LabStan Cases 0626

Part Two: General Provisions: 3, 4, 6
A. 3 in relation to
Art II - Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare.
Art XIII Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Construction in Favor of Labor
SECOND DIVISION
ARCO METAL PRODUCTS, CO., G.R. No. 170734
INC., and MRS. SALVADOR UY,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
TINGA,
VELASCO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus -
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

SA ARCO METAL-NAFLU (SAMARMNAFLU),
Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 14, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This
treats
of
the
Petition
for
Review[1] of
the
Resolution[2] and
[3]
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 9 December 2005
and
29
September
2005,
respectively in CA-G.R. SP No. 85089 entitled Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Arco Metal-NAFLU
(SAMARM-NAFLU) v. Arco Metal Products Co., Inc. and/or Mr. Salvador Uy/Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Apron M. Mangabat,[4] which ruled that the 13th month pay, vacation leave and sick leave
conversion to cash shall be paid in full to the employees of petitioner regardless of the actual service they
rendered within a year.
Petitioner is a company engaged in the manufacture of metal products, whereas respondent is
the labor union of petitioners rank and file employees. Sometime in December 2003, petitioner paid the
13th month pay, bonus, and leave encashment of three union members in amounts proportional to the
service they actually rendered in a year, which is less than a full twelve (12) months. The employees
were:
1. Rante Lamadrid
2. Alberto Gamban
3. Rodelio Collantes
Sickness
27 August 2003 to 27 February 2004
Suspension 10 June 2003 to 1 July 2003
Sickness
August 2003 to February 2004
Respondent protested the prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions petitioner did not
prorate the payment of the same benefits to seven (7) employees who had not served for the full 12
months. The payments were made in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004. According to
respondent, the prorated payment violates the rule against diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the
Labor Code. Thus, they filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). The parties submitted the case for voluntary arbitration.
The voluntary arbitrator, Apron M. Mangabat, ruled in favor of petitioner and found that the giving
of the contested benefits in full, irrespective of the actual service rendered within one year has
not ripened into a practice. He noted the affidavit of Joselito Baingan, manufacturing group head of
petitioner, which states that the giving in full of the benefit was a mere error. He also interpreted the
phrase for each year of service found in the pertinent CBA provisions to mean that an employee must
have rendered one year of service in order to be entitled to the full benefits provided in the CBA.[5]
Unsatisfied, respondent filed a Petition for Review[6] under Rule 43 before the Court of Appeals,
imputing serious error to Mangabats conclusion. The Court of Appeals ruled that the CBA did not intend
to foreclose the application of prorated payments of leave benefits to covered employees. The appellate
court found that petitioner, however, had an existing voluntary practice of paying the aforesaid benefits in
full to its employees, thereby rejecting the claim that petitioner erred in paying full benefits to its
seven employees. The appellate court noted that aside from the affidavit of petitioners officer, it has not
presented any evidence in support of its position that it has no voluntary practice of granting the contested
benefits in full and without regard to the service actually rendered within the year. It also questioned why
it took petitioner eleven (11) years before it was able to discover the alleged error. The dispositive
portion of the courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the
instant
petition
is
hereby GRANTED and the Decision of Accredited Voluntary Arbiter Apron M. Mangabat in
NCMB-NCR Case No. PM-12-345-03, dated June 18, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that the 13th month pay, bonus, vacation leave and sick leave
conversions to cash shall be paid to the employees in full, irrespective of the actual
service rendered within a year.[7]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied, hence this
petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the grant of 13th month pay,
bonus, and leave encashment in full regardless of actual service rendered constitutes voluntary employer
practice and, consequently, the prorated payment of the said benefits does not constitute diminution of
benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.[8]
The petition ultimately fails.
First, we determine whether the intent of the CBA provisions is to grant full benefits regardless of
service actually rendered by an employee to the company. According to petitioner, there is a one-year
cutoff in the entitlement to the benefits provided in the CBA which is evident from the wording of its
pertinent provisions as well as of the existing law.
We agree with petitioner on the first issue. The applicable CBA provisions read:
ARTICLE XIV-VACATION LEAVE
Section 1. Employees/workers covered by this agreement who have rendered at
least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to sixteen (16) days vacation leave with pay
for each year of service. Unused leaves shall not be cumulative but shall be converted into
its cash equivalent and shall become due and payable every 1 st Saturday of December of
each year.
However, if the 1st Saturday of December falls in December 1, November 30
(Friday) being a holiday, the management will give the cash conversion of leaves in
November 29.
Section 2. In case of resignation or retirement of an employee, his vacation leave
shall be paid proportionately to his days of service rendered during the year.
ARTICLE XV-SICK LEAVE
least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to sixteen (16) days of sick leave with pay
for each year of service. Unused sick leave shall not be cumulative but shall be
converted into its cash equivalent and shall become due and payable every 1 st Saturday of
December of each year.
Section 2. Sick Leave will only be granted to actual sickness duly certified by the
Company physician or by a licensed physician.
Section 3. All commutable earned leaves will be paid proportionately upon
retirement or separation.
ARTICLE XVI EMERGENCY LEAVE, ETC.
Section 1. The Company shall grant six (6) days emergency leave to employees
covered by this agreement and if unused shall be converted into cash and become due
and payable on the 1st Saturday of December each year.
least one (1) year of service shall be entitled to seven (7) days of Paternity Leave with pay
in case the married employees legitimate spouse gave birth. Said benefit shall be noncumulative and non-commutative and shall be deemed in compliance with the law on the
same.
Section 3. Maternity leaves for married female employees shall be in accordance
with the SSS Law plus a cash grant ofP1,500.00 per month.
xxx
ARTICLE XVIII- 13TH MONTH PAY & BONUS
Section 1. The Company shall grant 13th Month Pay to all employees covered by
this agreement. The basis of computing such pay shall be the basic salary per day of the
employee multiplied by 30 and shall become due and payable every 1 st Saturday of
December.
Section 2. The Company shall grant a bonus to all employees as practiced which
shall be distributed on the 2nd Saturday of December.
Section 3. That the Company further grants the amount of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as signing bonus plus a free CBA Booklet. [9] (Underscoring
ours)
There is no doubt that in order to be entitled to the full monetization of sixteen (16) days of
vacation and sick leave, one must have rendered at least one year of service. The clear wording of the
provisions does not allow any other interpretation. Anent the 13th month pay and bonus, we agree with
the findings of Mangabat that the CBA provisions did not give any meaning different from that given by
the law, thus it should be computed at 1/12 of the total compensation which an employee receives for the
whole calendar year. The bonus is also equivalent to the amount of the 13 th month pay given, or in
proportion to the actual service rendered by an employee within the year.
On the second issue, however, petitioner founders.
As a general rule, in petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does
not normally embark on a re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the Court.[10] The rule, however, admits of several exceptions, one of which is when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to that of the lower tribunals. Such is the case here, as the factual
conclusions of the Court of Appeals differ from that of the voluntary arbitrator.
Petitioner granted, in several instances, full benefits to employees who have not served a full
year, thus:
Name
1. Percival Bernas
2. Cezar Montero
3. Wilson Sayod
4. Nomer Becina
5. Ronnie Licuan
6. Guilbert Villaruel
7. Melandro Moque
Reason
Sickness
Sickness
Sickness
Suspension
Sickness
Sickness
Sickness
Duration
July 1992 to November 1992
21 Dec. 1992 to February 1993
May 1994 to July 1994
1 Sept. 1996 to 5 Oct. 1996
8 Nov. 1999 to 9 Dec. 1999
23 Aug. 2002 to 4 Feb. 2003
29 Aug. 2003 to 30 Sept. 2003[11]
Petitioner claims that its full payment of benefits regardless of the length of service to the
company does not constitute voluntary employer practice. It points out that the payments had been
erroneously made and they occurred in isolated cases in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and
2003. According to petitioner, it was only in 2003 that the accounting department discovered the error
when there were already three (3) employees involved with prolonged absences and the error was
corrected by implementing the pro-rata payment of benefits pursuant to law and their existing CBA. [12] It
adds that the seven earlier cases of full payment of benefits went unnoticed considering the proportion
of one employee
concerned (per year) vis vis the 170 employees of the company. Petitioner describes the situation as
a clear oversight which should not be taken against it. [13] To further bolster its case, petitioner argues that
for a grant of a benefit to be considered a practice, it should have been practiced over a long period of
time and must be shown to be consistent, deliberate and intentional, which is not what happened in this
case. Petitioner tries to make a case out of the fact that the CBA has not been modified to incorporate the
giving of full benefits regardless of the length of service, proof that the grant has not ripened into
company practice.
We disagree.
Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated by the employer.[14] The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on
the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare, [15] and to afford
labor full protection.[16] Said mandate in turn is the basis of Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that
all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor. Jurisprudence is replete with cases which recognize the
right of employees to benefits which were voluntarily given by the employer and which ripened into
company practice. Thus in Davao Fruits Corporation v. Associated Labor Unions, et al. [17] where an
employer had freely and continuously included in the computation of the 13 th month pay those items that
were expressly excluded by the law, we held that the act which was favorable to the employees though
not conforming to law had thus ripened into a practice and could not be withdrawn, reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated. In SevillaTRADING COMPANY v. Semana,[18] we ruled that the employers
act of including non-basic benefits in the computation of the 13 th month pay was a voluntary act and had
ripened into a company practice which cannot be peremptorily withdrawn. Meanwhile
in Davao Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez,[19] the Court ordered the payment of the cash
equivalent of the unenjoyed sick leave benefits to its intermittent workers after finding that said workers
had received these benefits for almost four years until the grant was stopped due to a different
interpretation
of
the
CBA
provisions.
We
held
that
the
employer cannot
unilaterally withdraw the existing privilege of commutation or conversion to cash given to said workers,
and as also noted that the employer had in fact granted and paid said cash equivalent of the unenjoyed
portion of the sick leave benefits to some intermittent workers.
In the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003, petitioner had adopted a policy of freely,
voluntarily and consistently granting full benefits to its employees regardless of the length of service
rendered. True, there were only a total of seven employees who benefited from such a practice, but it
was an established practice nonetheless. Jurisprudence has not laid down any rule specifying a minimum
number of years within which a company practice must be exercised in order to constitute voluntary
company practice.[20] Thus, it can be six (6) years,[21] three (3) years,[22]or even as short as two (2) years.
[23]
Petitioner cannot shirk away from its responsibility by merely claiming that it was a mistake or an
error, supported only by an affidavit of its manufacturing group head portions of which read:
5. 13th month pay, bonus, and cash conversion of unused/earned vacation leave,
sick leave and emergency leave are computed and paid in full to employees who
rendered services to the company for the entire year and proportionately to those
employees who rendered service to the company for a period less than one (1) year or
twelve (12) months in accordance with the CBA provision relative thereto.
6. It was never the intention much less the policy of the management to grant the
aforesaid benefits to the employees in full regardless of whether or not the employee has
rendered services to the company for the entire year, otherwise, it would be unjust and
inequitable not only to the company but to other employees as well. [24]
In
cases
involving
money
claims
of
employees,
the
employer
has
the
burden of proving that the employees did receive the wages and benefits and that the same we
re paid in accordance with law.[25]
Indeed, if petitioner wants to prove that it merely erred in giving full benefits, it could have easily
presented other proofs, such as the names of other employees who did not fully serve for one year and
thus were given prorated benefits. Experientially, a perfect attendance in the workplace is always the goal
but it is seldom achieved. There must have been other employees who had reported for work less than a
full year and who, as a consequence received only prorated benefits. This could have easily bolstered
petitioners theory of mistake/error, but sadly, no evidence to that effect was presented.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85089 dated 29 September 2005 is and its Resolution dated 9 December 2005 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174809
June 27, 2012
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MANOLITO Q. TRIA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 31, 2006 and Resolution2 dated September 21, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 70839. The assailed decision affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Resolution3 dated March 15, 2002 in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-009965-98, while the assailed
resolution denied petitioner Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc.s (DFPSIs) motion for reconsideration.
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Petitioner Duty Free Philippines Services, Inc. is a manpower agency that provides personnel to Duty
Free Philippines (DFP).
On March 16, 1989, [respondent] Manolo Tria was employed by Petitioner and was seconded to DFP as
a Warehouse Supervisor.
In an Audit Report, dated January 16, 1998, it was revealed that 1,020 packs of Marlboro bearing
Merchandise Code No. 020101 under WRR No. 36-04032 were not included in the condemnation
proceedings held on December 27, 1996 and that there were "glaring discrepancies" in the related
documents which "indicate a malicious attempt to conceal an anomalous irregularity." The relevant
Request for Condemnation was found to have been fabricated and all signatories therein, namely, Ed
Garcia, Stockkeeper; Catherino A. Bero, DIU Supervisor; and Constantino L. Cruz, were held
"accountable for the irregular loss of the unaccounted Marlboro KS Pack of 5"
After further investigation, it was discovered that the subject merchandise was illegally brought out of the
warehouse and it was made to appear that in all the documents prepared said goods were legally
condemned on December 27, 1996. Ed Garcia, one of the respondents in the Audit Review, implicated
[respondent] and [two] others. Garcia claimed that he was unaware of the illegality of the transaction as
he was only obeying the orders of his superiors who included [respondent]. Garcia disclosed that it was
[respondent] who ordered him to look for a van for the supposed "direct condemnation" of the subject
merchandise.
Consequently, the Discipline Committee requested [respondent] to submit a written reply/explanation
regarding the findings in the Audit Report and the allegations of Garcia.
[Respondent] denied his participation in the illegal transaction. Although he admitted that he instructed
Garcia to look for a van, it was for the purpose of transferring the damaged merchandise from the main
warehouse to the proper warehouse for damaged goods.
On August 27, 1998, the DFP Discipline Committee [DFPDC] issued a Joint Resolution holding
[respondent] "GUILTY OF DISHONESTY for (his) direct participation in the fake condemnation" and
pilferage of the missing 1,020 Marlboro Pack of 5s cigarettes and orders (his) DISMISSAL from the
service for cause and for loss of trust and confidence, with forfeiture of all rights and privileges due them
from the company, except earned salaries and leave credits."
On September 18, 1998, Petitioner sent [respondent] a memorandum terminating his employment with
Petitioner and his secondment to DFP "on the basis of the findings and recommendation of the (DFPs)
Discipline Committee."
Aggrieved, [respondent] filed a Complaint against Petitioner for Illegal Dismissal and for payment of
backwages, attorneys fees and damages.4
On May 31, 1999, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision 5 finding respondent to have been illegally
dismissed from employment. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
respondent company to reinstate complainant to his former position with all the rights, privileges, and
benefits appertaining thereto, including seniority, plus full backwages which as of May 31, 1999 already
amount toP172,672.50. Further, the respondent is ordered to pay complainant the equivalent of ten
percent (10%) of the total backwages as and for attorneys fees.
The claim for damages is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed7 the LA decision, but deleted the award of attorneys fees. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was also denied8 on March 15, 2002.
When petitioner elevated the case to the CA, it denied for the first time the existence of employeremployee relationship and pointed to DFP as respondents real employer. The appellate court, however,
considered said defense barred by estoppel for its failure to raise the defense before the LA and the
NLRC.9 It nonetheless ruled that although DFPDC conducted the investigation, petitioners dismissal letter
effected respondents termination from employment.10 On the validity of respondents dismissal from
employment, the CA respected the LA and NLRC findings and reached the same conclusion that
respondent was indeed illegally dismissed from employment. 11 Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied in a Resolution12 dated September 21, 2006.
Undaunted, petitioner elevates the case before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari based on
the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER DFPSI IS LIABLE
FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL AND DECLARE THAT:
A. DFPSI IS THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF DUTY FREE
PHILIPPINES ("DFP"); AND
B. THE ISSUE AS TO WHO TERMINATED RESPONDENT WAS RAISED ONLY FOR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT FAILED TO RULE ON THE LIABILITY OF DFP, AS AN INDISPENSABLE
PARTY TO THE COMPLAINT FOR ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND RULED CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENTS EMPLOYMENT WAS ILLEGALLY
TERMINATED.13
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in not considering its argument that it is not the employer of
respondent. It likewise faults the CA in not ruling on the liability of DFP as an indispensable party.
We cannot sustain petitioners contention. In its Position Paper,14 petitioner highlighted respondents
complicity and involvement in the alleged "fake condemnation" of damaged cigarettes as found by the
DFPDC. This, according to petitioner, was a just cause for terminating an employee.
In its Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal,15 petitioner insisted that there was basis for the
termination of respondents employment. Even in its Supplemental Appeal16 with the NLRC, petitioner
reiterated its stand that respondent was terminated for a just and valid cause and due process was strictly
observed in his dismissal. It further questioned the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision allegedly
because of strained relations between them.
With the aforesaid pleadings submitted by petitioner, together with the corresponding pleadings filed by
respondent, the LA and the NLRC declared the dismissal of respondent illegal. These decisions were
premised on the finding that there was an employer-employee relationship. 17 Nowhere in said pleadings
did petitioner deny the existence of said relationship. Rather, the line of its defense impliedly admitted
said relationship. The issue of illegal dismissal would have been irrelevant had there been no employeremployee relationship in the first place.
It was only in petitioners Petition for Certiorari before the CA did it impute liability on DFP as respondents
direct employer and as the entity who conducted the investigation and initiated respondents termination
proceedings. Obviously, petitioner changed its theory when it elevated the NLRC decision to the CA. The
appellate court, therefore, aptly refused to consider the new theory offered by petitioner in its petition. As
the object of the pleadings is to draw the lines of battle, so to speak, between the litigants, and to indicate
fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties, a party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to, or inconsistent, with its pleadings.18 It is a matter of law that when a party adopts a particular
theory and the case is tried and decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal. The case will be reviewed and decided on that theory and not approached
and resolved from a different point of view.19
The review of labor cases is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 20 The
alleged absence of employer-employee relationship cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 21 The
resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of evidence and the LA and the NLRC did
not pass upon it in their decisions.22 We cannot permit petitioner to change its theory on appeal. It would
be unfair to the adverse party who would have no more opportunity to present further evidence, material
to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware earlier of the new theory before the LA and
the NLRC.23 More so in this case as the supposed employer of respondent which is DFP was not and is
not a party to the present case.
In Pamplona Plantation Company v. Acosta,24 petitioner therein raised for the first time in its appeal to the
NLRC that respondents therein were not its employees but of another company. In brushing aside this
defense, the Court held:
x x x Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In the first place, it never raised
this defense in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the
nature of respondents employment, i.e., whether they are seasonal employees, contractors, or worked
under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner alleged that some of the respondents are
coconut filers and copra hookers or sakadors; some are seasonal employees who worked as scoopers or
lugiteros; some are contractors; and some worked under the pakyaw system. In support of these
allegations, petitioner even presented the companys payroll which will allegedly prove its allegations.
By setting forth these defenses, petitioner, in effect, admitted that respondents worked for it, albeit in
different capacities. Such allegations are negative pregnant denials pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied, and amounts to an
acknowledgment that respondents were indeed employed by petitioner. 25 (Emphasis supplied.)
Also in Telephone Engineering & Service Co., Inc. v. WCC, et al., 26 the Court held that the lack of
employer-employee relationship is a matter of defense that the employer should properly raise in the
proceedings below. The determination of this relationship involves a finding of fact, which is conclusive
and binding and not subject to review by this Court. 27
In this case, petitioner insisted that respondent was dismissed from employment for cause and after the
observance of the proper procedure for termination. Consequently, petitioner cannot now deny that
respondent is its employee. While indeed, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by acts or omission of the
parties, petitioners belated denial that it is the employer of respondent is obviously an afterthought, a
devise to defeat the law and evade its obligations.28
It is a fundamental rule of procedure that higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither
alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a
motion for reconsideration or on appeal.29 Petitioner is bound by its submissions that respondent is its
employee and it should not be permitted to change its theory. Such change of theory cannot be tolerated
on appeal, not due to the strict application of procedural rules, but as a matter of fairness. 30
As to the legality of respondents dismissal, it is well settled that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised, the reason being that this Court is not a trier of facts, and it is not for this
Court to reexamine and reevaluate the evidence on record. 31 Findings of fact and conclusions of the
Labor Arbiter as well as those of the NLRC or, for that matter, any other adjudicative body which can be
considered as a trier of facts on specific matters within its field of expertise, should be considered as
binding and conclusive upon the appellate courts.32
Petitioner dismissed respondent from employment based on the recommendation of the DFPDC holding
respondent guilty of dishonesty for his direct participation in the "fake condemnation" and "pilferage" of
the missing 1,020 Marlboro Pack of 5 cigarettes.33 Respondent was implicated in the anomalous
transaction by his co-employees who pointed to the former as the one who ordered the other suspects to
look for a vehicle that would be used to transport the subject cigarettes. This, according to the DFPDC,
was odd and strange. With this act alone and by reason of his position, the DFPDC concluded, and
affirmed by petitioner, that respondent definitely had knowledge of the "fake condemnation." From these
circumstances, petitioner sustained the findings of dishonesty and dismissed respondent from
employment.
Again, we agree with the appellate court that DFPDCs conclusions are not supported by clear and
convincing evidence to warrant the dismissal of respondent. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer is
burdened to prove just cause for terminating the employment of its employee with clear and convincing
evidence. This principle is designed to give flesh and blood to the guaranty of security of tenure granted
by the Constitution to employees under the Labor Code.34 In this case, petitioner failed to submit clear
and convincing evidence of respondents direct participation in the alleged fake condemnation
proceedings. To be sure, unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of employers do not
provide for legal justification for dismissing employees. In case of doubt, such cases should be resolved in
favor of labor, pursuant to the social justice policy of labor laws and the Constitution.35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated May 31, 2006 and Resolution dated September 21, 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 70839, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Recruitment and placement of workers

Definition
G.R. No. 141221-36
March 7, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused-appellants
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Batangas City in Criminal Case Nos.
6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432, 6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531
finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts
of estafa and one (1) count of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. 1
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment and eight (8)
informations for estafa were filed against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together
with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and convicted by the trial court as
Francisco Hernandez remained at large.1wphi1.nt
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of private complainants; a certification from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl Reichl and
Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment;2 the receipts for the payment made by private complainants;
and two documents signed by the Reichl spouses where they admitted that they promised to secure
Austrian tourist visas for private complainants and that they would return all the expenses incurred by
them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993,3 and where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private
complainants the total sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the processing of
their papers.4
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify for the prosecution. She stated that
Francisco Hernandez introduced her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain
Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she also saw the other applicants Melanie
Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and
Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic helper in Italy. They, however,
required her to pay the amount ofP150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel documents.
She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the
second installment of P25,000.00 on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on
December 27, 1992. She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichl spouses
at Matira's residence. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment 5 but not
for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992 but was not able to do so. Karl
Reichl explained that she would get her transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet leave for
Austria because theHOTELS were fully booked at that time because of the Christmas season. Narcisa's
departure was again scheduled on January 5, 1993, but it still did not push through. Narcisa stated that
they went to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian Embassy and Karl Reichl
assured her that she would be able to leave once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of
Narcisa and that of the other applicants several times but these proved to be empty promises. In March
1993, the applicants met with the three accused at the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes
and asked them to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting resulted in an
agreement which was reduced into writing and signed by Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure
private complainants' departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment. 6
Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony: In July 1992, her sister, Analiza
Perez, introduced her to Francisco Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City.
Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When she accepted the offer, Francisco
Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In August 1992, Leonora,
together with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went to RamadaHOTEL in Manila to meet with Karl
and Yolanda Reichl. At said meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda Reichl.
Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses
told Leonora to wait for about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco
Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the house of Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to
discuss some matters. Francisco Hernandez informed the applicants that their departure would be
postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the applicants were still unable to leave as it
was allegedly a holiday. Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment as
domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00. Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses
promised the applicants that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in January 1993,
Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly
for the plane fare. Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were not able to leave
on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the spouses again made another promise. Tired of the
recruiters' unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their application. However, Karl Reichl
constantly assured them that they would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The
promised employment, however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl signed a document stating that he
would refund the payment made by the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The document was
executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas
City.7
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that she paid a total amount
of P100,000.00 to the three accused.8
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she testified before the court. She said that
Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required her to pay
a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport and other papers to be used to secure a
visa. On November 25, 1992, she gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced her to his business partners,
spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl. Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that
they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an overseas job. They said she and
the other applicants would leave on December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the
amount of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls. Francisco Hernandez
again handed the money to the spouses. On February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco
Hernandez who delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not issue a receipt for the
payment made by Charito because he told her that he would not betray her trust. Like the other
applicants, Charito was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made by the
accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart, until finally the Reichls told the applicants
that Karl Reichl had so many business transactions in the Philippines that they would not be able to send
them abroad and that they would refund their payment instead. Hence, they executed an agreement
which was signed by Karl Reichl and stating that they would return the amounts paid by the applicants.
The accused, however, did not comply with their obligation. 9
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie Bautista, also took the witness stand.
She stated that in May 1992, Melanie applied for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez.
Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for the processing of her papers and
plane ticket. On June 26, 1992, Melanie made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez
who was then accompanied by Karl and Yolanda Reichl.10 Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco
Hernandez gave the money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on August 6, 1992
in the amount of P25,000.00,11 and another on January 3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.12 Three
receipts were issued for the payments.13
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de Manalo, testified that his wife applied
for the job of domestic helper abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to Karl and
Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to Italy. Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant
documents, i.e., passport, police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total placement fee
of P130,000.00.14 They paidP50,000.00 on June 5, 1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00
on January 3, 1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and were received by
Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a
receipt for the payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to secure a job for her
abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment if they fail on their promise. As with the other
applicants, Estela was also not able to leave the country.15
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he entered the Philippines on July 29,
1992. Prior to this date, he was in various places in Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to
explore business opportunities in connection with the import and export of beer and sugar. He also
planned to establish a tourist spot somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda
Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3, 1992, they moved to Manila Midtown
Hotel. They stayed there until August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to another
hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on September 19, 1992.16
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a certain Jimmy Pineda around August
1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel. Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European equipment to
be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting the deal, he made some research on
the background of the intended business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl
advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He
never saw Francisco Hernandez again until he left for Vienna in September 1992. 17
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco Hernandez allegedly approached
him and sought his help in securing Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and
told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines. On one occasion, Francisco
Hernandez invited him to an excursion at Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would
also bring some of his relatives with him and he would introduce him to them. There he met Narcisa
Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr.
Reichl at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and asked him if he could help
her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl, however, was firm on his refusal.18
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's
recruitment activities. He said that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help his
relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private complainants that he would give them
overseas employment.19 As regards the document where Mr. Reichl undertook to pay P1,388,924.00 to
private complainants, he claimed that he signed said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez
allegedly told him that private complainants would harm him and his family if he refused to sign it. He
signed the document as he felt he had no other option. 20
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her husband and denied the charges against
her. She claimed that she was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations, thus, she could
not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl further stated that she did not know of any
reason why private complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said that several
persons were harassing her and pressuring her to pay private complainants the sum of at
least P50,000.00.21
After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court rendered a decision convicting
accused-appellants of one (1) count of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused spouses KARL REICHL and
YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL 1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment as charged
in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6434, 6436 and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of syndicated and large-scale illegal
recruitment, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433,
6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as charged, in the abovementioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ
REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433, 6438 and 6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to
pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, to suffer the
indeterminate sentence of Six (6) Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen (16) Years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to indemnify the complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the
amount ofP150,000.00;
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven (11) years of
prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Leonora Perez in the amount
of P100,000.00;
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen (16) years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the
amount of P150,000.00;
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen (14) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the
amount ofP130,000.00;
indeterminate sentence of six (6) years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen (13) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the complainant Charito Balmes in the
amount ofP121,300.00; and
7. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They raise the following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa and
illegal recruitment committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the evidence presented by
the prosecution which miserably failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment on a
large scale by cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each filed by a single private
complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an automatic guilty verdict against
accused-appellant for the crime of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal
recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime does not ipso facto result in
conviction in the former."22
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by non-licensees
or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not, provided
that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.23 The law imposes a higher penalty
when the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are considered an
offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants
engaged in activities that fall within the definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code.
The evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to private complainants and
required them to prepare the necessary documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not
have any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary
authority or license gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad.25
Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure Austrian visas for private complainants,
which act did not constitute illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J" stating that
they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private complainants. We are not convinced. Private
complainants Narcisa Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated that Karl and
Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them overseas employment and promised them that
they would be able to leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to doubt the
truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely
testify against accused-appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and the latter
represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful employment for them abroad. The minor
lapses in the testimony of these witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not impair
their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on the material points, i.e., that they met with
the three accused several times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas employment,
and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but were not able to leave the country. It has been
held that truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies considering the
lapse of time and the treachery of human memory.26 Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a
document marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments given by private
complainants for the processing of their papers. We are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he
was forced by Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing, whether in his testimony
or in that of his wife, that private complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document.
Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not understand the contents of the paper
he was signing. When he affixed his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to ensure
the departure of private complainants and to provide them gainful employment abroad. Such obligation
arose from the promise of overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private complainants.
The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit "J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for
private complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to procure for them overseas
employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J", accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants
paid the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was executed on a later date, accusedappellants promised to refund to each complainant an amount exceedingP150,000.00. This is an
acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the complainants not only for securing
visas but also for their placement abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The acts of recruitment were committed
from June 1992 until January 1993 in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until
September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed in Batangas from October 21,
1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand, claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the
various informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few hours' drive from Manila. Thus,
even if the spouses were staying in Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in
their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three accused worked as a team and they
conspired and cooperated with each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to Italy.
Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the job applicants as his business partners.
Karl and Yolanda Reichl themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would seek
employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the payments given by the applicants to the
Reichl spouses and the latter undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy, each
of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-accused even if he himself did not personally
take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants of illegal recruitment
in large scale by cummulating the individual informations filed by private complainants. The eight
informations for illegal recruitment are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
"That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity,
conspiring and confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting,
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de Hernandez and to
more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de
Hernandez relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting,
procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on
these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a violation of
the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y Dolor and to
more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y
Dolor relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.1wphi1.nt
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y Atienza and to
more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y
Atienza relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
SIXTY THOUSAND (P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts
constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
"That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling and to more
than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute
a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy.
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo and to more
than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita
Karsada, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from the
Department of Labor and Employment or any other authorized government entity, conspiring and
confederating together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities by enlisting, contracting,
procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than
three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Anicel Umahon y Delgado
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
Contrary to Law."
"That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and subsequent thereto at No. 40 P.
Zamora Street, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority
contracting, procuring, offering and promising for a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to
more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said Charito Balmes y
Cantos relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
TWENTY ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We agree with accused-appellants that
they could not be convicted for illegal recruitment committed in large scale based on several informations
filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People vs. Reyes:27
"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment 'committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group,' it must be understood as referring to the number of
complainants in each case who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single
crimes of illegal recruitment can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal
recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a
group."28
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants. The charge was
not only for illegal recruitment committed in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by a
syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has
been shown that Karl Reichl, Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in
convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and giving them the guaranty that they
would be hired as domestic helpers in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that
accused-appellants should be held liable for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate which is also
punishable by life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) under Article
39 of the Labor Code.
Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-appellants for the crime of estafa. A
person who is convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or
fraudulent means of the accused-appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damages.29 It has been proved in this case that accused-appellants represented themselves to private
complainants to have the capacity to send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have any
authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced private complainants to pay a placement
fee of P150,000.00. Such act clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Cost against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195419
October 12, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH, RONNIE ARINGOY y MASION, and NESTOR RELAMPAGOS (at
large),Accused.
HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a consolidated criminal case filed against the accused-appellants for the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 21930) and Trafficking in Persons (Criminal Case No. 21908).
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City, in its Decision dated 29 November 2005 (RTC
Decision),1found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment
and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate, and sentenced each of the accused to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment plus payment of fines and damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) in
Cagayan de Oro, in its Decision dated 26 February 2010 (CA Decision), 2 affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision. The accused-appellants appealed to this Court by filing a Notice of Appeal 3 in accordance with
Section 3(c), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The Facts
The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:
In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single, was in Tumaga,
Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion Aringoy and Rachel
Aringoy Caete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, its good you are here" ("oy, maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel
asked Lolita if she is interested to work in Malaysia. x x x Lolita was interested so she gave her cellphone
number to Ronnie. After their conversation, Lolita proceeded to her grandfathers house.
xxx
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita received a text message from Ronnie
Aringoy inviting her to go to the latters house. At 7:30 in the morning, they met at Tumaga on the road
near the place where they had a conversation the night before. Ronnie brought Lolita to the house of his
sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is available in Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work as a
restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a passport. She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is
equivalent to P7,000.00 pesos in Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a
passport. Ronnie said that they will look for a passport so she could leave immediately. Lolita informed
him that her younger sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her for not telling him
immediately. He told Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they will go to Hadja
Jarma Lalli who will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter replied that
she was not in her house. She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Caete arrived
on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying at Southcom Village. Ronnie
asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita said that she will borrow her sisters passport. Ronnie,
Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolitas other sister, Gina Plando was staying. Her sister
Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to let her use Marifes passport. Marife refused
but Lolita got the passport. Marife cried. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel
and Lolita went to the house of Hadja Jarma Lalli just two hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie
in Tumaga. Ronnie introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is also interested in going to
Malaysia." Lolita handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs to her sister Marife Plando.
Hadja Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection with the DFA (Department of
Foreign Affairs) and Marifes picture in the passport will be substituted with Lolitas picture. Nestor
Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced Nestor to Lolita as their financier
who will accompany them to Malaysia. x x x Lolita noticed three other women in Hadja Jarmas house.
They were Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another woman who is about 28 years
old. The women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province. Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many
companions going to Malaysia to work. They will leave the next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at
2:30 in the afternoon.
On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon bringing a bag
containing her make-up and powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie Aringoy, Honey and
Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia;
a passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolitas picture on it, and P1,000.00 in cash. Hadja
Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan.
Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not board the boat. x x x After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma
Lalli and Nestor Relampagos approached Lolita and her companions. Nestor told them that they will have
a good job in Malaysia as restaurant entertainers. They will serve food to customers. They will not be
harmed.
M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 oclock in the morning of June 7, 2005.
After passing through the immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos, Lolita, Honey,
Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota Kinabalu. x x x At theHOTEL , Nestor
Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their employer.
After looking at the women, "Boss" brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and Lorraine to a restaurant near
theHOTEL . Diane and Lorraine were also on baord M/V Mary Joy when it left the port of Zamboanga for
Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant, a Filipina woman working there
said that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are used as prostitutes. Lolita and her
companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and Nestor that they do not like to work as
prostitutes. x x x After about five minutes, another person called "boss" arrived. x x x [T]hey were fetched
by a van at about 7:00 oclock in the evening and brought to Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa", a
Malaysian. At the club, they were told that they owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the
amount given by the club to Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the said amount
by entertaining customers. The customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time services of which 50 ringgits
will go to the entertainer, and 500 ringgits for over night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the
entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building. There were about 100 women working in the
club, many of them were Filipina women.
Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at 8:30 in the evening
of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60 which was pinned on her. That night, she had her first
customer who selected her among the other women at the club. He was a very big man, about 32 years
old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short time service at the counter. Lolita
was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given
to the entertainer for overnight services. The customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did not like to go with
him but a "boss" at the club told her that she could not do anything. At the hotel, the man poked a gun at
Lolita and instructed her to undress. She refused. The man boxed her on the side of her body. She could
not bear the pain. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. He had sexual
intercourse with her every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the customer went inside the
comfort room, Lolita put on her clothes and left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her back
to the hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005, Lolita was chosen
by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The customer paid for an overnight service at
the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far from Pipen Club. At the hotel, the man told
Lolita to undress. When she refused, the man brought her to the comfort room and bumped her head on
the wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower and said that both of them will take a bath. Lolitas
clothes got wet. She was crying. The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. They
stayed at the hotel until 11:00 oclock in the morning of June 15, 2005. The customer used Lolita many
times. He had sexual intercourse with her every hour.
Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She had at
least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around five customers a night. They all had
sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to contact by cellphone at about 10:00
oclock in the morning her sister Janet Plando who is staying at Sipangkot Felda x x x. Janet is married to
Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a driver in the factory. x x x Lolita told Janet that
she is in Labuan, Malaysia and beg Janet to save her because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told
Lolita to wait because her husband will go to Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 oclock that evening of that
day. x x x She told Janet to instruct her husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen Club. x x x At 9:00 oclock in
the evening, Lolita was told by Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a customer requested
for No. 60. The man was seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and said, "good
evening." The man asked her is she is the sister of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is, and asked the
man if he is the husband of her sister. He said, "yes." The man had already paid at the counter. He stood
up and left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. x x x Lolita told her sister about her ordeal.
She stayed at her sisters house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at 7:00 oclock in the evening, a
policeman went to her sisters house and asked if there is a woman staying in the house without a
passport. Her sister told the policeman that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on July 22,
Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where Lolita will board a
speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi. x x x
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of her eldest sister
Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta. Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her sisters house and
immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga. Ronnie was not there. She asked Russel,
niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so you are here, you arrived
already." He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita asked Ronnie to accompany her to
the house of Nestor Relampagos because she has something to get from him. Ronnie refused. He told
Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived from Malaysia.
Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. On August 2, 2005,
at past 9:00 oclock in the morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to
file her complaint. x x x
In her Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"; "1-A"-Lalli), Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met Lolita Plando on
June 6, 2005 on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia.
The meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and Lolita
Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted ways. They did not
see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what happened to them. She went
to Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having recruited Lolita Plando for employment abroad
(Exh. "1"; "1-A"). x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit (Exh. "1"-Aringoy), Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally knows Lolita
Plando since she was a teenager and he knows for a fact that her name is Cristine and not Marife "as she
purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June 2005, Lolita borrowed P1,000.00 from Ronnie
because she wanted to go to Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie lent
her P1,000.00. He told her that he knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who frequents to
Malaysia and with whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities." The entries in Philippine
Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January 29, 2004 (Exh. "2"; "2-A" to "2-Q")
showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the period from March 2004 to
June 2005.
xxx
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying
Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that Hadja Jarma Lalli
bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women
passengers.
xxx
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Caete (Exh. "2") and the Joint Affidavits of
witnesses Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando whom she
knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation officer) and massage attendant at Magic 2
Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita Plando has four children sired by different men; and that she
knows for a fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and from Malaysia to work in bars. When she
testified in court, Rachel did not present other evidence to substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar
and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to them as Marife
Plando was their co-worker as massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer) at Magic 2 Massage
Parlor and Karaoke bar where she used the names Gina Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the
said establishment for nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children from four
different men. No other evidence was submitted in court to prove their assertions. 4
The Decision of the Trial Court
The Regional Trial Court rendered its Decision on 29 November 2005, with its dispositive portion
declaring:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused HADJA JARMA LALLI y PURIH and RONNIE ARINGOY y
MASION GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 21908 of the Crime of Trafficking in
Persons defined in Section 3(a) and penalized under Section 10(c) in relation to Sections 4(a) and 6(c) of
Republic Act No. 9208 known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" and in Criminal Case No.
21930 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment defined in Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995" and
SENTENCES each of said accused:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine
ofP2,000,000.00 pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine
ofP500,000.00 pesos;
3. To pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and severally, the sum
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court did not find credible the denials of the accused-appellants over the candid, positive and
convincing testimony of complainant Lolita Plando (Lolita). The accused, likewise, tried to prove that Lolita
was a Guest Relations Officer (GRO) in the Philippines with four children fathered by four different men.
However, the trial court found these allegations irrelevant and immaterial to the criminal prosecution.
These circumstances, even if true, would not exempt or mitigate the criminal liability of the accused. The
trial court found that the accused, without a POEA license, conspired in recruiting Lolita and trafficking her
as a prostitute, resulting in crimes committed by a syndicate. 6 The trial court did not pronounce the liability
of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos (Relampagos) because jurisdiction was not acquired over his
person.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On 26 February 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC Decision and found accusedappellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in Persons.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming in
toto the RTC Decision.
The Ruling of this Court
We dismiss the appeal for lack of merit.
We modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons from P50,000
toP500,000 for moral damages and P50,000 to P100,000 for exemplary damages.
Grounds for Appeal
In his Appeal Brief,7 Ronnie Aringoy (Aringoy) admits that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli
(Lalli), Aringoys neighbor who frequents Malaysia and from whom Lolita could ask pertinent information
on job opportunities.8 Aringoy claims that he learned later that Lolita left for Malaysia. 9 He denies knowing
Relampagos to whom Lolita paid P28,000 as placement fee for finding her work in Malaysia. 10
Aringoy presented three witnesses: his niece Rachel Aringoy Caete (Rachel), Mercedita Salazar
(Mercedita), and Estrella Galgan (Estrella). In her testimony, Rachel declared that: (1) Lolita is a GRO and
Massage Attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor; (2) Lolita has four children sired by different
men; and (3) Lolita has been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. Mercedita and Estrella, on the other
hand, declared in their testimonies that Lolita was their co-worker as Massage Attendant and GRO in
Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke Bar from February to October 2002. 11
Aringoy assailed the credibility of Lolitas testimony because of inconsistencies with regard to: (1) Lolitas
grandfathers status and name; (2) the persons (Ronnie and Rachel) who approached Lolita to talk about
the job opportunity in Malaysia; (3) certain statements in Lolitas testimony that were not alleged in her
Sworn Statement; (4) payment of placement fee of P 28,000; and (5) names of the other female recruits
who were with Lolita in the boat going to Sandakan and Kota Kinabalu. 12 Aringoy likewise claims that he
was never included in the initial complaint filed by Lolita, and Lolitas statements about her meetings with
him, Lalli and Relampagos on 3, 4, 5 and 6 June 2005 were not corroborated by any witness. 13
On the other hand, in her Appeal Brief,14 Lalli claims that she simply met Lolita on 6 June 2005 on board
the ship M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan, Malaysia. 15 Lalli denies having met Lolita prior to their
meeting on board M/V Mary Joy.16 Lalli claims she was going to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-inlaw who was a Malaysian national.17 Lalli further claims that she only spoke to Lolita aboard the ship for
idle conversation to pass away the time.18 In this conversation, she learned that Lolita was with a party of
girls accompanied by Relampagos, and the latter was bringing them to Malaysia to work as sales
ladies.19 Lalli admits that Lolita, Relampagos and the other girls rode in Lallis van in Sandakan, driven by
a friend of Lallis son-in-law.20 They all rode together because Relampagos talked to the van driver,
requesting if he and his party of girls could board the van and pay their fare when they reach the city
proper of Kota Kinabalu.21 Lalli boarded the van with Lolita, Relampagos and their companions. 22 Upon
reaching her destination, Lalli got off the van, leaving Lolita, Relampagos and their other companions to
continue their journey towards the city proper of Kota Kinabalu. 23 After spending several days in Malaysia
with her daughter and son-in-law, Lalli went to Brunei to visit a cousin on 12 June 2005, and headed back
to Malaysia on 14 June 2005.24
Lalli assails the credibility of Lolita due to inconsistencies in her testimony with regard to: (1) Lolita not
being in Southcom Village on 5 June 2005 at 6:00 p.m., as she claimed, but in Buenavista Village; and (2)
Lolitas claim that Lalli and Relampagos on 12 June 2005 brought the girls to Labuan, when in fact, Lalli
was already in Brunei on 12 June 2005, as evidenced by the stamp in her passport. 25
Credibility of Testimonies
Both Aringoy and Lalli, in their respective Appeal Briefs, assail the testimony of Lolita due to its alleged
inconsistency on immaterial facts, such as the status of Lolitas grandfather, the name of the village she
was in, the date she was brought to Labuan, Malaysia, and the like. In a long line of cases, the Court has
ruled that inconsistencies pointed out by the accused in the testimony of prosecution witnesses relating to
minor details do not destroy the credibility of witnesses.26 On the contrary, they indicate that the witnesses
were telling the truth and not previously rehearsed. 27
The clear material inconsistency in this case, however, lies in the testimonies of accused Aringoy and
Lalli. Aringoy admitted that he referred Lolita to a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, his neighbor who frequents
Malaysia and with whom Lolita could ask pertinent information on job opportunities. 28 Lalli, on the other
hand, denies having met Lolita prior to their meeting on board M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, 29 and claims
that her meeting with Lolita was purely coincidental. 30 Lalli admits that, even if she met Relampagos,
Lolita and their companions only on that day on board M/V Mary Joy, she allowed these people to ride
with her in Malaysia using the van driven by the friend of Lallis son-in-law.31 Lastly, Lalli claims that she
often goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law.32 However, this does not explain why Lalli
purchased boat tickets, not only for herself, but for the other women passengers going to
Malaysia.33 From March 2004 to June 2005, Lalli traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times.34 Nora
Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying
Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified in open court that
"Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for
other women passengers."35 Clearly, it is not Lolitas testimony that is materially inconsistent, but the
testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy.
Aringoy presented his witnesses Rachel, Mercedita and Estrella to impeach the credibility of Lolita by
alleging that Lolita was a Massage Attendant and GRO in a massage parlor and videoke bar. His witness
Rachel further declared that Lolita, at the young age of 23 years, already had four children sired by four
different men, and had been previously travelling to Malaysia to work in bars. These bare allegations were
not supported by any other evidence. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lolita previously worked in
a Karaoke Bar and Massage Parlor and that she had four children from different men, such facts cannot
constitute exempting or mitigating circumstances to relieve the accused from their criminal liabilities. It
does not change the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work in Malaysia without the requisite POEA
license, thus constituting the crime of illegal recruitment. Worse, the accused deceived her by saying that
her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer, when in fact, Lolita would be working as a
prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of trafficking.
The facts found by the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, are, as a general rule,
conclusive upon this Court, in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of discretion. 36 The Court,
however, may determine the factual milieu of cases or controversies under specific circumstances, such
as:
(1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(2)
when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or

conjectures;
(4)
when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of

facts;
(5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee;
(7)
when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court;
(8)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based;
(9)
when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 37
In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are applicable. The
Court gives weight and respect to the trial courts findings in criminal prosecution because the latter is in a
better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses in person and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 38 For this reason, the Court adopts the findings of
fact of the trial court, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, there being no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the lower courts.
Criminal Case No. 21930 (Illegal Recruitment)
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042) defines illegal recruitment, as follows:
[I]llegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring,
or procuring workers and includes referring, contact services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad,whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known
as the Labor Code of the Philippines.
xxx
Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage.
xxx
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines, defines "authority" as follows:
"Authority" means a document issued by the Department of Labor authorizing a person or association to
engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity.
Section 7 of RA 8042 provides for the penalty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate (which
constitutes economic sabotage), as follows:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit or not, is engaged in
illegal recruitment.39 The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an agency under
DOLE created by Executive Order No. 797 to take over the duties of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, issues the authority to recruit under the Labor Code. The commission of illegal
recruitment by three or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another is deemed committed
by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage, 40 for which the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of not less than P 500,000 but not more than P1,000,000 shall be imposed.41
The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No.
10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than P 2,000,000 but not more than P 5,000,000.
However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the penalties in the old law, RA 8042.
In People v. Gallo,42 the Court enumerated the elements of syndicated illegal recruitment, to wit:
1. the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement"
defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the
Labor Code;
2. he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and
3. the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another.43
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines defines recruitment and placement as "any act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not, provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Clearly, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement, even the mere act of referring someone
for placement abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of referral, in connivance with someone
without the requisite authority or POEA license, constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest terms, illegal
recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that
they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. 44
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to
have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without
a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are present in this case, in
particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of
recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3)
illegal recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring and
confederating with one another.
Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to Malaysia. Such act of
referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone without a POEA license, is already
considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment and placement in the Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and placement of Lolita to
Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by coincidence on board the ship M/V Mary Joy.
Lallis denial does not deserve credence because it completely conflicts with the testimony of Aringoy who
claims he referred Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job opportunities in Malaysia.
The conflicting testimonies of Lalli and Aringoy on material facts give doubt to the truth and veracity of
their stories, and strengthens the credibility of the testimony of Lolita, despite allegations of irrelevant
inconsistencies.
No improper motive could be imputed to Lolita to show that she would falsely testify against the accused.
The absence of evidence as to an improper motive entitles Lolitas testimony to full faith and credit. 45
Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even knowing Relampagos,
who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the illegal recruitment, and claims that she only
met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V Mary Joy on 6 June 2005, and learned that
Relampagos was bringing Lolita and their other girl companions to Malaysia to work as sales ladies.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
In People v. Lago,46 the Court discussed conspiracy in this wise:
The elements of conspiracy are the following: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the
agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.
Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the
parties conduct indicating a common understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of
the crime. Neither is it necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The
conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be
inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest. 47
In this case, Lolita would not have been able to go to Malaysia if not for the concerted efforts of Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos. First, it was Aringoy who knew Lolita, since Aringoy was a neighbor of Lolitas
grandfather. It was Aringoy who referred Lolita to Lalli, a fact clearly admitted by Aringoy. Second, Lolita
would not have been able to go to Malaysia if Lalli had not purchased Lolitas boat ticket to Malaysia. This
fact can be deduced from the testimony of Nora Mae Adling (Nora), ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping
Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2 plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of
M/V Kristel Jane 3. Nora testified in open court that "Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her
travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but also for other women passengers." Lallis claim that she only
goes to Malaysia to visit her daughter and son-in-law does not explain the fact why she bought the boat
tickets of the other women passengers going to Malaysia. In fact, it appears strange that Lalli visited
Malaysia nine (9) times in a span of one year and three months (March 2004 to June 2005) just to visit
her daughter and son-in-law. In Malaysia, it was Relampagos who introduced Lolita and her companions
to a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as their first employer. When Lolita and her companions went back to
the hotel to tell Relampagos and Lalli that they did not want to work as prostitutes, Relampagos brought
Lolita and the girls on board a van to Sangawan China Labuan, where they stayed in a room for one
night. The next day, they were picked up by a van and brought to Pipen Club, where Lolita and her
companions worked as prostitutes. To date, accused Relampagos is at large and has not been brought
under the jurisdiction of the courts for his crimes.
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to
avoid arrest or detention or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. 48 The unexplained flight
of an accused person may as a general rule be taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to
establish his guilt.49 Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an
indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and
deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos
could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated each of the accused played a
pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a joint common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused
Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P 500,000 imposed on each of the accused.
Criminal Case No. 21908 (Trafficking in Persons)
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 (RA 9208), otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
of 2003, defines Trafficking in Persons, as follows:
Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
persons with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by
means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of RA 9208 enumerates the prohibited acts of Trafficking in Persons, one of which is:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
The crime of Trafficking in Persons is qualified when committed by a syndicate, as provided in Section
6(c) of RA 9208:
(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a
syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one
another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually
or as a group.
Section 10(c) of RA 9208 provides for the penalty of qualified trafficking:
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million
pesos (P5,000,000.00).
The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act is a new law passed last 26 May 2003, designed to criminalize the act
of trafficking in persons for prostitution, sexual exploitation, foced labor and slavery, among others.
In this case, Aringoy claims that he cannot be convicted of the crime of Trafficking in Persons because he
was not part of the group that transported Lolita from the Philippines to Malaysia on board the ship M/V
Mary Joy. In addition, he presented his niece, Rachel, as witness to testify that Lolita had been travelling
to Malaysia to work in bars. On the other hand, Lalli denies any involvement in the recruitment and
trafficking of Lolita, claiming she only met Lolita for the first time on board M/V Mary Joy going to
Malaysia.
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars
cannot be given credence. Lolita did not even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her
sisters passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is questionable how she could
have been travelling to Malaysia previously without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is
true that Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of Trafficking in Persons can
exist even with the victims consent or knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
Trafficking in Persons under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims,
but also includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking. In this case, since it has been sufficiently
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as discussed in Criminal Case No. 21930, that all the three accused
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one another to illegally recruit Lolita to
become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of
recruitment for prostitution also constitutes trafficking.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a prosecution
under one will not bar a prosecution under the other.50 The constitutional right against double jeopardy
only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same offense, or for an act punished by a law and an
ordinance.51 The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to an act or series of acts constituting
different offenses.
DAMAGES
Lolita claimed actual damages of P 28,000, which she allegedly paid to the accused as placement fee for
the work of restaurant entertainer in Malaysia. The trial court did not award this amount to Lolita. We
agree and affirm the trial courts non-award due to Lolitas inconsistent statements on the payment of
placement fee. In her sworn statement, Lolita alleged that she paid P 28,000 as placement fee to
Lalli.52 On cross-examination, however, she admitted that she never paid P 28,000 to the accused.53
We, however, modify and increase the payment of damages in the crime of Trafficking in Persons
from P 50,000 to P 500,000 as moral damages and P 50,000 to P 100,000 as exemplary damages.
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendants wrongful act for omission.1avvphi1
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral damages, by
way of example or correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
The payment of P 500,000 as moral damages and P 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of
Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may
also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9
of this article, in the order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute
without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to five times a day by different strangers is
horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation
when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was
aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 February 2010, affirming the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City dated 29 November 2005, finding accused Lalli
and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment and Trafficking in
Persons committed by a syndicate, with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case No. 21908, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P 2,000,000;
2. In Criminal Case No. 21930, each of the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
LIFEIMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P 500,000;
3. Each of the accused is ordered to pay the offended party Lolita Plando y Sagadsad, jointly and
severally, the sum of P 500,000 as moral damages, and P 100,000 as exemplary damages for
the crime of Trafficking in Persons; and to pay the costs.
The Court cannot pronounce the liability of accused-at-large Nestor Relampagos as jurisdiction over his
person has not been acquired.
SO ORDERED.
c. Disciplinary Action cases against Land-Based OFWs and their Employers of Seafarers-Part VII,
Rules I-III, POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based OFWs
[G.R. No. 131656. October 12, 1998]
ASIAN
CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.

(ACCESS), petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IBNO
MEDIALES, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner ASIAN CENTER FOR CAREER & EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM
& SERVICES, INC.(ACCESS) seeks to modify the monetary awards against it in the Decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), dated October 14, 1997, a case for illegal
dismissal.
The records disclose that petitioner hired respondent IBNO MEDIALES to work as a mason in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, with a monthly salary of 1,200 Saudi Riyals (SR). The term of his contract was
two (2) years, from February 28, 1995 until February 28, 1997.
On May 26, 1996, respondent applied with petitioner for vacation leave with pay which he earned
after working for more then a year. His application for leave was granted. While en route to the
Philippines, his co-workers informed him that he has been dismissed from service. The information turned
out to be true.
On June 17, 1996, respondent filed a complaint with the labor arbiter for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, refund of transportation fare, illegal deductions, non-payment of 13 th month pay
and salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract.
On March 17, 1997, the labor arbiter found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.[1] The dispositive
portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of
complainants dismissal and ordering the respondent ACCESS and/or ABDULLAH LELINA to
pay the complainant the amount of SR 13,200 representing complainants payment for the
unexpired portion of his contract and refund of the illegality deducted amount
less P5,000.00, the legally allowed placement fee.
Respondent are further ordered to pay attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
judgment award or the amount of SR 1,320, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
All other issues are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERD. (emphasis supplied)
It is noteworthy, however, that in the body of his decision, the labor arbiter applied Section 10 R.A.
8042,[2] the law relative to the protection of Filipino overseas-workers, and computed private respondents
salary for the unexpired portion of his contract as follows: SR1,200 x 3 months = SR3,600.
On appeal by petitioner, the NLRC affirmed the factual findings of the labor arbiter but modified the
appealed decision by deleting the order of refund of excessive placement fee for lack of jurisdiction. [3]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with respect to the labor arbiters award of SR13,200 in the
dispositive portion of the decision, representing respondents salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract. invoking Section 10 R.A. 8042. Petitioner urged that its liability for respondents salary is for only
three (3) months. Petitioner claimed that it should pay only SR 3.600 (SR 1,200 x 3 months) for the
unexpired portion of respondents employment and SR360 (10% of SR3,600) for attorneys fees.[4]
The NLRC denied petitioners motion. It ruled that R.A. 8042 does not apply as respondents
employment which started in February 1995 occurred prior to its effectivity on July 15, 1995.[5]
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
In the case at bar, petitioners illegal dismissal from service is no longer disputed. Petitioner merely
impugns the monetary awards granted by the NLRC to private respondent. It submits that although the
unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8) months, [6] it is liable to pay
respondent only three (3) months of his basic salary, pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. 8042, or SR1,200
(monthly salary) multiplied by 3 months, for a total of SR3,600. Petitioner claims that the NLRC erred in
ruling that as private respondents employment started only on February 28, 1995, R.A. 8042, which took
effect on July 15, 1995, would not apply to his case. Petitioner argues that it is not the date of
employment but the date of dismissal which should be considered in determining the applicability of R.A.
8042. Petitioner prays that the award in the NLRC Decision dated October 14, 1997, be changed to
SR3,600 instead of 13,200 and that the award of attorneys fees be deleted.
We affirm with modifications.
As a rule, jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. [7] In
the case at bar, private respondents cause of action did not accrue on the date of his date of his
employment or on February 28, 1995. His cause of action arose only from the-time he was illegally
dismissed by petitioner from service in June 1996, after his vacation leave expired. It is thus clear that
R.A. 8042 which took effect a year earlier in July 1995 applies to the case at bar.
Under Section 10 of R.A. 8042, a worker dismissed from overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
In the case at bar, the unexpired portion of private respondents employment contract is eight (8)
months. Private respondent should therefore be paid his basic salary corresponding to three (3)
months or a total of SR3,600.[8]
We note that this same computation was made by the labor arbiter in the body of his decision.
[9]
Despite said computation in the body of the decision, however, the labor arbiter awarded higher sum
(SR13,200) in the dispositive portion.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and
the body of the decision, the fallo controls.This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the final order while
the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing. However,where the inevitable
conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the
dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.[10]
We find that the labor arbiters award of a higher amount in the dispositive portion was clearly an
error for there is nothing in the text of the decision which support the award of said higher amount. We
reiterate that the correct award to private respondent for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
is SR3,600.
We come now to the award of attorneys fees in favor of private respondent. Article 2208 of the Civil
Code allows attorneys fees to be awarded when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons
or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act or omission of the party for
whom it is sought. Moreover, attorneys fees are recoverable when there is sufficient showing of bad faith.
[11]
The Labor Code,[12] on the other hand, fixes the attorneys fees that may be recovered in an amount
which should not exceed 10% of the total amount of wages awarded.
In the case at bar, petitioners bad faith in dismissing private respondent is
manifest. Respondent was made to believe that he would be temporarily leaving Jeddah, Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, for a 30-day vacation leave with pay. However, while on board the plane back to the
Philippines, his co-employees told him that he has been dismissed from his job as he was given only a
one-way plane ticket by petitioner. True enough, private respondent was not allowed to return to his
jobsite in Jeddah after his vacation leave. Thus, private respondent was compelled to file an action
for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter and hence entitled to an award of attorneys fees.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission, dated October 14, 1997, is AFFIRMED with modifications: petitioner is ordered to pay
private respondent IBNO MEDIALES the peso equivalent of the amounts of SR3,600 for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract, and SR360 for attorneys fees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77828 February 8, 1989

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER CHERYL AMPIL and MA. LOURDES A.
ZARAGOZA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Decision dated 19 March 1987 of the
public respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in POEA Case No. L-86-01026.
The pertinent facts follow:
Manuel Zaragoza had been an employee of petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. ("Eastern") for several
years, having served as engineer on board several of Eastern's vessels since 1973. At the time of his
death on 18 September 1983, Manuel Zaragoza was in Kakogawa, Japan serving as Chief Engineer of
the M/V Eastern Meteor, a vessel then owned by Freesia Shipping Company S.A. and chartered by
Eastern. A Death Certificate 1issued by Dr. Masayuki Inoue of the Kakogawa Hospital stated that
Zaragoza's death had been caused by "myocardial infarction."
On 17 December 1985, Manuel Zaragoza's widow, private respondent Ma. Lourdes A. Zaragoza, filed
with the public respondent POEA a formal Complaint 2 (docketed as POEA Case No. L-86-01-026)
against Eastern, after the latter allegedly had refused to act favorably on the widow's claim for gratuity
arising from the death of her husband. Mrs. Zaragoza alleged that the M/V Eastern Meteor having been
registered with the Ministerio de Hacienda y Tesoro of the Republic of Panama at the time of her
husband's death, she was entitled to receive from Eastern death benefits in the amount of P100,000.00
as provided under Memorandum Circular No. 71 issued on 18 November 1981 by the former National
Seamen Board. Moral damages or P50,000.00 and attorney's fees were likewise sought by the widow.
In its Answer, 3 Eastern alleged, among other things, that no cause of ac ' petition existed against it as the
company had already paid Mrs. Zaragoza a cash benefit of P12,000.00 for the death of her husband and
an amount of P5,000.00 for funeral expenses. Eastern further denied having incurred any additional
liability under NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71, alleging that "[the M/V Eastern Meteor] had been then
also considered a vessel of the Philippine registry." Eastern assailed the jurisdiction of the POEA over the
complaint, asserting that the company "is not engaged in overseas employment even as [it] admits that
[its] vessels are ocean-going vessels."
On 19 March 1987, public respondent POEA rendered a Decision 4 requiring petitioner to pay to private
respondent Mrs. Zaragoza P88,000.00 as the unpaid balance of her deceased husband's death benefits,
and dismissing the claim for moral damages for want of jurisdiction.
From this judgment, Eastern came directly to this Court. We issued a Temporary Restraining Order on 8
April 1987. 5
A preliminary point was raised by the Solicitor General in his Comment 6 on the Petition, that Eastern had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies in this case i.e., that petitioner Company did not interpose an
appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission before coming to this Court on certiorari. Inasmuch,
however, as the petition at bar raises questions essentially legal in nature, we do not consider the same
as having been prematurely filed with this Court. 7
We address first the issue of jurisdiction. Petitioner Company does not deny that Manuel Zaragoza was
its employee at the time of his death on 18 September 1983. Petitioner would contend, however, that the
company had neither been nor acted as an "overseas employer" of Manuel Zaragoza, and that the latter
had never been its "overseas employee." Hence, petitioner concludes, private respondent's claim for
death benefits should have been filed with the Social Security System, not with the POEA.
The argument does not persuade. Applicable here and petitioner admits this in its Petition is Executive
Order No. 797 (promulgated 1 May 1982), which abolished the former National Seamen Board and
created in its place the present Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Section 4 (a) of
Executive Order No. 797 expressly provides that the POEA "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including seamen. " This
provision is clarified substantially in the Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the
POEA, Section 1 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of which provides that "claims for death, disability and other
benefits arising out of [overseas] employment" fall within the POEA's original and exclusive jurisdiction.
The following definitions contained in Section 1, Rule II, Book I of said POEA Rules and Regulations are
also useful:
g. Contract Worker-means any person working or who has worked overseas under a
valid employment contract and shall include seamen.
xxx xxx xxx
x. Overseas Employment-means employment of a worker outside the Philippines,
including employment on board vessels plying international waters, covered by a valid
employment contract.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
We note that the statute and the relevant regulations refer to employment of Filipino workers
overseas, i.e., outside the Philippines. The statute and regulations do not limit their coverage to nonFilipino employers. Filipinos working overseas share the same risks and burdens whether their employers
be Filipino or foreign.
Neither party disputes that Manuel Zaragoza, at the time of his death, was covered by an existing contract
of employment with Eastern and that the deceased was at that time employed as a seaman (Chief
Engineer) on board the M/V Eastern Meteor, which vessel-then chartered by Eastern-was engaged in
plying ocean routes, outside Philippine waters and which, at the time of Zaragoza's demise, was berthed
in a foreign port (Japan). In addition, the record shows that Eastern submitted its shipping articles to
public respondent POEA for processing, formalization and approval, 8 apparently in recognition of POEA!s
regulatory authority over overseas employment under Executive Order No. 797. While not in itself
conclusive proof of employment by Eastern of people overseas, nevertheless, this latter circumstance
strongly suggests that Eastern must have regarded itself as engaged in such employment, otherwise, it
would not have found it necessary or useful to submit its shipping articles to the POEA. We hold that the
complaint of private respondent widow of Manuel Zaragoza falls well within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of public respondent POEA. 9
We come to the issue regarding the amount of death benefits for which Eastern may be held liable to
private respondent. In assessing such amount, the POEA relied upon Memorandum Circular No. 71
(effective 1 December 1981) issued by the now defunct National Seamen Board (NSB):
SECTION D. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS DURING THE, TERM OF THE
CONTRACT.
1. In case of total and permanent disability or death of the seaman during the term of his
contract, the company II pay the ,seaman or his beneficial the amount of:
P100,000.00-for masters and Chief Engineers
75,000.00 - for other officers
50,000.00 - for ratings
over and above the benefits which are provided for abd are the liabilities of the Philippine
government under the Philippine laws. Provided that when the employment of a seaman
is also covered by a collective bargaining agreement or death/disability insurance which
provides for higher benefits than those enumerated above, in which case, the seaman or
his heirs/beneficiaries may elect under what scheme he is they are claiming. Recovery
under one scheme is a bar to any farther recovery; except where there is a clear showing
in the collective bargaining agreement and/or death/disability insurance that benefits
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement and death/disability insurance are
separate and distinct from the abovementioned benefits. The exact amount of insurance
that each seaman is covered under this contract are as stipulated in Column J of
Appendix 2 of this contract. In addition to the above, the expenses for hospitalization of
the seaman shall be borne by the employer.
2. In lieu of paragraph 1 above, the liability of [an] employer of a Philippine registered
vessel (exceptforeign- owned vessels bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping
company) shall be governed by existing Philippine Laws over and above the benefits
granted [under] Philippine laws on social security and employees' compensation benefits
provided that the Philippine registered vessel and any vessel bareboat- chartered to a
Philippine Shipping Company shall be manned by full Filipino crews. (Emphasis and
brackets supplied).
It is the argument of Eastern here that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 collides with the public law
principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Eastern also argues that assuming the validity of the
Circular, its provisions (specifically paragraph 1) do not cover Eastern.
These arguments again do not persuade. Concerning the alleged unconstitutionality of NSB
Memorandum Circular No. 71, Article 20 of the Labor Code before its repeal by Executive Order No. 797,
provided in salient part:
Art. 20. National Seamen Board.-A National Seamen Board is hereby created which shall
develop and maintain a comprehensive program for Filipino seamen employed overseas.
It shall have the power and duty:
xxx xxx xxx
2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping
companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best
possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith;
xxx xxx xxx.
(Emphasis supplied)
The question of validity of the delegation of quasi-legislative power in favor of NSB's successor,
respondent POEA, embodied in the article quoted above, was addressed and resolved in the affirmative
by the Court inEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, et al. 10 On
the authority of this case, we hold that NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71 was issued in a valid exercise
by the NSB of its "power and duty ... [to] secure the best possible terms of employment for contract
seamen workers and [to] secure compliance therewith."
We consider next petitioner's argument that it is not covered by the provisions of NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 71. Eastern submitted in evidence Certificate of Philippine Register Nos. ICGD-78-0428
dated 28 December 197811 and ICGD-84-0288 dated 7 August 1984 12 to show that this M/V Eastern
Meteor was registered with the Philippine Coast Guard in 1978 and again in 1984. Eastern further
maintained that M/V Eastern Meteor had always been fully manned by a Philippine crew. The record also
shows, however, that this vessel was at the same time also registered in the Republic of Panama as
evidenced by the Patente Permanente de Navegacion Servicio Internacional Nos. 7708-77 (dated 31
March 1977) 13 and 770877-A (dated 27 February 1987). 14 Petitioner had in fact paid taxes to the
Panamanian government in 1978, 1979 1981, 1982 and 1983, 15 presumably because the M/V Eastern
Meteor was during those years operating under a valid Panamanian navigation license. It, therefore,
appears that at the time of the death of Manuel Zaragoza, the Eastern Meteor was both foreign-owned
and foreign-registered on one hand and upon the other band, simultaneously registered in the Philippines.
Interpreting Section D of Memorandum Circular No. 71, it appears clear that paragraph 1 covers
Philippine seamen working in foreign-registered ships while paragraph 2 applies to Philippine seamen
working on Philippine-registered vessels. The parenthetical phrase "except foreign-owned vessels
bareboat-chartered to a Philippine shipping company" in paragraph 2 precisely covers the situation of the
Eastern Meteor, that is, a foreign-owned vessel registered in a foreign country (Panama), with a second
registration in the Philippines; such a vessel is excepted from coverage by paragraph 2, and hence
covered by paragraph 1 instead. If the MN Eastern Meteor had been registered only in Panama, there
would have been no question that it was covered by paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. It
is well- known that foreign-owned and foreign-registered vessels have frequently also secured Philippine
registration where the interest or convenience of the owners dictated such second or dual registration.
The effect of the parenthetical phrase in paragraph 2 is, as already indicated, to bring such dualregistered vessel within the scope not of paragraph 2, but of paragraph 1. The fact that POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 6 (Series of 1986) in upgrading death benefits (P250,000.00 for master and
chief engineers) specified that such upgraded benefits "shall be applicable to all Filipino seamen on
board any ocean-going vessel provided the cause of action occurs on March 1, 1986 and thereafter"
suggests to us the correctness of our above reading of NSB Memorandum Circular No. 71. The
underlying regulatory policy, as we see it, is that Filipino seamen working on ocean-going vessels should
receive the same wages and benefits, without regard to the nationality or nationalities of the vessels on
which they serve. We hold that the POEA correctly held private respondent Mrs. Zaragoza entitled to the
benefits given to Philippine seamen under the provisions of Section D. paragraph 1 of NSB Memorandum
Circular No. 71, i.e. (1) P100,000.00 death benefit, and in addition, (2) death and related benefits
provided under applicable ordinary laws of the Philippines administered by the Social Security System.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Decision of the POEA in POEA Case No.
L-86-01-026 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order of 8 April 1987 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154213
August 23, 2012
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME LTD. AND AGEMAR MANNING AGENCY, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
EST ANISLAO SURIO, FREDDIE PALGUIRAN, GRACIANO MORALES, HENRY CASTILLO,
ARISTOTLE ARREOLA, ALEXANDER YGOT, ANRIQUE BA TTUNG, GREGORIO ALDOVINO,
NARCISO FRIAS, VICTOR FLORES, SAMUEL MARCIAL, CARLITO PALGUIRAN, DUQUE
VINLUAN, .JESUS MENDEGORIN, NEIL FLORES, ROMEO MANGALIAG, JOE GARFIN and
SALESTINO SUSA, Respondents.
*
PEREZ
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
On appeal is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on December 21, 2001 affirming the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring itself to be without appellate
jurisdiction to review the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
involving petitioners complaint for disciplinary action against respondents. 1
Respondents were former crewmembers of MT Seadance, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern
Mediterranean Maritime Ltd. and manned and operated by petitioner Agemar Manning Agency, Inc. While
respondents were still on board the vessel, they experienced delays in the payment of their wages and in
the remittance of allotments, and were not paid for extra work and extra overtime work. They complained
about the vessels inadequate equipment, and about the failure of the petitioners to heed their repeated
requests for the improvement of their working conditions. On December 19, 1993, when MT Seadance
docked at the port of Brofjorden, Sweden to discharge oil, representatives of the International Transport
Federation (ITF) boarded the vessel and found the wages of the respondents to be below the prevailing
rates. The ensuing negotiations between the ITF and the vessel owner on the increase in respondents
wages resulted in the payment by the vessel owner of wage differentials and the immediate repatriation of
respondents to the Philippines.
Subsequently, on December 23, 1993, the petitioners filed against the newly-repatriated respondents a
complaint for disciplinary action based on breach of discipline and for the reimbursement of the wage
increases in the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.
During the pendency of the administrative complaint in the POEA, Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) took effect on July 15, 1995. Section 10 of Republic Act No.
8042 vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over all money claims arising out of employer-employee
relationships involving overseas Filipino workers in the Labor Arbiters, to wit:
Section 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
The jurisdiction over such claims was previously exercised by the POEA under the POEA Rules and
Regulations of 1991 (1991 POEA Rules).
On May 23, 1996, the POEA dismissed the complaint for disciplinary action. Petitioners received the order
of dismissal on July 24, 1996.2
Relying on Section 1, Rule V, Book VII of the 1991 POEA Rules, petitioners filed a partial appeal on
August 2, 1996 in the NLRC, still maintaining that respondents should be administratively sanctioned for
their conduct while they were on board MT Seadance.
On March 21, 1997, the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction,3 thus:
We dismiss the partial appeal.
The Commission has no jurisdiction to review cases decided by the POEA Administrator involving
disciplinary actions. Under the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the Labor Arbiter
shall have jurisdiction over money claims involving employer-employee relationship (sec. 10, R.A. 8042).
Said law does not provide that appeals from decisions arising from complaint for disciplinary action rest in
the Commission.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, instant appeal from the Order of May 23, 1996 is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion. They received the
denial on July 8, 1997.4
Petitioners then commenced in this Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus. Citing St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission, 5 however, the Court referred the petition
to the CA on November 25, 1998.
Petitioners contended in their petition that:
THE NLRC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND/OR GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING
PETITIONERS APPEAL AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHEN IT REFUSED TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONERS APPEAL DESPITE BEING EMPOWERED TO DO SO UNDER THE
LAW.6
On December 21, 2001, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, holding that the
inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers from the POEA blacklist/watchlist were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the NLRC, and that the NLRC had no appellate
jurisdiction to review the matter, viz:
Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,
provides that:
"Money Claims Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,
within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.
xxxx
Likewise, the Rules and Regulations implementing RA 8042 reiterate the jurisdiction of POEA, thus:
"Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide:
a) All cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of rules and
regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities; and
b) Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers."
Further, Sections 6 and 7 Rule VII, Book VII of the POEA Rules & Regulations (1991) provide:
"Sec. 6. Disqualification of Contract Workers. Contract workers, including seamen, against whom have
been imposed or with pending obligations imposed upon them through an order, decision or resolution
shall be included in the POEA Blacklist Workers shall be disqualified from overseas employment unless
properly cleared by the Administration or until their suspension is served or lifted.
Sec. 7. Delisting of the Contract Workers Name from the POEA Watchlist. The name of an overseas
worker may be excluded, deleted and removed from the POEA Watchlist only after disposition of the case
by the Administration."
Thus, it can be concluded from the afore-quoted law and rules that, public respondent has no jurisdiction
to review disciplinary cases decided by the POEA involving contract workers. Clearly, the matter of
inclusion and deletion of overseas contract workers in the POEA Blacklist/Watchlist is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the POEA to the exclusion of the public respondent. Nor has the latter appellate jurisdiction
to review the findings of the POEA involving such cases.
xxx
In fine, we find and so hold, that, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public respondent
when it issued the assailed Decision and Order, dated March 21, 1997 and June 13, 1997, respectively,
dismissing petitioners appeal from the decision of the POEA.
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition not impressed with merit, the same is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.7
Issue
Petitioners still appeal, submitting to the Court the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW ON APPEAL CASES DECIDED BY
THE POEA ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
They contend that both the CA and the NLRC had no basis to rule that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the appeal only because Republic Act No. 8042 had not provided for its retroactive application.
Respondents counter that the appeal should have been filed with the Secretary of Labor who had
exclusive jurisdiction to review cases involving administrative matters decided by the POEA.
Ruling
The petition for review lacks merit.
Petitioners adamant insistence that the NLRC should have appellate authority over the POEAs decision
in the disciplinary action because their complaint against respondents was filed in 1993 was unwarranted.
Although Republic Act No. 8042, through its Section 10, transferred the original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide money claims involving overseas Filipino workers from the POEA to the Labor
Arbiters, the law did not remove from the POEA the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all disciplinary action cases and other special cases administrative in character involving such workers.
The obvious intent of Republic Act No. 8042 was to have the POEA focus its efforts in resolving all
administrative matters affecting and involving such workers. This intent was even expressly recognized in
the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 promulgated on February 29, 1996, viz:
Section 28. Jurisdiction of the POEA. The POEA shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide:
(a) all cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations or rules and
regulations relating to licensing and registration of recruitment and employment agencies or entities; and
(b) disciplinary action cases and other special cases, which are administrative in character, involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino migrant workers.
Section 29. Venue The cases mentioned in Section 28(a) of this Rule, may be filed with the POEA
Adjudication Office or the DOLE/POEA regional office of the place where the complainant applied or was
recruited, at the option of the complainant. The office with which the complaint was first filed shall take
cognizance of the case.
Disciplinary action cases and other special cases, as mentioned in the preceding Section, shall be filed
with the POEA Adjudication Office.
It is clear to us, therefore, that the NLRC had no appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the POEA
in disciplinary cases involving overseas contract workers.
Petitioners position that Republic Act No. 8042 should not be applied retroactively to the review of the
POEAs decision dismissing their complaint against respondents has no support in jurisprudence.
Although, as a rule, all laws are prospective in application unless the contrary is expressly provided, 8 or
unless the law is procedural or curative in nature,9 there is no serious question about the retroactive
applicability of Republic Act No. 8042 to the appeal of the POEAs decision on petitioners disciplinary
action against respondents. In a way, Republic Act No. 8042 was a procedural law due to its providing or
omitting guidelines on appeal. A law is procedural, according to De Los Santos v. Vda. De
Mangubat,10 when it
Refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may be
able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or
the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues they may be given retroactive effect on
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Republic Act No. 8042 applies to petitioners complaint by virtue of the case being then still pending or
undetermined at the time of the laws passage, there being no vested rights in rules of procedure. 11 They
could not validly insist that the reckoning period to ascertain which law or rule should apply was the time
when the disciplinary complaint was originally filed in the POEA in 1993. Moreover, Republic Act No. 8042
and its implementing rules and regulations were already in effect when petitioners took their appeal. A
statute that eliminates the right to appeal and considers the judgment rendered final and unappealable
only destroys the right to appeal, but not the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected prior to
its passage, for, at that stage, the right to appeal has already vested and cannot be
impaired.12 Conversely and by analogy, an appeal that is perfected when a new statute affecting appellate
jurisdiction comes into effect should comply with the provisions of the new law, unless otherwise provided
by the new law. Relevantly, petitioners need to be reminded that the right to appeal from a decision is a
privilege established by positive laws, which, upon authorizing the taking of the appeal, point out the
cases in which it is proper to present the appeal, the procedure to be observed, and the courts by which
the appeal is to be proceeded with and resolved.13 This is why we consistently hold that the right to
appeal is statutory in character, and is available only if granted by law or statute. 14
When Republic Act No. 8042 withheld the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC in respect of cases decided
by the POEA, the appellate jurisdiction was vested in the Secretary of Labor in accordance with his power
of supervision and control under Section 38(1), Chapter 7, Title II, Book III of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, to wit:
Section 38. Definition of Administrative Relationship. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or
in other laws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be
categorized and defined as follows:
Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain
the commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units; determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly
provided in the specific law governing the relationship of particular agencies, the word "control" shall
encompass supervision and control as defined in this paragraph. xxx.
Thus, Section 1, Part VII, Rule V of the 2003 POEA Rules and Regulations specifically provides, as
follows:
Section 1. Jurisdiction. The Secretary shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to act on appeals
or petition for review of disciplinary action cases decided by the Administration.
In conclusion, we hold that petitioners should have appealed the adverse decision of the POEA to the
Secretary of Labor instead of to the NLRC. Consequently, the CA, being correct on its conclusions,
committed no error in upholding the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on December 21, 2001 by the Court of Appeals;
andORDER the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
7. National Seamen Board now POEA 20, Bk VII, Rule II, POEA Rules
G.R. No. L-50734-37 February 20, 1981
WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. MINISTER OF LABOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the National Seamen Board
Proper, JAIME CAUNCA, ANTONIO CABRERA, EFREN GARCIA, JOSE OJEDA and RODOLFO
PAGWAGAN,respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with prayer that the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and
April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board (NSB) be declared null and void. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner sometime in May 1975 to work as seamen for a period of ten months on board the M/V
Woermann Sanaga, a Dutch vessel owned and operated by petitioner's European principals. While their
employment contracts were still in force, private respondents were dismissed by their employer, petitioner
herein, and were discharged from the ship on charges that they instigated the International Transport
Federation (ITF) to demand the application of worldwide ITF seamen's rates to their crew.
Private respondents were repatriated to the Philippines on October 27, 1975 and upon their arrival in
Manila, they instituted a complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal and recovery of wages and other
benefits corresponding to the five months' unexpired period of their shipboard employment contract.
In support of their complaint, private respondents submitted a Joint Affidavit 1 stating the circumstances
surrounding their employment and subsequent repatriation to the Philippines, material averments of which
are herein below reproduced:
J O I N TAF F I DAV I T
xxx xxx xxx
5. That aside from our basic monthly salary we are entitled to two (2) months vacation
leave, daily subsistence allowance of US$8.14 each, daily food allowance of US$2.50. as
well as overtime pay which we failed to receive because our Shipboard Employment
Contract was illegally terminated;
6. That while we were in Rotterdam, on or about July 9, 1975, representative of the ITF
boarded our vessel and talked with the Ship's Captain;
7. That the following day, the representatives of the ITF returned and was followed by Mr.
M.S.K. Ogle who is the Company's Administrative Manager, again went to see the
Captain;
8. That at around 7:00 in the evening all the crew members were called in the Mess Hall
where the ITF representatives informed us that they have just entered into a "Special
Agreement" with the Wallem Shipping Management, Ltd., represented by Mr. M.S.K.
Ogle, Administrative Manager, wherein new salary rates was agreed upon and that we
were going to be paid our salary differentials in view of the new rates;
9. That in the same meeting, Mr. M.S.K. Ogle also spoke where he told that a Special
Agreement has been signed and that we will be receiving new pay rate and enjoined us
to work hard and be good boys;
10. That the same evening we received our salary differentials based on the new rates
negotiated for us by the ITF.
11. That while we were in the Port Dubai, Saudi Arabia, we were not receiving our pay,
since the Ship's Captain refused to implement the world-wide rates and insisted on
paying us the Far East Rate;
12. That the Port Dubai is one that is within the Worldwide rates sphere.
13. That on October 22, 1975, Mr. Greg Nacional Operation Manager of respondent
corporation, arrived in Dubai Saudi Arabia and boarded our ship;
14. That on October 23, 1975, Mr. Nacional called all the crew members, including us to a
meeting at the Mess Hall and there he explained that the Company cannot accept the
worldwide rate. The Special Agreement signed by Mr. Ogle in behalf of the Company is
nothing but a scrap of paper. Mr. Jaime Caunca then asked Mr. Nacional, in view of what
he was saying, whether the Company will honor the Special Agreement and Mr. Nacional
answered "Yes". That we must accept the Far East Rates which was put to a vote. Only
two voted for accepting the Far East Rates;
15. That immediately thereafter Mr. Nacional left us;
16. That same evening, Mr. Nacional returned and threatened that he has received a
cable from the Home Office that if we do not accept the Far East Rate, our services will
be terminated and there will be a change in crew;
17. That when Mr. Nacional left, we talked amongst ourselves and decided to accept the
Far East Rates;
18. That in the meeting that evening because of the threat we informed Mr. Nacional we
were accepting the Far East Rate and he made us sign a document to that effect;
19. That we the complainants with the exception of Leopoldo Mamaril and Efren Garcia,
were not able to sign as we were at the time on work schedules, and Mr. Nacional did not
bother anymore if we signed or not;
20. That after the meeting Mr. Nacional cabled the Home Office, informing them that we
the complainants with the exception of Messrs. Mamaril and Garcia were not accepting
the Far East Rates;
21. That in the meeting of October 25, 1975, Mr. Nacional signed a document whereby he
promised to give no priority of first preference in "boarding a vessel and that we are not
blacklisted";
22. That in spite of our having accepted the Far East Rate, our services were terminated
and advised us that there was a change in crew;
23. That on October 27, 1975, which was our scheduled flight home, nobody attended us,
not even our clearance for our group travel and consequently we were not able to board
the plane, forcing us to sleep on the floor at the airport in the evening of October 27,
1975;
24. That the following day we went back to theHOTEL in Dubai which was a two hours
ride from the airport, where we were to await another flight for home via Air France;
25. That we were finally able to leave for home on November 2, 1975 arriving here on the
3rd of November;
26. That we paid for all excess baggages;
27. That Mr. Nacional left us stranded, since he went ahead on October 27, 1975;
28. That immediately upon arriving in Manila, we went to respondent Company and saw
Mr. Nacional, who informed us that we were not blacklisted, however, Mr. Mckenzie,
Administrative Manager did inform us that we were all blacklisted;
29. That we were asking from the respondent Company our leave pay, which they
refused to give, if we did not agree to a US$100.00 deduction;
30. That with the exception of Messrs. Jaime Caunca Amado Manansala and Antonio
Cabrera, we received our leave pay with the US$100.00 deduction;
31. That in view of the written promise of Mr. Nacional in Dubai last October 23, 1975 to
give us priority and preference in boarding a vessel and that we were not blacklisted we
have on several occasions approached him regarding his promise, which up to the
present he has refused to honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Answering the complaint, petitioner countered that when the vessel was in London, private respondents
together with the other crew insisted on worldwide ITF rate as per special agreement; that said
employees threatened the ship authorities that unless they agreed to the increased wages the vessel
would not be able to leave port or would have been picketed and/or boycotted and declared a hot ship by
the ITF; that the Master of the ship was left with no alternative but to agree; that upon the vessel's arrival
at the Asian port of Dubai on October 22, 1975, a representative of petitioner went on board the ship and
requested the crew together with private respondents to desist from insisting worldwide ITF rate and
instead accept the Far East rate; that said respondents refused to accept Far East ITF rates while the rest
of the Filipino crew members accepted the Far East rates; that private respondents were replaced at the
expense of petitioner and it was prayed that respondents be required to comply with their obligations
under the contract by requiring them to pay their repatriation expenses and all other incidental expenses
incurred by the master and crew of the vessel.
After the hearing on the merits, the hearing Officer of the Secretariat rendered a decision 2 on March 14,
1977 finding private respondents to have violated their contract of employment when they accepted salary
rates different from their contract verified and approved by the National Seamen Board. As to the issue
raised by private respondents that the original contract has been novated, it was held that:
xxx xxx xxx
For novation to be a valid defense, it is a legal requirement that all parties to the contract
should give their consent. In the instant case only the complainants and respondents
gave their consent. The National Seamen Board had no participation in the alleged
novation of the previously approved employment contract. It would have been different if
the consent of the National Seamen Board was first secured before the alleged novation
of the approved contract was undertaken, hence, the defense of novation is not in order.
xxx xxx xxx
The Hearing Officer likewise rules that petitioner violated the contract when its representative signed the
Special Agreement and he signed the same at his own risk and must bear the consequence of such act,
and since both parties are in paridelicto, complaint and counterclaim were dismissed for lack of merit but
petitioner was ordered to pay respondents Caunca and Cabrera their respective leave pay for the period
that they have served M/V Woermann Sanaga plus attorney's fees.
Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with the Board which modified the decision of the
Secretariat in an Order 3 of December 19, 1977 and ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract
when it ordered the dismissal of private respondents and their subsequent repatriation before the
expiration of their respective employment contracts. The Chairman of the Board stressed that "where the
contract is for a definite period, the captain and the crew members may not be discharged until after the
contract shall have been performed" citing the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Ogilvie, et al. (104
Phil. 748). He directed petitioner to pay private respondents the unexpired portion of their contracts and
their leave pay, less the amount they received as differentials by virtue of the special agreements entered
in Rotterdam, and ten percent of the total amounts recovered as attorney's fees.
Petitioner sought clarification and reconsideration of the said order and asked for a confrontation with
private respondents to determine the specific adjudications to be made. A series of conferences were
conducted by the Board. It was claimed by petitioner that it did not have in its possession the records
necessary to determine the exact amount of the judgment since the records were in the sole custody of
the captain of the ship and demanded that private respondents produce the needed records. On this
score, counsel for respondents manifested that to require the master of the ship to produce the records
would result to undue delay in the disposition of the case to the detriment of his clients, some of whom
are still unemployed.
Under the circumstances, the Board was left with no alternative but to issue an Order dated April 3,
1979 4 fixing the amount due private respondents at their three (3) months' salary equivalent without
qualifications or deduction. Hence,the instant petition before Us alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent official as Chairman of the Board, in issuing said order which allegedly nullified the
findings of the Secretariat and premised adjudication on imaginary conditions which were never taken up
with full evidence in the course of hearing on the merits.
The whole controversy is centered around the liability of petitioner when it ordered the dismissal of herein
private respondents before the expiration of their respective employment contracts.
In its Order of December 19, 1977 5 the Board, thru its Chairman, Minister Blas F. Ople, held that there is
no showing that the seamen conspired with the ITF in coercing the ship authorities to grant salary
increases, and the Special Agreement was signed only by petitioner and the ITF without any participation
from the respondents who, accordingly, may not be charged as they were, by the Secretariat, with
violation of their employment contract. The Board likewise stressed that the crew members may not be
discharged until after the expiration of the contract which is for a definite period, and where the crew
members are discharged without just cause before the contract shall have been performed, they shall be
entitled to collect from the owner or agent of the vessel their unpaid salaries for the period they were
engaged to render the services, applying the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Jesus Ogilivie et al. 6
The findings and conclusion of the Board should be sustained. As already intimated above, there is no
logic in the statement made by the Secretariat's Hearing Officer that the private respondents are liable for
breach of their employment contracts for accepting salaries higher than their contracted rates. Said
respondents are not signatories to the Special Agreement, nor was there any showing that they instigated
the execution thereof. Respondents should not be blamed for accepting higher salaries since it is but
human for them to grab every opportunity which would improve their working conditions and earning
capacity. It is a basic right of all workingmen to seek greater benefits not only for themselves but for their
families as well, and this can be achieved through collective bargaining or with the assistance of trade
unions. The Constitution itself guarantees the promotion of social welfare and protection to labor. It is
therefore the Hearing Officer that gravely erred in disallowing the payment of the unexpired portion of the
seamen's respective contracts of employment.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private respondents was justified because the latter threatened the
ship authorities in acceeding to their demands, and this constitutes serious misconduct as contemplated
by the Labor Code. This contention is not well-taken. The records fail to establish clearly the commission
of any threat. But even if there had been such a threat, respondents' behavior should not be censured
because it is but natural for them to employ some means of pressing their demands for petitioner, who
refused to abide with the terms of the Special Agreement, to honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of expression is contrary to law
and public policy. There is no serious misconduct to speak of in the case at bar which would justify
respondents' dismissal just because of their firmness in their demand for the fulfillment by petitioner of its
obligation it entered into without any coercion, specially on the part of private respondents.
On the other hand, it is petitioner who is guilty of breach of contract when they dismissed the respondents
without just cause and prior to the expiration of the employment contracts. As the records clearly show,
petitioner voluntarily entered into the Special Agreement with ITF and by virtue thereof the crew men were
actually given their salary differentials in view of the new rates. It cannot be said that it was because of
respondents' fault that petitioner made a sudden turn-about and refused to honor the special agreement.
In brief, We declare petitioner guilty of breach of contract and should therefore be made to comply with
the directives contained in the disputed Orders of December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated March 14, 1977 of the Hearing Officer is SET
ASIDE and the Orders dated December 19, 1977 and April 3, 1979 of the National Seamen Board are
AFFIRMED in toto. This decision is immediately executory. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995
ESALYN CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDNA BONTO-PEREZ, HON. ROGELIO T. RAYALA, HON. DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, HON. JOSE
N. SARMIENTO, CENTRUM PROMOTIONS PLACEMENT CORPORATION, JOSE A. AZUCENA, JR.,
and TIMES SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. respondents.
PUNO, J.:
One of the anguished cries in our society today is that while our laws appear to protect the poor, their
interpretation is sometimes anti-poor. In the case at bench, petitioner, a poor, uncounselled entertainment
dancer signed a contract with her Japanese employer calling for a monthly salary of One Thousand Five
Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500) but later had to sign an immoral side agreement reducing her salary
below the minimum standard set by the POEA. Petitioner invoked the law to collect her salary
differentials, but incredibly found public respondent straining the seams of our law to disfavor her. There is
no greater disappointment to the poor like petitioner than to discover the ugly reality behind the beautiful
rhetoric of laws. We will not allow this travesty.
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), 1 dated December 29, 1992, which affirmed the Decision of public respondent Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Administrator Jose N. Sarmiento, dated February 17, 1992,
dismissing petitioner's complaint for unpaid salaries amounting to Six Thousand Dollars (US$6,000.00).
The facts are undisputed.
On December 1, 1988, petitioner, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment contract
for overseas Filipino artists and entertainers with Planning Japan Co., Ltd., 2 through its Philippine
representative, private respondent Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation. The contract had a
duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a monthly compensation of One
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (US$1,5000.00). On December 5, 1888, the POEA approved the
contract. Subsequently, petitioner executed the following side agreement with her Japanese employer
through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion:
Date: Dec. 10, 1988

SUBJECT: Salary Deduction
MANAGERIAL COMMISSION
DATE OF DEPARTURE: _________________
ATTENTION: MR. IWATA
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the
honor to authorize your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my contracted monthly salary of SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena,
Jr.
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500).
(sgd. by petitioner) 3
On December 16, 1988, petitioner left for Osaka, Japan, where she worked for six (6) months, until June
10, 1989. She came back to the Philippines on June 14, 1989.
Petitioner instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the POEA on February 21, 1991.
She prayed for the payment of Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion
of her basic salary for six months. Charged in the case were private respondent Centrum Promotions and
Placement Corporation, the Philippine representative of Planning Japan, Co., Inc., its insurer, Times
Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., and Jaz Talents Promotion.
The complaint was dismissed by public respondent POEA Administrator on February 17, 1992. He
ratiocinated,inter alia:
. . . Apparently and from all indications, complainant (referring to petitioner herein) was
satisfied and did not have any complaint (about) anything regarding her employment in
Japan until after almost two (2) years (when) she filed the instant complaint on February
21, 1991. The records show that after signing the Standard Employment Contract on
December 1, 1988, she entered into a side agreement with the Japanese employer thru
her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion consenting to a monthly salary of US$750.00
which she affirmed during the conference of May 21, 1991. Respondent agency had no
knowledge nor participation in the said agreement such that it could not be faulted for
violation of the Standard Employment Contract regarding the stipulated salary. We cannot
take cognizance of such violation when one of the principal party (sic) thereto opted to
receive a salary different from what has been stipulated in their contract, especially so if
the contracting party did not consent/participate in such arrangement. Complainant
(petitioner) cannot now demand from respondent agency to pay her the salary based (on)
the processed Employment Contract for she is now considered in bad faith and hence,
estopped from claiming thereto thru her own act of consenting and agreeing to receive a
salary not in accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her self-imposed
silence for a long period of time worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed laches
to prevail which barred respondent from doing something at the outset. Normally, if a
person's right (is) violated, she/he would immediately react to protect her/his rights which
is not true in the case at bar.
The term laches has been defined as one's negligence or failure to assert his right in due
time or within reasonable time from the accrual of his cause of action, thus, leading
another party to believe that there is nothing wrong with his own claim. This resulted in
placing the negligent party in estoppel to assert or enforce his right. . . . Likewise, the
Supreme Court in one case held that not only is inaction within reasonable time to
enforce a right the basic premise that underlies a valid defense of laches but such
inaction evinces implied consent or acquiescence to the violation of the right . . .
Under the prevailing circumstances of this case, it is outside the regulatory powers of the
Administration to rule on the liability of respondent Jaz Talents Promotions, if any, (it) not
being a licensed private agency but a promotion which trains entertainers for abroad.
xxx xxx xxx
(Citations omitted.)
On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Decision, thus:
We fail to see any conspiracy that the complainant (petitioner herein) imputes to the
respondents. She has, to put it bluntly, not established and/or laid the basis for Us to
arrive at a conclusion that the respondents have been and should be held liable for her
claims.
The way We see it, the records do not at all indicate any connection between
respondents Centrum Promotion & Placement Corporation and Jaz Talents Promotion.
There is, therefore, no merit in the appeal. Hence, We affirmed. 4
Dissatisfied with the NLRC's Decision, petitioner instituted the present petition, alleging that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in finding: that she is guilty of laches; that she entered
into a side contract on December 10, 1988 for the reduction of her basic salary to Seven Hundred Fifty
U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) which superseded, nullified and invalidated the standard employment contract
she entered into on December 1, 1988; and that Planning Japan Co., Ltd. and private respondents are
not solidarily liable to her for Six Thousand US Dollars (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. 5
The petition is meritorious.
Firstly, we hold that the managerial commission agreement executed by petitioner to authorize her
Japanese Employer to deduct Two Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$250.00) from her monthly basic salary
is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy. It cannot supersede the standard
employment contract of December 1, 1988 approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended
thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in
conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the
POEA under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes
made in any part of this contract without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and
void; 6 (Emphasis supplied.)
The stipulation is in line with the provisions of Rule II, Book V and Section 2(f), Rule I, Book VI of the 1991
Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment, thus:
Book V, Rule II
Sec. 1. Employment Standards. The Administration shall determine, formulate and review
employment standards in accordance with the market development and welfare
objectives of the overseas employment program and the prevailing market conditions.
Sec. 2. Minimum Provisions for Contract. The following shall be considered the minimum
requirements for contracts of employment:
a. Guaranteed wages for regular working hours and overtime pay for
services rendered beyond regular working hours in accordance with the
standards established by the Administration;
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Standard Employment Contract. The administration shall undertake development
and/or periodic review of region, country and skills specific employment contracts for
landbased workers and conduct regular review of standard employment contracts (SEC)
for seafarers. These contracts shall provide for minimum employment standards herein
enumerated under Section 2, of this Rule and shall recognize the prevailing labor and
social legislations at the site of employment and international conventions. The SEC shall
set the minimum terms and conditions of employment. All employers and principals shall
adopt the SEC in connection with the hiring of workers without prejudice to their adoption
of other terms and conditions of employment over and above the minimum standards of
the Administration. (Emphasis supplied.)
and
BOOK VI, RULE I
Sec. 2. Grounds for suspension/cancellation of license.
xxx xxx xxx
f. Substituting or altering employment contracts and other documents approved and
verified by the Administration from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to
and including the period of expiration of the same without the Administration's approval.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the basic salary of One Thousand Five Hundred U.S. Dollars (US$1,500.00) guaranteed to
petitioner under the parties' standard employment contract is in accordance with
the minimum employment standards with respect to wages set by the POEA, Thus, the side agreement
which reduced petitioner's basic wage to Seven Hundred Fifty U.S. Dollars (US$750.00) is null and void
for violating the POEA's minimum employment standards, and for not having been approved by the
POEA. Indeed, this side agreement is a scheme all too frequentlyRESORTED to by unscrupulous
employers against our helpless overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic
economic needs.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches or "stale demands"' cannot be applied to petitioner. Laches has been
defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, 7 thus giving rise to a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 8 It is not concerned with mere
lapse of time; the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches. 9
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims, and is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a
right or claim to be enforced or asserted. 10 There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches; each
case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. 11
In the case at bench, petitioner filed her claim well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of
money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code. 12 For this reason, we hold the doctrine of laches
inapplicable to petitioner. As we ruled in Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178
(1991):
. . . Laches is a doctrine in equity while prescription is based on law. Our courts are
basically courts of law not courts of equity. Thus, laches cannot be invoked to resist the
enforcement of an existing legal right. We have ruled in Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate
Court . . . that it is a long standing principle that equity follows the law. Courts exercising
equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. In Zabat, Jr. v. Court of Appeals . . ., this Court was more emphatic upholding the
rules of procedure. We said therein:
As for equity, which has been aptly described as a "justice outside
legality," this applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory
law or, as in this case, judicial rules of procedure. Aequetas nunguam
contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here, they
should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on
equity.
Thus, where the claim was filed within the three-year statutory period, recovery therefore
cannot be barred by laches. Courts should never apply the doctrine of laches earlier than
the expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied. Citations omitted.)
Thirdly, private respondents Centrum and Times as well as Planning Japan Co., Ltd. the agency's
foreign principal are solidarily liable to petitioner for her unpaid wages. This is in accordance with
stipulation 13.7 of the parties' standard employment contract which provides:
13.7. The Employer (in this case, Planning Japan Co., Ltd. ) and its locally (sic)
agent/promoter/representative (private respondent Centrum Promotions & Placement
Corporation) shall be jointly and severally responsible for the proper implementation of
the terms and conditions in this Contract. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
This solidary liability also arises from the provisions of Section 10(a)(2), Rule V, Book I of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, thus:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment. Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:
a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in
favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former . . . . Such formal
appointment or recruitment agreement shall contain the following provisions, among
others:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or
foreign based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
Our overseas workers constitute an exploited class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our
society. They are thoroughly disadvantaged. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in
an environment of crime. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they can hardly find in
our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will
climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of
despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The
least we can do is to protect them with our laws in our land. Regretfully, respondent public officials who
should sympathize with the working class appear to have a different orientation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of respondent POEA Administrator and
NLRC Commissioners in POEA Case No. Adj. 91-02-199 (ER), respectively dated February 17 and
December 29, 1992, and the Resolution of the NLRC, dated March 23, 1993, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Private respondents are held jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the payment of SIX
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$6,000.00) in unpaid wages. Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

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Part Two: General Provisions: 3, 4, 6

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA

Recruitment and placement of workers

when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

when there is a grave abuse of discretion;

when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or

when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of

when the findings of fact are conflicting;

[G.R. No. 131656. October 12, 1998]

CENTER FOR CAREER AND EMPLOYMENT SYSTEM AND SERVICES, INC.

G.R. No. 77828 February 8, 1989

Date: Dec. 10, 1988

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