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n Irene Sante vs. Hon.

Claravall, the Supreme Court stated that since at the time of


the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has already been
adjusted to P300,000.00, there is no doubt that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction
over the case since the total amount of damages being claimed by the petitioner in the case
was P420,000.00.
Moreover, in the said case the Supreme Court found no error, much less grave abuse of
discretion, on the part of the Court of
Appeals in affirming the RTCs order allowing the amendment of the original complaint
fromP300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari filed before
the Court of Appeals.
The High Court declared that while it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an
amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction over the original
complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the
court (Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 303 SCRA 186,
196), the RTC in the case clearly had jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court. Ergo, the amendment of the complaint was in order. (IRENE SANTE
AND REYNALDOSANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, G.R. No. 173915, February 22,
2010, VILLARAMA, JR., J.).

Marcos II vs. CA
MARCOS II vs. CA
273 SCRA 47
GR No. 120880, June 5, 1997
"The approval of the court sitting in probate is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of
estate taxes."
"In case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at anytime within 10 years after the
omission."
FACTS: Bongbong Marcos sought for the reversal of the ruling of the Court of Appeals to grant
CIR's petition to levy the properties of the late Pres. Marcos to cover the payment of his tax
delinquencies during the period of his exile in the US. The Marcos family was assessed by the
BIR after it failed to file estate tax returns. However the assessment were not protested
administratively by Mrs. Marcos and the heirs of the late president so that they became final and
unappealable after the period for filing of opposition has prescribed. Marcos contends that the
properties could not be levied to cover the tax dues because they are still pending probate with
the court, and settlement of tax deficiencies could not be had, unless there is an order by the
probate court or until the probate proceedings are terminated.
Petitioner also pointed out that applying Memorandum Circular No. 38-68, the BIR's Notices
of Levy on the Marcos properties were issued beyond the allowed period, and are therefore null
and void.
ISSUE: Are the contentions of Bongbong Marcos correct?
HELD: No. The deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax assessment are already final
and unappealable -and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax remedy resorted to by the

government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal Revenue Code. This
summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such as Judicial Civil
actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any other tax
remedies instituted by the government.
The approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased's
estate is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes. On the contrary, under
Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden not to authorize the
executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive share to any
party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's
contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of the
estate tax.
On the issue of prescription, the omission to file an estate tax return, and the subsequent
failure to contest or appeal the assessment made by the BIR is fatal to the petitioner's cause, as
under Sec.223 of the NIRC, in case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed at
anytime within 10 years after the omission, and any tax so assessed may be collected by levy
upon real property within 3 years (now 5 years) following the assessment of the tax. Since the
estate tax assessment had become final and unappealable by the petitioner's default as regards
protesting the validity of the said assessment, there is no reason why the BIR cannot continue
with the collection of the said tax.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs Hon. Asuncion and Manuel Uy


Po Tiong GR No. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
Facts:
Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a
prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the
reglementary period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun
Insurance for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment,
seeking the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages,
attorneys fees, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not
specifically stated in the prayer, although it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it
would amount to about P50M. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of
damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked
for was not stated. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. On January 23,
1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he
be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of
the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Said
amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional
docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages,
which he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional
claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70.
On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of

this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent
paid an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid
a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the
amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists
that private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquires jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not
been paid?
Ruling:
Manchester ruling applies, with modification. Statutes regulating the procedure of courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and in that respect.
The Court dismissed petitioners motion and ordered the Clerk of court to re-asses the docket
fees.
Personal Observation:
The case is different in Manchester because the respondent herein has shown compliance by
paying docket fees upon reassessment and has also paid the docket fees on its amended
complaint increasing the claim for damages. Furthermore, there is no substantial evidence that
the respondent has the intention of deliberately defraud the court or evaded the payment of
docket fees.

Swagman vs. CA [GR NO. 161135, April 8, 2005]


Post under case digests, Remedial Law at Sunday, March 04, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
Facts: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman through Atty. Infante and Hegerty, its president
and vice-president, respectively, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three promissory
notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is
in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per
annum payable every three months. In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the
petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment
of said loans.
On 2 February 1999, Christian filed with the RTC a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising
as defenses lack of cause of action. According to them, Christian had no cause of action
because the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without
objection. Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant
complaint, as defendants obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may
nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence
showing that the obligations covered by the two promissory notes are now due and

demandable. When the instant case was filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory
notes was due and demandable, but , the first and the second promissory notes have already
matured during the course of the proceeding. Hence, payment is already due.
This finding was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured
by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case.

Held: No. Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as
follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate
relief.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is erroneous. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action
in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege
the essential facts.Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters
included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of
suits.