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1. MARBURY v.

MADISON
FACTS:
- In the last days of President John Adams presidency, he nominated a number of people to serve as
justices of peace for the District of Columbia.
- The Senate confirmed the nominations, and the commissions were prepared.
- However, President Adams Secretary, John Marshall, did not deliver all of the commissions before
President Thomas Jefferson took office.
- President Jefferson then ordered his Secretary, James Madison, not to deliver the commissions.
- As such, the plaintiffs (Marbury and others whose commissions were not delivered), sued Madison in
and argued that, in refusing to deliver the commissions, the Secretary of State was neglecting his
Constitutional duty.
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ISSUE:
1. Is Marburys appointment valid?
2. Whether the Supreme Court can award the writ of mandamus.
3. Whether the Supreme Court has judicial review power.
4. Is offering the writ of mandamus the appropriate remedy for the court?
HELD:
1. YES.
- It is valid because the appointment was done in full while Adams was still President. He completed the
entire task of the appointment process and did all he could do in such completion. The appointment is
valid when the President undertakes his final act required for the appointment, not upon delivery of the
appointment which is beyond the Presidents control. Marbury is entitled to appointment as a remedy
because it was a right given to him by President Adams. In this sense, Marbury was given a specific
right. The very essence of government is to provide remedies to rights that are abridged.
2. YES.
- The appointment was a legal right offered to Marbury; and for every legal right violated, the law must
afford a remedy. As such, his remedy is the rightful entitlement to the appointment. The delivery of the
appointment was simply ministerial and therefore was owed to him. The appointment had already
occurred prior to the necessity of delivery; and once the appointment was granted, Marbury had a
vested legal right.
3. YES BUT NOT IN THE INSTANT CASE.
- The Judiciary Act of 17891 gives to the Supreme Court the power "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases
warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under
the authority of the United States." However, Article III of the Constitution does not give the Supreme
Court authority to issue writs of mandamus. The two laws are, therefor, in conflict. As such, the
Supreme Court being charged with upholding the Constitution must adopt Article IIIs application.
Justice Marshall argued that there would be no point for the Supreme Court to exist were it not to
uphold the Constitution and strike down laws adopted by Congress that necessarily conflict with the
Constitution itself. In so doing, Marshall established the principle of judicial review.
4. YES, but in the instant case the Constitution conflict with the Judiciary Act of 1789 and therefore the remedy
cannot be proffered. In this case, a writ of mandamus is appropriate because it is an order for a public official
to carry out his duty. But for the reasons explained in (3), the order cannot be carried out.

1 An Act establishing the judicial courts of the United States.

2. SANTIAGO v. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
- Teodoro Santiago was a Grade 6 pupil at Sero Elem. School. He was adjudged 3 rd Honors (3rd placer). 3
days before graduation, Teodoro and his parents sought the invalidation of the ranking of honor students.
They filed a CERTIORARI case against the principal and teachers who composed the committee on rating
honors.
- They contend that the committee acted with grave abuse of official discretion because they claim that
o the 1st and 2nd placers had never been a close rival of Santiago before, except in Grade 5 only.
o That Santiago was a consistent honor student from Grade 1 to 5
o that the 1st placer was coached and tutored by grade 6 teachers during the summer (gaining unfair
advantage)
o The committee was composed only of Grade 6 teachers.
o That some teachers gave Santos a 75% with an intention to pull him to a much lower rank
o That in the Honors Certificate in Grade 1, the word first place was erased and replaced with
second place
o That the Principal and district supervisors merely passed the buck to each other to delay his
grievances.
- The respondents filed a MTD claiming that the action was improper, and that even assuming it was proper,
the question has become academic (because the graduation already proceeded).
- Respondents also argue that there was no GADALEJ on the part of the teachers since the Committee on
Ratings is not a tribunal, nor board, exercising judicial functions. (under Rule 65, certiorari is a remedy
against judicial functions)
ISSUE:
WON the Committee on Ratings exercised judicial power
HELD:
NO.
- Certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
functions.
- A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers. The exercise of judicial function is the
doing of something in the nature of the action of the court.
- In order for an action for certiorari to exist, the following requisites must be present:
1. there must be specific controversy involving rights of persons brought before a tribunal for
hearing and determination,
2. that the tribunal must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render a
decision.
3. the tribunal must pertain to that branch of the sovereign which belongs to the judiciary (or at
least the not the legislative nor the executive)
- It may be said generally that the exercise of judicial function is to determine what the law is, and what
the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed
with that authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
- "Judicial power" implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights. It includes the
power to hear and determine but not everyone who may hear and determine has judicial power. The
term "judicial power" does not necessarily include the power to hear and determine a matter that is not
in the nature of a suit or action between the parties.
- The phrase judicial power is defined as:
an authority to determine the rights of persons or property.

authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the rights of
persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter of adjudication.
The power exercised by courts in hearing and determining cases before them.
The construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights.
The so-called Committee for Rating Honor Students are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies in the
performance of its assigned task. It is necessary that there be a LAW that gives rise to some specific
rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
ensuing therefrom is brought in turn, to the tribunal or board clothed with power and authority to
determine what that law is and thereupon adjudicate the respective rights of contending parties.
There is nothing about any rule of law that provides for when teachers sit down to assess individual
merits of their pupils for purposes of rating them for honors. Worse still, the petitioners have not
presented the pertinent provisions of the Service Manual for Teachers which was allegedly violated by
the Committee.
The judiciary has no power to reverse the award of the board of judges. And for that matter, it would not
interfere in literary contests, beauty contests, and similar competitions.

NOTE:
It is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that
determines whether or not it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function.
3. RADIOWEALTH v. AGREGADO
FACTS:
- A Webster Teletalk and Webster Telephone Speaker were bought and installed in the second and third
floor of the Malacanang Annex which houses the SC.
- The Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee disapporoved of the purchase and its installation
invoking EO 302 which discontinued open market purchases.
- Radiowealth, nevertheless, pushed for the approval of the payment, however, the auditor of the SC
refused to countersign the warrant for payment.
- Respondents claim that judicial functions do not include the purchase of property
ISSUE:
WON the Judicial Department can make purchases without the prior approval of the Executive
HELD:
YES.
- The preservation of Judiciarys integrity and effectiveness is necessary. Corollary to this is the power
of judiciary to maintain its existence.
- The quality of the government depends upon the independence of judiciary and the officials of the
government cannot deprive the courts of anything which is vital to their functions. Furthermore, the
prerogatives of this court which the Constitution secures against interference include not only the
powers to adjudicate cases but all things that are REASONABLY necessary for the administration
of justice. The purchase of the necessary equipment would contribute to a more effective
judiciary.
- Lastly, these are implied and incidental powers that are as essential to the existence of the court
as the powers specifically granted to it.
4. IN RE LAURETA

FACTS:
- Eva Maravilla-Ilustre (Ilustre) sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera,
Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano (all members of the First Division).
- In the said letter, she complained about the dismissal of her case (about a land dispute involving a large
estate)
- In her letter, Ilustre used contemptuous language and claimed that the members of the court rendered
an unjust decision and that they acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself from
participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey Ordonez.
- On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and found no reason to take
action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and was only designated as Chairman of
First Division after the case was dismissed.
- As such, petitioner Ilustre again addressed letters to Justices Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz, threatening
that she would expose the injustice done to her case to the Ombudsman.
- She did just that^ by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)
- Meanwhile, Atty Laureta, the counsel of Illustre, circulated copies of her affidavit-complaint to the press,
without any copy furnished the Court, nor the Justices charged.
- The press then made appear that the Justices were charged with graft and corruption.
- The Tanodbayan dismissed the complaint.
- Now, the SC is charging them with contempt.
- Atty Laureta and Ilustre contend that the letters were private communication, and that they did not
intend to dishonor the court.
ISSUE:
WON Ilustre and Atty. Laureta may be held in contempt for their remarks to the Court.
HELD:
YES.
- Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is found guilty of grave
professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law until further Orders.
- The letters formed part of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire court.
- There is no vindictive reprisal involved here. The Courts authority and duty under the premises is
unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer,
mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.
- Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak for
themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the
same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The supremacy of the Supreme
Courts judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental principle of separation of powers and checks
and balances under a republican form of government such that the three co-equal branches of
government are each supreme and independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can
interfere with the performance of the duties of the other.
5. IN RE BORROMEO
FACTS:
- Joaquin T. Borromeo is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and he eventually had
come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal principles and procedural rules.
- For around 16 years, he was able to institute and prosecute legal proceedings in various courts,
preaching on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including the Supreme Court.
- He was under the illusion that his trivial acquaintance with the law had given him competence to
undertake litigation, which is why he started representing himself in numerous original and review
proceedings, which turned out to be disastrous.

It was mainly due to the transactions that he entered into with three (3) banks, which were: Traders
Royal Bank (TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co. (SBTC).
He obtained loans from these banks in order to secure mortgages over immovable which belonged to
him or his family or third persons. However, he failed to pay these obligations.
When he was being demanded to fulfill his obligations, he laid down his own terms for their satisfaction,
such terms being inconsistent with those originally agreed upon by the parties or those prescribed by
law.
When the banks refused to let him have his way, he brought suits left and right, against the said banks,
its officers, and even the lawyers who represented the banks in the actions brought by or against him.
He sued, as well, the public prosecutors, the Judges of the Trial Courts, and the Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court who at one time or another, rendered a judgment, resolution or order
adverse to him, as well as the Clerks of Court and other Court employees signing the notices thereof.
In the aggregate, he has initiated or spawned no less-than fifty (50) original or review proceedings, civil,
criminal, administrative. For some sixteen (16) years now, to repeat, he has been continuously
cluttering the Courts with his repetitive, and quite baseless if not outlandish complaints and contentions.
Concurrently, while he was representing himself in these proceedings, he circulated many defamatory
statements against the courts, judges and their employees, as well as his adversaries (he called judges
and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppressors, violators of the Constitution and the laws, etc.)
As such, the court is holding him for contempt of court.

ISSUE:
WON the Court may hold Borromeo in contempt
HELD:
YES.
- He is guilty of contempt, for abuse of and interference with judicial rules and processes, gross
disrespect to courts and judges and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice. He has stubbornly litigated issues already declared to be without merit, closing
his eyes to the many rulings rendered adversely to him in many suits and proceedings, rulings which
had become final and executory.
- On the cases he filed against the judges for rendering an adversary judgment:
o Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors.
They should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil, criminal or administrative sanctions
for acts they may do and dispositions they may make in the performance of their duties and
functions. Hence it is sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that
judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their jurisdiction and in good
faith.
o This Court has repeatedly and uniformly ruled that a judge may not be held administratively
accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To hold otherwise would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, deliberate and malicious, or incurred
with evident bad faith; it is only in these cases that administrative sanctions are called
for as an imperative duty of the Supreme Court.
o Based on Section 9, Act No. 190, "No judge, justice of the peace or assessor shall be liable to a
civil action for the recovery of damages by reason of any judicial action or judgment rendered by
him in good faith, and within the limits of his legal powers and jurisdiction."
o Exception to this general rule is found in Article 32 of the Civil Code, providing that any public
officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,

violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the enumerated rights and liberties of
another person which rights are the same as those guaranteed in the Bill of Rights (Article III
of the Constitution); shall be liable to the latter for damages. However, such liability is not
demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute. But again, to the extent that the offenses therein described have
"unjust judgment or "unjust interlocutory order" for an essential element, it need only be
reiterated that prosecution of a judge for any of them is subject to the caveat already mentioned:
that such prosecution cannot be initiated, much less maintained, unless there be a final judicial
pronouncement of the unjust character of the decision or order in issue.
6. ECHEGARAY v. SOJ
FACTS:
- The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January
4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray.
- The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the Court no longer has the authority to
grant the TRO because the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment that is already
final and executory;
ISSUE:
WON the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered.
HELD:
NO, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and executor judgment having
been rendered already.
-

By the finality of judgment, the court only lost its power to amend and modify or alter the judgment
made final by the court. The court retains its jurisdiction. There is a difference between the jurisdiction
of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former
continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the
latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.

7. IN RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY


FACTS:
- In this case, Atty. Harry Roque and Atty. Bagares hurled allegations of plagiarism against Justice
Castillo as a ground for the reconsideration of Castillo's ruling in the Vinuya vs Executive Secretary
case.2
- To add to this, several members of the UP Faculty published a statement on the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the court's decision in the Vinuya case. Essentially the
Faculty called for the resignation of Justice Castillo due to plagiarism in his work.
- The UP faculty treated the allegations against Castillo as truth.
- Aside from their statements against Castillo, they also made attacks against the Court.

2 In said case, the court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino Comfort women to compel certain officers of the
executive department to espouse their claims for reparations and demand apology from the Japanese government for the
Abuses committed against them during WW2. The Attorneys represent said comfort women. The allegations of plagiarism
centered on Justice Castillo's discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.

In the opening sentence of their statement, they stated that the decision in the Vinuya Case was a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the highest court of the Land.
They not only assumed that Castillo committed plagiarism but they also accused the court of
perpetuating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this court on how to go about the review of the
case. They also further insulted the court with imputations that they deliberately delayed the case.
As such, the Law Professors were directed to show cause as to why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar or why they should not be disciplined for issuing statements which alleged acts of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WON the law professors et. al should be disciplined for contempt of court
HELD:
YES.
- The publication of a statement by the UP Faculty of the College of Law regarding the allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a
rash act of misplaced vigilance.
- For one, there is an ongoing public investigation regarding the allegations, and the motion for
reconsideration of the alleged decision allegedly tainted with plagiarism is still pending. And it was
made clear in the case of Re: Kelly that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, or
tending to influence the decision of controversy is contempt of the court and is punishable.
- While the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is
also a general consensus that healthy criticism can only go so far. The ones that are leveled against the
judiciary in this case have crossed the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. The unjust
criticism threatens the independence of the judiciary.
- The Court insists that they be free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice. The court can only see the statement made by the UP Faculty
as having the objective to discredit the decision in the Vinuya Case and a way to undermine the Court's
honesty, integrity, and competence in addressing for the motion of reconsideration. This runs contrary
to their obligations as law professors and officers of the court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys and
to not promote distrust in the administration of justice.
- On the contention of respondents on their freedom of speech: The Court held that the right to criticize
the courts and judicial officers must be balanced with the need to protect the independence of the
Judiciary from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency. Verily, the accusatory and vilifying
nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed
as protected free speech.
8. PICHAY v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
- PGMA issued EO 12 which created the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with
the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,
among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the
President.

President Benigno Aquino thereafter issued EO 13 which abolished PAGC and transferring its functions
to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (ODESLA), particularly to the newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
Pursuant to the same, Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint for grave
misconduct against Pichay, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and other members of the LUWI for alleged graft and corruption in the purchase
of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Pichay counter-argues by assailing the constitutionality of EO 13 on the ground that it granted quasijudicial functions to administrative agencies, a power which only Congress has.

ISSUE:
WON EO 13 is unconstitutional on the ground that it exercises quasi-judicial functions
HELD:
NO, CONSTITUTIONAL. IT IS ONLY A FACT-FINDING AND RECOMMENDATORY BODY.
- Pichay points out that the name Investigative and Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IADODESLA wields quasi- judicial power.
- The Court ruled that while the term adjudicatory appears in its name, the IAD-ODESLA, however, has
no power to try and resolve cases because its authority is limited to conducting investigations,
preparing reports and submitting recommendations to the President. EO 13 explicitly states that the
IAD-ODESLA shall perform powers, functions, and duties of PAGC.
- In short, it is merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not hacing the power to
settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
- Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi- judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as judicial function, the act of
receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law.
- The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive
department
9. TAN v. MATSUURA
FACTS:
- Petitioner Tan filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor for the crime of falsification against
Petitioners Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua which was dismissed by the said office for lack of probable
cause.
- Tans Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by Office of the City Prosecutor. So he filed a
Petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, it was denied for lack of evidence.
- Tan then filed a MFR. The same was granted by DOJ Acting Secretary Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez
through a resolution.
- As such, Matsuura et. al filed a MFR of the said resolution which was denied but with the modification
that it excludes Respondent Cua.
- Tan then filed for a Partial MFR which was later granted by the DOJ.
- Matsuura et. al filed their Petitions for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which the same granted.
- Tan then assails the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Matsuura et. als petitions.

ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of petitions in which the Department of Justice has already
rendered a resolution
HELD:
YES.
- Despite the established principle that the determination of probable cause is vested in the public
prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice, it is also a well-settled rule that the courts are vested with the
power to review findings of prosecutors during preliminary investigations in exceptional cases.
- While the findings of the prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not mean that the courts
cannot intervene and review the findings of the prosecutors or the DOJ.
- In this case, the appellate court can take cognizance of the petitions considering that several varying
resolutions were issued by the DOJ.
- The appellate court is merely exercising its power of review to determine if there was grave abuse of
discretion.
10. GARCIA v. DRILON
FACTS:
- Petitioner Jesus Garcia (husband) appears to have inflicted violence against private respondents (wife
and daughter).
- Petitioner admitted having an affair with a bank manager. He heartlessly boasted about their sexual
relations to the household help.
- His infidelity emotionally wounded Rosalie Garcia (wife). Their quarrels left her with bruises and
hematoma. Petitioner also unconscionably beat up their daughter, Jo-ann, whom he blamed for
squealing on him.
- All these drove Rosalie to despair, causing her to attempt suicide by slitting her wrist.
- Instead of taking her to the hospital, petitioner left the house. He never visited her when she was
confined for seven (7) days. He even told his mother-in-law that Rosalie should just accept his
extramarital affair since anyway he is not cohabiting with his paramour and he has not sired a child with
her.
- Rosalie was determined to separate from petitioner. But she was afraid he would take away their
children and deprive her of financial support. He even warned her that if she pursued legal battle, she
would not get a single centavo from him. After she confronted him of his affair, he forbade her to hold
office. This deprived her of access to full information about their businesses.
- Thus, the RTC found reasonable ground to believe there was imminent danger of violence against
respondent and her children and issued a series of Temporary Protection Orders (TPO) ordering
petitioner, among other things, to surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a
Walther PPK.
- Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of RA 9262, in particular Sec 143 thereof which delegates to
barangay officials the power to issue protection orders. Petitioner contends that protection orders

3 SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the
protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of
this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a
BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong
Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect
its personal service.

involve the exercise of judicial power, and under the Constitution, the issuance of which is placed upon
the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established by law"
ISSUE:
WON the issuance of the Barangay Protection Order is an exercise of judicial function
HELD:
NO, NOT JUDICIAL BUT EXECUTIVE FUNCTION.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the
power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
and enforcing their due observance."
- As can be gleaned from Sec 14 of RA 9262, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance
of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay."
- The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply
the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may
affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers.
11. CITY OF MANILA v. GRECIA-CUERDO
FACTS:
- Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable
period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.
- In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of
the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), the said assessment required respondents to pay local
business taxes. They were constrained to pay the same under protest.
- As such, they filed before the RTC a complaint for the refund of the tax they paid with prayer to issue
TRO and writ of Preliminary injunction.
- The RTC granted their application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
- Petitioners filed a MFR but the RTC denied so they filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
but the CA dismissed the same, stating that it had no jurisdiction over the said petition because the
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC,
is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act
No. 9282 (RA 9282), which states that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
- Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by
the RTC in a local tax case.
HELD:
YES.
- In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases

to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is
deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable
reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al., it was held that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial
tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary
writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals where the Court stated that a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

12. NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE


FACTS:
- Antonio H. Noblejas is the Commissioner of Land Registration. By the terms of section 2 of RA 1151,
the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance."
- On March 7, 1968, Sec of Justice Teehankee sent a letter to Noblejas requiring him to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for "approving a subdivision and consolidatedsubdivision plan which covers areas in excess of the areas covered by the original titles."
- Noblejas answered and informed the Teehankee that, since he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a CFI judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in the
same manner as a CFI Judge, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the
Supreme Court (since siya yung may jurisdiction pursuant to section 67 of the Judiciary Act and
Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court).
- Nevertheless, he was suspended by the Executive Secretary, so he filed this case claiming lack of
jurisdiction of the ES and his abuse of discretion. He also reiterated his previous arguments.
ISSUE:
WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by RA 1151 and Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.
HELD:
NO, NOT BY THE SC.
- It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary.
- Petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance" includes by implication the
right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation would necessarily result in the same right being possessed by a variety of executive
officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.
- Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer upon
the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these Justices are
only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act, sec. 24, par. 2).
- If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and
privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court,
and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of
privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive

officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto (to that extent) the control of the Chief Executive over
such officials.
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislative to charge the Judiciary with administrative
functions except when reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.
The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the
exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its
members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

13. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS v. ANG CHO KIO


FACTS:
- Ang was convicted of various offenses. After serving his sentence for six years, he was granted
conditional pardon. The condition is that he should never to return to the Philippines because he is an
undesirable alien. He accepted.
- Notwithstanding his conditional pardon, he still went back to the Philippines (he came from Taipei and
he had a booked flight with PAL going to Honolulu. But before he could leave for Taipei, he was
identified as Ang Cho Kio). As such, for violating the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Secretary,
by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence that was imposed on him.
- He filed a petition for habeas corpus. RTC denied. CA also denied it. But the CA made a
recommendation that Ang may be allowed to leave the country on the first available transportation
abroad.
- The Solgen assailed this CA decision, claiming that the recommendation by the CA should not be part
of the decision because it gives the decision a political complexion since courts are not empowered to
make such recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers.
- The Solgen contends that allowing convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state, which
may be exercised solely by the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending an undesirable alien
out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to
influence, the political acts of the President.
ISSUE:
WON the CA decision was proper? Can it make recommendations?
HELD:
NO.
- The power to revoke a conditional pardon is within the realm of the executive, and does not fall within
the jurisdiction of the judiciary. Neither does the judiciary have the power to give advisory opinions. Its
main duty is to settle disputes and uphold rights, in the absence of which it cannot render opinions, as
this is not one of its functions.
- The case in the CA was for habeas corpus. The only issue there was whether the RTC correctly denied
the petition. The CA was not called upon the review any sentence imposed upon Ang. The sentence
against him had long become final and in fact, he was pardoned. The opinion should have been limited
to the affirmance of the decision of the RTC, and no more.
- The recommendatory powers of the court are limited to those expressly provided in the law, such as Art
5 RPC. (when an act is not punishable by law judge should report it to the executive or when the
imposition of a penalty would lead to undue harshness judge should still apply the proper penalty but
recommend to the President for executive clemency).
- The CA was simply called to determine whether Ang was illegally confined or not under the Director of
Prisons (for violating the pardon). It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that
would suggest a modification or correction of the act of the President. The matter of whether an alien

who violated the law may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely to the
President, under the principle of separation of powers. It is not within the province of the judiciary to
express an opinion, or a suggestion that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of an action by the
President, which are purely political in nature.
After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and
application of the law. Judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which
may only reflect unfavorably upon the competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.

NOTES:
1) Recommendatory powers of the SC under RPC does not include matters which are purely political in nature.
(Otherwise it violates separation of powers)
2) Deportation of aliens is a political question
3) Opinion of judges should be relevant to the question presented for decision.
14. SBMA v. COMELEC
FACTS:
- Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the
Subic Economic Zone.
- RA 7227 likewise created Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) to implement the declared national
policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
- On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines
government.
- Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the
sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
- On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,
Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to
join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
- Respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
- The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
- The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan
Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
- Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.
- On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof
was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
- On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Morong.
- On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar
of Activities for local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum.
- On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848
alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an
amendment of a national law.
ISSUE:
WON the local initiative is unconstitutional
HELD:

NO. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not
yet an approved law.
-

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted
for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced
or implemented thereunder.
At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or
possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases. Judicial power has been defined in jurisprudence as "the right to determine actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction". It is "the
authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are enforceable and
demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violation of such rights".
Thus, there can be no occasion for the exercise of judicial power unless real parties come to court for
the settlement of an actual controversy and unless the controversy is such that it can be settled in a
manner that binds the parties by the application of existing laws.

15. IN RE SAVE THE SUPREME COURT


FACTS:
-

16. TANO v. SOCRATES


FACTS:
- The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princessa enacted ordinance no. 15-92 banning the shipment
of live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princessa City for a period of 5 years.
- In the same light, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits
the catching, gathering, buying, selling and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years within the Palawan waters.
- The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged
for violating the above ordinance and resolution.
- Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts,
petitioners directly invoked the Court for certiorari assailing both ordinances for depriving them of due
process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of
Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts
HELD:
YES.
- There is a clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reason or
exceptional or compelling circumstance adduced why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed.
- That hierarchy of courts is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against

first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with
the Court of Appeals.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and
to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
We reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [its] primary
jurisdiction.

NOTE:
Petitioners (both private association and fishermen have no locus standi because their case is not ripe for
adjudication).
Malaga v Penachos
Facts:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) published
in the Western Visayas Daily an invitations to construct a Micro Laboratory at ISCOF. The notice
announced that the last day of submission of pre-qualification will be on December 2 in the afternoon.
Malaga et.al, was operating a construction company submitted their pre qualifications on the last day to
join the bidding. But they were not allowed to participate because they were considered late.
So Malaga filed a complaint in the RTC against PBAC, that they were disallowed to participate without
just cause to accept them as bidders. They also sought to reset the bidding date and also asked that if
the bidding commenced, the PBAC be directed not to award the project pending their complaint.
The judge of RTC issued a TRO. PBAC filed a motion to lift on the ground that the court is prohibited
from issuing such order, preliminary and mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project
under sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contend that the issue had already become moot because the
bidding had already been awarded.
The trial court lifted the TRO and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that ISCOF is
a government infrastructure project falling within the PD 1818.
ISSUE: WON ISCOF is a government instrumentality covered by PD 1818
HELD: NO
Indeed:
The
1987
Administrative
Code
defines
a
government
instrumentality
as
follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions).
The
same
Code
describes
a
chartered
institution
thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities
and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.

1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to
effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also
be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the
Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious
detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of
the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college
would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as
there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the
bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
In the case of Datiles and Co. v. Sucaldito, this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in P.D. 605, the
law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition pertained to the issuance of
injunctions or restraining orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the
exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla made it clear,
however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions of law, courts could not be
prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
1PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed these deadlines
without prior notice to prospective participants.
2 PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for
the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and
P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or only ten days before
the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November
12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled bidding
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies
such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by
the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been denied.
De Castro v. JBC
Facts:
This is a case regarding the controversy of the forthcoming compulsory retirement of the then CJ
Reynato Puno in May 17, 2010 (7 days after the presidential elections). This was pursuant to sec. 4 (1)
in relation to sec. 9 of Art 8 of 1987 Constitution. Vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence from a list of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council and shall be
appointed by the President w/o need for confirmation. Also, Art 7 sec. 15 of Consti prohibits making
appointments within 2 months immediately before the day of the next elections and up to the end of his
term.
On Dec. 22 2010, Cong. Matias who was an ex offcio member of the JBC wrote a letter therein to
commence immediately the nominations for the next CJ. In Jan. the JBC, en banc, decided
unanimously to fill up the vacancy of the CJ. They nominated AJ. Antonio Carpio, Conchita, Corona,
Carpio- Morales, Nachura, and Velasco, the latter 2 declined
The OSG contended that the appointment is valid and is not incoherent with art 7 sec 15 because it
does not apply to the appointments of the Supreme Court, if they intended (framers) then it should have
expressly stated in the Constitution itself. This is why the prohibition is not found in art VIII rather it is
only pressed in Art VII of the Constitution.

ISSUE: WON the incumbent president can appoint a successor for CJ PUNO?
HELD: YES
- There are two provisions that seem to be in conflict. However the Court said that the prohibition in art 7
sec. 15 does not apply to appointments to fill up the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence
thereto in the Supreme Court or any appointment in the Judiciary. The word shall connotes that it is
mandatory for the President to appoint in case there is vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence
therof.
- What art. 7 sec. 15 is trying to say is that no appointments must be made 2 months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to end of term is construed only in art. VII. If the framers of the
Constitution had the intention in adapting the said clause then is should have done so that which it
would be expressly written in Art. VII thereof.
Fortich v Corona
Facts:
The controversy arose when the municipality of Bukidnon wanted an agricultural measuring 144
hectares be converted into an agro-industrial land.
On March 1996, the Office of the President (OP) acceded to this conversion and converted the entire
land into an agro-industrial land in order to attract investors. This became final and executory.
Feeling aggrieved, the farmers went into a hunger strike to protest the ruling. The OP wanted to
appease them, so they decided to modify and issued a new resolution (win-win resolution) that only 44
hectares will be converted as an agro-land and 100 hectares will be distributed to the farmers.
Corona (deputy exec. Secretary) filed a MFR claiming that the resolution would be void but there was
no result as the justices voted 2-2 for the MR.
Corona now wants the case to be decided en banc because the required number of votes was not met.,
relying on art VII sec. 4(3) of the Constitution.
Hence, this issue
ISSUE: WON the resolution of the court should be referred to he Court en banc.
WON the farmer-intervenors has legal standing
HELD:
NO.
The intention of the framers draws a distinction between cases and matters
Using statutory construction, reddendo singular singulis, the word decided must refer to cases and the word
resolved must refer to matters
It is clear that only cases are referred to be decided en banc if the required number of votes are not met.
Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not obtained in
the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted
provision speaks only of case and not matter.
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases
by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case
then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files
a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in
the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in
view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration.

Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision
is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998
NO.
Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing to intervene in this
case. The Court said there was none, because the source of their standing to file is the Win-Win
Resolution (note that in that resolution, pinamigay nga yung lupa sa mga farmers, ngayon, meron
silang Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). Dahil dun, nag intervene sila).
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived their rights from
the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the CLOA to them does not grant them the requisite
standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and void.
REPUBLIC v GARCIA
FACTS:
Republic filed against major gen. Garcia a petition for forfeiture acquired properties, with a verified ex
parte petition of issuance of writ of preliminary attachment.
The Republic being a sovereign political entitiy, is exempt from filing the attachment bond
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
the properties of Garcia upon the filing of 1M bond by replublic- to avoid delay
Still, Republic despite the bond filed MFR said they were still exempt.
Sandiganbayan said there was nothing in the rules of court that will exempt them.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan GADALEJ when it rejected the exemption claim of Republic
HELD:
YES. Under sec. 57 of the Rules of Court before a writ of attachment is sought, a bond must first be filed to
answer all costs and damages it may sustain from the attachment. But as declared by the Tolentino case, the
court declared that the state as represented by the government is exempt from an attachment bond. Because
in theory, the state is always solvent.
the Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that it did
not by law possess. All courts must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of this Court.
Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form
an important part of our legal system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino
need(ed) to be carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that the rule on attachment ha(d)
undergone through the years.
Art VIII Sec 4(3) xxx no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en
banc.
PACU v Secretary of Education
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities filed a petition of unconstitutionality of an Act
number and a Commonwealth Act which sought to regulate the ownership of private schools. The acts
say that in order to own and operate a school, you must have secured a license to the secretary of
education. It follows that the SOE also has the discretion in providing the standards and may even ban
certain textbooks that he may see inappropriate.

PACU contends that their right to operate a school is provided in the Constitution, and avers that such
requirement would tantamount as an act of restraint. Also they aver that there was undue delegation
because the law did not specify the standards to be imposed.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have legal standing
WON the case is ripe for adjudication
HELD: NO. There is no justiciable controversy in this case. It is established that in order for the private
individual to be entitled, it must have an immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury, he must show that he
has sustained common interest to all members of the public.
NO. Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the
validity of statutes is incidental to the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution
and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort
and it must be necessary to determine a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are
brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere
academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein.
Tan vs. Macapagal
Facts:
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was
"without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider,
discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption
of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the
Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution
without altering the general plan laid down therein."
ISSUES:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement."
Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
2. NO.
At the time the case was filed, the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the
1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has
actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the
Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may
fulfil its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness

Suplico vs NEDA
Facts:
The National Economic Development Authority avers that there is no more justiciable controversy with
the ZTE National Broadband Network Project controversy for the Court to resolve.
Petitioners contend that because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the petition,
which among others, included the Presidents use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan
agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case despite its apparent mootness.
ISSUE:
WON the court still has jurisdiction to decide on moot cases.
Generally NO.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual
justiciable controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain from deciding moot issues. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or make
any
pronouncement.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one which
involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a
court of justice. Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, and an
adjudication thereon would be of no practical use or value as courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions
to
satisfy
scholarly
interest,
however
intellectually
challenging.
While there were occasions when the Court passed upon issues although supervening events had
rendered those petitions moot and academic, the instant case does not fall under the exceptional
cases. In those cases, the Court was persuaded to resolve moot and academic issues to formulate guiding
and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules for future guidance of both bench and bar.
Other exceptions: GREC
1. Grave violation of the constitution
2. The case is capable of repetition
3. Exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involve
4. Constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench.
Concepcion v COMELEC
Facts:
Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works
Facts:
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual,
then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually
going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision.
The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that
passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact
that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the
taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from
releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the
said property to the City of Pasig

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.


WON petitioner has legal standing
HELD:
No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that
the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with
the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be
expanded only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
YES. It is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury
in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are as many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers,
laws
providing
the
disbursement
of
public
funds.
Thus, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers, have sufficient interest
in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and may therefore question the
constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys.
Galicto v Aquino
Facts:
Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances,
bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila
Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has
been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate conducted an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and
government financial institutions (GFIs).
Based on its findings, officials and governing boards of various GOCCs and GFIs have been granting
themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits as well as
other irregular and abusive practices. Consequently, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17
urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently
excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of
GOCCs and GFIs.
Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the
Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the GOCCs and GFIs, and
for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed
compensation
and
position
classification
system
for
GOCCs
and
GFIs.
EO 7 was published and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from
granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from
increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees.
The respondents pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petition's dismissal: (1)
the petitioner lacks locus standi; and (2) certiorari is not applicable to this case.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 2011, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10149, otherwise known as the
GOCC Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President to fix the
compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
ISSUE:

WON petitioners has locus standi


WON the case is already moot
HELD:
NO
In the present case, the petitioner has not demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the
outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case,
the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent
events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of
such
right
deprives
the
petitioner
of
legal
standing
to
assail
EO
7.
YES.
The

petition

has

been

mooted

by

supervening

events.

Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that the present case has already been
rendered moot by the enactment of R.A. No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and
GFIs empowering their board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the
grant of authority to the President to perform this act. With the enactment of the GOCC Governance Act of
2011, the President is now authorized to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
LEGASPI v CSC
Facts:
Legaspi invokes his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern in a special civil
action for mandamus against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
The standing of the petitioner was challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to
be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees for failure of petitioner to provide
actual interest to secure the information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right to information in the case at bar.
HELD:
YES
The Constitution provides the guarantee of adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of examining the public records by the government
agency in custody thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information
from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security.
In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite
any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not,
civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's
request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees
concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed
eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The court delves into determining whether the information sought for by the petitioner is of public interest. All
appointments in the Civil Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a public office is a
public trust. Public employees therefore are accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their
positions in the government. The court also noted that the information on the result of the CSC eligibility
examination is released to the public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or

unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify the civil eligibilities of any person
occupying government positions.
Joya v PCGG
Facts:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by then Pres. Aquino,
signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christies of New York to auction off Old Masters Paintings
and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of Pres. Marcos, his
relatives, and cronies, for and in behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition
and Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin PCGG
from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule.
Petitioners claim that, as Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the preservation
and protection of the countrys artistic wealth and that the paintings and silverware are public properties
collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art alleging
that they have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, they have the
legal personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846.
Issue: WON the petitioners have legal standing for the courts to exercise judicial review over the case
Held:
NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila
Foundation, a non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares
were in fact gifts to the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper
because what the petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed not
because they are after the fulfilment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the
only ground for a writ of mandamus to be issued. The taxpayers suit cannot prosper as well since the items in
question were acquired from private sources and not with public money.
For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual controversy one which involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not
be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as this case. Since the
purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin the respondents from holding the auction sale of the artworks
on a particular date which had long past, the issues raised have become moot and academic. Nevertheless,
the Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual
case or legal standing when paramount public interest is involved. However, there is no such justification in this
petition.
Petition dismissed.
Board of Optometry v Colet
Facts:
Republic Act No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education,
Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes, otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of
1995, was approved into law on 7 June 1995.

On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition
for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order. Private respondents alleged in their petition that:
There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled Bill
which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel;2. R.A. No. 8050
derogates and violates the fundamental right of every Filipino to reasonable safeguards against
deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law.
When the petition (docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770) was examined, it was found out that it merely
listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses of
Optometry Practitioner Association of the Philippines (OPAP); Cenevis Optometrist Association (COA);
Association of Christian-Muslim Optometrist (ACMO); and Southern Mindanao OptometristAssociation
of the Philippines (SMOAP). They failed to indicate the details as to the juridical personality and
addresses of these alleged associations, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the private respondents have the locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8050.
2.) Whether or not there is an absence of a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition.
Ruling:
1.) No. The private respondents have no legal standing or capacity to question the constitutionality of the
questioned law. The Supreme Court has cited that under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is
considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its
members. If it is not to be proven as such, it cannot bring any civil action. In the case at bar, it was
founded that the private respondents did not claim that they are juridical identities as they chose to
remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their associations, having completely
disregarded Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. Without juridical entity, the private respondents are
not considered to be a real party in interest.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court - a real party in interest is a party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
2.) YES. The Supreme Court stated that the questioned civil case must be of a failure for the reason of the
missing requisites of a special civil action for declaratory relief.
The requisites as a special civil action for declaratory relief are as follows: 1.) the existence of a justiciable
controversy; 2.) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; 3.) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and 4.) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination.
What is lacking is the first and the fourth requisite.
Also, the Court stated that the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over
a constitutional question unless the following requisites must be first satisfied and these are: 1.) there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict or rights susceptible of judicial determination; 2.) the
constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; 3.) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and 4.) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of
the case.
An actual case or controversy means as existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjenctural or anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or
controversy involving all or any of the private respondents and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with
respect to rights and obligations under R.A. 8050. The Court concluded that the respondent Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of
R.A. 8050. The Court granted to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction.

Tondo Medical vs CA
President Estrada issued EO No. 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health (DOH), which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and
organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its
mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services
and technical assistance and the LGUs (local government units) are responsible for providing medical
assistance to their territories as part of the devolution of govt. In line with this, the DOH launched the
HSRA (Health Sector Reform Agenda) by the HSRA Technical Working Group.
It provided 5 general areas of reform: (1) to provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; (2)
Secure funding for priority public health programs; (3) Promote the development of local health systems
and ensure its effective performance etc.
Petitioners questioned the following for violation of Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II. When
the case reached the CA (Court of Appeals), it ruled that HSRA cannot be declared void because the
aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable
constitutional rights and they only provide guidelines for legislation.
ISSUE:
WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN UPHOLDING
TECHNICALITIES OVER AND ABOVE THE ISSUES OF TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE RAISED IN
THE PETITION
HELD:
NO. In transcendental importance, the petitioners must be able to assert substantial interest. Present
substantial interest, which will enable a party to question the validity of the law, requires that a party sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It is distinguished from a mere expectancy or future,
contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest
This case likewise stressed that the rule on constitutional questions which are of transcendental importance
cannot be invoked where a party substantive claim is without merit. Thus, a partys standing is determined by
the substantive merit of his case or a preliminary estimate thereof. After a careful scrutiny of the petitioners
substantive claims, this Court finds that the petitioners miserably failed to show any merit to their claims.