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Human influence on the climate system has made an enormous impact all over the world.
Constantly increasing temperature and a higher level of oceans made global warming one of
the most important issues of the 21st century. Even though many countries have already
introduced climate change mitigation policies, effectiveness across the world is too small.I
am going to use "Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure"
written by Paul G.Harris which can help to understand the reasons why cooperation to
combat climate change struggled so far. This analysis will explore different reasons such as
different incentives, lack of leadership and selective incentives which are mentioned in the
October 2015 issue of The Economist, the November 2015 issue of Huggpost Politics and the
August 2010 issue of The Globalist. The aim of this paper is to notice the different types of
difficulties which are used in articles and to find out whether they are applicable to analytical
The article "Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure" ( analytical
tool) written by Paul G. Harris explains "the failure of the climate regime" (2007). Author
highlights that countries cannot cooperate because they have different incentives or aims and
that developed countries do not want to help poor countries as much as they could. What is
more, the author states that it is important to have leadership in order to encourage changes.
The article "Its Getting Hotter" (article A) appeared in the October 2015 issue of The
Economist and highlights that some countries are not realizing what kind of impact global
warming has already done on the Earth and how it will affect the next generation. Their
ignorance to spend more money makes the fight against global warming less effective.
According to the article "Climate Activist Call For Greater Diversity Of Voices At The Table
In Paris" (article B), which appeared in December 2015 issue of Huffpost Politics, not
everybody gets a chance to contribute towards reducing global warming effect.


The last article is "Climate Change and Self-Interest" (article C) written by Bruce Bueno de
Mesquita and published in The Globalist in 2010. de Mesquita (2010) states that rich and
poor countries have different incentives which are the main reason why countries cannot
reach a mutually acceptable settlement.
First of all, cooperation towards global warming is not effective because developed and
developing countries have different incentives. Article C emphasizes that poor countries have
no incentives to become more eco-friendly because their main goal is economic growth.
These countries are too much dependable on fuels which have high carbon intensity so they
will do everything to improve their quality of life, even if it means to use less wind, fire or
water resources. Meanwhile, rich countries are trying to encourage poor nations to invest
more money towards tackling this problem because otherwise they will lose political power.
According to de Mesquita, rich countries are ready to invest a lot of money and "fight wars to
keep the rising poor" (2010). What is more, Article A also asserts that rich and poor countries
are trying to reach different results. Poor countries are already feeling the consequences of
global warming that is why they are taking radical actions. For example, Kiribati had to buy
some land in Fiji in a case of flooding. Meanwhile developed countries are taking opposite
actions - they are implementing new policies which, according to scientists are not effective
at all. Lastly, Article B highlights that incentives makes it hard to reach a mutual solution.
According to Reid Detchon people who lives in the north are not concerned about global
warming because they do not feel it. Meanwhile, the south "dont have the words to put on"
(2015), even though global warming effects them. All articles show that countries cannot
reach mutual consensus because countrie are trying to reach different aims. The analytical
tool suggests that " in the absence of [...] incentives beyond or outside the good being sought,
large groups will not provide a collective good" (Harris, 2007) It means that as long as poor


countries will care only about their economical situation and rich countries will think only
about their incentives the cooperation will be impossible.
Secondly, rich countries are not providing enough aid to poor countries, as a result, those
countries cannot contribute towards global warming problems. Article A states that developed
countries cannot find consensus on who will have to pay the bills for reducing emissions.
According to the same article, rich countries must pay more than 100 billion dollars annually
to the poor countries as compensation but no one wants to do it. Moreover, article B stress
that in poor countries not all of the people can get educated and lots of women in Africa work
in agricultural work. These problems prevent poor from contributing towards climate change.
Furthermore, article C says that rich countries will not provide selective incentives to poor
countries in order to protect their power. According to de Mesquita, rich countries are ready
to invest a lot of money and "fight wars to keep the rising poor" (2010). It shows that
developed countries are not going to aid developing countries because they desperately want
to defend their power. The analytical tool states that "groups having access to selective
incentives will be more likely to act collectively than will those not having such incentives".
The fact that the global warming is not the main aim for poor countries shows that developing
countries will contribute only if they get extra benefits. Unfortunately, developing countries
are not going to provide aid because they do not want to lose their political power and money.
Therefore, people should not expect cooperation towards this problem in the near future.
Lastly, there is no leader who could foster the fight against climate change. Article B
emphasizes that some countries in 2009 conference were not included in setting regulations.
It shows that developing and poor countries do not have a leader who could really represent
them. In addition, article A talks about a lack of leadership in rich countries. The author
recognizes that rich countries have to find 100 billion dollars annually for a climate fund but
no one wants to pay it. Moreover, article C states that leaders are not thinking about a long-


run. Leaders have no incentives to show leadership because global warming effect is not very
effective in a short-run. The analytical tool emphasizes that leader and leadership is one of
the parts in fostering cooperation and, indeed, extending and deepening it as the problem
became better understood. Therefore, we can see that countries do not have leaders which
are eligible to set main goals for both sides.
In conclusion, I can say that obstacles to counter global warming, which is mentioned in
articles A, B and C are applicable to an analytical tool. It shows that different incentives, lack
of leadership and too small aids for poor hinder to reach a global plan which could really
change something.

Anonymous, (2015 October 3). Its Getting Hotter. The Economist. Retrieved from:
Anonymous, (2015, December 1). Climate Activists Call for Greater Diversity of
Voices at the Table in Paris. Huffpost Politics. Retrieved from:


Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, (2010, August 2). Climate Change and Self-Interest. The
Globalist (Adapted from Bruce Bueno de Mesquitas book, The Predictioneers Game (2009
Random House)). Retrieved from: http://www.theglobalist.com/climate-change-and-selfinterest/
Paul Gordon Harris (2007, January). Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic
of Regime Failure. Natural Recources Journal