Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19565

January 30, 1968

ESTRELLA DE LA CRUZ, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEVERINO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Estacion and Paltriguera for plaintiff-appellee.
Manuel O. Soriano and Pio G. Villoso for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint on July 22, 1958 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, alleging in
essence that her husband, the defendant Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal
partnership properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and
(3) payment of P20,000 as attorney's fees, and costs.
The court a quo forthwith issued an order allowing the plaintiff the amount prayed for as alimony pendente lite, which however, upon
defendant's motion, was reduced to P2,000.
On June 1, 1961 the trial court rendered judgment ordering separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing the defendant
to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P20,000 as attorney's fees, with legal interest from the date of the original complaint, that is, from July
22, 1958, until fully paid, plus costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us,
"it appearing that the total value of the conjugal assets is over P500,000".
The basic facts are not controverted. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. Six children
were born to them, namely, Zenia (1939), Ronnie (1942), Victoria (1944), Jessie 1945), Bella (1946), and Felipe (1948). During their
coverture they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre, all assessed at P45,429, and three parcels of the Silay
Cadastre, all assessed at P43,580. All these parcels are registered in their names. The hacienda in Silay yielded for the year 1957 a net
profit of P3,390.49.
They are also engaged in varied business ventures with fixed assets valued as of December 31, 1956 at P496,006.92, from which they
obtained for that year a net profit of P75,655.78. The net gain of the Philippine Texboard Factory, the principal business of the spouses,
was P90,454.48 for the year 1957. As of December 31, 1959, the total assets of the various enterprises of the conjugal partnership
were valued at P1,021,407.68, not including those of the Top Service Inc., of which firm the defendant has been the president since its
organization in 1959 in Manila with a paid-up capital of P50,000, P10,000 of which was contributed by him. This corporation was the
Beverly Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, the Golden Acres Subdivision and the Green Valley Subdivision in Las Pias, Rizal, and a
lot and building located at M. H. del Pilar, Manila purchased for P285,000, an amount borrowed from the Manufacturer's Bank and Trust
Company.
The spouses are indebted to the Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained, to secure
which they mortgaged the Philippine Texboard Factory, the Silay hacienda, their conjugal house, and all their parcels of land located in
Bacolod City.
The essential issues of fact may be gleaned from the nine errors the defendant imputes to the court a quo, namely,
1. In finding that the only visit, from May 15, 1955 to the rendition of the decision, made by the defendant to the conjugal
abode to see his wife was on June 15, 1955;
2. In finding that the letter exh. 3 was written by one Nenita Hernandez and that she and the defendant are living as husband
and wife;
3. In finding that since 1951 the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant were far from cordial, and that it was from
1948 that the former has been receiving an allowance from the latter;
4. In finding that the defendant has abandoned the plaintiff;

5. In finding that the defendant since 1956 has not discussed with his wife the business activities of the partnership, and that
this silence constituted "abuse of administration of the conjugal partnerships";
6. In declaring that the defendant mortgaged the conjugal assets without the knowledge of the plaintiff and thru false pretences
to which the latter was prey;
7. In allowing the plaintiff, on the one hand, to testify on facts not actually known by her, and, on the other hand, in not allowing
the defendant to establish his special defenses;
8. In ordering separation of the conjugal partnership properties; and
9. In sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000, with interest at the legal rate.

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Two issues of law as well emerge, requiring resolution petition: (1) Did the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties? (2) Was the defendant's failure and/or refusal
to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?
The plaintiff's evidence may be summarized briefly. The defendant started living in Manila in 1955, although he occasionally returned to
Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at 2nd Street,
Bacolod City. Since 1955 the defendant had not slept in the conjugal dwelling, although in the said year he paid short visits during
which they engaged in brief conversations. After 1955 up to the time of the trial, the defendant had never visited the conjugal abode,
and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied communication with him. He has abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with
his concubine, Nenita Hernandez. In 1949 she began to suspect the existence of illicit relations between her husband and Nenita. This
suspicion was confirmed in 1951 when she found an unsigned note in a pocket of one of her husband's polo shirt which was written by
Nenita and in which she asked "Bering" to meet her near the church. She confronted her husband who forthwith tore the note even as
he admitted his amorous liaison with Nenita. He then allayed her fears by vowing to forsake his mistress. Subsequently, in November
1951, she found in the iron safe of her husband a letter, exh. C, also written by Nenita. In this letter the sender (who signed as "D")
apologized for her conduct, and expressed the hope that the addressee ("Darling") could join her in Baguio as she was alone in the
Patria Inn and lonely in "a place for honeymooners". Immediately after her husband departed for Manila the following morning, the
plaintiff enplaned for Baguio, where she learned that Nenita had actually stayed at the Patria Inn, but had already left for Manila before
her arrival. Later she met her husband in the house of a relative in Manila from whence they proceeded to the Avenue Hotel where she
again confronted him about Nenita. He denied having further relations with this woman.
Celia Baez, testifying for the plaintiff, declared that she was employed as a cook in the home of the spouses from May 15, 1955 to
August 15, 1958, and that during the entire period of her employment she saw the defendant in the place only once. This declaration is
contradicted, however, by the plaintiff herself who testified that in 1955 the defendant "used to have a short visit there," which statement
implies more than one visit.
The defendant, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and children, but admitted that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the
action, he started to live separately from his wife. When he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his
intention was not, as it never has been, to abandon his wife and children, but only to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his
work as she always quarreled with him, while in Mandalagan he could pass the nights in peace. Since 1953 he stayed in Manila for
some duration of time to manage their expanding business and look for market outlets for their texboard products. Even the plaintiff
admitted in both her original and amended complaints that "sometime in 1953, because of the expanding business of the herein parties,
the defendant established an office in the City of Manila, wherein some of the goods, effects and merchandise manufactured or
produced in the business enterprises of the parties were sold or disposed of". From the time he started living separately in Mandalagan
up to the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff herself furnished him food and took care of his laundry. This latter declaration was not
rebutted by the plaintiff.
The defendant, with vehemence, denied that he has abandoned his wife and family, averring that he has never failed, even for a single
month, to give them financial support, as witnessed by the plaintiff's admission in her original and amended complaints as well as in
open court that during the entire period of their estrangement, he was giving her around P500 a month for support. In point of fact, his
wife and children continued to draw allowances from his office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month. He financed the
education of their children, two of whom were studying in Manila at the time of the trial and were not living with the plaintiff. While in
Bacolod City, he never failed to visit his family, particularly the children. His wife was always in bad need of money because she
playedmahjong, an accusation which she did not traverse, explaining that she played mahjong to entertain herself and forget the
infidelities of her husband.
Marcos V. Ganaban, the manager of the Philippine Texboard Factory, corroborated the testimony of the defendant on the matter of the
support the latter gave to his family, by declaring in court that since the start of his employment in 1950 as assistant general manager,
the plaintiff has been drawing an allowance of P1,000 to P1,500 monthly, which amount was given personally by the defendant or, in his
absence, by the witness himself.

The defendant denied that he ever maintained a mistress in Manila. He came to know Nenita Hernandez when she was barely 12 years
old, but had lost track of her thereafter. His constant presence in Manila was required by the pressing demands of an expanding
business. He denied having destroyed the alleged note which the plaintiff claimed to have come from Nenita, nor having seen, previous
to the trial, the letter exh. C. The allegation of his wife that he had a concubine is based on mere suspicion. He had always been faithful
to his wife, and not for a single instance had he been caught or surprised by her with another woman.
On the matter of the alleged abuse by the defendant of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, the plaintiff declared
that the defendant refused and failed to inform her of the progress of their various business concerns. Although she did not allege,
much less prove, that her husband had dissipated the conjugal properties, she averred nevertheless that her husband might squander
and dispose of the conjugal assets in favor of his concubine. Hence, the urgency of separation of property.
The defendant's answer to the charge of mismanagement is that he has applied his industry, channeled his ingenuity, and devoted his
time, to the management, maintenance and expansion of their business concerns, even as his wife threw money away at
the mahjong tables. Tangible proof of his endeavors is that from a single cargo truck which he himself drove at the time of their
marriage, he had built up one business after another, the Speedway Trucking Service, the Negros Shipping Service, the Bacolod Press,
the Philippine Texboard Factory, and miscellaneous other business enterprises worth over a million pesos; that all that the spouses now
own have been acquired through his diligence, intelligence and industry; that he has steadily expanded the income and assets of said
business enterprises from year to year, contrary to the allegations of the complainant, as proved by his balance sheet and profit and
loss statements for the year 1958 and 1959 (exhibits 1 and 2); and that out of the income of their enterprises he had purchased
additional equipment and machineries and has partially paid their indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank and the Development
Bank of the Philippines.
It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal separation. The evidence presented by her to prove concubinage on the part of
the defendant, while pertinent and material in the determination of the merits of a petition for legal separation, must in this case be
regarded merely as an attempt to bolster her claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which abandonment, if it constitutes
abandonment in law, would justify separation of the conjugal assets under the applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil Code
which read: "The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except
that . . . if the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or
administration by her of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property". In addition to abandonment as a ground, the
plaintiff also invokes article 167 of the new Civil Code in support of her prayer for division of the matrimonial assets. This article
provides that "In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property by the husband, the courts, on the
petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property". It behooves us, therefore, to
inquire, in the case at bar, whether there has been abandonment, in the legal sense, by the defendant of the plaintiff, and/or whether
the defendant has abused his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property, so as to justify the plaintiff's plea for
separation of property.
We have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is our considered view that the defendant is not guilty of abandonment of his
wife, nor of such abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets.
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year are
the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of
these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. 1 The abandonment must not only be
physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Although an all-embracing definition of the term "abandonment " is yet to be spelled out in explicit words, we nevertheless can
determine its meaning from the context of the Law as well as from its ordinary usage. The concept of abandonment in article 178 may
be established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely,
receivership, administration by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to assure the wife of a ready and
steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband,
despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases
to give support to his wife.
The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense, means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly. 2 The dictionaries trace this word to
the root idea of "putting under a bar". The emphasis is on the finality and the publicity with which some thing or body is thus put in the
control of another, and hence the meaning of giving up absolutely, with intent never again to resume or claim one's rights or
interests. 3 When referring to desertion of a wife by a husband, the word has been defined as "the act of a husband in voluntarily leaving
his wife with intention to forsake her entirely, never to return to her, and never to resume his marital duties towards her, or to claim his
marital rights; such neglect as either leaves the wife destitute of the common necessaries of life, or would leave her destitute but for the
charity of others." 4 The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or
the wife who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of causing per perpetual separation." 5 Giving to the word
"abandoned", as used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention
of perpetual separation.

Coming back to the case at bar, we believe that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently. The record
conclusively shows that he continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by
the complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good reason to
believe, however, that she and the children received more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife and children
continued to draw from his office more than P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, whose declarations
were not rebutted by the plaintiff. And then there is at all no showing that the plaintiff and the children were living in want. On the
contrary, the plaintiff admitted, albeit reluctantly, that she frequently played mahjong, from which we can infer that she had money; to
spare.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the
conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights. In People v. Schelske, 6 it was held that where a husband, after leaving his
wife, continued to make small contributions at intervals to her support and that of their minor child, he was not guilty of their
"abandonment", which is an act of separation with intent that it shall be perpetual, since contributing to their support negatived such
intent. In re Hoss' Estate, supra, it was ruled that a father did not abandon his family where the evidence disclosed that he almost
always did give his wife part of his earnings during the period of their separation and that he gradually paid some old rental and grocery
bills.
With respect to the allegation that the defendant maintained a concubine, we believe, contrary to the findings of the court a quo, that
the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof that Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the
defendant and that they were living as husband and wife in Manila, is altogether too indefinite. Aside from the uncorroborated statement
of the plaintiff that she knew that Nenita Hernandez was her husband's concubine, without demonstrating by credible evidence the
existence of illicit relations between Nenita and the defendant, the only evidence on record offered to link the defendant to his alleged
mistress is exh. C. The plaintiff however failed to connect authorship of the said letter with Nenita, on the face whereof the sender
merely signed as "D" and the addressee was one unidentified "Darling". The plaintiff's testimony on cross-examination, hereunder
quoted, underscores such failure:
Q. You personally never received any letter from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you received on any time until today from 1949 from Nenita?
A. No.
Q. Neither have you written to her any letter yourself until now?
A. Why should I write a letter to her.
Q. In that case, Mrs. De la Cruz, you are not familiar with the handwriting of Nenita. Is that right?
A. I can say that Nenita writes very well.
Q. I am not asking you whether she writes very well or not but, my question is this: In view of the fact that you have never
received a letter from Nenita, you have ot sent any letter to her, you are not familiar with her handwriting?
A. Yes.
Q. You have not seen her writing anybody?
A. Yes.
Anent the allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal partnership property, the record presents a different picture.
There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his
industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million pesos.
The lower court likewise erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to
inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses constitutes abuse of administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that
the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these
may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the
partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter. 7
If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode,
but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the

separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to grant the wife's petition
for separation of property. This decision may appear to condone the husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies granted
to the wife by articles 167 and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect the conjugal
partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of the wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the
husband's act but merely points up the insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.
1wph1.t

Courts must need exercise judicial restraint and reasoned hesitance in ordering a separation of conjugal properties because the basic
policy of the law is homiletic, to promote healthy family life and to preserve the union of the spouses, in person, in spirit and in property.
Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual
affection and help expected of the spouses, the Civil Code (both old and new) requires that separation of property shall not
prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during
the existence of the marriage (Article 190, new Civil Code, Article 1432, old Civil Code): and in the latter case, it may only be
ordered by the court for causes specified in Article 191 of the new Civil Code. 8
Furthermore, a judgment ordering the division of conjugal assets where there has been no real abandonment, the separation not being
wanton and absolute, may altogether slam shut the door for possible reconciliation. The estranged spouses may drift irreversibly further
apart; the already broken family solidarity may be irretrievably shattered; and any flickering hope for a new life together may be
completely and finally extinguished.
The monthly alimony in the sum of P2,000 which was allowed to the wife in 1958, long before the devaluation of the Philippine peso in
1962, should be increased to P3,000.
On the matter of attorney's fees, it is our view that because the defendant, by leaving the conjugal abode, has given cause for the
plaintiff to seek redress in the courts, and ask for adequate support, an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff must be made. Ample
authority for such award is found in paragraphs 6 and 11 of article 2208 of the new Civil Code which empower courts to grant counsel's
fees "in actions for legal support" and in cases "where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be
recovered." However, an award of P10,000, in our opinion, is, under the environmental circumstances, sufficient.
This Court would be remiss if it did not, firstly, remind the plaintiff and the defendant that the law enjoins husband and wife to live
together, and, secondly, exhort them to avail of mutually, earnestly and steadfastly all opportunities for reconciliation to the end
that their marital differences may be happily resolved, and conjugal harmony may return and, on the basis of mutual respect and
understanding, endure.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set aside.
Conformably to our observations, however, the defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of support, the amount of
P3,000 per month, until he shall have rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the meantime, be reduced or increased
in the discretion of the court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without
interest. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintif, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children.
During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various businesses.
The plaintif filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further
alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On
the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided
support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the
expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in
his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed
by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence,
the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and dispose
the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE: WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an
abused of his authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.
HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family.
To be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with
intention of not coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not
mere separation. In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by
the wife. This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode. The plaintif even
testified that the husband paid short visits implying more than one visit. Likewise, as testified by
the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,0001,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator
of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of
administration. In order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest
of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13553

February 23, 1960

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner,

vs.
SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.
Joselito J. Coloma for petitioner.
BENGZON, J.:
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife Serafina, on the ground of adultery. The court of first
instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment, plus
condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
We granted certiorari to consider the application of articles 100 and 101 of the New Civil Code, which for
convenience are quoted herewith:
ART. 100.The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
ART. 101.No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire
whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall
intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.
The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described their
marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in
June 1955 with Nelson Orzame.
Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the
provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined the
defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his
evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose
de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat.
According to the Court of Appeals, the evidence thus presented shows that "plaintiff and defendant were married in
April 5, 1938 by a religious ceremony in Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and had lived thereafter as husband and wife. They
begot several children who are now living with plaintiff. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on several occasions that
his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having found the defendant
carrying marital relations with another man plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture, where
she stayed for one year. Again, plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was going out with several
other men, aside from Jose Arcalas. Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had finished studying her
course, she left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately.

"On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relations with another man by the name of
Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant manifested
her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5,
1955, a petition for legal separation."
The Court of Appeals held that the husband's right to legal separation on account of the defendant's adultery with
Jose Arcalas had prescribed, because his action was not filed within one year from March 1951 when plaintiff
discovered her infidelity. (Art. 102, New Civil Code) We must agree with the Court of Appeals on this point. 1
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, the appellate court found that in the night of June 18, 1955, the husband
upon discovering the illicit connection, expressed his wish to file a petition for legal separation and defendant readily
agreed to such filing. And when she was questioned by the Fiscal upon orders of the court, she reiterated her
conformity to the legal separation even as she admitted having had sexual relations with Nelson Orzame.
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101,
legal separation could not be decreed.
As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of
judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or
files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.2 This is not occur.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment,
inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be
granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law
prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the
actionipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to
prevent it.
The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she "like also" to be legally separated from her husband,
is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated
her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it
takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.
Needless to say, when the court is informed that defendant equally desires the separation and admitted the
commission of the offense, it should be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. (The Court of Appeals did not find
collusion.)
Collusion in divorce or legal separation means the agreement.
. . . between husband and wife for one of them to commit, or to appear to commit, or to be represented in
court as having committed, a matrimonial offense, or to suppress evidence of a valid defense, for the
purpose of enabling the other to obtain a divorce. This agreement, if not express, may be implied from the
acts of the parties. It is a ground for denying the divorce. (Griffiths vs. Griffiths, 69 N. J. Eq. 689 60 Atl. 1099;
Sandoz vs. Sandoz, 107 Ore. 282, 214 Pas. 590.).
In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had
been committed although it was not, or if the parties had connived to bring about a legal separation even in the
absence of grounds therefor.
Here, the offense of adultery had really taking place, according to the evidence. The defendant could not
havefalsely told the adulterous acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to jail the moment her husband
requests the Fiscal to prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at such a personal risk.
In this connection, it has been held that collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the guilty party
confesses to the offense and thus enables the other party to procure evidence necessary to prove it. (Williams vs.
Williams, [N. Y.] 40 N. E. (2d) 1017; Rosenweig vs. Rosenweig, 246 N. Y. Suppl. 231; Conyers, vs. Conyers, 224 S.
W. [2d] 688.).

And proof that the defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, is not by itself collusion. (Pohlman vs.
Pohlman, [N. J.] 46 Atl. Rep. 658.).
We do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in
1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she
"left" him after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered her dates with other men. Consequently, it
was not his duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to return.
Two decisions3 are cited wherein from apparently similar circumstances, this Court inferred the husband's consent to
or condonation of his wife's misconduct. However, upon careful examination, a vital difference will be found: in both
instances, the husband had abandoned his wife; here it was the wife who "left" her husband.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and
decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina
Florenciano. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David,
JJ., concur.

FACTS:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children
who are not living with plaintif. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that
his wife was betraying his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having
found out, he sent the wife to Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed
for one year. Again plaintif discovered that the wife was going out with several other man
other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintif and since
then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintif surprised his wife in the act of having
illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in
1955.
ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment
disallowed by the Family Code.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the
existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of
judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of
judgment, a confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the
adultery independent of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintif. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37720

March 27, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendants-appellants.
Emilio L. Medina for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the crime of adultery to three years, six months and
twenty-one days of prision correccional and appealed to this court, assigning the following error: "The court below erred in not holding
that the offended husband contested to the adultery committed by his wife Ursula Sensano in that he refused to live with her after she
extinguished her previous sentence for the same offense, and by telling her then that she could go where she wanted to and do what
she pleased, and by his silence for seven years notwithstanding that he was informed of said adultery."
The facts briefly stated as follows:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his child, the
husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her
anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she could call, she struggled for an
existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to live with
him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the
husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her
sentence, the accused left her paramour. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for
her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and
promised to be a faithful wife it he would take care her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she
wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she and her
child went back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The husband,
knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as
husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years completely abandoning his said wife
and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he
declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in
any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse,
we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he consented to the
adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any action against the

accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action against the accused during the
said seven years.
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Facts of the Case: A and B, husband and wife, respectively, were legally married. Later, B abandoned A. B Lived with C. A did nothing
to interfere with the relations of his wife and her paramour. He event went to Hawaii, completely abandoning his wife B for more than
seven years. Later, A returned and charged B and C with adultery.
Issue: Is B guilty of adultery?
Decision of the Supreme Court: B should be acquitted because A's conduct warranted the inference that in truth, as well as in fact,
he had consented to the philandering of his wife.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

ONG ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG, petitioner,

vs.
LUCITA G. ONG, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400
which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation
filed by herein respondent, as well as the Resolution2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.3
On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code4before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41 alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
grossly abusive conduct.5
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being
inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her
hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the causes of these fights were petty
things regarding their children or their business; William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using
the buckle of his belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with Williams decision to allow their eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her
and said, "it is none of your business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent quarrel
ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms; when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down
because of the pain, he hit her on the head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sisters
house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents house in Dagupan; the following day, she
went to her parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries.6
William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting language against her, or whipped the children
with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and only went back to their Tondo
house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house. 7
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal separation of plaintiff and defendant,
with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for
which purpose the parties are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can make a
just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
SO ORDERED.8

The RTC found that:

It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and misunderstanding which made
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did
not quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had blamed
her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)
These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation by the defendant against the
plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and
endured the mental and physical anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of
her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste by the plaintiff if the same had
been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace. Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in
plaintiffs memorandum, "it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts
of her home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her
endurance.9
William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated October 8, 2001, the CA found that the
testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family
Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately proven.10
As the CA explained:
The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and credible. Dr. Elinzanos testimony was
able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she
sustained redness in her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish discoloration on
both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these injuries was established by the testimonies of
[Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and
does not deviate from the doctors main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands of her husband,
caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The effect of the so-called alterations in the
Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by [William] does not depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the said
doctor.
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William] inflicted repeated physical violence
upon her during their marriage and that she had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled
invectives at her even in front of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and
"you dont know anything."
These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their conjugal home from 1989 to
1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date.
She was a witness to the kind of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She
observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very violent." She cited several instances
which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.
xxx
That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by [William] have been duly
established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not explained nor controverted by [William], except by making
a general denial thereof. Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be accorded to
the affirmative assertion.
The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her sister. The injurious invectives
hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute
grossly abusive conduct. The aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x11
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.12
Hence the present petition where William claims that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT THE
PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
REMOVING FROM PETITIONER THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAMILY.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR EVIDENCE REPUDIATING
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE
PART OF PETITIONER.13
William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership of properties belonging
to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were
acquired during the marriage through his (Williams) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a decree of legal separation are
Lucitas parents and siblings while such decree would condemn him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and
will taint his reputation, especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked
which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the
trial court that he committed acts of repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established; what
took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the children particularly Charleston, Lucitas favorite
son; marriage being a social contract cannot be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear
and convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses, her sister
Linda Lim, and their parents doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of
their marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to their marital and family life; William
expressed his willingness to receive respondent unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on
December 14, 1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the conjugal properties; the
Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation
of the marital union and not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds should be
clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among the spouses.14
Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present petition are factual; the findings of both
lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC
when confirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William that Lucita filed the
case for legal separation in order to remove from William the control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the
same to Lucitas family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of William and her
children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct of petitioner.15
Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition,16 as well as a Memorandum where he averred for the first time that since
respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family
Code.17 Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by abandoning the family simply because
of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioners in-laws, no
decree of legal separation should be issued in her favor.18
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.19
We resolve to deny the petition.
It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The rule finds more
stringent application where the CA upholds the findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt
the facts as determined by the lower courts.20
The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.21
As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional circumstances, the general rule applies.
Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the records or are based on
substantial evidence.22 In this case, the findings of the RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.

As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife, which made
his life miserable, and he blames her for being negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their
children.23
Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William displayed violent temper against Lucita
and their children; such as: when William threw a steel chair at Lucita;24 threw chairs at their children;25 slapped Lucita and utter insulting
words at her;26 use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children;27pinned Lucita against the wall with his strong arms almost strangling
her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray;28 shouted at Lucita and threw a
directory at her, in front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on his table;29 got mad at
Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and
shouted at her "putang ina mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston;30 and the December 9 and
December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal dwelling.31
Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first. As she related before the trial court:
q. You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were the most serious?
a. Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on the arm and black eye, but on
this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.32
To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the said incidents.33
As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court gives more weight to those of the
former. The Court also gives a great amount of consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
as trial court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the stand, a vantage point denied
appellate tribunals.34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect
and weight having had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.35
In this case, the RTC noted that:
Williams denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by him could not be given much
credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent
upon defendant for their livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as impartial
and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends upon him for support.36
Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of their relationship with her. We do not agree.
Relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witnesss testimony as biased and unworthy of credence37 and a
witness relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or her testimony.38 Considering the detailed
and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial
court, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in order for her side of the family to gain control
of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her
siblings could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to believe. What benefit would Lucita
personally gain by pushing for her parents and siblings financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is
that there truly exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from the courts. As aptly stated
by the RTC,
...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of her home and be
separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which is already beyond her endurance.39
The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also
does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucitas
decision to seek relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.
Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given
ground for legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than
one year.40 As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. 41 The
Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province
of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it and put into operation

the constitutional provisions that protect the same.42With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as
prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a
ground for legal separation, the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the relief she is
entitled to under the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Facts:
On February 25, 1976, Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of P1.00 and other valuable considerations,
executed a quitclaim over a parcel of land in Makati in favor of Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor. On November
19, 1980, Imelda revoked the quitclaim and donated the property to her son Rex. On June 20, 1983, Sandra,
through her guardial ad litem Alfredo Ong, filed an action to recover the land and to declare the donation to
Rex null and void. In their responsive pleading, petitioners claimed that the quitclaim is equivalent to a
donation which requires acceptance by the donee, and since Sandra was a minor, there was no valid
acceptance. The trial court ruled that the quitclaim is equivalent to a sale. The Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the quitclaim is equivalent to a deed of sale or to a deed of donation
Held:
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the
existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of proving such
allegation. Even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code
provides that the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by parents of legal
representatives applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation may have to assume
certain charges or burdens. Donation to an incapacitated donee does not need the acceptance by the lawful
representative if said donation does not contain any condition. In simple and pure donation, the formal
acceptance is not important for the donor requires no right to be protected and the donee neither undertakes to
do anything nor assumes any obligation. The Quitclaim now in question does not impose any condition.

EN BANC
Per Rec. No. L-2555

September 3, 1935

LEONARDO S. BITON, Petitioner, vs. ANDRES MOMONGAN, Respondent.

The respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General for the Government.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The administrative case originated from the complaint for malpractice filed against the respondent attorney. The latter
was a legal practictioner and at the same time a notary public in the City of Cebu, Province of Cebu. On October 26,
1927, he ratified, as notary public, a document entitled "Legal Separation", executed by the spouses Leonardo Biton
and Fortunata Quijano, as husband and wife, wherein it was agreed that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that
they renounced their rights and obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to
which they might be entitled and each promising not to be a witness against the
other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The respondent admits that he ratified the document without reading its contents, but that he was not the one who
prepared it. The complainant testified that the respondent prepared the document and that it was drawn up to
conform with the respondent's legal advice to him and his wife. The latter asserts that it was her husband who had
prepared the document. In the face of this evidence, we are of the opinion that it is preponderantly in favor of the
respondent's claim that he did not draft the document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It seems evident that the respondent ratified the document with knowledge of its contents. It is unbelievable that he
had merely asked the parties to the document if the acknowledged its contents without he himself being familiar
therewith. The word "pleases" appearing on the second line of the second paragraph has the respondent's initial's
stamped over it. The latter admitted his initials and the authorship of the amendment. This admission necessarily
implies knowledge of the contents of the document, for otherwise it would not have been possible for the respondent
to make the amendment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The contract acknowledged by the respondent is indubitably illegal and immoral. Its covenants are contrary to laws,
morals, and good customs, and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family. The ratification of a
contract of this type, executed by a notary public who is a practicing attorney at the same time, constitutes
malpractice, and as a disciplinary measure, this court may impose even disbarment. (Paganiban vs.Borromeo, 58
Phil., 367.)chanrobles virtual law library
In imposing the punishment, there should be taken into account the recommendation for leniency made by the judge
who conducted the investigation, and the circumstance that the respondent has been undoubtedly suspended from
the office of notary public to which he will not be reappointed for an indefinite period; wherefore, we hold the
respondent Andres Momongan guilty of malpractice, and he is hereby severely censured. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Butte, Goddard, and Recto, JJ.,concur.