Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 76873

October 26, 1989

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed

UYGUANGCO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents.
Constantino G. Jaraula for petitioners.
Anthony Santos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before the Court is not the status of the private respondent, who has been excluded
from the family and inheritance of the petitioners. What we are asked to decide is whether he
should be allowed to prove that he is an illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already
dead, in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the Civil Code.
The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 1 The latter
court held that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without
jurisdiction in allowing the private respondent to prove his filiation. Moreover, the proper
remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for
a
reversal of these rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with law
and
jurisprudence.
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife, Dorotea, four legitimate children
(her co-petitioners herein), and considerable properties which they divided among themselves. 2
Claiming to be an illegitimate son of the deceased Apolinario, and having been left out in the
extrajudicial settlement of his estate, Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco filed a complaint for partition
against all the petitioners. 3
Graciano alleged that he was born in 1952 to Apolinario Uyguangco and Anastacia Bacjao and
that at the age of 15 he moved to his father's hometown at Medina, Misamis Oriental, at th
e
latter's urging and also of Dorotea and his half-brothers. Here he received support from his father
while he was studying at the Medina High School, where he eventually graduated. He was also

assigned by his father, without objection from the rest of the family, as storekeeper at th
e
Uyguangco store in Mananom from 1967 to 1973. 4
In the course of his presentation of evidence at the trial, the petitioners elicited an admission
from Graciano that he had none of the documents mentioned in Article 278 to show that he was
the illegitimate son of Apolinario Uyguangco. 5 These are "the record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or (in) any authentic writing." The petitioners thereupon moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground that the private respondent could no longer prove his alleged
filiation under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code. 6
Specifically, the petitioners argued that the only evidence allowed under Article 278 to prove the
private respondent's claim was not available to him as he himself had admitted. Neither could he
now resort to the provisions of Article 285 because he was already an adult when his alleged
father died in 1975, and his claim did not come under the exceptions. The said article provides as
follows:
ART. 285.
The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the
lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1)
If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2)
If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of whic
h
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
As earlier related, the motion to dismiss was denied, prompting the petitioners to seek relief in
vain from the respondent court. In the case now before us, the petitioners reiterate and emphasize
their position that allowing the trial to proceed would only be a waste of time and effort. They
argue that the complaint for partition is actually an action for recognition as an illegitimate child,
which, being already barred, is a clear attempt to circumvent the said provisions. The private
respondent insists, on the other hand, that he has a right to show under Article 283 that he is "in
continuous possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter
or of his family."
We find that this case must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because
the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase. The Civil Code provisions
they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified, by the corresponding articles in the
Family Code, which became effective on August 3,1988.
Under the Family Code, it is provided that:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.

The following provision is therefore also available to the private respondent in proving his
illegitimate filiation:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1)

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2)

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

While the private respondent has admitted that he has none of the documents mentioned in the
first paragraph (which are practically the same documents mentioned in Article 278 of the Civil
Code except for the "private handwritten instrument signed by the parent himself'''), he insists
that he has nevertheless been "in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate
child," which is now also admissible as evidence of filiation.
Thus, he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, receiving support from him
during that time; that he has been using the surname Uyguangco without objection from his
father and the petitioners as shown in his high school diploma, a special power of attorne
y
executed in his favor by Dorotea Uyguangco, and another one by Sulpicio Uyguangco; that he
has shared in the profits of the copra business of the Uyguangcos, which is a strictly famil
y
business; that he was a director, together with the petitioners, of the Alu and Sons Development
Corporation, a family corporation; and that in the addendum to the original extrajudicia
l
settlement concluded by the petitioners he was given a share in his deceased father's estate. 7
It must be added that the illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation
by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptism
al
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other
kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 8
The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he seeks to prove his filiation
under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, his action is now barred because
of his alleged father's death in 1975. The second paragraph of this Article 175 reads as follows:
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought

during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (Italics supplied.)

It is clear that the private respondent can no longer be allowed at this time to introduce evidence
of his open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child or prove his alleged
filiation through any of the means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The simple
reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of
his alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
In her Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy explains the
rationale of the rule, thus: "It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicl
y
recognized, illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who then can be sure of their filiation but the
parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the illegitimate child of a certain
person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be given t
he
opportunity to affirm or deny the child's filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is
already dead." 9
Finally, it must be observed that the provisions invoked by the parties are among those affected
by the following articles in the Family Code:
Art. 254.
Titles III, IV, V, VI VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I of Republic Act No. 386,
otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17,18,19, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Art. 256.
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Graciano's complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario
Uyguangco, whose estate is the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be
proved in an action for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint,
where the issue of Graciano's filiation is being raised only collaterally. The complaint is indeed a
circumvention of Article 172, which allows proof of the illegitimate child's filiation under the
second paragraph thereof only during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Considering that the private respondent has, as we see it, established at least prima facie proof of
his alleged filiation, we find it regrettable that his action should be barred under the said article.
But that is the law and we have no choice but to apply it. Even so, the Court expresses the hope
that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement, based on fraternal and moral ties if not
the strict language of the law, that will allow the private respondent an equitable share in the
disputed estate. Blood should tell.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and Civil Case No. 9067 in the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, is hereby DISMISSED. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992

MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dat
ed
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named
Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo
also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had
three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was

still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p.
39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino,
Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial
partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the
registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of th
e
above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said
lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to
the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together
with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and
that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage)
were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of
their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2,
1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel
Santos were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join
the suit as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed
to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause o
f
action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition
of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in
an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited b
y
counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is
therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim wer
e
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of thei
r

continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence
fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp.
67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial cou
rt
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate
children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . .
" (Rollo, pp. 1415).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the
third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing th
e
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise
the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and
directing all the parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo
Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for
lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7
,
1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred
private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b)
whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able
to prove their successional rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however,
on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui . . .
and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui
had
repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have
continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the
deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are
entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among
others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in
favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally
one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised
only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals

correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the
law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citin
g
Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children
of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his)
mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such
.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered
to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo,
133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife,
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being
no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happene
d
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb),
(cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's
Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230
[1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . .
(Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs.

City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship
is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven
.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must
be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have bee
n
overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of
children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open an
d
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth
certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to
disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other
private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the
documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance
as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor
details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa
in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be
noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in the affidavit of
Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina
Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollaril
y,
prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition
does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA
532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano
vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition
is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On
the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed th
e
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners
to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in
1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552
[1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied
by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them. Pu
t
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their relationship to privat
e
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld privat
e
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962,
he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the
property left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not
to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacint
o
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint fro
m
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a vali
d
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in

possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it ha
s
likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no
argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there
was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of
title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their coheirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondent
s
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private respondent
s
commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered in
their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[A M. No. P-94-1054. March 11, 2003]
EDWIN A. ACEBEDO, petitioner, vs. EDDIE P. ARQUERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint[1] dated June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero,
Process Server of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality.
Complainant alleged that his wife, Dedje Irader Acebedo, a former stenographer of the MTC
Brookes Point, and respondent unlawfully and scandalously cohabited as husband and wife at
Bancudo Pulot, Brookes Point, Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero,
was born to the two on May 21, 1989. Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal
Certificate[2] reflecting the names of respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Also attached
to the letter-complainant was a copy of a marriage contract[3] showing that complainant and
Dedje Irader contracted marriage on July 10, 1979.
By Resolution of September 7, 1994, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the
complaint.[4]

By his Answer[5] of October 6, 1994, respondent vehemently denied the charge of immorality,
claiming that it is just a (sic) mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred an
d
extreme jealousy to (sic) his wife.[6] Attached to the answer were the September 27, 1987
affidavit of desistance[7] executed by complainant in favor of his wife with respect to a
n
administrative complaint he had much earlier filed against her, and complainants sworn
statement[8] dated September 13, 1994 acknowledging paternity of a child born out of wedlock,
which documents, respondent claims, support his contention that the complaint filed against him
is but a malicious scheme concocted by complainant to harass him.
Additionally, respondent claimed that sometime in 1991, complainant likewise instituted a
criminal complaint against him for adultery which was, however, dismissed after preliminary
investigation.
Finally, respondent claimed that complainant himself had been cohabiting with another woman.
By Resolution of February 6, 1995, this Court referred the case to then Executive Judg
e
Filomeno A. Vergara of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan for investigation,
report and recommendation.[9] Judge Vergara having retired during the pendency of the
investigation, the case was referred to Executive Judge Nelia Y. Fernandez who was, b
y
Resolution of August 16, 2000, directed by this Court to (1) verify the authenticity of th
e
marriage certificate and baptismal certificate submitted by complainant; (2) conduct a
n
investigation as to the information contained in the said baptismal certificate and t
he
circumstances under which it was issued, and such other verifiable matters relevant to the
charge; and (3) submit her report and recommendation thereon.[10]
In her Investigation Report of February 12, 2001, Judge Fernandez recommends that th
e
complaint be dismissed for failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that respondent is guilty
of the charge.[11] The report focuses on the non-appearance of complainant and Dedje Irader
Acebedo, thusly:
xxx
Having appeared that the complainant Edwin Acebedo and Dedjie Irader who per reliable
information cannot be notified for reason that subject persons are no longer residing in their
given address and their whereabouts is unknown as shown by the return of the subpoena dated
November 7, 2000, and the inadmissibility of the baptismal certificate alleging therein that the
father of Desiree Arquero is the respondent herein, and for the reason that the same had not been
testified to by Dedje Irader who is the informant of the entries contained therein, this Court had
not received adequate proof or relevant evidence to support a conclusion that respondent herein
could be held liable of the charge imputed against him, hence, he should be absolved from any

liability.
x x x[12] (Quoted verbatim).
By Resolution of April 25, 2001, this Court referred the case to the Office of the Co
urt
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
By Memorandum of December 12, 2001, the OCA, disagreeing with the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed, recommends that respondent be held
guilty of immorality and that he be suspended from office for a period of one (1) year without
pay.[13] Thus the OCA ratiocinates:
. . . [R]espondent admitted the fact that for eight (8) to nine (9) months, he a single m
an
maintained relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo, wife of herein complainant, attended with
sexual union (TSN dated 23 November 2000, pp. 14-15).
Based on his testimony,
we
observed that respondent justified his having a relationship with Dedje I. Acebedo solely on the
written document purportedly a Kasunduan or agreement entered into by complainant and his
wife, consenting to and giving freedom to either of them to seek any partner and to live with him
or her. Being a court employee respondent should have known that said agreement was void
despite it having been notarized. Even granting that Dedjie I. Acebedo was separated from her
husband during their short lived relation, to hold on to said scandalous agreement and enter an
immoral relationship with a very much married woman and a co-court-employee at that is highly
improper. It is contrary to the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and
Employees which provides that public employees of which respondent is one, xxx shall at
times (sic) respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. Moreover,
respondent cannot seek refuge and sling mud at complainant for having executed an Affidavit
dated September 13, 1994, acknowledging that he bore a woman other than his wife, a child. It
would seem that respondent would want to apply the principle of in pari delicto in the instant
case. Respondent would have it appear that a married man with an extra-marital relation and an
illegitimate child is precluded from complaining if his wife enters into a relationship wit
h
another man.
Second, the records show that an Affidavit of Desistance was executed by herein complainant.
However, a cursory reading of said document reveals that it favors only Dedje Irader Acebedo
and not herein respondent. Interestingly, the date of said affidavit is 2 September 1987.
Respondent had the temerity to claim it as evidence in his favor when the instant complaint was
only filed sometime in 1994.
Third, when respondent was asked by the investigating judge if he attended the baptism of the
daughter of Dedje Irader Acebedo, his former co-employee and ex-intimate friend, he answered,
I did not. Im not sure the child is mine. From his answer, we could infer that respondent did

not categorically rule out the possibility that said child might be her (sic) daughter, only that he is
doubtful of her paternity.
x x x[14] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original).
While complainant appears to have lost interest in the prosecution of the present case, the same
does not ipso facto warrant its dismissal. Once administrative charges have been filed, this Court
may not be divested of its jurisdiction to investigate and ascertain the truth thereof.[15] For it has
an interest in the conduct of those in the service of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of
justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the complainants
desistance from prosecuting the case he initiated.[16]
On the merits of the case, the entry of respondents name as father in the baptismal certificate of
Desiree May I. Arquero cannot be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be availed of
to imply that respondent maintained illicit relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo. A canonical
certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered, in conformity with the rites of
the Catholic Church by the priest who baptized the child, but it does not prove the veracity of
the declarations and statements contained therein which concern the relationship of the person
baptized.[17] It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit,
the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of t
he
statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.[18]
By respondents own admission, however, he had an illicit relationship with complainants wife:
Q: During the formal offer of the possible nature of your testimony before the Court by your
counsel, did the Court get it correct that there has been a short lived relation between you and
Dedgie Irader, am I correct in my impression?
A: During that time that I have heard she and her husband have parted ways already, I jokingly
informed her that she is now being separated, she is now single and is free to have so
me
commitment. So, I courted her and she accepted me, so we have a short lived relation and after
that we parted ways.
Q:

For how long was this short lived relation you made mention a while ago?

A:

May be (sic) about eight (8) to nine (9) months.

Q: When you said you have (sic) a short lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you mean to tell
the Court that you have (sic) a sexual union with this woman?
A:

Yes maam.[19] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Respondent justified his pursuing a relationship with complainants wife with the spouses having
priorly entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage which was embodied in
a
Kasunduan, the pertinent portions of which are reproduced hereunder:

Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na taong
gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Brokes (sic) Point,
Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable lamang ang
aming mga buhay kung aming ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama bilang mag-asawa, kami
ay malayang nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin
ay may kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi kami
maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang hukuman;
x x x[20] (Italics supplied).
Respondents justification fails. Being an employee of the judiciary, respondent ought to have
known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the validity of the marriage
between complainant and his wife. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is an
inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order or policy, governed by rule
s
established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.[21]
Republic Act 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, enunciates the States policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service.[22]
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual than in the judiciary.[23]
That is why this Court has firmly laid down exacting standards of morality and decency expected
of those in the service of the judiciary.[24] Their conduct, not to mention behavior,
is
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility,[25] characterized by, among other things,
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the publics respect and confidence in the judicial
service.[26] It must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to their duties in
the judicial branch but also to their behavior outside the court as private individuals.[27] There is
no dichotomy of morality; court employees are also judged by their private morals.[28]
Respondents act of having illicit relations with complainants wife is, within the purview of
Section 46 (5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful and immoral conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and dismissal
is imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against respondent constitutes his first offense, his
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day is in order.

WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the Municipal
Trial Court of Brookes Point, Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he is hereby
SUSPENDED for six (6) months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that
commission of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with severely.
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the personal record of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39381

July 18, 1975

FELISA LIM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-39033

July 18, 1975

GUADALUPE ENRIQUEZ UY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA LIM, respondents.
Juanito R. Sagun for Felisa Lim.
Pedro G. Uy and Francisco D. Bacabac for Guadalupe Enriquez Uy.

CASTRO, J.:
These two petitions for certiorari were separately filed by Felisa Lim and Guadalupe Enriquez
Uy to review the decision dated June 6, 1974 of the Court of Appeals, and the resolutions dated
September 12, 1974 and July 18, 1974 of the same court denying their respective motions for
reconsideration. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
In 1962 Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel Romualdez Uy Chen Hong in the
Court of First Instance of Manila for (1) declaration of nullity of the affidavit Uy executed in
which he adjudicated to himself, as the only son and heir of Susana Lim, a lot (120 squar
e

meters) with the house thereon located at Tayabas St., Sta. Cruz, Manila; (2) cancellation of the
certificate of title issued in the name of Uy; and (3) issuance of a new transfer certificate of title
in her favor.
Both Uy and Felisa Lim claimed they inherited, to the exclusion of each other, the property in
question from Susana Lim. Felisa Lim claims to be the natural daughter of Susana Lim. To
support her claim, she presented (1) her certificate of baptism, which certificate states that Felisa
Lim is the natural daughter of Susana Lim; and (2) her marriage contract, which contract states
that Susana Lim gave consent to Felisa Lim's mother. Felisa Lim also alleges continuou
s
possession of the status of a natural child.
On the other hand, Uy claimed to be the only son and heir of Susana Lim. To support his claim,
he presented, among others, (1) his application for alien registration in the Bureau
of
Immigration, which application names Susana Lim as Uy's mother; (2) the order of the Bureau of
Immigration cancelling his alien registration, which order describes Uy as a Filipino citizen by
derivation from his mother Susana Lim; and (3) his identification certificate issued by the Bureau
of Immigration, which certificate likewise describes Uy as a citizen of the Philippines b
y
derivation from his mother Susana Lim.
On November 22, 1967 the court a quo, after finding Felisa Lim as "the daughter and only heir"
of Susana Lim, rendered judgment declaring the affidavit executed by Uy null and void, and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila (1) to cancel the registration of the said affidavit, (2) to
cancel the certificate of title in the name of Uy, and (3) to issue a new transfer certificate of title
in favor of Felisa Lim.
Uy then moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision and asked for new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. This motion for reconsideration and new trial the court a
quo denied.
Uy appealed to the Court of Appeals. 1 On June 6, 1974 the appellate court reversed t
he
judgment dated November 22, 1967 of the court a quo and dismissed the complaint. Th
e
appellate court ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor Uy "is entitled to the inheritance because neither
of them had been recognized by Susana Lim as her child by any of the means provided for by
law; and neither had either of them been declared in a judicial proceeding to be a child of Susana
Lim." Both parties' subsequent respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
Hence the present recourse by both parties against the judgement dated June 6, 1974 of the
appellate court as well its resolutions dated September 12,1974 and July 18, 1974 denying their
respective motions for reconsideration.
In L-39381, Felisa Lim assails the finding of the appellate court that she "has no right to inherit
from Susana Lim, even on the assumption that she is her natural daughter, as she had not been

recognized by any of the means provided for by the New Civil Code." Felisa Lim alleges that
Susana Lim's consent to her marriage, given pursuant to Act 3613 (The Marriage Law
),
amounted to an admission and recognition on the part of Susana Lim that she (Felisa) is her
natural daughter. Felisa Lim adds that the records in the office of the Local Civil Registrar
pertaining to her marriage license, "together with the supporting papers which included the
consent given by Susana Lim, were destroyed during the liberation of the City of Manila."
However, that Susana Lim gave consent to her marriage, Felisa Lim asserts, the marriage
contract evinces. Felisa Lim states that the marriage contract partakes of a public document and
thus fulfills the provisions of the old Civil Code (re recognition "in some other publ
ic
document") and the new Civil Code (re recognition "in any authentic writing").
In L-39033, Guadalupe Enriquez Uy takes exception to the appellate court's non-adjudication of
the property in question in favor of her husband. The finding of the appellate court that he
r
husband "is not likewise entitled to inherit from Susana Lim" makes no difference, she states, for
her husband purchased the property in question "with his own money prior to his mother's death
and took conveyance and title thereof" in his mother's name in deference to her since "she gave
him a little amount to complete the purchase price."
L-39381
At the outset, it should be noted that Felisa Lim claims that her recognition by Susana Lim as her
(the latter's) natural child took place in 1943. Since the recognition allegedly took place during
the effectivity of the Civil Code of 1889, such recognition should be reckoned in accordance
with the requisites established by the said Civil Code. For, the law in force at the time of the
recognition governs the act of recognition.
Section 131 of the Civil Code of 1889 requires that the recognition of a natural child "be made in
the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document." Felisa Lim argues that he
r
marriage contract partakes of a public document.
According to article 1216 of the Civil Code of 1889, public documents "are those authenticated
by a notary or by a competent public official, with the formalities required by law." Thus, "there
are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office." 2 "The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by whic
h
recognition may be made belongs to the first class." 3
The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity
prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified
by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take each other
as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and the said

witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract does not
possess the requisites of a public document of recognition. Be it remembered that recognition,
under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn." 4
L-39033
Uy claims that her husband purchased the property in question with his own money prior to
Susana Lim's death but took conveyance thereof in her name. In the circumstances, she alleges,
an implied trust exists in favor of her husband. She questions the statement made by the appellate
court in its resolution dated July 18, 1974 denying her motion for reconsideration, whic
h
statement reads: "The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony cannot overcome the
fact that the sale was made to Susana Lim and title issued in her favor."
An implied trust arises "where a person purchases land with his own money and tak
es
conveyance thereof in the name of another. In such a case, the property is held on a resulting
trust in favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the transfer, unless a different intention
or understanding appears. The trust which results under such circumstances does not arise from
contract or agreement of the parties, but from the facts and circumstances, that is to say, it results
because of equity and arises by implication or operation of law." 5
To support her allegation regarding the existence of an implied trust, Uy presented excerpts from
the respective testimonies of her deceased husband, her husband's half-brother, and the former
owner of the property in question. These testimonies, as excerpted, tend to prove (1) that the
deceased Uy received a P10,000 legacy from his father; (2) that he purchased the property in
question; and (3) that the name of Susana Lim appeared on the deed of sale.
It is thus asserted that the deceased Uy furnished the consideration, although he asked Susana
Lim for a little amount to complete the purchases price of the property in question, and tha
t
having supplied the greater portion of the purchase money, he intended the purchase for his own
benefit.
It is our view that two countervailing circumstances militate against Uy's theory of an implied
trust in favor of her husband. (1) Uy raised the theory of implied trust for the first time in her
motion for reconsideration filed with the appellate court; (2) the evidence regarding the alleged
purchase by her late husband is altogether unconvincing.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109144

August 19, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MORENO L. TUMIMPAD, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Miguel M. Lingating for accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Constable Moreno L. Tumimpad and co-accused Constable Ruel C. Prieto
were charged with the crime of rape committed against a 15-year old Mongoloid child in a
complaint dated on May 24, 1991, signed by her mother, Mrs. Pastora L. Salcedo, which reads:
That during the period between the last week of March 1989 and the first week of April 1989, in
Barangay Lower Lamac, Oroquieta City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thi
s
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have
(sic) carnal knowledge with Sandra Salcedo, complainant's daughter, a woman who is
a
mongoloid and so weak of mind and in intellect as to be capable of giving rational and lega
l
consent. 1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and due trial
ensued.
The facts as established by evidence are as follows:
Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and daughter of Lt. Col.
Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-year old child, who still needed
to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was limited and most of the time she expressed herself
by motions.
Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four security
men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel Prieto and accusedappellant Moreno Tumimpad.
The Salcedo family, composed of Col. Salcedo, his wife Pastora, his son Alexander and wife and
daughter Sandra, lived in a two-storey officers' quarters inside Camp Lucas Naranjo, Provincial
Headquarters, in Oroquieta City. The upper storey of the house was occupied by Col. Salcedo,
his wife and Sandra while the lower storey had two (2) rooms, one of which was occupied by the
four security men and the other by Alexander Salcedo and his wife.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo then brought
her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given to Sandra but h
er
condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody. She felt sick and unhappy.
The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from the kitchen
and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos." 2
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo, worried of her daughter's condition, brought her to Regina Hospital.
Sandra was able to relieve herself the following day but still remained moody and irritable. She
refused to take a bath in spite of scoldings from her mother. She did not want to eat a
nd
whenever she did, she would vomit.
Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol, t
he
examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist, conducted the
urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant. 3 Mrs. Pastora Salcedo could not
believe that her daughter was pregnant and so she brought Sandra to Madonna and Chil
d
Hospital in Cagayan de Oro City. Dr. Kho, and OB-GYNE Specialist, examined Sandra and
subjected her to a pelvic ultra-sound examination. The results were positive. The fetu
s'
gestational age was equivalent to 17.1 weeks. 4 Another ultra-sound examination at the United
Doctors Medical Center (UDMC) at Quezon City on September 11, 1989 confirmed that she was
indeed pregnant. 5
On January 11, 1990, Sandra gave birth to a baby boy who was named Jacob Salcedo. Hence, the
filing of the complaint 6 by Mrs. Pastora Salcedo.
During the investigation conducted by the CIS, about thirty (30) pictures of different persons
were laid on the table and Sandra was asked to pick up the pictures of her assailants. Sandr
a
singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 7 Later, Sandra was brought out
of the investigation room to a police line-up of ten people, including Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto. She was again asked to point to her assailants. Without hesitation, Sandra fingered
Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto. 8
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified that she requested her two daughters-in-law, Joy Salcedo and
Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who sexually molested her. 9
Joy confirmed in her testimony that she asked Sandra who sexually molested her. Sandra
revealed that Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto were the ones who raped her. Sandr
a
demonstrated how she was raped. First, her thighs were touched, then she was hugged and her
panty was taken off. A push and pull movement followed. 10 Celsa testified that she was present

when the victim demonstrated how she was sexually abused by the two accused, including the
way her nipples were touched saying "dito hawak," and holding her breasts to emphasize. She
likewise went through the motion of removing her panty, uttering at the same time "hubad
panty."
Sandra identified in open court accused Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto as the persons who
raped her and said she wished them dead, as they did something bad to her. 11 She once again
demonstrated how she was sexually abused. She held her two thighs with her two hands next to
her sexual organ saying, "panty" and then placed her hand on her breast and gestured as if she
were sucking. She also touched her private organ and made a push and pull movement. 12
During the trial, the accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood Grouping Test" and
"Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her child Jacob and the two accused.
The result of the test conducted by the Makati Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a
type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo type "B", accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant
type "O".
Both accused anchored their defense on mere denial contending that it was impossible for them
to have committed the crime of rape.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted Moreno Tumimpad of the crime charged but
acquitted the other accused, Ruel Prieto, on reasonable doubt, stating that he "has a different type
of blood with (sic) the child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is "A", while that of child Jacob
Salcedo is
type "O".
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, PO1 Moreno Tumimpad,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, as charged in the information, and pursuant
to the provisions of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there being
no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, said accused
Moreno Tumimpad is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
indemnify the offended girl, Sandra Salcedo, in the amount of P20,000.00; and to suffer the other
accessory penalties provided for by laws; and to pay the costs of the proceedings.
On reasonable doubt, accused Ruel Prieto is hereby declared ACQUITTED from the charge.
SO ORDERED. 13
Accused-appellant assigns the following as errors of the lower court:
1.
The lower court erred in not appreciating the impossibility of committing the offense
charged without detection.
2.
The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant base on major blood grouping
test known as ABO and RHS test, not a paternal test known as chromosomes or HLA test.

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Accused-appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime of rape
because most of the time he and his co-accused Ruel Prieto were together with Col. Salcedo on
inspection tours while the victim was always in the company of her mother. He further contends
that it was likewise impossible for Sandra, if she had really been molested, not to have shouted
out of pain, she being a virgin. As if adding insult to injury, accused-appellant suggests that it
was Sandra's brother, Cristopher Salcedo, allegedly a drug user, who could have raped her.
We are not convinced.
It is true that the accused usually went with Col. Salcedo during inspection tours but sometimes
they were left behind and would play pingpong or card games with Sandra at the ground floor of
the house. While Sandra was always with her mother, there were times when she was left alone
in the house with the accused. 14
Mrs. Pastora Salcedo testified:
Q

How many security men remain if you can recall when your husband reported for work?

Two (2).

Who were these security men who remained?

Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel Prieto.

How about the 2 other security men Tanggan and Colaljo?

A
My husband sent (sic) them for an errand and sometime they used to go with my husband
to the office.
Q
Every time when your husband is out what they do while they were (sic) at t
he
headquarter?
A
I saw them sleeping and sometime they were playing at the porch with my daughter
Sandra playing pingpong and sometime they were listening music.
Q

Where did they play usually take place?

Living room. 15

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q
By the say, (sic) Mrs. Salcedo, you said a while ago when you were at the headquarters
you were able to do your choirs, (sic) doing laundry jobs in the second storey of your house. Do
you know where is your daughter Sandra at that time?

Yes, she spent her time at the second floor.

What part of the ground floor she used (sic) to stay?

Because she is found (sic) of music she stay in the living room.

Did she has (sic) any playmates?

Moreno and Prieto.

Have you seen actually the 2 accused playing with your daughter?

Yes, playing pingpong and playing cards. 16

The victim more than once positively identified accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad as one of
the perpetrators of the crime. First, during the investigation conducted by the CIS, Sandra singled
out accused-appellant and his co-accused from among the thirty (30) pictures of different persons
shown to her. Second, at the police lineup of several persons, likewise conducted by the CIS,
Sandra once again unerringly pointed accused-appellant and his co-accused as the ones who
raped her. Third, in open court, Sandra without hesitation, pointed to accused- appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
The following is the victim's own testimony:
PROS. RAMOS:
Will you please demonstrate before this Honorable Court what Moreno and Ruel did to you?
RECORD:
The witness when she stood up held both her thighs (sic) with her two hand (sic) down to her
sexual organ saying a word "panty" and she placed her hand on her breast and did something as
if sucking and held her private part (sic) and did a push and pull movement and she cried.
Q
When you said that there was a push and pull movement of the body and when this was
being done did you feel pain?
A

Yes pain.

What part of your body is painful?

RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q

Did you also see blood on your sexual organ?

Yes.

Where did you see these blood?

RECORD:
The witness touching her private parts.
Q

When this push and pull movement was being made, did you see a man's organ?

Yes sir.

Where did you see this male organ?

Witness touching her private part.

Who did this to you, who removed your panty?

Moreno and Ruel.

Did you see Moreno taking off his pants?

Yes.

Did you see his sex organ?

The witness touching her private parts.

How about this Ruel, did you see if he taken (sic) off his pants?

A
Q

Yes.
Did you see his sex organ?

Yes, witness again touching her private part.

Both of them?

Yes.

Where did Moreno and Ruel removed (sic) your panty?

Moreno.

In your house?

Yes.

What part of your house did Moreno and Ruel remove your panty?

Downstairs Moreno and Ruel remove panty.

What part of the ground floor, was it outside or inside the room?

In the room.

When (sic) Moreno and Ruel are inside the courtroom now, can you point to them?

Yes.

Will you please point to them?

PROS. RAMOS:
May we request the accused to stand up your honor?
RECORD:
Both accused stood up from where they were sitting inside the courtroom.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person (prosecutor Ramos point to accused Moreno Tumimpad)?
A

Moreno.

RECORD:
The witness pointing to a certain person who is standing and when asked what is his name, he
readily answered that he is Moreno Tumimpad.
PROS. RAMOS:
Who is that person standing besides Moreno?
A

Joel.

PROS. RAMOS:
If your honor please, she could not pronounced (sic) well the word Ruel but the way she called
this name is Joel which refers to the same person who is one of the accused in this case. 17
Melinda Joy Salcedo, the victim's sister-in-law, testified that Sandra demonstrated to her how she
was ravished by the two accused, thus:
Q

Now, will you please tell us what did Sandra Salcedo told (sic) you as to how she was

abused?
A

By what she had stated there were also actions that she made.

Q
Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how did Sandra Salcedo was abused
as narrated or demonstrated to you by Sandra Salcedo?
A
According to her she was held in her thigh and then she was hugged and then the panty
was taken off and making a push and pull movement (witness demonstration by holding her
thigh)?
Q
Now, after Sandra Salcedo told you and demonstrated to you how she was abused. What
else did Sandra Salcedo tell you if she had told you any more matter?
A

She did not say anything more.

Now, when Sandra Salcedo refused to talk or say anything else. What happened next?

Then it was Celsa who asked her.

Where were you when Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo?

I was just beside her.

Q
You said that after Sandra Salcedo refused to talk, Celsa did the questioning, did you hear
the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?
A

Yes.

And what was the question being asked by Celsa to Sandra Salcedo?

Celsa asked Sandra Salcedo as to what other things that these two had done to her?

And what if any did Sandra Salcedo tell you as to what was done to her?

By way of talking and action.

And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo?

He (sic) answered it by action and talking.

Q
And what was the answer of Sandra Salcedo as related by her to Celsa through words and
action?
RECORD:
The witness demonstrated by holding his (sic) nipple going down to her thigh.

What else had transpired next?

No more.

Q
Now, whenever Sandra Salcedo mentioned the names of accused Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto, have you observed whose names was usually mentioned first by Sandra Salcedo?
A

She mentioned first the name of Moreno Tumimpad and Ruel.

And what happened after that?

I informed my mother-in-law of what Sandra Salcedo had told us.

When did you tell your mother-in- law about what Sandra Salcedo told you and Celsa?

That very evening sir. 18

Accused-appellant simplistically and quite erroneously argues that his conviction was based on
the medical finding that he and the victim have the same blood type "O".
Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence given by the
victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as evidence only to show that the
alleged father or any one of many others of the same blood type may have been the father of the
child. As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19:

Paternity Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, t
he
child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father o
fa
particular child. But group blood testing cannot show only a possibility that he is. Statut
es in
many states, and courts in others, have recognized the value and the limitations of such t
ests.
Some of the decisions have recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where
the
results of the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged paternit
y.
This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may scientifically be complet
ely
accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred where the finding is allowed
to
turn on oral testimony conflicting with the results of the test. The findings of such blood tests
are
not admissible to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged fat
her
or any one of many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven be
yond
reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.