PEOPLE VS MARIACOS

FACTS:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police
Station of San Gabriel, La Union, conducted a checkpoint
near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a
suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group at the
checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc, the
Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint
did not yield any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police
instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang
to conduct surveillance operation.
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2
Pallayoc met with a secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned
3 bags and 1 blue plastic bag. Further, the agent described
a backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2 Pallayoc then
boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top
thereof. While the vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He then asked the other passengers on top of
the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one knew.

Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective

decisions on the fact that the search was conducted on a
moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of the
doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by
virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Bagista, the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a
search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of
evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped
and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless
search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.

When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc

alighted together with the other passengers. Unfortunately,
he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said
bag and 3 other bags, including a blue plastic bag, were
already being carried away by 2 women. He caught up with
the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but one of the women got
away.

It is well to remember that in the instances we have

recognized as exceptions to the requirement of a judicial
warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest
or seizure must have been impelled to do so because of
probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause
must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted. Without probable cause, the
articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence against the
person arrested.

PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified

as Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the
police station, the investigators contacted the Mayor of San
Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags. When the Mayor
arrived about 15 minutes later, the bags were opened and 3
bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, 2 round bundles
of marijuana, and 2 bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all
wrapped in a newspaper, were recovered.

Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of

suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or
objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
searched.

Thereafter, the investigators marked, inventoried and

forwarded the confiscated marijuana to the crime laboratory
for examination. The laboratory examination showed that
the stuff found in the bags all tested positive for marijuana,
a dangerous drug
When it was Mariacos turn to present evidence, she
testified the when the jeep was still at the terminal waiting
for passengers, Bennie Lao-ang requested her to carry the
bag which was on top of the jeepney. When the reached the
poblacion, Lao-ang handed the bag the bags to her and her
companion and ran away.
ISSUE: WON the Mariacos right against an unreasonable
search was violated when the police officers searched the
bag, assuming it was hers, without a search warrant
RULING:

The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the

absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported
by circumstances
sufficiently strong
in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have
been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the
object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described
to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement
which borders on the impossible in instances where moving
vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity.
This exception is easy to understand. A search warrant may
readily be obtained when the search is made in a store,
dwelling house or other immobile structure. But it is

impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is

conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in other motor
vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction where the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the
search in this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the
contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of
the essence in this case. The searching officer had no time
to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to
board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005, the night
before appellants arrest, the police received information
that marijuana was to be transported from Barangay
Balbalayang, and had set up a checkpoint around the area
to intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27, 2005, PO2
Pallayoc met the secret agent from the Barangay
Intelligence Network, who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana was loaded on a passenger jeepney about to
leave for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had probable
cause to search the packages allegedly containing illegal
drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there be a prior
valid arrest. Although, generally, a warrant is necessary for
a valid arrest, the Rules of Court provides the exceptions
therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the
person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Be that as it may, we have held that a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if
the police has probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search.
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on
that search is also valid.
DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went
to serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs.

Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid which prompted the

police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they
were riding and go directly to Del Castillos house and
cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in
Del Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was
able to confiscate from the hut several articles including
four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu.
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo,
charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the
arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found
Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against
him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there
was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the
Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is
applicable only against government authorities. Hence,
assuming that the items seized were found in another place
not designated in the search warrant, the same items should
still be admissible as evidence because the one who
discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private
individual.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of Del Castillos right
against unreasonable searches and seizure
RULING:
Petition GRANTED.
It must be remembered that the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A
designation or description that points out the place to be
searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry
unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.
In the present case, the search warrant specifically
designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as
the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized
by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the
residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having
been found in a place other than the one described in the
search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were
found in another place not designated in the search warrant,
the same items should still be admissible as evidence
because the one who discovered them was a barangay
tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable
only against government authorities. The contention is
devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by the police
officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the
assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established
that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by
the police authorities who effected the search warrant, the
same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons
in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines
persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as
any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an
individual or as a member of some court or governmental
corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person
in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman
shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who, by
direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of
public order and the protection and security of life and

property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and

barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person
in authority.

required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part

of one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be
an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief
and impression that submission is necessary.

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which

describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of
persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government
Code reads: For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay
shall be deemed as persons in authority in their
jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members
who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and
security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay
member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall
be deemed agents of persons in authority.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic

Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic
violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well

as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search
conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are
inadmissible in evidence.

LUZ VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the SubStation 1 of the Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer,
substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00
oclock in the morning, he saw the accused, who was
coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the accused for
violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor
vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their
sub-station since the place where he flagged down the
accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that while
he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket
for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the
accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his
jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter
may have a weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and
slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which
was a nickel-like tin or metal container about 2 to 3 inches in
size, including 2 cellphones, 1 pair of scissors and 1 Swiss
knife; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the
accused to open it; that after the accused opened the
container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something
beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled
out the contents of the container on the table which turned
out to be 4 plastic sachets, the 2 of which were empty while
the other 2 contained suspected shabu. Ambre was then
convicted of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid arrest and lawful search and
seizure
RULING:
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged
down for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso
facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person
to be arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to
the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or
physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is

Similarly, PNP Operations Manual provides the following

procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting
Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept
and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car
crew shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic
Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never
indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument
with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his
citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been
"under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3
Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him
into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period
during which petitioner was at the police station may be
characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by
the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that
petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of that
place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that
they were waiting there. There was no intention to take
petitioner into custody.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012,
which was violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash
helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only.
Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be
issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an
offense.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the
part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or
to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed
to have arrested the motorist. In this case, however, the
officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket
negates the possibility of an arrest for the same violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that
petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon being flagged down
for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his
ticket, then the requirements for a valid arrest were not
complied with.
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter
of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the
warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement they might make could be used against
them.14 It may also be noted that in this case, these
constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that
resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is
allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a

moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v)
customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii)
exigent and emergency circumstances.15 None of the
above-mentioned instances, especially a search incident to
a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged
to be inadvertently discovered, was not in "plain view." It
was actually concealed inside a metal container inside
petitioners pocket. Clearly, the evidence was not
immediately apparent.
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent
to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear
and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent
must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the
prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to
prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of
his pocket.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk"
rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer
observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead
him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and
frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing
for weapons.
AMBRE VS PEOPLE
FACTS:
On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station AntiIllegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust
operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a
certain Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was engaged
in the selling of dangerous drugs at a residential compound
in Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the
arrest of Aderp and a certain Moctar Tagoranao; that Sultan
run away from the scene of the entrapment operation and
PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo, pursued him; that in
the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to
his house; that inside the house, he police operatives found
Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that
Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected
to be a shabu in a rolled up alumni foil; and that PO3 Moran
ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested
Ambre, Castro and Mendoza for illegal use of shabu.
ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the
search of her person was valid
RULING:
Section 2, Article III13 of the Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence
of probable cause, absent which such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. Evidence obtained and confiscated
on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure
is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid
proscription. One of the recognized exception established by
jurisprudence is search incident to a lawful arrest. In this
exception, the law requires that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings. As a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests:

"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace

officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there
is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a
prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final
judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of
his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at
the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit
or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
In the case at bench, there is no gainsaying that Ambre was
caught by the police officers in the act of using shabu and,
thus, can be lawfully arrested without a warrant. PO1 Mateo
positively identified Ambre sniffing suspected shabu from an
aluminum foil being held by Castro.17 Ambre, however,
made much of the fact that there was no prior valid
intrusion in the residence of Sultan. The argument is
specious.
Suffice it to state that prior justification for intrusion or prior
lawful intrusion is not an element of an arrest in flagrante
delicto.
Thus,
even
granting
arguendo
that
the
apprehending officers had no legal right to be present in the
dwelling of Sultan, it would not render unlawful the arrest of
Ambre, who was seen sniffing shabu with Castro and
Mendoza in a pot session by the police officers. Accordingly,
PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo were not only authorized but were
also duty-bound to arrest Ambre together with Castro and
Mendoza for illegal use of methamphetamine hydrochloride
in violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid,
the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was
likewise lawful. After all, a legitimate warrantless arrest
necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority
to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense.
PEOPLE VS BELOCURA
FACTS:
On March 22, 1999, at 11 oclock in the morning, Chief Insp.
Divina was in his office in the headquarters of the Western
Police District on United Nations Avenue in Manila when he
received a call from a male person who refused to identify
himself for fear of reprisal. The caller tipped him off about a
robbery to be staged along Lopez Street, Tondo, Manila.
After relaying the tip to his superior officer, he was

immediately ordered to form a team composed of

operatives of the District Intelligence Group and to
coordinate with the Special Weapons and Attack Team
(SWAT) and the Mobile Patrol of the WPD.
After a briefing, Chief Insp. Divina and the other operatives
proceeded to Lopez Street, reaching the site before 1:00
pm. Chief Insp. Divina and PO2 Eraldo Santos positioned
themselves along Vitas Street. At around 2:00 pm, Chief
Insp. Divina spotted an owner-type jeep bearing a spurious
government plate (SBM-510) cruising along Vitas Street and
told the rest of the team about it. The numbers of the car
plate were painted white. The driver was later identified as
Belocura. Chief Insp. Divina signaled for Belocura to stop for
verification but the latter ignored the signal and sped off
towards Balut, Tondo. The team pursued Belocuras jeep
until they blocked its path with their Tamaraw FX vehicle,
forcing Belocura to stop. At this point, Chief Insp. Divina and
the rest of the team approached the jeep and introduced
themselves to Belocura as policemen. Chief Insp. Divina
queried Belocura on the government plate. SPO1 Rojas
confiscated Belocuras Berreta 9 mm. pistol (Serial Number
M13086Z) that was tucked in his waist and its fully loaded
magazine when he could not produce the appropriate
documents for the pistol and the government plate. They
arrested him.
PO2 Santos searched Belocuras jeep, and recovered a red
plastic bag under the drivers seat. Chief Insp. Divina
directed PO2 Santos to inspect the contents of the red
plastic bag, which turned out to be two bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper.
Afterwards, the team returned with Belocura to the WPD
Headquarters on board the Tamaraw FX. The team turned
over the jeep and the red plastic bag with its contents to the
General Assignment Section for proper disposition.
Chief Insp. Divina said that the caller did not mention
anything about any vehicle; that he and his men were in
civilian clothes at the time; that it was PO2 Santos who
recovered the red plastic bag containing the marijuana
bricks; and that SPO1 Rojas examined the contents of the
bag in his presence.
SPO1 Rojas confirmed his part in the operation. He conceded
that he was not present when the red plastic bag containing
the bricks of marijuana was seized, and saw the marijuana
bricks for the first time only at the police station.
Forensic Chemist Insp. Coronel attested that her office
received from the General Assignment Section of the WPD
one red plastic bag labeled "SHIN TON YON" containing two
bricks of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops individually
wrapped in newspaper at about 12:30 pm of March 23,
1999. The first brick bore the marking "RB-1" and weighed
830.532 grams while the other bore the marking "RB-2" and
weighed 959.291 grams, for a total weight of 1,789.823
grams. She conducted a chemical examination of the
marijuana bricks pursuant to the request for laboratory
examination from Chief Insp. Nelson Yabut of the WPD; and
concluded as the result of three qualitative examinations
that the submitted specimen tested positive for marijuana, a
prohibited drug.

ISSUE:WON the warrantless arrest of Belocura and the

search of the jeepney was valid
RULING:
The right against warrantless arrest, and the right against
warrantless search and seizure are not absolute. There are
circumstances in which the arrest, or search and seizure,
although warrantless, are nonetheless valid or reasonable.
Among the circumstances are those mentioned in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which lists down when a
warrantless arrest may be lawfully made by a peace officer
or a private person, namely:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
On the other hand, the constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of the following
exceptions, namely: (a) warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest recognized under Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court;19 (b) seizure of evidence under plain view;
(c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented warrantless
search; (e) customs search; (f) stop-and-frisk situations
(Terry
search);
and
(g)
exigent
and
emergency
circumstances. In these exceptional situations, the necessity
for a search warrant is dispensed with.
Belocura was caught in flagrante delicto violating Section 31
of Republic Act No. 4139 (The Land Transportation and
Traffic Code). In flagrante delicto means in the very act of
committing the crime. To be caught in flagrante delicto
necessarily implies the positive identification of the culprit
by an eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such identification is a
direct evidence of culpability, because it "proves the fact in
dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption."
Even by his own admission, he was actually committing a
crime in the presence or within the view of the arresting
policemen. Such manner by which Belocura was
apprehended fell under the first category in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest was valid, therefore,
and the arresting policemen thereby became cloaked with
the authority to validly search his person and effects for
weapons or any other article he might use in the
commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or
might be used as evidence in the trial of the case, and to
seize from him and the area within his reach or under his
control, like the jeep, such weapon or other article. The
evident purpose of the incidental search was to protect the
arresting policemen from being harmed by him with the use
of a concealed weapon.