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ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Macias v. COMELEC, No. L-18684, 14 September 1961
FACTS:
Petitioners request that respondent officials be prevented from implementing Republic Act 3040 that
apportions representative districts in this country. They allege it to be unconstitutional and void. One of the
allegations was that it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several
provinces.
Respondents aver that the Director of the Census submitted an official report on the population of the
Philippines in November, 1960, which report became the basis of the bill; and that the Act complies with the
principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution.
Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and
Bulacan, and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental. They allege, and this Court finds, that their provinces
had been discriminated against by Republic Act 3040, because they were given less representative districts
than the number of their inhabitants required or justified.
ISSUE:
-

Whether or not RA 3040 is unconstitutional for violating the principle of proportional representation
prescribed by the Constitution?
The controversy may be decided upon the issue of districts-in-proportion-to-inhabitants.

RULING:
-

This Court reached the conclusion that the statute be declared invalid.
There has been a disproportion in the representation.
Apportionment of Members. The Constitution directs that the one hundred twenty Members of the
House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the member of their respective inhabitants."
Conclusion. For all the foregoing, we hereby reiterate our resolution declaring that Republic Act 3040
infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.

Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, 7 March 1995

FACTS:
There are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A.
No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati." 1
-

Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854.
Section 51 states: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials
and employees of the City shall likewise continue exercising their functions and duties and they shall be
automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. They contend that this section collides
with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House of
Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3)
consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence,
section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and
disregards the terms previously served by them.

Petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No. 7854
which provides that Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter have at least two
(2) legislative districts.

They contend that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment6 cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not expressed in
the title of the bill 7 and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only four hundred fifty
thousand (450,000).

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These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos. 8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude (prevent) Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be
made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by
Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting
that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose
population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative. 14

ISSUE:
-

They assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:

2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.

3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following
the return of every census;

(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

RULING:
We find no merit in the petitions.
-

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.

Montejo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118702, 16 March 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1
of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that
it violates the principle of equality of representation.
Petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the
province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of
Tolosa in his district.
It involves the validity of the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting
and reapportionment.

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The conversion of sub-provinces into regular provinces resulted into the adding of municipalities per district and
resulted to the reduction of the municipalities. COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2736 where it
transferred municipalities to other districts.
The composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the Fifth
District were not disturbed.
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC, among
others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second Districts. He
alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District has 156,462 registered
voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference, he proposed that the
municipality of Tolosa with 7,700 registered voters be transferred from the First to the Second District.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (2) said adjustment complied with the constitutional
requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory.
Petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality of
representation ordained in the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out
in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke
this provision but relies on the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of
redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled
"Apportioning the Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different
Legislative Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area."

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of

the reapportionment herein made.

Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it
may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number
of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or
where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be
made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

The Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the COMELEC "to
make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made."
Section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to
transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another district.
The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created. . . ."

ISSUES:

RULING:
-

We hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736 transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
The conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.

Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

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The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the election." 2
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte, wherein she indicated that her residency is seven (7) months.
Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a
candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency.
Private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives.
Petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to
"since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
Provincial Election Supervisor informed petitioner that such amended certificate can no longer be accepted as
the deadline for the filing has already lapsed.
Petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila.
Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an
"honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. 11

ISSUES:
Dealing with two primary issues, namely:

the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and

petitioner's compliance with the one-year residency requirement.

RULING:
Second Division held: This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake."
Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was
quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite
Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
-

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied
with the one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent
for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96
Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408).
In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban
but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi (with the intention to return) is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur:
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality;
(2) intention to remain there; and
(3) intention to abandon the old domicile.

In other words there must basically be animus manendi (the intention of remaining) with animus non
revertendi (with the intention to return). When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila,
coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a
resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and
school days, as her place of domicile.
Respondent has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one-year prior the election, showed
intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been
a resident of Manila. It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of
Leyte "since childhood."
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte.

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The issue of Petitioner's qualifications: Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the
First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the
face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that
petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC
was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

The court did not agree with COMELECs contention that petitioner had abandoned her domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight (8) years old.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained,
it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin
by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte
contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue.

In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with
an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we
are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

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WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions
dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.

Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400

FACTS:
-

Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his Certificate of Candidacy, he had indicated that he is a resident
of Makati City for 10 months.

Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of
Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987
the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995
elections.

Petitioner filed another Certificate of Candidacy amending the first one wherein he indicated his residency to be
1 year and 13 days.

A hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among
others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.

Petitioner was garnered higher votes against another candidate. Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon
filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice. 17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the
qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile.

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it
as having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections,
indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of
the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of
both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at
various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of
origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was
Concepcion, Tarlac.

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Petitioners alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in Makati City just shows his intention not to
establish a new home in Makati City.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit
instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City
it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's
original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino
himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or
Quezon City. 26

ISSUES:
-

Whether or not petitioners domicile is Makati City?

RULING:
-

In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to continue requirements are hardly
met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining
respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.

Torayno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137329, 9 August 2000

FACTS:
-

Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family,
(1) had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City;
(2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the
provincial capitol being located therein; and
(3) has registered as voter in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or
newcomer" when he ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The assailed
Resolutions ruled that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be
eligible to vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.

During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor of
Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy
dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in
Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly urbanized city, in
which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of
the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five months was at 1409 San Jose
Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

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Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de
Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral
candidate, on the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement.

The Comelec First Division denied the Petition for Disqualification.

The Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division, holding that "[t]he records
clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City for such a period of time
necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established by the respondent having a
house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his family has been living since then."

"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or registering as a voter in
a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote for and be elected to a position in the
province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as he has complied with the requirements prescribed by
law in the case of a qualified voter.

ISSUE:
-

1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's:

o

(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election;

(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said province until said date; and

(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,

precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro City prior to the
May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for city mayor of said City.
-

2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro City, holding
offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in Cagayan de Oro City and having a
house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor, and registering as a voter in said City in
June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against the undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a
change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in
Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1) year for purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the May
11, 1998 elections.

(1) whether private respondent had duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year
prior to the May 11, 1998 elections to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof;

RULING:
-

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy

Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in Cagayan
de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts.

Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de Oro City
while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial government
was located at the heart of that city.13 He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter of intention, and it
is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case, Emano decided to
adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995 elections.

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Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum period required by law.

Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of his
position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring residence
while in office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent the performance of that
official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in which the seat of government became his adopted
place of residence.Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,14 the loss of any of the required qualifications for
election merely renders the official's title or right to office open to challenge. In Emano's case, no one
challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his residence to Cagayan de Oro
City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed his candidacy for mayor in March
1998.

Facts Showing Change of Residence

In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing in
Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the
three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that city, where the
seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of the same city.

these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time
sufficient to qualify him to run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the
part of Emano in his choice of residence.

Similarly, in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City
while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there
together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents
and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for
mayor thereof.

Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

FACTS:
-

Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and
citizens, seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment."

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district
municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the
second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

The stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for
such new district.4
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the
creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the
first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up
with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

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Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard.6 The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district.7
Verbatim, the submission is that:
o
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended thereto; and
o
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12
Respondents argue that the 250,000 minimum population is only a requirement for the creation of a legislative
district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional legislative district
within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We deny the petition.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a
legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative."
For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must
first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find support.
Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the
additional district.

ISSUE:

RULING:
-

Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

Veterans Fed. Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, 6 Oct. 2000

FACTS:
The four inviolable parameters to be determined as winner for the Philippine party-list elections are as follows:

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First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.

Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.

Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is

entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck down for having
been issued in grave abuse of discretion.
The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to
complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government -- the party-list
method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or organization registered
with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list representatives who, upon their
election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives as regular members. 4 In effect, a voter is
given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative. 5
Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy declaration, the State shall "promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system.
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA 7941) in this
wise:

"Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall

constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.

Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives

-

On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June
26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve (12) parties and
organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation
of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of PartyList Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution,
was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the threeseat limit under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared
winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations 8 filed their respective Motions for Intervention, seeking the same
relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution granting
PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14
already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional9 seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and twenty (20%)
percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement
prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list system," which
should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable
the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second,
"the system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the]
multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x x should have
at least one representative."
38 more party-lists were proclaimed to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent membership of
party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up," the Comelec en banc resolved only the issue

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concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other words, the issue was: Should the
remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1) to the thirteen qualified parties that had
each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to the Group of 38 - herein private respondents even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?

ISSUE:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for partylist solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?

RULING:
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number
of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list."
Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list."
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and
coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill.
The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld the
constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now
proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38) herein
respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly
violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional representation.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by the strict
enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as unconstitutional, there
must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits, the statute permits.31
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of three each),
because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the "proportional representation" mandated by
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Comelec are SET
ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives - two for APEC
and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties - are AFFIRMED.
Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, 26 June 2001
FACTS:
Two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 1issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec).
This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded,
in the 2001 party-list elections.

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Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was
intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented.
2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoral parties, organizations
and political parties.
As defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of
[some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections'
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a Petition 9before this assailing Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.
Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution
No. 3785.

ISSUES:
"2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
-

"3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.

RULING:
-

Second Issue: Participation of Political Parties

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under
the party-list system.

Third Issue: Marginalized and Underrepresented

The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as
follows:

that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give "genuine power to our people" in Congress.

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like
"in accordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty
objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.

The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented
constituencies mentioned in Section 5. 36

Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."

Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections
normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of
Representatives were set aside for the party-list system.

The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool
to others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.

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This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented.

Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 2 April 2013

FACTS:
-

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 partylist groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list
organizations.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and
9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUES:
two issues: first,
o
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations;
second,
o
whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
RULING:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this
Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The Party-List System. The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.

Section 5, Article VI.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation."
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral
parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the
entirety, of the party-list system.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral
and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
The party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional
parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations
are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be
organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but
also for non-sectoral parties.
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees.
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the
majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, 60 abandoning even the

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lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political
parties can participate in party-list elections.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009; Resolution 8 July 2009
FACTS:
-

BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution.
BANAT filed its petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been
quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7
WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the partylist system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the
votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided, finally, that each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

ISSUE:
-

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16

RULING:
-

We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated
in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in
the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution. Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution provides: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of
the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.

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Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent
Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This is
where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in
proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation
is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds
50.
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate
in the party-list elections.
We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats. The
allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections.

Ang Ladlad-LGBT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 8 April 2010

FACTS:
-

This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
The case has its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).

Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented
sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation;

after admitting the petitioners evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral
grounds

ANG LADLAD was criticized based on morality issues.

ISSUES:
The Parties Arguments
-

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

RULING:
We grant the petition.

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-

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those
sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system.
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation.

we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.

The Commission on Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list accreditation.

Phil. Guardians Brotherhood v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, 29 April 2010

FACTS:
These incidents arose from our Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to restore and maintain the PGBI to its
situation prior to the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8679.
Our Status Quo Order directly ordered the Comelec to include PGBI in the list of candidates under the party-list
system in the May 10, 2010 elections pending the final determination of PGBIs qualification to be voted upon
as a party-list organization.
-

Pursuant to Comelec Minute Resolution No. 10-0042, the Information Technology Department of Comelec
published a list of candidates Thereafter; Comelec shall be relieved from liability" 6 and the final list shall then be
prepared for printing.7

In our Resolution of April 29, 2010,12 we granted PGBIs petition and, accordingly, annulled the assailed
Comelec Resolutions in SPP No. 09-004 (MP) 13 which delisted PGBI from the roster of duly registered national,
regional and sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. We declared at the same time that PGBI is qualified to
be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the May 10, 2010 elections. Despite the Status Quo Order
and the Resolution, however, PGBI was never included in the ballot as one of the accredited party-list groups or
organizations eligible for election under the party-list system. Hence, PGBI was never voted upon as a party-list
candidate in the May 10, 2010 elections.

ISSUES:
the contempt charge1 against the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) for its alleged disobedience
to this Courts Status Quo Order2 dated February 2, 2010;
whether the petitioner, Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), should be declared to have participated
in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010, in light of the Comelecs failure to obey our Status Quo Order and our
subsequent Resolution3 granting PGBIs petition to annul its delisting from the roster of accredited party-list
groups or organizations.
RULING:
After due consideration of the attendant facts and the law, we find the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt of this
Court.

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-

Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the presence of the court and can be punished only
after notice and hearing. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court or
injunction granted by a court or judge constitutes indirect contempt. (Rules of Court)
Based on the recited antecedent facts, it cannot be disputed that the Comelec did not comply with our Status
Quo Order; it simply pleaded insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications as
reasons for its avoidance of our Order. It essentially posited that compliance with our Status Quo Order was
rendered impossible by the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections.

However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the Comelecs own self-imposed deadline of February 4,
2010 for the correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of participating party-list
groups and organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections.

The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had determined that changes in the official ballot
could still be made at any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases then pending involving the
registration of party-list organizations, the deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would
have to be resolved before the deadline; otherwise, the Comelec could not be held liable for their non-inclusion.

However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the Comelecs own self-imposed deadline of February 4,
2010 for the correction of errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of participating party-list
groups and organizations in the May 10, 2010 elections.

The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had determined that changes in the official ballot
could still be made at any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases then pending involving the
registration of party-list organizations, the deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would
have to be resolved before the deadline; otherwise, the Comelec could not be held liable for their non-inclusion.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Comelec Chair35 and Members36 are hereby found GUILTY of
CONTEMPT of the Supreme Court for their disobedience to our lawful directive, specifically the Status Quo
Order dated February 2, 2010. They are accordingly SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for this disobedience. They
are further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. shall be deemed not to have transgressed the participation and
level of votes requirements under Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 with respect to the May 10, 2010
elections.

Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, 21 January 2004

FACTS:
Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated
then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. ("Senator Guingona") as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
-

Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84
("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on
COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on
14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. 1 Resolution
No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve
only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.2

COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators.

Resolution No. 01-005 also provided that "the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years
and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President."

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Respondents Ralph Recto ("Recto") and Gregorio Honasan ("Honasan") ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in
Resolution No. 01-005.

Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the
13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly,
petitioners prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.

ISSUES:
(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14
May 2001.

RULING:
The petition has no merit.
-

Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001?

Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate
and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law," thus:

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election may be called
to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, with the following pertinent
parts:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the
House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for
Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of
such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such
vacancy.

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645:
However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be
held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, Section 2 of R.A.
No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a special election by fixing the date of the special
election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the
vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to
be voted for.

Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the 14 May 2001 regular
elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645?

Whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly
rendered Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election void.

Whether the special election is invalid for lack of a "call" for such election and for lack of notice as to the office
to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. For reasons stated
below, the Court answers in the negative.

COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election Did Not Negate the Calling of such
Election

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The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the
legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the elections validity.26 In a
general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body
charged to administer the election.27

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a
vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and
operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not
invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. 28 This is
because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election
by some authority29 and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.30

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly,
the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as VicePresident in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory
notice and COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election,
much less invalidate it.

The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the electorate of necessary information
regarding a special election, are central to an informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the
circumstances attendant to the present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and
give notice did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC should not take
chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable
laws relative to the conduct of regular elections in general and special elections in particular.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, 10 July 2003

FACTS:
-

A petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a
declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1 suffer
from constitutional infirmity.
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
The petitioner raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an
affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates for national offices and party list representatives including the President and the
Vice-President violate the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section
25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate
without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?

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B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution?

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome
of the election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election
has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors
and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning
candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar
as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning
candidates for the positions of president and vice-president.

ISSUES:

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for
being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
-

The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the
power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is
lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.

The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.

Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and
effect.

Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (See: SC Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed March 14, 1949)
FACTS:
-

Senator Taada and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating
charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation.
Petitioner delayed his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M.
When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the
Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public
he read slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Senator Taada repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner,
then presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on
being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who
would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his follower,
Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the latter would
ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
Some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session hall
followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the senators
remained.

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Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and
the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position of the
President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate."
Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines
Senate.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.

ISSUES:
-

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?

RULING:
-

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should
not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a
continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?;
(2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the
present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case.
What follows is the opinion of the other four on those four on those sub-questions.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty
three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino, it would be
most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that
depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the
President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with
thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein
involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756

FACTS:
Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition forquo warranto under
Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as minority leader of
the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
-

On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of Senate
President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position by
Sen. Miriam Defenser Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2, 8 Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected President
of the Senate.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had
voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
belonged to the "minority."

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During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the
senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority had
chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.

The Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto,
alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of
Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:
-

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?

3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?

4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?

RULING:
-

The Court finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of
and the assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue: The Court's Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco 11 in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction
to settle the issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the
definitions of "majority" and "minority" involve an interpretation of the Constitution,
specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that "[t]he Senate shall elect its
President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members."

The Respondent and the Solicitor General both contend that the issue of who is the lawful
Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the
principle of separation of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the
fundamental law does not provide for the office of a minority leader in the Senate.

Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question
involving an interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of
the Senate; neither are there "peculiar circumstances" impelling the Court to assume
jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general adds that there is not even any legislative
practice to support the petitioners' theory that a senator who votes for the winning Senate
President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was
the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court
ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its
intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session 13 and therein elect a
Senate President.

Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

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In recognizing Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its
officials, particularly Senate President Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?

Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the
constitutional provision requiring the election of the Senate President "by majority vote of all
members" carries with it a judicial duty to determine the concepts of "majority" and
"minority," as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue that "majority" in the
aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those
who voted for the losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the
minority, to whom the right to determine the minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners
assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority leader, since he voted for
Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-NUCDUMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority,
having voted for Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected
by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide
that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority," who
could thereby elect the minority leader.

Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of
votes," 41 not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality.

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House
Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power "to determine
the rules of its proceedings." 44 Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set
of rules to govern its internal affairs.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Arroyo v. de Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, 14 August 1997

FACTS:
Petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on
the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.
-

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives, charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, Rep. Arroyo announced that
he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by
the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

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Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are
in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in
violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that
"each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is
a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious.

Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They
argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)
for the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on
separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, Secs. 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.

ISSUES:

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

Pimentel v. Senate Committee, G.R. No. 187714, 8 March 2011

FACTS:
-

Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on
the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar.
Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"2 In
his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General
Appropriations Act, particularly the P200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P.
Garcia Avenue Extension from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paraaque City including Right-ofWay (ROW), and another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW.
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President Villar, from the time he was
member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the realignment of the
C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City and
Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las Pias would be financially benefited by the construction of the
new road;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;

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WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his personal
interests thereby sacrificing the peoples welfare;

Such Resolution was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges.

Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech 10 where he stated that he would answer the accusations against him
on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech 11 where
he stated that the Ethics Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics
Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villars case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of
the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole.
Petitioners argue that The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the
complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villars right to due process and
of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution;

ISSUES:
The issues for the Courts resolution are the following:

1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an
indispensable party in this petition;

2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort;

3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee
to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villars right to equal
protection;

4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villars right to due process and of the
majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and

5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for
their effectivity.

RULING:
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, 24 the Court declared void
unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The
Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:
-

Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of
its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall
be effective in the subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on
notice.

Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution.
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need not be
published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.

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In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of the Senate
since the proceedings involve the Senates exercise of its disciplinary power over one of its members. Clearly,
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the Senate.
Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83
FACTS:
ISSUES:
RULING:
Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863
FACTS:
-

Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He
asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity;
Sergio Osmena, a member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu,
took one hour to deliver a privileged speech, entitled A Message to Garcia.
He was ordered to appear before the House to face his charges. Failing to do so, shall require him to show
cause why he should not be punished by the House.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmea alleged; first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up other
business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that if other business has intervened after the
member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to
censure by the House.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison 3, even expelled by the votes of their
colleagues.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmea may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced. We believe, however,
that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has
conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by
the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been
said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

ISSUES:
RULING:

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 128055, 19 April 2001

FACTS:

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Page 28 of 53
-

The Court is called upon to review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in
criminal cases filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The criminal case has alleged that the Senator acted in bad faith in the performance as the Commissioner of
the Commission on Immigration and Deportation for approving the application for legalization of the aliens, who
mostly are Chinese nationals, who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well
that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines
was unlawfully legalized by said accused." 1

Petitioner posted a cash bail as she was then recovering from injuries caused by a vehicular accident.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional
liberty upon a recognizance.

The Sandiganbayan issued a 90 day suspension from her position as a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines.

The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination
of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be " no
ifs and buts about it." 5

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and
unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld
Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.

ISSUES:
RULING:

Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1

FACTS:
-

Three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote
of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on
April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session
of Congress following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the
election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for
their suspension had been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted
upon definitely by the House when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence, these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary threefourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of Congress

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Page 29 of 53
had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
-

If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified
law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect.

The petitioners contend that the enrolled bill rule has not found acceptance in this jurisdiction, citing the case of
United States vs. Pons (34 Phil., 729). It is argued that this Court examined the journal in that case to find out
whether or not the contention of the appellant was right. We think the petitioners are in error.

It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210,
that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by published
statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order; and (2) in case of
acts of the Legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by
the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as already stated,
the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as
amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the
opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be
found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted between the two documents and
the court did not say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to
the journals, disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."

ISSUES:

RULING:
-

In view of the foregoing consideration, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the senators
and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote were members of
Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.

Phil. Judges Assoc. v. Prado, 27 SCRA 703

FACTS:
-

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354.
These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional
Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced
by the above-named measures.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that:

(1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;

(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of
the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and

(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

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Page 30 of 53
-

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill
passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege
from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth
Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the
franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such
arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the
Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people,
there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did
not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from
the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to
any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference
committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both
Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

These arguments are unacceptable.

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and
approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

ISSUES:

RULING:

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Page 31 of 53
-

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was
not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative
of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December 2003

FACTS:
-

Two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section
14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were members of the minority bloc in the House of
Representatives.
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled "An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices," is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it
repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in
Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep.
Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006
primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of
unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No.
9006.

They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal of
Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer considered
ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office
even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
The Respondent argue invoking the "enrolled bill" doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations
that "irregularities" attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and
the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of
both houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.

The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly
stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act a complete
index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and every means necessary for its
accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls for all the parts of an act relating to
its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set forth.

ISSUES:

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Page 32 of 53
RULING:
-

Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Not a Rider32

Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as
surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its
subject finding expression in its title.33

To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient
for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an
abstract or index of the Act.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that the
entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law particularly
in the House of Representatives.
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not persuaded.
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. A review of cases51 reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the rule. The Court finds no reason
to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved
the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House.
This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or
Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. 52
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

U.S. v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729

FACTS:
-

The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal importation of
opium.
On April 10, 1915, the accused conspired, bringing from Spain to Manila City, Philippines, 125 kilograms of
opium. Knowing that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the Philippine
Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been
arrested.) Both were sentenced to be confined for two (2) years in Bilibid and ordered to pay a fine. However,
the former was to pay P 1,000 while the latter P 3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later withdrew his appeal and the
judgment as to him has become final.

The counsel alleged and offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for
1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty,
was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is admitted that the last day of the
special session was, under the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged
with having violated the provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely,

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Page 33 of 53

(1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence and
(2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.

These questions will be considered in the reversed order.

-

Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission shall perform the duties which would properly be
required of the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative
Procedure of the Philippine Commission provides, among other things, "that the proceedings of the
Commission shall be briefly and accurately stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the Secretary
"to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the Commission."

While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may take
judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such journals may be
noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the
adjournment. They show, with absolute certainty that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight
on February 28, 1914.

The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the
question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

ISSUES:

RULING:

Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714

FACTS:
The present controversy revolves around the passage of House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act
4065, "An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending
for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine, as Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila."
-

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It
was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the
Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a
minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the President
Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act
as Mayor.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in
toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the
Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No.
9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a
certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.

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Page 34 of 53
-

The President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The
bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor
drew immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the
enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of
the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and
approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was
not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of
no effect.

The President of the Philippines informed both Houses that he is withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
9266 adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually
approved by the two Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and
chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of business
establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the
Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with
this Court.

Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually
passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be
decisive in the resolution of the issue.

Whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction.

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of
the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all
bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable.

It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent
and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other records
of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions, 10although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be resorted to if the attestation of the
presiding officers is present.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all,
but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid
and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the
attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of,
what evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in
the journal should be consulted.

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Page 35 of 53
ISSUES:

RULING:
-

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the
point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266
signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to
declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 is
declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.

Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131

FACTS:
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported
a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance
The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation or
police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years or any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city for at least 8
years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
-

At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has served as officer in the Armed Forces" was
inserted to said provision.
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen.
Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the
conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as
chief of police with exemplary record".

It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or was still
part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and
substituted what now is section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

It would thus appear that the omission whether deliberate or unintended of the phrase, "who has served
the police department of a city or was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the
course of the engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was made
not by Congress but only by an employee thereof; and that what purportedly was a rewriting to suit some
stylistic preferences was in truth an alteration of meaning. It is for this reason that the petitioner would have us
look searchingly into the matter.

As we observed explicitly in our decision, the enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the
President of the Philippines shows that section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip
form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The
respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments.

Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted.

ISSUES:

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Page 36 of 53
RULING:

By what we have essayed above we are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals
must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution 11 expressly requires
must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by
a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. 12 All we hold is
that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.

Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300

FACTS:
-

ISSUE:
-

The Philippine Constitution Association has filed in this Court a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of
the Philippines and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned thereto by the
Auditor General as his representative, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10,
1964) to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as
amended in 1940, that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses
to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representatives, and to
and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the
Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term
of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such, increase.
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of
Republic Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who
participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution requires that not only the term of all the members of the
House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase
becomes effective? Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the payment of the increased
compensation to the members of the House of Representatives who were elected after the expiration of the
term of those House members who approved the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of
office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the approval of the increase?

RULING:
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered.
From the first proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934 Convention down to the present,
the intendment of the clause has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of the Legislature that
approved the higher compensation, whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to circumvent,
as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in its adoption.
-

The Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it
on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be
disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act)
authorizes the disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the
Constitution and must be held null and void.

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People v. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875, 3 Feb. 2000

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six
counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge
the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his
having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
-

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general?
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been reelected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law.
Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not
claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to
be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by
the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the custody of the law within
twenty four hours after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege
shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in
session.

The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend
congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free

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man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accusedappellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

ISSUES:

RULING:
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement
are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.10
-

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876

FACTS:
-

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by
plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of
damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being
summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous,
and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
(Article VI, Section 15.)

The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the
purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" that is to say, in Congress used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session,
as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was
an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably
was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be
so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is
not absolutely privileged.

ISSUES:
The issues before us are:

(1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not,

(2) whether it is libelous or not.

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RULING:
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.

Pobre v. Santiago, AC No. 7399, 25 August 2009

FACTS:
Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
-

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court.
Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken against the lady
senator.

Sen. Santiago explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary
immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its
committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation.

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session.
No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof."

Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the
Congress does not destroy the privilege.3 The disciplinary authority of the assembly4 and the voters, not the
courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.5

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment or
disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the matter.

ISSUES:

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431

FACTS:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30,
1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who

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likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office
would expire on March 3, 1986.
-

On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan
Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by
placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.

Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 1 and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office.

On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be
the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the
context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can
hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from
the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections;
and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa
elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or
employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime
minister or member of the cabinet. ...

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions
mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said
provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.

It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system of government in other states allows a local elective official
to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time.

In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas
Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional
provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor
attempt to discharge its functions.

ISSUES:
-

[1] whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP]
can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and
[2] whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa,

RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Puyat v. de Guzman, 113 SCRA 31
FACTS:

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-

This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent
Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao
A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.

The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings,
docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group
claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.

The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman,
Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds.
Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as
counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same
prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear,
Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

ISSUES:
-

Whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel,
albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.

RULING:
-

Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI
in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor respondents who have their
respective capable and respected counsel.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843
outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of
Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day
before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved
to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but
which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
"intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed
before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, codefendant of respondent Acero therein.

Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance
as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as
Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear
as counsel indirectly.

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in
SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is
hereby made permanent.

Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, 15 July 2009 & 18 Janaury 2011

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FACTS:
-

This resolves the Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration.

In the Decision,4 the Court held that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he accepted the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, as "the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office
or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution." 5 The Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter "insofar as
it creates the PNRC as a private corporation" and consequently ruled that "the PNRC should incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation."6 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3,
4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create
the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate powers.7

ISSUES:

RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Richard J. Gordons Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration and movant-intervenor PNRCs Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No.
175352 dated July 15, 2009 are GRANTED. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 95, as amended, the charter of the
Philippine National Red Cross, was not raised by the parties as an issue and should not have been passed
upon by this Court. The structure of the PNRC is sui generis being neither strictly private nor public in nature.
R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety. The dispositive portion of the Decision should
therefore be MODIFIED by deleting the second sentence, to now read as follows:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not
a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Villegas v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 53869, 25 March 1982

FACTS:
These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, respective, involved the
prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to read:
Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, ...
-

L-53869:

On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A. Villegas
against the Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private respondents) before the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch XVI.
An answer, dated October 11, 1979, was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman
Valentino 1. Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas
"challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred
under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or
Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial
Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction.

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-

Assemblyman Legaspi was likewise the lawyer of his wife in two pending cases.
L-51928:

Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent
Eustaquio T.C. Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI)
to Eustaquio T.C Acero, allegedly on the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to
him (Reyes). Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This
appearance was questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,
above-quoted.

ISSUES:
Whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L. Legaspi and Estanislao A.
Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.
RULING:
A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman from appearing
as counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction", and the "similar" provision of Section
17, Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads:
... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior
to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction.
-

A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation now comprehends all
members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of the Commissions on
Appointments, a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution.

Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7,
1981, Section 11 now reads:
SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction, ...

The term 'collegiate" remains deleted, and the terminology is now "Court without appellate jurisdiction."

Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved under the
amended provision.

what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction.

Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, in
preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch II, appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez
appears as counsel for Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch
XXI. They represent and plead the cause of another before a Court of justice.

The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi and Fernandez,
respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction?

By the deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both the original and amended Section 11, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is that Courts of First Instance, as appellate
Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the previous prohibition. They are single-Judge Courts with appellate
jurisdiction from decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated otherwise, under the amended
proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.

It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the
exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi
are still prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.

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-

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as
counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from
appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi hereby
declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), and before
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respectively.

Vera v. Avelino, 34 Phil 725

FACTS:
-

Pursuant to a constitutional provision (section 4, Article X), the Commission on elections submitted, last May, to
the President and the Congress of the Philippines, its report on the national elections held the preceding month,
and, among other things, stated that, by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the
Provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and
free expression of the popular will.

Thereafter, in the course of the session, a resolution was approved referring to the report and ordering that,
pending the termination of the protest lodged against their election, the herein petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero who had been included among the sixteen candidates for senator receiving the
highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commission on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as
members of the chamber.

Petitioners immediately instituted this action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution. They pray
for an order annulling it, and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats, and to exercise their
senatorial prerogatives.

ISSUES:

RULING:
-

Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may this petition be entertained? The answer
must naturally be in the negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to
suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the
power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46
Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one
branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance,
and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

The Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, had the constitutional power to adopt rules for its
proceedings(section 10 [3], Article VI of the Constitution), and by legislative practice it is conceded the power to
promulgate such orders as may be necessary to maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity. 4 We are
advised by the respondents that, after weighing the propriety or impropriety of the step, the Senate, in the
exercise of its authority and discretion and of its inherent power of self-preservation, resolved to defer the
administration of oath and the sitting of the petitioners pending determination of the contest. It is not clear that

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the measure had no reasonable connection with the ends in view, and neither does it palpably transcend the
powers of the public deliverative body. On the contrary, there are reasons to believe it was prompted by the
dictates of ordinary caution, or of public policy. For, if, as reported by the corresponding constitutional agency,
concededly well-posted on the matter by reason of its official duties, the elections held in the Provinces of
Pampanga, Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were so tainted with acts of violence and intimidation, that the
result was not the legitimate expression of the voters' choice, the Senate made no grievous mistake in
foreseeing the probability that, upon proof of such widespread lawlessness, the Electoral Tribunal would annull
the returns in that region (see Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil., 521; Laurel, Elections [2d ed.], p. 488et seq.), and
declare herein petitioners not entitled to seats in the Senate.
-

Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary practice, the
power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate in its deliberations. As we
have seen, the assignment by the constitution of the Electoral Tribunal does not actually negative that power
provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line, deciding an election contest against the member. Which
the respondents at bar never attempted to do. Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did not impair, the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal to decide the contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the
territory of the last named agency let ask the question: May the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate order that Body
to defer the admission of any member whose election has been contested? Obviously not. Then it must be
conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution meant no invasion of the former's realm.

Tanada v. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-10520, 28 Feb. 1957

FACTS:
-

Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party,
whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was
one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November,
1955,
Subsequently, the elections of this Senators-elect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senatewas contested by petitioner Macapagal,
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of
the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party,
said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator
Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and
Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as
members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz
and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as
supposed member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2)
Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator
Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar
against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators
who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Taada-belonging to
the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado,
and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted
absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the
Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath
of office therefor", said respondents had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are
unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that, consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio
and Reyes, as technical assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said
appointments to be made-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that
Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M.
Taada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party in the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and
his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an Electoral Tribunal composed of not
more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party having the second largest

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number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice,
instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the
rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral
Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner
alleged.. hereinabove.".

ISSUES:
-

Decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party
having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid
and lawful?. Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

RULING:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they
are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers
and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate
Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards
respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Pimentel v. HRET, 141489, 29 Nov. 2002
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET" for brevity) 2 and
the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity). 3 Petitioners pray that respondents be ordered to "alter,
reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to include party-list
representatives in accordance with Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA be
enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been reorganized.
-

Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a party-list system in the House of Representatives:

ISSUES:
Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

VIOLATES
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT
OF
PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN
THE HRET.

2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON

APPOINTMENTS
VIOLATES
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT
OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.

3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE

THEMSELVES TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

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RULING:
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats
allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution 24 explicitly confers on
the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of
the Constitution,25 each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers respective electoral
tribunal.
-

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on
proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse
to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners
direct recourse to this Court is premature.

Codilla v. de Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, 10 Dec. 2002

FACTS:
-

Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14,
2001 elections as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and
Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the
decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the dulyelected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping,
intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while
respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one
Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a
Petition for Disqualification 1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that
the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract,
haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of
inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative
and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.
Respondent Locsin joined as intervenor.

ISSUES:
The core issues in this case are:

(a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is
valid;

(b) whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity; and

(c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the
public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

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RULING:
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid: After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we
find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the
proclamation of respondent Locsin.
-

Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its
validity:
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her
proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review
the validity of her proclamation because she has become a member of the House of Representatives.
Thus, she contends that the proper forum to question her membership to the House of
Representatives is the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

We find no merit in these contentions.

First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to
review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided
by the Commission en banc."

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the
instant case.

Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election
and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.109

We reject respondent's contention.

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not
yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner
in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.

The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition
for quo warranto with the HRET.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines.111 In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent

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Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue
that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected
and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in
question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be
the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner
by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to
office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning.
It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the
winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name
of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of office.
This decision shall be immediately executory.

Barbers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165691, 22 June 2005

FACTS:
-

This is a petition for certiorari1 and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction to nullify the Resolution.
The Resolutions affirmed the proclamation of the COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers ("NBC") declaring Rodolfo G. Biazon ("Biazon") as the duly elected 12th Senator in the 10 May
2004 National and Local Elections.
Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the
10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections ("elections").
The COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04002 proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections.
On 2 June 2004, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. NBC 04-005 proclaiming Biazon as "the 12th
ranking duly elected 12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 10, 2004 national and local
elections.
The COMELEC stated that after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from Maguindanao
(Cotabato City), Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained 10,635,270 votes
nationwide. On the other hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes. Thus, Biazon obtained 10,685 more
votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this "difference will not materially be affected by the votes in
certain precincts where there was failure of elections."5
Claiming that Biazons proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.
In his petition, Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the
special elections, which were still to be conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections. 7
The power to annul proclamation is an exclusive power of the Commission vested upon it by the Constitution,
which states that the Commission shall exercise the power to "Decide except those involving the right to vote,
all questions affecting elections xxx" (Article IX-C, Section 2 (3).
As held in the Case of Aguam vs. COMELEC, the COMELEC shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement
and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which
may be conferred upon it by law. The Constitution enjoins the COMELEC to decide, saving those involving the
right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections. Corollary thereto, the court has given its
imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation illegally
made.

ISSUES:
-

Whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it deliberately insisted in resorting to and in using and considering, for purposes of
tallying/tabulation of the still uncanvassed election results, MERE improvised Municipal COCs, which are NONCANVASSED election documents, unauthentic, unreliable and dubious on their faces which documents were
submitted, not to the NBC, but to a mere Comelec Department [ERSD]; instead of availing and relying on official
CANVASS documents PROVINCIAL COCs submitted to COMELEC, as the National Board of Canvassers for
Senators.

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-

Whether or not the public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it first correctly recognized the undisputed fact that there was an INCOMPLETE CANVASS at
the time that respondent Biazon was initially "proclaimed" PREMATURELY on June 2, 2004, but adamantly
refused to rectify its VOID premature proclamation when it opted to reinstate the said sham proclamation of
respondent Biazon, by anomalously resorting to and relying on, unauthentic, dubious and non-canvassed
documents [Municipal COCs], rather than on the legal and lawful canvassed documents [PROVINCIAL
COCs].14

RULING:
-

The petition must fail. The basic issue for resolution is whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition.
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organization registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is
not reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits
none. However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the
election.251avvphi1.zw+
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been received by it, may
terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available election returns if the
missing election returns will not affect the results of the election.
Notwithstanding the fact that not all of the COCs have been received or canvassed, the NBC may terminate the
canvass if the missing COCs would no longer affect the results of the elections.
In the present case, the report which the COMELEC Supervisory Committee submitted on 29 June 2004 shows
that Barbers obtained 6,736 votes in areas where results were not included in the national canvass. As for
Biazon, he garnered 2,263 votes.26 Also, the Supervisory Committees report shows that the total number of
registered voters in areas where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering
only 19 precincts in three municipalities.27
Since the election returns not included in the national canvass as well as the results of the special elections to
be held would not materially affect the results of the elections, it is immaterial whether the COMELEC used
PCOCs or MCOCs in the subsequent canvass.
The alleged invalidity of Biazons proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the election returns of
members of the Senate. Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.
For this Court to take cognizance of the electoral protest against Biazon would usurp the constitutional functions
of the SET. In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolutions affirming Biazons proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results of the special
elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Vilando v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, 1 April 2009

FACTS:
The instant motion with prayer for oral argument filed by Louis C. Biraogo, petitioner in G.R. No. 179120, seeks
a reconsideration of the Courts April 1, 2009 Decision, which granted Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichongs petition
forcertiorari in G.R. Nos. 178831-32. The Court dismissed all the other petitions, including Biraogos petition,
and reversed the Joint Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17,
2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and 07-248 disqualifying Limkaichong from running as a congressional candidate in
the First District of Negros Oriental due to lack of citizenship requirement.
-

Indeed, the citizenship requirement was enshrined in our Constitution in order to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens. 2 With this principle in mind, we have said in Aquino v.
COMELEC3 that if one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives is lacking, then not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself. Hence assuming, time constraints notwithstanding, and
after proper proceedings before the proper tribunal be had, that Limkaichong would prove to be an alien, the
court of justice would tilt against her favor and would not sanction such an imperfection in her qualification to
hold office.

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-

The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen because her
parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the proceedings for the
naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as DISQUALIFIED
from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.

Biraogo maintained that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Limkaichong suspended only the execution of
the substantive relief or the first part of the above-quoted COMELEC Joint Resolution. However, it did not
suspend the execution of the injunctive part and, accordingly, the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC
should not have proceeded with Limkaichong's proclamation as the winning candidate in the elections.

Nevertheless, events have already transpired after the COMELEC has rendered its Joint Resolution.
Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath of office, and she
was allowed to officially assume the office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, we ruled in our April 1, 2009 Decision
that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), and no longer the COMELEC, should now
assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases. Pertinently, we held:

x x x The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
andassumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins.8 It follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification
should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to
hear and decide a case involving a Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in
Section 2509 of the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members.10

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

ISSUES:
The core issue in the consolidated petitions is the qualification of Limkaichong to run for, be elected to, and
assume and discharge, the position of Representative for the First District of Negros Oriental. The contention of
the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the
citizenship requirement in Section 6,1 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was
voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed
as the winner and has since performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of
Representatives.

RULING:
In sum, we hold that Biraogos Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument must be denied. This
Court did not err in ruling that the proper remedy of those who may assail Limkaichong's disqualification based
on citizenship is to file before the HRET the proper petition at any time during her incumbency.
-

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer for Oral Argument filed by petitioner Louis C.
Biraogo in G.R. No. 179120 is DENIED with FINALITY.

Vilando v. HRET, G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, 23 August 2011

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the March 24, 2010
Decision1of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto
and declaring private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as Member of the
House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros Oriental and its Resolution 2 dated May 17,
2010, denying the motion for reconsideration.

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-

Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental. She won over the other contender, Olivia Paras.

She was proclaimed as Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec
Resolution No. 8062.

She assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives.

Meanwhile, petitions involving either the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.

The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo
(G.R. No. 179120);4 Olivia Paras (G.R. Nos. 179132-33);5 and Renald F. Vilando (G.R. Nos. 17924041).6 These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by Limkaichong (G.R. Nos.
178831-32) assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved the disqualification cases
against her.

The Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong, reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec,
dismissed the three (3) other petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a
petition for Quo Warranto.

On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as
registered voter of the congressional district concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against
Limkaichong before the HRET.

These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged the eligibility of one and the same
respondent. Petitioners asserted that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was
elected and proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose naturalization had not
attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage
to the latter. Also, they invoked the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship,
which necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of Julio Sy.

Petitioner Vilando anchors petition on the following grounds:

3. HAVING THE PLENARY, ABSOLUTE AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO

DETERMINE, AMONG OTHERS, THE QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE HRET CAN LOOK INTO THE ELIGIBILITY OF
LIMKAICHONG EVEN IF, AS AN INCIDENT THERETO, IT WOULD MEAN LOOKING
INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION.8

It should be noted that Limkaichongs term of office as Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental
from June 30, 2007 to June 30, 2010 already expired. As such, the issue questioning her eligibility to hold office
has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of her term. Whatever judgment is reached, the same
can no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can no longer be enforced. 9 Thus, the
petition may be dismissed for being moot and academic.

In any case, the Court is of the view that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding that
Limkaichong is not disqualified to sit as Member of the House of Representatives.

Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary,
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate
of naturalization.

True, the HRET has jurisdiction over quo warranto petitions, specifically over cases challenging ineligibility on
the ground of lack of citizenship. No less than the 1987 Constitution vests the HRET the authority to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of its Members. This constitutional power
is likewise echoed in the 2004 Rules of the HRET. Rule 14 thereof restates this duty, thus:

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Rule 14. Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES:

RULING:
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond judicial interference. The only instance
where this Court may intervene in the exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination
that the decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting
such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 26 In this case, there is no showing
of any such arbitrariness or improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it
dismissed the quo warranto petition.
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In fine, this Court finds sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET which resolved the issue of citizenship
in favor of Limkaichong.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Court affirms the March 24, 2010 Decision of the HRET
declaring that Limkaichong is not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives representing the First
District, Negros Oriental.

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