REYES vs TRAJANO

Right to self-organization > extent and scope of right

FACTS:
The OIC of the Bureau of Labor Relations (Hon. Cresenciano Trajano) sustained the
denial by the Med Arbiter of the right to vote of 141 members of the "Iglesia ni Kristo"
(INK), at a certification election at which two labor organizations were contesting the
right to be the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit. The
competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in
Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS). Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters,
only 240 actually took part in the election, conducted under the provision of the Bureau
of Labor Relations. Among the 240 employees who cast their votes were 141 members of
the INK.
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK members. They were segregated
and excluded from the final count in virtue of an agreement between the competing
unions, reached at the pre-election conference, that the INK members should not be
allowed to vote "because they are not members of any union and refused to participate
in the previous certification elections."
The INK employees promptly made known their protest to the exclusion of their votes.
They filed f a petition to cancel the election alleging that it "was not fair" and the result
thereof did "not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees." TUEUOLALIA opposed the petition. It contended that the petitioners "do not have legal
personality to protest the results of the election," because "they are not members of
either contending unit, but . . . of the INK" which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization. . . ."
ISSUE:
WON the INK members have the right to vote
HELD:
Yes. The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor
union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to
engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and protection.

Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or
resign from a labor organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist
any union, and to maintain membership therein. The right to form or join a labor
organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from exercising said right.
It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that
a person has opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his
subsequently opting to renounce such membership.
The INK employees, as employees in the same bargaining unit in the true sense
of the term, do have the right of self-organization, is also in truth beyond question, as
well as the fact that when they voted that the employees in their bargaining unit should
be represented by "NO UNION," they were simply exercising that right of selforganization, albeit in its negative aspect.
The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they
"are not constituted into a duly organized labor union" "but members of the INK
which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
.organization" and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole
and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule
nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization
may take part in a certification election. Neither does the contention that petitioners
should be denied the right to vote because they "did not participate in previous
certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not
allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law,
administrative rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of
neglect to exercise the right in past certification elections. In denying the petitioners'
right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the public respondents
exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely
abused the same.

Benguet Electric Cooperative vs Ferrer-Calleja Beneco Ees Labor Union

Facts:
-June 21, 1985: Beneco Worker's Labor Union (BWLU) filed a Petition for Direct
Certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining rep of all the rank and file ees of P
Beneco, alleging that: (copy)
- Beneco Ees Labor Union (BELU) opposed the petition on the grounds that: 1. It was
the sole and exclusive bargaining rep of the sunject workers (order issued by the med
arbiter on Oct. 20, 1980) 2. 2 cases against Beneco are pending in the NLRC involving A.
Bargaining deadlock B. Unfair Labor Practice Pending these, bars any representation
question
- Beneco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition claiming that: 1. It is a non-profit Electric
Cooperative engaged in providing services to its members and patron-consumers 2. Ees
sought to be represented by BWLU are not eligible to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing because they are "members and joint owners of the
cooperative"
- Med-arbiter: Granted the Petition which limited the election among the rank and file
ees of P who are "non-members and without involvement in the actual ownership of the
cooperative", they are 37 ees - On appeal: Dismissed - SC: Dismissed
- Beneco protested and submitted a certification showing that only 4 ees who are not
members of Beneco (not members of any labor union) are eligible to vote - Certification
Election was held on Oct. 1, 1986 - BELU garnered 49 out of 83 valid votes cast
- Beneco protested but the same was dismissed by the med arbiter and BLR Dir. FerrerCalleja
(SC: Member-consumers of Beneco could form, assist or join a labor union)
- SG: Agreed with Beneco
- P asserts that the Certification Election was null and void because mem-ees of P Coop
who are not eligible to form and join union were allowed to vote - R Dir. and PR BELU
submit that mem of a Coop who are also rank and file ees are eligible to form, assist or
join a labor union
Issue:
Whether or not BELU can be certified as the sole and exclusive baragaining rep of the
rank and file ees - NO

Held:
It cannot be determined if R Union was duly elected by the eligible voters of the
bargaining unit since "even ees whi are ineligible to join a labor union within the coop
because of their membership were allowed to vote in the certification election" Only 37
ees are not mem of coop but 83 voted and 49 voted for R Union
Issue 2:
Whether or not ees (rank and file) of a coop are qualified to form or join a labor
organization for purposes of collective bargaining
Held:
3 Jurisprudence: Right to Collective Bargaining is not available to an ee of a coop who at
the same time is a "member and co-owner" But ees who are not members or co-owners
are entitled - The fact that the mem-ees of P "do not participate in the actual
management of the cooperative" does not make them eligible to form, assist or join a
labor organization - Davao City Case: Members of Coop cannot join a labor union based
on the fact that as members of the Coop, they are co-owners thereof "An owner cannot
bargain with himself or his co-owners" "It is the fact of ownership which disqualifies a
member from joining any labor organization within the Coop, not involvement in the
management"
The Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot form or
join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining. The Court held that:
A cooperative ... is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run
either by persons, partnerships, or corporations. - Its owners and/or members are the
ones who run and operate the business while the others are its employees. - As above
stated, irrespective of the number of shares owned by each member they are entitled to
cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. - Their share capital
earn limited interest. - They enjoy special privileges as-exemption from income tax and
sales taxes, preferential right to supply their products to State agencies and even
exemption from the minimum wage laws. - An employee therefore of such a cooperative
who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining
for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.
Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that: To have a valid, election, at
least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. - The labor

union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent of all workers in the unit . . . [Italics supplied.]
Metrolab Industries Inc. vs. RoldanConfesor
FACTS:
Herein petitioner Metrolab Industriesrepresented by the private respondent MetroDrug
Corp. a labor organization representing the petitioners employees. After the CBA
between the parties expired, negotiations fornew CBA ended into deadlock. Both
partiesfailed to settle their dispute hence the orderissued by the Secretary of Labor
andEmployment that any strike or acts that mightexacerbate the situation is ceased
and orderedthe parties to execute a new CBA. Later, thepetitioner moved two lay-off
acts to its rankand file employees and was opposed by theunion. Petitioner assailed that
the move wastemporary and exercise of its managementprerogative. Herein public
respondent declared that the petitioners act illegal and issued two resolution of cease
and desiststating that the move exacerbate and causedconflict to the case at bar.
Included on the lastresolution issued by the public respondentwhich states that
executive secretaries areexcluded from the closed-shop provision of theCBA, not from
the bargaining unit.A petition for certiorari seeking the annulmentof the Resolution and
Omnibus Resolution ofRoldan-Confesor on grounds that they wereissued with grave
abuse of discretion andexcess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON executive secretaries must be includedas part of the bargaining unit of rank
and fileemployees.
RULING:
NO. By recognizing the expanded scope of theright to self-organization, the intent of
thecourt was to delimit the types of employeesexcluded from the close shop provisions,
notfrom the bargaining unit. The executive secretaries of General Managerand the
Management Committees should notonly be exempted from the closed-shopprovision
but should not be permitted to joinin the bargaining unit of the rank and fileemployees
as well as on the grounds that theexecutive secretaries are confidentialemployees ,
having

access

to

vital

laborinformation.

As

stated

in

several

cases,

confidentialemployees are prohibited and disqualified to join any bargaining unit since
the very natureof the functions are to assist and act in aconfidential capacity, or to have
access toconfidential matters of, persons who exercisemanagerial functions in the field

of laborrelations.Finally, confidential employees cannot beclassified as rank and file

from the very natureof their work. Excluding confidentialemployees from the rank and
file of bargainingunit, therefore, is not tantamount to discrimination.
Therefore,

executive

secretaries

of

petitioners

General

Manager

and

its

ManagementCommittee are permanently excluded from the bargaining unit of

petitioners rank and file employees.
MERALCO vs Secretary of Labor
GR 91902
Facts:
On November 22, 1988, the Staff and Technical Employees Association of MERALCO, a
labor organization of staff and technical employees of MERALCO, filed a petition for
certification election, seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO. MERALCO
moved for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that the employees sought to be
represented by petitioner are security services personnel who are prohibited from
joining or assisting the rank-and-file union, among others.
Issue:
WON security guards may join rank-and-file or supervisors union.
Held:
While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor
organization of the rank and file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor
organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their
rank.
We are aware however of possible consequences in the implementation of the law in
allowing security personnel to join labor unions within the company they serve. The law
is apt to produce divided loyalties in the faithful performance of their duties. Economic
reasons would present the employees concerned with the temptation to subordinate
their duties to the allegiance they owe the union of which they are members, aware as
they are that it is usually union action that obtains for them increased pecuniary
benefits.
Thus, in the event of a strike declared by their union, security personnel may neglect or
outrightly abandon their duties, such as protection of property of their employer and
the persons of its officials and employees, the control of access to the employers

premises, and the maintenance of order in the event of emergencies and untoward
incidents.
It is hoped that the corresponding amendatory and/or suppletory laws be passed by
Congress to avoid possible conflict of interest in security personnel.

Rosario Bros v. OpleFACTS:

Private respondents are tailors hired by the petitioner in its tailoring department. They
were paid weekly wages on piece-work basis, minus the withholding tax of BIR. They
were registered with SSS as employees of petitioner. They were required to report for
work and stay in the shop for no less than 8 hours a day. A mastercutter distributed job
orders equally.Private respondents filed a complaint for violation of PD 851(13th month
pay) and PD 525 (EmergencyLiving Allowance) against petitioner.
ISSUE:
WN an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and private
respondents
HELD:
Yes. The existence of ER-EE relationship is determined by:1.the selection and
engagement of employee2.payment of wages3.power of dismissal4.power to control
employees conduct Although the fourth element is the most important. An
independent contractor is the one who exercises independent employment and
contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods without being subjected to
control of his employer except as to the result of his work.In the case at bar, the selection
and hiring of respondents was done by petitioner through the mastercutter.
Respondents received their weekly wages from petitioner on piece-work basis within
the meaning of theterm wage under the Labor Code, which defined as the
remuneration or earnings. However, designated, whetherfixed on a time, task, piece or
commission basis, payable by an employer to an employee under a written orunwritten
contact for work

done or to be done or for services rendered or to

be

rendered.Petitioner also had the power to dismiss respondents, thus, the latters conduc
t was controlled bypetitioner. Respondents were allowed to register with SSS and
withholding taxes were also deducted from theirwages.

INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, petitioner vs. HON.

PURA CALLEJA IN HER CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES
(TUPAS) WFTU respondents.
FACTS:
ICMC an accredited refugee processing center in Morong Bataan, is a non-profit agency
involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and enjoys Consultative
status II. It has the activities parallel to those of the International Committee for
Migrtion (ICM) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
On July 14, 1986, Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed with
the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among
the rank and file members employed by the ICMC. The latter opposed the petition on
the ground that it enjoys diplomatic immunity.
On Februaury 5, 1987 Med Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin sustained ICMC and dismissed
the petition of TUPAS for lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, The Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations reversed the Med Arbiters
Decisionand ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election.
This present Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction assailing the BLR Order.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to ICMC extends to
immunity from the application of Philippine labor laws.
HELD:
The Petition is GRANTED, the order of the Bureau of Labor Relations for Certification
election is SET ASIDE, and the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued is made
PERMANENT.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of

powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should
refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and
where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept
the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the
government . . . or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, in adherence to the
settled principle that courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction . . . as to embarrass the
executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine
that in such cases the judicial department of (this) government follows the action of the
political branch and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic
jurisdiction.
BASIS:
Article II of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Philippine Government and
ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status similar to that of a specialized agency.
Article III, Section 4. The specialized agencies, their property and assets, wherever
located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their
immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity shall extend to any
measure of execution.