RESEARCH 1 Threat. Reductions

Understanding the Nuclear Weapons Threat
While it has been more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the existence of
thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious global threat. The likelihood of a
nuclear war between the United States and Russia has decreased, but the continued presence of
large stockpiles makes the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a persistent risk.
Many of the countries with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, are actively
engaged in regional conflicts, making the possibility of regional nuclear war a concern. North
Korea illicitly acquired nuclear weapons, and other countries, including Iran and Syria, have
violated their nuclear safeguards commitments and are suspected of covertly pursuing nuclear
weapons capabilities. In the post-9/11 world, the potential for catastrophic nuclear terrorism is
also a serious threat.
A number of efforts by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental

organizations are underway to attempt to mitigate the nuclear threatbut significantly reducing
the risk of nuclear weapons use will require the sustained long-term commitment of the entire
international community.
Overview Last updated: December, 2014

The United States possesses a substantial nuclear weapons arsenal and associated
delivery systems, and is one of the five nuclear weapon states recognized by the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
While the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggested that the United States might develop
and possibly test new types of nuclear weapons, the 2010 NPR reversed this position, stating that
Life Extension Programs will use only nuclear components based on previous designs, and will
not support new missions or capabilities.
[1] The United States destroyed its biological weapons in the early 1970s, and continues the
process of destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons.
Nuclear
The United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, making it
the only country ever to use nuclear weapons during a conflict. At its peak, in 1967, the
American arsenal contained 31,255 nuclear warheads. As of the latest U.S. government
disclosures (September 2013), the arsenal consisted of 4,804 nuclear warheads, although there
were several thousand additional warheads that had been retired but not yet dismantled.
[2] The United States has historically deployed tactical nuclear weapons in several European
NATO countries as part of its commitment to extended deterrence. In 2010 there were
approximately 200 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey.
[3] In addition to the NPT, the United States is a party to several treaties related to the reduction
and control of nuclear weapons.
The U.S.-Russian New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty) which received
the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate for ratification in December 2010 and entered into
force on 7 February 2011 requires both countries to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to
1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles.
[4] According to the most recent New START data exchange (1 October 2014), the United States
deploys 1,642 strategic warheads on 794 delivery systems.
[5] The actual number of operational U.S. warheads is likely higher since the treaty counts one
strategic bomber as one warhead even though, for example, the B-2 bomber can carry up to 16
warheads.
[6] A January 2014 estimate published by Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris put the actual
number of operational U.S. warheads at 2,130.
[7] Washington is also a member of export controlorganizations aimed at limiting the

proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies, including theNuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and
the Zangger Committee (ZAC). After conducting a total of 1,054 nuclear tests since 1945, the
United States has maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992.
[8] The United States signed theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, but in
October 1999, the U.S. Senate voted against giving its advice and consent to ratification of the
treaty.
[9] In order to address the age-related deterioration of nuclear warheads, the George W. Bush
administration resumed small-scale warhead production at Los Alamos National Laboratory in
2007. Bush administration plans for a large-scale Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW)
program were stalled by repeated Congressional denials of funding, and President Barack Obama
made clear in his FY2010 budget proposal that his administration would not support the RRW
program.
[10] President Obama's "Prague Speech" on 5 April 2009 presented a bold vision for his
administration's approach to the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century. Committing the
United States to the long-term goal of zero nuclear weapons, Obama said "today, I state clearly
and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons."
[11] President Obama also indicated he would seek ratification of the CTBT and promote
progress on the proposed Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).
[12] In a June 2013 speech in Berlin, President Obama re-asserted his view that "so long as
nuclear weapons exist, we are not truly safe," and announced his readiness to reduce by "one-
third" the 1,550-warhead limit established by New START as well as to seek "bold reductions in
U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Europe."
[13] In April 2010, the United States hosted over 40 nations at the first Nuclear Security Summit
in Washington, where leaders endorsed the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials
within 4 years.
[14] The Washington Summit was followed by two additional summits in Seoul, South Korea in
March 2012 and in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2014. In his June 2013 speech in Berlin,
President Obama announced his intention to host a fourth, and likely final summit, in the United
States in 2016.
[15] The United States is actively involved in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It
possesses 104 nuclear power reactors, including 69 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR) and
35 Boiling Water Reactors (BWR), producing over 100,000 MWe of energy or approximately
20% of the country's electric power needs.
[16] In February 2012, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) awarded Southern Company
a license to build two new reactors at the Vogtle Nuclear Power Plant, which are projected to
become operational in 2017 and 2018, respectively.
[17] This was the first new reactor license to be granted in the United States in three decades. In
March 2012, the NRC awarded South Carolina Electric and Gas Company (SCE&G) a license
for two reactors at the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station.
[18] As of July 2014, the NRC had 18 combined license applications awaiting approval.
[19] According to the 2013 Annual Energy Outlook early release, nuclear generating capacity is
expected to increase by 13 gigawatts (GW) from 2011 to 2025 for a total of 114 GW, with 5.5
GW coming from new sources.
[20] The United States has had a policy against reprocessing spent nuclear fuel since the 1970s,
when the Carter Administration first imposed a moratorium, primarily in response to the
proliferation concerns associated with reprocessing. The George W. Bush Administration
revisited the reprocessing debate beginning with the February 2006 announcement of its Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), whose next generation technologies were intended to
utilize reprocessing.
[21] However, the Obama administration cancelled key components of GNEP, and reorganized
the program into the International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC).
Biological
[22] In 1941, U.S. Secretary of War Henry Stimson commissioned a study by the National
Academy of Sciences on the threat posed by biological weapons. The study concluded that the
United States should move forward with an offensive and defensive biological weapons
program, and President Franklin Roosevelt verbally approved the program in May 1942.
[23] Beginning in 1943 and ending in 1969, the United States weaponized a variety
of pathogens and toxins for use against humans and plants. Weaponized anti-human agents
included Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Coxiella burnetii (Q
fever), Brucella suis (Brucellosis or Malta fever), Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus
(VEE), Clostridium botulinum (Botulinum Toxin), andstaphylococcus aureus (staphylococcal
enterotoxin B or SEB).
[24] Weaponized anti-plant agents included wheat rust, rye blast, and other bacterial pathogens,
toxins, and fungal plant pathogens designed to destroy food crops or defoliate trees.
[25] In addition, military scientists conducted research on Rift valley fever, plague,
Chikungunya, cholera, dengue fever, human glanders, and shigellosis (dysentery).
[26] On 25 November 1969, President Nixon renounced biological weapons and unilaterally
placed restrictions on further production.
[27] Then on 10 April 1972 Nixon signed the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention
(BTWC), followed by the deposit of ratification on 10 April 1975. [28] Between May 1971 and
February 1973, the United States destroyed its entire BW stockpile (including over 40,000 liters
of anti-personnel biological warfare agents and 5,000 kilograms of anti-agricultural agents) at the
Pine Bluff Arsenal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Fort Detrick.
[29] In December 2009, the Obama Administration released its National Strategy for Countering
Biological Threats, which seeks to strike a balance between countering current threats and
preventing the misuse of science.
Chemical
[30] In response to German chemical attacks during World War I, the United States established
the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in 1918. During the war, the CWS manufactured,
stockpiled, and used chemical weapons, primarily mustard and phosgene gases.
[31] Other early agents included chlorine and chloropicrin. Chemical weapons (CW)
development and production expanded rapidly during World War II, with production of new
chemicals including cyanogen chloride, hydrogen cyanide, and lewisite. However, President
Franklin Roosevelt declared a no-first-use policy and did not use CW during WWII.
[32] After WWII, the renamed Chemical Corps concentrated on research and development of
weaponized sarin and V-series nerve agents (VX), with eventual weaponization of artillery,
rockets, and other delivery systems.
[33] In 1969, Public Law 19-121 restricted testing, transport, storage and disposal of CW.
[34] Also in 1969, President Nixon signed an executive order halting further production of
unitary chemical weapons. These two events, combined with several environmental incidents
and growing international criticism over chemicals used in Vietnam (such as Agent Orange
and tear gas), resulted in a substantial reduction of CW programs.
[35] In 1975, the United States ratified the Geneva Protocol, with the reservation that the treaty
not apply to defoliants and riot control agents such as those used in Vietnam and Laos.
The Reagan administration reexamined the CW issue in the 1980s and began production of
binary sarin artillery shells in 1987. However, the use of CW in the Iraq-Iran war soured public
opinion towards CW. Then in 1989, chemical companies, fearing a public relations disaster,
refused to provide the first Bush administration with necessary CW related chemicals. On 1 June
1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev signed the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA),
halting all production of new U.S. and Soviet CW.
[36] In April 1997 the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
committed to destroying all chemical stockpiles by 2007.
[37] By 2013, Washington had destroyed 28,000 metric tons of chemical-warfare agents (or
roughly 90% of its declared stockpile).
[38] The CWC required that all parties destroy their stockpiles by 2007, with the possibility of a
five year extension to 2012. The United States, Russia, and Libya requested and received the
extension until 29 April 2012. However, none were able to meet this deadline. The CWC states
that if parties are unable to meet the deadline they should complete destruction in the "shortest
time possible."
[39] Of the nine U.S. disposal facilities, six have completed disposal of their stockpiles and have
been closed. The Tooele County, UT facility has completed disposal and is the process of being
closed. The Pueblo, CO facility commenced destruction operations in December 2012 and
continues ongoing construction projects. The Pueblo facility is set to complete disposal of its
chemical agents by 2019.
[40] As of 26 June 2014, construction and systemization of the final facility in Blue Grass,
Kentucky was 82% and 18% complete, respectively.
[41] In December 2012 the Department of Defense shifted $36.4 million in funds to construction
of the Blue Grass plant to compensate for budget short-falls.
[42] The facility is set to eliminate its stockpiles by 2023.
[43] The United States also participates in CW nonproliferation through the Australia Group
(AG), anexport control mechanism.
Missile
The United States produces highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-fueled ballistic missiles as well
as cruise missiles. According to a detailed breakdown of the New START data from July
2014, Washington deploys 449 LGM-30G Minuteman III nuclear-tipped intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) at bases in Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming.
[44] The Navy deploys 240 UGM-133A Trident II D-5 submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM) on 14 Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).
[45] The Air Force deploys 11 B-2A bombers that can carry up to 16 nuclear bombs and 78 B-
52H Stratoforce bombers that can each carry up to 20 AGM-86B nuclear tipped air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCM) each.
[46] Following the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the United States
eliminated its entire stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) and medium-range
ballistic missiles (MRBM).
[47] Pursuant to the restrictions of the INF, the United States does not possess ballistic or cruise
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the
United States decided to retire the Navy's nuclear-tipped Tomahawk sea-launched cruise
missiles (TLAM-N).
[48] The United States devotes considerable budgetary resources to missile defense systems,
including those designed to intercept incoming missiles at the boost, midcourse, and terminal
phases. Most proposed systems are hit-to-kill interceptors and many are in the early stages of
research and development. The "most mature" short-range system is the PAC-3 patriot system
(MIM-104F).
[49] Use of PAC-3 systems in the 2003 Iraq war produced mixed results: while it successfully
intercepted the nine "most threatening" ballistic missiles, it failed to detect several low-flying
Iraqi cruise missiles and ultralight aircraft, and friendly fire on coalition aircraft resulted in the
deaths of three soldiers.
[50] The Army has activated two batteries, with a total of 48 interceptors, of the land-based
terminal-phase Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system.
[51] The Navy operates 26 ships equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system,
which has been deployed to Europe and sold to Japan.
[52] Finally, the Air Force has deployed 30 Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
interceptors in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
[53] On 22 June 2014, the United States successfully conducted a test of its homeland Ground-
based Missile Defense System.
[54] This marked the first successful use of a "second-generation kinetic kill vehicle," mounted
on a Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) against an intermediate-range missile target.
[55] The effectiveness of the new Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, dubbed the "CE-2," bolstered
the popularity of the Defense Department's $1 billion plan to station 14 more GBI missiles in
Fort Greely, Alaska by 2017.
[56] Given the program's cost, however, some experts and former government officials remain
circumspect, citing concerns with the technology's ability to perform consistently, and the fact
the "CE-2" has yet to successfully intercept an ICBMthe primary objective of the anti-missile
program.
[57] The February 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Review reversed the Bush
Administration's plans for an antiballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe, instead adopting a
four-phase, adaptive approach that will focus new technologies on the threat from short- and
medium-range missiles to U.S. and allied forces.
[58] In March 2013 the Obama Administration canceled Phase IV, which called for SM-3 IIB
ground-based interceptors to be deployed to Europe by 2018.
[59] Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that cancellation of the fourth phase would
help fund an additional 14 GMD interceptors for Alaska by 2017.
[60] In June 2013, the House Armed Services Committee authorized funding for East Coast
GMD interceptors, while the head of the Missile Defense Agency argued there was no security
need for their deployment.
[61 The United States is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), whose
goal is to restrict the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons
of mass destruction. Washington also subscribes to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (HCOC), designed to supplement and bolster the MTCR.
Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," January 2002; U.S.
Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," 6 April 2010, www.defense.gov.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet: Transparency in the U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Stockpile," 29 April 2014, www.state.gov.
[3] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, " U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,
2011,"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 67, no.1, January/February 2011, pp. 64-73,
www.thebulletin.org.
[4] Office of the Press Secretary, "Key Facts about the New START Treaty," 26 March 2010,
www.whitehouse.gov; Peter Baker, "Senate Passes Arms Control Treaty with Russia, 71-
26,"New York Times, 22 December 2010, www.nytimes.com; "New START Enters into
Force," Global Security Newswire, 7 February 2011, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[5] U.S. Department of State, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive
Arms," Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 1 October 2014, www.state.gov.
[6] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "US nuclear forces, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 70, No. 1 (January 2014), p. 91.
[7] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "US nuclear forces, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 70, No. 1 (January 2014), p. 85, 91.
[8] U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office, "United States Nuclear Tests: July
1945 through September 1992," DOE/NV209-REV 15, December 2000, www.nv.doe.gov;
U.S. Congress, "Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1993," 102nd Congress
H.R. 5373, 2 October 1992, http://thomas.loc.gov.
[9] "Country Profiles: United States of America," Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization,
www.ctbto.org.
[10] Scott Miller, "Obama Cuts RRW Program," Arms Control Today, April 2009,
www.armscontrol.org.
[11] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Barack Obama,"
Hradcany Square: Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[12] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Barack Obama,"
Hradcany Square: Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[13] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at
the Brandenburg Gate Berlin, Germany," 19 June 2013, www.whitehouse.gov.
[14] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Communiqu of the Washington Nuclear
Security Summit," 13 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov.
[15] The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by President Barack Obama at
the Brandenburg Gate Berlin, Germany," 19 June 2013, www.whitehouse.gov.
[16] Department of Energy, "U.S. Nuclear Reactors," and "U.S. Nuclear Generation of
Electricty," Energy Information Administration, www.eia.doe.gov.
[17] Miguel Llanos, "U.S. licenses first nuclear reactors since 1978," MSNBC News, 9 February
2012, http://usnews.msnbc.msn.com; Rob Pavey, "NRC oversight ensures safety at Vogtle,
chairwoman says." Augusta Chronicle (Augusta, GA), 7 June 2013,
http://chronicle.augusta.com.
[18] United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Combined License Applications for New
Reactors," 6 February 2013, www.nrc.gov.
[19] U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), "Combined License Applications for New
Reactors," 1 July 2014, www.nrc.gov.
[20] "AEO2013 Early Release Overview," U.S. Energy Information Administration, DOE/EIA-
0383ER(2013), 5 December 2013, www.eia.gov.
[21] Edwin Lyman and Frank N von Hippel, "Reprocessing Revisited: The International
Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership," Arms Control Today 38, no. 3, 1 April
2008, pp. 6-14.
[22] International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, www.ifnec.org.
[23] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp.
59-60.
[24] Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the
Concerned Citizen (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2002), p. 31.
[25] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005), p. 212.
[26] Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p.
106; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear,
125.
127.
International Peace, 2005), pp. 60, 212.
[30] Merle David Kellerhals Jr., "United States Introduces New Biological Weapons Security
Strategy," America.gov, 9 December 2009.
[31] Jonathon B. Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-
Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), p. 19.
Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 223-224.
Qaeda (New York: Anchor Books, 2007), pp. 245-295.
[37] "Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 21 May 2009," OPCW
Technical Secretariat, S/768/2009, 27 May 2009, www.opcw.org.
[38] "Director-General Visits USA for High-Level Meetings, Addresses Closing Ceremony of
Chemical Materials Agency," Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 21 May
2012, retrieved from www.opcw.org
[39] Danier Horner, "Accord Reached on CWCs 2012 Deadline," Arms Control Association,
armscontrol.org.
[40] "Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Monthly Status Update,"
Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives,
www.peoacwa.army.mil; "Construction Complete at Pueblo Chemical Arms Disposal Facility,"
Global Security Newswire, 1 February 2013, www.nti.org.
[41] Center for Disease Control and Prevention, "Closing U.S. Chemical Warfare Agent
Disposal Facilities," www.cdc.gov; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Chemical
Weapons Elimination: Blue Grass Chemical Disposal Facility, Madison, Kentucky,
www.cdc.gov; Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Map of Chemical Disposal
Facilities, www.cdc.gov; "Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP) Monthly
Status Update," Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives,
www.peoacwa.army.mil; News from the BGCAPP Construction Site, June 2014, Program
Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, 26 June 2014,
www.peoacwa.army.mil.
[42] "Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) Monthly Status Update,"
Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives,
www.peoacwa.army.mil.
[43] "Kentucky Chemical Weapons Disposal Plant to Get $36M in Extra Funding," Global
Security Newswire, 12 December 2012, www.nti.org.
[44] U.S Department of State, "New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive
Arms," Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, July 1, 2014, www.state.gov;
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists 70, No.1, 6 January 2014, pp. 85-93, http://bos.sagepub.com.
[45] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists Vol. 70, No.1, 6 January 2014, http://bos.sagepub.com; U.S Department of
State, "New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification and Compliance, July 1, 2014, www.state.gov.
[46] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists Vol. 68, No.3, May/June 2012, http://bos.sagepub.com; U.S Department of
State, "New Start Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification and Compliance, July 1, 2014, www.state.gov.
International Peace, 2005), pp. 85-87.
[48] U.S. Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review Report," April 2010,
www.defense.gov.
International Peace, 2005), pp. 97.
[50] Dennis M. Gormley, "Missile Defense Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War," Survival 45,
no. 4, Winter 2003-2004, pp. 61-86.
[51] "Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)," U.S. Missile Defense Agency,
www.mda.mil.
[52] "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense," U.S. Missile Defense Agency, www.mda.mil.
[53] "Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)," U.S. Missile Defense Agency, www.mda.mil.
[54] Rachel Oswald, "U.S. Ends Losing Streak with Successful Missile Intercept Test," Global
Security Newswire, 23 June 2014, www.nti.org.
Security Newswire, 23 June 2014 www.nti.org.
[58] U.S. Department of Defense, "Ballistic Missile Defense Review," February 2010,
www.defense.gov; "U.S. scraps final phase of European missile shield," BBC News, 16 March
2013, www.bbc.co.uk.
[59] "U.S. scraps final phase of European missile shield," BBC News, 16 March 2013,
www.bbc.co.uk.
[60] "U.S. scraps final phase of European missile shield," BBC News, 16 March 2013,
www.bbc.co.uk.
[61] Jeremy Herb. "House panel passes $638b Defense bill," The Hill, 6 June 2013; Tony
Capaccio. "Pentagon, Army Say East Coast Missile Defense Site Not Needed," Bloomberg, 11
June 2013.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
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Overview Last updated: October, 2014
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 left the Russian Federation in possession of
the vast majority of the USSR's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex. Over the past
two decades, Russia has implemented arms control agreements and participated in threat
reduction programs that have dismantled and downsized substantial parts of its arsenals and
made inventory numbers more transparent.
At present, Russia is modernizing and recapitalizing its entire arsenal of strategic nuclear
weapons and delivery systems. Although the retirement of aging Soviet-era capabilities provides
much of the impetus for these efforts, Russia also views modernization as a means to counteract
the conventional superiority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as a way
to retain its status as a major military power. Given its extensive WMD capabilities, Russia's
active participation in nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament efforts is a prerequisite to
their global success.
Nuclear
The Soviet nuclear weapons program began during World War II and culminated in a successful
nuclear test in 1949. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a nuclear weapon state party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and one of the three NPT
depository states.
[1] According to estimates by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), by 1991 the
Soviet Union had approximately 35,000 weapons in its stockpile, down from a peak in 1986 of
approximately 45,000.
[2] Under the provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), and
the New START Treaty that entered into force in 2011, Russia and the United States are limited
to 1,550 strategic warheads by 2018. According to a biannual exchange of data required under
the New START Treaty, as of October 2014 Russia had 1,643 warheads on 528
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBM), and warheads designated for- heavy bombers.
[3] However, Moscow's current total stockpile of deployed and

nondeployedstrategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including those awaiting dismantlement is
approximately 8,000 warheads.
[4] Russia inherited a massive nuclear weapons production complex and large stocks
of weapons-grade fissile material after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is estimated that
Russia currently has 695 120 metric tons of weapons grade-equivalent highly enriched
uranium (HEU) and approximately 128 8 tons metric tons of military-use plutonium.
[5] Despite cooperative agreements in this area, Russia has hesitated to report the total quantity
of its HEU and plutonium stocks.
Biological
The Soviet Union ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1975 and
was one of the treaty's three depository states.
[6] However, the Soviet Union violated the terms of the BTWC by secretly operating a large
offensive BW program until the USSR's dissolution in 1991. Within the BW program, the USSR
weaponized the causative agents of anthrax, glanders, Marburg fever, plague, Q fever,
smallpox, tularemia, and Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis.
[7] In wartime, formulated agents would have been loaded into a variety of delivery systems,
including aerial bombs and ballistic missile warheads.
[8] Soviet BW scientists also researched, developed, and produced anti-crop and anti-livestock
agents.
[9] Additionally, the USSR established an anti-plague system, the primary objective of which
was to control endemic disease and prevent the import of exotic pathogens that could threaten
crops, animals, and humans. In the late 1960s, the system was also tasked with defending the
USSR against biological attacks.
[10] This anti-plague system continues to operate in Russia today.Although the full extent of the
former Soviet biological weapons program is unknown, facilities suitable for offensive biological
weapons production likely remain in Russia.
[11] Russia continues to engage in dual-use biological research activities, but there is no
indication that these activities are inconsistent with its BTWC obligations. However, it remains
unclear whether Russia has fulfilled its obligations under Article I of the BTWC.
[12] Some nonproliferation experts also worry that scientists formerly associated with the Soviet
biological warfare program could assist foreign countries with clandestine BW programs.
Chemical
[13] During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the world's largest arsenal of chemical
weapons, including artillery shells, bombs, and missiles that contained choking
agents (phosgene); nerve-agents (sarin, soman, and VX); and blister agents (mustard, Lewisite,
and mustard-lewisite mixture).
[14] There have been allegations that the Soviet Union developed a new class of nerve agents
(Novichok), estimated to be between 5 and10 times more toxic than VX. [15]
Russia inherited the declared Soviet stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of CW munitions and agents
stored in bulk.
[16] In November 1997 Russia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), but financial
and other difficulties have been an impediment to the timely destruction of its chemical weapons
stockpile. Moscow announced in September 2013 that it had destroyed over 76% of its stockpile
over 30,000 of 40,000 metric tons and anticipates adequate financing for complete
destruction by December 2020.
Missile
[17] Russia has one of the most robust and advanced missile programs in the world, and
maintains the capability to produce highly sophisticated liquid- and solid-propelled missiles of
all ranges. Russia is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).
According to the October 2014 New START data exchange, Russia deploys its 1,643 warheads
on 528 strategic nuclear delivery systems.
[18] Soviet legacy missile systems comprise 72% of the Russian missile arsenal. Current military
modernization plans call to reduce that number to 60% by 2016 and 2% by 2021.
[19] For the land based leg of the nuclear triad Russia currently only produces the RS-24 Yars
(NATO: SS-29) road mobile ICBM. A new road mobile ICBM, the RS-26 Rubezh colloquially
known as the "Missile Defense Killer," is currently being developed.
[20] On 7 June 2013, Russia conducted the fourth successful test launch of the new road mobile
ICBM which is set to enter into combat duty in 2014.
[21] The RS-26 has raised concerns within the United States and among its NATO allies given
the fact Russia has flight tested the missile to ranges within those proscribed by the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
[22] However, Russia did test the RS-26 beyond INF-prohibited ranges in May 2012, qualifying
the missile as an ICBM counted under New START and therefore not subject to the INF.
[23] In 2009, plans were announced to develop a new liquid-fueled heavy ICBM to replace
current silo-based ICBMs.
[24] The missile is scheduled to be produced as early as 2018 and put into service by 2019;
however, this timeline is not likely to be feasible.
[25] For its sea-based deterrent Russia is developing the R-30 Bulava (NATO:SS-NX-30), a
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to be deployed on the new Borey-class
submarines. After numerous technical problems throughout development, the Bulava finally
received approval to enter active service in June 2012, and the first Borey SSBN, the Yuri
Dolgoruki, entered into combat duty in January 2013.
[26] The delivery platform for Russia's air-based deterrent is the Kh-55 (NATO: AS-15
'Kent') air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), deployed on Tu-95MS (Bear H) and Tu-160
(Blackjack) bombers. Russia has been developing a new ALCM, the Kh-102, for a number of
years, but the missile has not yet been deployed.
[27] Russia has designed a new long-range bomber that will eventually take over the roles of the
Tu-95MS, the Tu-160 and the Tu-22 non-strategic bomber, currently known as PAK-DA (future
long-range aircraft).
[28] Russia has also been developing a controversial ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM),
reportedly named the R-500.
[29] In its annual Compliance Report released in July 2014, the U.S. State Department
determined Russia had tested a GLCM in violation of the INF Treaty, which obligates the United
States and Russia "not to possess, produce, or flight-test" missiles with maximum ranges
between 500 and 5,500 km.
[30] Although U.S. officials had reportedly raised the issue privately with Moscow in May 2013,
the Obama administration apparently hopes going public with its concerns will pressure Russia
back into compliance.
Sources:
[1] The United States and the United Kingdom are the other two NPT depository states.
[2] Robert S. Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, U.S.-USSR/Russian Strategic Offensive Nuclear
Forces, 1945-1996 (Washington, DC: National Resources Defense Council, 1997), p. 43.
[3] U.S. Department of States, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive
Arms," Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, October 1, 2014, www.state.gov.
[4] Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Russian nuclear forces, 2014," Bulletin of Atomic
Scientist, 3 March 2014, bos.sagepub.com, p. 77.
[5] "Global Fissile Material Report 2013," International Panel on Fissile Materials, January
2012, www.fissilematerials.org, pp. 10-11, 20.
132.
[7] Milton Leitenberg and Raymond A. Zilinskas, with Jens H. Kuhn, The Soviet Biological
Weapons Program: A History, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp. 288, 631-678.
[8] Christopher J. Davis, "Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs
of the Former Soviet Union and Iraq," Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, July 1999,
www.cdc.gov.
[9] Gulbarshyn Bozheyeva, Yerlan Kunakbayev and Dastan Yeleukenov, "Former Soviet
Biological Weapons Facilities in Kazakhstan: Past, Present, and Future," CNS Occasional Paper,
No. 1, June 1999, p. 11.
[10] Sergei Popov and Marina Voronova, "Russian Bioweapons: Still the Best-Kept Secret?" The
Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2004, p. 192.
[11] "Stated Government Policy," Jane's CBRN Assessments, 27 July 2009, www.janes.com.
[12] "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments," U.S. Department of State, August 2011.
[13] Judith Miller and William J. Broad, "Iranians, Bioweapons in Mind, Lure Needy Ex-Soviet
Scientists," New York Times, 8 December 1998, www.nytimes.com; and Anthony H. Cordesman
with Adam Adam C. Seitz, "Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: Biological Weapons
Program," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 28 October 2008, p. 14.
[14] "Key Facts, Chemical, Russian Federation," Jane's CBRN Assessments, 8 September 2009,
www.janes.com.
[15] David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand (New York: Doubleday, 2009), p. 310.
[16] "Key Facts, Chemical, Russian Federation," Jane's CBRN Assessments, 8 September 2009,
www.janes.com.
[17] "
60,4 " [Russia destroyed three quarters of its chemical
weapons ], Lenta, 9 September 2013 , www.lenta.ru.
[18] U.S. Department of States, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive
Arms," Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, October 1, 2014, www.state.gov.
[19] "Russian Strategic Rocket Forces to be Almost Fully Re-Armed by 2021 -

Commander," Interfax: Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly, December 23, 2011.
[20] "Russia Tests New 'Missile Defense Killer', Ria Novosti, 7 June 2013, en.ria.ru; Jerry
Davydov and Bryan Lee, "Russia Nuclear Rearmament: Policy Shift or Business as Usual?"
Nuclear Threat Initiative, December 18, 2013.
[21] "Russia Tests New 'Missile Defense Killer', Ria Novosti, 7 June 2013, en.ria.ru.
[22] Jeffrey Lewis, "An Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by any Other Name," Foreign Policy,
April 25, 2014. www.foreignpolicy.com.
[23] Jeffrey Lewis, "An Intercontinental Ballistic Missile by any Other Name," Foreign Policy,
April 25, 2014. www.foreignpolicy.com.
[24] Pavel Podvig, "New heavy ICBM expected to be ready in 2019," Russian Nuclear Forces,
Dec. 14, 2012, russiannuclearforces.org.
[25] Pavel Podvig, "New heavy ICBM expected to be ready in 2019," Russian Nuclear Forces,
Dec. 14, 2012, russiannuclearforces.org.
[26] "Russia's Bulava Carrying Sub to Enter Service by June," RIA Novosti, 20 January 2012,
en.rian.ru; "Russia's Bulava Missile Hits Test Target," Global Security Newswire, 29 October
2010, http://gsn.nti.org.
[27] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2010,"Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, Volume 66, Number 1, January/February 2010, p.78.
[28] First flight prototype of new strategic bomber will appear by 2017 - Air Force
commander,"Interfax: Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly, December 24, 2012; "Russian Air
Force Approves New Bomber Design Commander," RIA Novosti, April 11, 2013,
http://en.ria.ru.
[29] Hans M. Kristensen, "Russia Declared In Violation of INF Treaty: New Cruise Missile May
Be Deploying," FAS Strategic Security Blog, July 30, 2014.
[30] "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments," U.S. State Department, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification,
and Compliance, July 2014.
[31] Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty," The New
York Times, July 28, 2014, www.nytimes.com.
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Overview Last updated: January, 2015
India perceives its nuclear weapons and missile programs as crucial components of
its strategic doctrine. New Delhi rejects the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the grounds that it perpetuatesat least in the short-
terman unjust distinction between the five states that are permitted by the
treaty to possess nuclear weapons, while requiring all other state parties to the
treaty to remain non-nuclear weapon states.
India has also been highly critical of the pace of the nuclear weapon
states' disarmament progress, arguing that they have not fulfilled their commitments under
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, India
has recently taken steps to integrate into the broader nonproliferation regime, receiving a waiver
in 2008 from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), entering into bilateral civilian nuclear
agreements, ratifying a version of the Additional Protocol, and expressing interest in joining the
major export control regimes.
Nuclear
India is not a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or
theComprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), though it is a state party to the Partial Test
Ban Treaty (PTBT). New Delhi embarked on a nuclear energy program in 1948 and a nuclear
explosives program in 1964.
[1] The latter culminated in the May 1974 test of a "peaceful nuclear explosion." Following five
nuclear tests in May 1998, India formally declared itself a nuclear weapon state.
[2] According to the 2014 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises 90 to 110 warheads.
[3] Estimates in 2013 put India's highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile at 2.4 0.9 tons, and
its weapons-grade plutonium stockpile at 0.54 0.18 tons.
[4] Although India is increasingly concentrating on developing missiles for nuclear delivery
roles, aircraft such as the Mirage 2000 and the Jaguar remain integral parts of its nuclear delivery
force. In July 2014, India and the United Kingdom agreed to a GBP250 million deal that placed
British Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (ASRAAM) on the Indian Air Forces
Jaguars.
[5] While these missiles do not themselves deliver a nuclear payload, they can be seen as
augmenting the Jaguars nuclear capability. In addition to the Mirage 2000 and the Jaguar, a $20
billion deal with the French will add 126 Rafale fighter jets, capable of carrying nuclear
payloads, to their delivery arsenal.
[6] India and the United States announced a nuclear cooperation initiative in July 2005 that
would permit New Delhi to participate in international nuclear trade, under certain conditions.
[7] In 2008, New Delhi negotiated a limited safeguards agreement with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).
[8] Subsequently, in September 2008 the Nuclear Suppliers Group removed the ban on India's
participation in nuclear trade with its members. In October 2008, India and the United States
signed a bilateral '123' nuclear cooperation agreement. India has since signed nuclear cooperation
agreements with several countries, including Canada, Russia, France, Argentina, Kazakhstan,
and Namibia. In September 2014, Australia and India signed a nuclear cooperation agreement
allowing uranium export to India for nuclear power purposes.
[9] India is working to conclude an agreement with Japan.

[10] In June of 2014, India ratified a version of the IAEA Additional Protocol, after a 5-year
delay.
[11] The agreement allows IAEA inspectors access to the countrys civilian sites, but not to
military facilities.
[12] India is expanding its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability in order to
complement its land- and air-based nuclear weapons.
[13] In order to meet the increased amount of uranium, India has increased enrichment
capabilities at the Indian Rare Metals Plant near Mysore in Karnataka.
[14] There is fear, however, that the uranium hexafluoride could be diverted to Indias
thermonuclear weapon capability.
Biological
[15] Although some intelligence estimates suggest that India possesses biological weapons, there
is very limited open-source information available about a possible Indian biological weapons
program. India's Defence Research and Development Establishment has conducted research on
detecting and countering various diseases.
[16] India ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1974. The U.S.
Department of State found India to be compliant with its commitments to the BTWC in 2010 and
2011, and has not addressed India in its Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments report since 2012.
[17] India has an extensive dual-use capability in its advanced pharmaceutical industry.
Chemical
After many years of denying the existence of a chemical weapons program, India disclosed in
June 1997 that it possessed chemical weapons. Under the terms of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), which India signed in 1993 and ratified in September 1996, India had
destroyed approximately 75 percent of its stockpile of Schedule 1 chemicals by the end of 2006.
[18] In March 2009, India announced that it had destroyed all of its chemical weapons stocks in
accordance with the CWC. [19]
Missile
For more than two decades, India has sought to develop and deploy ballistic and other types of
missiles. India reportedly possesses four nuclear-capable land-based ballistic missilesthe
Prithvi I and II; and the Agni I,II, and IV.
[20] The Agni III is thought to be inducted into service but not fully operational. Two additional
land-based nuclear-capable missiles, the Agni IV and V, are under development.
[21] The Prithvi-II achieved successful testing in 2014 and uses advance inertial guidance
systems to reach accuracy within a few meters.
[22] In January 2014, a third and final test of the Agni IV demonstrated the ability to carry a 1-
ton payload more than 4,000km.
[23] India tested the Agni V, its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of
more than 5,000km, in April 2012 and September 2013.
[24] The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in May 2012 announced
plans to develop the Agni VI, an ICBM with a range of 8,000 to 10,000km.
[25] New Delhi has also taken steps toward achieving a submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM)capability, with the first test of the K-15 (Sagarika) taking place in February 2008 from a
submerged barge.
[26] India debuted its INS Arihant nuclear submarine in early 2014. The indigenously built
submarine has the capacity to carry twelve vertical-launched nuclear-tipped missiles.
[27] India is also in the process of developing newer missile systems. The latest project, the
Shaurya (Valor), was first successfully tested in November 2008.
[28] This 700-800km range nuclear-capable ballistic missile greatly enhances India's fledgling
sea-based deterrent.
[29] In July 2014, the U.S. Defense Department stated that the U.S. intended to make a $200
million sale of Harpoon anti-ship missiles to India to be fitted on their submarines.
[30] India is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), but in July
2005 it agreed to comply with MTCR guidelines.
[31] In November 2002, New Delhi rejected a draft of the Hague Code of Conduct Against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), which it believes is discriminatory and interferes with
the peaceful uses of space technology.
[32] Although granted waiver status in 2008, India continues to seek admittance into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, with the latest round of talks taking place in June 2014.
[33] In January 2015, India and the United States issued a joint statement that indicated
American backing for Indias phased entry into the NSG, MTCR, the Wassenaar Agreement, and
the Australia Group. China expressed conditional support for Indias entry into the NSG, but
insisted upon caution and discussion among NSG members.
[34] India has also focused on cruise missile advancements and made significant progress in the
development and deployment of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, which was jointly
developed with Russia.
[35] A second cruise missile, the Nirbhay (Fearless), was announced in 2007; a sub-sonic missile
with a range of 1,000km.
[36] The Nirbhay, which has undergone extensive research and development, is expected to be
tested in late 2014. In June 2014, DRDO also successfully test fired the Astra air-to-air missile,
Indias first indigenously produced beyond visual range (BVR) missile.
[37] The medium-range Akash (Sky) surface-to-air missile was also tested in June of 2014,
intercepting an aerial vehicle 30m above sea level.
[38] India is also concentrating on acquiring missile defense capabilities. Since 2006, India has
tested components of its missile defense system on several occasions. The DRDO announced in
April 2012 that India's missile defense system could be ready for deployment in late 2014.
[39] New Delhi expects missile defense cooperation with companies and governments from the
United States, Israel, and Russia. [40]
Sources:
[1] George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkley:
University of California Press, 1999), pp. 17-18 and 82-83.
[2] See images at: "First Nuclear Test at Pokhran in 1974," Federation of American Scientists, 4
July 2000, www.fas.org.
[3] "16 June 2014: Nuclear Forces Reduced while Modernizations Continue, Says SIPRI,
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 16 June 2014, www.sipri.org.
[4] "Countries: India," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 4 February 2013,

www.fissilematerials.org.
[5] James Hardy. India, UK Agree GBP250 Million ASRAAM Deal, Janes Defense Industry,
8 July 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
[6] Rajit Pandit, India Closes in on $20 Billion Rafale Deal, The Times of India, 16 July 2014,
www.timesofindia.com.
[7] Office of the Press Secretary, "Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh," distributed by the White House, 18 July 2005.
[8] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Nuclear Verification: The Conclusion of Safeguards
Agreements and Additional Protocols," (Agreement Text), 9 July 2008, www.isis-online.org.
[9] "Australia ends ban on selling uranium to India," Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 5
September 2014, www.abc.net.au.
[10] Ravi Velloor, "N-Trade for India, Japan on the Cards; Pact Being Thrashed Out, Say
Sources," The Straits Times (Singapore), 24 August 2011, www.lexisnexis.com; David Fickling,
"Australia Governing Party Backs End to India Uranium Export Ban," The Wall Street Journal, 5
December 2011, www.online.wjs.com; "India Courts Canada on Nuclear Partnership," CBC
News, 17 July 2011, www.cbc.ca.; "India, Canada Sign Civil Nuclear Deal," Times of India, 29
June 2010, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
[11] Robert Kelley and Karl Dewey, India Ratifies Nuclear Inspections Protocol After Five-
Year Delay, Janes Defense Weekly, 2 July 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
[12] Indias Nuclear Diplomacy: Late Addition, The Economist, 28 June 2014,
www.theeconomist.com.
[13] Brian Cloghley and Robert Kelley, Nuclear Option India Increases its Uranium
Enrichment Programme, Janes Intelligence Review, 5 June 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
[16] Dev Vrat Kamboj, Ajay Kumar Goel, and Lokendra Singh, "Biological Warfare
Agents," Defence Science Journal, Vol. 56, No. 4, October 2006, pp. 495-506, via:
http://drdo.gov.in; "Dr. Saraswat Inaugurates State of the art Chem-Bio sensor facility," DRDO
Press Release, 24 May 2012, http://drdo.gov.in.
[17] U.S. Department of State, "Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," 2012, www.state.gov.
[18] Amb. Neelam D. Sabharwal, " Statement by Ambassador Ms. Neelam D. Sabharwal,
Permanent Representative of India to the OPCW and Leader of the Indian Delegation to the 11th
Session of the Conference of States Parties December 5-8, 2006," Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, December 2006, www.opcw.org.
[19] "Update on Chemical Demilitarisation," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons, 21 April 2009, www.opcw.org.
[20] Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "VI. Indian Nuclear Forces," in SIPRI Yearbook
2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: Oxford University
Press, 2013) p. 312; India Test Fires New Agni-IV Ballistic Missile, RIA Novosti, 20 January
2014, http://en.ria.ru.
[21] Shannon N. Kile and Hans M. Kristensen, "VI. Indian Nuclear Forces," in SIPRI Yearbook
2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Stockholm: Oxford University
Press, 2013) p. 312.
[22] Strategic Weapons Systems, IHS Janes Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia, 12
February 2014, www.janes.ihs.com; India Successfully Tests Prithvi-II Missile, The Hindu, 28
March 2014, www.thehindu.com.
[23] India Test Fires New Agni-IV Ballistic Missile, RIA Novosti, 20 January 2014,
http://en.ria.ru.
[24] Siman Denyer, "India Tests Missile Capable of Reaching Beijing," The Washington Post, 18
April 2012, www.washingtonpost.com; Jatindra Dash, India Tests Agni-V Missile with Range
as Far as Beijing, Reuters, 15 September 2013, http://in.reuters.com.
[25] "India to go for new age Agni-VI," New Indian Express, 23 May 2012,
http://expressbuzz.com.
[26] Rahul Bedi, "Sagarika Test Firing Heralds India's SLBM Capability," Jane's Navy
International, 1 March 2008.
[27] Strategic Weapons Systems, IHS Janes Sentinel Security Assessment South Asia,
12February 2014, www.janes.ihs.com.
[30] India - UGM-84L Harpoon Missiles, U.S. Defense Dept. Press Release, 1 July 2014,
www.defense.gov.
[31] Manu Pubby, "India Unveils N-Capable Shourya," The Indian Express, 13 November 2008,
www.indianexpress.com; "India Test-Fires Shaurya Missile," The Hindustan Times, 12
November 2008, www.hindustantimes.com.
[32] "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India," Fact Sheet, Arms Control Association,
November 2007, www.armscontrol.org.
[33] Indias Role in the Nuclear Race, New York Times, 5 July 2014, www.nytimes.com.
[34] Caution needs to be exercised on Indias NSG inclusion: China, The Economic Times, 26
January 2015, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com; U.S.-India Joint Statement Shared
Effort; Progress for All, White House Office of the Press Secretary, 25 January 2015,
http://www.whitehouse.gov.
[35] "India Rejects Conduct Code on Missile Proliferation," Economic Times, 15 November
2002, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com.
[36] Josy Joseph, "Navy Wants BrahMos in Submarines," Daily News & Analysis, 21 June 2008;
T.S. Subramanian, "Cruising Along," Frontline, Vol. 24, Issue 13, 30 June-13 July 2007; "Trials
of BrahMos Air Version from 2012: Sivathanu Pillai," The Hindu, 5 March 2011,
www.thehindu.com.
[37] Astra Missile Test Fired Successfully From Su-30MKI, New Indian Express, 20 June
2014.
[38] Rajit Pandit. Stage set for Test of Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile Nirbhay, The Times of
India, 15 May 2014, www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
[39] Zachary Keck, India Prepares Long Range Missile Defense Test, The Diplomat, 23 April
2014, www.thediplomat.com.
[40]Eric Auner, Indian Missile Defense Program Advances, Arms Control Association,
January/February 2013, www.armscontrol.org.
India Treaty Membership
India Missile Chronology
India Nuclear Chronology
India Chemical Chronology
India Biological Chronology
Overview Last updated: December, 2014
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an active nuclear weapons
program and tested nuclear explosive devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013. It is also
capable of enriching uranium and producing weapons-grade plutonium. North
Korea deploys short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and successfully launched
a long-range rocket in 2012.
Pyongyang unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) in January 2003 and is not a party to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) or a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The DPRK is not a
party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and is believed to possess a large chemical
weapons program. North Korea is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC), but is suspected of maintaining an offensive biological weapons program in defiance
of that treaty.
Nuclear
North Korea's interest in a nuclear weapons program reaches back to the end of World War II.
Since then, Pyongyang developed a nuclear fuel cycle capability and has both plutonium and
enriched uranium programs capable of producing fissile material. North Korea declared that it
had roughly 38.5kg of weapons-grade plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods in May 2008,
however external estimates have varied.
[1] In November 2010, North Korea unveiled a uranium enrichment program ostensibly intended
to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors, though it is possible for Pyongyang to
produce highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes.
[2] North Korea conducted three nuclear weapons tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013.
[3] As of May 2014, satellite images showed activity at North Koreas Punggye-ri Nuclear Test
Site, but analysts disagreed as to whether this indicated a fourth nuclear test was imminent.
[4] The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and
the United States began in 2003 with the goal of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. However,
these talks have been suspended since April 2009. Initial uncertainties about North Korea's
nuclear program after the death of Kim Jong Il were tempered when Pyongyang agreed to
suspend nuclear tests, uranium enrichment, and long-range missile tests in exchange for food aid
from the U.S. on 29 February 2012.
[5] After a dispute with the United States over the launch of a rocket in April 2012, North Korea
declared the agreement void, and later conducted a nuclear test in February 2013.
[6] In April 2013, North Korean state media announced that Pyongyang would restart all nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon, including its 5MW graphite-moderated reactor, and uranium enrichment
plant.
[7] By August 2013, satellite imagery confirmed steam venting from the 5MW reactor's turbine
and generator building.
[8] The reactor is capable of producing 6 kg of plutonium a year, however it is not clear how the
modified cooling system, and repeated shutdowns will affect production.
[9] As of November2014, imagery analysis suggests that the 5MW reactor is shut down.
Biological
[10] Although the DPRK signed the Geneva Protocol and acceded to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1987, it is suspected of maintaining an ongoing biological
weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK and the defense agencies of the United States and
South Korea generally agree that the country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in
the early 1960s.
[11] However, open source information on the DPRK's biological weapons program varies
considerably. The 2012 Defense White Paper by South Korea's Ministry of National Defense,
estimates that the DPRK possesses the causative agents of anthrax, and smallpox, among others.
Chemical
[12] North Korea is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
[13] The DPRKs pursuit of chemical weapons dates back to 1954. It most likely obtained
indigenous offensive CW production capabilities in the early 1980s.
[14] The DPRK's CW agent production capability is estimated to be up to 4,500 metric tons
during a typical year and 12,000 tons per year during a period of crisis, with a current inventory
of 2,500 to 5,000 tons.
[15] Pyongyang has concentrated on acquiring mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-type chemical
agents.
[16] Reports indicate that the DPRK has approximately 12 facilities where raw chemicals,
precursors, and actual agents are produced and/or stored, as well as six major storage depots for
chemical weapons.
[17] The United Nations Human Rights Council reported that North Korea may use prisoners
and the disabled to test chemical weapons in February 2014, though they could not
independently confirm the accuracy of defector testimony.
[18] Pyongyang also has placed thousands of artillery systems including multiple launch
rocket systems that would be particularly effective for chemical weapons delivery within
reach of the Demilitarized Zone and Seoul.
Missile
[19] North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s and tested a Scud-
B ballistic missile by April 1984.
[20] North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR).
[21] In its short-range arsenal, Pyongyang has produced the 500km-range Scud-C, the 700km-
range Scud-D, and the solid-fueled KN-02, which is an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21
"Scarab" with a slightly longer range of about 120km. In its medium and intermediate-range
arsenal, North Korea has the 1,300km-range missile known as the Nodong (Rodong), which it
initially tested in 1993 (500km).
[22] North Korea has deployed between 175 and 200 Nodong missiles.
[23] Pyongyang has also displayed its Musudan IRBM in parades, although it has never flight
tested the missile. A yet-unnamed Nodong-variant was also displayed in October 2010, which
possesses visible similarities to Iran's Ghadr-1.
[24] North Korea's Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1), an 1800km-range space launch vehicle has also
been flight-tested. North Korea's three-stage Taepodong/ Unha SLV has been tested with varied
success.
[25] North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange for food aid
from the U.S. on 29 February 2012.
[26] However, on 12 April, it attempted to launch the Kwangmyong-3 satellite into orbit using
an Unha-3 launch vehicle. The launch failed after approximately 80 seconds, and the debris
landed off the western coast of South Korea. The U.S. government withdrew its offer of food aid
because it considered the space launch, which relied on missile technology, a violation of the
bilateral agreement as well as UN Security Council resolutions 1718and 1874.
[27] On 15 April 2012, North Korea displayed six never before seen missiles in a parade in
honor of its founder Kim Il Sung. These missiles, known externally as KN-08s, are likely only
mock-ups.
[28] The missiles were displayed on six trucks of Chinese-origin that were converted to
transporter-erector-launchers (TELs).
[29] On 12 December 2012, North Korea reattempted its Unha-3 launch, successfully putting a
Kwangmyong-3 satellite into orbit.
[30] This test proves a significant advancement in North Korean missile technology. With only
slight modifications for re-entry the rocket could deliver a very small payload, though without
great accuracy. As of October 2014, North Korea has completed upgrades to launch pads at the
Sohae Satellite Launching Station, potentially allowing the country to launch rockets larger than
the Unha-3.
[31] Pyongyang has also tested anti-ship cruise missiles numerous times since 1994. The North
Korean missile identified as the AG-1 is based on the Chinese CSSC-3 'Seersucker'. Anti-ship
cruise missile tests on 25 May and 7 June 2007 are believed to have been either the KN-01 or the
Chinese-made CSSC-3 'Seersucker'.
[32] In June 2014, North Korea released propaganda footage showing what appears to be a
variant of the Russian Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile.
[33] North Korea also launched a series of short-range rockets in the summer of 2014. [34]
Sources:
[1] "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs," International Crisis Group Asia Report
N168, 18 June 2009, www.crisisgroup.org. U.S. analysts have been skeptical of North Korea's
claim, citing its history of past deception. Some U.S. estimates have cited 50-60kg of Pu-239.
"Jane's CBRN Assessments, Production Capability: Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information
Group, 7 January 2010.
[2] Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center
for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, http://iis-
db.stanford.edu.
[3] "Jane's CBRN Assessments, Key Facts: Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7
January 2010; "3
[Third Underground Nuclear Test ConductedSuccessfully]," KCNA, 12 February 2013,
www.kcna.kp.
[4] Why a Nuclear Test May Not Be Imminent: Update on North Korean Punggye-ri Nuclear
Test Site, 38 North, 13 May 2014, http://38north.org; NK Nuclear Test Site Shows Increased
Activity: Seoul, Yonhap News Agency, 4 April 2014, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
[5] Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang-hun, North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work; U.S.
to Give Aid, New York Times, 29 February 2012, www.nytimes.com.
[6] "DPRK Rejects UNSC's Act to Violate DPRK's Legitimate Right to Launch Satellite,"
KCNA, 17 April 2012, www.kcna.co.jp; "KCNA Reports on Successful 3rd Underground
Nuclear Test," KCNA, 12 February 2013.
[7] DPRK to Adjust Uses of Existing Nuclear Facilities, KCNA, 2 April 2013,
www.kcna.co.jp. Independent analysis confirms activity taking place at Yongbyon during this
time, see: Nick Hansen and Jeffery Lewis, Satellite Images Show New Construction at North
Koreas Plutonium Production Reactor; Rapid Restart?, 38North, 3 April 2013,
http://38north.org.
[8] Nick Hansen and Jeffrey Lewis, North Korea Restarting its 5 MW Reactor, 38 North, 11
September 2013, http://38north.org.
[9] Beth Duff-Brown, "Hecker Responds to NKorea Intent to Expand Nuclear Arsenal," Center
for International Security and Cooperation, 10 April 2013, http://cisac.stanford.edu.
[10] David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, "Yongbyon: Centrifuge Enrichment Plant
Expands while 5 MWe Reactor is Possibly Shut Down," Institute for Science and International
Security, 3 October 2014, www.isis-online.org; Nick Hansen, "North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear
Facility; Reactor Shutdown Continues; Activity at Reprocessing Facility," 38 North, 19
November 2014, http://38north.org.
[11] "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs," International Crisis Group,
18 June 2009, www.crisisgroup.org.
[12] Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, 2012 Defense White Paper, 11
December 2012, p. 36, www.mnd.go.kr.
[13] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,"Non-Member States,"

www.opcw.org.
[14] "North Korea's Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs," International Crisis Group,
18 June 2009, www.crisisgroup.org.
[15] Joseph Bermudez Jr., North Koreas Chemical Warfare Capabilities, 38 North, 11
October 2013, http://38north.org.
[16] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 5 July
2010.
2010.
[18] UN Human Rights Council, "Report of the Detailed Finds of the Commission of Inquiry on
Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p.93, 7
February 2014, www.un.org.
2010.
[20] North Koreas Missile Program, BBC News, 25 March 2014, www.bbc.com.
[21] Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR Partners, www.mtcr.info.

[22] Tae-Hyung Kim, North Koreas Missile Development and Its Impact on South Koreas
Missile Development and ROK-U.S. Alliance, Korea Observer, Winter 2008, pp. 582-583.
[23] Daniel A. Pinkston, "North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles During Military Parade, Some
for First Time," WMD Insights, June 2007, www.wmdinsights.com.
[24] Joshua Pollack, "Another North Korean Missile First," Arms Control Wonk, 10 October
2010, www.armscontrolwonk.com; Doug Richardson, "Iran test-flies solid-propellant ballistic
missile,"Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 2 December 2008.
[25] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 20 January
2011.
[26] Steven Lee Myers and Choe Sang-hun, North Koreans Agree to Freeze Nuclear Work;
U.S. to Give Aid, New York Times, 29 February 2012, www.nytimes.com.
[27] Evan Ramstad and Laura Meckler, "North Korean Launch Fails," The Wall Street Journal,
13 April 2012, http://online.wsj.com.
[28] Jeffrey Lewis, "Real Fake Missiles?," Arms Control Wonk, 1 May 2012,
http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com.
[29] Melissa Hanham, "North Korea's Procurement Network Strikes Again: Examining How
Chinese Missile Hardware Ended Up in Pyongyang," NTI Issue Brief, 31 July 2012,
www.nti.org.
[30] Kim Eun-jung, "S. Korea, U.S. Assess N. Korea's Rocket Launch as Success," Yonhap, 12
December 2012, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
[31] Nick Hansen, "North Korea's Sohae Satellite Launching Station: Major Upgrade Program
Completed; Facility Operational Again," 38 North, 1 October 2014, http://38north.org.
[32] "Strategic Weapon System, Korea, North," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 20 January
2011.
[33] Jeffrey Lewis, Translating a Noun into a Verb Pyongyang Style: The Case of North
Koreas New Cruise Missile, 38 North, 16 June 2014, http://38north.org.
[34] "N. Korea Apparently Fires Two Ballistic Missiles: Seoul", Yonhap News, 13 July 2014,
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr.
Overview Last updated: January, 2015
Iran has been a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since 1970, and has an advanced nuclear
program that it declares to be peaceful in nature. The nuclear program has
progressed significantly in the past decade, in line with Iran's 2006 announcement
that it would begin enriching uranium. Tehran's failure to report significant parts
of its program to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and insistence on
developing all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, has led many states to worry that
Iran's true intention is to acquire nuclear weapons, precipitating international
diplomatic pressure and sanctions.
One of Iran's Russian-built Kilo-class submarines

www.dodmedia.osd.mil
Iran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and is actively
working to acquire, develop, and deploy a broad range of ballistic missiles and space
launch capabilities. The scope and status of Iran's chemical and biological activities are
unknown, but the most recent Western intelligence estimates have downgraded the likelihood
that Iran maintains significant offensive chemical and biological weapons programs.
Nuclear
Mohamed Reza Shah initiated Iran's nuclear program during the 1950s with assistance from the
U.S. Atoms for Peace Program. Establishing the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) in
1974, the Shah had ambitious plans to construct 20 nuclear power reactors, a uranium
enrichment facility, and a reprocessing plant forspent fuel.
[1] However, after the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini deemed
the nuclear program "un-Islamic" and ordered it terminated. In 1984, Khomeini reversed course
on the issue of nuclear power and sought international partners to continue building the Bushehr
reactors.
[2] Currently, Iran has a robust nuclear infrastructure, including uranium mining, milling,
conversion, and enrichment capabilities.
[3] The most controversial dimension of the program to many in the international community has
been Iran's effort to build up its enrichment capabilities, which could be used to produce highly
enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. This includes developing, constructing and
implementing an extensive enrichment program comprising nearly 20,000 gas centrifuges at 3
major facilities.
[4] [5]
The UN Security Council has passed multiple resolutions demanding that Iran halt its enrichment
activities. Negotiations to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States, Russia, France,
the United Kingdom, China, Germany (P5+1 also known as E3+3), and Iran failed during the
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but have progressed further under President Hassan
Rouhani.
[6] On 27 September 2013, President Obama and President Rouhani held the first direct talks
between U.S. and Iranian leaders since the 1979 revolution.
[7] Building on this overture, Iran and the P5+1 held several rounds of talks in Geneva in
October and November 2013.
[8] These culminated in a 6-month Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) and the Framework for
Cooperation (FFC) between the IAEA and Iran. The 11 November 2013 FFC signed between the
IAEA and Iran bound Iran and the IAEA to cooperate further "with respect to verification
activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues."
[9] The Joint Plan of Action concluded between Iran and the P5+1 sought to attain a "mutually-
agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear programme will be
exclusively peaceful," by 20 July 2014.
[10] In addition, the JPOA obligated Iran to implement several interim steps over this period,
including suspending enrichment activities to produce near 20% uranium hexaflouride (UF6),
converting and blending down its existing stockpile of this material, and providing expanded
IAEA access to nuclear facilities. In return, the P5+1 countries agreed to suspend some
previous sanctions on Iran and return confiscated funds totaling as much as $7 billion.
[11] The latest IAEA safeguards report released in November 2014 indicated Iran has thus far
complied with the JPOA, but has yet to provide the Agency with "any explanations" as called for
within the context of the FFC regarding certain past activities suspected of being related to
designing a nuclear weapon.
[12] Despite some progress, Iran and the P5+1 failed to reach a comprehensive accord before the
July 20th deadline, but agreed to extend the interim agreement through 24 November 2014.
[13] The extension allowed Iran access to $2.8 billion in frozen assets held abroad in exchange
for converting "a portion of its 20% enriched uranium in powdered form into fuel plates for the
Tehran Research Reactor, making it even less readily accessible for use in a weapons program."
[14] After failing to arrive at a comprehensive agreement by this extended deadline, the
negotiating parties agreed to a second, seven-month extension lasting through June 30, 2015.
Additionally, Iran and the P5+1 have set a tentative four-month deadline to reach a "political
agreement" for a comprehensive deal, hoping to use the remaining three months to iron out the
technical details and specifics of implementation.
[15] According to officials involved in the negotiations, defining a mutually acceptable capacity
for Irans enrichment plants, how fast sanctions should be removed, and the ultimate duration of
a final deal remain the thorniest issues to resolve.
[16]
Biological
There is very little publicly available information to determine whether Iran is pursuing a
biological weapons program. Although Iran acceded to the Geneva Protocol in 1929
and ratified theBiological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1973, the U.S.
government in the past has accused Iran of pursuing a biological weapons program; however,
more recent intelligence estimates do not suggest that such a program currently exists. The report
to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence for the year 2011 assessed that "Iran
"probably has the capability to produce some biological warfare (BW) agents for offensive
purposes, if it made the decision to do so. [] Iran continues to expand its biotechnology
infrastructure and seek dual-usetechnologies that could be used for BW."
[17] This qualified assessment likely indicates that U.S intelligence does not have conclusive
evidence of a current Iranian BW program. Historically, Iran has denied the acquisition or
production of biological weapons.
Chemical
Iran suffered severe losses from Iraq's use of chemical weapons between 1982 and 1988 during
the Iran-Iraq War. Consequently, Iran has significant experience with the effects of chemical
warfare (CW). Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in November 1997 and
has been an active participant in the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW). Iran has publicly acknowledged the existence of a chemical weapons
program developed during the latter stages of the 1980 to 1988 war with Iraq. After ratifying the
CWC, Iran opened its facilities to international inspection and claimed that all its offensive CW
activities had been terminated and the facilities destroyed prior to the treaty's entry into force.
Nevertheless, throughout the late 1990s and the early 2000s, the United States continued to claim
that Iran maintained an active program for the development and production of chemical
weapons. This program was alleged to include stockpiles of blood, blister, choking, and
possibly nerve agents.
[18] Evidence could not be found to confirm these accusations. Reflecting this uncertainty, since
2003 the U.S. intelligence community has substantially downgraded its public assessments of
Iranian chemical warfare capabilities. In its unclassified report to Congress covering the year
2011, the Director of National Intelligence asserted that Iran "maintains the capability to produce
chemical warfare (CW) agents and conducts research that may have offensive applications."
[19] Iran denies producing or possessing chemical weapons in violation of its treaty obligations.
[20]
Missile
Following the Iran-Iraq war, Iran committed itself to the development of one of the most
sophisticated ballistic missile programs in the Middle East. Iran has pursued a dual track
strategy, developing both liquid and solid-fueled systems. As a first step, Tehran acquired Soviet
R-17/R-300 (Scud-B) and R-17M (Scud-C) missiles and production lines from North
Korea (renamed Shahab-1 and Shahab-2).
[21] On 22 July 1998, Iran tested a single-stage liquid-fueled Shahab-3 with a range of 1,000km.
[22] Tehran declared the Shahab-3 operational in July 2003. The Shahab-3, including its
guidance system and engine design, is identical to North Korea's Nodong missile.
[23] With foreign assistance, Tehran produces considerable quantities of the Shahab family of
missiles.
[24] Seeking a longer range missile, on 11 August 2004 Iran test-fired a modified Shahab-3, the
Ghadr-1, with a range of 1,600km.
[25] The development of the Ghadr-1 represented the threshold and limit for modifying the
existing Scud-based Shahab missiles. Marking a significant shift in Iranian missile development
and capabilities, in November 2008 Tehran successfully tested a two-stage, solid-propellant 2000
km medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Sejjil.
[26] Since 2008, Iran has conducted five additional tests of the Sejiil, two successfully.
[27] The Sejjil has not been officially accepted into service, and technological hurdles remain
before it could be used as an effective military weapon. Solid-propellant missiles offer numerous
advantages over liquid-propellant missiles, and it is likely that Tehran will continue to develop
the Sejjil and other solid-fueled missiles as its program moves forward. In February 2014, Iran
launched a Barani missile, claimed to be capable of carrying many warheads that could be
deployed against a single target. However, analysts from Jane's Defence dispute this capability
on technical grounds.
[28] Iran has also recently revealed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which appears to be a
copy of the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel that crashed in December 2011.
[29] The specifications of the UAV, and whether it actually has stealth capabilities or is just a
mock-up, are unknown at this time. In addition to its missile program, Iran is actively developing
a space launch capability. Iran successfully launched three satellites into space in February 2009,
June 2011, and February 2012 aboard the Safir space launch vehicle (SLV).
[30] Some analysts fear that the Safir represents the technical basis for Tehran to develop long-
range ballistic missiles.
[31] However, Tehran would need to significantly modify the second stage of the Safir before it
could be used as an ICBM, and has not demonstrated it would be able to do so, or developed the
requisite reentry vehicle for an ICBM.
[32] Since 1999, the U.S. intelligence community has estimated Iran could potentially test an
ICBM by 2015, but its most recent assessment from January 2014 reportedly "dials back" this
estimate.
[33] Expert debate concerning Iran's technological capacity to develop ICBMs in the near future
is significant and ongoing. [34]
Sources:
[1] Judith Perera, "Iran's Nuclear Industry," Middle East and North Africa, January 2006.
[2] "Iran's Nuclear Program: 1950s and 60s: Atoms for Peace," Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS), www.isisnucleariran.org.
[3] "Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle," Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS),
www.isisnucleariran.org.
[4] David Sanger, Helen Cooper, "Iran is warned over nuclear 'deception'," The New York Times,
25 September 2009.
[5] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security
Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, the
International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 November 2011.
[6] "Hassan Rouhani leads Iran presidential election vote count," BBC News, 15 June 2013.
[7] Dan Roberts, "Obama Holds Historic Phone Call with Rouhani and Hints at End to
Sanctions,"The Guardian, September 27, 2013, www.theguardian.com.
[8] "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on October 17,
2013," Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in New York,
www.nyconsulate.prchina.org.
[9] IAEA Press Release, "IAEA, Iran Sign Joint Statement on Framework for Cooperation," 11
November 2013, www.iaea.org.
[10] Joint Plan of Action, "Joint Statement between the P5+1 and Iran," Geneva, 24 November
2013, http://eeas.europa.eu.
[11] W. R. Sherman (Under Secretary for Political Affairs), "Assessing the P5+1 Joint Plan of
Action With Iran," Written Statement Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Washington, DC, 12 December 2013.
[12] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency, 7 November 2014.
[13] David E. Sanger, "Negotiators Agree to Extend Nuclear Talks Four More Months,
Diplomats Say," The New York Times, July 18, 2014.
[14] Robert Einhorn, "A Justified Extension for Iran Nuclear Talks, But Hard Choices Ahead,"
Iran at Brookings Blog, July 19, 2014, www.brookings.edu.
[15] Laura Rozen, "Iran to limit centrifuge R&D under extension," Al-Monitor, December 1,
2014 www.al-monitor.com.
[16] David E. Sanger and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. and Allies Extend Iran Nuclear Talks by 7
Months," The New York Times, November 24, 2014. Arshad Mohammed, "U.S., Iran foreign
ministers to meet on nuclear issues on January 2014," Reuters, January 9, 2015.
[17] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of

Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December
2011, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.

Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002,
Central Intelligence Agency, www.fas.org.

Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December
2011, Director of National Intelligence, www.dni.gov.
[20] Joseph Cirincione, Jon Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, "Iran," in Deadly Arsenals:
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for
[21] Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, Dossier, London: IISS: International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 14-17.
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p, 22.
[23] Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, London: IISS: International Institute
for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 17-22.
[24] Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical
Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009,,
www.ewi.info; Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, Dossier, London: IISS:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 26-31.
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, p. 23.
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 54-63; Ted Postol, "Technical Addendum to the Joint
Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential The Sejjil Ballistic Missile,"
EastWest Institute, 31 May 2009, www.ewi.info; "Sejil (Ashoura)," Jane's Strategic Weapon
Systems, 12 February 2012, www.janes.com.
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 54-63; Ted Postol, "Technical Addendum to the Joint
Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential The Sejjil Ballistic Missile,"
EastWest Institute, 31 May 2009, www.ewi.info; "Sejil (Ashoura)," Jane's Strategic Weapon
Systems, 12 February 2012, www.janes.com.
[28] Jeremy Binnie, "Iran announces new missile tests," IHS Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 February
2014, www.janes.com.
[29] David Cenciotti, "Tehran has just unveiled an indigenous version of the US RQ-170
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) captured in December 2011," The Aviationist, 11 May 2014,
http://theaviationist.com.
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010, pp. 26-31.
[31] Nazila Fathi and William J. Broad, "Iran Launches Satellite in a Challenge for Obama," The
New York Times, 3 February 2009.
[32] Uzi Rubin, "New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities: Implications beyond the
Middle East," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2009, www.jcpa.org; "Iran's Nuclear
and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," The East-West
Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.
[33] Jason Sherman, "Pentagon Dials Back Longstanding Assessment That Iran Could Test
ICBM By 2015," Inside Defense, July 9, 2014
[34] Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical
Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009,
www.ewi.info; Uzi Rubin, "New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities: Implications
Beyond the Middle East," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2009, www.jcpa.org;
"Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts,"
The East-West Center, May 2009, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.

Iran Treaty Membership
Iran Missile Chronology
Iran Nuclear Chronology
Iran Chemical Chronology
Iran Biological Chronology
START I
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
This article is about the treaty signed in 1991. For the current treaty, see New START. For the
rocket, see Start-1.
START
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Presidents George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev sign START, 31 July
1991
Type Strategic nuclear disarmament
Drafted 29 June 1982 June 1991
Signed 31 July 1991
Location Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union
Effective 5 December 1994
Condition Ratification of both parties
Expiration 5 December 2009
Signatories George H. W. Bush
Mikhail Gorbachev
Parties United States
Soviet Union
Languages Russian, English
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was a bilateral treaty between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR) on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms. The treaty was signed on 31 July 1991 and entered into force on 5
December 1994.[1] The treaty barred its signatories from deploying more than 6,000nuclear
warheads atop a total of 1,600 ICBMs, inter-continental ballistic missiles, and bombers. START
negotiated the largest and most complex arms control treaty in history, and its final implementation
in late 2001 resulted in the removal of about 80 percent of all strategic nuclear weapons then in
existence. Proposed by United States President Ronald Reagan, it was renamed START I after
negotiations began on the second START treaty.
The START I treaty expired 5 December 2009. On 8 April 2010, the replacement New START treaty
was signed in Prague by U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. Following
ratification by the U.S. Senate and the Federal Assembly of Russia, it went into force on 26 January
2011.
Contents
[hide]
1 Proposal
2 Negotiations
3 Implementation
4 Efficacy
5 Expiration and renewal
6 Memorandum of Understanding data for START 1
7 See also
8 References and notes
9 External links
Proposal[edit]
Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile

American LGM-118 Peacekeeperintercontinental ballistic missile
The START proposal was first announced by United States President Ronald Reagan in a
commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College on 9 May, 1982,[2] and presented by
President Ronald Reagan in Geneva on 29 June 1982. Reagan proposed a dramatic reduction in
strategic forces in two phases, which he referred to as SALT III at the time.[3] The first phase would
reduce overall warhead counts on any missile type to 5,000, with an additional limit of 2,500
on ICBMs. Additionally, a total of 850 ICBMs would be allowed, with a limit of 110 "heavy throw"
missiles like the SS-18, with additional limits on the total "throw weight" of the missiles as well. The
second phase introduced similar limits on heavy bombers and their warheads, and other strategic
systems as well.
At the time the US had a commanding lead in strategic bombers. The US B-52force, while aged,
was a credible strategic threat but was only equipped with AGM-86 cruise missiles, beginning in
1982, because of Soviet air defense improvements in early 1980s. The US also had begun to
introduce new B-1B Lancer quasi-stealth bomber and was secretly developing the Advanced
Technology Bomber (ATB) project that would eventually result in the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. The
USSR's force was of little threat to the US, on the other hand, as it was tasked almost entirely with
attacking US convoys in the Atlantic and land targets on the Eurasian landmass. Although the USSR
had 1,200 medium and heavy bombers, only 150 of them (Tupolev Tu-95s and Myasishchev M-4s)
could reach North America (the latter only with in-flight refueling). They also faced difficult problems
in penetrating admittedly smaller and heavily defended US airspace. Possessing too few bombers
available when compared to US bomber numbers was evened out by the US forces having to
penetrate the much larger and heavier defended Soviet airspace. This changed when new Tu-95MS
and Tu-160 bombers appeared in 1984 equipped with the first Soviet AS-15 cruise missiles. By
limiting the phase-in as it was proposed, the US would be left with a strategic advantage, for a time.
As Time magazine put it at the time, "Under Reagan's ceilings, the U.S. would have to make
considerably less of an adjustment in its strategic forces than would the Soviet Union. That feature of
the proposal will almost certainly prompt the Soviets to charge that it is unfair and one-sided. No
doubt some American arms-control advocates will agree, accusing the Administration of making the
Kremlin an offer it cannot possibly accepta deceptively equal-looking, deliberately nonnegotiable
proposal that is part of what some suspect is the hardliners' secret agenda of sabotaging
disarmament so that the U.S. can get on with the business of rearmament." However, Time did point
out that, "The Soviets' monstrous ICBMs have given them a nearly 3-to-1 advantage over the U.S. in
"throw weight"the cumulative power to "throw" megatons of death and destruction at the other
nation."
Negotiations[edit]
Continued negotiation of the START process was delayed several times because US agreement
terms were considered non-negotiable by pre-Gorbachev Soviet rulers. President Reagan's
introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative program in 1983 was viewed as a threat by the Soviet
Union, and the Soviets withdrew from setting a timetable for further negotiations. Due to these facts,
a dramatic nuclear arms race proceeded during the 1980s, and essentially ended in 1991 by nuclear
parity preservation at a level of more than ten thousand strategic warheads on both sides. This
treaty also stated that the United States and Russia would have 6,000 fighter aircraft, 10,000 tanks,
20,000 artillery pieces and 2,000 attack helicopters.
Implementation[edit]
B-52G Stratofortresseschopped into five pieces atAMARC
365 B-52s were flown to the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center at Davis-Monthan
Air Force Base in Arizona.[when?] The bombers were stripped of all usable parts, then chopped into five
pieces by a 13,000-pound steel blade dropped from a crane. The guillotinesliced four times on each
plane, severing the wings and leaving the fuselage in three pieces. The ruined B-52s remained in
place for three months so that Russian satellites could confirm that the bombers had been
destroyed, after which they were sold for scrap.[4]
"It remains in effect between the U.S. and Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The latter
three became non-nuclear weapons states under the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons of 1 July 1968 (NPT) as they committed to do under the Lisbon Protocol(Protocol to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms) after becoming independent nations in the
wake of the break up of the Soviet Union."[5][6]
Efficacy[edit]
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have disposed of all their nuclear weapons or transferred them to
Russia; while the U.S. and Russia have reduced the capacity of delivery vehicles to 1,600 each, with
no more than 6,000 warheads.[7]
A report by the US State Department called "Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control,
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments" which was released on july 28
2010 stated that Russia was not in full compliance with the treaty when it expired on 5 December
2009. The report did not specifically identify Russia's compliance issues.[8]
Expiration and renewal[edit]
Soviet SS-18 inspected by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar before its destruction
START I expired 5 December 2009. Both sides agreed to continue observing the terms of the treaty
until a new agreement is reached.[9] There are proposals to renew and expand the treaty, supported
by U.S. President Barack Obama. Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada,
said: "Obama supports sharp reductions in nuclear arsenals and I believe that Russia and the U.S.
may sign in the summer or fall of 2009 a new treaty that would replace START-1". He added that a
new deal would only happen if Washington abandoned plans to place elements of a missile shield in
central Europe. He expressed willingness "to make new steps in the sphere of disarmament,"
however, saying they were waiting for the U.S. to abandon attempts to "surround Russia with a
missile defense ring." This referred to the placement of ten interceptor missiles in Poland, as well as
an accompanying radar in the Czech Republic.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, said, the day after the U.S. elections, in his first state of the
nation address, that Russia would move to deploy short-range Iskander missile systems in the
western exclave of Kaliningrad "to neutralize if necessary the anti-ballistic missile system in Europe."
Russia insists that any movement towards a new START should be a legally binding document, and
must, then, set lower ceilings on the number of nuclear warheads, and their delivery vehicles.[7]
On 17 March 2009, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev signaled that Russia would begin a "large-
scale" rearmament and renewal of Russia's nuclear arsenal. President Medvedev accused NATO of
pushing ahead with expansion near Russian borders and ordered that this rearmament commence
in 2011 with increased army, naval, and nuclear capabilities. Additionally, the head of Russia's
strategic missile forces, Nikolai Solovtsov, told news agencies that Russia would start deploying its
next-generation RS-24 missiles after the 5 December expiry of the START-1 treaty with the United
States. Russia hopes to change the START-1 treaty with a new accord. The increased tensions
come despite the warming of relations between the United States and Russia in the two years since
U.S. President Barack Obama took office.[10]
As of 4 May 2009, the United States and Russia began the process of renegotiating START, as well
as counting both nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles when making a new agreement. While
setting aside problematic issues between the two countries, both sides agreed to make further cuts
in the number of warheads they have deployed to around 1,000 to 1,500 each. The United States
has said they are open to a Russian proposal to use radar in Azerbaijan rather than Eastern Europe
for the proposed missile system. The Bush Administration insisted that the Eastern Europe defense
system was intended as a deterrent for Iran, while the Kremlin feared that it could be used against
Russia. The flexibility by both sides to make compromises now will lead to a new phase of arms
reduction in the future.[11]
A 'Joint understanding for a follow-on agreement to START-1' was signed by Presidents Barack
Obama and Dmitri Medvedev in Moscow on 6 July 2009. This will reduce the number of deployed
warheads on each side to 1,5001,675 on 5001,100 delivery systems. A new treaty was to be
signed before START-1 expired in December 2009 and the reductions are to be achieved within
seven years.[12] After many months of negotiations,[13][14] Presidents Obama and Medvedev signed the
successor treaty, Measures to Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,
in Prague, Czech Republic on 8 April 2010.
Memorandum of Understanding data for START 1[edit]
Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnevsign SALT II treaty, 18 June 1979, inVienna.
See also[edit]
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
START II
START III
RS-24
New START
References and notes[edit]

1. Jump up^ "Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I): Executive Summary". The Office of Treaty Compliance.
Retrieved 5 December 2009.
2. Jump up^ Eureka College Commencement Speech, 1982
3. Jump up^ Time to START, Says Reagan
4. Jump up^ CNN. Special: COLD WAR. Uncle Sam's salvage yard: A Cold War icon heads for the scrap heap By
Andy Walton, CNN Interactive[dead link]
5. Jump up^ Lisbon Protocol, signed by the five START Parties 23 May 1992.
6. Jump up^ CIA Fact Book
7. ^ Jump up to:a b http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081106/118158928.html
8. Jump up^ Gertz, Bill, "Russia Violated '91 START Till End, U.S. Report Finds", Washington Times, 28 July 2010,
p. 1.
9. Jump up^ "US rejects Russian missile shield concerns". BBC News. 29 December 2009.
10. Jump up^ http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20090317/ts_afp/russianatomilitarynuclear
11. Jump up^ Barry, Ellen (5 May 2009). "U.S. Negotiator Signals Flexibility Toward Moscow Over New Round of
Arms Talks". The New York Times. Retrieved 1 April 2010.
12. Jump up^ US and Russia agree nuclear cuts, accessed 16 July 2009
13. Jump up^ Baker, Peter; Barry, Ellen (24 March 2010). "Russia and U.S. Report Breakthrough on Arms". The New
York Times. Retrieved1 April 2010.
14. Jump up^ Early March 2010 Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych had proposed to both Russia and the United
States to sign the treaty inKiev, the capital of Ukraine (Source: Ukraine awaiting reply to offer of Kyiv as venue for
Russia-U.S. arms cuts deal signing, Kyiv Post (16 March 2010))
15. ^ Jump up to:a b START data for 1 July 2009 on state.gov
16. ^ Jump up to:a b START data for 1 January 2009 on state.gov
17. ^ Jump up to:a b START data for 1 January 2008 on cdi.org
18. ^ Jump up to:a b START data for 1 September 1990 on fas.org
External links[edit]
START1 treaty hypertext US State Dept.
Engineer Memoirs - Lieutenant General Edward L. Rowny, ambassador for the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (START)
Nuclear weapons limitation treaties
1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
1974Threshold Test Ban Treaty
1970s Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
1991 START I
1993START II
1994 United States Russia mutual detargeting
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (not in force)
1997 START III
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
2010 New START
Book:Arms control treaties

Category:Arms control treaties
Categories:
Arms control treaties
History of the Soviet Union and Soviet Russia
Nuclear weapons governance
Soviet UnionUnited States treaties
RussiaUnited States relations
1991 in the United States
1991 in the Soviet Union
Cold War treaties
Treaties concluded in 1991
Treaties entered into force in 1994
Presidency of George H. W. Bush
Nuclear technology treaties
Perestroika
New START
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
New START / -III
Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian

Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Presidents Obama and Medvedev after signing the Prague Treaty.
Type Strategic nuclear disarmament
Drafted 19 May9 November 2009

Signed 8 April 2010
Location Prague, Czech Republic
Effective 5 February 2011[1][2]
Condition Ratification of both parties
Expiration 5 February 2021
(Option to extend until 2026)
Signatories Barack Obama
Dmitry Medvedev
Parties United States of America
Russian Federation
Ratifiers United States Senate
Federal Assembly of Russia
Languages English, Russian
Signing the New START Treaty (video in Russian)
New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) (Russian: -III, SNV-III) is anuclear arms
reduction treaty between the United States of America and theRussian Federation with the formal
name of Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It was
signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague,[3][4] and, after ratification,[5][6] entered into force on 5 February
2011.[1] It is expected to last at least until 2021.
New START replaced the Treaty of Moscow (SORT), which was due to expire in December 2012. In
terms of name, it is a follow-up to the START I treaty, which expired in December 2009, the
proposed START II treaty, which never entered into force, and the START III treaty, for which
negotiations were never concluded.
Under terms of the treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers will be reduced by half.
A new inspection and verification regime will be established, replacing the SORT mechanism. It
does not limit the number of operationally inactive stockpiled nuclear warheads that remain in the
high thousands in both the Russian and American inventories.[7]
Contents
[hide]
1 Overview
2 History
o 2.1 Drafting and signature
o 2.2 Ratification process
2.2.1 United States
2.2.2 Russia
o 2.3 Deadlines
3 U.S. public debate
4 Status of the strategic forces of Russia and the U.S.
5 See also
6 References
7 External links
Overview[edit]
Under the terms of the treaty, the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers will be reduced by
half. The treaty limits the number of deployedstrategic nuclear warheads to 1,550, which is down
nearly two-thirds from the original START treaty, as well as 10% lower than the deployed strategic
warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.[8] The total number of deployed warheads, however, could
exceed the 1,550 limit by a few hundred because per bomber only one warhead is counted
regardless of how many it actually carries.[8] It will also limit the number of deployed and non-
deployed inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 800. The number of
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments is limited to
700.[9] The treaty allows for satellite and remote monitoring, as well as 18 on-site inspections per year
to verify limits.[8]
These obligations must be met within seven years from the date the treaty enters into force. The
treaty will last ten years, with an option to renew it for up to five years upon agreement of both
parties.[11] The treaty entered into force on 5 February 2011, when the United States and Russia
exchanged instruments of ratification, following approval by the U.S. Senate and the Federal
Assembly of Russia.[12] However, the United States began implementing the reductions even before
the treaty was ratified.[13]
Documents made available to the U.S. Senate described[clarification needed] removal from service of at least
30 missile silos, 34 bombers and 56 submarine launch tubes, though missiles removed would not be
destroyed and bombers could be converted to conventional use. While four of 24 launchers on each
of the 14 ballistic missile nuclear submarines would be removed, none would be retired.[14]
The treaty places no limits on tactical systems, such as the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, which
will most likely be replacing the F-15E and F-16 in the tactical nuclear delivery role.[15]
The treaty does not cover rail-mobile ICBM launchers because neither party currently possesses
such systems. ICBMs on such launchers would be covered under the generic launcher limits, but the
inspection details for such systems would have to be worked out between the parties if such
systems were reintroduced in the future.[16]
History[edit]
Drafting and signature[edit]
The New START treaty is the successor to the START I. The START II was signed, but not ratified.
The START IIInegotiating process was not successful.
The drafting of the treaty commenced in April 2009 immediately after the meeting between the
presidents of the two countries, Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev, in London.[17] Preliminary talks
were already held in Rome on 27 April,[18]although it was originally planned to have them held in the
middle of May.[19]
Prolonged talks were conducted by U.S. and Russian delegations, led on the American side by U.S.
State DepartmentAssistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller. The Russian delegation was headed by
Anatoly Antonov, director of security and disarmament at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[20]
Talks were held on:
First round: 1920 May, Moscow[21]

Second round: 13 June, Geneva[22]
Third round: 2224 June, Geneva[22]
Fourth round: 2224 July, Geneva[22]
Fifth Round: 31 August2 September, Geneva[23]
Sixth round: 2128 September, Geneva[24][25]
Seventh round: 1930 October, Geneva[26]
Eighth round: 9 November, Geneva[27]
On the morning of 6 July, the agreement on the text of the "Joint Understanding on Further
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" was announced,[28][29] which was signed by
Medvedev and Obama during the US Presidential visit to Moscow the same day. The document
listed the intention of both parties to reduce the number of nuclear warheads to 1,500 1,675 units,
as well as their delivery weapons to 500 1,100 units.[30]
Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced on 26 March 2010 that they had reached an
agreement, and they signed the treaty on 8 April 2010 in Prague.[3]
Ratification process[edit]
United States[edit]
On 13 May, the agreement was submitted by U.S. President Barack Obama for ratification in the
U.S. Senate. Ratification required 67 votes in favor (out of 100 Senators). On Tuesday, 16
September 2010 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted 144 in favor of ratifying New
START. The measure had support from three Senate Republicans: Richard Lugar of Indiana, Bob
Corker of Tennessee, and Johnny Isakson of Georgia.[31] Senator John Kerry[32] and Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton expressed optimism that a deal on ratification was near.[33]
Republicans in the Senate generally deferred to Jon Kyl (R-AZ), a leading conservative on defense
issues, who sought a strong commitment to modernize U.S. nuclear forces, and questioned whether
there was time for ratification during the lame duck session, calling for an opening of the negotiation
record before a vote is held.[34] Senator Ben Nelson (D-NE) joined Kyl in expressing skepticism over
the timing of ratification,[35] and Senator Kit Bond (R-MO) expressed opposition.[36]
Obama made New START ratification a priority during the 2010 post-election lame duck session of
Congress, and SenatorsJohn Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), the Democratic Chairman and
senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, were leading supporters of the
treaty.[37][38][39]
On 22 December 2010, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification of the treaty, by a
vote of 71 to 26 on the resolution of ratification.[40] Thirteen Republican senators, all 56 Democratic
senators, and both Independent senators voted for the treaty.[41] President Obama signed documents
completing the U.S. ratification process on 2 February 2011.[42]
Russia[edit]
On 28 May 2010, the document was introduced by Medvedev for consideration in the State Duma.
On 6 July, the State Duma held parliamentary hearings on the treaty, which was attended by
representatives from the Foreign Ministry and General Staff. On 8 July, the Duma Defense
Committee and the International Affairs Committee recommended that the State Duma ratify the
treaty.
However, on 29 October, the chairman of the Duma International Affairs Committee, Konstantin
Kosachev, called for the return of the document to committee hearings, noting that the agreement
does not restrict the activities of the United States on missile defense, as well as the fact that ballistic
missiles with non-nuclear warheads are not covered under the agreement. At the same time,
Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov proposed not to rush to the amendment, or vote on the
treaty, and to monitor the discussions in the U.S. Senate.
Following ratification by the U.S. Senate, the formal first reading of the treaty was held on 24
December and the State Duma voted its approval. The State Duma approved a second reading of
the treaty on 14 January 2011.[43] 349 deputies out of 450 voted in favor of ratification.
The third and final reading by the State Duma took place on 25 January 2011 and the ratification
resolution was approved by a vote of 350 deputies in favor, 96 against, and one abstention.[44] It was
then approved unanimously by the Federation Council on the next day.[5][45]
On 28 January 2011, Medvedev signed the ratification resolution passed by the Federal Assembly,
completing the Russian ratification process.[6] The treaty went into force when Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of StateHillary Clinton exchanged the instruments of
ratification at the Security Conference in Munich, Germany, on 5 February 2011.[1][5][6]
Deadlines[edit]
The New START Treaty requires a number of specific actions within periods after Entry into Force
(EIF) (5 February 2011)[46]
No later than (NLT) 5 days after EIF

Exchange Inspection Airplane Information:
Lists of the types of airplanes intended to transport inspectors to points of entry will be
exchanged.
NLT 25 days after EIF

Exchange Lists of Inspectors and Aircrew Members:
Lists of initial inspectors and aircrew will be exchanged.
Exchange databases:
Databases will provide information on the numbers, locations, and technical characteristics
of weapon systems and facilities that are covered under the Treaty.

Exhibition: Strategic Offensive Arms:
If a type, variant, or version of a strategic offensive arm (SOA) that was not exhibited in
connection with the START Treaty is declared, then the SOA's features and technical
characteristics must be demonstrated and confirmed.
60 days after EIF

Right to Conduct Inspections Begins:
Parties may begin inspections, 18 on-site inspections per year are provided in the Treaty.
Each Party is allowed ten Type One Inspections and eight Type Two Inspections.
Type One Inspections focus on deployed and non-deployed SOAs sites. Activities include confirming
accuracy of data on SOAs, the number of warheads located on designated deployed ICBMs and
SLBMs, and the number of nuclear armaments to be on designated deployed heavy bombers.
Type Two Inspections focus on sites with non-deployed SOAs. They can involve confirmation of the
conversion/elimination of SOAs, and confirming the elimination of facilities.

Exhibition: Heavy Bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base:
The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of each type of environmentally-sealed
deployed heavy bombers located at the storage facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base in Arizona.

Initial Demonstration of Telemetry Playback Equipment:
Parties will conduct an initial demonstration of recording media and playback equipment for
telemetric information, information that originates on a missile during its initial motion and
flight.

Exchange Updated Databases:
Parties will exchange updated databases and every six months thereafter for the duration of
the Treaty.
NLT 1 year after EIF

Exhibition: B-1B Heavy Bomber:
The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of a B-1B heavy bomber equipped with
non-nuclear armaments to demonstrate it no longer can employ nuclear armaments.
NLT 3 years after EIF

Exhibition: Previously Converted Missile Launchers:
The United States will conduct a one-time exhibition of its four SSGNs, which are equipped
with cruise missile launchers and were converted from nuclear ballistic submarines, to
confirm that SSGNs cannot launch SLBMs. The United States will also hold an exhibition of
the five converted ICBM launcher silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, now
used as missile defense interceptor launchers. This will confirm that the converted launchers
are no longer able to launch ICBMs and determine the features to distinguish converted silo
launchers from unconverted ones.
NLT 7 years after EIF

Meet Central Treaty Limits:
Parties are required to meet the limits laid out in the Treaty for deployed strategic warheads,
and deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles and launchers.
10 years after EIF

Treaty Expires:
Unless Parties agree with an extension for up to five years.
Credit and special thanks to the contributing authorships and Wiki Encyclopedia from
DESBIC Entitys who suchly situated a process verbal declaration with telepathy all are in for
a unit of candor to surprise attack a winner at the Honorable Antons Supreme Celestial
Court I hear.
References[edit]
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72. Jump up^ US Nuclear Forces 2009

RESEARCH 1 Threat. Reductions

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Understanding the Nuclear Weapons Threat

A number of efforts by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental

Overview Last updated: December, 2014

[7] Washington is also a member of export controlorganizations aimed at limiting the

[42] The facility is set to eliminate its stockpiles by 2023.

[22] International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation, www.ifnec.org.

Overview Last updated: October, 2014

[3] However, Moscow's current total stockpile of deployed and

[19] "Russian Strategic Rocket Forces to be Almost Fully Re-Armed by 2021 -

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Overview Last updated: January, 2015

[9] India is working to conclude an agreement with Japan.

[4] "Countries: India," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 4 February 2013,

[19] "Update on Chemical Demilitarisation," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical

Overview Last updated: December, 2014

[13] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,"Non-Member States,"

[21] Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR Partners, www.mtcr.info.

One of Iran's Russian-built Kilo-class submarines

[17] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of

[18] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of

[19] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of

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Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

Type Strategic nuclear disarmament

Drafted 29 June 1982 June 1991

Signed 31 July 1991

Location Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union

Effective 5 December 1994

Condition Ratification of both parties

Expiration 5 December 2009

Signatories George H. W. Bush

Parties United States

Languages Russian, English

Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile

B-52G Stratofortresseschopped into five pieces atAMARC

Expiration and renewal[edit]

Memorandum of Understanding data for START 1[edit]

References and notes[edit]

Nuclear weapons limitation treaties

1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Book:Arms control treaties

New START / -III

Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian

Presidents Obama and Medvedev after signing the Prague Treaty.

Type Strategic nuclear disarmament

Drafted 19 May9 November 2009

Location Prague, Czech Republic

Effective 5 February 2011[1][2]

Condition Ratification of both parties

Expiration 5 February 2021

(Option to extend until 2026)

Signatories Barack Obama

Parties United States of America

Ratifiers United States Senate

Federal Assembly of Russia

Languages English, Russian

Signing the New START Treaty (video in Russian)

First round: 1920 May, Moscow[21]

No later than (NLT) 5 days after EIF

NLT 25 days after EIF

NLT 60 days after EIF

60 days after EIF

NLT 120 days after EIF

NLT 180 days after EIF