IN RE: MAX SHOOP

43 PHIL 213 (1920)

FACTS:
Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the Philippines
under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of Candidates for Admission to
the Practice of Law. It was shown in his application that he was practicing for
more than 5 years in the highest court of the State of New York. The said rule
requires that: New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission
without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippine Islands. The rule of New York court, on the other
hand, permits admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate
Division in several cases. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as
a member of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory of
the American Union or in the District of Columbia. The applicant practiced 5
years in another country whose jurisprudence is based on the principles of the
English Common Law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Max Shoop can practice law in the Philippines.

HELD:
Yes he can practice Law in the Philippines. The Philippines is an
UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under a Civil Government Established
by the Congress. In interpreting and applying the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered by the letter of
the written law, this court relies upon the theories and precedents of AngloAmerican cases, subject to the limited exception of those instances where the
remnants of the Spanish written law present well-defined civil law theories and
of the few cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs and
institutions. The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the English
Common Law in its present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an
almost exclusive extent. New York permits conferring privileges on Attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippines similar to those privileges accorded by
the rule of this court. Petition is granted ad decision is based on the
interpretation of the New York rule. It doesnt establish a precedent with
respect to future Applications.

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette the unpublished Executive
Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders,
general orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense,
respondents stated that the petitioners have no legal personality in the case
citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for
filing for a Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the
public and thereby does not require any special circumstance to institute an
action. On the other hand, respondents stated that publication of the
mentioned issuances is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law provides its
own effectivity date as stated in Article 2 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive
Issuances.
RULING:
The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish
the Executive Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure
for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect.
It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the
legal maxim known as ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish
would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for
transgression of the law which he had no notice. The court declared that
Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be
inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in their concurring
opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not an absolute
requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is
needed but it must not only confined in the Official Gazette because it would

make those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any
binding force or effect.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.

vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES (DOLE) and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO (POEA)
G.R. NO. 101279 AUGUST 6, 1992
FACTS:
The case is a petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order
filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI), to prohibit and
enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and
the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16,
Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of
1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies
of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through
the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses
suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary
Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong". In relation to the DOLE circular, the
POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10,
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment
of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers. On August 1,
1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37,
Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers
for Hong Kong.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the requirements of publication and filling with the

Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD:
Due to lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in
question may not be enforced and implemented. In the case of Taada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, the court held that Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.) Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.) We
agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)
The writ of prohibition was granted. The implementation of DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars
Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby suspended
pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing
under the aforementioned laws of the land.

TAYUG RURAL BANK vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. L-46158 NOVEMBER 28, 1986

FACTS:
Tayug Rural is a bank in Pangasinan which took out 13 loans from
Central Bank in 1962 and1963, all covered by promissory notes, amounting to
813k. In late 1964, Central Bank released a circular; Memorandum Circular
No. DLC-8 thru the Director of Loans and Credit. This circular all informed all
rural banks that an additional 10% per annum penalty interest would be
assessed on all past due loans beginning 1965. This was enforced beginning
July 1965.In 1969, the outstanding balance of Tayug was at 444k. Tayug Rural
filed a case in CFI Manila to recover the 10% penalty it paid up to 1968,
amounting to about 16k, and to restrain Central bank from further imposing
the penalty. Central Bank filed a counterclaim for the outstanding balance
includingthe10% penalty, stating that it was legally imposed under the Rules
and Regulations Governing Rural Banks promulgated by the Monetary Board
on 1958, under RA 720.Tayugs defense was that the counterclaim should
be dismissed since the unpaid obligation of Tayug was due to Central Banks
flexible and double standard policy of its rediscounting privileges to Tayug
Rural and its subsequent arbitrary and illegal imposition of the 10% penalty.
Tayug Rural contends that no such 10% penalty starting from 1965 was
included in the promissory notes covering the loans. A judgment was rendered
by CFI Manila in favor of Central Bank ordering Tayug Rural Bank to pay10%

penalty in the amount of around 19k pesos for loans up to July 1969, and to
pay nothing for the next remaining loans. Tayugs claim in the case was
however successful, and so Tayug was also ordered to pay 444k, with interest
to the Central Bank for the overdue accounts with respect to the promissory
notes. Central Bank appealed to the CA, but also lost on the ground that only a
legal question had been raised in the pleadings. The case was then raised to
the SC, with each party arguing in the following manner: CFI rules that the
circulars retroactive effect on past due loans impairs the obligation of contracts
and deprives Tayug Rural of property without due process of law. Central
Bank reasons that Tayug Rural, despite the loans, should have known that
rules and regulations authorize the Central Bank to impose additional
reasonable penalties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty via
Memorandum Circular No. DLC-8.
HELD:
NO. A reading of the circular and pertinent provisions, including that of
RA 720, shows that nowhere therein is the authority given to the Monetary
Board to mete out additional penalties to the rural banks on past due accounts
with the Central Bank. As said by the CFI, while the Monetary Board possesses
broad supervisory powers, nonetheless, the retroactive imposition
of administrative penalties cannot be taken as a measure SUPERVISORY in
character. Administrative rules have the force and effect of law. All that is
required of administrative rules and regulations is to implement given
legislation by not contradicting it and conform to the standards prescribed by
law. Rules and regulations cannot go beyond the basic law.. The law cannot be
given retroactive effect. More to the point, the Monetary Board revoked the
additional penalty later in 1970, which clearly shows an admission that it had
no power to impose the same. The Central bank hoped to rectify the defect by
revising the DLC Form later. However, Tayug Rural must pay the additional
10% in case of suit, since in the promissory notes, 10% should be paid in
attorneys fees and costs of suit and collection.

FIRESTONE TIRE AND RUBBER COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS LARIOSA and
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
G.R. No. 70479 FEBRUARY 27, 1987

FACTS:
Carlos Lariosa works in Firestone as factory worker. When he was about
to leave the company premises, he was frisked by security guard because while
his personal bag was inspected, there were 16 wool flannel swabs all belonging
to the company. As a result, he was terminated by firestone on the ground of
stealing company property and loss of trust. The company also files criminal
complaint for attempted theft. Lariosa, on other hand, filed a case for illegal

dismissal Labor Arbiter found the dismissal just bust the NLRC reversed
the decision Firestone contends that NLRC erred in not dismissing Lariosas
appeal for being late.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal filed by Lariosa and NLRC was filed late.

HELD:
Lariosa filed his appeal on June 7, 1984 or after the lapse of 14 days
from the notice of the decision of the labor arbiter. Under the Labor Code,
the reglementary period for which an appeal from decision of labor arbiter may
be filed to NLRC is within a period of ten days. The ten-day period has to be
interpreted to mean as ten calendar days and not ten working days.

MARIANO S. GONZAGA vs. AUGUSTO CE DAVID

G.R. No. L-14858 29, 1960

FACTS:

Mariano Gonzaga, as owner of a cargo truck and passenger bus, registers

the
vehicles
and
pays
the first installment for registration
fees due
on 1957. To cover the second installment for registration fees, he remitted to
the provincial treasurer of Cagayan, by registered mail, the amount of P500.00,
under postal money orders. The postal cancellation mark on the envelope
containing the remittance bears the date August 31, 1957. The registrar of the
Motor Vehicle Office ruled that pursuant to Revised Motor Vehicle Law, the
second installment for registration fees was payable on or before the last
working day of August. The last working day of August 1957 was Friday,
August 30, 1957. And consequently, the remittance of Gonzaga which bears
cancellation mark dated August 31,1957 was made beyond time fixed by law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remittance for second installment of registration fees
was made beyond the time fixed by law.

RULING:
The Motor Vehicle Office in Cagayan had no official business on August
31, 1957. However, it was immaterial the last working day contemplated in the
Revised Motor Vehicle Law should not necessarily mean the last working day of
Motor Vehicle Office. The fact that August 31, 1957 was declared a special
public holiday did not have the effect of making the preceding day, August 30,
the last day for paying registration fees without penalty. Moreover, under the
said law, for payment of registration fees by mail, the date of cancellation of the
postage stamps of the envelope containing the remittance is considered the
date of application.

RURAL BANK OF CALOOCAN, INC. and JOSE O. DESIDERIO, JR.

vs HE COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMA CASTRO
G.R. No. L-32116 APRIL 21, 1981

FACTS:
Maxima Castro, accompanied by Severino Valencia, went to Rural Bank
of Caloocan to apply for industrial loan. The loan was secured by a real estate
mortgage on Castors house, after that, the bank approved the loan of P3000.
Valencia obtained from the bank an equal amount of loan affixing Castros
signature as co-maker without its knowledge. The sheriff then sent a notice
announcing the property would be sold at public auction to satisfy the
obligation. Upon request, the auction sale which was scheduled for March 10,
1961was postponed for April 10, 1961. But April 10 was subsequently declared
a special holiday so the sheriff sold the property on public auction on April 11,
1961 which was the next succeeding business day following the special holiday.
Castro prayed for the annulment of sale alleging that there was fraud on the
part of Valencia who induced her to sign as co-maker of a promissory note
since she is a 70-year old widow who cannot read and write and it was only
when she receive the notice of sheriff, she learned that the encumbrance on
her property was P6000 and not for P3000.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the public auction sale was null and void for transferring
the date already set by law.

RULING:
The sale is null and void for not having in accordance with Act 3135
which states that that a notice shall be given by posting notices of sale for not
less than 20 days in at least 3public places and if the property is worth more
than P400 such notice shall also be published for in a newspaper of general
circulation in the municipality or city once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The
pretermission of a holiday applies only where the day, or the last day for doing
any act required or permitted by law falls on a holiday or when the last day of a
given period for doing an act falls on holiday. It does not apply to a day fixed
by an office or officer of the government for an act to be done. Since April 10,
1961 was not the day or the last day set by law for the extrajudicial foreclosure
sale, nor the last day of a given period but a date fixed by deputy sheriff, the
sale cannot be legally made on the next succeeding business day without the
notice of the sale in accordance with Act no. 3135.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs. PAZ M. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-7234 MAY 21, 1955

FACTS:

On July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of

Pasay City charging Paz M. del Rosario with slight physical injuries committed
on the 28th day of May, 1953. The accused thereupon presented a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the offense charged had already
prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 90 and 91 of the
Revised Penal Code. The municipal court sustained this motion and dismissed
the case. Against the order of dismissal appeal is made directly to this Court
under the provisions of section 17, sub-paragraph 6 of the Judiciary Act of
1948 as only questions of law are involved in the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term "month" in the Revised Penal Code should be
understood to be a month of 30 days, instead of the civil calendar or calendar
month.

HELD:

Yes. The term "month" used in the Revised Penal Code should be
interpreted in the sense that the new Civil Code defines the said term, we find
persuasive authority in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain. In a case
decided by it in the year 1887 (S. de 30 de Marzo de 1887), prior to the
approval of the Civil Code of Spain, it had declared that when the law spoke of
months, it meant the natural month or the solar month, in the absence of
express provisions to the contrary. But after the promulgation of the Civil Code
of Spain, which provided in its Article 7 a general rule for the interpretation of
the laws, and with particular respect to months, that a month shall be
understood as a 30-day month, said court held that the two months period for
the prescription of a light offense should be understood to mean 60 days, a
month being a 30-day month. Similarly, we hold that in view of the express
provisions of Article 13 of the new Civil Code the term "month" used in Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood to mean the 30-day month
and not the solar or civil month.

The offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, is said to

be counted by excluding May 28 by the commission of the offense, and that
when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet been
prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29. The order of
dismissal appealed from is hereby reversed and the case ordered reinstated
without costs.