ARROYO v VASQUEZ-DE ARROYO

(G.R. NO. L-17014, August 11, 1921)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City.
They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live
separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis
of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel
fees and permanent separate maintenance.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to
P400, also other fees.

Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory
injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him
as his wife.

ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home

2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order
or permanent mandatory injunction

HELD:
1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by
plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient
cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate
maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two

parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and

separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is
under obligation to return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by
mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the
duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the
courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said
order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live
together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much
criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself
without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to
support.

SC: Judgment appealed from, REVERSED. Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented
herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that
it is her duty to return. The plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without
special pronouncement as to costs of either instance.

Pelayo vs. Lauron

Facts: Pelayo is a physician based in Cebu. He was called to the house of the
defendants bec. Their daughter-in-law was about to give birth. He had to perform a
surgery to remove the fetus using forceps. After the surgery, the defendants refuse
to pay the amount of P500 which Pelayo was asking in exchange for the services he
rendered. Thus, he filed a case against the defendants.

The defendants alleged that their daughter-in-law died as a consequence of the

childbirth and that their son and daughter-in-law lived independently and her giving
of birth at their house was only accidental.

Issue: W/N the defendants are bound to pay the bill for the services that has been
rendered by Pelayo.

Held: No. Rendering of medical assistance in case of illness is among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses are bound by way of mutual support. Thus, it is the
husband's obligation to pay Pelayo and not the defendants(father & mother-in-law).
The defendants are not under any obligation to pay the fees claimed. There was no
contract between Pelayo and the defendants, thus, they can't be compelled to pay
him.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF POTENCIANO

ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs.ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA
K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES

FACTS: On March 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the CA a petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents
refused petitioners demands to see and visit her husband. CA allowed visitation
rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for habeas
corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition. She
seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to
have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife
Ilusorio filed with the SC an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody
of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio. This case was consolidated with another case
filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio
appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never
refused to see her.
The court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for lack of merit, and granted the
petition to nullify the CA ruling giving visitation rights to Ilusorio.
ISSUE: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live
with her in their conjugal dwelling.

RULING: No. Marital rights including covertures and living in conjugal dwelling may
not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a
person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It
is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all
manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the
subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when
it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even
prayed for such right.
Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the
FC support her position that as spouses, Potenciano and Erlinda are duty bound to
live together and care for each other. The court agrees.
The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court
order" to enforce consortium. Obviously, there was absence of empathy between
spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972.
We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion. Marital union is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor
gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the court DENY Erlinda's motion for reconsideration. At any rate,
the case has been rendered moot by the death of subject.

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda 35 Phil 252

FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San
Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to
her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside
the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform
such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation.
Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to
support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree
granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the
conjugal home.

HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created
merely in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is
not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his
obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home
because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband,
she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even
outside the conjugal home.

MOISES JOCSON V. C.A 170 SCRA 333

FACTS: Emilio Jocson during his lifetime sold parcels of land to his daughter
Agustina. One said parcels of land bears and entry in the TCT Emilio Jocson, married
to Alejandra Poblete. These parcels of land are claimed by one of the surviving heirs
of Emilio to have been sold fictitiously and without any or insufficient consideration.
Futhermore he claimed that when his father sold one of the land, it was still part of
the conjugal property of their parents which has not been liquidated.
Agustina on the otherhand claim that the sale was with sufficient consideration and
rebutted the allegation that she has no source of income by alleging she is engaged
in playa buying business. This was not controverted by Moises.
ISSUE: Will the presumption that a property is conjugal arise based on the entry in
the registry which states that the owner is Married to thereby making it conjugal.
HELD; In order for the presumption to apply, it must first be proven that the
property was acquired during the marriage. The description married to does not
vest title but merely serves to describe the civil status. Registration does not vest
ownership but merely confirms one already vested. The allegation that the sale is
fictitious due to insufficient consideration must be proven by the one who allege the
same. In this case Moises failed to prove this fact which likewise fails to overcome
the presumption that a sale is with sufficient consideration.

WONG vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Private respondent Romarico Henson married Katrina Pineda (1964). During
the marriage (1971), Romarico bought a 1,787-square-meter parcel of land in
Angeles City from his father with money borrowed from an officemate. Meanwhile,
Katrina was charged with estafa for failing to return pieces of jewelry for sale and
which were consigned to her. The estafa case was dismissed. Subsequently,
petitioner spouses Wong filed a collection suit against Romarico and Katrina. The
court found for spouses Wong. Levied upon were four lots in Angeles City.
On whether or not the properties levied upon and sold at public auction may be
reconveyed to Romarico, the court, finding that there was no basis for holding the
conjugal partnership liable for the personal indebtedness of Katrina, ruled in favor of
reconveyance in view of the jurisprudence that the interest of the wife in the
conjugal partnership property being inchoate and therefore merely an expectancy,
the same may not be sold or disposed of for value until after the liquidation and
settlement of the community assets.
The IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. It held that the properties
are Romarico's exclusive capital having been bought by him with his own funds. But
granting that the properties are conjugal, they cannot answer for Katrina's
obligations as the latter were exclusively hers because they were incurred without
the consent of her husband, they were not for the daily expenses of the family and
they did not redound to the benefit of the family.
Issue: Whether or not the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico
Held: No. The Court ruled that the properties having been acquired during the
marriage, they are still presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership even though
Romarico and Katrina have been living separately.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of
clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to
prove that the properties are exclusively owned by Romarico. While there is proof
that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid
it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not
exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in
the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may
not be paid for with them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners
to be one of the charges against the conjugal partnership. Furthermore, under the
Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code), a wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family
or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the
support of the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the
administration of the conjugal partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or
by the husband, and when the wife gives moderate donations for charity. Having
failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not
bind the conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.

VALDEZ V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY and

CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
260 SCRA 221

FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in January 1971 and had
five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court, in its decision of 29 July
1994, granted the petition, declaring among others that (1) the marriage of
petitioner Antonio Valdez and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdez null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code; and (2) the petitioner and the respondent are
directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as
defined by Article 147 of the Family Code. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of
that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." In
an order, the TC made the following clarification: Consequently, considering that
Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to
have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by
them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will own their "family home" and all
their properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and partition of
properties owned in common by the plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on
ownership found in the Civil Code shall apply.

The TC said that considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147,
the property regime of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner submits that Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the
Family Code should be held controlling.

ISSUE: WON Article 147 of the Family Code apply to cases where the parties are
psychologically incapacitated.

HELD: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation
is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be,
of the Family Code. Article 147 provides:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof in the former's
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work
and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through
their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal
partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in
the co-ownership.
Thus, petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their
common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation
and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on coownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 111547. January 27, 1997.*

SPS. TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and PAULINO ESTONINA, petitioners
Vs
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. CELSO ATAYAN and NILDA HICBAN and
CONSUELO VDA. DE GARCIA, REMEDIOS, ELVIRA, OFELIA, VIRGILIO,
MARILOU, and LOLITA all surnamed GARCIA, and HEIRS OF CASTOR GARCIA
and of SANTIAGO GARCIA, JR., respondents.

TOPIC: Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
FACTS:
The lot subject of controversy was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children
and a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy
arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and
was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9
children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents
in this case. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo
Garcia. The land was then sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name
of Estonina.
Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT
claiming that they own 9/10 of the land.
RTC: The court ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Laguna, to cancel
the TCT in the name of TRINIDAD S. ESTONINA and issue another one, also in her
name, stating therein that said person is the owner of the property therein covered
to the extent of 55% pro indiviso, and the remaining 45% belongs to the heirs of
Santiago Garcia pro indiviso.The court ruled that the land was presumed to be
conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the
intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. The court ordered the amendment
of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Later, both
parties appealed.
CA: After a thorough review of the evidence on record, the Court of Appeals
concluded that contrary to the finding of the RTC, the parcel of land in question was
not the conjugal property of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia, but was the formers
exclusive property. It was therefore the entire property that formed part of Santiago
Garcias estate upon his death. When Santiago Garcia died, his nine children and
Consuelo Garcia inherited the said property each to the extent of one/tenth (1/10)
pro indiviso share. Hence, it was only Consuelo Garcias one tenth (1/10) pro
indiviso share in the parcel of land in question which could be validly attached,
levied and sold in execution to satisfy the judgment against her and in favor of
Trinidad Estonina in Civil Case No. 88430.
ISSUE:
Whether the property in question is an exclusive or conjugal property of Spouses
Santiago and Consuelo Garcia.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in
toto. The evidence on record as well as established jurisprudence on the matter,
lead the court to concur with the finding of the Court of Appeals that the property

involved in this dispute is indeed the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago
Garcia.
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the presumption under Article 160 of
the Civil Code that all property of the marriage belong to the conjugal partnership
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the
marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership.
In the case at bench, the petitioners have been unable to present any proof that the
property in question was acquired during the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo.
They anchor their claim solely on the fact that when the title over the land in
question was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the
registration in the name of Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza. This,
according to the spouses Estonina, suffices to establish the conjugal nature of the
property. The foregoing contention has no merit.

AYALA INVESTMENT VS. CA & SPS. SHING

GR NO. 118305, FEBRUARY 12, 1998

FACTS:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a P50,300,000 loan from petitioner

AIDC. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo
Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements, making
himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC. PBM
failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case
for sum of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the CFI
of Pasig. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondenthusband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of
P50,300,000 with interests. Upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of
execution pending appeal. Upon AIDC's putting up of an P8,000,000 bond, a writ of
execution was issued. Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo Magsajo, Sr. Deputy Sheriff of
Pasig, caused the issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of
sheriff sale on 3 of their conjugal properties. Petitioner Magsajo then scheduled the
auction sale of the properties levied. Private respondents filed a case of injunction
against petitioners to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot
enforce the judgment against theconjugal partnership levied on the ground that,
among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. The lower court issued a temporary restraining order. AIDC filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, questioning the order of the lower
court enjoining the sale. Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the lower court from enforcing its Order, thus paving the way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondentsspouses conjugal properties. The auction sale took place. AIDC being the only
bidder, was issued a Certificate of Sale. Upon expiration of the redemption period,
petitioner sheriff
issued the final deed of sale which was registered. AIDC filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for injunction filed before the CFI of Pasig on the ground that the same
had become moot and academic with the consummation of the sale. Respondents
filed their opposition to the motion arguing, among others,
that where a third party who claim is ownership of the property attached or levied
upon, a different legal situation is presented; and that in this case, 2 of the real
properties are actually in the name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil
case.
RTC: the conjugal partnership of gains of respondents-spouses Alfredo and
Encarnacion Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by respondenthusband Alfredo Ching. Thus, the sale on execution null and void.
CA: Affirmed decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:

WON a surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is
within the contemplation of Art. 161 of the Civil Code and considered for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
No. The surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer is
not considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. We do not agree with
petitioners that there is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit
of" or "benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They
mean one and the same thing. Art. 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Art. 121 (2) of the
Family Code are similarly worded, i.e., both use the term "for the benefit of." On the
other hand, Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that "The payment of personal
debts by the husband or the
wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As
can be seen, the terms are used interchangeably. From the jurisprudential rulings of
this Court, we can derive the following conclusions:
(A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly
received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own
profession, that contract falls within the term obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved.
It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of
the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family
stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or
profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession
fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
(B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or
entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot,
by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the
benefit ofthe conjugal partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
can be inferred that, when a husband
enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit
redounding to the conjugal partnership. The provisions of the Family Code is
applicable in this case. These provisions highlight the underlying
concern of the law for the conservation of the conjugal partnership; for the
husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it. This is
the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into
by one of the spouses must be those that redounded to the

benefit of the family and that the measure of the partnership's liability is to "the
extent that the family is benefited." Here, the property in dispute also involves the
family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for
the benefit of the family.

GUIANG VS. CA
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
DOCTRINE: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.

FACTS:
Private respondent Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They
have three children, namely: Junie (18 years old), Harriet (17), and Jodie (15). The
couple bought a 421 sq. meter lot in Koronadal, South Cotabato from Manuel Callejo
through a conditional deed of sale. The consideration was payable in installment. In
1988, the couple sold one-half portion of their Lot to petitioner-spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. Since then, Guiang occupied the one-half portion and built their
house thereon. They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. Gilda Corpuz left
for Manila to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an
unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for
sometime in Manila. After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie Corpuz seldom went
home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work.
Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half
portion including their house to Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother. Gilda
Corpuz replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform
her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Luzviminda Guiang so that she
would advise her father. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda, Judie Corpuz
pushed through the sale. He sold to Luzviminda Guiang thru a "Deed of Transfer of
Rights" remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house. Gilda returned home.
She found her children staying with other households. Only Junie was staying in
their house. Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered her children
together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was
informed by her children that their father had a wife already. For staying in their
house sold by her husband, spouses Guiang complained before the Barangay
authorities for trespassing. The parties thereat signed a document for amicable
settlement stating that Gilda Corpuz and her three children must leave voluntarily
the house without any charge. Thereafter, Gilda approached the Barangay Captain
for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, they stayed
put in her house and lot. Spouses Guiang filed a motion for execution of the
amicable settlement with the MTC. However, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed
a Complaint against her husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang. The said Complaint sought the declaration of a Deed of Transfer
of Right, which involved the conjugal property, null and void. The trial court ruled in
favor of private respondent. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
WON the assailed Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed.

HELD:

NO Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed was validly executed by the parties
in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's
consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code.
The provision in par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts
which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance,
private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was
totally inexistent or absent. The contract falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the
Family Code, which provides that "...In the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void..." Furthermore, it must be noted that the
fraud and the

FERRER VS. FERRER

G.R. No. 166496, November 9, 2006
It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership
or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be.

FACTS:
In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and
accounting with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner alleged that she is
the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), half-brother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer
(Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael).

Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot. He applied for a
loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements thereon, including
a residential house and a two-door apartment building. It was during their marriage
that payment of the loan was made using the couples conjugal funds. From their
conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot.
Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the
apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he
stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the
property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents,
Manuel and Ismael and their spouses.
It is petitioners contention that when her husband was already bedridden,
respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his
last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering
Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon.
Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for Annulment
of the said sale against respondents. The RTC dismissed the same. The RTC found
that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good
faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Further, in support of her Complaint, petitioner alluded to a portion of the Decision
of the RTC, which stated, that in determining which property is the principal and
which is the accessory, the property of greater value shall be considered the
principal. In this case, the lot is the principal and the improvements the accessories.
Since Article 120 of the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of
accessory follows the ownership of the principal, then the subject lot with all its
improvements became an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an
obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at the
time of liquidation of [the] conjugal partnership. Clearly, Alfredo has all the rights to
sell the subject property by himself without need of Josefas consent.
According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died she had
the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredos lot. Hence,
one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the
registered owners of Alfredos lot. She averred that respondents cannot claim lack
of knowledge about the fact that the improvements were constructed using

conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredos lot,
and even paid rentals to petitioner.
For their part, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that petitioner had
no cause of action against them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior
judgment.
RTC rendered an Order, denying the Motion to Dismiss. According to the RTC, no
pronouncement as to the improvements constructed on Alfredos lot has been made
and the payment of petitioners share in the conjugal partnership constitutes a
separate cause of action. A subsequent Order was issued by the RTC, denying
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.
Aggrieved, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by way of a
Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the RTC in denying the dismissal.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that petitioners
Complaint failed to state a cause of action. The appellate court rationalized as
follows:
[W]e believe that the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent
to enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the
subject property. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the same should be
made and directed in the settlement of estate of her deceased husband Alfredo
Ferrer pursuant to Article 129 of the Family Code. Such being the case, it appears
that the complaint herein fails to state a cause of action against the petitioners, the
latter not being the proper parties against whom the subject action for
reimbursement must be directed to. xxx Albeit the respondent herein has the legal
right to be reimbursed of the cost of the improvements of the subject property, it is
not the petitioners but the estate of her deceased husband which has the obligation
to pay the same. The complaint herein is therefore dismissible for failure to state a
cause of action against the petitioners. Needless to say, the respondent is not
without any further recourse as she may file her claim against the estate of her
deceased husband.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the public respondent committed grave abuse
of discretion in denying the petitioners motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause
of action.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon. Court of Appeals
rendered a Resolution denying the motion.
Hence, the present recourse.

ISSUE:
Whether or not he Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioners Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.

HELD:
NO.After a reading of the allegations contained in petitioners Complaint, we are
convinced that the same failed to state a cause of action.
According to petitioner, while the RTC recognized that the improvements
constructed on Alfredos lots were deemed as Alfredos exclusive and capital
property, the court also held that petitioner, as Alfredos spouse, has the right to
claim reimbursement from the estate of Alfredo. It is argued by petitioner that her
husband had no other property, and his only property had been sold to the
respondents; hence, she has the legal right to claim for reimbursement from the
respondents who are now the owners of the lot and the improvements thereon. In
fine, petitioner asseverates that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action because the respondents have the correlative
obligation to pay the value of the improvements.
Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the
respondents to respect or not to violate her right. While we could concede that Civil
Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in
Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements,
the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire
property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the
property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the
improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the
expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are
more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire
property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to
reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the ownerspouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The
subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the
basis of Article 120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained
in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not
petitioners spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom
the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse
who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do
not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
It can be said, thus, that respondents act of acquiring the subject property by sale
was not in violation of petitioners rights. The same can also be said of the
respondents objection to reimburse petitioner. Simply, no correlative obligation
exists on the part of the respondents to reimburse the petitioner. Corollary thereto,
neither can it be said that their refusal to reimburse constituted a violation of

petitioners rights. As has been shown in the foregoing, no obligation by the

respondents under the law exists. Petitioners Complaint failed to state a cause of
action against the respondents, and for this reason, the Court of Appeals was not in
error in dismissing the same.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS vs. SPOUSES VICTOR and

ELENA ALINAS
G.R. No. 158040; April 14, 2008

Facts:

Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas (petitioners) separated sometime in 1982.

They left behind two lots identified, one with a bodega standing on it and the other
with petitioners' house. Respondent Victor Alinas is the brother of petitioner.
Petitioners alleged that they entrusted their properties to respondents. Sometime in
1993, petitioners discovered that their two lots were already titled in the name of
the respondent spouses. Onesiforos signature appeared in an Absolute Deed of
Sale selling one of the lots to respondent spouses. Records also show a notarized
document whereby petitioner acknowledged that his brother used his own money to
redeem one of the lots mortgaged and foreclosed and thus his brother became the
owner. Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership of their conjugal properties with damages against respondent spouses.

Issue:
Whether or not the sale of conjugal property by the husband petitioner to
respondent spouses is valid despite the lack of consent on the part of the wife.

Ruling:
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners'
conjugal property made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. It
should be noted that respondent spouses were well aware that the property is a
conjugal property of petitioners. They also knew that the disposition being made by
Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that petitioners had
separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario.
The fact that Onesiforo had to execute the Absolute Deed of Sale and a notarized
Agreement reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities of the sale.
Such being the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they
risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the subject
property is a conjugal property.

DOCENA v. LAPESURA
MARCH 28 2001

Facts: Casiano Hombria, private respondent, filed a complaint for the recovery of a
parcel of land against his lessees, petitioner-spouses, Antonio and Alfreda Docena.

The spouses claimed ownership of the land based on the occupation since time
immemorial. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with CA
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in issuing orders and
that of the sheriff in issuing the writ of demolition. CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the petition was filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of non-forum shopping attached
thereto was signed by only one of the petitioners.

ISSUE: WON the Petition filed by the spouses should prosper

HELD: In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the petition
questioning the writ of demolition thereof originated from an action for recovery
brought against the spouses and is clearly intended for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership and the wife as point out was in the province of Samar whereas the
petition was prepared in Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum
shopping that would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf
and that of his wife is too harsh.

In the previous court rulings, certificate of non-forum shopping should be sign by all
the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar, such certificate signed by
Antonio Docena alone should be deemed to constitute substantial compliance with
the rules. The two petitioners in this case are husband and wife and their residence
is the subject property alleged to be a conjugal property. Under the Family Code, the
administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and wife jointly.
However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance where the consent of both
spouses is required, joint management or administration does not require that the
husband and wife always act together. Each spouse may validly exercise full power
of management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases.

Hence, petition is granted and the case is remanded to CA for further proceedings.

Thelma Manalo vs CA
GR No. 147978 January 23, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties (located in
Makati and Taytay Rizal) of the respondents -> the husband of Norma Fernandez C.

Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some bargaining, petitioner and

Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The agreement
handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with the knowledge and
conformity of his wife. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement because they needed "spot
money." Hence, she filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against
respondents. The first file MTD, and later on moved for summary judgement, stating
that there is no genuine issue. That Norma did not give her consent. And that they
returned the checks as downpayment of said properties to Thelma and was in fact
accepted by the latter. RTC favored respondents and affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife's written consent.

HELD: No. Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be
obtained. Respondent Norma Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale.
Even granting that respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the
sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is
required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the negotiations for the
sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to demonstrate
consent.
Petitioner further argues that since respondent Norma unjustly refuses to affix her
signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted. The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner is correct
insofar as she alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court which will give
such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it should be
stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where
the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case, petitioner failed
to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to
the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife's incapacity, court
authorization cannot be sought. SC - Affirmed.

CARLOS VS. ABELARDO

GR NO. 146504, April 9, 2002

FACTS:
In October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo
approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 (P625,
000. 00) for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses
conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31,

1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property,
who acknowledged receipt thereof.

When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the
amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded
that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries on the
amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.

Despite formal demand for the payment of the said loan, spouses were unable to
pay their obligation. Hence, this prompted petitioner to institute a collection suit
against respondent and his wife. As they were separated in fact for more than a
year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate
answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her
husband, from petitioner. She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a
staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate
payment of the full amount.

In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00

but claimed that the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It
was his share of income on contracts obtained by defendant.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
Yes. The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of
the Family Code:

Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated
administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both
spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the
other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal
partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.

While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and
signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family
because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal
home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable
for such loan together with his wife.

Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the
conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase
the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal
home, thus benefiting the family.

On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife

binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the
family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally
liable in the payment of the loan.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

Facts: During their marriage, Spouses Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from Sandra Dalida. The Deed
of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife.
Through an SPA executed by Marcelino Dailo, Lilibeth Gesmundo was authorized to
obtain a loan amounting to 300k from petitioner bank using their house and lot as
security. REM was executed on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
transactions was without knowledge and consent f respondent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings from which a Certificate of Sale was issued in

favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the
property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president, consolidated the
ownership thereof by executing Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed
of Absolute Sale.
When respondent learned of the transaction she filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of REM, Certificate of Sale, Deed of Sale and prayed for reconveyance of
property and damages.
On their answer, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr.
RTC - ruled in favor of plaintiff. Declared the abovementioned documents null and
void and ordered the reconveyance of the property.
CA - affirmed the trial courts ruling, finding that the subject property was conjugal
in nature. The appellate court declared as void the mortgage on the subject
property because it was constituted without the knowledge and consent of
respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code
Issue: 1. Whether or not the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on
the subject property as co-owner thereof is valid as to his undivided share.
2. Whether or not the conjugal partnership is liable for the payment of the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The same having redounded to the benefit
of the family.
Ruling:
1. Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In
the absence of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains governed the property relations between respondent and her
late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4
on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made applicable to
conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity unless vested
rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Co-ownership
will not apply in this case.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express
provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or
written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct
in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack
of respondents consent.
2. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent
of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . ." For the

subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There
must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the
welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership respond for a
liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the
avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo,
Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this
Court. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of
the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino
Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the conjugal
partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
Petition is DENIED.

Beumer v. Amores

Facts: Willem (Beumer), a Dutch national, married Avelina (Amores) on March 29,
1980. Their marriage was declared a nullity by the RTC on November 10, 2000 by
reason of psychological incapacity, thus Willem filed a petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership and distribution of properties which he claimed were acquired
during their marriage.
During trial, Willem testified that Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of Avelina, but it was purchased using funds he received from the Dutch
government as disability benefit, and Avelina had no sufficient income to purchase
the properties. On the other hand, Avelina alleged that except for the two
residential houses and Lots 1 and 2142, all the other lots were her paraphernal
properties and acquired thru her funds.

Issue: Whether or not Willem is entitled to the whole or at least one half of the
purchase price of the lots subject of the case.

Ruling: In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds
used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While
admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal
funds were used to purchase Lot 1,5 he likewise claimed that his personal disability
funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands,
he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement
to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule
will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil
Code,8 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction
knowingly entered into.

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA

MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Facts:
On September 22, 1989, respondent Helmut Muller married Petitioner Elena
Buenaventura Muller in Hamburg, Germany. Respondent inherited the house of his
parents and sold it thereafter. The proceeds were used to purchase a parcel of land
and the construction of a house in Antipolo, Rizal after they moved in the Philippines
in 1992. The said property was registered in the name of petitioner. The spouses
eventually separated due to their incompatibilities. Later, respondent filed a petition
for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The trial

court terminated the regime of absolute community of property. It decreed the

separation of properties and ordered the equal partition of personal properties
located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
marriage(properties inherited by petitioner in Germany). With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
respondent. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the
property was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
On appeal by the respondent, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts
Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase
of the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also
considered petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As
regards the house, the Court of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring the same.
Petitioners arguments
Since respondent is an alien, he is disqualified to own private lands in the
Philippines. Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but
circumvented the same. And that respondent wanted to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondents arguments
Respondent claims that he merely seeks reimbursement from the purchase of the
Antipolo property since the funds paid by him for the said property were in
consideration of his marriage to petitioner. And that the funds were given to
petitioner in trust. Hence, equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of
his personal funds.

Issue
Whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
Ruling
The Court finds for the petitioner
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of

the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the
national patrimony. Respondents disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where
the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express
provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his
knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of
equity, is likewise misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy,
cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent
cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery
of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in
effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to
own.

Agapay vs. Palang

276 SCRA 341
Facts
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with private respondent Carlina (or
Cornelia) Vallesterol in 1949. A few months after the wedding, he left to work in
Hawaii. The trial court found evidence that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted
to divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second
marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months
earlier, on May 17, 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale,
jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located in Pangasinan. Consequently,
a Transfer Certificate of Title covering said rice land was issued in their names.
A house and lot in Pangasinan was likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said
property was later issued in her name.

On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a
form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The
parties therein agreed to donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of
land to their only child, Herminia Palang.
Miguel and Erlindas cohabitation produced a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979,
Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlinas complaint and two
years later, Miguel died.
On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz,
herein private respondents, instituted an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. Private
respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly
purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Petitioner, as defendant below, contended that while the riceland is registered in
their names (Miguel and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the property to
their son Kristopher Palang. She added that the house and lot is her sole property,
having bought the same with her own money. Erlinda added that Carlina is
precluded from claiming aforesaid properties since the latter had already donated
their conjugal estate to Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint after declaring that there was little evidence to prove that the subject
properties pertained to the conjugal property of Carlina and Miguel Palang.
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial courts decision. The Court of
Appeals declared the plaintiffs-appellants as the owners of the riceland and the
house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with defendant
appellee.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner can be considered as the rightful co-owner of the riceland
and the house and lot.
Held
The Court held that under Article 148 of the Family Code, providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in
the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade the
Court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting

is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only
around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a
pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to
conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price
of subject property, there being no proof of the same.
Petitioner again claims that the riceland was bought two months before Miguel and
Erlinda actually cohabited. In the nature of an afterthought, said added assertion
was intended to exclude their case from the operation of Article 148 of the Family
Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation
not having been adduced, the Court cannot state definitively that the riceland was
purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even assuming that
the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership
would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential. Since
petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, the Court finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the
same. Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property
of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00
on when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this
claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for
the purchase price and directed that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which
was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made
between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation,
under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now
applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.

TUMLOS VS. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ (ART. 148)

FACTS: It was averred that petitioner Guillerma Tumlos and Mario Fernandez
cohabited without the benefit of marriage, since Mario has a subsisting marriage.
During their cohabitation, an apartment building was acquired by Mario where
Guillerma lived without payment of rents. When the apartment building was being
considered to be renovated, respondent spouses Mario and Lourdes Fernandez
moved for the ejectment of Guillerma from the building. Guillerma ignored the
ejectment plea. Respondent spouses filed an action in court for ejectment against
Guillerma. In her defense, Guillerma claimed that she is a co-owner of subject
apartment building since it was bought during her cohabitation with Mario. Spouses
presented their marriage contract and contract to sell under their names. Guillerma
invoked Art 144 of the Civil Code providing for rules on co-ownership shall govern
her property relations with Mario.

MTC: ruled in favor of respondent spouses.

RTC: affirmed the MTC decision. Guillerma filed MR.

RTC on MR: Reconsidered its previous decision. Reversed MTC decision. Contract to
sell submitted by spouses Fernandez appeared not to be authentic, as there was an
alteration in the name of the wife of Mario Fernandez. Hence, it cannot be given
weight. RTC further ruled that Guillerma and Mario acquired the property during
their cohabitation as husband and wife, although without the benefit of marriage.
Hence, Guillerma is a co-owner of the subject property.

CA: reversed the RTC. Guillermas claim of ownership was not satisfactorily proven.
No other evidence was presented. It was only on appeal that Guillerma alleged that
she cohabited with Mario. However, even if said allegations could be considered, the
claim of co-ownership must still fail. Guillerma and Mario are not capacitated to
marry each other. Thus, the property relations governing their supposed cohabitation is Art. 148 FC, which requires actual contribution by the parties in the coownership, in contrast with Art. 147 which states that efforts in the care and
maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of property. Hence, if no actual contribution of the party is proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

ISSUE: Is there co-ownership?

RULING: Petition has NO merit. There is no co-ownership.
Petitioner is not a co-owner under Art 144. As correctly held by the CA, the
applicable law is Art 148 providing for actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry for acquisition of properties in cases of cohabitation not falling under Art
147(parties not legally incapacitated to marry). Art 144 applies only to a
relationship between a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other, or to one in which the marriage is void from the beginning. It does not apply
to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage, for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife.
Petitioner fails to present any evidence that she had made an actual contribution to
purchase the subject property. Indeed, she anchors her claim of co-ownership
merely on her cohabitation with respondent Mario. Likewise, her claim of having
administered the property during the cohabitation is unsubstantiated. In any event,
this fact by itself does not justify her claim, for nothing in Art 148 provides that the
administration of the property amounts to contribution in its acquisition. Clearly,
there is no basis for petitioners claim of co-ownership. The property in question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of respondents.

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner,

vs.
BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

Facts:

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against
respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March 1997. After
due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property. Custody over the two minor
children was awarded to petitioner. After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of
properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following properties to be
excluded from the conjugal properties: a) The Bacolod property, considering that
the same is owned by petitioners parents; and b) Suite 204 of the LCG
Condominium, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by
respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a
Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. In view of the above decision, Suite 204, LCG
Condominium was declared the EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent. Accordingly,
petitioner was directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of
respondent. The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support

their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food
and medical expenses. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order
with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of
the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at
the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership
should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Resolving said
motion, the trial court held that since the marriage between petitioner and
respondent was declared void ab initio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in
the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to
Article 147 of the Family Code. The court, however, affirmed its previous ruling that
Suite 204 of LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couples cohabitation and
therefore pertained solely to respondent. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal
questioning the order of the trial court but subsequently withdrew the notice and
instead filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the appellate court.

Issue:
Whether or not Suite 204 of LCG Condominium should be governed by the rules on
co-ownership and what rules should be applied in the settlement of the common
properties?

Ruling: YES.

Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed
by the rules on coownership. Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a coownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. This
peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in
the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party
to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the
Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the
property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys

"efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Thus, for
Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry
each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void.

All these elements are present in the case at bar. It appears from the facts, as found
by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship,
petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latters residence in
Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was
born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the
meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG
Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by
respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller.
Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr".
Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the
name of petitioner. In light of these facts, the Court gave more credence to
petitioners submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties cohabitation.
It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to
marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when
petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in
marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the
Family Code because of respondents psychological incapacity to comply with
essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG
Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time
when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be
considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. Further, the Court
held that the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with
the law on co-ownership.

JACINTO SAGUID vs. GINA S. REY

Facts: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but separated de facto from
her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in
July 1987. After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in
a house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father. Jacinto made a living as the patron
of their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers. Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish
dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her
relationship with Jacintos relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did
not ebb away the conflict with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to
separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation.
On January 9, 1997, Gina filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal
Property with Receivership against the Jacinto with the Regional Trial Court of Boac,
Marinduque. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer
in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished
house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she was able
to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects,
with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner
of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, rendered a decision in favor of Gina ordering the
partition of the house and directing the Jacinto to return and/or reimburse to Gina
the amount of seventy thousand pesos (P70,000,00) which the latter actually
contributed to its construction and completion. The lower court also declared Gina
as the exclusive owner of the personal properties.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in its ruling.

Held: Yes. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry
each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of
her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same
married man. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions
Proof of actual contribution is required.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, article 148 applies because
this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code. The fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties
to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal properties of
the parties. Private respondent alleged in her complaint that she contributed
P70,000.00 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony
did she specify the extent of her contribution. What appears in the record are
receipts in her name for the purchase of construction materials in the total amount
of P11,413.00.
While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, there is, however, no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their
respective shares therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence
of proof of extent of the parties respective contribution, their share shall be
presumed to be equal. Here, the disputed personal properties were valued at
P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not questioned by the
petitioner. Hence, their share therein is equivalent to one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
On the basis of the evidence established, the extent of Ginas co-ownership over the
disputed house is only up to the amount of P11,413.00, her proven contribution in
the construction thereof. Anent the personal properties, her participation therein
should be limited only to the amount of P55,687.50.

LUPO ATIENZA, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO, Respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Lupo Atienza despite being a married man, lived together in consortium
with Yolanda. After the birth of their second child, their relationship turned sour until
they parted ways.

Lupo thereafter filed a complaint against Yolanda for judicial partition between them
of a parcel of land with improvements. Lupo alleged that the subject property was
acquired during his union with Yolanda as common-law husband and wife, hence the
property is co-owned by them. Further, the questioned lot was acquired by Yolanda
but with the use of HIS exclusive funds and the title was under HER name without
his knowledge and conent.

Yolanda denied the allegations. According to her, she acquired the same property
using HER exclusive funds.

The trial court rendered judgment for Lupo by declaring the contested property as
owned in common by him and Yolanda and ordering its partition between the two in
equal shares.

The CA, however, reversed the decision declaring Yolanda to be the exclusive owner
of the subject property based on the provisions of Article 148 of the Family Code
and the evidences presented by her in contrast to Lupo.

Lupo arguess that pursuant to Article 1446 of the Civil Code, he was in no way
burdened to prove that he contributed to the acquisition of the subject property
because with or without the contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner
thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is co-owned by Lupo and Yolanda.

RULING:
No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each
other because petitioner Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the
time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property regime, therefore, is
governed by Article 1488 of the Family Code. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions ...9 Proof of actual contribution is required. Absent
proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision
governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before
the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
Petitioners evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to
warrant the trial courts finding that the disputed property falls under the purview of
Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to petitioners dismal failure to prove his
cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent
sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property
from her earnings, not only as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged
in foreign currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented her
clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with her clients.
She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which
reflect that she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject
property.

Hontiveros vs. RTC

Teodora Ayson

Br. 25, Iloilo City & Spouses Gregorio Hontiveros &

G.R.No. 125465, June 29, 1999

Facts:
Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before the RTC
Iloilo City.
Petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a land located at the town of
Jamindan, Province of Capiz, as shown by OCT No. 0-2124, issued pursuant to the
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified decision of CFI Capiz, in
a land registration case filed by private respondent Gregorio Hontivero. Also, that
they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case. The income consisted of rentals from tenants of the land in the
amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968 to 1987, and P595,000.00 per year
thereafter; and that private respondents filed the land registration case and
withheld possession of the land from petitioners in bad faith.
Private respondents denied that they were married and alleged that private
respondent Hontiveros was a widower while private respondent Ayson was single.
They denied that they had deprived petitioners of possession of and income from
the land. They alleged that possession of the property in question had already been
transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated
July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the RTC Capiz, Mambusao, the return
thereof having been received by petitioners counsel. Since then, petitioners have
been directly receiving rentals from the tenants of the land. The complaint failed to
state a cause of action since it did not allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise had been made, considering that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and
private respondent Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. The decision of the IAC in Land
Registration Case was null and void since it was based upon a ground which was not
passed upon by the trial court. That petitioners claim for damages was barred by
prescription with respect to claims before 1984; that there were no rentals due since
private respondent Hontiveros was a possessor in good faith and for value; and that

private respondent Ayson had nothing to do with the case as she was not married to
private respondent
Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any proprietary interest in the subject
property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for an
order against petitioners to pay damages to private respondents by way of
counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC palpably erred in dismissing the complaint on the
ground that it does not allege under oath that earnest efforts toward a compromise
were made prior to filing as required by Art. 151 of FC.

Held:
No. This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code. Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the
Family Code does not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among
family members. Petitioners claim that whenever a stranger is a party in a case
involving family members, the requisite showing of earnest efforts to compromise is
no longer mandatory. They argue that since private respondent Ayson is admittedly
a stranger to the Hontiveros family, the case is not covered by the requirements of
Art. 151 of the Family Code. We agree with petitioners. The inclusion of private
respondent Ayson as defendant and petitioner Maria Hontiveros as plaintiff takes
the case out of the ambit of Art. 151 of the Family Code. Under this provision, the
phrase members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and
children, ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters, whether full or
half-blood. In Gayon v. Gayon, the enumeration of brothers and sisters as
members of the same family does not comprehend sisters-in-law. In that case,
then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized that sistersin-law (hence, also
brothers-in-law) are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code as members of
the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code repeats essentially the same
enumeration of members of the family, we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the mater. Consequently, the court a quo erred in ruling that
petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law of private respondent Hernando, was
required to exert earnest efforts towards a compromise before filing the present
suit. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not given any legal effect
in this jurisdiction. Consequently, private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros, and petitioner Maria Hontiveros,
who is admittedly the spouse of petitioner Augusto Hontiveros, are considered
strangers to the Hontiveros family, for purposes of Art. 151. Petitioners finally
question the constitutionality of Art. 151 of the Family Code on the ground that it in
effect amends the Rules of Court. This, according to them, cannot be done since
the Constitution reserves in favor of the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules of pleadings and procedure. Considering the conclusion we have reached in
this case, however, it is unnecessary for present purposes to pass upon this

question. Courts do not pass upon constitutional questions unless they are the very
lis mota of the case.

HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. EDMUNDO T.
ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch
122, Caloocan City, and ALBERTO MORENO, respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios and the spouses Felipe
and Maria Owe for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of mortgage in its
favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were
the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of
mortgage; that he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad.

PETITIONER: filed a MD on the ground that espondent failed to comply with Article
151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between members of the
same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any
fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made prior to
its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

RESPONDENT: argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of the
same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family Code, failure to allege
in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made by the
plaintiff before filing the complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto

asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his family the
ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.

RTC: agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a compromise is not required
before the filing of the instant case considering that the case involves parties who
are strangers to the family. If one of the parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff
before filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

RTC: denied petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration. It ruled that the present
case involves parties who are strangers to the family, failure to allege in the
complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is not
a ground for a Motion to Dismiss. The court ruled that it is defendant Remedios
Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art. 151 of the Family Code, being a member
of the same family as that of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151.

PETITIONER: argues that what is applicable to the present case is the Courts
decision in De Guzman v. Genato and not in Magbaleta v. Gonong, the former being
a case involving a husband and wife while the latter is between brothers.

ISSUE: WON the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that lack of earnest efforts toward a
compromise is not a ground for a motion to dismiss in suits between husband and
wife when other parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit, and
when he ruled that a party who is a stranger to the family of the litigants could not
invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for the dismissal of
the complaint.

LAW: Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: No suit between members
of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint
or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise
under the Civil Code.

RULING: In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the family, the
alleged owner of the subject property. The Court, taking into consideration the
explanation made by the Code Commission in its report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it imperative that
such efforts to compromise should be a jurisdictional pre-requisite for the
maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as a necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is alien
to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish, the
delay and the complications that wranglings between or among relatives more often
than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the
rights of a stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently acquired
some kind of interest in any right or property disputed among its members should
be made to depend on the way the latter would settle their differences among
themselves. x x x.

Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving members of the same
family, the law no longer makes it a condition precedent that earnest efforts be
made towards a compromise before the action can prosper.

In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses and the alleged
paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to the efforts exerted by the
husband, through the Philippine Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was
substantial compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the presence of
a party who is not a family member, the requirements that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been exerted must be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of
the Civil Code, now Article 151 of the Family Code.

While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle enunciated in the
Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because it is reiterated in the subsequent
cases of Gonzales v. Lopez, Esquivias v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Hontiveros v.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, and the most recent case of Martinez v.
Martinez. Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code applies to cover when the suit is
exclusively between or among family members.

The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the
aforementioned cases should not equally apply to suits involving husband and wife.

Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a husband and his
wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. However, the Court finds no
specific, unique, or special circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as

well as in the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a husband and

his wife, as in the present case. In the first place, Article 151 of the Family Code and
Article 222 of the Civil Code are clear that the provisions therein apply to suits
involving members of the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code, to wit:

ART. 150. Family relations include those:

1.

(1) Between husband and wife;

2.

(2) Between parents and children;

3.

(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and

4.

(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.

and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:

ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:

1.

(1) Between husband and wife;

2.

(2) Between parent and child;

3.

(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;

4.

(4) Among brothers and sisters.

Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of the same family as respondent,
may not invoke the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code.

Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement under Article
151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which are exclusively between or
among members of the same family, it

Modequillo v. Breva
Facts: On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.,"
the dispositive part of which read as follows:
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the
goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at
Malalag, Davao del Sur.
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market
value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No.
87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a
market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration
No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose
Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is
where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case
and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof,
and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced against the family home of
defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for
reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit.
The petitioner asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his
family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the
Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the
said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated
in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to

damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which
became final in 1988 is not one of those instances enumerated under Article 155 of
the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It
is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot
became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became
effective, and that the Family Code cannot be interpreted in such a way that all
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time
of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said
Code; and that it also erred when it declared that Article 162 of the Family Code
does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Issue: W/N a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may
be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family
Code?
Held: Yes. The family home is not exempt from the writ of execution.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at
the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not
fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family Code.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted
as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It
became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family
Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila
Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the
time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under
Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of this Chapter
shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all
existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Patricio vs Dario III (Family Home)

Facts:

Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitionerPerla G.

Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and privaterespondent Marcelino
G. Dario III. He left a residential house and a pre-school building situated at
Cubao,Quezon City. Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extra
judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of theirintention
to partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private responded
refused to partition the property. Petitioner and Marcelino Marc filed an action for
partition before RTCQuezon City.Trial court ordered the partition of the property.
Private respondents motion for reconsideration denied.Appeal to the Court of
Appeals denied.Upon motion for reconsideration, CA dismissed the petitioners
motionfor partition. It held that family home should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiarythereof. The heirs could
not partition the property unless thecourt found compelling reasons to rule
otherwise.(Son of the private respondent was a minor beneficiary of the family
home).

Issue:

Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners
refuse to accede to such a partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still
resides in the said home.

Held:

Petition granted as the minor son does not satisfy all the requisites to beconsidered
as a beneficiary of the family home.

To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must
be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live
in the family home; and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of
the family.

As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband
and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents,
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants' contemplates all descendants of
the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it
must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses
who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private
respondent's minor son, who is also the grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first
requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family
home to avail of the benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent
and grandson of the decedent has been living in the family home since 1994, or
within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second
requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his
paternal grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The
liability for legal support falls primarily on his parents, especially his father, herein
private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The law first imposes
the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the
father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueas as guardian ad litem,

and MARIA DUEAS
vs.
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG

FACTS: Emiliano Andal was married to Maria Dueas. His mother Eduvigis Macaraig
donated a parcel of land situated in the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur
by reason of such marriage. Emiliano suffered tuberculosis in January 1941. Then,
his brother, Felix, went to live in his house to help him work his farm. However, his
sickness became worse that on or about September 10, 1942, he became so weak
that he could hardly move and get up from his bed. On September 10, 1942, Maria
Duenas, his wife, eloped with Felix, and both went to live in the house of Maria's
father, until the middle of 1943. Since May 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual
intercourse and treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943,
Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral.
On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of
Mariano Andal.

In this case, Mariano, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueas, as guardian ad
litem, brought an action in the CFI Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership
and possession of the donated parcel of land in Camarines Sur. The complaint
alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of deceased Emiliano Andal and
Maria Dueas, as heir, he is the owner of the subject land which was occupied by
the respondent.

RTC: Declared Mariano Andal as legitimate son of Emiliano Andal hence owner of
said land.

ISSUE: Is Mariano Andal, a legitimate son of Emiliano Andal?

RULING: Yes. Article 108 of the Civil Code provides that Children born after the one
hundred and eighty days next following that of the celebration of marriage or within

the three hundred days next following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. This presumption may be rebutted only
by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred next
preceding the birth of the child. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and
Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate
son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days
following the dissolution of the marriage.

Despite Emilianos illness, there was no sufficient evidence presented that it was
physically impossible for him to have access to his wife. In fact, during the initial
period of conception (August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942) the couple were
still under the marital roof. As Manresa on this point says: Impossibility of access by
husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial period of conception,
(2) impotence which is patent, continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment,
unless it can be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of
prison regulations. Manresa, 492-500, Vol. I, cited by Dr. Arturo Tolentino in his book
"Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vol. 1, p.90)." None of these
circumstances were present in this case.

Teofista Babiera vs Presentacion Catotal

G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000

FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She
asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries, to wit:

That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years
of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion was born.

Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed
therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
She also filed a motion on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the
child of Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the
petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of
the Family Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of
limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Presentacion.

RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.

1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows
that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed child
of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and
Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason
why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period
for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the
cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The
action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of birth certificate.
First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
mother's signature was different from other signatures. Second, no medical records
or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was
impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista and that the latter
was not hers of Eugenio.

ILANO VS CA
G.R. No. 104376, February 23 1994

FACTS: Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as
secretary to Atty. Mariano C. Virata. She then resigned, and lost contact with
Artemio.

Sometime in 1957, Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco

distributor, met petitioner again who was engaged in the same business and they
renewed acquaintances. Since then, he would give her his unsold allocation of
goods. Later, he courted her more than four years,

The two eloped to Guagua, Pampanga on April 1962. She lived in an apartment
acquired by a certain Melencio under his own name, and was granted monthly
financial support by Artemio.

On June 1962, Leoncia, who was pregnant at that time, was fetched by Artemio to
transfer to Pasay. Unfortunately, Leoncia gave birth to a dead child. The death
certificate of which was signed by Artemio.

In 1963, Leoncia gave birth to Merciditas Ilano, who was conceived when they
moved to Makati. Artemio continued to support the child and her mother through
allowances. He even signed some of her report cards in school. He would bring
home candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her for a drive, eat
at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep.

Artemio now denies the claim of filiation by Leoncia and Merceditas. (baliw to si
koya)

ISSUE: Whether Merceditas can be considered as an acknowledged illegitimate

child?

HELD: YES. Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate
children or those who are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally
classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction, were those born outside of
lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2) Spurious, whether
incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time
Merceditas was conceived, she is a spurious child

The natural, logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of
plaintiff's birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find
ample support from the testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no
room to reasonably doubt his paternity which may not be infirmed by his belated
denials.

Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the true or real child of his
parents but because under the law, he had been recognized or acknowledged as
such a child. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn.

TAYAG VS CA
FACTS:
Emily Cuyugan is the mother of a minor child named Chad Cuyugan. She filed a
Claim for Inheritance on the RTC against the estate of Atty Ricardo Ocampo wh was
the putative father of Chad. To prove Chad's filiation, she presented various
documents and letters which proved Atty. Ocampo acknowledging Chad as his child.
The heirs of Atty. Ocampo then filed a otion to Dismiss on the ground that the action
is already barred by prescription and that an action to compel recognition based on
continuous acknowledgement must be brought during the lifetimw of the putative
father. Both he RTC and CA denied the Motion. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the action to compel Chad's recognition has already prescribed?
RULING:
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of
his majority;
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, Article 175 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the
action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Article 256 of the Family Code states that "[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws." It becomes essential, therefore, to determine
whether the right of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested right
or not.
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of
action of the minor child bas been vested by the filing of the complaint in court
under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court

of Appeals, et al. where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested
in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final
adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the provision of the Family Code in
question is procedural in nature, the rule that a statutory change in matters of
procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the
act excludes them from its operation, is not so pervasive that it may be used to
validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effective, since
procedure must be governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of
procedure arises especially where vested rights may be prejudiced. Accordingly,
Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it
will ineluctably affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially,
of the mind child she represents, both of which have been vested with the filing of
the complaint in court. The trial court is therefore, correct in applying the provisions
of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondent's cause of
action has not yet prescribed.

John Paul E. Fernandez, et al., vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994

FACTS: Violeta P. Esguerra, single, is the mother and guardian ad litem of the two
petitioners, Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez, met sometime in
1983, at the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said courts, where
Violeta's father served as tennis instructor. Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of
her two sons. She claimed that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6)
months after their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro
Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that Carlito was
married until the birth of her two children. She averred they were married in civil
rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however, she discovered that the marriage
license which they used was spurious. Petitioners presented the following
documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito
as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his
father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the baptism of
petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of
Violeta Esguerra. In defense, respondent Carlitodenied Violeta's allegations that he
sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors in the
baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the testimony of
Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a
sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism.

ISSUE: Whether or not Claro Antonio and John Paul are children of Carlito and are
entitled for support.
RULING: No. The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances. One such
situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash with those of the trial
court as in the case at bench. It behooves us therefore to exercise our extraordinary
power, and settle the issue of whether the ruling of the appellate court that private
respondent is not the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on
record. The evidence offered by the petitioners is insufficient to prove their filiation.
Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of the private
respondent in the baptism of petitioner Claro. These photographs are far from
proofs that private respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the
private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner
Claro. The pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private respondent
showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
The baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming private respondent as his
father has scant evidentiary value. There is no showing that private respondent

participated in its preparation. The certificates of live birth of the petitioners

identifying private respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on
the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that private respondent
had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. Also, there is no proof that Father
Fernandez is a close friend of Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which
should render unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not prepared to
concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day
in and day out can remember the parents of the children he has baptized.

CAMELO CABATANIA vs. CA and CAMELO REGODOS

Facts:
Florencia Regodos, in behalf of her minor son, Camelo Regodos filed a Petition
for Recognition and Support against Camelo Cabatania.
She claimed that after her husband left her in 1981, she worked as a maid at
petitioners house.
After sometime, petitioner brought her to a motel and had sexual intercourse,
wherein petitioner allegedly promised to support her in case she got pregnant.
She also claimed that she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27
days after their sexual intercourse.
-

She gave birth to Camelo Regodos on September 9, 1982.

During the trial, she presented a copy of the birth and baptismal certificate of
her son.

On the other hand, petitioner denied the alleged paternity. He averred that
Florencia was already pregnant when they had sex.

RTC
- ruled in favor of private respondent; and declared that Camelo Regodos as the son
of petitioner.
- that based on the personal appearance of the Camelo Regodos, there can never
be a doubt that he was the child of petitioner.
- also brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia that she was a widow, but in
reality, her husband was still alive. The lower court treated this as a minor issue and
said that this did not affect her entire testimony.
CA
- affirmed the ruling of the RTC

Issue:
Can the court compel petitioner to acknowledge the child as his illegitimate child
and to give support to the latter?

Ruling:
No.
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant
to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand
in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to
record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person
The lower courts erred in brushing aside the misrepresentation of Florencia. The fact
that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between
them gives rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the
extremely subjective test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not
suffice as evidence to prove paternity and filiation before the courts of law.

NARCISO SALAS, petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, respondent.

G.R. No. 180284.September 11, 2013.

FACTS: On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the RTC of Cabanatuan City.

Respondent claimed that petitioner is the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas
who was born on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time,
enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a
widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered
all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation
and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioners family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and
her child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further
alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to
support her and their child.

Petitioner filed his answer and described respondent as a woman of loose morals,
having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she went to work in Italy.
Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on petitioners
jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named
Felicisima de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro
and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in
exchange for the quashing of drug charges against respondents brother-in-law who
was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced
herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with
another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder
the expenses for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondents chicanery and
deceit designed to scandalize him in exchange for financial favor.

At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was
declared to have waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered
submitted for decision based on respondents evidence.

Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his kumadre
Felicisima de Guzman. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her he is
already a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all
grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business
and a housing subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma.
Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a single mother as
she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy. He then brought her to a motel,
promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She believed him and yielded
to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a better life.
Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child.

When she became pregnant with petitioners child, it was only then she learned that
he is in fact not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it
because he wanted to have another child.

On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she
stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to
their child on December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan
City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room and massaged
her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the
childs birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself.
It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was
excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his look-alike, and
this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the
apartment unit petitioner rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth,
petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her daughter
and eventually his wife was also informed about his having sired an illegitimate
child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give respondent money so
she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and
sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives and
friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought
to the hospital by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the
Cabanatuan City Police Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it
was only petitioners wife who showed up and she was very mad, uttering unsavory
words against respondent.
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by petitioner of
apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his
presence during and after delivery of respondents baby, respondents attempted
suicide through sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the
bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with petitioners wife at
the headquarters.

TC: judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant ordering
the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS for
the child Christian Paulo through the mother.

PETITIONER: appealed to the CA arguing that the TC erred in finding that petitioner
is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.

CA: affirmed the TCs ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the
illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting respondents prayer for support. It held that

Christian Paulo does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry
which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. However it had been
established by plaintiffs evidence, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle was
provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental which he paid for; with a
household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month. He also provided her a monthly
food allowance of P1,500.00. Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the
latter was in labor, walking her around and massaging her belly. Narciso brought
home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelles discharge from the
hospital. People living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos
delight to father a son at his age which was his look alike. It was only after the
18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew
his support to him and his mother. Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having
been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso
rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal
or documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs evidence. In Ilano vs. CA, it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically
covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. Any other evidence or
proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the
other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first three
paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits
hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to
illegitimate filiation.

PETITIONER: MR- Denied.

ISSUE: WON the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents
evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.

LAW: Article 172 and 175, FC

RULING: Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.

Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2)Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which
the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him.
Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said
document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she
wrote therein.

We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Thus, if the father
did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument and it has no
probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.

As to the Baptismal Certificate of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as

the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence
of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the childs paternity.
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and
letters, hospital bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their
rented apartment unit.

Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are
inconclusive evidence to prove paternity. Exhibits E and F showing petitioner
and respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value.
The Statement of Account from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where
respondent herself was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that
petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners admission in his
answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of respondents child as an
act of charity.

As to the handwritten notes of petitioner and respondent showing their exchange of

affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and
contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child.
Thus, even if these notes were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2)
vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent evidence of
illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument
signed by the parent concerned.

Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and
continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered
the testimonial evidence sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.

An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, like his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies
of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondents evidence
insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.

The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of

Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while respondent lived in Murillos
apartment and his regular visits to her at the said apartment, though replete with
details, do not approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial presented in Ilano. The testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of respondents
evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties
so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and
convincing evidence.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still
alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) of the Family Code. We have also held
that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during
his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child. The rule on substitution of
parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus
applies.

Liyao vs Liyao
GR No 138961 Mar 7 2002

FACTS: Petitioner, represented by his mother Corazon, filed an action for

compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the late William Liyao
against herein respondents, the legitimate wife and children of the deceased.

Corazon is legally married but living separately from her husband allegedly for more
than ten years at the time of the institution of this civil case. She cohabited with the
late William until his death. Petitioner alleged that he was in continuous possession
and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime
and presented witnesses and evidence to prove his allegations. On the other hand,
respondents painted a different picture of the story.

RTC rendered judgment in favour of petitioner.

CA reversed the ruling of RTC, favoured the presumption of legitimacy of the child
and gave weight to the testimonies of the witnesses of the respondents that
Corazon and her husband were seen together during the period she cohabited with
the deceased.

ISSUE:

1. WON the petition initiated by Corazon to compel recognition by respondents can

prosper.

2. WON petitioners action to impugn his legitimacy is proper.

RULING: No. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced as an adulteress.

No. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear
mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his
heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be
the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot

elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. (Art
170-171, FC)

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

De Jesus vs. Estate of Dizon

Prayer of the Petitioner: Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being

illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself
sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for
judicial approval.

Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children who having been born in a lawful
wedlock; claim to be the illegitimate children of the decedent, Juan G. Dizon in order
to enforce their respective shares in the latters estate under the rules on
succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on August 23, 1964 and
during this marriage, herein petitioners, Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A.
de Jesus were born. However, in a notarized document dated June 07, 1991, Juan G.
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate
children by Carolina Aves de Jesus.
On the following year, Juan G. Dizon died intestate leaving behind a considerable
amount of assets. Thus, on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment, herein
petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and accounting of the Dizon
estate. On the other hand, herein respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case. They argued that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless
call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the
spouses De Jesus to illegitimate children of the Spouses.
The trial court denied their motion to dismiss as well as their motion for
reconsideration, which prompted the respondents to elevate the issue before the
Court of Appeals but still the latter upheld the decision of the lower court and
ordered that case be remanded for further proceedings.
Years later, respondents, notwithstanding with their submission of their answers and
several motions, they filed an omnibus motion for the dismissal of the complaint.
They contend that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the recognition
of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon and that
the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been
able to establish their status as such heirs. They also asserted that an action for
partition was not an appropriate forum to ascertain the question of paternity and
filiation because the same could only be taken up in an independent suit or
proceeding. And at this instance, the trial court favored with the respondents and
therefore dismissed the complaint of the petitioners for lack of cause of action and
being improper.

Issue:
Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate children
of the decedent.

Ruling: The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established

by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten

instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation
shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate
action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on
other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the
childs acknowledgment.
However, based on the records presented, they showed that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also identify
Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness
of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably,
upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases
Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G.
Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children
of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done
because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional instances
the latters heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully
impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in
Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to
be an acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document, signed by the
acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate
children asserting to be somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally

ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly
opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina
de Jesus.
The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon
establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners
are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be
aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their
legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus
born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only
be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.
Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as
having been an adulteress.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
No costs.

EDGARDO A. TIJING, et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.

G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife, they have six children,
youngest of whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched
Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old
child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her child while she was
doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita was

nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husbands efforts, they could not
locate Angelita and their childs whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read
about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, whose
interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now
named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son,
sired by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation.
Bienvenida now alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and
Tomas for it was the latters own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered
sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage nor
with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomasbrother even testified that Tomas himself
admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and
credible witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to mention that it could
be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their
faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the
alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomasown brother that Tomas was
sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired subject child. More
importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married which is false because even Angelita had admitted
she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth
certificate. In this case, the Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for
identification and parentage testing.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge, but as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its admissibility.
Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PROLLAMANTE

G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005

FACTS: Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support
pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City . In their
complaintrespondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th

birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided

otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at
the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City . The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and
hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support
despite his adequate financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.
Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had
allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at
least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993
but "he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one
secret lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly
demanding and possessive. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as
by referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop" where she worked.
Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000,
Arnel and his entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their
return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had
impregnated her. Arnel refused to acknowledge the child as his because their "last
intimacy was sometime in 1998." Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and
family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his child. According to
Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the discussion became so heated that he had
no "alternative but to move on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body."
Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC)
attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were falsified.
The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single when he was actually
married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been 1964.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering that
his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.
He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that
his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties
to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

ISSUES: (1) whether a complaint for support can be converted to a petition for
recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding
for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination.

HELD: The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into
one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of
action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary
evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order
effectively integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support,
such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of
Appeals,20 we allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an
action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and
successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to
the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the
putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because
such acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There
being no allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. The ratio
decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure of
the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the
prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends
that the complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor
Chad Cuyugan is anillegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as one to
compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is
not new in our jurisprudence.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag,
the basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not
respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination
of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the
declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing
violates his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under
the 1987 Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process
of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken
from the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,28 hair,29 and other bodily substances.30We have also declared as

constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy

tests for women accused of adultery,31 expulsion of morphine from ones mouth32
and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.33 In
Jimenez v. Caizares,34 we even authorized the examination of a womans
genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that
she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these
procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were
constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,35 are now
similarly acceptable.
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance
public service and the common good.

In re: Petition for Change of Name of Julian Lim

G.R. No. 159966 March 30, 2005
Facts: On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition for change of name
and/or cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered name changed
from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time
because they will let him study there together with his sister named Wang Mei
Jasmine who was born in Singapore.... Since in Singapore middle names or the
maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate

that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current
registered name which carries a middle name. Julian and his sister might also be
asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames.
Carulasan sounds funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have
the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

The RTC rendered a decision denying the petition. The trial court found that the
reason given for the change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner
Julian may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because of his
middle name did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The trial court
ruled that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the
State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian
reaches the age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name
by dropping his middle name.

Issue: Whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child is contrary to
Article 174 of the Family Code

Held: The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and
reasonable cause for which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of
name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among
the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his
middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and

difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his
registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which

his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As
he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the
change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in
his rights under our laws.

BRIONES vs. MIGUEL

FACTS:
- Petitioner Joey Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents Maricel Miguel and Francisca Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor
(illegitimate) child Michael Kevin Pineda. Said petition was later on amended to
include respondent Loreta Miguel, the mother of said minor, who is now residing in
Japan and married to a Japanese citizen.
- On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel and Francisca came to the house of the
petitioner in Caloocan City on the pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child for recreation at the SM
Department store. They promised him that they will bring him back in the afternoon,
to which the petitioner agreed. However, the respondents did not bring him back as
promised by them. This prompted petitioner to file the instant Petition.

- Respondent Loreta alleged that she was the one who brought their son in the
Philippines pursuant to their agreement, and not petitioner. She further claimed that
she was the one who took Michael Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she
returned to the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and consented.
- Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has preferential right over their minor
child. He insists, however, that custody should be awarded to him whenever she
leaves for Japan and during the period that she stays there.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be awarded care, custody and control
over the minor illegitimate child Michael Kevin

HELD:
No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides
that illegitimate children shall be, among others, under the parental authority of
their mother, in conformity with this Code. This is the rule regardless of whether the
father admits paternity.

The recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering
the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers
to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if
she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Of course,
the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the child
shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.

There is thus no question that Respondent Loreta, being the mother of and having
sole parental authority over the minor, is entitled to have custody of him. She has
the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be deprived of that right, and she
may not even renounce or transfer it except in the cases authorized by law.

Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no
child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when
the court finds cause to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such
as the mothers unfitness to exercise sole parental authority, shall justify her
deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone else. In the
past, the following grounds have been considered ample justification to deprive a
mother of custody and parental authority: neglect or abandonment, unemployment,
immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable disease. There is no showing at all that
she is unfit to take charge of him.

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS

vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE SANTOS

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is the daughter of Dr. Antonio de Santos
and Sofia Bona who were married on February 7, 1941. Dr. Antonio fell in love with a
fellow doctor and private respondent, Conchita Talag. Dr. Antonio sought a formal
dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court
in 1949. He proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with
whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union
produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a
month later, on 23 April 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On 8 March 1981,

Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of

P15,000,000.00. Private respondent went to court asking for the issuance of letters
of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of her late
husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived
by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and
petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.

After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to

intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter
alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate.

RTC: On 14 November 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her

administration, the court a quo passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing
the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and declared them,
along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

CA: On 9 January 1992, Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE: Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?

RULING: No. Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states that only natural children
can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural. In other words, a child's parents should not have been
disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a
"natural child." In this case, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born when the
latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. It must be noted
that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and
Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children," Article 89, a provision
subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and
voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects of said marriages on their
offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are
"conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning," but because
there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged
natural children" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as
such kind of children. In this case, the marriage under question is considered "void
from the beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was
still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents

were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a prior
subsisting marriage.

It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's

half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for two reasons:
First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that
they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269; second, natural children
by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of
the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural children. Legitimation is not a "right"
which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children
proper, as defined under Article 269. Although natural children by legal fiction have
the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the
syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the right to be legitimated,
which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing
marriage between the children's father and his estranged first wife effectively
barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
Attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two
classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are
nothing if not pure fiction.