G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014 CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T.

SANTOS, Respondent
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment.
An affidavit of reappearance is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has never been absent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28,
2008 and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment declaring her
presumptively dead.
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after
her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he and Celerina rented an apartment
somewhere in San Juan, Metro Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980. After a year, they moved to Tarlac City. They
were engaged in the buy and sell business.
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in
Hong Kong. Ricardo initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work abroad. She allegedly applied in an
employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in Feb 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they,
too, did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him
any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his RTC petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed
away.
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in Oct 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On Nov 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in
Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any notice of and opportunity to
oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and worked as a domestic helper abroad. Neither did she go
to an employment agency in Feb 1995. She also claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 yrs. Ricardo was
aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit
with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made
false allegations in his petition.
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a
newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of
Ricardo's petition.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for
being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil
registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Art 42 of the FC.
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution dated Nov 28, 2008. The CA denied the motion for
reconsideration in the resolution dated Mar 5, 2009.
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
remedy for a fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Art 42 of the FC is appropriate only when the spouse is actually
absent and the spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-founded belief of the spouse's death. She
added that it would be inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the first place. She insisted that
an action for annulment of judgment is proper when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained fraudulently.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Art 42 of the FC would not be a sufficient remedy bcoz it would not
nullify the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive death.
In Ricardo's comment, he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed
when there are other remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to terminate the subsequent
marriage. Ricardo iterated the CA ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Art42 of the FC is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the
"remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner."
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos
v. City of Legaspi:
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts
pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is
extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from
presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy. (Emphasis supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in
the court with respect to her residence. Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no publication
of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general circulation. Celerina claimed that because of these, she was
deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead.
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive death were false. Celerina further
claimed that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient
ground/s for annulment of judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment on Nov17, 2008. This was less than 2yrs from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her
presumptively dead & about a month from her discovery of the decision in Oct2008. The petition was, therefore, filed win the 4-yr period

allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, & before the action is barred by laches, w/c is the period allowed in case of lack of
jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief
by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage.
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when
he or she reappears. Thus:c
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis
supplied)
In other words, the FC provides the presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.

Moreover, a close reading of the entire Art 42 reveals that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject
to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2)
recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the
fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only
when all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first
marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded
in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first
spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital
relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security
System v. Vda. de Bailon. This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent marriage even if the parties
to the subsequent marriage were notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by [filing an]
affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]" "Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law."
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the 2nd marriage and the liabilities of
the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when
the following are present:

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as. validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his
subsequent marriage void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.

If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the
subsequent marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under Art 35(4) of the FC. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of "well-founded belief under Art41 of the FC, which is essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous
marriages to apply.

The provision on reappearance in the FC as a remedy to effect the termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the
spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a
subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage."
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Art42 of the FC is valid until terminated, the "children of such
marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages." If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination
shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy.
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent
marriage, specifically, in relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or wife." This means
that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to
file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the CA for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for
nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
[G.R. No. 116607. April 10, 1996] EMILIO TUASON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L.
TUASON, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul&set aside the decision datedJuly29,1994 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying
petitioners appeal from an order of the RTC,Br 149,Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:

In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati a petition for
annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that
she and petitioner were married on June 3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage,
petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on
private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs,
was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that petitioner
was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women in succession, one of whom he
presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even
refused to pay for the tuition fees of their children compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family
and friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership by alienating some of
their assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card companies and other financial institutions, without private respondents
consent; that attempts at reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioners refusal to reform. In addition to her prayer for
annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he and private respondent were a
normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and actually begot two children during this period; that it was
only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a
husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the extreme animosities between them, he temporarily left the
conjugal home for a cooling-off period in 1984; that it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a
serious affair with another man; that petitioners work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to
malicious gossip linking him to various women in media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he experienced financial
reverses in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive

golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue his administration
of the conjugal partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent presented four witnesses, namely, herself; Dr.
Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close
friend of the spouses, and Any. Jose F. Racela IV, private respondents counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husbands relationship with other women, his apprehension by the authorities for
illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior church annulment decree. The parties marriage was clerically annulled by the
Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.
During presentation of private respondents evidence, petitioner, on Apr18, 1990, filed his Opposition to private respondents
petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioners evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing, a counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the ground that the
principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on the first week of June. The court granted the motion and reset the
hearing to June 8, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to have waived his
right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondents marriage to petitioner and
awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L. Tuason & Emilio R. Tuason on June3, 1972 is declared null & void oh initio
on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of the FC. Let herein judgment of annulment
be recorded in the registry of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of Makati,
M.Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the 2 legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of annulment as provided for under Arts. 50 and
51 of the FC.Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on Aug24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision. On Se
24, 1990, private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains & Adjudication to Plaintiff of the
Conjugal Properties.Petitioner opposed the motion on Oct 17, 1990. Also on the same day, Oct 17, 1990, petitioner, through new
counsel, filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision. The trial court denied the petition
on Aug 8, 1991.
Petitioner appealed before the CA the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment. On July29, 1994, the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court.
Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the circumstances of the case. We rule in the
negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
Sec 2. Petition to CFI for relief from judgment or other proceedings thereof. When a judgment or order is entered, or any other
proceeding is taken, against a party in a court of first instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may
file a petition in such court and in the same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the RTC may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. In addition, the petitioner must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of action. If
the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been granted therein.

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioners marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when
petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period. Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and
void for violation of his right to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two scheduled
hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the
evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then confined for
medical and/or rehabilitation reasons. In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F.
Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27, 1990 petitioner was admitted
for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police. The records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform
the trial court of this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for which
reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
The failure of petitioners counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is negligence
which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform
him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular
on its face.
Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioners confinement and medical
treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his former
counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the negligence of
petitioners counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but he
was not denied his day in court. As the records show, petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He
filed his answer to the petition, cross-examined private respondents witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private
respondents motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available
or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from
an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks
avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which provides that in actions for
annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should intervene for the state because the law looks with
disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of annulment of marriages by default. He contends that when he failed to appear at the
scheduled hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the
reason for his non-appearance.
Articles 48 & 60 of the FC read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecution attorney or
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of
judgment.x x x x x x x x x
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion.Hence, in all cases for
annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf

of the state for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead,
should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may
oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof
adduced is dubious and fabricated.Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
institution.Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is
vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens
our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For one, petitioner was not
declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of
action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and crossexamining the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds
barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine whether
collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioners vehement
opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation
by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced
that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the
validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondents witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased,
incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he and private respondent lived together
with their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that
his work as owner and operator of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for malicious
gossip linking him with various women. These facts, according to petitioner, should disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to
petitioner.

Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the
time of the marriage is final and binding on us. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts factual findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses vis-a-vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
37925 is affirmed.