Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

Interpretation means the art of finding out the true sense of an enactment by
giving the words of the enactment their natural and ordinary meaning. It is
the process of ascertaining the true meaning of the words used in a statute.
The Court is not expected to interpret arbitrarily and therefore there have
been certain principles which have evolved out of the continuous exercise by
the Courts. These principles are sometimes called rules of interpretation.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the
legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated
by SALMOND, "by interpretation or construction is meant, the process by
which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the
medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed."
What we speak or write are the means of communication. No problem arises
when the words are of single meaning, but those with plural meanings
require the basic intend of the conveyor to be understood. If two people
conversing with each other, surely whatever be the uncertainty in the
language will be resorted at the same time. Let us suppose we discovered a
letter written by a soldier during World War I, to his wife, there will
definitely be some words inconsistent with the others and will be delivering
more than one meaning. The best way to understand the real meaning is to
have a logical interpretation of his mind and the conditions that affected his
writing of the letter which will deliver the real intend of the writer. All that
we can do is to solve the mystery by our self as the soldier is not there to
make us understand the whole meaning of the letter; the same is the case
with our judiciary as they by their own intellect have to interpret the statutes
made by the legislators. In most circumstances the language of the statute
has a plain, simple and to the point meaning. Interpretation becomes more
important when it comes to uncertain and repugnant provisions of the
statues.
The reason for ambiguity of legislation is the basic nature of language. It is
not always possible to accurately convert the real intend of the legislation
into written words. The versatility of language inevitably means that there
will often be equally good or equally unconvincing arguments for two
competing interpretation. There are at times the provisions having more than
one meaning or the ambiguity in the language. The legislature becomes
functus officio after enacting the statues. The interpreters cannot go back to
the legislature and ask for the exact meaning of the statute as the legislators

would not have assumed such a wide variety of conditions while making of
any
particular
statute.
Thus it is totally on the Judges to interpret such provisions so that both are
effective. To avoid further ambiguities legislation has provided us with the
primary rules of interpretations. Here only two of the rules will be discussed
and a reasonable comparison shall be drawn out between them. Harmonious
Construction and Beneficial Construction are the two rules to be discussed
as a concept and shall be compared with each other as per usages of the
same and on different heads.
Interpretation And Construction
Interpretation is the method by which true sense or the meaning of the word
is understood. The meaning of an ordinary meaning of an English word is
not a question of law. According to Gray, the process by which a judge
constructs from the words of a statute book, a meaning which he either
believes to be that of the legislature, or which, he proposes to attribute to it
is interpretation. Salmond describes interpretation as the process which the
courts seek to ascertain the meaning of the legislature through the medium
of authoritative forms in which it is expressed.
Rule of Harmonious Construction
When there is a conflict between two or more statues or two or more parts of
a statute then the rule of harmonious construction needs to be adopted. The
rule follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and
intent as per law and should be read as a whole. The interpretation consistent
of all the provisions of the statute should be adopted. In the case in which it
shall be impossible to harmonize both the provisions, the courts decision
regarding
the
provision
shall
prevail.
The rule of harmonious construction is the thumb rule to interpretation of
any statute. An interpretation which makes the enactment a consistent whole,
should be the aim of the Courts and a construction which avoids
inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of the
statute should be adopted. The Courts should avoid a head on clash, in the
words of the Apex Court, between the different parts of an enactment and
conflict between the various provisions should be sought to be harmonized.
The normal presumption should be consistency and it should not be assumed
that what is given with one hand by the legislature is sought to be taken
away by the other. The rule of harmonious construction has been tersely

explained by the Supreme Court thus, When there are, in an enactment two
provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so
interpreted, that if possible, effect should be given to both. A construction
which makes one portion of the enactment a dead letter should be avoided
since harmonization is not equivalent to destruction. Harmonious
Construction should be applied to statutory rules and courts should avoid
absurd or unintended results. It should be resorted to making the provision
meaningful in the context. It should be in consonance with the intention of
Rule makers. Rule of Harmonious construction is applicable to subordinate
legislature also.
The Supreme Court laid down five principles of rule of Harmonious
Construction in the landmark case of CIT v Hindustan Bulk Carriers:1
1. The courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting
provisions and they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to
harmonize
them.
2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision
contained in another unless the court, despite all its effort, is unable to find a
way to reconcile their differences. When it is impossible to completely
reconcile the differences in contradictory provisions, the courts must
interpret them in such as way so that effect is given to both the provisions as
much
as
possible.
3. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one
provision to a useless number or dead is not harmonious construction.
To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it
fruitless.
It is a sound canon of interpretation that courts must try to avoid a conflict
between the provisions of Statute. The rule of reconciliation on the Entries
was propounded for the first time in the case of in re C.P. and Bera Act. 2 It is
the province of the courts to determine the extent of the authority to deal
1
2

AIR 2002 SC 3491.

AIR 1939 FC 1

with subjects falling within the legislative purview of each legislature. To

avoid conflict, the Courts should read Entries of two Lists together and the
language of one Entry can be interpreted, and modified too, with the help of
another Entry. Interpreting Entries 24 and 25 of the State List harmoniously,
the Supreme Court held that gas and gas works being in Entry 25 would
not fall in the general Entry 24Industry and observed:3
It is also well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the
language of Entries but some of the entries in the different Listsmay
overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with
each other, it is then duty of this court to reconcile the entries and
bring about harmony between them. In this way it may, in most cases,
be found possible to arrive at a reasonable and practical construction
of the language of the sections, so as to reconcile the respective
powers they contain and to give effect to all of them.
In Tika Ramji v. State of Uttar Pradesh,4 the position of the industries was
clarified by Supreme Court. In the instant case the vires of U.P. Sugarcane
(Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 was involved. It was
contended that sugarcane being controlled industry fall within the
jurisdiction of the Union List by virtue of Entry 52 of List I falls within the
legislative purview of Parliament. The Supreme Court, therefore, had to
explain the Inter-relation between Entries 52 of List I, 24 and 27 of List II
and 33 of List III. Entry 24 of List II and 52 of List I establish that except
controlled industries, the industries generally fells within the State Sphere.
Entry 27 of List II gives power to State to regulate the production, supply
and distribution of goods subject to provisions of Entry 33 of List III. The
3
4

Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044

AIR 1956 SC 676

sugar industry being controlled industry, the distribution, supply and

production of the product of this controlled industry viz. Sugar as a finished
product, would fall within the legislative jurisdiction of the both Central and
State Legislature by virtue of Entry 33of list III. But, by virtue of Entry 27
of List II, the sugarcane would be within the States jurisdiction because
sugarcane can be regarded as raw material for sugar industry. Dealing of
sugarcane under the term goods in Entry 27 of List II, by the U.P. Act
Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, was held valid.
The position of industries after the Tika Ramji case may be explained
as follows: as regards the industries falling with the State Spheres the State
have a comprehensive regularity power covering all aspects of any such
Industry. The States can regulate raw materials for such industries under
Entry 27, List II as goods and also the finished products of the same. As
regard the centrally controlled industries, the process of manufacture falls
within the Central domain under Entry 52, List I; control over finished
products of these industries also falls under Central jurisdiction under Entry
22 in List III. As regards the raw materials of these industries power lies
mainly with the States under Entry 27, List II, except in so far as the
commodities specified in Entry 33, List III, which the Centre may regulate.
Regulatory power regarding centrally controlled industry would thus appear
to be somewhat fragmented in so far as some raw materials pertaining to
these industries may fall outside the Centre State co-ordination. Failure by a
State to ensure adequate supply of raw materials to an industry may hamper
the same and the Centre may be unable to take any corrective measures.

The judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujrat University v. Shri

Krishna5 has aroused the discussion on the area of higher education in
India. The question in the instant case was whether the Gujrat State
Legislature was competent to enact the Gujrat University Act, 1949, which
prescribed Gujrati or Hindi as the exclusive medium in which instruction is
to be imparted in State Universities. The relevant Entries were the Entry II
of the State List reading education including universities subject to items
63, 64, 65 and 66 of list I 6 and Entry 25 of List III. By virtue of Entry 66
of List I, the Parliament was authorized to legislate to Co-ordination and
determination of standards in institutions of higher education the
University of Gujrat contended that Entry 66 in List I should be interpreted
in restrictively and urged that the prescribing of medium of instruction in the
University doesnt come within legislative purview of the Parliament. The
Counsel for the University contended that this aspect of the education falls
within the Entry 11 of List II. The Court rejected the contention of the
University and struck down the impugned enactment in so far as it purported
to prescribe the exclusive medium. The Supreme Court pointed out that the
word education in Entry 11, List II is of wide import and prescribing of
medium maybe regarded as an ancillary power unless it is taken away by
necessary amendment to the contrary. The Supreme Court explained that the
power of the Centre to make law in respect of medium of instruction is
contained in entries 63 to 65 and it also arises under Entry 66 in List I
insofar as it has a direct bearing and impact upon the legislative head of coordination and determination of standards in instructions of higher
education. Thus, Entry 11 of List II and Entry 66 of List I overlap.
5
6

AIR 1963 SC 703

Entry 11, List II, Omitted by the Constitution 42nd Amendment Act, 1976

Therefore, there should be construed in such a manner so as to avoid

conflict. To extent of overlapping, the power of Centre under Entry 66 must
prevail over the power of State under Entry 11. The power to prescribe
medium of instructions has been excluded from Entry 11, List II. Therefore,
it is submitted that, the power of the Centre under Entry 66, List I was
interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court.
The Gujrat University7 case was quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court in D.A.V. College, Bhatinda V. State of Punjab.8 In this
case the Supreme Court struck down the provisions of the Punjab University
Act, 1961, prescribing Punjabi as the sole medium of instruction on the
ground that this aspect of education is covered under Entry 66, List I,
therefore the State was not competent to legislate in respect of medium of
instruction in the colleges and universities imparting higher education.
The rationale of Gujrat University case appears to have been limited
by the Supreme Court in Chitralekha v. State of Mysore.9 The question
before the Court was whether prescribing of higher percentage of marks for
extracurricular activities for admission to medical and engineering colleges
lowered the standard of the education and affected the power of the Centre
under Entry 66, List I. It was ruled by the Supreme Court that if the impact
of the State law is so heavy or devastating as to wipe out or appreciably
abridge the Centre field, it might be struck down. But it could not be decided
on speculative or hypothetical reasoning: that was a question of fact to be
ascertained in each case. It is not possible to hold that if a State legislature
made a law prescribing higher percentage of marks for extra curricular

AIR 1963 SC 703

(1971) 2 SCC 261
9
AIR 1964 SC 1823
8

activities in the matter of admission to colleges, it would be directly

encroaching on the field covered by Entry 66 of List I.
In O.N.Mohindroo v. Bar Council,10 the constitutionality of the
Advocates Act, 1961 which prescribed the qualifications, enrollment, right
to practice and discipline of the advocates, was sustained by applying rules
of harmonious construction. The power conferred by Entry 26 in List III
Legal, Medical and other professionals, was general and Entries 77 and 78
are carved out of reading Persons Entitled to practice before the Supreme
Court and High Court the general power under Entry 26 in List III.
Therefore, the Centre is exclusively entitled to legislate in respect of person
entitled to practice before the Supreme Court and High Court.11
The rule of avoidance between the two Entries in the two Lists is also
applicable in case of a conflict between two Entries in the Same List. Entry
3, List II of the Constitution relates to Administration of Justice,
Constitution of Courts, while Entry 65 deals with jurisdiction and powers
ofCourts. The Supreme Court had an opportunity to interpret these two
entries in State of Bombay v. Narottam Das Jethabhai.12 The Supreme
Court read the two Entries together and held that while Entry 3 of List II
conferred power on the State Legislature to provide general jurisdictions to
court, Entry 65 conferred the special jurisdiction with regard to the matters
included in List II, while enacting a law in respect of those matters. To put in
another words, the words Administration of Justice, Constitution of Courts
must be construed restrictively excluding from their scope jurisdiction and
powers of courts. The harmonious construction prevents Entry 65, List II
from being futile and meaningless.
10

AIR 1968 SC 886

Durgeshwa v. Secretary Bar Council, AIR 1954 All 728; Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer,
AIR 1969, SC 59
12
AIR 1951 SC 69
11

In Union of India v. H.S. Dhillon,13 the construction adopted by the

Supreme Court has titled the balance of powers in favour of the States. The
vires of the Wealth Tax Act,1957, as amended by the finance Act of 1969,
was challenged on the ground that the subject matter did not fall within the
legislative purview of the Parliament but comes under Entry 49 of List II.
Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court held that the impugned Act can
be saved under Entry 97, List I. Sikri, C.J., speaking for the Supreme Court,
observed that the only question to be asked is: is the subject matter sought to
be legislated included in List II or List III or is the tax sought to be levied
mentioned in List II or List III. No question should be asked about List I. It
was stated that if any Central Act is challenged, it would be reasonable for
the Court to judge the validity of the Act by enquiring whether the impugned
Act fell under any Entry of List II. If it falls under List II, then the case is
over. If it does not fall under any Entry of List II, then the Court should not
plunge itself into the discussion of inquiring that which Entry of List I,
except 97, will take care of it. Entry 97, in such case, would be sufficient to
take care of the Act. This construction gives undue higher position to Entry
97, relegating Entries 1-96 to subordinate lace and making them only the
illustrations of residuary power found in Entry 97 of List I. it submitted that
such construction upsets the balance drawn by the framers of the
Constitution between Union and the States titling the scale in favour of the
States. The object of providing residuary power is to confer power only in
respect of a matter which could not be foreseen or contemplated at the time
of the framing of the constitution. It is in consonance with the spirit of the
Constitution to give same status to the enumerating in Entries 1-96 in List I
as given to the enumerations in List II to avoid restrictive interpretation of
13

AIR 1972 SC 1061

Entries 1-96 of List I. Harmonious Construction does not imply destroying

of One Entry at the expense of another Entry.
Beneficial Construction in Socio Economic legislations
Socio-economic legislation which is aimed at social or economic policy
changes, the interpretation should not be narrow. Justice Krishna Iyer in a
case relating to agrarian reforms observed that the judiciary is not a mere
umpire but also an active catalyst in the constitutional scheme.
In the case of Sant Ram v Rajinderlal14, the Supreme Court said that welfare
legislation must be interpreted in a third World perspective favoring the
weaker and poor class. It has also been laid down in the case of labor
legislation that courts should not stick to grammatical constructions but also
have regard to teleological purpose and protective intendment of the
legislation. Interpretation of labor legislations should be done by the courts
with more concern with the colour, the context and the content of the statute
rather
than
its
literal
import.
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is one of welfare statute which intends to bring
about peace and harmony between management and labour in an industry
and improve the service conditions of industrial workers which in will turn
accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its prosperity. As a
result the prosperity of the country in turn will help to improve the
conditions of the workmen. Therefore this statute should be interpreted in
such a way that it advances the object and the purpose of the legislation and
gives it a full meaning and effect so that the ultimate social objective is
achieved. The courts while interpreting labour laws have always stressed on
the doctrine of social justice as enshrined in the Preamble of Constitution.
Beneficial Construction A tendency rather than a rule
It is said by Maxwell, that Beneficial Construction is a tendency and not a
rule. The reason is that this principle is based on human tendency to be fair,
accommodating, and just. Instead of restricting the people from getting the
benefit of the statute, Court tends to include as many classes as it can while
remaining faithful to the wordings of the statute. For example, in the case of
14

1978 AIR 1601.

Alembic Chemical Works v Workman, an industrial tribunal awarded more

number of paid leaves to the workers than what Section 79(1) of Factories
Act recommended. This was challenged by the appellant. SC held that the
enactment being welfare legislation for the workers, it had to be beneficially
constructed in the favor of worker and thus, if the words are capable of two
meanings, the one that gives benefit to the workers must be used.
When a statute is meant for the benefit of a specific class, and if a word in
the statute is capable of two meanings, one which would preserve the
benefits and one which would not, then the meaning that would preserve the
benefits must be adopted and shall be followed by the court of law. It is
important to note that omissions will not be supplied by the court. Only
when multiple meanings are possible, can the court shall pick the beneficial
one. Thus, where the court has to choose between a wider mean that carries
out the objective of the legislature better and a narrow meaning, then it
usually chooses the former meaning carrying out the objective of the
legislation. Similarly, when the language used by the legislature fails to
achieve the objective of a statute, an extended meaning could be given to it
to achieve that objective, if the language is fairly susceptible to the extended
meaning.

Limitation on The Application Of Beneficial Construction

If on the application of the rule of beneficial construction, the court finds
that it is doing complete justice and delivering a fair judgment then there is
no question of why should not such rule is applied? But there are certain
restrictions which the court has to take care of which at the time of
application
have
to
be
adhered
to

1. Where the courts find that by the application of the rule of beneficial
construction, it would be re legislating a provision of statute either by
substituting, adding or altering any provision of the act.
2. Where any word in a statute confers to a single meaning only. Then the
courts should refrain from applying the rule of benevolent construction to
the
statute.
3. When there is no ambiguity in a provision of a statute so construed. If the

provision is plain, unambiguous and does not give rise to any doubt, the rule
of
beneficial
construction
cannot
be
applied.
Conclusion
The conclusion shall be the final analysis of the comparison between the rule
of Harmonious Construction and rule of Beneficial Construction.
Harmonious construction is only applied where there are a conflict between
the meaning coming out of two different sections and the meaning land the
courts in dubious situation of which section to apply? Whereas, the rule of
Beneficial Construction is applied in the cases where any construction may
do any benefit to the society or any group of people and are basically applied
in the socio economic legislations. Here there is no conflict between the
meanings of any two sections and meanings attributed to them.
Therefore the rule of Harmonious Construction and Beneficial Construction
both play an important in the interpretation of statutes and are two important
rules of interpretation.

Project on:

Harmonious construction

Submitted By:
Brijesh
B.A.LL.B. (Hons.)
5th Semester
Roll no.: 76/14

Submitted to:
Ms. Tanmeet Kaur