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Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the
consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death
is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death.
NOTES:
What are dying declarations?
Dying declarations are the statements made by a person after the mortal
wounds have been inflicted, under the belief that death is certain, stating the
facts concerning the cause of, and the circumstances surrounding the
homicide. (Wharton's Criminal Evidence)
to
the
cause
and
the
surrounding
the officer who would be testifying in court. The officer has no personal
knowledge of the event. If the dying declaration of X is offered to prove the
guilt of Y, the testimony of the officer in court is definitely hearsay. The dying
declaration of X is however, an exception to the inadmissibility of hearsay
evidence. There has been a traditional acceptance of dying declarations
because of the presumption that a dying person will tell the truth before he
meets his Creator. While there is no guarantee that a person in the throes of
death will tell the truth, this assumption has been traditionally accepted for
almost two hundred years, an assumption which has trickled down to
modern times.
The most significant element therefore, of a dying declaration is that the
declaration must have been conscious of his impending death. It is this
consciousness which is assumed to be the compelling motive to tell the
truth.
To be admissible as a dying declaration, the declaration must relate to the
cause and circumstances of the declarant. Any statement he makes not
related to the circumstances of his death is inadmissible as a dying
declaration.
The dying declaration is admissible in any case provided the subject of
inquiry in that case is the death of the declarant. The old rule that it is
admissible only in a criminal case no longer holds true because of the
phraseology of Sec. 37 of Rule 130.
It is required that the declarant should die. If he lives, there is no need for
the dying declaration because the declarant may testify personally based on
his own personal knowledge. Suppose by chance he survives but is unable to
testify due to severe physical and emotional infirmity, may his declaration be
admitted in evidence? Yes but not as a dying declaration. It could be
admitted as a statement made by a person immediately subsequent to a
startling occurrence. The shooting of the declarant is the startling
occurrence. The statement made as to the circumstances of the shooting,
while not a dying declaration because he survived, could be considered as
part of the res gestae under Sec. 42 of Rule 130.
Intervening time from the making of the declaration up to the actual death
is immaterial as long as the declaration was made under the consciousness
of impending death and as long as no retraction was made by the declarant
before his death
CASES:
People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)
Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim
was about to be taken to the hospital, a patrolman was able to get his
statement as to the identity of the perpetrators. The victim was unable to
sign the statement and he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of
considerable time between the commission of the offense and the taking of
the statement. However, the statement amounts to a dying declaration, as it
is a statement coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs
hours or days after it was inflicted if there be showing that it was due to the
wound whose gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration
until the end came. There is no need for proof that the declarant state "that
he has given up the hope of life. It is enough if. from the circumstances, it
can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of mind. It
is sufficient that the circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the
conclusion that the time [of such statement] the declarant did not expect to
survive the injury from which he actually died. Its admissibility is not
affected by death occurring hours or days afterwards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the
sand at the bank of a river. Pablos hands were tied on his back and he was
lying face down. The barrio captain took Pablos ante-mortem statement and
learned that he was Pablo Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and
that Pablo was not sure if he would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered.
Pablo died in the hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was charged and convicted
of Murder. Laquinon argues that the statement is not a dying declaration
because it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a
dying declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would
die or not. The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself
in extremis, at the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct,
which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception
to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae
since the statement was made immediately after the incident and the
deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a charge against
the accused.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was
incomplete. The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible
sentence. The phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question
asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo,
Apo, who did this to you?" The deceased was cut off by death before she
could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court
simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had
intended to name her killer. But Eulalia herself did not say so and we cannot
speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death
not interrupted her. We are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying
declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision.
Under the context, what else could have Si Paqui meant other than that he
was responsible for the crime?
People vs. Antonio (1970)
Where the declarant stated that he would not die if treated, such statement
indicates an awareness of death and the nature of his wound and his death
an hour later qualifies such statement into a dying declaration, or at least, as
part of res gestae.
People vs. Gueron (1983)
Where, shortly after he was wounded, the victim was asked as to whether he
believed he would die and to which he replied, I cannot ascertain, and he
died the following day, his statement is admissible both as part of res gestae
and as a dying declaration.
People vs. Laquinon (1985)
Where the victim, when asked as to whether he thought he would die,
replied, I dont know, his declaration was not made under the
consciousness of his imminent death and does not qualify as an antemortem
statement, although the same may be admitted as part of the res gestae
since it was made immediately after the incident
The credibility and weight of the admitted dying declaration should be
determined under the same rules used in other testimonial evidence
A dying declaration is admissible only to insofar as it refers to facts
regarding the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death