Desbic Treaty 05 March 2015 4 15pm

PREFACE 1.
UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR

BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.
THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE

DISCOVERY AND APPEALS- DESBIC AGENDA
A U N Secretary General Auspicious
Attention NYPD & Charge de' affaires
Officer of the Commission-ment
of Treaty's U N 10017 N Y N Y
THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN, STATE,

REPUBLIC'S', TRUST, OR OTHER DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNTANCY IN STAR BASED INTERNAL
COMMAND FOR FRIENDLY RE PORE, UNIVERSAL LAW AND ORDERLY PROCEDURES, NBC-
WMD DISARMAMENT, EVOLUTE-GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT UNDER AUTHORITY-S OF
POLICE, SHERIFF AND ATTORNEY GENERALS UNIFORMED CONSENT AND
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVENCE.
That of which START, II, NPT, submerge to form an integral part of this Treaty's intended
so stated purpose-s. In and though "acts of God's" are rare , subject contends to assure all
fissile materials are contained and mitigated in safer areas of research to these ends.
HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS DEPARTMENTS:
THE CELESTIAL ELDER THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANTON NOW PRESIDING (SEE EXHIBIT
A) MAP TOPOGRAPHY IMAGE AND SAID ENTITYS BUILT ON PREVIOUS TREATY'S
DESIGN AND CONSCRIPTION'S.
Descriptive Encode
1. VISUAL EXHIBIT(S) (a), (b), and (c)
2. PREFACE-S 1-2
3. PROLOGUE INTRO
4. PRE-AMBULAR
5. ARTICLE'S 1-19
6. THE SORT COMPACT AND RESEARCH TEXTS
7. INCORPORATION OF START (IOS) START DRAFTS
8. STATEMENTS ON MULT-MEGATON
ATTRIBUTION AND ANALAGY'S
9. WEAPONS OF ATTACK GLOSSARY-S

OF TERMS AND TERMINOLOGIES
10. PROTOCOLS AND TREATY INTEGRATION
11. APPENDAGES AND VARIANTS ASSIGNED
12. ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING

TRANSFER AND POSSESSION OF WMD
13. NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS
14. CLOSING MINUTES AND PASSAGES
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 05 March 2015 5: 00 pm PST
PREFACE 2
1. The encoded inscription is out-dated due to the fact the evidence concerted to include
extra-ordinary circumstances do have a say and an influence on the way we approach the
contemporaneous disarmament questions. These circumstances include the extra
terrestrial biological entity on map topography of Africa has flexed its muscles somewhat
and is in more control then yester years; this and-s the disclosures made by Justice Anton
the ebe indicated the masses are indeed fire-proof and nuclear composite replicas of
Humans purposely bringing dangers forward in an effort to confuse a witness and lone
specimens psych intending on sodomic reproach and Soully regressions.
2. Do to the length and difficultys following 300 pages of possible prioritys and demanding
concerns, technical advisor-s seek to reformat said lengthy variations and out-dated drafts
of this agreement in accordance with its intentions to re-situate glasnost perestroika 1990
to current wave bands yuletides of supplement to resolve particulars more effectively.
3. The facts disclosed by "Celestial Justice" Anton include: we have neither real riffs with
Russia nor with Isis, in and they are Party's to an alien replica scheme who do hack authors
effort in an area of sack your right to discern replicas in need of our assistance to some
varying measure-s. United States legislative assembly do the same in effort to construe
neither replicas of our word nor abuses in technology we see go off to counter the rights of
Gods will.
(a) In other words: The High Contracted Partys are at Convention to submit to dunder that
and did see authors successful development which serves the interest of a word we use to
better evolve and procure. An more meaningful approach than the said many directives
ordered by Mr. Obama mad, nods that individuals I say with are not a passive sympathist to
degenerative and regressive concepts of life spans to contends. Now by lifting the
sanctions against our friends, the Russian Federation and regarding their closeness to
contiguous areas and zones of policing as "internal" matter-s the nice Russian leaders will
also construe elimination of most volatile arsenals not the underlying problems to contend
for-s I say-s, so discretion-s so to speak-s, adages the national consensus that of fake badges
and occupations will be construed in area of fake research as rightly contribute to our
mistaken understanding of lifes purpose.
4. The Honorable Anton now presiding and little people we see, view the fore mentioning
action as reasonable to suggest so then? This paradigm shift and policy change address
advisement is directed especially to Congress and Senate staff's attention-s I see-s for a
purpose of Utopian order-s as well will situate a need to note? It will also be noted, the
Desbic Treaty 2015 Legal Actionary Framework manuscript which is an integral part of the
legal grounds and authority to conduct business, will contend inter alias Law Suit against
County of Orange where we resides detailed the definite ironies we see. (Copy and paste to
your address space to view document). Or click:
http://desbictreaty.blogspot.com/2015/01/as-clearly-laid-out-in-this-descriptive.html
THE DESBIC AGENDA TREATY

INTERNATIONAL OBSERVENCE-S.
Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command the Articles of Genetic Disclosure,
Discovery and Appeal(s) Descriptive Encode in "Star Based" Internal Command the DESBIC
AGENDA inter alia: DESBIC TREATY The Official Text Prologue Introductory Paragraphs
are as Follows:
DESBIC Prologue Introductory
1. The United Nation's International Organization and all Party to an State of nuclear energy
utility services came to caller ID bracelets, phone characterizations, in apparitions, songs,
saucer platform technical psych, and space aged modern convenience-ment with apparel
use to colonize a lie where may be breeding nuclear fission or isotopic experimental
testing-s, from hereinafter referred to as the: "Nuclear Powers", forasmuch a side of Faith
2. Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty(s') between the High Contracting
Party's' of a Russian Federation and USSR proxy's status and an United States of America,
consensus toward a non-proliferation stances by way side of all other economies re-
deciding to nuclear deter and acclimate at its supreme interest. Then to this focal points, we
ascribe a safety draft of service requested Descriptive Encode in "Star Based" Internal
Command"; DESBIC AGENDA, the Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s),
referred to herein.
3. Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty's' for the de-limitation of nuclear, bio-
chemical and biological weapons grade ordnance within a State, and statements there
though nuclear energy policy remains as it's supreme interest; perspective of policy
setbacks in appendages START II itemized at 1700 SLBM as interpreted the Party's here
situated desires to withdraw from previous Treaty obligations.
4. Having re-touched Treatys on files with a salutation's asides, contents of nuclear, bio-
molecular, and quasi chemical a specific accountancy of the warheads and bomb explosive
apparatus', inter alias: explosive actuators, and, or fissionable assemble-ments or other
descript or accounts of the noun: meaning pressurized or non-pressurized vacuum release
capability or non, and-s mindful of the geological shelf life that of moax emissions in its said
to forgo, all insignias to an Ensigns are stipulates "bound" by actions taken to construe
penalty. Petitioners Pray for the Justices of the peace to last throughout our memories to
come here placed.
5. Omitted and Open
6. Decisive in their purpose for strengthening the Will, needs, and the related subject matter
of offensive and defensive fine lines of divisions in security related protocol in its exercise
conferred here in and a unity of the foregoing principles for recourse and realization there
sounded off a mutation definition has no real military purpose; confess by tort and repent
with whole heart-ed a-vigor assuredly is all to situated.
7. Taking in to account commitments to universal Laws inasmuch all can side-s, also-s
taking into account the "Devil-like" existence of Human replicas who so appear to be
considering unprecedented universal-like concession undertaking to the flagrances of roll
call today and the challenges we see.
8. Having question a people who exercise wreck less abandonment for the United States
Code of Justice at first and did construe wrongfully and resorted to kidnap, tortures
and intimidate bearing in mind, should auld acquaintance be forgot?
9. Urges an U N Security Council to sustain interests of Charter here within collective and
continuous settlement in the fields of licensing re-assignment; and retention of Inter-
national- On Site Inspection and Recovery Units as to safeguard the Programme we see of
decommission and disappear-ment operations to the call for actions as so required by U S
Attorney General asked a United Secretary General's U N herein if applicable to side.
10. Also urges the Principals therefrom address, advise and call attention to the dangers and
catastrophic element of the sudden outbreak of Walvis got an idea and / or a missile
attack(s) in a theater of highly valued, see fit to say easy access target able said nuclear
utility complexes. Im-prescriptive to the facts all are energy in fission able acts
of sabotage to this entry.
11. Mindful of the note to need, and the need to note; the principal objectives in
formulations hypothesized for the benefit of all who come to breathe oxygen and drink
water is take adequate measures on the exercise of free speech to the
matters concerning your awareness in disbandment of nuclear utility complexities
and complexes.
12. Welcomes agreed upon honest and equitable procedures and dates to a side of a truer
meaning of the word love and understanding the contemporaneous same sex unions
debate and discussions pertaining to iotas of concerted opinion.
13. Appeals to all States relative in theories expressed of "abuses of alien technology" a
matter at Court-s suchly a concerted attention for?
14. Convinced that nuclear energy decommission and the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear faulty accounting of history-s we
see despite these undesirable allegory's contending we leaned toward the relevant
provisions of the Charter of an United Nations on the reserve-use of force or threat of force,
taking note of Security Council resolution 984(1995) of 11 April 1995 and the views
expressed on it;
15. Recalling its relevant resolutions adopted in previous years in particular resolutions
45/54 of a stated: 4 December 1990 46/32 of 6 December 1991, 47/50 of 9 December
1992, 48/73 of 16 December 1993, 49/73 of 15 December 1994, 50/68 of 12 December
1995, 51/43 of 10 December 1996, 52/36 of 9 December 1997, 53/75 of 4 December 1998,
54/52 of 1 December 1999 and 55/31 of 20 November 2000;
16. Having scrutinized the fact in and though START II did suggests policy's aimed at
nuclear threat reduction assimilation , the nuclear warheads issues were itemized for
undisclosed and-s obscure destinations now appended to include Entirety of nuclear bio-
molecular quasi-chemical stock piles, mostly warheads and contraptions a primary
concern, that of which dismantling, disappear-ment, inspection, recovery, resuscitation and
micro-management to air spaces known to be desolate and safe in star based destination-
al non-deploy interprets.
17. Also recommends in view of the age of computer friendly automation, active
negotiations to assure an nuclear energy utilities newer construction ban as by, for and of
the people, be put in place by 31 December 2014 and after waywardly to its life spans not
by past 31 December 2027 subject to advisements from star based internal dispatch.
18. Noting in depth that nuclear fissile material, manufacturing and fuel enrichment
reprocessing is a field of certainly we do seek to will continue to be discussed moreover
deterred to action we see as menacing so contended.
19. Realizing the Contracting Party's undertake, the presences of the International
Assemblies as measures to unite, the call to duty of up way ward for numerous on site
contingencies,.
20. Stresses the necessity to acknowledge the circle of dangerous targeting of warhead-ed
emplacements and counterpoint intent as a serious threat in their relations to the
Provisions of the multilateral Conventions to which they are Party to, and two agreed upon
motions of disposal in accordance to this chapter with its interpretation of depositary
functions being sought.
21. Appeals to the Nuclear States the importance and effectiveness of confidence building
measures, taking into account the a specific advantages for general and comprehensive de-
targeting of nuclear silo emplacements, and one anothers population centers for the sake
of the police and Sheriff Department protectors of the safety commission I see.
22. Calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, nuclear utilities specialized
useages to acknowledge the act and fact that, other than Geiger counter, nuclear medicine
and hospital x-ray materials, there exists no real need for nuclear utility explosive energy
complexes. In pursuit of the said objectives strictly provided under star board master
generalizations nothing in this Treaty shall include research in support of peaceful use of
nuclear energy utilities contrary to the opinions vested here under and-s in Articles 33 (1)
of the Charter of the United Nations there tell.
23. Encouraging the establishment to ascertain to the fullest extent the dangers associated
with Independently owned and operated sales of nuclear energy and the by-products
associated to ex-spent highly radioactive waste such as moax emissions and plutonium
recyclable dangers imposed on others.
24. Also encourages the public to endorse an International referendum on the subject of bio-
molecular chemo-quasi weapons and stockpiles of mass destruction and their deployable
states of storages as described do constituted aggression still-s at Sheriff Departments
candor that follow up by hacking an said subjects free spoken contentions in an effort to
construe better there do see.
25. Requests the Secretary General's' organize and descend upon the United Nations General
assembly bring to that consensus 6 or so International referendums every 6 years such as
gasoline motor car manufacturing, Tran genetic degeneration, and licensing fees,
disarmament quotas forgo as such;
UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR
BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.


HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS DEPARTMENTS:
THE CELESTIAL ELDER THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANTON NOW PRESIDING (SEE EXHIBIT
A) MAP TOPOGRAPHY IMAGE AND SAID ENTITYS BUILT ON PREVIOUS TREATY'S
DESIGN AND CONSCRIPTION'S.
Have decidedly ascribed:
We the Author's of this Manuscripts;
Have decided respond, to;
Article I (The Establishment of Treaty)

PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 03 March 2015
05 March 2015
Descriptive Encode
Pre Ambler: Part 1
1. For the purposes set out in the Texts of START II a definition(s') of SLBM means "sea
launch ballistic missiles", and not solely submarine based; therefore the elimination
descriptive of warheads, 2160 a side biannually, the sea launch arsenals elimination
descriptive of applicable warheads shall be interpreting as warheads most anatomical
combustible frequency fields first priority, long range then medium and short range would
be next subjections towards reiterated the elimination of the most volatile stockpiles in
regard to importance for the two sides each and; China, who did so counter with its own
long range launchers and warheads assimilations. Having read START II in particular, it
was told us they that China are a major manufacturer of weapons of mass destruction
means: (wmd).
2. Apart from the obligations undertaken by the Multi-Nation Party's; in virtue of the
present Treaty's concerns of addressing a deploy hiatus circumvention of bomber
emphasis, where concerns actual nuclear warheads and explosive fissile deploy ability and
resolve to include this entry to the START II Treatys, the subject of the matter governing
warheads standard fission-ary explosive and field frequency a specific-al data will
continue to be concerted until the matter is resolved and no longer compromises the
security questions of all insignias to an Ensign, Republic, State emphasis or Marquis of any
intent to defend a region with nuclear, bio-molecular, quasi-chemical, (nbc)-weapons of
mass destruction, (wmd) herein described.
3. 4. Omitted and Open
5. The application for the preceding Articles shall be taken up by Russian, China, and U S A.
An police officer can side swipe another law degree of faulty constraints, knows who are
strategies of lob a big one 12 nautical miles off our coastal reaches seeks an injunction to
notices something align somewhere as if sided no U S nor Russian nor Chinese warships of
any aggregate displacements, including submersibles average attention, may traverse
assuagements by way side of lesser than 200 nautical miles off United States Continental
Russia mainlands and China mainland to this contention.
6. An U S, Russian Federation, China and / or their allies or proxy status quo visiting
neighbors must first get cleared from their Head of States if traversing a warship or
submersibles of any designation closer than 200 nautical miles from each others coastal
shorelines this and a Bering straits traffic of warship at 6 nautical miles distances from one
another's ambitions to rub shoulders another winter folders and the three nuclear
projectors, except where concerns an atolls whereby it is state a difference of half the fuller
reaches of a Two Party shoreline shall be the limitations of statutory trespass of every or
any such vessel of war ad adages a 200 nautical miles line of conform a sequence of pre-
authorized destination charter.
(a) The same is appended by virtue of this declaration on the use of sub air spaces in the
Three High Contracting Partys ambitions to circum-navigate closer than a 200 N-mile
statute of limitation-al war ship motes operatic us and or intended nor otherwise traffic in
cargo of w m d N B Cs operable in its own recognition of fallout intends to allow potential
enemies to trespass these margins of circumference are situated for a more certain case to
not altercate.
(b) These fore going inclusions in this Provisions, detail other Insignias not bound by 200
nautical miles statutes situate an distance from one anothers assuagements at least six
nautical miles from a counter parts aggressions unless permission and authorization have
been given by each Head of State and will be reviewed to includes, vessels of espionage
subject to a $5 million dollar penalty assessment per incident U S dollar U N mandate.
(c) This entrys Provision mental is an integral part of the Law therefore do not float
irresponsibly. The preceding application applies primarily for the United States,
the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China and all insignias to an Emblem
are hereby instructed to seek permission before entering the Contracting
Parties contiguous zones of occupation thereat.
7. A Black Sea entry at or around the Bosphorous straights, will not be acceptable by
western leaders recollection of phony retro in effect 01 March 2015 and situate noted an
United States nor Allied vessels of war or warships unless The Russian Federated Prime
Minister and Russian President are both in accord to request assistance from any or all
other navies. Turkey will be served 911 critical life supports by its own navy or it shall seek
the assistance of the resource of its friendly neighbor Russia, as to not statutorily align one
anothers ineptitudes for fire firstly invocation.
8. Omitted / Open
9. The obligations provided for in this Ad Interim Agreements preclude a voiced SOS May
Day for assistance from one another's vessels of war jargon which must be given to Port
Authority's and the Partys status quo' of the High Contracting Parties, except where done a
critical life petition and Party' reserves right to-ebb tide all shores at to where concerns
transnational Russian U S A China Nationals on board an 911 critical life support embark-
ment emphases in as conferred hereto with a path to dis-engage in nuclear aircraft carrier
construction hiatus on the vessels of war aspect to searches is all the placards.
10-12. Omitted and Open
13. Subject to this Articles limitable deploy positions for nuclear warheads, count and
repository; forded an exercise of private acceptances to shed light on this warhead
question there told. So in its exercise of free speech the question of whether the surplus
cuts had been dismantled and a yearly quotation by the preceding afore mentioning deaf,
dumb, blind actors on how many warheads annually the U S, Russia and China capable of
recycling when underlying the authorized especially concert attention toward most volatile
stockpiles will continue to be an emphasis to the subjects of nuclear composite Alien
Presidents well capable of disappear-ment activitys to the limitations provided for in
treaty's intended purposes?
14. As afforded to seek Russia attention and siding neither are we indeed said to have
excess of nearer of forty thousand seventy three warheads to ninety thousand or such in
neither her areas of vastness; nor-s thirty five percentages said on trajectory courses; so
order a fiscal cliff reminder of a said third percentile of these munitions are-s of which one,
two, three hundred or greater kiloton this Article indicates, the highest frequency field
fission-ary explosive calibrates. This and the subjects of buyer beware situate possible
espionage service attention to Iran the most high-s, a concert attention to firstly officers of
the Courts now describing inter agency liaisons got an beat on a criminal activities in areas
of loyalty and excitement with the word we contend forbearing in mind the
contemporaneous disappear-ment research we see the Party's disclosure docket in an area
of phony Court documents and fictitious County iota of concerns. Entitys stated these
individuals are very well culpable of re-situating construe in a Celestial supervisor's and
the Honorable Justice's Anton's Court and contention-s for Human rights attention needed.
15. U S arsenals are believed to be a parody in areas of evacuated a smaller contingency

then that of their Russian counterparts. U S. arsenals to survive are believed to be less
anatomically as explosive- when describing options we set asides to construe not a fetter,
decided by His Eminency Lord Anton Sir-s.
16. Analysis: are the aggregate identifying numerical contingencies accurate? How does the
fact all armies in dissension bring are phony artists lawful concerted understand-s that of
which alien replica's of our subject of interested discussion brought to our attention this
morning has no iota of concerted topics we can clearly assign to they of who are-s very well
capable of "energizing" a disappearing function on these dangerous and abominable
threats will contend Your Honor's Sir Thank You-s.
Discuss further:
17. So of 1700 SLBMs each side pertaining to START II the functions in exercise as
conferred by this program desires to enforce the High Contracting Partys to the emphasis
of "legal authority" will re-situate retro effective dates to-engage on these
said pertinence's ad adage past extension dates 31 December 2007 have come to pass and
the limitation called into questions are said fell short of expectation, nevertheless a witness
and Host for Starfleet were lead to believe 1700 each side long range and most anatomical
calibration was the interpretation we had up-s.
18. In furtherance to the preceding paragraphs the subject of most volatile stock pilings
remains to be surveyed till the questions and ambiguity no longer compromises the
security suchly describe an welfare recipients faithful effort to address the senses of needs
to a reporter when I do still continue to allegory a field(s) of counter terrorism I see..
Having situated policy objectives, this Memorandums referred toward START II particular
emphasis with limitations and stipulated again disposal technique of most volatile stocks
emphasis agreed to when concerns arise to integrate our numerical goals set forward from
START II.
19. Omitted / Open
20. It was stated in START II and NPT, a technical ways and means of verification would
benefit the course of action we situating. Having say so, the subject of disarmament of
dangerous weapons of attack will continue to be a subject so long as Lord Anton Sir-s, ways
of doing things is situating glasnost perestroika new openness with voice discussions and
reliable, re pore a side to share and live for from a new found idea of lawful and meaningful
expression in Anton's Judiciary presence whereby an answer to the ambiguitys may be
instrumental when facing technical means of verification ironies.
21. Trans national units of 54 men of the such as otherwise agreed to by and byways for-s
each of the High Contracting Parties shall construe assigned Committees input on size and
duties of inspection teams multi-task functions such as stationary sentrys, (if applicable)
and On Site Inspectors, reporters and photo journalists by and by wayward any which
mode of deployment unit agree to collect, gather, and disseminate information to an Sub-
commission U N / U S Attorney Generals quarter notes to needed adages needs to note
involvement.
22. An United Nations obligation of Charter will underscore Treaty accession details and-s
function to the disarmament desires we situate, therefore the Partys will concert
precedence and diplomacy bearing in mind the disclosure is real and undesirable to be
Party from. Therefore a U N restitution penalty may be excised from the said High
Contracting Party's if willful and deliberate dissention is given to the time tables and senses
of needs we contend for-s.
23. Also noted, subjects hereby reserves rights to contend paraphrase contentions beast
six Anti-christ be noted. In as suchly, phrases however are a description of phony
decals acclaims. Although such is the case, for the purpose of integration and also
construed for a purpose of integration and undisputable discernment and meaningful
expression of etiquette these expressions being used describe a likeness of differing
concepts in evolution and development.
24. Now if The High Contracting Party's contend a independent Ensign is a concern, the
motion of legal ramifications will be taken. So consider situating competent and disciplined
inspection units when assigned to observe and carry out an exercise of free expressed
discretion by a U N Secretary Generals quarter otherwise the most liable and responsible
Partys to inspect and micro-manage all other regions of air spaces will be the competent
auspicious of a Russian Federation, a United States of America and a People Republic of
China and a United Nation Panelists U N Inspection team and Commission-ment thereby in
accordance with this Entity's right to describe a particular Programme of work by a
Commissioner of a said United States Jurisdiction in the effort to situate a nuclear free and
wmd disarmament status qua so stipulated.
DISCUSS, DEBATE, CONCERT COMMITTEES ATTENTION-S, ANALYZE, BUILD AND SHARE

IDEAS AS TO MOST EFFECTIVELY IMPLORE DISAPPEARENCE AND SAFETY ORIENTED
PROCEDURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE CHAPTERS.


Have decided to research

And describe protection;
As follows:
ARTICLE 1 (The Establishment of Treaty)
1. In conformity with from here in a Say I seated, a side of words we talk to avoid pressing
buttons and acting like "evil alien replicas who do Hell to our Souls" inter alia menaces to a
Universal laws I teach. The foregoing stipulations in our sought a faulty constraint actions
may decide tables be established as work-s for forensic lawyer to evaluate further whereas
all come to pie squared and re-decide again a place-mat of lawful eventualitys do stipulates
when as precedences allows for:
(a) an proposal for an agreement to situate a placard destination such as a Heavenly like
objective be given as incentive to work-s, live-s, grow-s, communicate-s, research-s, inter-
planetary travel-s, weigh, learn-s, teach-s, share-s assist-s and condemn deceptive practice
of they whose itinerary do seek-s destruction to those reasons to strive, get better set forth
for a purpose of reconciliation, trusted so is sold to undertake equal and impartial means of
arbitration as an act of accepted an seriousness of characters.
(b) consensual circumstances we pursue in good faith for a benefit of the common standard
of social progress in the best of mutual respective intentions; wherefore an document is
thine adversary as thy self in objective as permission given to ordain and uphold, protect,
and bear true faith as due patriotic:
ARTICLE 2 (Disarmament Conditions)
1. Each Party shall reduce, react, dispose, disseminate, decommission, de-target, disguard,
disassemble vaporize, neutralize, disappear, store, ship to safer areas where star regions
will accept bio-hazardous molecules, nuclear, atomic, neutron alloys and there, bio-
molecular chemical quasi arsenal functions at a decision agreed upon under specific
accordance with the legal authority vested in the Honorable Sir Lord Anton-s Supreme
Allied Court's will continue to be the contentions.
2. Treatys, NPT, SALT, START I and II, SORT and all said memos regarding vows, oaths,
promises, agreements, accordances, and-s revision-mental will be subject to the letterhead
we sought regarding the terms and conditions of any said Treaty or Convention governing
and acceptance procedures regarding the elimination and limitation of Nuclear, Bio-
molecular, Chemi-quasi formulation (nbc) and / or other decisions pertaining to Weapons of
Mass Destruction, (wmd) registered to a United Nations?
3. The Partys consented to be bound as we see by telepathic Celestial Monitors ways and
means of coinciding unity a phone call message of glasnost, perestroika, for common
approach there in saying friendly working relation bringing coincidentally re-iterated to
allow for a way out exit strategy should the Pentagon get in too dark to describe, if
applicable; bearing in mind the glasnost overtures of 1990-91, did almost save the days of
reckoning cold hearted fine lines and potential hardships directed at our attention when
waiving the symbols respectfully a side.
4. The Party(s) conclude mysterys that a hydrogen explosive property of fission is duly
diagnose wrongfully for the ambiguity of sixth and eighth or ninth generation runaway
cloud covers and geological shelf life of radioactivity did dispel knowledge of candor to the
limitations when statement previous inscriptions detailed neither any such nuclear, nor
bio-molecular up-graded nor upgrading as described in this Article as conferred to
Attorney Generals need to place under a license that of which our WMD NBC disarm and
"disappearing" obligations to these Chapters of service procurement in expressions toward
its relative matters to express a loss of attention for our safety in which did result in an
START II and III shortfall of concerted efforts.?
5. The Partys will continue to pursue in good Faith On-site Inspection, Disarmament and
Micro-management Teams that when consist of Staff to White House in care support,
technical advice, hands on and off-s supervision, friendly and working re pores with
perestroika set in and a determined effort to deal suchly with the dismantling, disappear-
ment and Micro-management concessions and responsibilities noted also the probabilitys
of interaction with nuclear composite star elders and the pertinences of working in
contaminated airspaces, lands, air, seas, mobile stock piles and loose ended areas, silos,
chief psychic officers assigned to this Program bearing in minds the iotas of concert
attention to nuclear individuals attentions needed at times a favor in and such noted. There
and-s benevolence a key common approach in these details we set aside do we see eye to
eye conjurer on the telephones to our attention? So be inseparable, and doth remove the
doubts on neither quantities nor limitations provided for-s, situated a general rules
implying as to simplify the work orders appendages are:
(a) six percentile annual quota minimal most volatile first priority-s toward they of the
gross aggregate totals of estimates who would be treated and transferred in sub airspace in
safe areas of flight destinations. There have at eighteen years gone the contaminants
should be nearly recessitated. Unless and-s or otherwise the Contracted Parties and On Site
Inspection, Recovery, and Micro-management authorities are in a way to numerically
configure more Duty than the minimal six percentile annual repository quotation whenst
engaged in and-s on upon an abundance of assimilation and-s productive constructive
furloughs welcomed and urged; this six percentile annual clean-up and said consignment of
Ensigns, and accounting-s will contend is reasonable assuage-ment to the emphasis
contended for.
6. The subject of contiguous areas of contamination will be a subject to take up not ladder
than twenty years after the zones of On Site Recovery and Micro-management have been
cleared unless other extraordinary circumstance such as expeditious and highly talented
achievers arise and-s undertake quick work ethic up to the advice of consenting Attorney
ledgers in star base internal command headquarters.
7. The subject of On Site Recovery
ARTICLE 3 (Disarmament Terms)
1. The Partys hereunder do decide a firm decision by an authority figure may be indeed a
way to resolve the differences. The facts and so stated disclosures do cite our lawful
exercise of attention we see there so be its own exercise of free will and lawful approach as
to the question of The Honorable Lord Anton Sir-s presides, lawful ways and means to
confer is in military circles, extraordinary circumstances and in saying suchly the terms
and conditions of the disarmament obligations will be the subject of a credible leader who
consented to be bound need follow the guidelines we have up with complete and thorough
accuracy in and such a declaration and listings as to the complete and thorough accuracy of
the a specific data and information of entire stock piles as such to allow On Site Units of
Transnational supervisory and recovery teams assist in reporting and recording disappear-
ment activity.
2. Analysis: the density of zones where may be itemized fission and the friendly behaviors
we are stipulate designing is cause for Senate and Sheriff's Department to describe
wordage in a face of legal actions to convey an iota or measure-s be taken. Having heard the
Constitution allows for free speech to be recognized, the subject-s that of which
accountability is measures I see depends on the validity of each Partys words so seek a
response. A ladder day witness accounts in area of disclosures and said police
participation, that of litigation and friendship campaigns in so sided disclosure, the cited
Partys do have some reproach obligations to this classification and-s the ability to vanish
hexafluorinal and other atomic elements give clearer insight as to what a proper analogy
should describe when bearing a cross or other idols of faith.
3. Pursuant with this time tables Texts, Memorandums, Protocols and Annexes here as one
START, START II, III, IV, NPT, INF, SORT syllables of a first iotas of contention from a Press
secretarys mistaken calendar of prioritys; therefore let not anyones opinion nor any
care-coordinator nor Health Department Programs attention, contacts dislikes, service
affiliation desires, nor news bulletins trump the senses of need and all due regarded for this
iota of a contention, for friendly and undeniable competent re pore with our counter
decisions that so forged at a time when a firm decision to say that which is for suchly to
contend.
4. In the performance of their duty an Secretary Generals quarter shall move to resolve
their differences under auspicious of Celestial supervisors cordons as to validate the
ironies a legislative reckless desire of County officers in plain clothes do attempted accost
us at this moment. Therefore do to local civic leaders dissentions brought to our attention
this Chapters intended terms was disrupted by unruly civic leader-s needs for attention.
5. Each Party(s') shall recognize the entry into force of START-II and continue to resolve
the particulars by extending to START an integration platform mindful of the bomber
descriptive-s suggested in STARTS Provision-mentals, however the concessions needed
will be re-addressed as ordnance and munitions areas most volatile at six percentile of an
Insignias limitable and gross inventory per annual recovery so clarified to a matters of
ambiguity to research DESBIC, there surely inclusive in theory's expressed as stated
evident in disclosure posted to make known by whose presents had come and cause to
pursue the disappear-ment recommendations now under way in accordance with this
Chapters accounts and descriptions in an area Treaty dictations.
6. County Sheriff's obligations to perjure not these factual ironies ad adage faithfully inform
United States and Russian President, the Senate, the Congress, the Duma, Parliament-s ,the
Peoples Republic of China's and all signatorys to the word of disclosed and literary new
openness to assign each members Celestial credentials at U N headquarters adages stellar
invites to underground facilitys to confirm these obligations and identities in an effort to
use alien technology's in a manner conducive with civil I say?
7. Although the subject of virtual disappear-ment is being singled out, the fallacy continues
to blindside our candidates recollection of their involvement-s with our Entity's
incriminating discussions. Having said recently seen an approach thwarted by police and
Sheriff units of candor, federal responsibility falls short in areas of friendly and warm
working relations with Entitys authors will continue to be the concern we re-decided to
side. An iota of common approach we situated to disseminate the senses of lawful means
describing, a need to align our discretion with a reasonable way to conduct better re pore
with our friends at the Sheriff and police departments accountability answers so
stipulated.
8. Until or unless subjects are guaranteed an vital organs meta-morph sized procedure
and clone operation as suchly to withstand absolute nuclear and bio-hazardous approach
in so saying, our zone of safety describing Planitias Earths dimension-s we seat and its
firmament, atmosphere, water, oxygen ecological integritys, be suspected as such to
construe, there is no sure way to avoid becoming a victim of disclosure and dangers posed
from un-breathable and un-safe orientations and so while seeking to be declared safe from
internal and government sponsored predications the subject we see will continue to seek
an compromise until again the said threats no longer do such compromise the safety of
inviting influences and hospices we intend to reside for with and besides to these ends.
9.. Pursuant of START II, but within the limitations set forth in this Treaty, as such,
activations, reserve and non-reserve, deployed and non-deployed are subject to the Judges
legal actions we see. An accounting will be pressed as to situate phony responses and if so
consider friendly means of persuasion aimed at encouraging all Ensigns to this acclaim
come forward each to his or their region of representation and give declaration on the
concise and accurate accounting of in particular the nbc arsenals they possess. The subject
of delivery apparatus will be temporarily resigned as to stress the significance of honest
accounting by the Ensigns and High Contracting Partys defining High Contracting Partys
as the United States of America, the Russian Federation and its alliances as indicated in this
Paragraph and supplement to the said Conventions.
10.. In an effort to protect the blessings of life and in as suchly the expression of
appreciation for the services and governing securitys of allied and axis overtures and
successes built on each of the Partys ideas of protecting and serving, an High Standing
Commission to the authenticity and legal areas of these conditions added concert attention
for dangerous and fissile toxic chemicals and their precursors in general order of most
volatile and-s nbc-s, (nuclear, bio-molecular, quasi-chemical) at which in accordance with
this chapters revisions, includes, neutron, hydrogen, uranium and plutonium fissile
properties in and that so best describe the said yields, explosive combustibility in desires
for authors to construe neither a concern, nor, decay and shelf life of lethal property
indexs past or presently on the drawing board will continue to be the subject.
11. As Such to construe an effort be made to address START I and IIs shortfalls, this
agreement and the exercise of virtual disappear-ment of every type-s nbc-wmd payload-s,
including bio-hazardous aerosols, cultures of measles, germs, infections ,defoliants and
detergents such as agent orange of every topic I never knew to deceive for a side-s a
disclosure- can situate for or against, an appropriate counter measure, will be due to
properly concerted attention well construe as subject to the limitation and vanishing
obligation we set aside.
12. In an effort to comply with police procedures and by whose presents we seek to
support the subject of assimilate police issued pepper and tear gas necessity at not in
excess of forty liter contraption and dispensable units of such limitable said specific active
ingredient to the emphasis of replicas stage riots and upheavals so Committee sided these
amended chapters in accordance to this Provision mentals intended purposes when
concert the limitations provided for.
Analysis, Discussions, Constructive criticism, Advise, Offers
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION UPDATED 10 30 PM 04 MARCH 2015 PST
ARTICLE 4 (Disarmament Dutys and Descriptions)
1. The subject of a news crews, and United Nations hotlines and tended officers situated to
care-coordinate research and advise on technical matters should questions and obscuritys
be taken up in accordance with this Paragraph and the noted need for a dispatch at U N
headquarters so be situated.
2. Since conversion tables are an uncertain area of public knowledge when configuring
kiloton to megaton measurements units of combustible mixtures and in so viewing a real
footage of tv camera peoples ideas of said Hiroshima and in so noting it's explosive
calibration was just 15 k-ton, a complete and formal accounting and preparation
mechanism to handle megaton attributed lineages must be made for On Site Inspection-ary
and Duly Sworn recovery and disarm-virtual disappear-ment units to which we suggest
who so deed perfidy in all are alien replicas of my fathers creation will jeopardize their
freedoms so weigh my rights another way and consider taking necessary preparation to
account and do the magic shot in a way conducive and beneficial to Entitys rights to
preside?
3. An Supreme Unified Command and Response Authoritys (SUCRA), to represent each to

their unity and branch of military specialized fields corresponding to the selective service
and technical advice affiliation thereby conscribed and assigned to their category of
expertise shall over see and account for leadership authority as such detail described, an
Navy Branch, each in accordance to their affiliation of Ensign or Star whose concerted
attention will oversee, (as example), an United States Naval ordnance, arsenals, zones of
offensive and strategic and non-strategic weapons grade contraptions as to account for:
(a) every war ship, submersible, flotilla, or yet not noticed vessels hazardous and
fissionary details and a specific data in an effort to give reliable and accurate accounting as
sowardly.
(b) classes, variants, models, integers, components, fissile and other adjectives use to
decide before and after dispersal and virtual disappear-ment properties in an effort to
exercise civil and moral homages to our creators planner.
4. The subjects of the High Contracted Partys assignment to these discussions will be a
subject as such- for Duly as advises a two year commitment to involve their areas of
expertise in especially Russian /United States- in duties of Joint Recovery and On Site
Decommission-ment and Observer Teams; JROSDOT in area of descriptive? The JROSDOT
under the auspicious of Police and Sheriff Department personnel, and-s Attorney Generals
Ensigns regard for authorities present and a United Nations contingent of JROSDOT
missionarys, shall consist of one third percentile of the United States and Russian total
units assigned to the Job sites and contiguous zones where such as virtual disappearance
and assignment obligations may be re-constituted. Noting further the High Contracted
Partys will be urged to not make haste and procrastinate; for these imprinted salutations
received step one:
(a) canvass and film designated area to be treated, clear area assign disappearance
managers to fulfill liability escrows desire to use force, and presto although the acts of
vanish-ment as studied takes no more than an hour to describe Hararys in every captains
quarter therefore let no phony baloney excuse describe a better candidate for another
resource Bibi?
5. By virtue of this binding Provision and in accordance with this Chapters Disarmament
objectives The High Contracted Partys will require to each their own supply of friendly
video and photography news service supplications in as so called to remove the doubts as
long as the disclosed information pertains to no real riffs with Russians, nor Isis, nor
Palestine adages a notation of phony recollection when history began and after having read
the disclosure and viewed the exhibitions then subject of documentation for a one hour
interval per units of re-constitution per day time viewing scheduled intervals will allow all
to assimilate an unfamiliar attention be serviced and be seen to the The Celestial and
Honorable Presiding Judges in the Supreme Courts of Anton our Captains side so stated.
6. Noted in these Final Recommendations; the subject of photography, whether it be stills

or video reel digital will be construed as an lawful obligation. Parody is essential to these
conditions of Joint Recovery and On-Site Decommission-ment; therefore each receiving
Party will extend an olive branch to the JROSDOT and give attention to an assimilation of
pride and hospitable a tentative desire to serve the needs of the Partys assigned to these
contentions.
7. Russian and United States (MOAB) Massive Ordnance Air Burst detonation device and
any class of its type, aka, a Daisy Cutter explosive limitation- weapon of confidence building
subject shall be construed as an wmd and is subject to SUCRA disarmament obligations
assumed and this Chapters protocols situated to these imprints.
8. Cruise Missiles and Variants of the type not to exceed 4,500 pound warhead = CM. will
be construed as a wmd regardless of its payload attribution there study.
ARTICLE 5 DECLARATIONS
1. Each State Party shall submit to the Organization, With respect to nuclear bio-molecular
chemo-quasi weapons herein after (nbc):
(a) Declare whether it owns or possesses any (nbc) weapons, or whether there are any
(nbc) weapons located in any place under its jurisdiction or control;
(b) Specify the precise location, aggregate quantity and detailed inventory of (nbc)
weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or
control, in accordance with this Chapters intended purposes, report any chemical weapons
on its territory that are owned and possessed by another State and located in any place
under the jurisdiction or control of another State, in accordance
(c) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any (nbc) weapons
and specify the transfer or receipt of such weapons, in accordance with this Sub-
paragraph?
(d) Provide its general plan for virtual disappear-ment of (nbc) weapons that it owns or
possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance to
this Sub paragraph?
(e) With respect to old (nbc) weapons and abandoned (nbc) weapons; Declare whether it
has on its territory old chemical weapons and provide all available information in
accordance with this Sub paragraph
(f) Declare whether there are abandoned (nbc) weapons on its territory and provide all
available information in accordance with this entry and Declare whether it has abandoned
chemical weapons on the territory of other States and provide all available information in
accordance with this paragraph?
2. With respect to (nbc) weapons production facilities, Declare whether it has or has had
any (nbc) weapons production facility under its ownership or possession, or that is or has
been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time this and a specify any
(nbc) weapons production facility it has or has had under its ownership or possession or
that is or has been located in any place under its jurisdiction or control at any time, in
accordance with this paragraph.
(a) Report any (nbc) weapons production facility on its territory that another State has or
has had under its ownership and possession and that is or has been located in any place
under the jurisdiction or control of another State at any time in accordance with this Sub
paragraph.
(b) Declare whether it has transferred or received, directly or indirectly, any equipment for
the production of (nbc) weapons and specify the transfer or receipt of such equipment, in
accordance with this Sub-paragraph.
(c) Provide its general plan for virtual elimination as disappear-ment hiatus will describe of
any such (nbc) weapons production facility it owns or possesses, or that is located in any
place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with its obligation we see as formal
and binding in accordance with this Sub paragraph.
(d) Specify an action to be taken for closure of any (nbc) weapons production facility it
owns or possesses, or that is located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in
accordance with this Sub paragraph
(e) With respect to other facilities: Specify the precise location, nature and general scope of
activities of any facility or establishment under its ownership or possession, or located in
any place under its jurisdiction or control, and that has been designed, constructed or used
for development of either (nbc) weapons. Such declaration shall include, inter alia,
laboratories and test and evaluation sites.
(f) With respect to riot control agents: Specify the chemical name, structural formula and
Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry number, if assigned, of each chemical it holds for
riot control purposes. This declaration shall be updated not later than 30 days after any
change becomes effective in accordance to the provisions of this Article and the relevant
provisions of the terms of disarmament Chapters of his decided.
ARTICLE 6 (PROCEDURES IN CHALLENGED INSPECTIONS)

1. Each State Party has the right to request an onsite challenge inspection of any facility or
location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other
State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning
possible noncompliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection
conducted anywhere without delay by an inspection team designated by authority of
Entitys we seated and a Secretary Generals waivers of consented in accordance with this
Chapter and by virtue of the present dangers associated with criman-ee architecture
complaints.
2. Each State Party is under the obligation to keep the inspection request within the scope
of this Convention and to provide in the inspection request all appropriate information on
the basis of which a concern has arisen regarding possible non-compliance with this
Convention as specified in this meeting of the minds. Each State Party shall refrain from
unfounded inspection requests, care being taken to avoid abuse. The challenge inspection
shall be carried out for the sole purpose of determining facts relating to the possible non-
compliance.
3. For the purposes of verifying compliance with the provisions of this authority to convey,
each State Party shall permit the mostly executive and administrative assigned Supreme
Unified Command Response Authority, SUCRA or their assigned contingents to conduct the
on-site challenge inspection pursuant to Chapters III paragraph 14 of the DESBIC Treaty
Draft to this indication.
4. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in

accordance with the procedures provided for in the meeting of the minds, the inspected
State Party shall have: (a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with this Entitys and, to this end, enable the inspection team
to fulfill its mandates. The obligation to provide access within the requested site for the
sole purpose of establishing facts relevant to the concern regarding possible non-
compliance; and the right to take measures to protect sensitive installations, and to prevent
disclosure Inventory of will be hereby forfeited not latter than the commencement of Joint
Recovery and On Site Decommission-ment and Observer Teams; JROSDOT expected
deployments to areas under scrutiny.
5. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply: (a) The requesting State Party may,
subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party, send a representative who may be a
national either of the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the conduct
of the challenge inspection. The inspected State Party shall then grant access to the
observer in accordance with the entitys decided we situated a meeting of the minds so
stated. The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer, but if the
inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be recorded in the final report.
6. The requesting State Party shall present an inspection request for an on-site challenge
inspection to the Executive Council and at the same time to the JROSDOT for immediate
processing. 14. The Head of a JROSDOT shall immediately ascertain that the inspection
request meets the requirements specified in and that as an Entitys can decide for a
purpose of reconciliation and if necessary, assist the requesting State Party in filing the
inspection request accordingly. When the inspection request fulfils the requirements,
preparations for the challenge inspection shall begin.
7. The Head of the Joint Recovery and On Site Decommission-ment and Observer Teams,
JROSDOT shall transmit the inspection request to the corresponding liaisons and a speedy
hearing may be concerted. the inspected State Party must give a window of nearer toward
24 hours of any said decision to deny access nor consent to approach and man the
designated installations.
8. Analysis, research, discussion, constructive criticism: Financial distress can be a cause for
in trepidation, so in the singled out cases of a United States and Russian alliance we see
were waiting and holding out for Mr. Obama to lift sanctions and end cold areas of fuss
over a internal matter of the Russian Federations to say according to my recollection as
well secret service policys concerted toward causes to block virtual disappear-ment and
dispersal activitys I see? Having seen good relations go sour over poor foreign policy
decision making once before the objectives for the two High Contracted Participants, is all
to do with per capita income and an ability to pay. In so saying, Mr. Obama Sir-s, it is
customary when going to the nice Russian Federation to tip out, this way, based on the
laws of give and take we see a parody within our Communities. Authorities to say
suggesting from Russias point of view, at least we did not spend the last twenty five years
militarily offending since the generous times of the overture period was situated for open
and warmer relations Mr. Obama Sir-s.
9. After having received the inspection request, the Joint Recovery and On Site
Decommission-ment liaisons shall take cognizance of the actions on the request and shall
keep the case under its consideration throughout the inspection procedure. However, its
deliberations shall not delay the inspection process.
10. The Executive Council, (mostly executive and administrative assigned to suchly
Supreme Unified Command Response Authority, SUCRA or their assigned contingents)
may, not later than 12 hours after having received the inspection request, decide by a
three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection.
(a) Analysis: And so I seek the inspection request to be frivolous, abusive or clearly beyond
the scope of this Convention as described herein bearing in minds, cold hearted ways and
means of ending the dissensions are needed. Do we see a nuclear chain reaction in Mr.
Obama and Mr. McCains answers?
11. Neither the requesting nor the inspected State Party shall participate in such a decision.
If the Executive Council decides against the challenge inspection, preparations shall be
stopped, no further action on the inspection request shall be taken, and the States Parties
concerned shall be informed accordingly. The Director-Generals shall issue an inspection
mandate for the conduct of the challenge inspection. The inspection mandate shall be the
inspection request referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 put into operational terms, and shall
conform to the inspection request so stated. The challenge inspection shall be conducted in
accordance with Entities knowledge of candor to assail neither. The inspection team shall
be guided by the principle of conducting the challenge inspection in the least intrusive
manner possible, consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of its mission.
12. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the challenge
inspection and facilitate its task. If the inspected State Party proposes, arrangements to
demonstrate compliance with this Convention, alternative to full and comprehensive
access, it shall make every reasonable effort, through consultations with the inspection
team, to reach agreement on the modalities for establishing the facts with the aim of
demonstrating its compliance. The final report shall contain the factual findings as well as
an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation
granted for the satisfactory implementation of the challenge inspection. The Director-
Generals shall promptly transmit the final report of the inspection team to the requesting
State Party, to the inspected State Party, to the Executive Council and to all other States
Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the Executive Council the
assessments of the requesting and of the inspected States Parties, as well as the views of
other States Parties which may be conveyed to the Director-General for that purpose, and
then provide them to all States Parties.
13. The Executive Council shall, in accordance with its powers and functions, review the
final report of the inspection team as soon as it is presented, and address any concerns as
to: (a) Whether any non-compliance has occurred; (b) Whether the request had been
within the scope of this Convention; and (c) Whether the right to request a challenge
inspection had been abused.
14. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers and
functions, that Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
Center for Nonproliferation Studies be allowed a say on the matter, (if applicable),(TCWC-
16CWC TEXT EXCERPTS further action may be necessary) it shall take the appropriate
measures to redress the situation and to ensure compliance with this Convention, including
specific recommendations to the Conference. In the case of abuse, the Executive Council
shall examine whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial
implications of the challenge inspection.
15. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party shall have the right to
participate in the review process. The Executive Council shall inform the States Parties and
the next session of the Conference of the outcome of the process. If the Executive Council
has made specific recommendations to the Conference, the Conference shall consider
action in accordance with this Article as conferred.
UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 March 2015

ARTICLE 7 (Recalled and Dangerous Munitions)
1. Another said explosive unit of ordnances used is the JDAM of which stockpile
contingencies shall remain subject to the limitations provided herein a fore; no such
uranium depleting means of cancerous asphyxiations shall be seriously considered safe to
usages hereto nor "Cluster Bombs", in a civilian theater, all military schools, as an a
specifically controlled weapon of attack.
2. In addition, observer missionaries aside from Russia, NATO, China the USA and U N are
to have a say so as reconsider the liability's as lawfully attained when in the use of Cluster
Bombs (which spread into hundreds of bomb lets and are deadly to civilians) in and though
perspective to such an occasion to which in its own resolve however, may be thought well
of a specifically, as far as cluster bombs are concerned, as suchly stated, cluster device have
a particular military purpose as so intended. The Manufacturer's supply lenders are the
sending Party of such ordnance's so emphasized, there care shall be made financially liable
for all civilian fatalities when a civil defense claimant petition a law officer of vice and shall
see fit to federalize a claim in accordance with this revision of particulars and
extended Provision here-stating.
3. Penalties and fines be taken in contentions and as well, in Counties where instituting an
United Nations Treasury Secretary 10017 New York Offices. Fines and DARE programs to
be enforced (Disarmament Abuse Resistance Education), post 31 December 2,022; use to
assuage compliancy on those who are not in conformity with this Provision
4. In saying so, the Israeli's -criminally disqualify their authorship from which to protect
counterpoint strategic divisions by deeding never again take note to this entrys impetus
in 'cumulative growth of said nuclear weapons that so. In furtherance's she maintains an
disturbing strategic and non-strategic anatomical dis-proportionate accumulative
stockpiles here told. She orients to target each countrys mass and other secret stations in
an effort to confuse all I seated.
5. For the purpose of considering the request, specialized frequency a specific pertinences,
such as nitrous shelf life and thermal heat convection, the hydrogen questions, the neutron
in its own intended capacity to regulate a city in terms we as a phony animals and replicas
of a Human can decided differ with atomic explosive properties will also construe as an
wmd and be subject to the terms of this subject as well.
6. Nuclear propelled or tipped warhead(ed) ordnance and-s nuclear propelled or tipped

anti-missile systems shall be considered an WMD and classified pursuant of this
Provisionary as standard displacement or classification of WMD subject to these ends.
7. OPEN ANALYSIS, DISCUSS
DESBIC TREATY ARTICLE-S 8 (Registry of Treaty(s')
1. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article(s') 102, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations on the premises of lawfully construe iotas of authors plain
clothes assailant tryers? Do authenticate a factual meaning to whose it was to say?
2. This Section is applicable to fundamental tactic reserved reckonings of "Entitys at Court

I see telepathic transmissions and "alleged" DESBIC AGENDA'S impursuant to Knows what
I deeded County escrow consideration to the U N Charter, as suchly welcomed to execute,
as on a case by case basis a "proces verbal" mode of communication, so to address, advise,
and call attention to:
(a) manipulation so as to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired, side of psychiatry,
while the Entity of biological researchers situate a account for our said, capability of
authenticating a side of a matter, so to speak, therewith; we, the U N advisors, undertook
an consent to be bound iota I say.
3. The function of the Depositary, in particular shall be to:
(a) keep custody of the original and updated text of the Treaty and keep charge of its
Statutes;
(b) prepare certified copies in such additional languages as may be required and transmit
the relevant data to the Plenipotentiaries entitled to become Party(s') of a State, to the
Treaty(s');
(c) receive signatures and keep custody of instruments, notifications and communications
relating to it; examine whether the information thereto is in due and proper form and, if
need be,
(d) bring a matter to the attention of the State(s') in question; inform the Party(s') to the
State(s') of ratification, acceptance, approval and accession required for entry into force of
the Treaty(s') after it has been received or deposited; register the Treaty(s') with the
Secretariat of the United Nations dictates thereby;
(e) perform the functions specified within the framework and Provision-ment of the
present Convention and the Convention of International Diplomacy, Done 04 March 2015
(f) proceed from the premise that nuclear confrontation would have devastating
consequences for ever and for all mankind alike; each Party(s') undertake not to deploy
anti -ballistic defenses armed with a nuclear or multiple nuclear warheads as system
deploy hereto.
Article 9 (Anti-Missile Defense)
1. Proceeding from the premise that nuclear confrontation would have devastating
consequences for ever and for all mankind alike; each Party(s') undertake not to deploy
anti -ballistic defenses armed with a nuclear or multiple nuclear warheads as system
deploy hereto.
2. Pursuant to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Limitations Treaty, Article XV Section 2.,

"extraordinary events" have transpired, extra-terrestrial presences and disclosure at our
attention. Also such as the proliferation of Russia's current arsenal alone estimated to be,
between 60,000 to 130,000 nuclear weapons of fear; of these say 9,000 currently deployed,
9,000 are said to be deployed tactical nuclear weapons of war, and the remaining 110,000
are either in reserve, for sale, on standby for extraordinary alarm herein. U S A stock piles
are about 15 percent less quantity and less frequency yield and less geological user fired
shelf existence but do claim they are both threats and challenges we faced.
(a) Notice is hereby given including a statement of concern. Anti-Missile laser technology is
a way to defend from an accidental or incidental occurrence without compromising
security perspective to non-nuclear warhead anti-ballistic missile proliferation. In viable
standing of Article IV, to this treaty, and with exception to any nuclear warhead ABM
system, scripted herein therefore the U S entry is an reasonable withdrawal right assertion,
bearing in mind obsolete is to describe replicas secret identities of alien races in need of a
helping hand s will continue to be a subject from star elders advisement attorneys
contentions.
3. For the purpose of considering the requests for, the act or fact that an Electric Photonic
Technologys for use as an anti-missile, is defined as a class of anti-matter reactionary
soldiers and of SALTs concerns.
4. Such as it may be called it may be capable of defensive exaggerations if the doubts still
continue as to why an atomic warhead propulsion and exploding aperture is as offensive to
the detrimental well kindness of where to whom these presents may see.
5. Having say so for the continued active negotiations and to promote the objectives of and
implementations of the Provisions of this Interim Agreement: cease and desist uranium
enrichment services abetment as such may concern bearing in mind a photonic laser ray,
displays a different mode of transport than an anti-ballistic war-headed properties
submachine gunners opinions in particularly the cause for uninhabitable landscapes of
powers here and now though as why therefore.
DESBIC TREATY (Israels Right to Exist)
ARTICLE-S 10 (Israel's Right to Exist)
1. Make Known to These Presents, all who killed falsify our directive or so it seem and
resolve for suspicious demeanor known to all alien replica abuses of alien technologys
especially States of Israel rancor. The Jewish States leaders are to take a careful look at the
cases we have up and not engage in under sided terror tactics
http://desbictreaty.blogspot.com/2015/01/as-clearly-laid-out-in-this-descriptive.html
(a) the reported frequency dealings on the said un-anatomical dis-proportionate objectives
I hear we called in to scrutiny weight of State of Israel's put up a five trillion dollar bond
nor or do I say Ill order us to undertake a 24/7/ 365 on site inspection review to this
exercise as conferred by the under-insurers objective to we pledge allegiance not for united
safety worthy to understand when given the ultimatum by an action we brought to a said
realty escrows.
7. In exercising their rights and performing their duties each Party undertakes to ensure
that acts or threats of social upheaval, hostility or violence do not compromise the justice of
the peace. It shall be construed that any such leader proscribing to edify combustive
disdain-ment as to perpetuate violence, are:
(a) disturbing the peace and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their
legal actionary framework, far and free away from disdain and dissidence therein.
8. The foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall refer to Israel as an International

Organization within the bounds of having a alien identity and falsified ledgers I see in Star
Based Internal complexes if and when:
(a) an imposition of such as a dispute of sort as we have inscribed to resolve pursuant of

the Protocols, and an absence of Legal emphasis as to the Star Elder decision of a matter
bring Party's to a Statement to conflict once again in so long as the status quas of Israel, a
Statement I seat orders lawful decision in a matter of degenerative sorcery attires.
(b) the letter of the law as decidedly ascribed for the State of Israel is that a sentence that of
6 months and 6 days in the detention hold and 666 sheckles fine be there hand over shall
any law nor lawful organization contribute in every and any way to give aid in nor support
of trans gender lifestyle nor a terrorist seditious acts of treason.
(c) Partys to the wafer of words ; lament to do suchly as one Israel, there-fore an care co-
ordinate effort to re-vitalize, rebuild, re-unify, repair, reason, regard, Palestine programme
of provision-al supplementary assist under the terms of this Articles legitimate facsimiled
a-specific matter of descent respect to this end. Bearing in mind your intentions as replica
imposters was impose a Hell like torment and regression on our faces.
(d) Analyze-review-
FOR ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN MARQUIS; BY THESE PRESENTS SHALL YE GIVE FAITH AND
REVERENCY TO GOD'S WILL WE TRUST THE WORD OF THE WAFER BY WHOSE
PRESENCE WE SUMMON IN GODS WILL WE PRESS DONE 4 MARCH 2015 MIDWAY CA.
92655
ARTICLE 11 (Disbandment of Nuclear Resources)
1. The Provisions of this Article, in so far as each Party is concerned, shall take due account
of the depletion of oxygen molecules characterized by escaping radioactive nuclear
products and by products, and the field frequency of escaping charged particles
accumulated therein.
2. The Party(s') here to establish to make Provision, in accordance with this Statute and the
application of this Treaty(s'): to dismantle and decommission all 500 or so nuclear power
plants of Planitia plane of existence air I breathe a face of Earth's inter-dependency, on the
basis of nuclear safety regulations and the concerns over life security incessant with:
(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing
component in instruments used to establish a condition of security clearances thereof.
3. If exempted nuclear material is to be processed and situated out of a reaches of space in

galactic isolations stored together with nuclear materials subject to safeguards under this
agreement, provision shall such actions be situated.
4. The recourse and the Subsidiary Arrangements to be made with organizations of the
Trust, (the Depositary), calls for upward of near four per Ensign or more nuclear reactors,
commercial or non-descriptive, per country or Party to a State to deco missionary and dis
assembly standards every 3 months as part of the Subsidiary Arrangements to be agreed
upon here withal.
5. For the discharge of the functions and the exercise of the powers mentioned in the
present Article(s), and pursuant to Article III, Section 3 of the present agenda, a
moratorium and construction ban in the field of nuclear power generation assembly, and
nuclear power research and development projects oldest that present most liability hereby.
Therefore, to promote the objectives and implementations of the Provisionment to this
Treaty(s'), the Party(s') will be advised, on a voluntary basis to:
(a) disengages, or suspends those reactors that are scheduled to be built, or that are
currently under construction hereinafter.
6. Within the framework of paramount consideration, a penalty assessment fee of 12.5

million dollars, U S/U N, per reactor, biennial, sequentially continual, shall be paid to the
International Organization the United Nations who bear the burden of:
(a) maintaining International security with the objective of achieving, as soon as possible,
agreement on further measures for the limitations, reduction and eventual termination of
our 500 or so nuclear reactors on land or subsoil; and shall surely
7. In view of the contributions the use of nuclear energy has seemed to facilitate, each of the
Party(s') to a State undertake to:
(a) cease and desist in the supplemental categories of providing source, and/or fissionable
materials such as uranium enrichment for commercial use at plants, or other purchases
and/or purposes we don't sequester therefore. Having regard for a spirit of sincere co-
operative settlement consistent of an order to ensure accession to this accordance(s),
regardless of whatsoever in each others internal affairs, exportation, importation, for side,
let, or sublet; along with marketing strategies, in general contracting or sub contractual fine
lines of a specified frequency(s), shall,
(b) be subject to the penalty assessments, under due process of Law, as mentioned in the
previous paragraph(s) hereon thereto.
8. In order to make a reasonable contribution to the common objective of confidence
building, the participating States accordingly, without the necessity of any special
agreement, will come to reaffirm a Faith in and that radioactivity as specified herein:
(a) depletes the oxygen molecules that a breath of fresh air is a right to pursue as common
ends whereof.
9. The existence of any fact which, if established constitute an anti-equation, is a matter of

Courts authorized to have a say in a matter of where I go when dies if even dies a matter.
This is our good Lords to say; take any such actions as may be required to save a people
therefore, issue no new operating permit continuances as effective at once and undertake
consequential dis-continuations hereby will contends.
ARTICLE 12 (Disbandment of Nuclear Resources)
World Nuclear Power

Summary, 2,005
Reactors in Operation
in Number of Units;
And Non-Op, or Scheduled
to be Built (NONOP-SB)
(a) The Party to a divide be bound by the instruments of this entry, inasuch the subject of
nuclear energy complexities shall continue to be the subject on which weapons grade
contentions shall be surmised in every manor of treachery divisible, to the limitations
provided for pursuant of this entry and sorcery related new developments with a view to
disappears somewhere near the last centillion armigers of galactic-al know how, therefore
licensing fees shall be short of discontinued on the grounds of intentions to disband
reiterated four nuclear reactor units or complexes per Ensign every three months will
contend is a step in a right direction will contend hereby-s.
(b) And in furtherance of the said distinguished masters presences, The Partys to this
global telepathic review deed concur someway to finalize the reductions to aggregate 0,00
a postulate terminates not latter then, 31 January 2,025 or sooner pending on critical life
estimates of expirations if applicable?
(b)World Nuclear Power Summary, 2,005 through 31 December 2,007 Reactors in
Operation in Number of Units; And Non-Op, or Scheduled to be Built (NONOP-SB)
Countries:
1. Argentina ------------4 --5

2. Armenia--------------1
3. Belgium---------------8 --9
4. Brazil------------------3 --5
5. Bulgaria---------------5 --7
6. Canada---------------15 --23
7. China-----------------15 --23
8. Czech Republic-------6 --08
9. Finland-----------------5
10. France---------------61 --65
11. Germany------------22 --27
12. Hungary--------------4
13. India-----------------23 --29
14. Iran--------------------2 --03
15. Israel------------------1 --02
16. Japan-----------------60 --65
17. Korea North----------2 --03
18. Korea South---------22 --30
19. Lithuania--------------2 --03
20. Mexico-----------------2
21. Netherlands-----------1
22. Pakistan----------------4 --08
23. Romania---------------1 --03
24. Russia-----------------38 --45
25. Slovakia----------------8 --10
26. Slovenia----------------1
27. South Africa -----------3
28. Spain-------------------10 --12
29. Sweden-----------------11 --12
30. Switzerland-------------5 --07
31. Taiwan-------------------9 --11
32. Ukraine-----------------18 --21
33. Un-disclosed-----------10
34. United Kingdom-------34 --39
35. United States----------106 -121
36. Naval Global-----------60 -100
37. Global Mini-------------12 -20
38. = 36 Countries-Totals
39. Total Est. -------------------525
40. Total Est.
(NONOP-SB) -------------097 -100
41. Total Est.

Commission-able --------------0,625
NUCLEAR ENERGY REACTOR' UTILITY'S
11. To the extent possible consistent with its primary responsibilities an, U N
Secretary Generals quarter shall be called to answer to a Higher Court in an effort to
assure the obligations are tended to will contend that so especially when contending an
accounting for the nuclear propelled submersibles, aircraft carriers, any and all such
missile strategic offensive and defensive projections advent projectiles nor missiles there
as: by, any atomic or thermal nuclear means of trajectory over flight herein as will control
and command authorities.
12. The Party's' hereto established as an International Atomic Energy Agency, (hereinafter
referred to as "The IAEA". or "The Agencies", upon the terms hereinafter set forth dis-
agreed to agreed be bound by these new disclosures and material facts so stated for a
record and undertake a policy directed at the elimination of nuclear energy complexes
selective service conscription and make known to all intending IAEA be banned from
assisting in the development, address, advise, nor calling attention to:
(a) any nuclear reactor energy utility enterprise, organizational esquire with any custodial
mode of operates whose permits may enlist for, Peaceful Servitudes, by, nor of the IAEA
services,
(c) occupational clandestine perestroika are too replicas of Human very well capable of
supplying green and eco-friendly ways and means of energys so evidence suggested will
contend again-s.
13. Pursuant of this Chapter, "Objectives", of THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,// Geiger counting apparatus and hospital or medical x-ray
machinery supervised under strict military auspicious, shall be considered:
(a) the only "peaceful purposes", brace thoughts to reduce, dispose, collect, gather
decommission, and dis-assemble to uniform standard com pliancy only in the case for the
"Objectives" to the letter of the advancement for society's Convention on the UNSCC Treaty,
in accordance's with this agenda's interpretation as dis-agreed to agreed that:
(b) even lesser frequency fissionable tools, products and services, will contend, be last to
decommission in and these commodities may easily be re-invented by another means of
stipulate atomic understanding-s.
(c) wheresoevers exists an ex-spent fuel rod fuel enrichment procedures the risk
assessment that of burdened by more said accumulation than can humanly be expected to
amount dangerous contamination and death. In decidedly agreed terms, it is the opinion of
this entry that the primary concern for the elimination and de-conversion of nuclear fuel
enrichment synthesized energy source into safe and practical search warrants necessary
for you to keep faith with it where as we did seek legal assistance in this matter of tongue
dialect spoken to us before this abridgment Sir.
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION

5 March 2015
Article 13 (Maritime Disclosure)
1. For the purpose of this Convention: the "area" refers to International Waters
and the sub-space within its jurisdictional limits; the same as "external waters"
here bouts The sovereignty of a coastal State, or a land locked State extends to:
(a) the sub-space referred to as territorial sea. Except where otherwise provided
for in this Article, the standing domain to the sub-space of internal waters, or
territorial seas is 12 nautical miles, subject to the conditions of this Provisionment here as,
(b) respective hereafter thereupon as the states at large, in parochial and

custodial charges of keeping Law and Order in its place thereabouts but within the bounds
of,
(c) wayward up in such a said projection therefore an agreed upon moments

of the business senses, disqualifies the reach of 200 nautical miles from the
points of geological reference and/or submergence within the crests and even
tides of a shorelines in accordance an legal actions displayed give cause to act or trespass
within the bounds expressed thereof.
2. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of International Maritime

Security, Support and Service thereto, a United Nations sub contractual award shall be
entered as duly handed down to the United States Navy and Marine Corps. The award shall
be accompanied by a supporting opinion, which shall be adopted by a majority resolution
there as the chambers of a Secretary General's, United Nations. Supportive conjectures.
3. In accordance with the foregoing principles the two High Contracting Parties, subject to
the Memorandum of Understanding, the Protocol, and to the agenda for which it stood for,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall act as an componency, hereby therein, support
and service to: the- U N. and High Contracting Party(s'), (U S Department of Defense). (US
Navys)
4. Subject to the supply and demand, and in accordance with the Provisions of these orders
afore, specified High Contracting Partnerships, shall rank and file then award for inter-
agency contract services as remedial and supplemental action to meet its growing needs
thereof why fore. Any differences that might arise in regard to the interpretation or
execution of the award shall be submitted to the floor of the General Assembly for a
confidence measure salutation whereby any such as said dissenting arbiter(s), and as firm
decision can concern, shall have its right to state their grounds for dissent ion.
5. Within the bounds of the Black Sea co-ordinates thereto, and up wayward of the North
East Siberian Pacific Waters, the standard 200 nautical mile trans boundary
submergences of legal discretion will be assessed to all who come to dual as duly implied
notwithstanding the status quota considerations therefore will applied for would be
notions of protection recalls; "charge' d'affaires" to U N may wave service descriptive as so
to agree to the terms and conditions of the Global Maritime Security Act, which are
inclusive of the fact(s) all stated not latter than 31 December 2017:
(a) A U N mandate that assures a principle of multilateralism is in force.
(b) U N authorities are on board U S carrier groups and escort ships, co-monitoring actively
on ship(s), as to establish a program of work;
(c) an open line of International Maritime Communication furthers to undertake to settle

military enrollment as automatically ratified for successive periods, and in so doing,
support the cause of each others assistance in which the way of primary care supplication
has arisen to the occasion of men, to these of whose presents we stand.
6. Proclaiming as their principle aim, the Partys of an agreement whose jurisdiction or

control is the surface and submergence's of every stormy sea that will cause to plot out any
said course of clandestine or tumultuous acts of inexcusability to a said act or fact :
(a) to ensign to the establishment of the International Maritime Committee'(s) thereby

advise and consent be granted of Entities now presiding in holding areas "mot us operat
us" entered as gentle men's agreement concurred mindful of the vulnerabilities, fearing
nothing more, perspective to the inquirys, and use of U N intermediaries on ships and on
high seas.
(b) there exists a need to limit the incidents and accidents associated with Inter-active
naval proliferation, and the threats imposed by the states of competitive and stipulated
soon forgotten waves of dangers; as sold to the attentions of what might decide to put away
pre activated weapons NBC laden cargo reminders of a charge to a May Day issued, we
decided.
(c) and need to limit the construction therein, of International desires down in the
shipyards, to that principle objective adequate measures for the legal systems in force and
the Member Countries are waived to the affirmations accepted as lawful, and confirmed as
Office of Secretary of Defenses discretion to cease and desist construction inventorial
supply joint engagements as follows:
(d) disbandment of Aircraft carriers of any said aggregate numerical quasi repeating
decimal integers; battleships, amphibious and littoral combat emplacements, the business
industrys note to need, and needs to note a permit of U N General assembly authorization
calendar on 24 /7 /said 365 days alerts for an open ended line of procedure,
developmental and operative custody assurances of the powers in this Courts follow
through may concede to these dis-engage-ments in fit of rages attention?
8. In conformity with this entry as entered, unauthorized usage of a Party(s') to a

violation or citation thereto is grounds for penalty assessments, seizure of a naval
flotilla, loss of permanent membership status-quo to a Security Council in and that, unless
otherwise given permission by the U N General Assembly(s') determined efforts, any vessel
deemed to be laden with nuclear, biological, chemical weapons grade formulations,
descriptive to illegal or suspicious cargo herein, shall be inspected and subject to this
Provisionment to the Law of the sea, Charter of their United Nations General Assembly(s)
hereinafter wherefore.
9. In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities, an United Nations Organization of
International Governance may annex as an "eminent domain trust", the Pan-American
Isthmus, and the Suez Isthmus hereby; use for the aforementioned purposes, without cost
except as provided for in this accounting for a purpose of orderly transit, accepts the grant
of such rights and undertakes to exercise them in accordance with this Treaty(s') and
related agreements hereto thereby.
10. In accordance with the Provisions of this Article, no Naval warships, Flotilla
arrangements of any Country's origin be circumnavigating 200 nautical miles off the coast
of the USA and Russia with several exemptions such as the Berring Straights and some
authorized adjoining country's permission, Air and sea in general item implies. This
Provision is subject to revised quotation hereas.
ARTICLE 14 THE ORGANIZATION (DESBIC) GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for Allied unity
and the Prohibition of (nbc) Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention,
to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international
verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation
among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization. A State Party
shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization. The seat of the Headquarters
of the Organization shall be The United Nations 10017 NY USA.
3. Omitted and Open
4. There situated are hereby established as the organs of the Organization: the Conference
of the States Parties, the Executive Councils, and the Secretary Generals quarter by word of
police in areas of I do.
5. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this
Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient
accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution
to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities
coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall
abide by the provisions set forth in the United States Federal Code of Justice.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider measures to

make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Organizations activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in
membership between the United Nations and this Organization, and subject to the
provisions of amended and approved Articles IV and V. of this Treatys rudimentary
authorships. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall
be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. The
budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to
administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in denial of its intended purposes shall have no
vote in the Organization if the amount of dues owed equals or exceeds the amount of the
contribution due from it for the preceding two full years the Conference of the States
Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to
pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
DRAFTS OF EXECUTIVE PROCEDURES
ARTICLES 15
Composition, procedures and decision-making .
1. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) shall
be composed of all members of this Organization. Each member shall have one
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the depositary not later than 30
days after the entry into force of this Convention.
3. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually unless it
decides otherwise. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive Council; (c)
When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members; or (d) In
accordance with this paragraph to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.
4. Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be convened not later
than 30 days after receipt of the request by the discretion of the Secretary General of the
United Nations unless specified otherwise in the request.
5. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference in

accordance with this paragraph and its exercise of formal indoctrination.
6. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the
Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the
beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may
be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at
the next regular session.
7. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum for the
Conference. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the Conference. The
Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the
members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as
possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision,
the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall
make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference
before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the
Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting
unless specified otherwise in this Convention.
8. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any
questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including those relating to
the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Secretary Generals quarter. It
may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related
to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive
Council.
9. The Conference shall oversee the integration of this Convention, and act in order to
promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review compliance with this
Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretary General (encoded) an United States Agencys oversight commissioners rank and
file of sequential not at liberty to discuss and may issue guidelines in accordance with this
Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
10. The Conference shall consider and adopt at its regular sessions, report programme and
budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, if applicable as well as
consider other reports; decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States
Parties in accordance with paragraph the rules and guidelines as so situated; Elect the
members of the Executive Council; appoint an Director-General; approve the rules of
procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; establish such subsidiary
organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this
Convention;
(a) Also contending: recognize a need to foster international cooperation for virtue-
disappear-ment agents scope and purposes in the field of (nbc) (wmd) disarmament and
restoration activities; review scientific and technological developments that could affect
the operation of Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
adages to include in this context, a said authorities as such an Director-General to establish
a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render
specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the
Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties.
11. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in
accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference; consider and approve at its
first session any relevant draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed by the
Preparatory Commission; establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in
accordance with this Provision; take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with
this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions
of this Convention.
12. The Conference shall not later expire and shall in its own recognition serve the interests
of the Secretary Generals and the secret service by way of Entity authority figures Human
rights interests as to indoctrinate an so called entry into force of this objective and common
ground approach in an effort to self service its identifying agencies and at such other times
within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake
reviews of the operation in as such reviews take into account any relevant scientific and
technological developments. At varying and working intervals therefore, unless otherwise
decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with security and star
based re-pore being appended as focal points to construe.
INFORMATION OUTDATED DO TO EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES REGARDING

ANTONS AUTHORITY TO FULFILL AND DECREE AND THE FACTS PRESENTED
INCLUDED THE MASSES ARE INDEED REPLICAS ABUSERS OF ALIEN TECHNOLOGY WE
CAUGHT DEVISING HELL I SEE?
ARTICLE 16 (Principles of Exploring Celestial Bodies)
(OBSOLETE ALL HAVE SAUCER GALACTIC UNDERSTANDING)
1. The exploration and use of outer space, excluding the Moon as non cosmic classification
and other celestial bodies considered classified to some extent as is scheduled, so is all
rights, titles and interests to the Party(s') first to step feet on and display their Mass owns
rights titles and interest, to the Moon satellite, in a confirmed non cosmic lander soil a
sampler's escrow too. Of a Faith inasmuch the missions which were carried out some
yesteryears afar shall be for the benefit and in the interests of all Party(s') to an insignia,
regardless of who actually owns the escrow services holster appliances at work. For
celestial cosmic interplanetary claims of ownerships such as Mars you must display your
mass and take footage and other samples as to establish your ground to the claim there
serviced.
(a) Theresought being convinced in these circumstances the moon is properly claimed as a
U S **/ U N Title deed imprescriptive of its own rules hereinafter all planning an
expenditure rates are: 6 billion dollars visitation premium per going NYSE Market rates in
gold reserves; 3 billion to the Treasury Secretary U N Trust account; upon approval from a
U S Joint Chiefs of staff and 3 billion to a DoD Trust accountancy, no trespassing though;
(a) Adjudged in accordance with; mission control, or in the chamber's of the Secretary
Generals, United Nations whereof. The agency feels that The United States has a legal and
moral obligation to take custodial possession of the property which needs to be insured, so
side carry insurance and underwriting services in the event a Party cause damages thereso.
2. The Party(s) to the Treaty(s) reaffirm their Faith and commitment in the purposes and
principles as to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, yet here we are
determined to place a higher value on celestial adventurisms then the costs of nuclear
disarmament, associated with the price of patience and virtue hereand.
3. When a Treaty(s) specifies that it is of unlimited duration, or the terms are that of
START II, and is entered into force, as stated, upward through December 31, 2,007, with
exclusionary implication that it role forward toward a START III phase; no earlier or later
act, or fact which takes place, unless it is an act of Nature or Natures Law, hereof, the
breadth of it; a State is obligated to refrain from actions which would defeat the purpose, or
the object of acceptance by the designated instruments of Deposit hereunder thereby call it.
4. A considerations set forth in this Article is such that are NASA expense accounts for lunar
manned subsoil missions and the ratio of past failed missions is a deciding factual
representation on the U S legal rights of escrow foreclosure to they who coincidently side
space cases; custodial controls.
6. In conformity with the purposes and principles of Global theater nuclear disarmament,
the Party(s) understand to the fullest extent of a Depositary Signatory status, the
consequences of negligible dissention of a charge to a senior obligating to decree and fulfill
as posted so please take notice and adhere.
7. The disclosure of his acquisitions of The Moon, the Party's undertake in good Faith to
recognize by virtue of this declaration, she will be considered a territory of a United States
of America, to the undertaking and initial application of sovereign written permission to
consent as the subject to the matter of imminent domain is best situated in U S custody ad
interim rather than going directly to a %5 Billion dollar a year United Nations acquisitions
hold on a matter of default by the Pentagon. Petitioners wave the motion that U N hold the
title by reason of power of attorney for the Pentagon Defense attorneys.
8. They further undertake not to trespass upon The Moon without written and authorized
consent of the U S Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U S A were the first non cosmic human animals
to display their Mass on the Legend of the mineral rich reminders of an fruitful and costly
exploration hereto.
9. Although a United States had plans to colonize the lunar surface with ecosphere's of
settlements without regard of action or inactions of every other party, the subject of
property rights became more unimpeded when all nuclear options and their space
ambitions became shrouded in secret weapons based exploitations of the U S well earned
and deserved rights, titles and interests of The Moon forgo a clause soldier.
10. The Party's undertake not to enter geosynchronous orbit within the atmosphere of the
Moon without permission as requested by clandestine operatives. However, if the special
agents in charge of this brief memo see your satellite escrow as a purposeful
Mission India and others, you will be requested to remit a visitors fee that may at times be
waived off by special aperture agencies.
11. The provisions of this entry Article XIII Sections 7 through 11 shall apply to the
activities of States Party to the starboard invitation absences with a view toward
unauthorized dumping and desecration of earthly accumulations on the Moon, unless a
Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved in a unanimous consent of council of particulars. All
Joint Chiefs including the Chief's Chair must unanimously approve any and every syllable of
doubt to naysay over the matter. Subject to the conditions of these declarations it is not
ruled out that another settling Party must pay rental fees to reside or dwell thereupon The
Moon.
12. The subject is considered a reasonable assumption heresay, as warning to all who loiter
there, no trespassing, trespassers will be used for target practice from now on in afar
affixed and sealed as certifiably ongoing and the Clerk of the Courts shall concur the matter
as procedural disclosure coded though Top Secret Military Waiver, whereas a depositary
bond is your dinner when all come to know the insurer of the deposit is Israel to a Plaintiffs
name places here went down to the ground a fire;
TO KNOW BY ALLDESIGNS ON THESE PRESENTS DONE AT 92655 USA FOR ALL ENSIGNS
TO AN REPUBLIC, STATE OR EMBLEM; IN GOD'S WILL WE TRUST
ARTICLE 17 IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

1. General undertakings: Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this
Convention. In particular, it shall:
(a) Prohibit violent felons and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place
under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law from undertaking any activity
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention, including enacting penal legislation with
respect to such activity;
(b) Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention; and Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and
Regimes.
(c) Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited
to a State Party under this Convention undertaken anywhere by persons not possessing its
nationality, in conformity with international law.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the appropriate
form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the obligations under paragraph
1.
3. Each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under this Convention,
shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the
environment, and shall cooperate as appropriate with other States Parties in this regard.
4. In order to fulfill its obligations under this Convention, each State Party shall designate
or establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point for effective liaison
with the Organization and other States Parties. Each State Party shall notify the
Organization of its National Authority at the time that this Convention enters into force for
it.
5. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the legislative and administrative
measures taken to implement this Convention.
6. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to information and
data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in connection with the
implementation of this Convention. It shall treat such information and data exclusively in
connection with its rights and obligations under this Convention and in accordance with
the provisions set forth in the preceding Chapters.
7. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of all its
functions and in particular to provide assistance to the Technical Secretariat.
ARTICLE 18 THE ORGANIZATION GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to this Convention hereby establish the Organization for Allied unity
and the Prohibition of (nbc) Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of this Convention,
to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international
verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation
among States Parties.
2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization. A State Party
shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization. The seat of the Headquarters
of the Organization shall be The United Nations 10017 NY USA.
4. There situated are hereby established as the organs of the Organization: the Conference
of the States Parties, the Executive Councils, and the Secretary Generals quarter by word of
police in areas of I do.
5. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under this
Convention in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and efficient
accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information and data
necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under this Convention. It shall take every precaution
to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military activities and facilities
coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Convention and, in particular, shall
abide by the provisions set forth in the United States Federal Code of Justice.
6. In undertaking its verification activities the Organization shall consider measures to

make use of advances in science and technology.
7. The costs of the Organizations activities shall be paid by States Parties in accordance
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted to take into account differences in
membership between the United Nations and this Organization, and subject to the
provisions of amended and approved Articles IV and V. of this Treatys rudimentary
authorships. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission shall
be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular budget. The
budget of the Organization shall comprise two separate chapters, one relating to
administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs.
8. A member of the Organization which is in denial of its intended purposes shall have no
vote in the Organization if the amount of dues owed equals or exceeds the amount of the
contribution due from it for the preceding two full years the Conference of the States
Parties may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to
pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
ARTICLE 19 (THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES)
Composition, procedures and decision-making .
1. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as the Conference) shall
be composed of all members of this Organization. Each member shall have one
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
2. The first session of the Conference shall be convened by the depositary not later than 30
days after the entry into force of this Convention.
3. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions which shall be held annually unless it
decides otherwise. Special sessions of the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference; (b) When requested by the Executive Council; (c)
When requested by any member and supported by one third of the members; or (d) In
accordance with this paragraph to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention.
4. Except in the case of subparagraph (d), the special session shall be convened not later
than 30 days after receipt of the request by the discretion of the Secretary General of the
United Nations unless specified otherwise in the request.
5. The Conference shall also be convened in the form of an Amendment Conference in

accordance with this paragraph and its exercise of formal indoctrination.
6. Sessions of the Conference shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the
Conference decides otherwise. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the
beginning of each regular session, it shall elect its Chairman and such other officers as may
be required. They shall hold office until a new Chairman and other officers are elected at
the next regular session.
7. A majority of the members of the Organization shall constitute a quorum for the
Conference. Each member of the Organization shall have one vote in the Conference. The
Conference shall take decisions on questions of procedure by a simple majority of the
members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance should be taken as far as
possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up for decision,
the Chairman shall defer any vote for 24 hours and during this period of deferment shall
make every effort to facilitate achievement of consensus, and shall report to the Conference
before the end of this period. If consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the
Conference shall take the decision by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting
unless specified otherwise in this Convention.
8. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall consider any
questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Convention, including those relating to
the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the Secretary Generals quarter. It
may make recommendations and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues related
to this Convention raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive
Council.
9. The Conference shall oversee the integration of this Convention, and act in order to
promote its object and purpose. The Conference shall review compliance with this
Convention. It shall also oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical
Secretary General (encoded) an United States Agencys oversight commissioners rank and
file of sequential not at liberty to discuss and may issue guidelines in accordance with this
Convention to either of them in the exercise of their functions.
10. The Conference shall consider and adopt at its regular sessions, report programme and
budget of the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, if applicable as well as
consider other reports; decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States
Parties in accordance with paragraph the rules and guidelines as so situated; Elect the
members of the Executive Council; appoint an Director-General; approve the rules of
procedure of the Executive Council submitted by the latter; establish such subsidiary
organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this
Convention;
(a) Also contending: recognize a need to foster international cooperation for virtue-
disappear-ment agents scope and purposes in the field of (nbc) (wmd) disarmament and
restoration activities; review scientific and technological developments that could affect
the operation of Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes
adages to include in this context, a said authorities as such an Director-General to establish
a Scientific Advisory Board to enable him, in the performance of his functions, to render
specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant to this Convention, to the
Conference, the Executive Council or States Parties.
11. The Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of independent experts appointed in
accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference; consider and approve at its
first session any relevant draft agreements, provisions and guidelines developed by the
Preparatory Commission; establish at its first session the voluntary fund for assistance in
accordance with this Provision; take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with
this Convention and to redress and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions
of this Convention.
12. The Conference shall not later expire and shall in its own recognition serve the interests
of the Secretary Generals and the secret service by way of Entity authority figures Human
rights interests as to indoctrinate an so called entry into force of this objective and common
ground approach in an effort to self service its identifying agencies and at such other times
within that time period as may be decided upon, convene in special sessions to undertake
reviews of the operation in as such reviews take into account any relevant scientific and
technological developments. At varying and working intervals therefore, unless otherwise
decided upon, further sessions of the Conference shall be convened with security and star
based re-pore being appended as focal points to construe.
PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 March 2015 5 O0 pm PST
THE SORT COMPACT AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS ASSUMED

TREATY NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT; PEACE, INTERNATIONAL
TREATY DEPOSITION CRITERION; (RESEARCH);
TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SORT COMPACT

Documents Submitted to Congress;
1. HTUTreaty Originally Between the United States

of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions UTH
2. HTULetter of TransmittalUTH
3. HTULetter of SubmittalUTH
4. HTUArticle-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty
United States of America _____________________
The Russian Federation _______________________
In Witness Whereof didst sign 2,002

INTERIM AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCES TO THE
STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION
INCORPORATION OF START (IOS)
ACCEPTANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AMERICA, THE UNITED NATIONS

ORGANIZATION THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND FORMER REPUBLICS AND THE STATUS
AND DELIVERY SYSTEM APPENDAGE AN EXTENTION OF START I, AND II,
INCORPORATION OF DESBIC (RESEARCH)
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
1. Documents Pertaining to U N and NATO Strategic Offensive Reductions Considered

Subject par 6 % percent per biennial aspect up way for by year de-limitations ratio. Though
as is sold for another state of Federal plans on a planner perspective to the Nuclear Powers
question and the potential circumvention of arms transfers.
2. Convinced that the current upgrades as ascribed to date hereby is of urgent necessity;
3. Reaffirming as though Inter communication advocacy professional cooperatives seat

complacency in its places of uniform measures;
4. Noting that the Nuclear State would fill purchase orders to those individuals who feel
compelled to supply their countrymen with a means to an end to the point of out of handed
mutually assured disastrous nature,
5. Have read the report bid to make amends as though if star based research is ongoing,
said Party's' to an wrongfully and categorically residual to ascribe 5,000 activated c and
currently deployed nuclear warheads of high frequency is wrongful, perspective to the act
and facts contained hereto, with a view to Star Elder occupancies at said U S and Russias
interior design apparatus Sir.
6. Welcomes a release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990,Star elder
technical facsimile' of a rating 18 or over may concern as well with a draft measures to
competitive articulate standard compliancy so forth Sirs. Sir.
7. Notes with satisfaction the consciousness of START'S intended grounds and enclosures
that are listed in the Memorandas, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto.
8. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic
Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released
to the public-unless otherwise agreed.
7. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information
provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations
provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other
information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such
data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations
provided for in this Treaty. [Said Statements on Release to Public]
ARTICLES 2 (IOS)
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty,
each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of
verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph l of this
Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by
national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In
this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not
to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs,
SLBM s, mobile -launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBM s and their
launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures may be reviewed
as to apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, within
the specified time and frame work of 6 % per annum deco missionary standard
employabilitys, even so as stated perspective of or to the use of environmental shelters for
strategic offensive arms.
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique
identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.
ARTICLES 3 (IOS)
1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall
make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information
obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine
which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the
methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.
2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric
information, including: [Statements on Encryption & Jamming]
(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow

directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of eject able capsules or
recoverable reentry vehicles..
3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
undertakes not to broadcast from reentry vehicles. telemetric information that pertains to
the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or
SLBM.
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol* on Telemetric
Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry
Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is
broadcast during the flight test.
5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test
shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol*, data
associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.[Agreed State 35]
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall
have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no
more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s each year. Of these eleven flight
tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s of each type, any
missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such
encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section
III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with
paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are
carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against
the quotas specified in this paragraph.[Said Agreed State 31]
ARTICLES 4 (IOS)
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty,
each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous
monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the
Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be
conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol* and
the Conversion or Elimination Protocol*. [item of inspection] [size criteria][Agreed State
36]**
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to
confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities
in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol*. [facility inspections at] [Said Agreed State 10]
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm
the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the
notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol*.
[facility inspections at] [Said Agreed State 10]**
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the
accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new
facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification
Protocol*.[facility inspections at]**, and pursuant to START AGENDA'S' 6 % percent
annularly ascribed de-limitation-al expectancy's of said Mega-ton and highest value
frequency range de-target-able contingencies in its orders of attributable warheads.
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert
assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such
ICBMs is not occurring. [facility inspections at] [Joint State
on Site Diagrams]**
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of
deployed ICBMs and SLBM s to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no
more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them and proceed there
from to oversight deco missionary stage points or reduce, disposal area's of warheads
dismember and diffuse disposal standards as all agreed upon to the date of entry into
forces some said concerned with another objective Sir. Sirs All Countries thereabouts be
bound here so.[facility inspections]**
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of
deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the
number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the
inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after completion of the
dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or
elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic
offensive arms.
9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that
the elimination of facilities has been completed.
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to
confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in
accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for
purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM
of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version
of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics
correspond to the data specified for these items.
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguish ability exhibitions for heavy bombers,
former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right
during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical
characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond tothe data
specified for these items in Annex G* to the Memorandum of Understanding*; to
demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear -ALCMs for which a heavy
bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this
number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article V of this
Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear
ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear
armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type
of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been
flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each
variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear
ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant
of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one
another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range
nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit
the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and
each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these
items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such
exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in
accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, of
START and START 2, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable
from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during
such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training
heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial
exchange of data provided.. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the
inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for.
After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a
type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight tested, the
Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall
have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy
bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of such type equipped for nuclear
armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy
bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party
the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable
from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at
production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of
ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.[Agreed State] [facilities] [Site Surveys
Letters]
ARTICLES 5 (IOS)
1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each

Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with the Protocol, carry out
the following cooperative measures:
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within
restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall, unless 6 %
biannual standards are or not in it's said attribution standard of negotiable specifications
as called for, not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers
of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM
base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of
fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a
display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be
displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites
specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire
train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of
rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall
include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no
more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one
request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each
parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memoranda; and:
(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within
one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former
heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy
bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane
from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy
bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that
are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the
requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with Protocol. Such a notification
shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and

former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the
right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any
particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or
any particular air base more than two times each year.
(a) A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-
mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of
heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours
after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that
the request was made.
(b) If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by
force major, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with
Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which
the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been
designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors
have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested
shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed
or until notification has been provided in accordance with Protocol.
ARTICLES 6 (IOS)
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail
garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of
ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed
mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as
provided for below:
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II
of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and

time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol
shall be considered to be involved in exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or
rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and
their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail
garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such
a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation.
Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance
with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of
the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of
Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile
launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be
part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility
outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.
(g) An exercise in dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has
been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an
inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated
for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an
inspection.
(v) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with

Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or
reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a
dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion
of such a dispersal.
(vi) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs

and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their
restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in
accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification

has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of
September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the
notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification
Protocol.
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the
Notification Protocol.
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in
the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification
Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.
(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be
completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for
baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct
inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers
involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume
three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy
bombers has been provided in accordance with the Protocols.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of
such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be
carried out in accordance with this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise.
Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in this Treaty.
ARTICLES 7 (IOS)
1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy
bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and
there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such
dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party
shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as
provided for below.
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time
specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and

time specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:
(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the
Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched
Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes
are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant
notifications shall be provided in accordance with the Protocols;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such
case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that
has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the
operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with the
Protocols.
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later

than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been
provided in accordance with Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request
cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four
days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in
accordance with Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the
time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures
during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas
provided for by this Treaty.
4. When an operational dispersal is completed:
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be
located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations .
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be
located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations .
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed
normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national
territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately
engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.
5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not
conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two
requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for
ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall count toward
the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of
Article XII of this Treaty.
ARTICLES 8 INCORPORATION OF START (IOS)
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the
Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties
agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission to: United Nation Assemblies**
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a
new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with
Protocol.
ARTICLES 9 (IOS)
1. To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any
international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The
Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to
resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties [United Nations
Assemblies Protocol] agree that this provision does apply to any patterns of cooperation,
including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of
signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State. [Agreed State 1] [Soviet State on
Non-Circumvention & Patterns of Coop. The NATO Alliances and Its Supreme
Commanders; The Republic of China, Koreas and Japanese Multilateralism, The Persian
Empires, The Arabian Peninsula, France, Switzerland, Spain Portugal, Sweden The States of
Israel, and India, Pakistan and all other insignias to developing needs to isotopic
mentioning there again in still.
ARTICLES 10 (IOS)
1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum, and Memoranda's of
Understanding, START, START II, NPT's re-evaluation all of which form integral parts and
are considered hereby the START AGENDA Treaty series, in which the purpose was to
reserve adaptive language and interceptive resurrection thereof the joint specified drafts of
Treatys' assimilation, shall be subject to ratification in accordance bound thereto the
constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the
exchange of instruments of ratification as proceed at once not later than 31 December
2,007 Sir. Sirs.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for unlimited years to missions descriptive by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.
The Party's' shall maintain an 24 /7 / 365 days Headquarters manned round the clock to
further the development of the 31 December 2,007 accordances,
(a) headed By the U S, Russian, and an Israeli sending and receiving unit missionary
adjutants to number not less than 120 Men Women Staff, who will maintain
communication peripheral on the said status quo' of ongoing de-targeting and
decommissioning of projectiles and WMD as so stated warheads there when, conditions of
NATO and all insignias come to a table of law.
(b) The Party's' agree to convene every 5 years thereafter and in so doing meet to consider
whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, whether performance of the
obligations assumed are satisfactory to the U N Independent Commission assigned to
assess penalty or operable income necessities to the protocol stated here withal search
warrant characterizations of an enzyme trigger Sirs., and to re-define such a due date
period by a subsequent agreement on the reduce, dispose and delimitation of strategic
offensive arms.
(c) This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in
accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force
for each agreed five year period of extension unless as was to be retro ceded by a
subsequent agreement on the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
3. There shall any Party in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty. No such extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
can jeopardized the supreme interests as willful or negligible dissention... Such notice shall
have no bearing on the situation implied as dire need to comprehend a statement of the
extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having Natures said orientation over
its supreme interests.
ARTICLE 11 (IOS)
Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into
force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLES 12 (IOS)
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
The Israeli Consul General and U S Head of State will be required to pay recompense for the
damage awards of the Partys herewith fourscore all solved the responsible People as
sought for negligence a parody of equal opportunities in this matter of incidental and
accidental infusement of catastrophic or heinous war crimes there when.
PREVIOUS START TREATY INFUSED THERE ABOVE

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION THE U N
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTER ALIA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
THE NATO ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION
AND ALL INDEPENDENT ENSIGNS

TO A MARQUIS IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
THE UNDERSIGNED
_____________________________________________RUSSIAN FEDERATION
___________________________________________UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_________________________________________________WITNESSS
ANALYSIS: THE OBLIGATIONS PRESCRIBED IN START I AND II AND SORT THOUGH

DESIRED, FELL SHORT OF EXPECTATION, THE EMPHASIS ON DELIVERY APPERATUS IS
TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, WE LEARN FROM THIS UNDERTAKING, AND CARE TO
BUILD ON ITS MERITS.
ARTICLES INCORPORATIO N OF START (IOS)

THE ELIMINATION AND HEAVY BOMBER DETAILS
(i) The formation of a command; as, simply stated it may be; address, advise, and call
attention to a firm decision of what becomes an orderly procession of uniformity, and or as
an integral embodiment of sequence and sequences whereas obligations assumed the
action of carrying out the fraternal orders thereto why.
START
Protocol On Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and on Procedures

Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs Relating to the Treaty Between All
Ensigns to a Marquis Dial Tone 7 / 11 followers or Beggars Bread, on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic and Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Apparatus
and Defensive and Offensive Arms
Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty Series including post factus START III above and
entitled your honors, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination
of heavy ICBMs and upon procedures governing the conversion of silo launchers of such
ICBMS.
I. Procedures for Elimination of Heavy ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters
1. Elimination of heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures
provided for in this Section at elimination facilities for ICBMs specified in the START Treaty
or shall be carried out by using such missiles for delivering objects into the upper
atmosphere or space. Notification thereof shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers (NRRCs) 30 days in advance of the initiation of elimination at
conversion or elimination facilities, or, in the event of launch, in accordance with the
provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988.
2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the

inspected Party:
(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicles;
(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and
control system from the missile and its launch canister, and other elements that shall not
be subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section;
(c) shall remove the missile from its launch canister and disassemble the missile into
stages;
(d) shall remove liquid propellant from the missile;
(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its
launch canister;
(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and
(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.
These actions may be carried out in any order.
3. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process,
inspectors shall confirm the type and number of the missiles to be eliminated by making
the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. After the procedures
provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the process of the elimination of the
missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination
process.
4. Elimination process for heavy ICBMS:
(a) missile stages, nozzles, and missile interstage skirts shall each be cut into two pieces of
approximately equal size; and
(b) the self-contained dispensing mechanism as well as the front section, including the
reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be cut into two pieces of
approximately equal size and crushed.
5. During the elimination process for launch canisters of heavy ICBMS, the launch canister
shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or into three pieces in such a
manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a
launch canister.
6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of
the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual, written report containing the results of the
inspection team's observation of the elimination process that the inspection team has
completed its inspection.
7. Heavy ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after
completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be
provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol Relating
to the START Treaty.
II. Procedures for Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers for
Heavy ICBMs
1. Conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS,
and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in situ and shall be subject to
inspection.
2. Prior to the initiation of the conversion process for such launchers, the missile and
launch canister shall be removed from the silo launcher.
3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the conversion process for silo launchers of
heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy
ICBMs as soon as the silo launcher door has been opened and a missile and its launch
canister have been removed from the silo launcher. Notification thereof shall be provided
in accordance with paragraphs I and 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol Relating to
the START Treaty.
4. Conversion process for silo launchers of heavy ICBMS, silo training launchers for heavy
ICBMS, and silo test launchers for heavy ICBMs shall include the following steps:
(a) the silo launcher door shall be opened, the missile and the launch canister shall be
removed from the silo launcher;
(b) concrete shall be poured into the base of the silo launcher up to the height of five
meters from the bottom of the silo launcher; and
(c) a restrictive ring with a diameter of no more than 2.9 meters shall be installed into the
upper portion of the silo launcher. The method of installation of the restrictive ring shall
rule out its removal without destruction of the ring and its attachment to the silo launcher.
5. Each Party shall have the right to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraph
4 of this Section have been carried out. For the purpose of confirming that these
procedures have been carried out:
(a) the converting Party shall notify the other Party through the NRRCs:
(i) no less than 30 days in advance of the date when the process of pouring concrete will
commence; and
(ii) upon completion of all of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section;
and
(b) the inspecting Party shall have the right to implement the procedures provided for in
either paragraph 6 or paragraph 7, but not both, of this Section for each silo launcher of
heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy
ICBMs that is to be converted.
6. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to
observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo
training launcher for heavy ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be
converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:
(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than
seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will observe the filling of
the silo in question;
(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the
converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo
launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo can be measured;
(c) the inspecting Party shall have the right to observe the entire process of pouring
concrete from a location providing an unobstructed view of the base of the silo launcher,
and to confirm by measurement that concrete has been poured into the base of the silo
launcher up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo launcher. The
measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher
door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level
of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the
concrete has hardened;
(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph

4 of this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the
restrictive ring. The restrictive ring shall not be shrouded during such inspections. The
Parties shall agree on the date for such inspections;
(e) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs and (d) of this
paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by the
inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
(f) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be
drawn from the list of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
(g) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START
Treaty.
7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to
measure the depth of each silo launcher of heavy ICBMS, silo training launcher for heavy
ICBMS, and silo test launcher for heavy ICBMs that is to be converted both before the
commencement and after the completion of the process of pouring concrete, and to
measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. For this purpose:
(a) the inspecting Party shall inform the Party converting the silo launcher no less than
seven days in advance of the commencement of the pouring that it will measure the depth
of the silo launcher in question both before the commencement and after the completion of
the process of pouring concrete;
(b) immediately prior to the commencement of the process of pouring concrete, the
converting Party shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the base of the silo
launcher is visible, and that the depth of the silo launcher can be measured;
(c) the inspecting Party shall measure the depth of the silo launcher prior to the
commencement of the process of pouring concrete;
(d) following notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of

this Section, the inspecting Party shall be permitted to measure the diameter of the
restrictive ring, and to re-measure the depth of the silo launcher. The restrictive ring shall
not be shrouded during such inspections. The Parties shall agree on the date for such
inspections;
(e) for the purpose of measuring the depth of the concrete in the silo launcher,
measurements shall be taken from the level of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher
door to the base of the silo launcher, prior to the pouring of the concrete, and from the level
of the lower edge of the closed silo launcher door to the top of the concrete fill, after the
concrete has hardened;
(f) the results of measurements conducted pursuant to subparagraphs (c), (d), and
(e) of this paragraph shall be recorded in written, factual inspection reports and signed by
the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort;
(g) inspection teams shall each consist of no more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be
drawn from the fist of inspectors under the START Treaty; and
(h) such inspections shall not count against any inspection quota established by the START
Treaty.
8. The converting Party shall have the right to carry out further conversion measures after
the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this
Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after
notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section.
9. In addition to the reentry vehicle inspections conducted under the START Treaty, each
Party shall have the right to conduct, using the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to the
Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty, four additional reentry vehicle
inspections each year of ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that
have been converted in accordance with the provisions of this Section. During such
inspections, the inspectors also shall have the right to confirm by visual observation the
presence of the restrictive ring and that the observable portions of the launch canister do
not differ externally from the observable portions of the launch canister that was exhibited
pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the START Treaty.
(a) Any shrouding of the upper portion of the silo launcher shall not obstruct visual
observation of the upper portion of the launch canister and shall not obstruct visual
observation of the edge of the restrictive ring. If requested by the inspecting Party, the
converting Party shall partially remove any shrouding, except for shrouding of instruments
installed on the restrictive ring, to permit confirmation of the presence of the restrictive
ring.
10. Upon completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or paragraph 7 of this
Section or, if such procedures are not conducted, upon expiration of 30 days after
notification of completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, the
silo launcher of heavy ICBMs being converted shall, for the purposes of the Treaty, be
considered to contain a deployed ICBM to which one warhead is attributed.
III. Equipment; Costs

1. To carry out inspections provided for in this Protocol, the inspecting Party shall have the
right to use agreed equipment, including equipment that will confirm that the silo launcher
has been completely filled up to the height of five meters from the bottom of the silo
launcher with concrete. The Parties shall agree in the Bilateral Implementation
Commission on such equipment.
2. For inspections conducted pursuant to this Protocol, costs shall be handled pursuant to
paragraph 19 of Section V of the Inspection Protocol Relating to the START Treaty.
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry
into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As
provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon
such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of
the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not
affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral
Implementation Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the
procedure for making amendments set forth in Article VII of the Treaty.
DONE at Moscow on January 3, 1993, in two copies, each in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION:
FOR ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN OFFICER OF THE COURTS:
_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________________________
Protocol on Exhibition and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between
the All Ensigns to a Marquis on Further Reduction and Limitation of Defensive & Offensive
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and
the Russian Federation affixed to include the Nuclear Powers on Further Reduction and
Limitation of Defensive & Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties
hereby agree all Insignias to expent radio active fuel storage depot are subject and
considered suspects to the ironys of conduct exhibitions and inspections of heavy bombers
pursuant to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty.
I. Exhibitions of Heavy Bombers
1. For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty, and as required by paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of Article IV of the Treaty, each Party
shall conduct exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, heavy
bombers reoriented to a conventional role, and heavy bombers that were reoriented to a
conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role.
2. The exhibitions of heavy bombers shall be conducted subject to the following provisions:
(a) the location for such an exhibition shall be at the discretion of the exhibiting Party;
(b) the date for such an exhibition shall be agreed upon between the Parties through
diplomatic channels, and the exhibiting Party shall communicate the location of the
exhibition;
(c) during such an exhibition, each heavy bomber exhibited shall be subject to inspection
for a period not to exceed two hours;
(d) the inspection team conducting an inspection during an exhibition shall consist of no
more than 10 inspectors, all of whom shall be drawn from the list of inspectors under the
START Treaty;
(e) prior to the beginning of the exhibition, the inspected Party shall provide a photograph
or photographs of one of the heavy bombers of a type or variant of a type reoriented to a
conventional role and of one of the heavy bombers of the same type and variant of a type
that were reoriented to a conventional role and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, so
as to show all of their differences that are observable by national technical means of
verification and visible during inspection; and
(f) such inspections during exhibitions shall not count against any inspection quota
established by the START Treaty.
II. Inspections of Heavy Bombers
1. During exhibitions of heavy bombers, each Party shall have the right to perform the
following procedures on the exhibited heavy bombers; and each Party, beginning 180 days
after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, shall have the right, in addition to its
rights under the START Treaty, to perform, during data update and new facility inspections
conducted under the START Treaty at air bases of the other Party, the following procedures
on all heavy bombers based at such air bases and present there at the time of the
inspection:
(a) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, in
order to confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually
equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution. The
inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the
inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for weapons, as
well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, but not to inspect
other portions of the exterior or interior;
(b) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role, in order to

confirm the differences of such heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or
variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of verification and visible
during inspection. The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those
portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the differences observable
by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, but not to inspect
other portions of the exterior or interior; and
(c) to conduct inspections of heavy bombers that were reoriented to a conventional role
and subsequently returned to a nuclear role, in order to confirm the differences of such
heavy bombers from other heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type that are
observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection, and to
confirm that the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber is actually
equipped does not exceed the number specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.
(d) The inspection team shall have the right to visually inspect those portions of the
exterior of the inspected heavy bomber where the inspected heavy bomber is equipped for
weapons, as well as to visually inspect the weapons bay of such a heavy bomber, and to
visually inspect those portions of the exterior of the inspected heavy bomber having the
differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible to inspection,
but not to inspect other portions of the exterior or interior.
2. At the discretion of the inspected Party, those portions of the heavy bomber that are not
subject to inspection may be shrouded. The period of time required to carry out the
shrouding process shall not count against the period allocated for inspection.
3. In the course of an inspection conducted during an exhibition, a member of the in-

country escort shall provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph l
(a) or subparagraph l of this Section, explanations to the inspection mm concerning the

number of nuclear weapons for which the heavy bomber is actually equipped, and shall
provide, during inspections conducted pursuant to subparagraph l(b) or subparagraph l
of this Section, explanations to the inspection team concerning the differences that are
observable by national technical means of verification and visible during inspection.
This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry
into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As
provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon
such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of
the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not
affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION
FOR ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN EMBLEM:
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating

to the Treaty Between The Nuclear Powers and All Insignias To an Ensign on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Defensive and Offensive Arms of Mass Destruction Pursuant to
and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms affixed,
hereinafter referred to as the Treaty Series, the Parties have exchanged data current as of
January 3, 1993, on the number of nuclear weapons for which each heavy bomber of a type
and a variant of a type equipped for nuclear weapons is actually equipped.
No later than 30 days after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties shall
additionally exchange data, current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty,
according to the categories of data contained in this Memorandum, on heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear weapons; on heavy bombers specified as reoriented to a conventional
role, and on heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role that are subsequently
returned to a nuclear role; on ICBMs and SLBMs to which a reduced number of warheads is
attributed; and on data on the elimination of heavy ICBMs and on conversion of silo
launchers of heavy ICBMs.
Only those data used for purposes of implementing the Treaty that differ from the data in
the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the
START Treaty are included in this Memorandum.
I. Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Other On Heavy Bombers

Reoriented to a Conventional Role
1. Pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IV of the Treaty each Party undertakes not to have
more nuclear weapons deployed on heavy bombers of any type or variant of a type than the
number specified in this paragraph. Additionally, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article IV of
the Treaty, for each Party the numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers
not reoriented to a conventional role as of the date of signature of the Treaty or to heavy
bombers subsequently deployed are listed below. Such numbers shall only be changed in
accordance with paragraph 5 of Article IV of the Treaty.
The Party making a change shall provide a notification to the other Party 90 days prior to
making such a change. An exhibition shall be conducted to demonstrate the changed
number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the listed type or variant of a type
are actually equipped:
(a) United States of America

Heavy Bomber Types Number of Warheads
and Variant of a Type*
B-52G 12
B-52H 20
B-1B 16
B-2 16
Aggregate Number of Warheads
Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________
(b) Russian Federation Number of Warheads

Heavy Bomber Type
and Variant of a Type
Bear B 1
Bear G 2
Bear H6 6
Bear H16 16
Blackjack 12
Aggregate Number of Warheads

Attributed to Deployed Heavy
Bombers, Except for Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role __________
II. Data on Heavy Bombers Reoriented to a Conventional Role and Heavy Bombers
Reoriented to a Conventional Role that Have Subsequently Been Returned to a Nuclear Role
1. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as
follows:
* Heavy bombers of the type and variant of a type designated B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-
52F, located at the Davis-Monthan conversion or elimination facility as of September 1,
1990, as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding to the START Treaty, will be
eliminated, under the provisions of the START Treaty, before the expiration of the seven-
year reductions period.

Heavy Bomber of Type Number
and Variant of Type
__________ __________
__________ __________
(b) Russian Federation

Heavy Bomber Type Number
__________ __________
__________ __________
(c) Nuclear Powers

Heavy Bomber Type Numbers
___________ __________
2. For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role as well
as data on related air bases are as follows:

Air Bases:
(i) Nuclear Powers

Heavy Bomber Type Differences
___________ __________
Name/Location Bomber Type

Variant of a Type
__________ __________
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________

Air Bases:
Name/Location Bomber Type and

__________ Variant of a Type
Heavy Bombers Reoriented Number
to a Conventional Role __________
3. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for
heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are as follows:
Heavy Bomber Type Difference
__________ __________

__________ __________
4. For each Party, the differences observable by national technical means of verification for
heavy bombers reoriented

__________ __________

__________ __________
(c) Nuclear Powers

___________ __________
III. Data on Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs of Which a Reduced Number of
Warheads Is Attributed for each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases, and on
ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of
warheads attributed to them is reduced pursuant to Article M of the Treaty are as follows:
Type of ICBM or SLBM
____
(b) Nuclear Powers

___________ __________
Deployed ICBMS or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____
Warheads Attributed to Each

Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____
Number of Warheads by Which

the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____
Aggregate Reduction in the

Number of Warheads Attributed
to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:
Name/Location ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the
Number of Warheads Is Reduced ____

Deployed ICBM After Reduction
in the Number of Warheads on
It ____

the Original attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced ____
to deployed ICBMs of that
Type ____
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:
Name/Location SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the


Deployed SLBM After Reduction
It ____

Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed SLBMs of that
Type ____
Type of ICBM or SLBM
____
Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs, on Which the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced ____

Deployed ICBM or Deployed
SLBM After Reduction in the
Number of Warheads on It ____

the Original Attribution of
Warheads for Each ICBM or
SLBM Was Reduced ____

to Deployed ICBMs or Deployed
SLBMs of that Type ____
ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced:
Name/Location ICBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed ICBMs on Which the

Deployed ICBM After Reduction
It ____

Warheads for Each ICBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed ICBMs of that
Type ____
SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced:
Name/Location
SLBM Type on Which
the Number of
Warheads Is Reduced
__________ ____
Deployed SLBMs on Which the

Deployed SLBM After Reduction
It ____

Warheads for Each SLBM Was
Reduced ____

to deployed SLBMs of that
Type ____
IV. Data on Eliminated Heavy ICBMs and Converted Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs
1. For each Party, the numbers of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs converted to silo launchers
of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs are as follows:

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Ground: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______

Aggregate Number of Converted Silo Launchers ____
ICBM Base for Silo
Launchers of ICBMs:
Name/Location ICBM Type Installed
in a Converted
Silo Launcher
______
Silo Launcher Group: (designation)
______
Silo Launchers: ____
______
2. For each Party, the aggregate numbers of heavy ICBMs and eliminated heavy ICBMs are
as follows:
(a) United States of America Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____
(b) Russian Federation Number

Deployed Heavy ICBMs ____
Non-Deployed ICBMs ____
Eliminated Heavy ICBMs ____
V. Changes
Each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in the attribution and data contained in
this Memorandum.
The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge the acceptance of the categories of
data contained in this Memorandum and the responsibility of each Party for the accuracy
only of its own data.
This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of
entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in
force. As provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article V of the Treaty, the Parties may agree
on such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness
of the Treaty.
The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in
this Memorandum or to make other changes to this Memorandum that do not affect
substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Bilateral

OF AMERICA:
FOR THE RUSSIAN

FEDERATION:
ALL INSIGNIAS TO AN EMBLEM:

_________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________
STATEMENTS ON MULTI-MEGATON ATTRIBUTIONS
AND OPEN DISCUSSION AND ANALAGY
Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command- The Article's

of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal;
inter alias DESBIC Treaty DONE IN MIDWAY CITY USA 92655
STATEMENTS ON PAST AND PRESENT DANGERS POSED BY MULTI-MEGATON WEAPONS

MULTI-MEGATON ATTRIBUTION SUBJECT TO VIRTUAL DISAPPEAR-MENT
ELIMINATIONS
The Largest Nuclear Weapons

Un-named Sources 19 June 2005
Seat also Multi-megaton Weapons:

The largest nuclear weapons;
Contents:
High-yield thermonuclear weapons: overview

United States:
o U.S. nuclear warheads with yield over
4.5 megatons (table)
o The largest U.S. nuclear weapon
o The first U.S. high-yield nuclear weapons
o Mass produced multi-megaton weapons
o The Titan II heavy ICBM
o The Spartan ABM
o The last U.S. high-yield nuclear weapon
USSR/Russia:
o Soviet/Russian nuclear warheads with yield
over 4.5 megatons (table)
o The largest Soviet nuclear weapons
o The R-9 and R-16 ICBMs
o The R-36 heavy ICBM
o The R-36M, R-36MUTTKh, and R-36M2 heavy ICBMs
o The RS-16 and RS-18 ICBMs
The largest PRC nuclear weapon
ANALYSIS,
1. In order to make a fuller contribution to their common objective aimed at lessening

military confrontation and promoting disarmament which we set aside to do up authors
contending iotass, a subjects of strengthening peace and friendship overtures, when
realizing the perils of neither nuclear core meltdown in an populated contiguous zone of
application with liquefaction set in, nor nuclear composite arterys in fields of lighted
accrue will continue to be the subject to the limitations provided for there then. By that
we'll contends all 525 nuclear reactor energy utility complexes are projection concept and-
s another forms of risk assimilation.
(a) So describe an explosive calibration we never saw-s in some areas of historical

significant details has also no meaning and will be construed as outdated and formally a
threat in areas of most volatile said explosive detonation yield such as the largest multi-
megaton nuclear or variant of its class, would have more or such as the same devastating
irreconcilable effect-s in view of geological shelf lifes, leaving in its wake an landscapes of
uninhabitable grazing pasture for all to seek see.
(b) Accorded the same graven dangers as if further consideration be given, the question of
when enemies engage a nuclear complex with moax emission in its core and stated, we do
set aside peaceful uses of IAEA iota of advice as counter point to construe in and though
replicas are nuclear composite individuals, author would point out tricks the replicas used
to situate as we seen in Fukushima? So stated.
(c) High-yield thermonuclear weapons: Notice of intention to virtual disappear and-s

assimilate an non-proliferation order-s will continue to be a subject? Sir.
2. Proceeding from the pretenses that thermonuclear assimilation would only amount to
counterpoint treachery; The United States and the Soviet Union, after independently
developing thermonuclear weapons, said both produced some numbers of such weapons of
very high yield. While most thermonuclear weapons built had yields in the range of several
hundred kilotons to a few megatons, some much larger weapons were built. Weapons with
yields up to 20-50 megatons were developed and deployed (one Soviet weapon of 150 mt
was developed. Of the roughly said 135,000 warheads ever built by the two superpowers,
about 3% had yields over 4.5 megatons therefore.
3. The Partys to a status quo agreed to settle their differences. Though the United States
said to have built the greater number of multi-megaton weapons, doing so in the late 1950s
and 1960s mostly to equip its bomber force with a massive nuclear capability then again
the U.S.S.R. The U.S. said largely abandoned such weapons in favor of smaller nuclear
weapons, allowing more flexible delivery of larger numbers of warheads. Most of the Soviet
strategic nuclear capability was in its ICBMs, but like the U.S. the Soviets deployed high-
yield weapons before mostly shifting to smaller, multiple warheads.
4. The act or contention though that The U.S. has now retired all of its multi-megaton
weapons there from disassembly of the last type removed from service, the B53, may is not
completed in 2006 is somewhere up in the air as the SORT Compact does outline neither,
Russia maintains an number that of which ICBMs in high-yield single warheads is an
contention.
(a) The People's Republic of China have many a ICBM armed with very many and un
yielding high-yield warheads as well-s we set aside at Courts the Entitys telepathic
indifference for a possible use against lone author specimen whose Soully spirited matter is
much to be exploited by these giants.
Russia's R-36M2 Voyevoda (SS-18 Mod 6) with a 20 mt warhead (possibly 5 deployed).

(The UR-100N version (SS-19 Mod 2) with a 5 mt warhead may no longer be deployed.)
PRC's DF-5A (CSS-4) with a 5 mt warhead (about 24 deployed).
5. There is still considerable uncertainty on some of the issues discussed here and-s while
much information on U.S. nuclear warhead history is still available, information is still is
neither collective as confidence building will attest here as on some high-yield nuclear
weapons. Information now available on the former Soviet/current Russian arsenal is
limited regarding its largest weapons, and considerable discrepancies remain to be retired
as doubts to the limitations provided for while still hid away in cave awning displays
waiting friction fallout from inevitably so called fiercest foes in available information
surmise.
6. The following graphs provide estimates of the total numbers and yield of
U.S./Soviet/Russian high-yield weapons (those with individual yields over 4.5megatons).
Note that these estimates are based on models of stockpile history, and that total stockpile
numbers and yields may not correspond to other figures on this web site.
7. Now seek and situated The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have conducted a total of 23 nuclear tests of
at least 4 megatons each. The U.S. from 1952 to 1962 detonated 11 such devices above
ground plus one underground in 1971. The total yield of these was 105 mt for an average of
9 mt each. The largest of these was a 15 mt test in 1954. In turn, the U.S.S.R. detonated 12
such multi-megaton devices above ground in 1961 and 1962, plus one underground in
1973. Their total yield was 200 mt, for an average of 15 mt each. The largest Soviet test was
a 58 mt test in 1961. The total fission yield of all 22 above ground tests was about 124 mt
(54 mt from U.S. tests and 70 mt from Soviet tests).
8. U.S. nuclear warheads with yield over 4.5 megatons
x-ray
Explanation: IOC=initial operational capability, NGB=nuclear gravity bomb,
ICBM=intercontinental ballistic missile, ABM=antiballistic missile, TN=thermonuclear,
clean/dirty refers to low/high fission yield fraction, respectively. See text for sources.
9. The largest U.S. nuclear weapon

(Image: Mk-17/24 bomb casing at the National Atomic Museum.)
The largest nuclear weapons ever built by the United States is still considered a weapon of
attack were the EC17/Mk-17, the EC24/Mk-24, and the B41 (Mk41).
(a) Public domain information does not allow a conclusive determination as to which had
the largest yield. However, current best estimate is that the highest yield weapon was a
version of the B41 with a yield of 25 mt which there as shall be considered to oppose to
that of which may be considered obsolete and destructive permeance if that Naval
Intelligence mothballed global communicate intrinsified..
10. The High Contracting Party's' shall see fit as Duly sworn to do so, to virtually vanish
every retired multi-megaton explosive ways and means of resurrection so stated as top
priorities. China too, Independent hide and seekers, and home bases as such The Mk-17
and Mk-24 were said virtually identical weapons: they used different primaries, but were
indistinguishable by external appearance and weight.[1] "Emergency capability" versions
of both bombs (the EC17 and EC24) were briefly stockpiled in small numbers rushed into
service in 1954. These were retired in late 1954 when the production versions were
deployed.[1,2] At 18.9 metric tons each and 7.5 meters long, only the B-36 bomber could
carry these weapons. All were said to behave as if retired by 1957 in favor of smaller
weapons that could be carried by a variety of bombers.[1]
11. Reported yields for the Mk-17 and Mk-24 range from 10 mt to 20 mt. unnamed sources
gave figures of 15-20 mt[1] or 10-15 mt for production versions (for the emergency
capability versions he gives 11 mt for the EC17 and 13.5 mt for the EC24)[3]; NRDC reports
10-15 mt.[4] Nuclear test yields include 11 mt for the EC17 in shot Castle Romeo on 27
March 1954 and 13.5 mt for the EC24 in shot Castle Yankee on 5 May 1954.[5] Based on
this the best estimates here are yields of 11 mt for the EC17, ~12.5 mt for the Mk-17, 13.5
mt for the EC24, and ~15 mt for the Mk-24.
12. The Mk-41 was the only three-stage thermonuclear weapon ever deployed by the U.S. It
weighed 4,840 kilograms and was 3.8 meters long.[6] It could be carried by the B-52 or the
B-47.[7] While about 500 were built from September 1960 to June 1962, retirement began
in November 1963 and the last B41s withdrawn in July 1976.[6]
13. Best estimate here is that the B41 was produced in at least two versions, one of which
had a yield of 25 mt--the highest yield weapon ever built by the U.S. It is likely that only a
small fraction of the weapons built were the high yield version, and that these were the
first ones retired (in the 1960s). These conclusions are based on the following:
In 1962 DOE declassified the statement "The U.S. has a nuclear weapon in stockpile with a
yield of approximately 25 megatons."
A 25 mt yield for the B41 would give it a yield-to-weight ratio of 5.2 kilotons/kilogram.
While this would require a far greater efficiency than any other U.S. weapon (at least 40%
efficiency in a fusion fuel of lithium deuteride), this was apparently attainable. In 1963 DOE
declassified statements that the U.S. had the technological capability of deploying a 35 mt
warhead on the Titan II, or a 50-60 mt gravity bomb on B-52s.[8] Neither weapon was
pursued (the Titan II was deployed with a 9 mt warhead), but either would require yield-
to-weight ratios superior to a 25-mt B41.
While in 1989 Chuck Hansen gave a yield of "less than 10 megatons" for the B41,[1] he
gave two yields in 1995: "less than 10 megatons" and "25 MT...the highest-yield weapon
ever stockpiled [by the U.S.]".[6] His discussion suggests that two versions were developed:
a high yield "dirty" version and a low yield "clean" version. The NRDC gives a yield of 10
mt.[4]
A TX-41 prototype was tested in shot Hardtack Poplar with a yield of 9.3 mt.[5] This may
correspond to the low yield Mk-41 version.
DOE has released cumulative stockpile data, including numbers of stockpiled warheads
each fiscal year and total stockpile yield each fiscal year.[9] This data is inconsistent with
all B41s having a 25 mt yield, but are consistent with limited numbers of a high yield
version which were then retired early.
Development of the B53 was ordered as a replace for the B41.[10] This may be
interpreted as a continuation of the shift away from high-yield and/or dirty weapons. Note
that with the exceptions of the B41 and B53, all other multi-megaton strategic bombs were
retired by 1964.
14. The first U.S. multi-megaton weapons following the first Soviet nuclear test in August
1949, U.S. President Truman directed continued development of thermonuclear weapons
in a January 1950 directive. The first such weapon designed used liquid deuterium as
fusion fuel--necessarily cooled to temperatures near absolute zero to keep it in a liquid
state. Such weapons were difficult to handle not only because of their extremely large size,
but also because of the special cryogenic requirements:[11, 12];
(a) The first multistage thermonuclear test was Ivy Mike on 1 November 1952: far from
being a deliverable weapon, this cryogenic experimental device weighed 74 metric tons
and occupied a warehouse. Yield was 10.4 mt, which was 60% fission.[13]
(b) The TX-16 was a weaponized version of this device: it weighed about 18 metric tons,
was 7.56 meters long and had a yield of about 7.5 mt. Part of the weight reduction was
accomplished by using equipment in the B-36 to top off the liquid hydrogen before
delivery. About 5 "emergency capability" units designated EC16 were built in March 1954.
All were retired the following month, however, as solid-fueled thermonuclear weapon
prototypes were successfully tested in the Pacific. After the cancellation of the Mk-16, no
other liquid-fueled thermonuclear weapons were ever built.[12, 14]
(c) Conventional solid-fueled thermonuclear weapons used lithium-deuteride as fusion

fuel. The first such weapon was the EC14; it weighed 13,133 kg and was 5.64 meters long.
These "emergency capability" weapons actually preceded the EC16 into the stockpile, with
5 units built in February 1954, making the EC14 the first operational multistage
thermonuclear weapon.[11] The design was tested in shot Castle Union on 26 April 1954,
producing a yield of 6.9 mt.[5] All were retired in October 1954.[11] These early
thermonuclear weapons were carried by specially modified B-36 bombers; the limited
number of such converted bombers available in 1954 operated from Kirtland AFB in New
Mexico.[12]
15. Mass-produced multi-megaton weapons
(a) Four high-yield thermonuclear weapons had been rushed into the stockpile in 1954: the
EC14, EC16, EC17/Mk-17, and EC24/Mk-24. In the late 1950s, three multi-megaton
weapons of more robust design were mass produced: the B21, B27, and B36.
(b) The B21 weighed about 7,000 kg and was produced in both clean and dirty versions;[3,
15] a clean version was tested in shot Redwing Navajo on 11 July 1956 at a yield of 4.5
mt.[5] From December 1955 to July 1956 about 275 units were produced. They were all
converted to B36-Y1 weapons from June to November 1957.[15]
(c) The B27 weighed 1,430 kg and had a yield of about 5 mt. About 700 were produced
between November 1958 and June 1959. All were retired between November 1962 and
July 1964.[86]
(d) The 7,900 kg B36 NGB was also produced in a dirty version (B36-Y1) and clean version
(B36-Y2). The B36-Y1 had a yield of about 9.5 mt, while that of the B36-Y2 was 6 mt; most
of the 940 units built were probably the high yield, dirty version.[16, 17]
16. The Titan II heavy ICBM
(a) The Titan II carried the highest yield missile warhead ever deployed by the United
States. This was the W53 warhead with a 9-megaton yield, which could be delivered by the
Titan II to a range of 15,000 km.[18] About 60 W53 warheads were built from December
1962 to December 1963.[19]
(b) The first Titan II was placed on alert in April 1963 in Arizona. The first squadron of 9
was operational in June 1963, and full operational capability was attained with 54
deployed in December 1963: 18 near Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona, 18 near Little Rock
AFB in Arkansas, and 18 near McConnell AFB in Kansas.[20, 21, 22] A guidance upgrade
was conducted to improve the accuracy of operational Titan IIs from February 1978 to
December 1979.[18, 22] On 19 September 1980 leaking fuel exploded in a Titan II silo in
Arkansas, killing one and injuring 27. This silo was never returned to service; the same is
apparently true of a silo in Kansas damaged by a fuel leak on 24 August 1978.[23, 24]
(c) Retirement of the remaining 52 Titan IIs began in September 1982.[24] The last one
was removed from alert in May 1987.[25] Disassembly of W53 warheads had begun in
October 1969[19] and was probably completed by 1988.
17. The Spartan ABM
(a) In January 1963 the U.S. began development of a two-layered anti-ballistic missile
system which would eventually be named Safeguard, with the two ABMs being Spartan and
Sprint. The first layer, the Spartan missile, was an exo-atmospheric ABM using a high-yield
thermonuclear warhead (the W71) to intercept incoming warheads outside the
atmosphere. The second was Sprint, an endo-atmospheric high-acceleration ABM using a
low-yield warhead to intercept surviving warheads within the atmosphere.[26]
(b) The W71's yield was too large for underground testing at the Nevada Test Site, so
Amchitka Island in the Alaskan Aleutians was selected as a site. To evaluate concerns over
this site, a test of 1.2 megatons was conducted at Amchitka on 2 October 1969 (Milrow).
Political opposition to the W-71 test (and the Safeguard ABM system in general) included
an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court attempting to block the test on the scheduled day; the
Court rejected the appeal 4-3, allowing the test to proceed.[27] On 6 November 1971 the
Spartan's warhead, the W71, was tested at full yield in shot Cannikin of Operation
Grommet. At the bottom of a 1.76 km-deep shaft,[27] the warhead's yield was reported as
"approximately" 5 mt[26] or "less than 5 megatons"[27], estimated here as about 4.8
megatons.
(c) The first W71 units were completed in July 1974, and full production ran from October
1974 to July 1975 [26] by which time 39 warheads had been built.[28] The W71 warhead
was "tailored": using a layer of gold around the thermonuclear secondary, the output of x-
rays was maximized to achieve a more efficient kill of targeted warheads.[26]
(d) The SALT I treaty, signed 26 May 1972, and breached forth by they and others
observing this statement of facts found out, limited the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each to a pair of
100-missile ABM sites; an additional protocol signed 3 July 1974 reduced this to one such
site each. The U.S. selected a site near Grand Forks AFB in North Dakota for the Safeguard
site, named the Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex,[29] which would provide limited
protection to the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman ICBM field.
(e) The first ABMs were emplaced at Grand Forks in late 1974. The first ABMs were placed
on alert in April 1975, with 8 Spartans and 28 Sprints operational. The full complement of
30 Spartans and 70 Sprints became operational on 1 October 1975, with all 30 Spartans at
the MSR site near Nekoma, North Dakota.[30]
(f) The following day, 2 October 1975, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to shut
down the Safeguard site. The U.S. Senate passed a similar measure on 18 November 1975,
and that month the Safeguard site was taken off alert. Decommissioning of the site began
10 February 1976.[31, 32, 33]
(g) The Spartan missiles and warheads were retained in inactive storage until the 1990s.
The warheads were dismantled in 1995.[34]
18. The last U.S. high-yield nuclear weapon

(Image: B53 bomb casing at the National Atomic Museum.)
(a) Development of the B53 began in March 1958 as a replacement for the B41.[10] The
B53 was carried by the B-47, B-52, and B-58 bombers. It was reportedly produced in two
yield versions. The 9-megaton B53-Y1, a "dirty" version, was first produced in August 1962,
weighed 4010 kg and was 3.8 meters long. The B53-Y2 was a "clean" version first produced
in June 1964; it weighed 3860 kg and was 3.7 meters long.[5, 10] The yield of the Y2
version is unknown, but was probably lower than 9 mt.
(b) When B53 production ended in June 1965, about 340 had been built. Retirement of
some early versions began in 1967.[10] When the B41 was retired in 1976, the B53 was left
as the only high-yield bomber weapon in the U.S. stockpile.
(c) In 1987 about 25 B53s remained in the active stockpile, plus additional B53s retired
and awaiting dismantling. On 5 August 1987 the DOD announced that B53 retirement was
being halted, and those retired but still intact units would be returned to the active
stockpile.[10] This unusual action likely reflected the B53's then unique capabilities against
deeply buried hardened targets in the U.S.S.R.
(d) Thus, at the end of the Cold War, in 1991, there were an estimated 50 B53s remaining
in the active stockpile, and their retirement was believed to be eminent.[35, 36] (This
figure may not include 28 B53s dismantled between October 1989 and September
1997.[28]) However, in 1995 it emerged that these were being retained pending
development of an earth-penetrating warhead.[37] Without the B53, the U.S. would have
had no weapon to hold at risk certain super hardened, deeply buried targets. The B61-11
was developed as a replacement: with a potential 350-500 kt yield in an earth-penetrating
warhead, allowing detonation slightly below the ground surface for better coupling of
shock to ground, this was a viable replacement.[38] The B61-11 was deployed from Dec.
1996 to 1997, allowing retirement of the B53.[39]
(e) The B53 was immediately retired from the active stockpile [39]; there were apparently
safety concerns with the warhead. Some B53s were disassembled at the Pantex Plant in
Texas from 1998 to May 1999, at which time disassemblies were suspended due to safety
protocols.[40] Resumption of disassemblies was delayed by adoption of new safety
documents and by dedicated efforts at Pantex to complete disassemblies of remaining W56
and W79 warheads from October 2001 to September 2003.[41, 42, 43, 44, 45] In 2002 it
was reported that the last B53s, about 35, were to be soon dismantled.[46, 47] DOE
documents suggest that some issues still had to be worked out (including transportation
from temporary storage at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico[49, 50]), plus
disassembly efforts remained concentrated on other warheads (including the W70 [51]).
Funds for B53 disassembly were included in the FY2004 [49] and FY2005 [52] and
requested for FY2006 [51], although it is not clear if any additional disassemblies have
been completed as of February 2005.
(f) Following removal of the B53 from service, the highest yield U.S. weapon is the variable
yield B83, with a maximum yield of 1.2 mt.[53]
19. Soviet/Russian nuclear warheads with yield over 4.5 megatons
system (U.S. des.) [warhead] type stock entry
IOC off alert retired type weight (kg) yield (mt)
no. built R-16 Sheksna (SS-7 Mod 3) ICBM 1963
1978 1950 ~6 0-320 R-9 (SS-8) ICBM Nov 1963 1978
1800 ~5 23-46 R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 1)
ICBM Nov 1966 1980 7000 18 140-290
R-36 8K67 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 2) [8F675]
ICBM 1966 1980 7000 25 140-290
R-36 8K69 Tsiklon (SS-9 Mod 3)
FOBS Aug 1969 Jan 1983 5000 ~20 0-20
MR UR-100N (SS-17 Mod 2) ICBM 1977
1984 3500 ~5 10-30 R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) [15B86]
ICBM Dec 1974 ~1978 7500 24 20-60
R-36MUTTKh (SS-18 Mod 3) ICBM 1976 1990 730
20 20-60 R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 6)
ICBM Aug 1990 9000 20 20 UR-100N (SS-19 Mod 2)
ICBM 1977 3500 ~5 60 RDS-220 ("Tsar Bomba")
NGB 27000 ~150 0-5 NGB 50 0-20
NGB ~20 0-120 NGB ~5000? ~5 ?
20. The largest Soviet nuclear weapon
(a) The largest nuclear weapon ever developed by any nuclear power was the Soviet RDS-
220,[62] also nicknamed "Vanya" or "Tsar Bomba" (King of Bombs). It was a three-stage
weapon weighing 24.8 metric tons and was 8 meters long. Its 2-meter diameter required a
specially modified version of the Tu-95 Bear bomber for delivery. The single such Tu-95V
carried the RDS-220 partially protruding from the bomb bay.[63, 64] The U.S.S.R. tested
this design in an airdrop over Novaya Zemlya on 30 October 1961 at a yield of 58 megatons
(the U.S. estimated 58 mt[65], while Russian sources report 50 mt[66]). However, this was
a reduced yield "clean" version: the uranium sleeve on the tertiary stage was replaced with
lead, and the fission yield was only 3% of the total yield.[63] The full yield version had a
yield of 150 mt[62] (Russian sources report 100 mt[64] to 150 mt[67]).
(b) Another device tested the following year had a nominal yield of 50 mt. Tested at a
reduced yield of 24.2 mt on 24 December 1962 at Novaya Zemlya, it was designed at
Chelyabinsk-70 (as opposed to Arzamas-16 for the RDS-220)[66].
(c) Whether either of these weapons was operational is sided. The RDS-220 was probably
believed operational: only the single specially modified Tu-95V could carry it, and when
doing so it would have been particularly vulnerable to anti-aircraft action. The 50-mt
Chelyabinsk-70 device might have weighed 10-15 metric tons, based on comparison to
other Soviet warheads of the time. Thus it was probably deliverable by unmodified Tu-95M
Bear bombers, which could carry 15 metric tons of payload (albeit to a reduced range).[68]
Any operational deployment was probably only for a short time since bomber forces were
converting to cruise missiles, but the weapons could have remained in the stockpile as late
as the 1980s, given the apparent slow pace of Soviet warhead disassembly.
(d) The Soviets briefly considered developing an ICBM capable of carrying the 150-mt RDS-
220 warhead or a similarly large warhead. Of several proposed missiles, only the UR-500
reached the flight stage, by which time any nuclear-armed version was abandoned in favor
of using the UR-500 exclusively as a space launch vehicle.[69]
The R-9 and R-16 ICBMs
21. The R-36 heavy ICBM
(a) The R-36 heavy ICBM, known in the West as the SS-9 Scarp, was deployed in four
versions. Two versions of the R-36 carried single warheads: the SS-9 Mod 1 carried a
warhead of 10 mt (some sources report 5 mt), and the SS-9 Mod 2 carried the 8F675
warhead with a yield of 25 mt (some sources report 18 mt). The R-36O version (Western
designation SS-9 Mod 3) was a fractional-orbit bombardment system (FOBS). It would
launch a single 5-mt warhead into low-Earth orbit, southbound from the USSR. Once
orbiting over the United States, the warhead would deorbit and strike its target. The system
was intended to bypass U.S. early-warning radars. The final version, the R-36P (Western
designation SS-9 Mod 4) carried 3 warheads, not independently target able. Each warhead
had a yield between 2 and 5 mt.[70, 71]
(b) The R-36 went on alert on 9 November 1966, and 268 of all four versions were
deployed in underground silos. All were retired by 1978 except for some R-36O versions.
The R-36O FOBS version, which went on alert 25 August 1969, was retained in small
numbers until January 1983, when the SALT II treaty was completed and barred their
deployment.[70, 71]
22. The R-36M, R-36MUTTKh, and R-36M2 heavy ICBMs
(a) The heavy ICBM known in the West as the SS-18 Satan actually includes three related
missiles--the R-36M, the R-36MUTTKh, and the R-36M2--with a variety of warhead
loadings in each case. Deployed in both MIRVed and single-warhead versions, the single
warhead variants carried the largest missile warheads ever deployed.[72, 73]
(b) The R-36M was developed as a replacement for the R-36. Flight tests were conducted
from October 1972 to October 1975 on three variants. The 15B86 single warhead version,
with a 24-mt yield, was the first version deployed; this was known in the West as the SS-18
Mod 1. These became operational in December 1974 in converted R-36 silos at
Dombarovksy. Most R-36Ms were deployed with 15F143 MIRV warheads--eight warheads
each--although a ten-warhead 15F143U version also existed. The MIRVed version (Western
designation SS-18 Mod 2) became operational in November 1975. A version carrying
terminally-guided 15F678 warheads (MaRVs) was tested from July 1978 to August 1980
but never deployed.[72, 73]
(C) The follow-on R-36MUTTKh was flight tested in a MIRVed variant from October 1977 to
November 1979, known in the West as the SS-18 Mod 4.[72, 73] The 15F183 warhead
section generally carried 10 warheads, although at least one flight test carried 14
warheads.[74] Some R-36MUTTHk ICBMs carried the 15B86 single warhead at 24 mt
(Western designation SS-18 Mod 3), now with improved accuracy over the R-36M. In
September 1979 the first three R-36MUTTKh regiments became operational; they had
replaced all R-36 missiles by 1980, all R-36M missiles by 1982 or 1983, and reached full
deployment in 308 silos by 1983.[72, 73]
(d) Another follow-on, the R-36M2 Voyevoda ("commander" in English), was flight tested
from March 1986 to September 1989. The MIRVed variant (SS-18 Mod 5), with ten 15F173
warheads, became operational in December 1988. A single-warhead version (SS-18 Mod 6),
with the 15F175 warhead providing a 20-mt yield, was deployed in small numbers
beginning in August 1990.[72, 73] The single-warhead R-36M2 is the highest yield nuclear
weapon currently deployed by any nation.
The UR-100N and MR UR-100N ICBMs
23. The largest PRC nuclear weapon
(a) The People's Republic of China is subject to the conditions and terms of space based
saucer modularly conformities sure as though she has deployed a warhead estimated at 5
megatons on the Dong Feng 5 ICBM (U.S. designation CSS-4). The DF-5 can carry a 3,000-kg
warhead to a range of 12,000, while the improved Dong Feng 5A can carry 3,200 kg to a
range of 13,000 km.[78] The warhead is probably a high yield version of the design(s) used
in the PRC's thermonuclear tests of 1968, 1970, and 1976 (given the limited number of
Chinese nuclear tests, an independent warhead design is unlikely).[76]
(b) Estimated deployments of DF-5s are highly uncertain. The first two DF-5 missiles were
deployed in silos in 1981,[78] and the force remained at 2 through at least 1984.[79]
Estimated numbers deployed were 18 in June 2000, 20 in 2003,[76] and 24 in 2005,
although reports vary. From about 1990 to 2000, deployed DF-5s were replaced with
improved DF-5As.[75, 77] Reportedly the DF-5 force is currently organized into three
missile brigades.
(C) The 803rd brigade in Hunan province was established in 1984 and converted to DF-5A
missiles by the mid-1990s. The 804th brigade in western Henan province was established
in the late 1980s, converted to DF-5A missiles by 2000, and may include missiles based in
tunnels. The 818th brigade in Hunan province was established in 1996 and was likely
initially equipped with DF-5A missiles.[77]
SOME INFORMATION IS MISSING AD ADAGES HISTORY IS SAID DATED 1956-57

STIPULATED FALSLEY DERIVED FOR AUTHORS TO INCINERATE FAITH A DAY COME I
SAW DEVISING HELL ADDED.
5th DAY OF MARCH 2,015 IN 92655 U S A
Treaty Nuclear disarmament; Peace, International

Treaty Deposition Criterion; Agenda; The Article's
of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal;
Descriptive Encode In Star Based Internal Command;
inter alias DESBIC Treaty DONE IN 92655 USA
Weapons of Attack Terms, and Terminology's
1.The listing includes all types of nuclear warheads deployed, built but not deployed,
cancelled, currently proposed, or presumed/suspected.
2. Relatively complete information is as stated so;
3. For the US, UK, France, South Africa, Sweden. This is considered hereto as an draft
assimilation of the aspect to ratio with regard for variant comparability when the
undertaking of mutual qualitative disarmament is to be sought Sirs Sir.
4. Comparable specifics are to be recognized by the terms provided for hereto; especially
that of notwithstanding the USSR or Russia (which inherited the Soviet nuclear arsenal?);
and the PRC.
5. It shall be the duty of the Secretary General's to transpose the extensions and specific
variations for other countries, thereto no classification shall be much considered as
speculative here when Sir.
6 Explanation of terms
Weapon name: designation and/or name assigned by respective country Warhead

designation (for US, UK, and France): designation for nuclear warhead Western designation
(for all other countries): U.S. and NATO designations-
Weapon type:
AAM - air-to-air missile
ABM - anti-ballistic missile
ADM - atomic demolition munitions
AFAP - artillery-fired atomic projectile
ALBM - air-launched ballistic missile
(range over 1000 km)
ALCM - air-launched cruise missile (range over 1000 km)
ASAT - anti-satellite weapon
ASCM - anti-ship cruise missile
ASM - air-to-surface missile (range under 1000 km)
ASW - anti-submarine weapon
ATBM - anti-tactical ballistic missile
DEW - directed energy weapon
FOBS - fractional orbit bombardment system
GLCM - ground-launched cruise missile
(range between 1000 km and 5500 km)
ICBM - intercontinental ballistic missile
ICCM - intercontinental cruise missile
IRBM - intermediate-range ballistic missile
MICBM- mobile intercontinental ballistic missile
MRBM - medium-range ballistic missile
NDB - nuclear depth bomb
NGB - nuclear gravity bomb
SAM - surface-to-air missile
SLBM - submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM - submarine-launched cruise missile
SRBM - short-range ballistic missile
(range under 1000 km)
7. Stock entry: date when first warheads entered nuclear stockpile IOC: initial operational
capability, or date of first alert capability-off alert: date when alert capability ended Retire
stock: date when last warheads dismantled
8.WH type: type of nuclear device:
BF - boosted fission
ER - enhanced radiation
FI - implosion, unspecified fission
GA - gun assembly, uranium fission
IC - implosion, fission, composite core
IM - implosion, fission, various cores
IP - implosion, plutonium fission
IU - implosion, uranium fission
LC - "Sloika" thermonuclear
LI - linear implosion, plutonium
PG - gun assembly, plutonium fission
TC - multi-stage thermonuclear, clean (
TD - multi-stage thermonuclear, dirty (>65% fission)
TN - multi-stage thermonuclear
TS - multi-stage thermonuclear, standard (25%-65% fission)
9. No. built: total number of warheads built
10. Yield: explosive yield in kilotons (kt) or megatons (mt), with notes as follows:
DV - different versions (warhead stocks include separate versions with different yields)
S - selectable yield (individual warhead yield may be selected from several options)
SC - separate cores (individual warhead yield determined by which of several

interchangeable fissile cores is used)
V - variable yield (individual warhead yield may be set within a continuously variable
range)
MRVs, MIRVs, or MARVs - multiple reentry vehicles, multiple independently-target able

reentry vehicles, and maneuverable reentry vehicles, respectively (figures indicate
warhead loading per missile)
11. The above accounts and description of the Annex of Terminal Attribution, pursuant to
the classifications ascribed of in Chapter's 6 of this Provision, shall be subject to the
limitations provided for under this Treaty and considered an integral priority undertaking
on the elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction to be phased out, decommissioned and
destroyed, as an display of civil obedience therewith our star elder presences instilled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF 04 MARCH 2,015 OF FAITH WHEREBY

DESBIC PROTOCOLS
1.This Protocol is an integral part of this DESBIC Treatys AGENDA, and of this Treaty(s')
and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty(s') and shall remain
in force for an unlimited duration pending sound extension and revisionment(s). As
provided for within the Provisions of the Treaty(s'), the Party(s') may agree upon such
additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and the effectiveness of
disarmament and the related terms thereupon.
2. The Party(s') agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes to the conditions of a
Provisions to this Treaty(s'), the substantive interpretation was to the point of 0,000
nuclear and 0,000 biological warheads, as, and/or relating devices, were to be the common
and level sound approach; along with 000, nuclear fuel reactors, except as prohibited also
Naval Global Enforcement Duty(s').
3. USTICE ANTON HIGHER COURTS NOW PRESIDED SANTA ANA CA. ATTENTION ALL
INSIGNIAS TO AN ENSIGN A UNITED NATIONS IN GOD'S WILL WE TRUST: THE
HONORABLE ANTON PRESIDED AN ENTITY AND A LORDS MAY HIS WORDS BE
UNDERSTOOD
4. To promote the objectives and implementations of the Provisions to this Convention, all
insignia's to a Marquis, be they independent or clandestine "motus operates", be bound by
this Testament, and for the purpose of independent housing and growth away from aliens
we see, whereby the United States in Support and Service to the United Nations and
Atlantic Treaty Organization, referred to hereinafter as U S S' U N A T O, may collaborate to
promote well calibrated abstracts of contingencies thereto. The Commission is to act as an
inter-compartmental Agency and promote unity?
5. The above mentioned embodiments of governing principalities shall be referred to as the

Principal's, and/or the Party(s') to a State(s); or Party(s'); and/or the United Nation's
Atlantic Treaty Organization hereby. The Party(s') to this Treaty reaffirm their Faith in the
principles of national and International accordance to a declaration of Charters of
governments of the past Signatures on file at the United Nation's. In view of this declaration
which will repudiate on the part of the nuclear proliferating Ensigns; the Israelis are not a
religious society, along with the U S A, and the United Nations Organization of International
Governments are considered along with Russia, Her constituents are primary or read
another care co-ordination Principal- thereby hereto.
(The USS U N and Celestial Claims)
6. Pursuant to its responsibilities under the Charter of the League of Nations, the United
Nation's done lied to the present charges in observance of the Provision descriptive and
inter-planetary extra-terrestrial connotives present that exists and are purpose and
purchase crude radioactive displays of dissidence to my recollections? These reports may
include particulars of decisions and recommendations whereby relevant information has
previously been furnished to the United Nations study reference to an event of alpha-
scientific importance.
7 All the while s subject now in question will be a Soul patterns, my "Soully spirited matter"
perhaps for a network of afterlife as we are, placement of molecular in servitude to all the
disrespect, and social disassociation with the precepts weve discussed concerning genetic
mutations, and the act and fact these individuals harbor resentment standing rather than
obey the word of the Lord, His Majestys Grace. The special orders were to provide
assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational,
professional, technical, social, cultural, and administrative spheres of common dialect.
8. The establishment of a programme of universal utopia order is a matter of say. We say.

Our say is something to assign. Love is something to perceive in entered a region of
underworld and counter point objectives and physical enticement to a recollection to who
do we take notices up as Human understanding continued.
9. Now desiring to establish a firm foundation for common approach to promote regional
cooperation on standards of the spirit capacity; that of equality and partnerships and
thereby contribute toward peace, progress, and prosperity; fostering good understanding,
good neighborliness, and meaningful social justices among the civilized Ive encountered, in
order to preserve and describe succeeding generations.
Protocol 5 (Naval Proliferation)
10. In order to consolidate good relations between the Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Power's
on the open seas, and the far corners of the earth's inhabitants it shall be necessary to
facilitate an High Standing Order shall be assigned here when accountancy licensing for all
Aircraft Carrier's, with a capability of landing fixed winged aircraft shall be the letter of the
will of the Justices for the Peace.
11. In Addition the conscripted U N award for United States with (if applicable), be there
inseperable immunities set forward for maritime exchange and enforcement of critical life
services on the high seas and inlets, because of the turbulences of combinative, competitive
strike force oriented ship and defense contracting.
12. Realizing their desire to create a system of collective security, taking into consideration
at the same time the situations that have come about regarding allied cohesion a U N
Secretary General will suspend all sales of submersible vehicular transport and all
submarine sales from every miner including, U S A, German, French, Russian, Chinese in
order to keep parity and afloat as global maritime constrictors awards and by 31
December 2016; The suspensions with an exception noted for 011 critical life support
assimilation being noted are its international contingents and variants of as follows:
(i) Strategic Naval Class Limitations
tons standard aggregate displacement
(a) Aircraft carrier-----------90,000 tons
(b) Battleships----------------70,000
(c) Cruiser Class Warship----- 32,500
(d) Destroyers-----------------24,000
(e) Frigates Armed W/Torpedoes-23,500
(f) Amphibious War Ships------ 26,500
(g) Missile Patrol Boats------ 13,500
(h) Special Warfare Crafts-----13,500
PROTOCOL 13 TREATY INTEGRATION

DESBIC TREATYS AND AGENDA
13. In line with rights, duties, and awards to the United States Navy-Marine Corps in
exercising its global enforcement obligations, all shipbuilders and all insignia's to a Marquis
shall not exceed the aggregate postulation standards aforementioned in this Article. The
aggregate numbers provided for shall be initiated no later than December 31, 2,016 and
special permission from the U S S' U N must be given to all and all, who come to call for an
Aircraft Carrier of any such contract projection to be constructed, as is the same for ballistic
and Attack Submarines or submersibles, by permission only, subject to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff authorization and his agency, in order to assure protection and service
thereto.
14. In accordance with the provisions of this Article, the Party(s') shall agree to the
limitations provided for in this agreement(s). Any such breach of what can be unanimously
construed as disposition-ment of Law, shall be subject to excessive fines, detention and/or
suspension of permanent membership status to the Security Council U N, (if -applicable), in
and that the Law enforcement authorities as a matter of Protocol and principles agree that
as long as there are nuclear, biological and chemically laden ships going out to sea, the
arms subject, and the balances of security, remains a highest priority.
15. Respective to the binding uses of projections The Russian Federation and Unity and
territorial watercourses will not be an assignment nor contracting waivers for service as
not needed in at or bouts Northeast Asia Pacific regions and the Black Sea region of co-
operative engagement(s) thereon; pursuant to the Provision-ment set forth in this
agreement herein.
PROTOCOL 16 (Network Communication)
16. The Party(s') undertake to notify each other through the diplomatic channels of the
United Nations, or by direct communication access to the charge d'affaires ad interim, or a
diplomatic Head of the Mission, in the event of an accidental, unauthorized, or any other
unexplained incident, such as launch code piracies, and incidents considered a possible
breach of security be called into question nor compromise a faulty ledgers of
understanding..
17. Counter espionage in launch code accessibility, and/or attempts, along with nuclear
warheads being made available for purchase, as so to report, in and that the threats
imposed by nuclear fuel enrichment proliferation is a cause of legal action and an
obligation of conveyance as to clarify an undertaking of virtual disappear-ment concessions
a priority hereof.
18. The Provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any obligation which
may arise taken in conformity with the disarmament terms and Dutys, in and that each
Party undertake to maintain and improve, as deemed necessary, it's existing organizational
and technical obligatory arrangements, so as to protect any such informants' who do come
forward to reveal the actions, activities, and/or whereabouts of such an event of sabotage
or dissident factions assimilation a descriptive thereto. The United Nation's Organization
Government shall act as a receiving State whereby the Secretary General's' quarter may
permit and protect the freedom of the communication on the part of the Consular Post if a
breach of security is being reported.
19.If as so, corresponding testimony to a violation or act of retaliatory pre-emptivity

assimilation bears a canny reference to phony, shall be anticipated from time to time,
regard fully so, in effect thereto; and shall, for the most part, be considered or taken, as
factual, if reported from a Consular Post headed by an Honorary Consular General hereby.
DESBIC TREATY AGENDA PROTOCOLS 20-31
(Understanding the Laws of Nature)
20. As a common standard of achievement, and to secure the blessings of pro-creation, we

come to understand Love. Love; Love is a word of human rights and a side of safety to those
who come endowed with reason and consciousness. In another way we come to
understand self realization, in and that, so shall thou do unto others, brace thoughts, as
shall be done unto themselves hereunder.
(a) Understanding that of which is of paramount importance, perspective of a higher

power, to which an equal opportunity of give and take in the fields of development should
be made uniform through continuous cultural emergence thereinafter.
(b) Within the insignias of colorfast and common approach, and to promote and approve
rules and limitations regarding the exercise of equal opportunity status quo; all Party(s') to
the Treaty(s') shall conform to this entry, that be there no such transgender orientation, or
trans genetical intransigencies thereto in accordance with the statutes of Carnal Knowledge
in scribed and assigned to the Entitys followers inter alias persons of interest we say we
decide.
(c) transgender orientation shall be considered unlawful and is strictly prohibited. To

copulate or ingest hormone seed of which is a major cause for warfare in space traveler not
seek our attention do contends in a Courts of laws we teach, a mental health jobs resorted
to bedlam coordinators assigned to derail regards for sodomic creatures ambitions to
sodomize to where we surprise an assets to our side and-s Soully essence-s when did arise
at Court to ambush, and kidnap will contend also? The fact neither care nor concern is
given by care coordinators understanding of authority to convey will continue to be a
subject at Court we seek to justify a need for contentions.
(d) Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as affecting the unalienable rights of a
naturalized universally accepted common standard of ethnic and genetic respect, though a
vise and virtue connotation is a recommendation; we have a purpose of understanding love
and survival.
(e) In and that once more: their shall no man shall lie unto Mankind as with womankind it
is abomination thereto; and a visa versa; furthermore it is mutation; the fact that this type
of desires is in leagues with ethnicities who have agendas in underworld activities and
with federal magistrates I see-s are grounds to assail unlawful behavior I say. This
behavior leads to Soul snatching and sodomic regression as I can say is good causes to give
ear when saying como esta and-s not seeing eye to eye for a fight when informed a
Levitown promoters of fists care coordination for sodomic creatures in disguise, another
contentions there this.
(f) In furtherance, that of which is of great importance: a said womankind-s, shall not
ingest by oral extremities nor baul imputes neither enzymes nor hormone seed emission in
that same attainment of dis-respect for our surprise visits a ready, it is abomination and a
cross pollination act. That so then like this current detail descriptive and described another
areas of cocker roach insemination pleasure not. This Article calls for a Moratorium on
transgender orientation, by and for a U N Secretary General's quarter for the full realization
of an pledge to affirm a Faith wherefore.
Protocol 21 START AGENDA TREATY(S)
(Stellar Diplomacy)
21. In the absence of a specific destination within a sector, or in cases where priorities are
ambiguous, in and though specific operatives licensing s is required, the universal laws
such as, "we come in peace and goodwill", implies in the event of a saucer module captain's
May Day. From a time traveled, and of he who tried to warn a people of a coming seditious
acts of treacherous alien degenerates among our Communitys I see who do a fight for
gender cross-pollination I see.
22. Except as concerns etiquette and precedence, the Party(s) to a DEF-CON-5 shall
promote hospitable acknowledgement to a receiving Status-quo, and ascertain by all viable
means, the Star Elder question; in and though, how loyal are your ancestry to describe a
phony concerted attention to all we say, district Judges contentions I hears?
23. Whenever a Treaty or convention specifies to authenticate our presences as real in

order to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired, so to say; within a defining moment a
few disabled attack individuals cry than a faulty resorted to anything they can think of like
police and Sheriff Deputie caught in Court exercising contempt I see. This Paragraph deals
with over sight and accountability in mind and spending as such to described:
(a) appropriated 1 trillion dollars Mars to pretend that Star Elder's did not advise,
(b) are abuses of clairvoyance such as is masters performing in sideshows to see a side of
fate.
(c) for heavens sake, pretended the faces on the maps never exist anyhow.
(d) concerted attention to oxygen depletion molecules for said uninhabitable regions
(e) subscribe not to carnal transgender degeneration, mutation, and show reproach.
24. If a Party to a State of the United Nations consorts, consents or has forged an alliance
with Star Elder Being ness or Space travelers, or other descriptive of higher intelligence
other than the sodomic creatures here on areas known as detention bring, the receiving
Party to that State are to undertake to bring to the attention of the Secretary General(s), is
to exercise benevolent approach firstly, in a report, file footage and/or a special invitation
to receive instructions and accurate conveyance of missionary objectives, analyze and
detain neither a face of loyal associations nor construe addict to end opinions so that it may
be applied inasmuch to the paramount necessitation of public safety, growth and inasmuch
as the questions may be decided hitherto.
25. If as a result of applying the Provisions of this Chapter, serious discrepancies emerge
and occur over a sector of theater implicated submergences in secret agendas that are void
of formulation to the survival of mankinds existence and for the planet and time reference
that is known as Earth, then the Secretary Generals quarters are to consider this Treaty as
Official as can be, delivered by they who come from the stars thereto. In the event that such
an occasion comes to light or of timely manifestation thereto, all reasonable Party(s) to a
State are to submit such an encounter to the Global Political Institution, care/of: Scientific
Commission, Secretary General United Nations NY thereby for evaluation hereunder
wherefore.
START TREATY AGENDA
Protocol 26
(The Isthmus of Panama)
26. Pursuant of space based Internal Security Clearance procedure, IC. docket N507, dated
March 05, 2,015 commanders in charge of Star Based descriptive encoded, secrecy
instilled; the Sheriff Department joined by attack escrow fielders caught describing
difference of opinion at an United States shall be requested par to reasonable expectation,
incessant of the obligations assumed, underwrite the active utility resource by these
premises for the permanent and neutral oceanic corridor hereof: the Panama Canal, by
reason of security surpluses in engagement expectations, the Isthmus of Panama, and the
Pan American water courses therein thereupon shall abide by U S entry of Naval flotilla as a
stay of Faith.
(a) The United Nations Security Council shall also be requested to endorse a State of Say as
understood, to be an interpretation of policy and actions necessary to protect legitimate
interests in this sphere here withal ascribed thereupon.
(b). Resolved to strengthen the safeguard of peace and liberty by conditioning this
combination of resources in accordance with the principles of stated neutrality
between the various influences of militia status quo and a State of intrinsic knowledge;
Intending to disqualify obscure and in volute stalemates of various citizens from sudden
acquisition of theater ballistic explosives for a purchase order in consent and /nor exploit a
state of insignias to a Marquis in secret service attention when shipping and re-situating
help such as border patrol ironies in fertilizer and other dangerous cargo..
27. Directing their efforts to sanctify a U N subcontracting Mission for common defense
and practical enforcement concern regarding the evolvement and exploitation of
uranium laden warships with fallacies to every piracys need to note and note to need;
(a).Mindful of the irregular implacabilitys to every coincidental attempts to decide a

matter at handle within the scope of surgical and legal expunge ability therefore.
Have Decided to initiate the application of procedures which shall make it possible
to:
(b) co-ordinate by association, the precepts of star based insignias and the transfer
progression of tipped arrows with isotopic sin based expletives whereupon.
28. In order to make fuller contribution to their common objective, when conducting
military activities in the area known as The Canal Zone, in accordance with these
objectives, within the zones of application and prior notification of military
maneuvers on the part or behalf of the Central or South American Governments must
be given to:
(a) the Depositary underwriters consent to the U N Charter whereof

therefore.
START AGENDA TREATY
PROTOCOLS 29 (Korean Re-unification)

29. A PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA , AN UNITED STATES, AN FEDERAL JUDGES IN THE
WAY, AN RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND-S AN UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY SEEKS FAULTY
RELATIONSHIPS WITH GOD FIGURE (ENTITY) IN ITS JOINT NORTHERLY AND
SOUTHERLY SECURITY COUNCIL NOT WITHOUT EQUALLY REPRESENTED FULL
SESSIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SAY OVER A MATTER OF CONTENTION I HEARS.
30. In order to resolve this technical arrangements to the satisfaction of the predominantly
China and U S ambassadors to a U N concern never to better decide with spontaneous
confidence the Joint two Party interim decisions to be understood clearer then I never
notice;
Have a say on any idiosyncratic decisions if there remains a doubt as to whether enough
situation I hears a fuss to-s on a stipulated matter of concern is in the Partys best
interest. So to remove the doubts abstentions from a High Contracting Party shall take
secondary and primary precedences if the doubts remain un-cleared by a United States
and Peoples Republic of China Military Chief of Staffs approvals of decent wage to kid not a
day in Court and a multilateral with given seventy two hours minimal to a Party to these
imprints to discuss further or agree to have an impasse settled in a U N atmosphere forgo a
change.
Looking toward the future U S, China, Russia and U N Security Council in full session not
without one standing delegate each North and South Korea ad-joined and stationed in
Seoul South Korea. Conscript receiving delegates to each Party here under referred as High
Contracting Partys hereto decided to remove the division as to undertake within their
means a level playing field.
Convinced that the system for freedom of trade is our responsibility, added a note of
limitations, prohibitions, and restrictions as the essential foundations to reinforce the links
between the general conditions of a most favored nation endorsement at the subterfuges of
cause; whence so ever Ad Extricate becomes a common denominate objective, to that of
which is the issue of solidarity be instituted by these presences where why not.
Persuaded by the factual interprets that the five permanent memberships to a U N Security
Council are being observed and treated by star people, as the right truth in reverse
psychologys I see, to that end their exists an adjudicate to the faulty Prayers of I seated an
District Judges in trouble forensics a lie to our knowledge of Faith and obedience for the
Republics for which it stood. Any statement of truth undeniably, spoiling the fruit of our
wisdom a Creator I hear is all it is as U S is doing will be construed as malevolent.
31. It is requested of South Korea The U S and Japan and such as to mention the Souths
trading partners to cover the Multi neutral stabilization projection tours of duty costs and
overhauls there though with a North South Korean administrative coalitions to seat the
contemporaneous questions of trans migration-al limitations per annual average.
32. Agreement between the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one
hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army North Korea and the
commanders in chiefs of South Korea here is a bell toll for United States interests in pre-
post armistice demilitarized concession-ings and the Commander of the Chinese People's
volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military transition-ing in the two Koreas
subject to the Provision-ment of this Treaty.
33. Wed prefer the United States and China deal with any extremist requesting and if the
two High Contracting Partys can not come to an accordance the Entirety of High
Contracting Partys stating hereunder shall assail never before a Perjury forfeitures ranks
34. The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand,
and the Supreme Commander of the North Korean People's Army and the Commander of
the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean
conflict, the United States Chief of Staff and the Commanders in Chief South Korea with its
great toil of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing a
merger-ing economic growths which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of
all acts of armed force in Korea where have a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do
individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by
the conditions and terms of mutual assured re-unifications set forth in the following
articles and paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be in character
and to pertain solely to the road map of where it consents to be bound and bonded.:
35. A Peoples Republic of China in accordance with the Provisions of this Treaty, may
observe the two Koreas Ad interim per adventives dual occupancy in states afore me
though North Korean sending administration to micro manage and assure its parental
North Korean affiliate here in so whenever not to do so at a times of peril North Korean
assurities that the fifteen billion annularly domestic unless otherwise regarded as not
enough be secured for non-military like programs in the Northern Provinces here more
then.
36. Having had contacts with our star base apertures advised for a Security Council to
discourage Dictatorship field representation if a Proponent had been driving for not more
then twelve to fourteen years thinks the new arrivals will Party some had suggested the U
N limit dictatorships twelve years or so if the dictators do not concur to take the relief and
the re-union in good standard acceptances how now.
37. With respect to include other arrangements to the armistice to the safeguards provided
for as a condition of the 31 December 2,016 post fact re-union, until further notice and
supplemental accordances with respect to the relevant position laid down in this decision
and its authority and the stipulating interest at budgetary allocated minimal down to
retain the administrate semi segregates there full;
38. A full United Nations Security Council attention shall govern the actions of this Ad
interim Accordance, The High Contracting Partys recognized under lawful give and
Summons are The Peoples Republic of China, The Russian Federation, United States of
America a full U N Security Council presence each Partys U N Security Council members;
the two Ad interim Republic ambassadors if either North Korea nor South Korea to readily
act accordingly in A U N Security Council presence.
39. The Two shall become one united and the Northerly presences in Southern-likes area of
reunification shall consist of A Head of State, a Charge de Affaires, a Ministry of Defense
composed of an unspecified contingency soon to be agreed upon , say 13,000 Officials
North as it may remain open ended to be discussed; a Ministry of Trade 10,000 Officials
suggested, an Ministry of Economic Affaires 25oo-7500 or up to The High Contracting
Partys People Republic of China under any circumstance, a Ministry of Tourism 10,000 to
30,000 residents. A Ministry of Olympic Athletics 3000-6000 up for discuss further, a
Ministry of Education up for proper realization includes construction effort on vehicles in
pass around 6 universities are needed North as to situate warm and working re-pore in
accordance to this Provisionary and its Protocol.
30. The Party to this writ shall remain at peace and offer no resistance nor aggressive
competitive overtures to the U N manned and Multi-Nation mini stabilization forces as
requests of the Joint fields of endeavor-ment entered as that same DMZ here from this day
wayward by and beginnings 31 December 2,016 11:59 pm, dmz time up outfit not their
concern is you owe us your life a Captains urge constraints as U S withdrawal that will not
further any military purpose, under condition, which ensure the safety of any shipping and
shipments as set forth in the terms of this documentations Texts, Protocols, and
declaratives are Partys to Ensigns in Deputys wallet to direct deposit and offer no
resistance. Hold it tenderly as to construe a fuller contribution and family unit therefore.
Neutral nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry.
(a) Territory under the military contrail of the United Nations Command
INCHON..................................(37 28, 126 38'E)

TAEGU....................................(35 52'n, 128 36'E)
PUSAN....................................(35 45'N, 129 02'E)
KANGNUNG.............................(37 45'N, 128 54'E)
KUNSAN..................................(35 59'E, 126 43'E)
(b) Territory under the military control of the Chinese People's Volunteers
NORTH KOREA ENTIRELY TO SOUTH KOREA CUSTODY
SINUJU....................................(40 06'n, 124 24E)
CHONGJIN................................(41 46'N, 129 49E)
HUNGNAM...............................(39 50'N, 127 37'E)
MANPO....................................(41 46'N, 126 18'E)
SINANJU...................................(39 36'N, 125 36'E)
General
31. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to
exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral nations
Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four
(24) hour notice by any member.
32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations
Supervisory commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice commission as soon
as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.
33. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the
results of their supervision observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral
Nations supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall
make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by
the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be
submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports
submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as information
only.
34. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection teams shall be forwarded
to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the
process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall
evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the
Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission
shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has
been received from the Neutral nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral
nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the
Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the
Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.
35. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the
reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission
is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be
necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one
set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.
36. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the
Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice
Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a
more effective armistice.
37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be
authorized to communicated with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.
________________________________
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
_______________________________
_______________________________
NORTH KOREA
__________________________________
SOUTH KOREA
__________________________________
CHINA
__________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
___________________________________
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
____________________________________
THE RE-UNIFICATION TREATY BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA
Considering the fundamental role of treaties in their history of international relationships,
Recognizing a need to not let a smolder burn between others and the two Koreas,
38. Also recognizing a free market economy and cross frontier trade investments, and a
Northern Korean administration be appointed for Southern Korea will describe a language
barrier when all understand English so stated the Entitys if the doubts directed toward
one anothers DMZ build ups remain undecided,
Recalling the determination of the peoples of the United Nations to establish conditions
under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaty can be maintained,
Affirming that the rules of customary international law will continue to govern questions
by the provisions of the present Convention,
Have verily ascribed:
PROTICOLS (The Principles) Korean Decisions
39. In view of the contributions both the Peoples Republic of China and the United States of
America have taken in the Korean re-unification question with the objective of formal
custodial acquisition ment of her southerly counterpart, both sides shall harmonize their
defense relationship, broaden their economic trade zones and form a transition-like
approach in Seoul, as needed to form a concession of disarmament and free trade republics.
40. The Contracting Parties will decide for themselves so strive to create uniform
provisions regarding crime and the consequences of crime. The investigation and
prosecution of a crime committed in one Korea should be passed by a court of its
constituencys.
41 The Contracting Parties If so decided shall continue to work to attain the highest
possible degrees of justice and equality between nationals of the two Koreas; in
furtherance If decided on their own accord-s, shall endeavor to facilitate the acquisition
ment of citizenship rights by wayward not later then 31 December 2016 here so. The
Contracting Parties in any presidents wisdom-s,strive to achieve mutual coordination in
other areas of fiscal collective responsibility and legislation.
42. So see if-s a State of war between the Parties will be terminated and who would side
peace be established between them upon the exchange and instruments of worrys relating
to removal of all weapons aimed at one anothers fortitudes.
43. And-s seek-s South Korea to share her administrative bodys and not to suggested yield
some transition mental powers and authority to the Defense Minister of North Korea and-s
visa versa for parody as in to effective as soon as an authority can catch a President, a
Defense Minister, a Minister of States a Multi-purpose administration from the north to the
south a Social Trade Ministry, a Health and Human services Secretary, and a Secretary of
State as to what allows precedence and follow through here situate it sided.
44. In order to take a more-fuller contribution toward the Koreas and in ways we seem to
unify the southerly way inflow of immigration to pass through into Southern regions; it
shall be construed as Joint Protocol. A Joint Protocol Commission shall be comprised of four
Northern sectors-and five Southern areas Commissioners as noted to determine the issues
of restoration, programs of work, and general border crossing questions that may arise.
Although an two Koreas may be received as a re-unification mandate by way wards of this
Article, the subject of a fence and its perimeters shall continue to be an interest for the
Parties until a North feels its Southerly counterpart is perceived to become a self sustain
fledgling of an Republics of Korea here told..
45. In the event that there arise a mass riot or upheaval by its northern or southern
frontiers over an issue that may seem unfair to all, Chinese riot squadrons will assist in
diffusing such an occurrences and will ask The Peoples Republic of China at its own
discretion assign a contingencies of plastic munitions if assimilating a friends in an areas
where dis-orderly constable paying attention do Devil candor still we see.The land mines
questions may become a silent reminder of a phony baloney rift on into a forty year
sequence as to repel what was expected to become a mass running, jumping and illegal
entryways to our Southerly prefecture and might serve our purpose as intended to more
effectively account and provide for us from an northern prefectures that-told forgo.
46. Having considered the views expressed in its place of an northerly frontiers two million
people free standing army and infantry, A United Nations Assembly shall seek a use of
these individuals for factionary peace keeping forces under the color of the Peoples
Republics of China -U N. Accordingly in its own interest a U N Governance shall ask
Dispatch to conscribe Northern Korea militia acquisition for UN sponsored programme of
work, with a view toward non-militaristic supplication wherefore odd jobs and manpower
may address the impertinences of overly militarized relating assistance calls.
47. In Witness Whereof DONE ON THIS 5th OF MARCH 2015

IN MIDWAY CITY USA 92655 IN GODS WILL WE TRUST NEVER SOLD
The Plenipotentiarys agreed to the basic content in context with the Provisionment
provided for of the corresponding assignments as inscripted informative consent and
agreed to guarantee the safety of its north-like and southerlies constitutional drafts
assigned so weigh California PD?
NORTH KOREA
_______________________________
______________________________
______________________________
SOUTH KOREA
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
_________________________________
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (USSR)
_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________________________
THE SECRETARY GENRALS UNITED NATIONS
__________________________________
OR ACTING U N SECURITY COUNCILS REPRESENTATION

__________________________________
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
_________________________________
_________________________________
48. Findings of the Court;

For the purpose of the Law hereby
relating to the claimants Filing
for Petition and Grantee of Title deeds: By;
The North Korea,

(The Republics For)
(A)
VS.
The Provincial State and Republic For South Korea

(B)
Name of Claimant A Name of Claimant B
Petitioner Respondent Petitioner Respondent
Arbitrator (Holy Ghosted Entitys)

United Nations New York 10017, USA
Appellate Department for:
The World International Court(s) of Justice
Findings: South Korea would be better served by offering financial incentives aimed at
trickle re-unification suchly to which can be attained who will decide.
PROTOCOL 49.(Taiwan ROC Issue)
(China, Nuclear Proliferation and the Korean Issues)
(a)A mans mind may make him a Buddha, or it may make him a beast. Misled by error;
become an enlightened one-s, becomes a Buddha. Therefore, control your mind and do not
deviate from the right path You should respect each other, follow whose teachings, and
refrain from disputes The Spirit of Buddha is that of great loving kindness and
compassion. The great loving kindness is the spirit to save all people by any and all
means.:
(b) BUDDHAS RELIEF AND SALVATION FOR US
The world is a burning house, the people, unaware that the house is on fire, are in danger
of being burned to death so Buddha in compassion devises ways of saving them.
(c). In the spirit of sincere co-operation, declare that they are prepared to participate in a
results oriented space based with star people in order to communicate and take actions
necessary to put an end to inevitable outbreaks of deceptive practices, second and third
Party nuclear pre-emptive consternation thereby
(d)an assessment of re-unification prospects between the Peoples Republic of China and
Taiwan re-tro in effect up way wards to December 31, 2,016, pursuant of the non-
proliferation overtures by China and her progress in marketable commodities to a factual
findings
(e) in and that supplying and completely proliferating in nuclear arms trafficking is not in a
better interest and so China had been defusing tensions in an effort to reach a respective
sidedness in the China Taiwan re-unification financial arrange-ments let it be stated.
(f) The Party to the statement foregoing agrees in a said fairer than we might implied; a
question of bank securitys and agreed to upon terms of such a miniscule and-s acceptable
appendage-s in concerted attention to property taxation phase to these additions. That and
reasonable search and seizure questions and guarantees?
Open for discussion, analysis, debate sharing, constructive criticism?

ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING TRANSFER AND POSSESSION OF WMD
PROVISION MENTALS ON TRAFFICKING AND TRANSFER IN NBC WMD (POTNBCWMD) OR

DELIVERY APPARATUS AND UNLAWFULL MATERIALS AN ANNEX APPENDAGE OF
LITARARY DESIGN AFFILIATES COMPOSITION(S)
ON THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, TESTING, RESEARCH, ACQUISITION AND

PROLIFERATION OF MISSILE TECHNOLOGY ALL SAID STATUS QUOS AND RESTRICTIONS
ALL ENSIGNS EMBLEMS STATES FEDERAL REPUBLICS TRUSTS ROGUE NOT SPECIFIED
RUSSIA, FRANCE, UNITED STATES, NORTH KOREA, PAKISTAN, INDIA ISRAEL, AUSTRALIA,
UNITED KINGDOM GERMANY, SWITZERLANDS ANTICS, FILIPINES SOWARDS AS
FOLLOWS IN PARTICULARS:
ANALYSIS:
All shipping weigh stations must be manned by clairvoyants task force we are not looking
to identify.
(a) This Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and
"technology". Category I items, all of which are in Annex items 1 and 2, are those items of
greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be
considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed
or duplicated. Category II items are those items in the Annex not designated Category I.
(b) The transfer of "technology" directly associated any items in the Annex will be subject
to some form of penaltys per United Nations resources to affix a particular cost to society a
particular breach might weigh here stating minimal six months $twenty five thousand to
30 years $500 million dollars depending on the five security council names and their say
over toward a U N International Court of Justices finding to this entry made to halt the
trafficking and transfer of detrimental conspiring as will the equipment itself, to the extent
permitted by international legislation. The approval of any Annex item for export also
authorizes the export to the same end user of the minimum technology required for the
installation, operation, maintenance, and repair of the item.
(c) In reviewing the proposed applications for transfers whether by computer or computer
devices discs, dvds, hard drive information, flash drive, floppy, e-mail, chat versions of
espionage nor falsifying letterhead of complete rocket and unmanned air vehicle systems
described in Items 1 and 19, and of equipment or technology which is listed in the
Technical Annex, for potential use in such systems, the Government will take account of the
ability to trade off range and payload.
2. DEFINITIONS
(a) For the purpose of this Annex, the following definitions apply: (a) "Development" is
related to all phases prior to "production" such as:
design
design research
design analysis
design concepts
assembly and testing of prototypes
pilot production schemes
design data
process of transforming design data into a product
configuration design
integration design
layouts
(b) A "microcircuit" is defined as a device in which a number of passive and/or active

elements are considered as indivisibly associated on or within a continuous structure to
perform the function of a circuit.
(c) "Production" means all production phases such as:
production engineering
manufacture
integration
assembly (mounting)
inspection
testing
quality assurance
(d) "Production equipment" means tooling, templates, jigs, mandrels, moulds, dies, fixtures,
alignment mechanisms, test equipment, other machinery and components therefor, limited
to those specially designed or modified for "development" or for one or more phases of
"production".
(e) "Production facilities" means equipment and specially designed software therefor
integrated into installations for "development" or for one or more phases of "production".
(f) "Radiation Hardened" means that the component or equipment is designed or rated to
withstand radiation levels which meet or exceed a total irradiation dose of 5 x 10 5 rads
(Si).
(g) "Technology" means specific information which is required for the "development",
"production" or "use" of a product. The information may take the form of "technical data"
or "technical assistance".
(1) "Technical assistance" may take forms such as:

instruction
skills
training
working knowledge
consulting services
(2) "Technical data" may take forms such as:

blueprints
plans
diagrams
models
formulae
engineering designs and specifications
manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices such as:
-- disk
-- tape
-- read-only memories NOTE: This definition of technology does not include technology "in
the public domain" nor "basic scientific research".
(i) "In the public domain" as it applies to this Annex means technology which has been
made available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. (Copyright restrictions
do not remove technology from being "in the public domain".)
(ii) "Basic scientific research" means experimental or theoretical work undertaken

principally to acquire new knowledge of the fundamental principles of phenomena and
observable facts, not primarily directed towards a specific practical aim or objective.
(h) "Use" means:
operation
installation (including on-site installation)
maintenance
repair
overhaul
refurbishing
3. TERMINOLOGY
Where the following terms appear in the text, they are to be understood according to the
explanations below:
(a) "Specially Designed" describes equipment, parts, components or software which, as a

result of "development", have unique properties that distinguish them for certain
predetermined purposes. For example, a piece of equipment that is "specially designed" for
use in a missile will only be considered so if it has no other function or use. Similarly, a
piece of manufacturing equipment that is "specially designed" to produce a certain type of
component will only be considered such if it is not capable of producing other types of
components.
(b) "Designed or Modified" describes equipment, parts, components or software which, as a

result of "development," or modification, have specified properties that make them fit for a
particular application. "Designed or Modified" equipment, parts, components or software
can be used for other applications. For example, a titanium coated pump designed for a
missile may be used with corrosive fluids other than propellants.
(c) "Usable In" or "Capable Of" describes equipment, parts, components or software which
are suitable for a particular purpose. There is no need for the equipment, parts,
components or software to have been configured, modified or specified for the particular
purpose. For example, any military specification memory circuit would be "capable of"
operation in a guidance system.
ITEM 1- CATEGORY I
(i) Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and
sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicle systems (including cruise missile systems,
target drones and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least a 500 kg payload to
a range of at least 300 km as well as the specially designed "production facilities" for these
systems.
ITEM 2 - CATEGORY I
(i) Complete subsystems usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well as the specially
designed "production facilities" and "production equipment" therefor:
(a) Individual rocket stages;
(b) Reentry vehicles, and equipment designed or modified therefor, as follows, except as
provided in Note (1) below for those designed for non-weapon payloads:
(1) Heat shields and components thereof fabricated of ceramic or ablative materials;
(2) Heat sinks and components thereof fabricated of light-weight, high heat capacity
materials;
(3) Electronic equipment specially designed for reentry vehicles;
(c) Solid or liquid propellant rocket engines, having a total impulse capacity of 1.1 x 10 6 N-
sec (2.5 x l0 5 lb-sec) or greater;
(d) "Guidance sets" capable of achieving system accuracy of 3.33 percent or less of the
range (e.g. a CEP of 10 km or less at a range of 300 km), except as provided in Note (1)
below for those designed for missiles with a range under 300 km or manned aircraft;
(e) Thrust vector control sub-systems, except as provided in Note (1) below for those
designed for rocket systems that do not exceed the range/payload capability of Item 1;
(f) Weapon or warhead safing, arming, fuzing, and firing mechanisms, except as provided in
Note (1) below for those designed for systems other than those in Item 1.
Notes to Item 2:
(1) The exceptions in (b), (d), (e) and (f) above may be treated as Category II if the
subsystem is exported subject to end use statements and quantity limits appropriate for
the excepted end use stated above.
(2) CEP (circle of equal probability) is a measure of accuracy; and defined as the radius of
the circle centered at the target, at a specific range, in which 50 percent of the payloads
impact.
(3) A "guidance set" integrates the process of measuring and computing a vehicle's position
and velocity (i.e. navigation) with that of computing and sending commands to the vehicle's
flight control systems to correct the trajectory.
(4) Examples of methods of achieving thrust vector control which are covered by (e)
include: a. Flexible nozzle; b. Fluid or secondary gas injection; c. Movable engine or nozzle;
d. Deflection of exhaust gas stream (jet vanes or probes); or e. Use of thrust tabs.
ITEM 3 - CATEGORY II
Propulsion components and equipment usable in the systems in Item 1, as follows, as well
as the specially designed "production facilities" and "production equipment" therefor, and
flow-forming machines specified in Note (1):
(a) Lightweight turbojet and turbofan engines (including turbocompound engines) that are
small and fuel efficient;
(b) Ramjet/scramjet/pulse jet/combined cycle engines, including devices to regulate

combustion, and specially designed components therefor;
(c) Rocket motor cases, "interior lining", "insulation" and nozzles therefor; (d) Staging
mechanisms, separation mechanisms, and interstages therefor; (e) Liquid and slurry
propellant (including oxidizers) control systems, and specially designed components
therefor, designed or modified to operate in vibration environments of more than 10 g RMS
between 20 Hz and 2,000 Hz. (f) Hybrid rocket motors and specially designed component
therefor.
Notes to Item 3:
(1) Flow-forming machines, and specially designed components and specially designed
software therefor, which:
(a) according to the manufacturer's technical specification, can be equipped with numerical
control units or a computer control, even when not equipped with such units at delivery,
and
(b) with more than two axes which can be coordinated simultaneously for contouring
control. Technical Note: Machines combining the function of spin-forming and flow-
forming are for the purpose of this item regarded as flow-forming machines. This item does
not include machines that are not usable in the production of propulsion components and
equipments (e.g. motor cases) for systems in Item 1.
(2) (a) The only engines covered in subitem (a) above, are the following: (1)Engines having
both of the following characteristics: (a)Maximum thrust value greater than 1000N
(achieved un-installed) excluding civil certified engines with a maximum thrust value
greater than 8,890N (achieved un-installed), and (b)Specific fuel consumption of
0.13kg/N/hr or less (at sea level static and standard conditions); or (2)Engines designed or
modified for systems in Item 1, regardless of thrust or specific fuel consumption. (b)Item
3(a) engines may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or in quantities appropriate for
replacement parts for manned aircraft.
(3) In Item 3(c), "interior lining" suited for the bond interface between the solid propellant
and the case or insulating liner is usually a liquid polymer based dispersion of refractory or
insulating materials. e.g., carbon filled HTPB or other polymer with added curing agents to
be sprayed or screeded over a case interior.
(4) In Item 3(c), "insulation" intended to be applied to the components of a rocket motor,
i.e., the case, nozzle inlets, case closures, includes cured or semi-cured compounded rubber
sheet stock containing an insulating or refractory material. It may also be incorporated as
stress relief boots or flaps.
(5) The only servo valves and pumps covered in (e) above, are the following: a. Servo
valves designed for flow rates of 24 litres per minute or greater, at an absolute pressure of
7,000 kPa (1,000 psi) or greater, that have an actuator response time of less than 100 msec;
b. Pumps, for liquid propellants, with shaft speeds equal to or greater than 8,000 RPM or
with discharge pressures equal to or greater than 7,000 kPa (1,000 psi). (6) Item 3(e)
systems and components may be exported as part of a satellite.
(1) Propellants and constituent chemicals for propellants as follows: (a) Composite
Propellants (1) Composite and composite modified double base propellants; (b) Fuel
Substances (1) Hydrazine with concentration of more than 70 percent and its derivatives
including monomethylhydrazine (MMH);
(2) Unsymmetric dimethylhydrazine (UDMH);
(3) Spherical aluminum powder with particles of uniform diameter of less than 500 x 10-6m
(500 micrometer) and an aluminum content of 97 percent by weight or greater;
(4) Metal with particle sizes less than 500 x 10 -6 m (500 micrometer), whether spherical,
atomized, spheroidal, flaked or ground, consisting of 97 percent by weight or more of the
following: beryllium, boron, magnesium, zirconium, and alloys of these;
(5) High energy density materials such as boron slurry, having an energy density of 40 x
106 J/kg or greater. (c) Oxidizers/Fuels (1) Perchlorates, chlorates, or chromates mixed
with powdered metels or other high energy fuel components. (d) Oxidizer Substances (1)
Liquid (a) Dinitrogen tetroxide;
(b) Nitrogen dioxide/dinitrogen tetroxide;
(c) Dinitrogen pentoxide;
(d) Inhibited Red Fuming Nitric Acid (IRFNA);
(e) Compounds composed of flourine and one or more of other halogens, oxygen or
nitrogen.
(2) Solid (a) Ammonium perchlorate;
(b) Ammonium Dinitramide (ADN);
(c) Nitro-amines (cyclotetramethylene-tetranitramine (HMX), cyclotrimethylene-

trinitramine (RDX); (e) Polymeric Substances (1) Carboxl-terminated polybutadiene
(CTPB)
(2) Hydroxy-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB)
(3) Glycidyl azide polymer (GAP)

(4) Polybutadiene-acrylic acid (PBAA)
(5) Polybutadiene-adrylic acid-acrylonitrile (PBAN). (f) Other Propellant Additives and

Agents (1) Bonding Agents
(a) Tris (1-(2-methyl)aziridinyl phosphine oxide (MAPO);
(b) Trimesoyl-1(2-ethyl)aziridine (HX-868,BITA);
(c) "Tepanol" (HX-878), reaction product of tetraethylenepentramine, acrylonitrile and

glycidol;
(d) "Tepan" (HX-879), reaction product of tetraethylenepentamine and acrylonitrile;
(e) Polyfunctional aziridine amides with isophthalic, trimesic, isocyanuric, or

trimethyladipic backbone and also having a 2-methyl or 2-ethyl aziridine group (HX-752,
HX-874 and HX-77) (2) Curing Agents and Catalysts
(a) Triphenyl Bismuth (TPB); (3) Burning Rate Modifiers (a) Catocene;
(b) N-butyl-ferrocene;
(c) Butacene;
(d) Other ferrocene derivatives;
(e) Carboranes, decarboranes; pentaboranes and derivatives thereof; (4) Nitrate Esters and
Nitrated Plasticizers (a) Triethylene glycol dinitrate (TEGDN);
(b) Trimethylolethane trinitrate (TMETN);
(c) 1,2,4-Butanetriol trinitrate (BTTN);
(d) Diethylene glycol dinitrate (DEGDN); (5) Stabilizers, as follows (a) 2-

Nitrodiphenylamine;
(b) N-methyl-p-nitroaniline
(1) Production technology, or "production equipment" (including its specially designed
components) for:
(a) Production, handling or acceptance testing of liquid propellants or propellant

constituents described in Item 4.
(b) Production, handling, mixing, curing, casting, pressing, machining, extruding or
acceptance testing of solid propellants or propellant constituents described in Item 4.
Notes to Item 5:
(1) Batch mixers or continuous mixers covered by (b) above, both with provision for
mixing under vacuum in the range of zero to 13.326 kPa and with temperature control
capability of the mixing chamber, are the following:
Batch mixers having: a. A total volumetric capacity of 110 litres (30 gallons) or more; and b.
At least one mixing/kneading shaft mounted off centre. Continuous mixers having: a. Two
or more mixing/kneading shafts; and b. Capability to open the mixing chamber. (2) The
following equipment is included in (b) above: a. Equipment for the production of atomized
or spherica metallic powder in a controlled environment; b. Fluid energy mills for grinding
or milling ammonium perchlorate, RDX or HMX.
(i). Equipment, "technical-data" and procedures for the production of structural composites
usable in the systems in Item 1 as follows and specially designed components, and
accessories and specially designed software therefor:
(a) Filament winding machines of which the motions for positioning, wrapping and
winding fibers can be coordinated and programmed in three or more axes, designed to
fabricate composite structures or laminates from fibrous or filamentary materials, and
coordinating and programming controls;
(b) Tape-laying machines of which the motions for positioning and laying tape and sheets
can be coordinated and programmed in two or more axes, designed for the manufacture of
composite airframes and missile structures;
(c) Multi-directional, multi-dimensional weaving machines or interlacing machines,

including adapters and modification kits for weaving, interlacing or braiding fibres to
manufacture composite structures except textile machinery not modified for the above end
uses;
(d) Equipment designed or modified for the production of fibrous or filamentary materials
as follows:
(1) Equipment for converting polymeric fibres (such as polyacrylonitrile, rayon or

polycarbosilane) including special provision to strain the fibre during heating;
(2) Equipment for the vapor deposition of elements or compounds on heated filament
substrates; and
(3) Equipment for the wet-spinning of refractory ceramics (such as aluminium oxide);
(e) Equipment designed or modified for special fibre surface treatment or for producing
prepregs and preforms.
(f) "Technical data" (including processing conditions) and procedures for the regulation of
temperature, pressures or atmosphere in autoclaves or hydroclaves when used for the
production of composites or partially processed composites.
Note to Item 6:
(1) Examples of components and accessories for the machines covered by this entry are:
moulds, mandrels, dies, fixtures and tooling for the preform pressing, curing, casting,
sintering or bonding of composite structures, laminates and manufactures thereof.
(2) Equipment covered by sub item (e) includes but is not limited to rollers, tension
stretchers, coating equipment cutting equipment and clicker dies.
(i) Pyrolytic deposition and densification equipment and "technology" as follows:
(a) "Technology" for producing pyrolytically derived materials formed on a mould, mandrel
or other substrate from precursor gases which decompose in the 1,300 degrees C to 2,900
degrees C temperature range at pressures of 130 Pa (1 mm Hg) to 20 kPa (150 mm Hg)
including technology for the composition of precursor gases, flow-rates and process control
schedules and parameters;
(b) Specially designed nozzles for the above processes;
(c) Equipment and process controls, and specially designed software therefor, designed or
modified for densification and pyrolysis of structural composite rocket nozzles and reentry
vehicle nose tips.
Notes to Item 7:
(1) Equipment included under (c) above are isostatic presses having all of the following
characteristics: a. Maximum working pressure of 69 MPa (10,000 psi) or greater; b.
Designed to achieve and maintain a controlled thermal environment of 600 degrees C or
greater; and c. Possessing a chamber cavity with an inside diameter of 254 mm (10 inches)
or greater. (2) Equipment included under (c) above are chemical vapour deposition
furnances designed or modified for the densification of carbon-carbon composites.
(i) Structural materials usable in the system in Item 1, as follows:
(a) Composite structures, laminates, and manufactures thereof, specially designed for use
in the systems in Item 1 and the subsystems in Item 2, and resin impregnated fibre
prepregs and metal coated fibre preforms therefor, made either with organic matrix or
metal matrix utilizing fibrous or filamentary reinforcements having a specific tensile
strength greater than 7.62 x 104 m (3 x 106 inches) and a specific modulus greater than
3.18 x 106 m (1.25 x 108 inches);
(b) Re-saturated pyrolized (i.e. carbon-carbon) materials designed for rocket systems;
(c) Fine grain recrystallized bulk graphites (with a bulk density of at least 1.72 g/cc
measured at 15 degrees C and having a particle size of l00 x 10-6m (100 microns) or less),
pyrolytic, or fibrous reinforced graphites usable for rocket nozzles and reentry vehicle nose
tips;
(d) Ceramic composite materials (dielectric constant less than 6 at frequencies from 100 Hz
to 10,000 MHz) for use in missile radomes, and bulk machinable silicon-carbide reinforced
unfired ceramic usable for nose tips;
(e) Tungsten, molybdenum and alloys of these metals in the form of uniform spherical or
atomized particles of 500 micrometer diameter or less with a purity of 97 percent or higher
for fabrication of rocket motor components; i.e. heat shields, nozzle substrates, nozzle
throats and thrust vector control surfaces;
(f) Maraging steels (steels generally characterized by high Nickel, very low carbon content
and the use of substitutional elements or precipitates to produce age-hardening) having an
Ultimate Tensile Strength of 1.5 x 109 Pa or greater, measured at 20 C. Therefore any
soldiers who conspire knowing or not at will in these elements of composite matter or any
arms dealers especially now ongoing in suitcase I can represent must face the
consequences of these choices of judgment legal action-ary re-percussions for this I will
require a piece of I D include U S Customs Officer I know do see a vision to International
shipping I just heard may go to Islam Party to these footnote a fool I do declare an items
misrepresented to sold your Faiths down not a cop either service bureau of really-s.
Notes to Item 8:
(1) Maraging steels are only covered by 8(f) above for the purpose of this Annex in the
form of sheet, plate or tubing with a wall or plate thickness equal to or less than 5.0 mm
(0.2 inch).
(2) The only resin impregnated fibre prepregs specified in (a) above are those using resins
with a glass transition temperature (Tg), after cure, exceeding 145oC as determined by
ASTM D4065 or national equivalents.
Instrumentation, navigation and direction finding equipment and systems, and associated
production and test equipment as follows; and specially designed components and
software therefor:
(a) Integrated flight instrument systems, which include gyrostabilizers or automatic pilots
and integration software therefor, designed or modified for use in the systems in Item 1;
(b) Gyro-astro compasses and other devices which derive position or orientation by means
of automatically tracking celestial bodies or satellites or other curiositys Im up an offer;
(c) Accelerometers with a threshold of 0.05 g or less, or a linearity error within 0.25
percent of full scale output, or both, which are designed for use in inertial navigation
systems or in guidance systems of all types;
(d) All types of gyros usable in the systems in Item 1, with a rated drift rate stability of less
than 0.5 degree (1 sigma or rms) per hour in a 1 g environment;
(e) Continuous output accelerometers or gyros of any type, specified to function at

acceleration levels greater than 100 g;
(f) Inertial or other equipment using accelerometers described by subitems (c) or (e) above
or gyros described by subitems (d) or (e) above, and systems incorporating such
equipment, and specially designed integration software therefor;
(g) Specially designed test, calibration, and alignment equipment, and "production
equipment" for the above, including the following:
(1) For laser gyro equipment, the following equipment used to characterize mirrors, having
the threshold accuracy shown or better:
(i) Scatterometer (10 ppm); (ii) Reflectometer (50 ppm); (iii) Profilometer (5 Angstroms).
(2) For other inertial equipment:
(i) Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU Module) Tester;
(ii) IMU Platform Tester;
(iii) IMU Stable Element Handling Fixture;
(iv) IMU Platform Balance fixture;
(v) Gyro Tuning Test Station;
(vi) Gyro Dynamic Balance Station;
(vii) Gyro Run-In/Motor Test Station;
(viii) Gyro Evacuation and Filling Station;
(ix) Centrifuge Fixture for Gyro Bearings;
(x) Accelerometer Axis Align Station;

(xi) Accelerometer Test Station.
Notes to Item 9:
(1) Items (a) through (f) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft, satellite, land
vehicle or marine vessel or in quantities appropriate for replacement parts for such
applications.
(2) In sub-item (d): a. Drift rate is defined as the time rate of output deviation from the
desired output. It consists of random and systematic components and is expressed as an
equivalent angular displacement per unit time with respect to inertial space. b. Stability is
defined as standard deviation (1 sigma) of the variation of a particular parameter from its
calibrated value measured under stable temperature conditions. This can be expressed as a
function of time.
(3) Accelerometers which are specially designed and developed as MWD (Measurement
While Drilling) Sensors for use in downhole well service operations are not specified in
Item 9(c).
(i) Flight control systems and "technology" as follows; designed or modified for the systems
in Item 1 as well as the specially designed test, calibration, and alignment equipment
therefor:
(a) Hydraulic, mechanical, electro-optical, or electro-mechanical flight control systems

(including fly-by-wire systems);
(b) Attitude control equipment;
(c) Design technology for integration of air vehicle fuselage, propulsion system and lifting
control surfaces to optimize aerodynamic performance throughout the flight regime of an
unmanned air vehicle;
(d) Design technology for integration of the flight control, guidance, and propulsion data
into a flight management system for optimization of rocket system trajectory.
Note of Item 10:

(i) Items (a) and (b) may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in
quantities appropriate for replacement parts for manned aircraft.
(i) Avionics equipment, "technology" and components as follows; designed or modified for
use in the systems in Item 1, and specially designed software therefor:
(a) Radar and laser radar systems, including altimeters;

(b) Passive sensors for determining bearings to specific electromagnetic sources (direction
finding equipment) or terrain characteristics;
(c) Global Positioning System (GPS) or similar satellite receivers; (1) Capable of providing
navigation information under the following operational conditions;
(i) At speeds in excess of 515 m/sec (1,000 nautical miles/hour); and
(ii) At altitudes in excess of 18 km (60,000 feet); or (2) Designed or modified for use with
unmanned air vehicles covered by Item 1.
(d) Electronic assemblies and components specially designed for military use and
operation at temperatures in excess of 125 degrees C.
(e) Design technology for protection of avionics and electrical subsystems against
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and electromagnetic interference (EMI) hazards from
external sources, as follows: (1) Design technology for shielding systems;
(2) Design technology for the configuration of hardened electrical circuits and subsystems;
(3) Determination of hardening criteria for the above.
Notes to Item 11:

(1) Item 11 equipment may be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in
(2) Examples of equipment included in this Item:
a. Terrain contour mapping equipment;
b. Scene mapping and correlation (both digital and analogue) equipment;
c. Doppler navigation radar equipment;
d. Passive interferometer equipment;
e. Imaging sensor equipment (both active and passive); (3) In subitem (a), laser radar
systems embody specialized transmission, scanning, receiving and signal processing
techniques for utilization of lasers for echo ranging, direction finding and discrimination of
targets by location, radial speed and body reflection characteristics.
(i) Launch support equipment, facilities and software for the systems in Item 1, if the
material looks like it is some kind of intricate technology and especially if the destination is
not a known full fledged Ally of the U S or is a said rogue nation investigate it tracker does
mind it not cant then say it do as follows:
(a) describes the particular ingredients needed to manufacture develop and test missile of
war however we didnt pay for Apparatus and devices designed or modified for the
handling, control, activation and launching of the systems in Item 1;
(b) Vehicles designed or modified for the transport, handling, control, activation and
launching of the systems in Item 1;
(c) Gravity meters (gravimeters), gravity gradiometers, and specially designed components
therefor, designed or modified for airborne or marine use, and having a static or
operational accuracy of 7 x 10-6 m/sec2 (0.7 milligal) or better, with a time to steady-state
registration of two minutes or less, to station clairvoyants at international shipping carrier
locations me to decide why;
(d) Telemetering and telecontrol equipment usable for unmanned air vehicles or rocket
systems, (e) Precision tracking systems: (1) Tracking systems which use a code translator
installed on the rocket or unmanned air vehicle in conjunction with either surface or
airborne references or navigation satellite systems to provide real-time measurements of
in-flight position and velocity;
(2) Range instrumentation radars including associated optica1/infrared trackers and the
specially designed software therefor with all of the following capabilities: (i) an angular
resolution better than 3 milli-radians (0.5 mils); (ii) a range of 30 km or greater with a
range resolution better than 10 metres RMS; (iii) a velocity resolution better than 3 metres
per second.
(3) Software which processes post-flight, recorded data, enabling determination of vehicle
position throughout its flight path.
(i) Analogue computers, digital computers, or digital differential analyzers designed or
modified for use in the systems in Item 1, having either of the following characteristics: (a)
Rated for continuous operation at temperatures from below minus 45 degrees C to above
plus 55 degrees C; or (b) Designed as ruggedized or "radiation hardened".
Note to Item 13:

(ii) Item 13 equipment may not be exported as part of a manned aircraft or satellite or in
(i) Analogue-to-digital converters, usable in the systems in Item 1, having either of the
following characteristics:
(a) Designed to meet military specifications for ruggedized equipment; or,

(b) Designed or modified for military use; and being one of the following types: 1)
Analogue-to-digital converter "microcircuits", which are "radiation-hardened" or have all
of the following characteristics: i) Having a resolution of 8 bits or more; ii) Rated for
operation in the temperature range from below minus 54 degrees C to above plus 125
degrees C; and
(iii) Hermetically sealed. 2) Electrical input type analogue-to-digital converter printed

circuit boards or modules, with all of the following characteristics: i) Having a resolution of
8 bits or more; ii) Rated for operation in the temperature range from below minus 45
degrees C to above plus 55 degrees C; and iii) Incorporating "microcircuits" listed in (1),
above.
(i) Test facilities and test equipment usable for the systems in Item 1 and Item 2 as follows;
and specially designed software therefor:
(a) Vibration test systems and components therefor, the following:
(1) Vibration test systems employing feedback or closed loop techniques and incorporating
a digital controller, capable of vibrating a system at 10g RMS or more over the entire range
20 Hz to 2000 Hz and imparting forces of 50kN (11,250 lbs), measured 'bare table', or
greater;
(2) Digital controllers, combined with specially designed vibration test software, with a
real-time bandwidth greater than 5 kHz and designed for use with vibration test systems in
(1) above;
(3) Vibration thrusters (shaker units), with or without associated amplifiers, capable of
imparting a force of 50 kN (11,250 lbs), measured 'bare table', or greater, and usable in
vibration test systems (1) above;
(4) Test piece support structures and electronic units designed to combine multiple shaker
units into a complete shaker system capable of providing an effective combined force of 50
kN, measured 'bare table', or greater, and usable in vibration test systems in (l) above.
(b) Wind-tunnels for speeds of Mach 0.9 or more;
(c) Test benches/stands which have the capacity to handle solid or liquid propellant
rockets or rocket motors of more than 90 kN (20,000 lbs) of thrust, or which are capable of
simultaneously measuring the three axial thrust components;
(d) Environmental chambers and anechoic chambers capable of simulating the following
flight conditions: (1) Altitude of 15,000 meters or greater; or (2) Temperature of at least
minus 50 degrees C to plus 125 degrees C; and either (3) Vibration environments of 10 g
RMS or greater between 20 Hz and 2,000 Hz imparting forces of 5 kN or greater, for
environmental chambers; or (4) Acoustic environments at an overall sound pressure level
of 140 dB or greater (referenced to 2 x 10-5 N per square metre) or with a rated power
output of 4 kilowatts or greater, for anechoic chambers.
(e) Accelerators capable of delivering electromagnetic radiation produced by

"bremsstrahlung" from accelerated electrons of 2 MeV or greater, any type of high tech
gadget that may have a military application must be screened, and systems containing
those accelerators. Note: The above equipment does not include that specially designed for
medical purposes.
Note to Item 15(a):

(i) The term "digital control" refers to equipment, the functions of which are, partly or
entirely, automatically controlled by stored and digitally coded electrical signals.
(i) Specially designed software, or specially designed software with related specially
designed hybrid (combined analogue/digital) computers, for modelling, simulation, or
design integration of the systems in Item 1 and Item 2.
Note to Item 16:

(ii) The modelling includes in particular the aerodynamic and thermodynamic analysis of
the systems.
(i) Materials, devices, and specially designed software all not specified softwere must be
readily available to customs peer not for reduced observables such as radar reflectivity,
ultraviolet/infrared signatures and acoustic signatures (i.e. stealth technology), for
applications usable for the systems in Item 1 or Item 2, for example:
(a) Structural materials and coatings specially designed for reduced radar reflectivity;
(b) Coatings, including paints, specially designed for reduced or tailored reflectivity or
emissivity in the microwave, infrared or ultraviolet spectra, except when specially used for
thermal control of satellites;
(c) Specially designed software or databases for analysis of signature reduction;
(d) Specially designed radar cross section measurement systems.
(i) Devices for use in protecting rocket systems and unmanned air vehicles against nuclear
effects (e.g. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), X-rays, combined blast and thermal effects), and
usable for the systems in Item 1, as follows: (a) "Radiation Hardened" "microcircuits" and
detectors. (b) Radomes designed to withstand a combined thermal shock greater than 100
cal/sq cm accompanied by a peak over pressure of greater than 50 kPa (7 pounds per
square inch).
Note to Item 18 (a):
(i) A detector is defined as a mechanical, electrical, optical or chemical device that
automatically identifies and records, or registers a stimulus such as an environmental
change in pressure or temperature, an electrical or electromagnetic signal or radiation
from a radioactive material.
(i) Complete rocket systems (including ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles and
sounding rockets) and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise missile systems, target
drones and reconnaissance drones), not covered in Item 1, capable of a maximum range
equal or superior to 300 km. a listing via computer of any and all said designated parts and
a listing of transferable technology must be made available to customs and our carriers are
not being screened by customs enough either so it is the Duty of this official
acknowledgement declined that if the Entity God of Israel said to issue up heres Steven
then shell cooperate by showing us how we can identify clairvoyants station chiefs and
employ they to all walks away then not afford cosmic magic make believe is it told study.
Complete subsystems as follows, usable in systems in Item 19, but not in systems in Item 1,
as well as specially designed "production facilities" and "production equipment" therefor:
(a) individual rocket stages (b) Solid or liquid propellant rocket engines, having a total
impulse capacity of 8.41 x 105Ns (1.91 x 105 lb.s) or greater, but less than 1.1 x 106 Ns (2.5 x
105 lb.s).
Article
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this
Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede
to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification

and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States
of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the
five U N permanent Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary
Governments under this Treaty.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to

the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of
the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and
accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
Article
7. Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments
shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon
their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each
remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.
8. Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year
after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such
withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.
9. This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts are equally
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified
copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the
Governments of the signatory and acceding States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have designed this Treaty.
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, and Moscow, done this 18th Day of June
2009
appendage approves in the city of Midway 92655 USA on this 5th day of March two
thousand fifteen and two thousand zero nine 2009
ANNEXES
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________
____________________________
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
_____________________________
_____________________________
THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
______________________________
TAIWAN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
_____________________________
_____________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA
_________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
THE REPUBLICS OF AFRICAN UNITY
___________________________________
___________________________________
____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________X
THE RUPUBLIC OF SERBIA
___________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH KOREA
___________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE
_________________________________
THE REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN
_____________________________
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATUS
X ___________________________
_______________________________
THE STATE OF CUBA
_______________________________
All UNITED NATIONS DELEGATES
SEEK ATTACHMENT INVOICES
____________________________
THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD COURTS

OF JUSTICES
________________________________X 9
SEEK INVOICE MENT
NATO MEMBERSHIPS EACH IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AND

INDIVIDUAL CAPACITYS
__________________________________X
THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHISTAN

_______________________________
THE STATE OF INDIA
________________________________
THE STATE OF ISRAEL
_________________________________
THE UNITED KINGDOM
__________________________________
ALL ENSIGNS IN PARTICULARS
________________________________X
DESBIC TREATY SERIES
1. The present Convention shall be mandatory of all States Members of the United Nations
or of any of the specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or
parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by any other State invited or
ordered to do so, by the General Assembly of the United Nations to become a party to this
Convention.
2. Thereby whose as time references so as unlimited duration, at the Federal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in the State of Israel, and subsequently, at United Nations Headquarters,
New York. Ratification
3. The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Accession The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State belonging
to any of the categories mentioned hereupon.. The instruments of accession shall be
deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Entry into force:
1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirty first 31 of December 2,007
and so shall the date of deposit of the U N Charter insignias for an instrument of ratification
or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the
instruments of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force within the
time references as specified as retro effective and existing non-proliferation doctrine with
the notable obligations assigned to all Nuclear Powers and their suspected sponsoring
states, thereby the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession is
assigned to the United States of America as Depositary underwriter and defendant;
(a) and in the case of an absence of Law specific reference to the U S guarantor of the
Depositary function and pledge due to an excuse or submergence of anti-pas; in light of
abstentions, the State of Israel by reason of deductive programming and star based special
science selective service retention, is obligated to perform as the acting authority of this
world in the Day of the LORD, not later than 31 December 2,007 therewithal herein..
Authentic texts.
3. The original of this present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian
and Spanish and all dialect of tongue etiquette as sold said to save texts shall be equally
authentic and deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be made
available in all manner of speech, with all due consideration of the various languages of the
U N Memberships, to that end;
IN WITNESS WHEREOF
the undersigned
Plenipotentiaries,
being duly authorized thereto by
their respective Governments,
have signed the present Convention.
DESBIC TREATY SERIES AGENDA

NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS
Article 1
DEFINITION/USAGE OF TERMS
1. For the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols:
(a) "Inter-Continental nuclear-weapon-free zone" means the breath and territory of

habitable and uninhabitable planes of realitys to where we are coming from and when we
are going to state differently then the Law of Nature and Natures GOD(S), in the firmament
and between the advise and consent of star based definitions on usages of-.land, air, and
sea bases and all the continents in between as affixed, in Unity with its Resolution to
descend upon here and now therefore;
(b) "Territory" means not limited to the land territory, internal waters, territorial seas and
archipelagic waters and the airspace above them as well as the sea bed and subsoil
beneath;
(c) "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device
capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used.
The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms,
and may also include the means of transport of such critical masses as:
(d) "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters,

stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment;
(e) "Nuclear installation" means a nuclear-power reactor, a nuclear research reactor, a

critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope
separation plant, a separate storage installation and any other installation or location in or
at which fresh or irradiated nuclear material or hazardous quantities of radioactive
materials are present;
(f) "Nuclear material" means any source material or special fissionable material as defined
in the Statute and terms, of the accounts and descriptions provided for therefore an
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is needless seekers of degeneracy lingers here
withal and as amended from time to time by the existence of our star men hereinafter.
APPLICATION OF THE TREATY

Article 2
1. Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to the
territory within the Inter-Continental Hemispheres as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as
illustrated on the maps and the global satellite photos distributed by NASAs Jet Propulsion
Laboratories, published by National Geographical Topography indeed a societys of our
Lords creating, who is whereat; annex I.
2. This Treaty may prejudice or affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State
under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.
Article 3
RENUNCIATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
1. Each Party undertakes:
(a) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire,
possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;
(b) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture,
stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device;
(c) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development,
manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device.
Article 4
PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE

DEVICES
1. Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive
device.
2. Without prejudice to the purposes and objectives of the treaty, each party in the exercise
of theater ballistic nuclear questions as such remains subject to vice and virtue realities as
to decide for itself to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields,
transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial
sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage,
archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.
Article 5
ANNEX
DESBIC TREATY SERIES AND AGENDA NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE DECLARATION,
DISMANTLING, DECOMMISSION-ING OR CONVERSION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES
AND THE FACILITIES- FOR THEIR MANUFACTURE AND ATTRIBUTES
(a) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices;
(b) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior
to the coming into force of this Treaty;
(c) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices or, where possible,
inform the Secretary General, U S State Department, Israeli Defense Chiefs, or the CIA if
information concerning the activities or whereabouts of such crude or explosive frequency
field dispositions may exceed your line of conformitys thereabouts again therefore;
(d) To permit the On Site Inspection Agencys and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(hereinafter referred to as OSIA & IAEA), and the Commission established in article 12 to
verify the processes of dismantling virtual disappear-ment and decommissioning of the
nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their
production therefore it is established Israel and a Faith that you have won.
NATO CHAIN OF NAVAL LIMITIBLE ATTRIBUTION
Article 6
1. Each Party undertakes not to test any nuclear said devices; not to give aid and abet-ment,
in any such measure of field frequency service affiliation including nuclear energy disposal
units to another grade frequency Depositary and in a cause of a leading sponsor supplier of
uranium fuel, the Principals and the establishment of inventory assign abilities shall take
counts and charge of depleted or ex-pent fuel rods in as much as the Nords under Russos
authorities have been given charge of France and Germanys nuclear and bio-molecular,
and chemical arsenals and that weve been subject to apprehension and policy fines
imposed.
2. If a question remains pertaining to the negligible or willful and / nor deliberate acts,
accidents, nor facts arise to an occasion of belligerence or willful misconduct a Head of
State may become an exe mark for the charge of surrender given by, for, and as an Israeli
Defence Missionary stance pursuant of the day of Atonement actions entered as critical life
support indeed.
(a) The French and German Navys are not to project more than 12 nautical miles off, and
afar from the baseline of their mainland shoreline submergences unless otherwise given
permission by Group 5 and are not to traverse Sea, east to west north to south with
nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads of any attributes withstanding exclusive
permission group 5 not more than special detention grade resonance here as limitable
attribute not to exceed 5 k-ton nor to exceed 15 to 9 vessels of attack with one carrier, one
battleship thereabouts.
3. France and Germany both, if in the cause of independent projection are viewed as an
oversized explosive detonation yielder looking to devise an excuse to project, when in the
course of human under insurabilitys nuclear energy utility disassembly Protocol is a
primary first order of concern ability from now on in here as.
Article 7
PROHIBITION OF DUMPING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES
(a) To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained in this

Convention on the Ban of the Import and exportation of fewer than necessary units of
measurable contents of hazardous wastes within sub and inter continental Earth based
relatives in so far as it is relevant to radioactive contamination and void of fixation here
with our agenda(s) therefore;
(b) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and
other radioactive matter anywhere within the Inter and Sub-Continental nuclear-weapon-
free zone applications in an Entity hereof.
Article 8
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supportive therethough use of nuclear
science and technology for peaceful purposes.
2. As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and development, the Parties
undertake to denunciate individual and collective use of nuclear science and technology for
economic and social development. To this end they undertake to establish and strengthen
mechanisms for proliferation implied at the bilateral, sub regional and regional levels.
3. Parties are encouraged to make use of the ecologically safe and sane means of generating
energy resources here withal. All Partys to the U N Declaration shall be obligated to
assume the characteristics of a nuclear hostile State when in the course of human events it
becomes inevitable to discern that ex-pent highly radioactive fuel rods are an atomic
weapon of natures void; of assistance available in IAEA and, in this connection, to
strengthen cooperation under the Multi-National Regional Cooperation Agreement for
disbandment of nuclear resource utilitys Training and Development Related to Nuclear
Science and Technology will be forces of Israeli Class saucer modules and telepathic say of
our side to there is an unknown region.
Article 9
VERIFICATION OF PEACEFUL USES
(a) To conduct all activities for the IN TOLERABLE use of nuclear energy under strict non-
proliferation measures to provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;
(b) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA for the purpose of
verifying compliance with the undertakings in subparagraph (a) of this article;
(c) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material

especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material for peaceful purposes of any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a
comprehensive safeguards agreement considered safer than acceptability such as hospital
X-ray and atomic Geiger counter device utilities; concluded with Israeli Defence Ministrys
results oriented approval or rejection as need be, the Court of Justices newly found Faith;
and as so with the IAEA.
Article 10
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND FACILITIES
1. Each Party undertakes to maintain the highest standards of security and effective
physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or
unauthorized use and handling. To that end each Party, inter alia, undertakes to apply
measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed
by IAEA for that purpose.
Article 11
PROHIBITION OF ARMED ATTACK ON NUCLEAR

INSTALLATIONS
Each Party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed
attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the nuclear par
Group 5 decision there as.
Article 12
MECHANISM FOR COMPLIANCE
1. For the purpose of ensuring compliance with their undertakings under this Treaty, the
Parties agree to establish the Commission on Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the
Commission) as set out in annex III.
2. The Commission shall be responsible inter alia:
(a) Collating the reports and the exchange of information as provided for in article 13;
(b) Arranging consultations as provided for in annex IV, as well as convening conferences
of Parties on the concurrence of simple majority of State Parties on any matter arising from
the implementation of the Treaty;
(c) Reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by IAEA and
OSIA'S as elaborated in annex II;
(d) Bringing into effect the complaints procedures as specified in annex IV;
(e) Discouraging regional and sub regional conditions for cooperation in the peaceful uses
of nuclear science and technology;
(f) Denouncing international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the

peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.
3. The Commission shall meet in ordinary session once a year, and may meet in
extraordinary session as may be required by the complaints and settlement of disputes;
Article 13
REPORT AND EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION
1. Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Commission on its nuclear activities as
well as other matters relating to the Treaty, in accordance with the format for reporting to
be developed by the Commission.
2. Each Party shall promptly report to the Commission any significant event affecting the
implementation of the Treaty.
3. The Commission shall request The Principals to provide it with an annual report on the
activities of the State in question therefore;.
Article 14
CONFERENCE OF PARTIES
1. A Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the Depositary as soon as
possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to, elect members of the commission and
determine its headquarters. Further conferences of State Parties shall be held as necessary
and at least every two years, and convened in accordance with paragraph 2 (b) of article
12.
2. The Conference of all Parties to the Treaty shall adopt the Commission's budget and a
scale of assessment to be paid by the State Parties.
Article 15
INTERPRETATION OF THE TREATY
1. Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Treaty shall be settled
by negotiation, by recourse to The Principals, or another procedure agreed to by the
Parties, which may include air support against the said belligerent proliferation, to an
arbitral panel or to the Star Based designated procurers attention who are the Joint Chief
of USA Military Authority, and the Prime Ministry for Israel and, or his quarters thereupon
an International Court of Justice.
Article 16
DISBANDMENT OF PETROLEUM DEPENDENCYS
1. To promote the objectives of this Treaty, in conformity with the purposes

and principles of its interests, all insignias to an Emblem are required to
(a) commute by alternative and ecologically practical and resourceful measures hereafter,
other than source petroleum exportation and crude oil expectancys and the short sided
ness that a less than honest means of satiation divided by cultures bonded by virtue less
greed, besides the act or face of supply and demand and the politics of favoritisms during a
military or global policy in force entry.
2. The Contracting Partys state that further development in public health and
medical care are a concern to the mark of exploitation, but the lofty people, slick as
asphyxiate to an expiratory calendar may appear to be crude, it is the findings of this entry
for which true title ship and entrustment lies as a Status quo and domain eminent in
issues of international commercial policy here as:
(a) 31 December 2,007 as International mandatory minimum days instilled, by penalty

assessments and attributable fines for a purpose of life as we noticed it is, even as
necessary to avert the sudden outbreaks of ious; inter alia divisions in fine lines of a
citation emblem here as. There shall crude oil petroleum exportation,
(b) give notice by these pretences as conditions will allow and set forth as subject for auto-
transport and home heating to be subject to International restrictions. Pursuant to this
Article, contingency preparations and re-format to breathable standards for succeeding
generations to exist and survive the fate of hostile
dependencys shall be adapted for all the worlds to seek wherefore:
(c) 31 December 2,012 Each Party to a State agreed in effect to cease gasoline engine
motorcar production, in imports and in exportation for a fuel cylinder know how deplete
oxygen molecules also as if so where then.
(d) The Statute and the organization of the petroleum exporting countries* (OPEC), is
hereby obligated to endorse a subsequent freeze on index storage potential losses and shall
come to the table with respective and long lived considerations of the repugnant and
indignant desecration that a vacuum recesses has eroded; as with the buyers, so be the
sellers, and like the cold of the winters and the heat of the summers, the likeness giveth,
and to avert the outbreak of war 6.66% per annum post 31 December 2,012 aspect to
ratio declines in exports to the worlds 66 leading industrialist Nations shall be instituted as
lawful decree entered on this 28 of July 2,005 as:
(e) Each Party to a State shall be subject to military forfeiture and the OPEC organization is
hereby ordered to obey the Secretary Generals quarter and the moral majority decision
effective 31 December 2,007, under the auspices of this and relevant Provision-ment
concerning the eminent domain status quo of a utility.
3. For this purpose the International Organ waives right to regulate and excise any such
International Utilitys legitimate function. bearing in mind it is agreed that
within the balance of said cumulative ozone depletion-ary threats their lies
the decision handed down by Courts, crude oil by the barrel price affixation do not exceed
the registry of this days official Dow Jones industrial price at the closing of trade.
4. In and that the day of Atonement come forth restitution will be levied by the Secretary
Generals and a risk of complete and total forfeiture may legally be impugned on the
country of origin thereat. Set forward as come to be known to all by these Presents an
International utility opted for by minds over matters pertaining to how much in damages
due the International Courts for the prices affixed therewith hither for a said barrel crude
oil 31 December 2,007 34$ U S.
5. Should either of the High Contracting Party's', resort to condemn or deny the Official or
Intergovernmental of U N, actions shall be handed down, and choice of Judgment legal
actions will be pending there with U S NATO and China are obligated to protect the chair
and the due process of International Laws of Nature, Monopolies, and Government gauging
at the expense of the health and wellbeing of the seekers who addressed, advised, and
called attention to it to uphold and protect hereinafter.
6. Due regard shall be given to non-monopolistic dealings, who best provide for their own
escrow such as Russia, who is urged to follow suit in the way of alternative fuel designation
with a 10 year continuance on the said application. Subject to export petroleum policies
rendered as retroactive notice of intention to acclamation of eminent utility conglomerate
as said a United Nations utility there such as She may sustain, Russia and her reserves are
urged to gradually convert to electric motor and alternative challenges here and there so.
7. East Asian or West European auto and truck dealers into a designated impeachable
offence as see fit not to offer such as in synchronicity to a day of Atonement perpetual to an
act or fact of contrition here as.
8. Unless the secretariat give notice for revision and the airline passenger and commercial
status quo can be easily made to retro-attributable alternative specification 31 December
2,047 shall be the target able reentry into force projected actionary performance specifics
on diversion of aircraft from current standards of liquid propulsion to another matter as
set forth based on supply and demand in some areas as will opt to keep open for suitable
climate for capital and expertise investments herein as way fore.
9. In pursuit of the said objectives due to the creation of a suitable climate for eased
tensions among the oil exporting countries Although the electric and solar modifications
are a necessity for transformation to preserve and protect the environment the act and fact
still remains to be seated that though the Middle East may be assured neither stock piling
of weapons of mass destruction which somewhat wound up in the hands of neighboring
Jordan and other areas of attack me presents; nor having know it sold to our situation the
Iraqi Government and the OPEC Organization are to compensate for the costs incurred in
accordance with this Provision supplemental and in accordance if these compromises to
region become aesthetic to the Capital gains achieved by OPEC Dividends informal ad lib
soward.
Article 17
DURATION
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely. It shall
be the subject to a subsequent review, every five years at or upon 31 December 2,007;
2,027; continuously until or unless all Partys can agree that the numerical contingency
accountings are a nominal 00,000 nuclear warheads or attributable crude devices; and ,a
virtual disappear-ment options remove the doubts to a conclusion that areas of 000 nuclear
terminates and energy utility complexities cease to be the subject.
Article 18
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION AND ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall be open for signature by any State of The Principals nuclear-weapon-
free zone. It shall be subject to ratification.
2. It shall enter into force on the date of deposit upon the designated instruments of
ratification.
3. For a signatory that ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit, if it
sits well with The Principals, it shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of
deposit of its instrument of ratification. All Ensigns to a State are required by Star Based
authorities to be a Party to the START III IV AGENDA Treaty, therefore it is incumbent of
the Justices of the Peace to instill a motion of 31 December 2,007 as entry into force; such
Plenipotentiaries to this Convention shall incline efforts and brace thoughts to have signed
in, six months prior to the aforementioned time references here withal therein.
Article 19
AMENDMENTS
1. Any amendments to the Treaty proposed by a Party shall be submitted to Russian,
Israeli, U S, U N, Secretary, (the Principals), designates, the Swedish, Norwegians, Danes,
and Finns, in that order shall be entrust to Head NATO operative, and administrative,
custody, command and rank and file control hereto 2,022 onwards..
(a) On a basis of reciprocal nuclear, bimolecular demilitarization, and nuclear utility

disruption of service abet mentors on call while away, the security Council U N for which
the a specified Memberships are to share a U N Security Council are to recognize
Conciliatory Committees pursuant to Descriptive recommendations, with the Israeli
Delegation assigned and hereby charged with a permanent membership seat as status
quotations come rain or shine here withal and in so stated to an amendments which may
be necessary from time to time as so to circulate it to all Parties.
3. Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a two-thirds majority

of the Parties either through written communication to The Principals or through a
conference of Parties convened upon an Israeli absolution waiver of consent.
3. An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all Parties after receipt by the
Depositary of the instrument of ratification by the majority of Parties.
Article 20
WITHDRAWAL
OR ABSTENTION
1. Their shall not any such Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, have any such right
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-
matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Withdrawal shall be interpreted as an admission to aid and abet the enemy in an attempt
to become Party of, or Party to a State of nuclear and, or biological mischief, which is a High
Crime and act that may be characterized as aggression, punishable by Ajax detergent
enzymes recommended actions.
3. In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, the U N Secretary Generals agrees upon
Statement whereat if their exist an impasse, the Israeli Prime Ministers quarter shall have
final say; unless the Joint Chief(s) USA can provide resource and evidence to star elders at
mission control that waive for an SBIC Interim Agreement hereby a Party giving notice,
which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary;
Article 21
DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS
1. This Treaty, of which English is considered the majority language, shall be that of all
dialects of U N Memberships; texts shall be equally authentic, deposited with the Secretary-
General U N who recognizes the USA as such, as the hereby designated Depositary of the
Treaty; The State of Israel Also a common secondary in the event of a schism thereto.
2. The Depositary shall:
(a) Receive instruments of ratification;
(b) Register this Treaty and its Protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations;
(c) Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its Protocols to all States in
pursuit of a nuclear bio-chemical molecular-free zone and to all States Party to the
Protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify them of signatures and ratification of the Treaty
and its Protocols.
Article 22
STATUS OF THE ANNEXES
The annexes form an integral part of this Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the
annexes.
In witness whereof: the undersigned, being duly authorized by their

Governments are bound by this Treaty.
THE ANNEXES OF DESBIC TREATY SERIES
ANNEX I
THE UNITED NATIONS NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE ZONE
1. without prejudice to the Convention for the purpose of exercising their

function, the Northern Hemisphere, the Southern Hemisphere, all the Continents
in between, the breadth of the airspaces and the open seas thereupon which are set forth in
this document, shall be observed and come to be recognized as The Nuclear Free Zone
whereat thereabouts.
ANNEX II
SAFEGUARDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY

AGENCY
1. The safeguards referred to in subparagraph (b) of the article 9 shall in respect of each
Party be applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency as set forth in an agreement
negotiated and concluded with the Agency on all source or special fissionable material in all
nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out
under its control and the assigned auspice on site exchange to that ends anywhere.
2. The Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be, or shall be equivalent in its
scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection with the Treaty on:
(a) the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/153 corrected). A Party that has
already entered into a safeguards agreement with the OSIA & IAEA is deemed to have
already complied with the requirement. Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to
ensure that the Agreement referred to in paragraph 1 is in force for it not later than
eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.
3. For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph 1 above shall
have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown.
4. Each Party shall include in its annual report to the Commission, in conformity with
article 13, for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most
recent report by the International Atomic Energy Agency on its inspection activities in the
territory of the Party concerned, and advise the Commission promptly of any change in
those conclusions. The information furnished by a Party shall not be, totally or partially,
disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the reports, except when that
Party gives its express consent. The subject of Commissions may be at the acceptance of
The Principals there as.
ANNEX III COMMISSION ON NUCLEAR ENERGY
1. The Commission established in article 12 shall be composed of twelve Members elected

by Parties to the Treaty for a three-year period, bearing in mind the need for equitable
geographical distribution as well as to include Members with advanced nuclear expertise.
Each Member shall have one representative nominated with particular regard for his/her
principles in the subject of the Treaty.
2. The Commission shall have a Bureau consisting of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and
the Executive Secretary. If in the opinion of any of the Party's' their remains any doubts or
discrepancies to the common interests of the objectives of this Treaty the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman shall ascertain to the fullest extent possible here as though disassembly
standard compliancy shall be recognized as the only principle and purpose one said
International Atomic Energy Agency should brace thoughts to forgo as stated.
3. The Secretary-General of the organization there come forward where and an Israeli
Unity, at the request of Parties to the Treaty and in consultation with the
chairman, shall designate the Executive Secretary of the Commission. For the first meeting
a quorum shall be constituted by representatives of the Members of the Commission.
(a) For that meeting decisions of the Commission shall be taken as far as possible by
consensus or otherwise by a popular majority of the Members of the commission. The
Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure at that meeting.
3. The Commission shall develop a format for reporting by States as required under articles
12 and 13.
4. (a) The budget of the Commission, including the costs of inspections pursuant to annex
IV to this Treaty, shall be disseminated by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with a
scale of assessment to be determined by the Parties;
(b) The Commission may also accept additional funds from other sources
provided such donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of
the Treaty.
ANNEX IV
COMPLAINTS PROCEDURE AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party or a
Party to Protocol III is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall bring the subject-
matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the
latter thirty days to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter. This may
include technical visits agreed upon between the Parties.
2. If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring this complaint to the
Commission.
3. The Commission, taking account of efforts made under paragraph 1 above, shall afford
the Party complained of forty-five days to provide it with an explanation of the matter.
4. If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party
complained of, the Commission considers that there is sufficient substance in the complaint
to warrant an inspection in the territory of that Party or territory of a Party to Protocol III,
the Commission may request The Principals, who in turn may request The OSIA or the
International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct such inspections as soon as possible. The
Commission may also designate its representatives to accompany the Agency's inspection
team.
(a) The request shall indicate the tasks and objectives of such inspection, as
well as any confidentiality requirements;
(b) If the Party complained of so requests, the inspection team shall be accompanied by
representatives of that Party provided that the inspectors shall not be thereby delayed or
otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions;
(c) Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all information and
places within each territory that may be deemed relevant by the inspectors to the
implementation of the inspection;
(d) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the work of the
inspection team, and shall accord them the same privileges and immunities as those set
forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, per say;
(e) The International Atomic Energy Agency, and The On Site Inspect Inspection Teams,
shall report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to the Commission, outlining its
activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by it, with supporting
evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions. The Commission
shall report fully to The Principals, and if need be: all States Parties to the Treaty giving
its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this
Treaty;
(f ) If the Commission considers that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations
under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, States Parties
to the Treaty shall meet in extraordinary session to discuss the matter;
(g) The States Parties convened in extraordinary session may as necessary, make
recommendations to the Party held to be in breach of its obligations and to the
organization of the United Nations Unity.
(h) The costs involved in the procedure outlined above shall be borne by the responsibility
of the Membership resources and current index evaluation of the Partys holdings and title
ship accounting's there as. In the case of abuse, the Commission shall decide whether the
requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications.
5. The Commission must submit in writing to the Joint Chief of Staff USA, the Prime
Ministry Defense Israel, and the Secretary Generals quarter U N as so to establish its own
inspection mechanisms.
DONE FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND
ALL INSIGNIA'S TO THE CHARTER UNITED NATIONS; TO THEE I DO BEAR TRUE
FAITH WHEREFORE THERE AS WE ARE WE ARE
In Witness Whereof, the Undersigned Being Duly Authorized by Their Respective
Governments Undertake to Carry Out Settlement, Mediation, And Reconciliation to create a
Suitable Atmosphere For the Safeguard And Vital Concerns of this Extraordinary Session
Hereinafter Therefore
On Behalf of the Establishment of Faith and Understanding the Oath and Pledges Inscribed
by the Collective Will of All Partys Shall be Guided by Divine Revelation to Carry Out These
Aims and Purposes; to These Ends The Plenipotentiaries inter alia The Principals Will
Recognize the Legitimacy as Duly Sworn and Taken into Account Lawful
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In Witness of Our Say and of our Sheriff Departments
Said Hack and Obligation to Courts?
Let Us Say Amen
COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION
DONE 5th OF MARCH 2015 4 20 PM PST
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The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal(s) Descriptive Encode in "Star
Based" Internal Command; DESBIC TREATY SERIES AND AGENDAS
__________________________________________
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day in Courts I hear County escrow?
Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and his greatness is far reaching. Every day I
will praise, extol, commune, support and Hallow thee; blessed is the good Lord and may his
word's be understood, revered, praised and honored at all times. I will give law degrees a
phony occupation to emphasis of stay his apprehensions at court several times a day
ringer? Praise be to our higher powers and to the entitys I seek. Amen.
May an exercise of etiquette and free willed discussion decide the best apportion-ments to
settle for-s?
<<>>
POSTED AS OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED ON THIS 5th DAY OF March 2015 THE SITUATED
LORD ANTONS COURTS NOW PRESIDING TO MY ATTENTION I NEED BLESSED IS HE
WHO FULFILLS AND DECREES EMPHASIS FROM OUR PROVIDENTIAL
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF EMBODIMENT THERE SITUATED; A GOOD REST PEACE BE
GIVEN TO THEY WHO EARN SOLITUDE-S. HERE SAY?

Desbic Treaty 05 March 2015 4 15pm

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PREFACE 1.

UNDER ORDERS OF DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR

THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN, STATE,

HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS DEPARTMENTS:

1. VISUAL EXHIBIT(S) (a), (b), and (c)

6. THE SORT COMPACT AND RESEARCH TEXTS

7. INCORPORATION OF START (IOS) START DRAFTS

9. WEAPONS OF ATTACK GLOSSARY-S

10. PROTOCOLS AND TREATY INTEGRATION

11. APPENDAGES AND VARIANTS ASSIGNED

12. ANNEX 1 AND TREATYS BANNING

13. NUCLEAR FREE ZONE APPENDAGE AND TEXTS

14. CLOSING MINUTES AND PASSAGES

PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 05 March 2015 5: 00 pm PST

THE DESBIC AGENDA TREATY

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN, STATE,

DESBIC Prologue Introductory

5. Omitted and Open

BASED INTERNAL COMMAND-COMMUNICATION-S AND AUTHORITY-S.

THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN, STATE,

HAVING SEEN LEGAL ACTION BROUGHT TO POLICE, SHERIFFS DEPARTMENTS:

Have decidedly ascribed:

We the Author's of this Manuscripts;

Have decided respond, to;

Article I (The Establishment of Treaty)

Pre Ambler: Part 1

3. 4. Omitted and Open

10-12. Omitted and Open

15. U S arsenals are believed to be a parody in areas of evacuated a smaller contingency

19. Omitted / Open

DISCUSS, DEBATE, CONCERT COMMITTEES ATTENTION-S, ANALYZE, BUILD AND SHARE

THE TREATYS BETWEEN ALL INSIGNIA'S TO AN EMBLEM, MARQUIS, ENSIGN, STATE,

THE ARTICLES OF GENETIC DISCLOSURE

Have decided to research

ARTICLE 1 (The Establishment of Treaty)

ARTICLE 2 (Disarmament Conditions)

7. The subject of On Site Recovery

ARTICLE 3 (Disarmament Terms)

Analysis, Discussions, Constructive criticism, Advise, Offers

PAGES UNDER CONSTRUCTION UPDATED 10 30 PM 04 MARCH 2015 PST

ARTICLE 4 (Disarmament Dutys and Descriptions)

3. An Supreme Unified Command and Response Authoritys (SUCRA), to represent each to

6. Noted in these Final Recommendations; the subject of photography, whether it be stills

ARTICLE 6 (PROCEDURES IN CHALLENGED INSPECTIONS)

4. Pursuant to a request for a challenge inspection of a facility or location, and in

UNDER CONSTRUCTION 5 March 2015

6. Nuclear propelled or tipped warhead(ed) ordnance and-s nuclear propelled or tipped

7. OPEN ANALYSIS, DISCUSS

DESBIC TREATY ARTICLE-S 8 (Registry of Treaty(s')

2. This Section is applicable to fundamental tactic reserved reckonings of "Entitys at Court

3. The function of the Depositary, in particular shall be to:

Article 9 (Anti-Missile Defense)

2. Pursuant to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Limitations Treaty, Article XV Section 2.,

DESBIC TREATY (Israels Right to Exist)

ARTICLE-S 10 (Israel's Right to Exist)

8. The foregoing provisions of this Chapter shall refer to Israel as an International

(a) an imposition of such as a dispute of sort as we have inscribed to resolve pursuant of

ARTICLE 11 (Disbandment of Nuclear Resources)

3. If exempted nuclear material is to be processed and situated out of a reaches of space in

6. Within the framework of paramount consideration, a penalty assessment fee of 12.5

9. The existence of any fact which, if established constitute an anti-equation, is a matter of