Institute for International Policy) https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/indopacific-security-links-mischief-reef-plas-second-artillery-chinas-defence
Is Russia's Alliance with Greece a Threat to NATO? - Henry Stanekly - July 17, 2016 - http://
nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-alliance-greece-threat-nato-16998
No ASEAN Consensus on the South China Sea - By Termsak Chalermpalanupap - July 21,
2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/no-asean-consensus-on-the-south-china-sea/
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Rough Waters Ahead in the South China Sea: http://publicaffairsasia.com/rough-watersahead-in-the-south-china-sea/

Roughly two thirds of South Koreas energy supplies, nearly 60 per cent of Japans and
Taiwans energy supplies, and 80 per cent of Chinas crude oil imports come through the
South China Sea - Robert D. Kaplan, Asias Cauldron
Rupert Wingfield Hayes for BBC News, South China Sea - 15 December 2015 - http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-35106631
Russia could gain from backing China in South China Sea disputes - experts - September 8,
2016 NIKOLAI LITOVKIN, RBTH - http://rbth.com/international/2016/09/08/russia-couldgain-from-backing-china-in-south-china-sea-disputes-experts_628057
Satellite Imagery Shows Ecocide in the South China Sea - Victor Robert Lee - January 15,
2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/satellite-images-show-ecocide-in-the-south-chinasea/
Slovenia, Croatia Awaiting Border Arbitration Ruling - 13 Jun 2015 - A year after the
conclusion of oral arguments, Slovenia and Croatia are still waiting for the arbitration ruling
that will demarcate the disputed border. - http://www.sloveniatimes.com/slovenia-croatiaawaiting-border-arbitration-ruling
SPRATLY AIRSTRIP UPDATE: IS MISCHIEF REEF NEXT? September 15, 2015 POTENTIAL
NEW RUNWAY PRESENTS NEW HEADACHES - Gregory Poling - https://amti.csis.org/
new-imagery-release/
The ASEAN Way: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement - Logan
Masilamani and Jimmy Peterson | Oct 15, 2014 - http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/
2014/10/15/the-asean-way-the-structural-underpinnings-of-constructive-engagement/
The Cham: Descendants of Ancient Rulers of South China Sea Watch Maritime Dispute
From Sidelines: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/06/140616-south-china-seavietnam-china-cambodia-champa/
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The 'Constitution for the oceans' at stake - Kentaro Nishimoto - The Straits Times - July 20,
2016 - http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-constitution-for-the-oceans-at-stake
The Environment Is the Silent Casualty of Beijings Ambitions in the South China Sea Hannah Beech - Time Magazine - 1 June 2016 - http://time.com/4353292/south-china-seaenvironment-destruction-coral-giant-clams/
Why China cares about the South China Sea - Salvatore Babones - Al Jazeera Opinion - 16
July 2016
Will Vietnam File a South China Sea Case Against China? - Hanoi may yet take Beijing to
court - Shawn W. Crispin - August 03, 2016 - http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/will-vietnamfile-a-south-china-sea-case-against-china/
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:
Chinese President Xi Jinping's quotes in a book - Monday, March 2, 2015 - chinadaily.com.cn
China refuses South China Sea arbitration award - Source: Xinhua - 2016-07-12 - http://
news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/12/c_135507844.htm
China completes majority purchase of Greece Piraeus port - John Vassilopoulos
- 2
September 2016 - https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/09/02/gree-s02.html

Duterte in China: Deals worth $19b clinched, 1m jobs to be created - 21 October 2016 The Straits Times.
Govt to relocate fishermen to Natuna to strengthen sovereignty - Anton Hermansyah The
Jakarta Post - August 15, 2016 - http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/08/15/govt-torelocate-fishermen-to-natuna-to-strengthen-sovereignty.html
How Chinas fishermen are fighting a covert war in the South China Sea - Washington Post https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/fishing-fleet-puts-china-on-collisioncourse-with-neighbors-in-south-china-sea/2016/04/12/8a6a9e3c-fff3-11e5-8bb1f124a43f84dc_story.html
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Natuna Islands: Indonesia says no 'overlapping' South China Sea claims with China - 22 Jun
2016 - http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-22/no-overlapping-claims-with-china-inindonesian-waters-says-fm/7534498
Pounds plummet to 31-year low not unwelcome, says UK trade under secretary - SCMP 07 October, 2016 - http://www.scmp.com/business/money/money-news/article/2025974/
pound-hammered-after-hollande-promises-tough-stance-brexit
Philippines' Duterte says 'goodbye' to US ties in Beijing - 20 Oct 2016 - http://
www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/philippines-duterte-says-goodbye-to-us-ties-inbeijing/3219936.html
Philippine President Duterte curses Obama over human rights - 5 September 2016 - http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37274594
South China Sea Ruling Increases Uncertainty for Shipping, Trade - Sara Schonhardt - July 14,
2016 - http://www.wsj.com/articles/south-china-sea-ruling-increases-uncertainty-for-shippingtrade-1468487095
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University of Texas at Austin Library: Maps of the World

Chinese President Xi Jinping's quotes in a book - Monday, March 2, 2015 - chinadaily.com.cn

Images from: http://www.manilalivewire.com/wp-content/uploads/Scarborough-Shoal_2190232b.jpg

The Hague Tribunal Case Filing Process in Context:

The Philippines Submissions: The International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/

The Arbitral Tribunal Award in 5 Major Categories:

personnel22 . Chinas maritime law-enforcement vessels violated the Philippines sovereign

Reactions to the Hague Ruling:

China refuses South China Sea arbitration award

Source: Xinhua - 2016-07-12 - http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/

MFA, Republic of Singapore: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/if/2016/201607/

Impacts of the South China Sea Conflict on the Global

The maritime borders in the

It can be therefore argued that Chinas so called check-book diplomacy seems to

The Key Drivers of the Devastation of Coral Reefs and Fish

The time interval of the proliferation of coral reefs destruction is key to

Asia Maritime Transparency Institute: https://amti.csis.org/vietnam-island-building/

Sand Cay: August 2011, Concrete Pier with a hotel complex

Sand Cay: February 2015, New Defensive Structures

Chinese fishing boats (Getty Images)

Conclusion: What to expect next in the South China Sea?

OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS, STATEMENTS AND REPORTS:

Rough Waters Ahead in the South China Sea: http://publicaffairsasia.com/rough-watersahead-in-the-south-china-sea/

September 2016 - https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2016/09/02/gree-s02.html

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