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1.

Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS: Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land.
The former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate), and
Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by
his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila and
was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law Lucila
for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo demanding
him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to
file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the barangay for
conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses
that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner
is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her
relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted
that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in
their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the
katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable
settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.
2. Lejano vs People; People vs Webb
GR Nos. 176389 and 176864
January 18, 2011
Facts: The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert
Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and
Gerardo Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it
"denied the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded
Alfaro as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that
resulted in the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and
prosecution witnesses."
Issue:Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.
Ruling: No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered for it places the accused under
double jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the
grounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the
State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Althou complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not specify that violations of due process and acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also
alleged that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually
questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses'
credibility. That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible witness. The
complaint wants the court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such
evaluation which is not constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of acquittal can no longer
be disturbed.

3. People of the Philippines vs Francisco Larraaga January 31, 2006


Facts: Larraaga et al were convicted of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape on February 3, 2004; and for serious illegal detention. The first crime is punishable by death and
the second is punishable by reclusion perpetua. One of the co-accused, James Andrew Uy, alleged that
on July 16, 1997, the date of the commission of the crime, he was only 17 years old and 262 days old.
To prove his claim, Uy presented his birth certificate duly certified by the City Civil Registrar and the
National Statistics Office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Uy is entitled a mitigating circumstance due to minority?
HELD: Yes. Uy was able to prove his claim hence he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance in both
crimes charged against him. This is pursuant to Article 68 and 80 of the Revised Penal Code, which
provides that persons below 18 years of age are entitled to a penalty one degree lower than that imposed
by law.
4. CRESPO vs MOGULGR No. L-53373 June 30, 1987
FACTS:Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information
for estaga against Mario Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment the accused filed a motion to deter arraignment on the ground that there was a pending
petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the office of provincial Fiscal.
Issue: Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders
fro, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
HELD:It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a
criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The reason for placing the criminal
prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and
it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse
the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to
dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists
warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper
court.
5. Municipality of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Co. of the Philippines G.R. No. L-25716 (July 28, 1966)
FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Maniladismissing the Plaintiffs complaint for the collection of sales taxes from Defendant onthe
ground that the law which authorizes collection of the same is unconstitutional.D e f e n d a n t
C o m p a n y r e f u s e d t o p a y t a x e s a c c r u i n g f r o m i t s s a l e s b e c a u s e according to them the
taxable sites of the property sought to be taxed is not the saidMunicipality. According to the
Defendant, RA 1435 or Act to Provide Means for Increasing Highway Special Fund is
unconstitutional because it embraces two subjects which are 1)amendment of the tax code, and 2)
grant of taxing power tothe local government, and makes reference to Road and Bridge Fund.
ISSUE: W/N RA 1435 is constitutional.
HELD: RA 1435 is constitutional because it embraces only one subject reflected by its title Road and
Bridge Fund.

Statutory definition prevails over ordinary usage of thet e r m . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t


a s t o t h e t i t l e o f t h e b i l l m u s t b e l i b e r a l l y construed. It should not be technically or
narrowly construed as to impede the power of legislation. When there is doubt as to its validity,
it must be resolved against the doubt and in favor of its validity. In the abovementioned cases, what
is pointed out isthe constitutional requirement that A bill shall embrace only one subject, expressedin
its title. This is to prohibit duplicity in legislation because the title must be able toapprise
legislators and the public about the nature, scope, and consequences of that particular law.
7. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology G.R. No. 153866. February 11, 2005
FACTS:
Respondent is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission to do
business in the Philippines and is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA). The respondent is
Value Added Tax-registered entity and filed for the VAT returns. An administrative claim for refund of VAT input
taxes in the amount of P28,369,226.38 with supporting documents (inclusive of the P12,267,981.04 VAT input
taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was filed on 4 October 1999 and no final action has been received by
the respondent from the petitioner on the claim for VAT refund. Hence, petitioner is sued in his official capacity.
The Tax Court rendered a decision granting the claim for refund and CTA affirmed the decision. Hence, the
present
petition
for
certiorari.
ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate in the amount of
P12,122,922.66 representing alleged unutilized input VAT paid on capital goods purchased for the period April 1,
1998
to
June
30,
1999
HELD:The Petition is unmeritorious. As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic
zone, respondent is entitled to the fiscal incentives and benefit provided for in either PD 66 or EO 226. It shall,
moreover, enjoy all privileges, benefits, advantages or exemptions under both Republic Act Nos. (RA) 7227 and
7844. Respondent as an entity is exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations. This exemption
covers both direct and indirect taxes, stemming from the very nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for
which the direct liability is imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another. Respondent, as
an exempt entity, can neither be directly charged for the VAT on its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added
cost to such sales, the equivalent VAT on its purchases. The exemption is both express and pervasive, among
other reasons, since RA 7916 states that no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business establishments
operating within the ecozone. Even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the transaction, it may
still be passed on and, therefore, indirectly imposed on the same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That
no VAT shall be imposed directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA 7916 also
means that no VAT may be passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et
per obliquum. When anything is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly. Special laws expressly grant
preferential tax treatment to business establishments registered and operating within an ecozone, which by law is
considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is exempt from all internal revenue taxes,
including the VAT, and regulations pertaining thereto. Thus, the petition is denied and the decision of lower courts
affirmed.
9. Picart v. Smith G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
Facts: Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the
defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to
the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction.
Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was
frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got
injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant.

ISSUE:Whether or not Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair
the damage done
HELD: Yes. Althought Picart was guilty of negligence in being on the wrong side of the bridge, the
defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal damages resulting from the collision, as he had a
fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the situation created by the negligence of the
plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity; while Picart could by no means then place
himself in a position of a greater safety.
Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the
other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.
10. St. Marys Academy vs. Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002

Facts: St. Mary conducted an enrolment drive and as part of this drive, they campaign to different schools for
prospective students. On that fortunate day, one named Sherwin Carpitanos--student of St. Mary and part of the
campaign group went to a particular school with his classmates riding in a mitsubishi jeepney owned by one
named Vivencio Villanueva and driven by his classmate who was a minor. Allegedly the latter droved the jeepney
in a reckless manner and as a result the jeepney turned turtle.
As a result Sherwin Carpitanos died due to the injuries he sustained from the accident
The lower court held St. Mary solidarily Liable under article 218 and 219 of the family code and the guardians of
the minor driver and the owner of the jeepney as subsudiarily liable. on appeal to CA the owner of the jeepney
was freed from liabilities.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys Academy is liable for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
Ruling: GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for determination of any liability of the school. The Court
held that for the school to be liable there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because of negligence, must have causal connection to the accident.
There is no showing of such. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is
not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
11. Eternal Gardens v. CA, North Philippine Union Mission Digest
Facts: Eternal Gardens entered into a land development agreement with private respondent Mission wherein the
former would subdivide a property of the latter into memorial lots to be sold to third parties. Further, the parties
agreed that the petitioner will deposit 40% of the monthly gross collection in the name of Mission. Subsequently,
Maysilo Estates and the heirs of Vicente Encarnacion laid a claim on the subject property. This prompted the
petitioner to file an interpleader suit to compel the Mission and Maysilo Estates to litigate their conflicting claims
between themselves. On the other hand, the heirs of Encarnacion filed an action for the quieting of title to the
property against the petitioner and the private respondent.
The respondent moved that the payments be deposited with the court while the case is ongoing. The petitioner
assails the decision of the court ordering it to deposit the amounts due to the Mission by virtue of the agreement
previously entered into.
Issue: Whether or not deposit is proper under the circumstances of this case
RULING: Yes, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the essence of the interpleader on the part of the
petitioner, aside from disavowal of interest in the property being litigated, is the deposit of the property or funds
in controversy with the court. This rule is founded on justice and equity so that the plaintiff will not be benefited
from the property or funds in litigation at the expense of whoever will ultimately be adjudged as entitled thereto.

12. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN ET. AL. V. REYES G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution and the decision of the Court of Appeals
whereby making the petitioners liable for moral and exemplary damages.
Amay Bisaya was having a coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko when an old friend, Dr. Filart, asked him to
join the party of the former manager of the said hotel, Mr. Tsuruoka. When he was helping himself at the buffet
table, Ms. Lim approached him and said to leave the party for it was intended for a number of guests. Amay
Bisaya claimed that he was humiliated by the manner Ms. Lim asked him to leave. He alleged that Ms. Lim asked
him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the other guests. He was accompanied by a Makati policeman
in leaving the penthouse. He was more embarrassed when Dr. Filart denied that she invited him on the said party.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Ms. Lim constitutes an abuse of right to make the petitioners liable for damages
caused to Amay Bisaya.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Amay Bisaya might have suffered through Ms.
Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
It is unlikely to happen that Ms. Lim exposed him to ridicule and shame because admittedly, Amay
Bisaya stated that Ms. Lim was very close enough for him to kiss when she asked him to leave the party. It was
intended to be heard only by Amay Bisaya. Nevertheless , his reaction to the request must have made the other
guests aware of what transpired between them. Since Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Amay Bisaya to leave
the party for being a gate-crasher, neither she nor her employer be held liable for damages under Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July
2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
13. Gonzales vs Katigbak G.R. No. 69500, July 22, 1985
Facts: The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim, was classified For Adults Only.
The main objection was the classification of the film as For Adults Only. For petitioners, such classification is
without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is an
integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential
for the integrity of the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the
Board as basis for its classification.
Issue: Whether there was grave abuse of discretion in classifying said film as For Adults Only.
Held: No. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari solely on the ground that there are not enough votes for
a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as For Adults Only.
The movie involved in this case was "Kapit sa Patalim" which the censors wanted to cut in some part and to label
"For Adults". The SC rules that movies are within the constitutional protection of freedom of expression, so that
censorship is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. The only case whe the Board of Censors can
order a deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil against national security or public
morals or other public interest. In all other cases, the Board can only classify.
But a different standard must be followed in television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence of the
medium on people who watch its programs without having to pay anything.
On the issue of obscenity, the SC held that sex along is not necessarily obscenity, the test being whether, using
contemporary community standards, the dominant appeal us to the prurient interest. (Miller v. California). Thus
on this score, it found abuse of discretion of the part of the Board for subjecting the producer to difficulty and for
entertaining a narrow view of obscenity, but it lacked the votes to rules that the abuse was grave.
14. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639
Facts: Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of
October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where they were
signed as laborers. A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court
granted the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.
Issue:
WON
Mayor
Lukban
has
the
right
to
deport
women
with
ill
repute
Held: His intent of exterminating vice was commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino
women to change their domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense
"lepers of society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other
filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could
considered
tantamount
to
slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode. "Ours is a
government of laws and not of men."
15. PEOPLE v. ROMEO JALOSJOS (2001)

Facts: Rape is a crime against human dignity, punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, particulary odious when
committed against a minor. There were six other cases where the Jalosjos was acquitted of the charges of acts of
lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Eleven year old Rosilyn
Delantar accused Romeo G. Jalosjos of sexual impropriety against her on the dates of June 18 & 20, 1996, at the
Ritz Towers, Makati City. The rest of the information provided for lascivious conduct only. Allegedly, he paid
Php10k, Php5k& Php5k on different dates. She was pimped by her homosexual adopted father Simplicio Delantar
since the age of 9 (she was born in 1985) and first met Jalosjos in February 1996. He let her stay nights in his
condominium unit and repeatedly kept trying to have sex with her, saying, After all, I am your daddy until, on
the dates mentioned, he succeeded. This went on for some months until Rosilyn ran away in August 1996, when
she was taken to DSWD and the NBI conducted an investigation into her rape claims. Jalosjos claimed that it was
his brother Dominador who Rosilyn met and he was in the province allegedly at the time the sexual advances took
place. This issue was allegedly crafted by his political enemies to put him at a dis advantage chadosorio. He was
found guilty and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and Php50k for each count of rape (2), and reclusion temporal
and Php20k damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness (6).
Issue:Is the reliance of the trial court on the witnesss credibilitysufficient to hand him such sentence?
Held: "Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus(false in part, false in everything). The fact that the trial court accepted his
alibi means that Rosilyns story was concocted in part, and therefore her whole testimony falls. Plus, its not even
justified that Rosilyn was a minor because we shouldnt rely on her birth certificate, which was expunged from
the NSO.
SC: It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it
with respect to other facts. In People vs.Keller, it was seen that Testimony may be partly credited and partly
rejected. Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept some portions of his
testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be
the truth Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are
not required to reject the whole of their uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem
worthy of belief. No woman would accuse someone of defloration if she did not want the culprit apprehended
and punished, because of the accompanying shame of the investigation to prove such accusation. Her hesitation
and uncertainty to answer some of the questions were how rape victims answered in real life, and not mere acting.
The fact that Rosilyn did not specify rape in her affidavits against Jalosjos does not mean that it never occurred,
because rape is too much of a technical term for such a young child. rape is consummated by the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis. There need not be
full and complete penetration of the victims vagina for rape to be consummated. There was no case originally
against Jalosjos, because the original case filed was against the pimp Simplicio Delantar, it was just that Jalosjos
was identified in the pictures. Since rape is a crime against persons, any prosecutor can move on with legal action,
not necessarily the victim herself. It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved
by the presentation of her birth certificate. However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there
is sufficient and ample proof of the complainants age in the records, like baptismal certificate, hospital records.