DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001

Facts:
1.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be
prosecuted under RA 7080 the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659.
2.
He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder
Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to him,(a)
it suffers from the vice of vagueness;(b) it dispenses with the reasonable
doubt standard in criminal prosecutions; and,(c)it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code,all of
which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
3.
The provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have
transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4.
Issue:
1.
Whether The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague?
2.
Whether it requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process?
Held
1.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 1 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which
nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that
are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities.
The first may be saved by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such

activities. 2 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the
assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
2.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty
is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and
practice.3 It must be stressed, however, that the vagueness doctrine
merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to
suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act
will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in
its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in
advance as in all other statutes. The running fault in this reasoning is
obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder,
as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption
of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.4 The use of the
reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical
that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It
is also important in our free society that every individual going about his
ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him
guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper fact finder of his
guilt with utmost certainty. This reasonable doubt standard has acquired
such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged. 5