Brillantes v.

Yorac
192 SCRA 358 (1990)
Facts:
Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the
Philippines of Associate Commissioner Hayde B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named
chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup detat attempt.
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is an
internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites that practice in Court, where the
Senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary. It is also alleged that the
respondent is not even the senior member of the COMELEC, being outranked by Associate
Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.
Issue:
Whether the designation of an Acting Chairman of the COMELEC unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. The designation of Hayde B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is invalid.
Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the Constitution prohibits the designation of any Commissioner of
the COMELEC in a temporary or acting capacity.
Moreover, Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are
not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of the commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and
its own rules and in the exercise of its discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only
to review on Certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A,
Section 7.
The designation of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes
under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the
President of the Philippines.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the COMELEC would most likely
have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any
event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make.

Montenegro v. Castaeda
91 Phil. 882 (1949)
Facts:
In October 18, 1950, Maximo Montenegro was arrested by agents of the Military
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for complicity with a communistic
organization in the commission of acts of rebellion, insurrection or sedition. On October 22,
1950, President Elpidio Quirino issued Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. On October 21, 1950, Maximos father, Marcelo Montenegro (petitioner),
submitted this application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking the release of his son.
The petitioner contested that the proclamation was void, and that, anyway, it did not
apply to his son, who has been arrested before its promulgation. Heeding the suspension order,
the court of first instance denied the release prayed for. The appeal was founded mainly on the
following petitioners propositions:
(a) The proclamation is unconstitutional "because it partakes of a bill of attainder, or an ex post
facto law; and unlawfully includes sedition which under the Constitution is not a ground for
suspension";
(b) "There is no state of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof," the only
situations permitting discontinuance of the writ of habeas corpus; showing was made that the
petitioners son was included within the terms thereof.
(c) Supposing the proclamation is valid, no prima facie.
Issue:
Whether or not Montenegros petition for release should be granted.
Held:
The Constitution expressly vested the President of the Philippines the calling-out of the
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law.
However, the Proclamation No. 210 issued by the President was for the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus for the persons detained, as well as others who may be hereinafter similarly
detained for the crimes of sedition, insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them.
The inclusion of sedition does not invalidate the entire proclamation; and it is immaterial
in this case, inasmuch as the petitioners descendant is confined in jail not only for sedition, but
for the graver offense of rebellion and insurrection. Without doing violence to the presidential
directive, but in obedience to the supreme law of the land, the word "sedition" in Proclamation
No. 210 should be deemed a mistake or surplus age that does not taint the decree as a whole.

As ruled by the Supreme Court in Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil., 87, pp. 98 and 100),
Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend
in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not
correctly be placed in doubt. The authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension belongs to the President and "his decision is final and conclusive" upon the courts and
upon all other persons.
A proclamation of the President suspending the writ of habeas corpus was held valid and
efficient in law to suspend all proceedings pending upon habeas corpus, which was issued and
served prior to the date of the proclamation.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 129406, 06 March 2006, 484 SCRA 119
Facts:
Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing
under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal,
owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he
appeared to have controlling or majority interest due to his involvement in cases of ill-gotten
wealth. Among the properties thus sequestered and take over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227
shares in NOGCCI owned by and registered under the name of private respondent or under the
names of corporations he owned or controlled.
As sequester of the 227 shares formerly owned by Benedicto, PCGG did not pay the
monthly membership due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227
sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. Despite filing a
writ of injunction, it was nevertheless dismissed. So petitioner Republic and private respondent
Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement which contains a general release clause where
petitioner agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares
acknowledging that it was within the private respondents capacity to acquire the same shares out
of his income from business and the exercise of his profession. Implied in this undertaking is the
recognition by petitioner that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten.
Benedicto filed a Motion for Release from sequestration and Return of Sequestered
Shares/ Dividends praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released
from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise
Agreement in that case. It was granted but the shares were ordered to be put under custody of the
Clerk of Court. Along with this, PCGG was ordered to deliver the shares to the Clerk of Court
which it failed to comply with without any justifiable grounds.
In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes
state immunity from suit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Republic can invoke state immunity
Held:
No. In fact by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,
petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same
level of its adversary. When the state enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise there from, the State
may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the
sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act
of entering into such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the
other party to the agreement.

Pimentel v. Ermita
GR No. 158088, 06 July 2005
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit (even without the signature of the
President) the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate
of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of
aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The
provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
of the signatory state.
Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law,
is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed
copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant suit.
Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N.
even without the signature of the President.
Held:
Only Senator Pimentel has a legal standing to the extent of his power as member of
Congress. Other petitioners have not shown that they have sustained a direct injury from the nontransmittal and that they can seek redress in our domestic courts.
Petitioners interpretation of the Constitution is incorrect. The power to ratify treaties
does not belong to the Senate.
Under E.O. 459, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) prepares the ratification papers
and forward the signed copy to the President for ratification. After the President has ratified it,
DFA shall submit the same to the Senate for concurrence.
The President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution
provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the
Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The participation of the
legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations.

It should be emphasized that under the Constitution the power to ratify is vested in the
President subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The President has the discretion even after the
signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify a treaty.
The signature does not signify final consent, it is ratification that binds the state to the
provisions of the treaty and renders it effective.
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, concurrence to the ratification.
It is within the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or having secured its consent
for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this court via writ of mandamus,
Thus, the petition is DISMISSED.