Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5054

May 29, 2002

SOLEDAD NUEZ, Represented by ANANIAS B. CO, Attorney-in-Fact for Complainant, petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative complaint filed on 21 April 1999 by Soledad Nuez, a septuagenarian represented by her
attorney-in-fact Ananias B. Co, Jr., seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort on the ground of
grave misconduct.
From the documents submitted by the complainant, it appears that sometime in October 1982 she authorized
respondent to sell her two parcels of land located in Legazpi City for P40,000. She agreed to give respondent 10
percent of the price as commission. Respondent succeeded in selling the lots, but despite complainants repeated
demands, he did not turn over to her the proceeds of the sale. This forced complainant to file against respondent
and his wife an action for a sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. Q-93-15052.
For his failure to file an answer, respondent was declared in default and complainant was required to present exparte her evidence. On 29 September 1993, the court rendered its decision (Annex "C" of the Complaint) ordering
respondent herein to pay complainant the sum of P16,000 as principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal
rate from the date of the commencement of the action, i.e., 8 March 1993, until it is fully paid, and to pay the costs of
suit.
1wphi1.nt

Respondent and his wife appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed
for failure to pay the required docket fee within the reglementary period despite notice.
On 23 October 1995 complainant filed in Civil Case No. Q-93-15052 a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution, which the court granted on 30 October 1995. The next day, the alias writ of execution was issued (Annex
"B" of Complaint). It appears that only a partial satisfaction of the P16,000 judgment was made, leavingP13,800
thereof unsatisfied. In payment for the latter, respondent issued four postdated checks drawn against his account in
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City.
Upon presentment, however, the checks were dishonored because the account against which they were drawn was
closed (Annexes "D" and "E" of Complaint). Demands for respondent to make good the checks fell on deaf ears,
thus forcing complainant to file four criminal complaints for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (Annexes "F," "G," "H" and "I" of the Complaint).
In the "Joint Affidavit" of respondent and his wife filed with the Office of the Prosecutor, Quezon City, respondent
admitted having drawn and issued said four postdated checks in favor of complainant. Allegedly believing in good
faith that said checks had already been encashed by complainant, he subsequently closed his checking account in
China Banking Corporation, Legazpi City, from which said four checks were drawn. He was not notified that the
checks were dishonored. Had he been notified, he would have made the necessary arrangements with the bank.
We required respondent to comment on the complaint. But he never did despite our favorable action on his three
motions for extension of time to file the comment. His failure to do so compelled complainant to file on 10 March
2000 a motion to cite respondent in contempt on the ground that his strategy to file piecemeal motions for extension
of time to submit the comment "smacks of a delaying tactic scheme that is unworthy of a member of the bar and a
law dean."
In our resolution of 14 June 2000, we noted the motion for contempt; considered respondent to have waived the
filing of a comment; and referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation or decision within ninety days from notice of the resolution.

In her Report and Recommendation dated 12 September 2000, Investigating Commissioner Atty. Milagros V. San
Juan concluded that respondent had no intention to "honor" the money judgment against him in Civil Case No. Q93-15052 as can be gleaned from his (1) issuance of postdated checks; (2) closing of the account against which
said checks were drawn; and (3) continued failure to make good the amounts of the checks. She then recommends
that respondent be declared "guilty of misconduct in his dealings with complainant" and be suspended from the
practice of law for at least one year and pay the amount of the checks issued to the complainant.
In its Resolution No. XV-2001-244 of 27 October 2001, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved and adopted
Atty. San Juans Report and Recommendation.
We concur with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted and approved by the Board of Governors
of the IBP, that respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is guilty of grave misconduct in his dealings with complainant.
Indeed, the record shows respondents grave misconduct and notorious dishonesty.
There is no need to stretch ones imagination to arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent gravely abused
the confidence that complainant reposed in him and committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds
of the sale of her property. Worse, with palpable bad faith, he compelled the complainant to go to court for the
recovery of the proceeds of the sale and, in the process, to spend money, time and energy therefor. Then, despite
his deliberate failure to answer the complaint resulting in his having been declared in default, he appealed from the
judgment to the Court of Appeals. Again, bad faith attended such a step because he did not pay the docket fee
despite notice. Needless to state, respondent wanted to prolong the travails and agony of the complainant and to
enjoy the fruits of what rightfully belongs to the latter. Unsatisfied with what he had already unjustly and unlawfully
done to complainant, respondent issued checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution. But, remaining unrepentant of
what he had done and in continued pursuit of a clearly malicious plan not to pay complainant of what had been
validly and lawfully adjudged by the court against him, respondent closed the account against which the checks
were drawn. There was deceit in this. Respondent never had the intention of paying his obligation as proved by the
fact that despite the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, he did not pay the obligation.
All the foregoing constituted grave and gross misconduct in blatant violation of Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondents claim of good faith in closing his account because he thought complainant has already encashed all
checks is preposterous. The account was closed on or before 26 February 1996. He knew that there were still other
checks due on 29 February 1996 and 15 March 1996 which could not be encashed before their maturity dates.
By violating Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent diminished public
confidence in the law and the lawyers (Busios v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407 [1997]; Ducat v. Villalon, 337 SCRA 622
[2000]). Instead of promoting such confidence and respect, he miserably failed to live up to the standards of the
legal profession (Gonato v. Adaza, 328 SCRA 694 [2000]; Ducat v. Villalon, supra).
Respondents act of issuing bad checks in satisfaction of the alias writ of execution for money judgment rendered by
the trial court was a clear attempt to defeat the ends of justice. His failure to make good the checks despite
demands and the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 showed his continued defiance of judicial processes,
which he, as an officer of the court, was under continuing duty to uphold.
To further demonstrate his very low regard for the courts and judicial processes, respondent even had the temerity
of making a mockery of our generosity to him. We granted his three motions for extension of time to file his
comment on the complaint in this case. Yet, not only did he fail to file the comment, he as well did not even bother to
explain such failure notwithstanding our resolution declaring him as having waived the filing of the comment. To the
Highest Court of the land, respondent openly showed a high degree of irresponsibility amounting to willful
disobedience to its lawful orders (Thermochem Incorporated v. Naval, 344 SCRA 76, 82 [2000]; Sipin-Nabor v. Atty.
Baterina, Adm. Case No. 4073, 28 June 2001).
Respondent then knowingly and willfully violated Rules 12.04 and 12:03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide that lawyers should avoid any action that would unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes; and that lawyers, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, should not let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an
explanation for their failure to do so.
1wphi1.nt

The penalty of suspension "for at least one (1) year" imposed by the Board of Governors of the IBP is both vague
and inadequate. A suspension may either be indefinite or for a specific duration. Besides, under the circumstances
of this case a suspension for a year is plainly very light and inadequate. For his deliberate violation or defiance of
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 12:03 and 12:04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, coupled
with his palpable bad faith and dishonesty in his dealings with the complainant, respondent deserves a graver
penalty. That graver penalty is indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby INDEFINITELY SUSPENDEDfrom
the practice of law, and is directed to pay complainant Soledad Nuez the amount of P13,800 within ten (10) days
from notice of this resolution.
This resolution shall take effect immediately. Copies thereof shall be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal record; the Office of the President; the Department of Justice; the Court of
Appeals; the Sandiganbayan; and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Court Administrator shall also furnish all
lower courts with copies of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 1372

June 27, 2002

SPOUSES LIRIO U. RABANAL AND CAYETANO D. RABANAL, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. FAUSTINO F. TUGADE, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant spouses Cayetano and Lirio Rabanal against Atty. Faustino
F. Tugade. It is alleged that respondent, as counsel for complainant Cayetano Rabanal, did not file the appellant's
brief in the Court of Appeals, as a result of which the appeal filed by Cayetano was dismissed and the decision of
the then Circuit Criminal Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan became final and executory.
It appears that complainant Cayetano Rabanal was one of the accused-appellants in Criminal Case No. CCC-I-150,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Marcelino Rabanal y Ibaez, et al.," of the Criminal Circuit Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan.1 He was found guilty of homicide and the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant terminated the services of his previous counsel and engaged the services of respondent Atty. Faustino
F. Tugade as new counsel to prosecute the appeal.2 However, despite the extension of time granted to him totalling
60 days, Atty. Tugade failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. 3Cayetano filed a
motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied. 4 Complainants alleged that they paid P1,000.00 to
respondent as attorney's fees and, in addition, the amount of P1,400.00 for the preparation of the appellant's
brief.5 Complainants sought the suspension from the practice of law or the disbarment of respondent attorney.6
In his comment dated October 24, 1974, respondent said he did not want to accept complainant's case due to his
busy schedule, but that he was nonetheless prevailed upon by the latter, who is his "kababayan," to sign the
appellant's brief to be filed in the case.7 Cayetano gave the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) pertaining to the
case to respondent, and the sum of P600.00 as litigation expenses, after which respondent asked another lawyer to
prepare the appellant's brief. However, on May 11, 1974, Cayetano informed respondent that the Court of Appeals
had dismissed his appeal for failure of counsel to file an appellant's brief. Respondent alleged he then entered his
appearance as counsel for Cayetano and filed a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals, for which he
was paid P800.00.8 The motion was, however, denied and Cayetano served sentence from 1974 to 1979, when he
was released on conditional pardon.9
In a resolution, dated November 4, 1974, the Court referred the administrative case against respondent to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report, and recommendation. 10 The OSG conducted hearings on
February 5, 1976 and November 27, 1976, during which the spouses Rabanal testified in support of their
complaint.11 On January 24, 1979, Cayetano was released from the New Bilibid Prisons on conditional pardon. 12 A
few years later, the Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) assumed jurisdiction
over the administrative case.13 After each of the complainants had testified, the IBP Commissioner set the hearing
for reception of respondent's evidence on June 26, 1992 with warning that the case would be considered submitted
for resolution if respondent failed to present his evidence. 14 Three notices of the hearing sent by registered mail to
respondent were, however, returned unclaimed.15 Accordingly, the IBP Hearing Commissioner, upon motion of
complainant Lirio Rabanal, considered the case submitted for resolution. 16 On May 8, 1993, the IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for at least one (1)
year.17
On July 15, 1993, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC). Later, however, the transcripts of stenographic notes (TSN) were lost. 18 In any case, on May 20,
2002, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) adopted the findings of the IBP and recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year.19
After a review of the records of this case, the Court finds no basis for reversing the findings and recommendation of
the IBP and the OBC. Their recommendation is affirmed with the modification that the penalty imposed is reduced
from one (1) year to six (6) months.

Respondent claims that he was not the counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal prior to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals and he could not be held responsible for the dismissal of complainant's
appeal for failure of counsel to file the appellant's brief. We disagree.
The absence of a written contract does not preclude a finding that there was a professional relationship which merits
attorney's fees for professional services rendered. A written contract is not an essential element in the employment
of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. 20 Thus, in Villafuerte v.
Cortez,21 the Court held that the admission of respondent lawyer that he received payment from complainant is
sufficient evidence to establish a lawyer-client relationship. In this case, complainant sought and received legal
advice from respondent Tugade, who admitted that he agreed to sign the appellant's brief to be filed and that he
received P600.00 from complainant spouses. It is therefore clear that a lawyer-client relationship existed between
the two.
It is immaterial that respondent Tugade assisted Cayetano in the case as a mere friend or "kababayan" of the latter.
In Junio v. Grupo,22 respondent also denied the existence of a lawyer-client relationship, stating that complainant
was a close personal friend whom he helped in a personal capacity. Nonetheless, it was held:
To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. . . It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid,
promised, or charged for: neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
employment must be regarded as established. . . .
In this case, Cayetano consulted respondent Tugade in his professional capacity in order to obtain advice
concerning his appeal. Respondent agreed, as shown by his acceptance of the payment to him, his receipt of the
TSNs of the case, and the fact that he signed the appellant's brief. His claim that he merely accepted payment but
that he asked another lawyer to prepare the brief is an obvious subterfuge. He has not even named the lawyer
assuming that the latter is real. It is hard to see why respondent should personally accept payment and the
transcripts of stenographic notes from complainant if he did not intend to prepare the appellant's brief. Moreover, the
fact that respondent filed a motion for reconsideration after the dismissal of the appeal only confirms that he was
indeed Cayetano's lawyer.
The records clearly show that respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was remiss in the performance of his duties as
counsel of complainant Cayetano Rabanal. He was given by the Court of Appeals an extension of time totalling 60
days within which to file the appellant's brief, but he failed to file the same. He thus violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides:
RULE 12.03. A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
What this Court said in another case is fitting:
Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence,
and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights,
and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client,
save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege
to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and
to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.23

Indeed, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client. He should be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him, remembering always that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. In this case, the failure of
respondent to file the appellant's brief resulted in the dismissal of the appeal. As a consequence, the decision in the
trial court finding complainant guilty of homicide became final and executory and he was sentenced to ten years of
imprisonment. As has been held:
An attorney is bound to protect his client's interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del
Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed
committeda serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation
and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada,
43 SCRA 515).24
It should likewise be noted that respondent failed to notify the IBP of his change of address, thus delaying the
resolution of this case. Service of notice and other pleadings, which must be furnished to the parties, must be made
at the last address on record. If the parties are represented by counsel, such notices shall be sent instead to the
counsel's last given address on record in the absence of a proper and adequate notice of a change of address,
unless service upon the party himself is ordered.25
In Resurreccion v. Sayson,26 the Court attributed the delay in the resolution of an administrative case to respondent
lawyer, after finding that "The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent, caused by his failure
to appear before the Office of the Solicitor General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that also
indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought against him." Similarly, respondent Tugade likewise
showed a disregard of the charge against him, and the IBP properly made its recommendation solely on the basis of
complainants' testimonies and the documentary evidence.
In Galen v. Paguirigan,27 the Court, taking into account that it was a first offense, suspended for a period of six (6)
months a lawyer who failed to file a brief. Atty. Faustino Tugade showed lack of due care for his client's interest and
willful neglect of his duties as an officer of the court, thus warranting the imposition of the same penalty on him.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Faustino F. Tugade is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for six (6) months effective upon finality hereof with WARNING that a repetition of the same negligent act
charged in this complaint will be dealt with even more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Chairman, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., abroad, on official business.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
AM No. RTJ-01-1640

October 15, 2002

ATTY. HERMOGENES DATUIN, JR., complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ANDRES B. SORIANO, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Recreant members of the judiciary must be denounced, but only when charges against them are substantiated. The
administrative complaint at bar presents no such occasion.
The complaint arose from Civil Case No. 1335-8 (the civil case), a complaint for sum of money filed before the
Regional Trial Court at Malolos, Bulacan on December 24, 1998 by a certain Olivia Natividad against one Teresita
Lopez, which was raffled to Branch 13 thereof presided by Judge Andres B. Soriano, herein respondent. In said civil
case, herein complainant Atty. Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. appeared as counsel for the defendant.
On October 13, 1999, in the course of the trial of the civil case, complainant filed a Motion for Disqualification of
respondent the pertinent allegations of which read verbatim as follows:
1. In the pre-trial conference of September 21, 1999, the Presiding Judge Hon. Andres B. Soriano, showed
his partial and bias attitude in favor of the plaintiff by arrogantly hollering at counsel for the defendant without
any justifiable cause or motive.
2. When approached in Chamber the above-named Presiding Judge intimated to the defendant that should
there be a buyer of the property covered by TCT No. 368418 of the defendant which is worth Ten (10) Million
Pesos and which is admittedly being illegally withheld by the plaintiff without justifiable reason and which title
has nothing to do with the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim of Php 531,000.00, the buyer should be
made to appear before Him; thus, clearly showing His interest in the prospective transaction.
3. After the pre-trial was concluded on September 21,1999, the abovenamed Judge issued an order which,
in its pertinent portion, reads as follows: "Pre-trial proceeded and in due course was concluded", without,
however, reciting in detail the matters taken up in the conference contrary to and in violation of Rule 18, Sec.
7, . . . (Italics supplied).
Claiming that respondent failed to resolve the Motion for Disqualification for about three months, complainant filed a
letter dated January 10, 2000, which was received at the Office of the Chief Justice on January 20, 2000, attributing
to respondent "incompetency to hear and decide cases" and requesting that the motion be treated as an
administrative charge against respondent "for removal from office".
Complainants letter-complaint was endorsed for appropriate action to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
which, by Ist Indorsement dated February 9, 2000, directed respondent to file a Comment within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof.
Respondent thus filed his Comment on March 7, 2000 denying the alleged non-resolution within three months of the
Motion for Disqualification and claiming that 1) his grant of said motion by Order of December 27, 1999 disproves
his alleged bias in favor of the plaintiff, 2) granting, for the sake of argument, that hollering at complainant at the
September 21, 1999 pre-trial were true, that does not by itself demonstrate bias or partiality, and 3) he intended to
subsequently issue the pre-trial order contemplated in Section 7 of Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
upon the "completion" of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the pre-trial.
By Resolution of July 11, 2001, this Courts Third Division referred the case to the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for raffle among its associate justices, with the directive that the Associate Justice to whom the case is
assigned SUBMIT his/her investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days.

The OCA accordingly forwarded to the CA the record of the case which was raffled to CA Associate Justice
Bienvenido L. Reyes for investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a hearing on September 19, 2001, the Investigating Justice submitted a REPORT on May 2, 2002
partly stating as follows:
After a circumspect reading of the records, We find nothing in the conduct of the respondent that would warrant any
punitive action from the High Court. Outside his naked assertions, the imputation of impartiality against the public
respondent was not amply substantiated by the complainant. In this regard, it needs to be underscored that in
administrative cases akin to the instant controversy, it is the complainant who totes the burden of proving the
respondent judges liability (Concepcion v. Vela, Adm. Matter No. 309-MJ, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 133). The
evidence presented [is] not sufficiently convincing to compel the exercise of the disciplinary powers of the Supreme
Court. We cannot simply syllogize on the culpability of the respondent judge on the basis of evidence which [is], at
best, inconclusive and conjectural. (Underscoring supplied).
xxx
Under pain of redundancy, the evidence proffered by the complainant, which consists chiefly of suppositions and
uncorroborated statements, fall[s] short to discharge the compulsory burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Collectively, [it] fail[s] to establish that the public respondent was indeed inspired by any selfish intent and that he
bore personal bias which is susceptible to obscure the merits of the case, betray the respondents objectivity and
jeopardize his sense of judgment. The fact that even before an administrative case was filed against the respondent
judge, he had already inhibited himself from the case belies the claim that he was partial to the complainants and
that he took special interest in the property subject of the litigation. (Underscoring supplied).
The Investigating Justice thus recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondent.
The recommendation is well-taken.
It is settled that in administrative proceedings the complainant has the burden of proving, in general by substantial
evidence, the allegations in the complaint.1 This complainant failed to discharge.
The Motion for Disqualification filed by complainant had already been granted by respondent, before the former
lodged his letter-complaint, in order, to use respondents words, "to assure the parties that the civil case will be
heard and tried without regard to personalities".
With respect to complainants allegation that respondent yelled at him, absent evidence as to its content as well as
the circumstances under which it was made, its import cannot be appreciated, hence, this Court cannot be so rash
as to condemn respondent to punitive action.
Neither can this Court fault respondent on the basis of his intimation that should there be a buyer of the property
subject of the civil case, the buyer "must be made to appear before him". For complainant did not dispute at the
hearing of the present complaint before the Investigating Justice on September 21, 2001 that the "intimation" was
made by respondent in open court in his attempt to settle the civil case before his sala. 2 The argument that
respondent wont be asking that the buyer be presented to him if he had no hidden agenda 3 is unadulterated
speculation, hence, deserves no weight.
Respondents efforts to have the parties arrive at an amicable settlement in fact shows that he was carrying out the
mandate to consider during pre-trial the possibility of an amicable settlement. 4
Notatu dignum is the presumption of regularity in the performance of a judges functions 5, hence, bias, prejudice and
even undue interest cannot be presumed, especially weighed against a judges sacred allegation under oath of
office to administer justice without respect to any person and do equal right to the poor and the rich. 6
As for respondents alleged violation of Section 7 of Rule 18 of the 1997 Code of Civil Procedure which reads:
SEC.7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon termination thereof, the court
shall issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference; the action taken thereon, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the
matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the order shall explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried.
The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent
manifest injustice,

it is a matter of public policy that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial
capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. 7 For a judge may not
be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. 8
In respondents case, he has explained that his Order of October 21, 1999 was not the pre-trial order contemplated
in above-quoted Section 7 of Rule 18 as he was wont to issue one only after the transcription of the stenographic
notes taken during the pre-trial was completed to make sure that all the matters therein taken up are reflected in the
order.9 No prohibition against said practice is contained in the aforecited rule, and absent any showing of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption on respondents part, no disciplinary action lies against him. 10
With respect to the charge of incompetence,11 complainant has failed to establish the same by the requisite proof.
Respondents alleged inaction on the Motion for Release of Title filed by complainant on September 7, 1999
opposition to which was filed on October 7, 1999 cannot amount to incompetence. For the Motion for
Disqualification subsequently filed by complainant on October 18, 1999 had assailed the very objectivity of
respondent to act on the civil case, which latter motion he granted, thus rendering unnecessary his resolution of the
Motion to Release Title.
With regard to complainants invocation12 of paragraph 1-A (2) (d) of Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89 which
provides that "if a trial is to be conducted, the judge shall fix the necessary trial dates to complete the presentation of
evidence by both parties within 90 days from initial hearing", he has failed to show its application to the present
complaint. If he seeks to apply this provision to the alleged failure of respondent to resolve the Motion for
Disqualification within three months, he (complainant) failed to refute respondents claim that the motion was
submitted for resolution on November 16, 1999 and was resolved on December 27, 1999 13 or within the 90-day
period.
A word on the following italicized utterances of complainant addressed to respondent during the hearing of
September 19, 2001 before the Investigating Justice:
ATTY. DATUIN:
Judge, why dont you be candid.
Judge, you should be candid.
There are three titles. The trouble with you, you dont even memorize the matters taken in the proceedings. 14
xxx
The trouble with you (referring to complainant) is you dont know your law.15
xxx
ATTY. DATUIN:
That is his main reason even in his Motion for Reconsideration that is provided under the rules of court, that a judge
should wait for the transcript.
I dont understand because I have been practising for half a century.
Earlier judges were very smart then.
Immediately after every incident submitted, they rule.
I dont understand why counsel is not candid.16
x x x (Italics supplied).
As a member of the bar, complainant is charged with the duty to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues17, and to avoid using language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise

improper.18 For public confidence in the legal system may be eroded by the unfitting deportment of a member of the
bar.
WHEREFORE, finding the charges against respondent without adequate factual and legal bases, they are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.