The Geopolitical Dimensions of Indo Us Nuclear Deal

The Geopolitical Dimensions of Indo-US Nuclear Deal
Written by {ga=muhammad-tayyab-khan}
Policy Perspectives , Vlm 3, No.2
Abstract
[The signing of Indo-US nuclear deal in March this year (2006) has the potential to open up a
Pandoras Box of similar deals and agreements in the region, which is already gripped in
fast-paced proliferation efforts and is also the most hot spot in the contemporary conflict and
power game. This paper is an effort to comprehend the geopolitical landscape of the region with
a focus on the regional security structures, and the nature of the strategic partnership
relationship. Author]
Geopolitical Landscape and the Regional Security Structures
Today Asian international relations are driven by politics of oil, religion, drugs and arms trade as
well as ethnic irredentist security fights along with geopolitics and economics. [1] The conflicts
reveal tensions between consideration of global norms (human rights, arms control) and
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national security (military, trade, prestige and integrity). Furthermore, the cold war regional
boundaries have lost their salience. Instead, the interaction and preoccupation of players reveal
connections between Central Asia, Persian Gulf, the Indian Subcontinent, and between
China-Myanmar-Bay of Bengal and the sea lanes from the South China Sea to the Indian
Ocean, and between the Korean Peninsula-Japan-Russia-Taiwan-PRC-USA.
[2]
The boun-daries of Asia-pacific have enlarged and altered sub-regional centres of gravity have
emerged. In the latter, clusters of players, issues and patterns of interactions have surfaced with
the system changing potential. Each group presents both regional and sub-regional pathways.
Each pathway has a process of engagement and each offers movement in terms of ideology,
and economic and military power. In other words the boundaries of interaction and influence are
no longer the traditional cold war boundaries of south Asia or south East Asia or East Asia. Now
political ideas, economic exchange and military movement occur entirely within regions as well
as between regions. Geo-strategy i.e. the organization of movement and the development of a
system in a defined geographical sphere is in full play in the major pathways in Asia-Pacific.
[3]
Asia sits today as a region of great potential and of great potential danger with its nations
treading warily towards an uncertain future, on the one hand hopeful of economic momentum
and worried about serious potential political-security crises on the other. In such a scenario
there are some important points to be kept in mind, and they are:
1. Today the US-China dynamic has become more pronounced. The competitive nature of the
relationship between the two states is growing with the status of Taiwan continuing to be the
flashpoint.
2. Nuclear and Missile capabilities are increasingly altering the strategic landscape of the
region and considerably raise the stakes in future crisis situations.
3. Recent developments in South China Sea and in the Indian Ocean indicate that these vital
maritime passageways will remain an area of contentions for years to come.
In sum, India and Pakistan nuclear and missile race with added risk of inadvertent or accidental
nuclear use because of unsophisticated nuclear command and control systems; chinas quest
for modernized force projection capabilities; Japans impressive acquisition of dual use
capabilities; the dangers of nuclear and missile proliferation by North Korea and the presence of
2 / 15

proliferation rings and terror networks, however, do provide a cause for concern and so making
a very important geo-strategic environment.
The china concern along with a plethora of other territorial disputes that could generate
armed conflict right from Korean Peninsula on the one side of Caucasus and Middle East on the
other are also altering the US strategic profile in the region. Whereas, the US control of
Afghanistan on one end, logistical presence in access to Singapore, use of ship repair facilities
in Malaysia, and perhaps in Indonesia, as well as enhanced bilateral military cooperation
between the United States and ASEAN nations-underscored by the new US Philippines military
cooperation accord and the US-India strategic partnership deal have reinforced the US
commitment to security engagement in the region.
George Perkovich, very candidly, argues that the authors of the new US strategy (Rice, Burns,
Zelikow, and, ultimately, President Bush)
based it on six fundamental premises, which may or may not be widely shared throughout the
US government which are:
[4]
1. To dissuade China from competing harmfully with it, the United States must mobilize states
on Chinas periphery to balance Chinese power.
2. India is a rising power with great intrinsic merits, including its attachment to democracy, and
is a natural partner with the United States in the global system. The United States should
cultivate a partnership with India and enhance Indias international power. A more powerful and
collegial India will balance Chinas power in Asia.
3. To win over India, the United States should change national and international laws and rules
that bar technology cooperation with India due to Indias nuclear-weapons and ballistic missile
programs. Changing these rules is necessary to cement the partnership, and such changes also
will help India bolster its strategic capabilities, including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles,
which will further balance Chinas strategic power.
4. India will have to increase its use of nuclear energy in order to fuel economic growth and
reduce its rate of greenhouse gas emissions.
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5. India has never been a threat to the United States or the liberal international system. Indias
possession of nuclear weapons breaks no international treaty. India has been a responsible
steward of nuclear technology, material, and know-how. India is not a proliferation threat that a
smart counter proliferation strategy must combat; rather it is a partner to cultivate in isolating
terrorists and rogue states that are proliferation threats. Indias exclusion as an accepted
nuclear- weapons power is a historical anomaly that should be corrected.
6. The established global non-proliferation regime is predicated on rules that do not sufficiently
discriminate between bad actors and good actors. Universal equal compliance with rules will
never happen because bad guys will always exist and cheat. The objective should be not to
constrain or burden good actors, including the United States and India, but rather to concentrate
power on removing or nullifying bad actors. If negotiation and enforcement processes are hung
up on equal treatment and mutual obligations, they are a waste of time and political capital.
According to Condoleezza Rice, The US should pay closer attention to Indias role in the
regional balance. India is an element in Chinas calculation, and should be in Americas too.
India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one. [5]
Many of the experts agree that the US has selected to harness India's apparent strategic
weight for its own geopolitical aims. As Siddharth Varadarajan puts it, the joint statement
released by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on July 18 is the
most dramatic textual manifestation of what Washington is attempting to do. [6]
Giving India anything less, or insisting that it cap or scrap its nuclear weapons, is seen by
Washington's neo-conservatives as tantamount to strengthening China in the emerging balance
of power in Asia. Ashley Tellis notes "By integrating India into the non-proliferation order at the
cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent [the US would] threaten to place New
Delhi at a severe disadvantage vis--vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian
security but also the US interests in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power
over the long term" [7]
At present, China is under arms embargoes imposed by the E.U. and the US, dating from the
suppression of the Chinese pro-democracy movement in 1989. [8] Beijing's request to lift its
embargo though supported by Paris and Berlin is "unacceptable" to the US as it does not want
4 / 15

China to have advanced weapons technology that it could employ against it in any future
Sino-American military confrontation, particularly over Taiwan. US also fears that Beijing will be
able to sell the technology to Washington's adversaries and that American technology will find
its way into Chinese hands through the US-European weapons sharing and would be used
against the US interests in the region, especially around the Taiwan Strait. Washington has
threatened to curtail military cooperation with Europe if the embargo is lifted.
[9]
On the other hand New Delhi is purchasing advanced Russian fighter aircraft, submarines and
an aircraft carrier. In addition, India is expanding its defence contacts with Israel and has
acquired the Phalcon early warning system that was denied to China. Jerusalem's proposed
sale of the Phalcon system to China was effectively blocked by Washington in 2000. India's
ambitious $8.13 billion Project Seabird, which consists of the Karwar naval base, an air force
station, a naval armament depot, and missile silos is to be realized in the geopolitics of the
Arabian Sea and the Western Indian Ocean. [10]
Therefore, in the backdrop of all these combine geographic constraints of Indian Blue water
navy ambitions and the US entering into Afghanistan in 2001, just four months after the US
troops entered Kabul, the Chinese successfully proposed to Islamabad the sharing of the
Gawadar naval base. This proposal served the Chinese purposes in three ways: [11]
1. It serves as a tool to secure Beijing's access to the Gulf's resources
2. It is a useful military base to counter Washington's influence in Central and South Asia
3. Gwadar functions as an excellent wedge between India and the Middle East and as an offset
against India's naval power.
Ever since 1989, Beijing had suspected Washington of trying to cobble together a new system
of anti-China containment. [12] On the other hand across the Indian Ocean and South Asian
region, India watches warily as China expands its military and political roles, fearing that it is
sliding into a state of strategic encirclement by China.
[13]
Chinese activities in Great Coco Island, some 30 nautical miles off the Indian Andaman chain of
islands, are viewed with increasing suspicion in New Delhi.
5 / 15

[14]
Chinese activities in Myanmar are believed to include the construction and operation of naval
and electronic facilities on Great Coco Island, the modernization of naval base at Hianggyi, and
the development of the existing naval infrastructure at a number of Myanmars ports.
[15]
China reached a strategic understanding with Pakistan founded on their convergent interests
vis--vis India and so successive Chinese and Pakistani regimes have maintained and
deepened this strategic entente, much to Indias dismay.
[16]
New Delhi remains suspicious of the Sino-Pakistani relationship and their resilient security ties,
ranging from the construction of a strategic outlet for Pakistan in the Gawadar Port and
continuous supplies of military equipment reinforce the spectre of strategic encirclement of
India. In a letter of May 12, 1998, to US President Mr. A. B. Vajpayee justified Indias
weaponization by reflecting elliptically but clearly enough to China multiple challenges to India.
Vajpayees letter not only gave powerful credence to the China threat theory but suggested
that India might be moving toward strategic alignment with Washington to deal with that threat
and the events followed are the manifestation of the same.
John. W. Garver in his book Protracted Contest-Sino-Indian rivalry in the twentieth century
notes that:
Excluding a Chinese or other extra-regional presence from South Asia has been a long
standing Indian concern. Like a perennial plant, it is not always a blossom or apparent but its
roots are always there, ready to push to the surface when rising temperature rouses it to
activitythe analysts will find that among the extra-regional powers that have played a role in
the post 1947 South Asia, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Soviet Union,
Russian federation, France, Portugal, the Netherlands concerns with china looming presence
weighed most heavily with Indian leaders even if it was not always at the top of their explicit
foreign policy agenda. [17]
In the backdrop of all this the Signing of Strategic partnership agreements by India with China
and soon after the conclusion of signing of nuclear deal with the US reflects that India's
overriding geo-strategic interest is to be the regional power centre of the subcontinent and it will
cooperate with Beijing and Washington only so far as it perceives that cooperation serves that
interest.
6 / 15

Strategic Partnership Relationship and Indo-US Case
These relationships often are defined and can be explained as a bilateral relationship with the
main function being to facilitate the increase of power (at first in absolute terms) of the two
states involved. In this sense, it differs both from a classical security-oriented alliance and from
political and economic integration processes such as the European Union. [18]
Strategic partnerships are neither directed against a common rival, nor involve any transfer of
national sovereignty to a supranational authority (for example in political integration attempts
such as the European Union), instead, they are based upon the mutual goal of increasing
individual power and independence, allowing the preservation of national sovereignty. [19]
The two state parties agree to raise the level of their standard exchanges to embrace levels
from the lowest to the highest, to deal with the enormous range of issues that concern each of
them in a cordial and holistic manner seeking cooperation or understanding, and to make
long-term commitments for mutual benefit and furthering their respective goals, but do not enter
into alliance. The substance of any strategic relationship, and its possible transformation from
dialogue to partnership, however, depends on the depth and span of interactions, the actual
congruence of interests and objectives, and the amount of effort each party consistently devotes
to accommodating the others concerns and winning support for its own positions. [20]
With the US still determined to counter Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region by carrying
out the US-Taiwan-Japan alignment clearly aimed at containing Beijing, the 55th anniversary of
the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and India last year witnessed a major
milestone for the two ancient civilizations, neighbours, for entering into a bilateral and a
potentially revolutionary "strategic partnership for peace and prosperity" on April 11, 2005.
Like all kinds of bilateral relationships, strategic partnerships are not static, but dynamic
processes that can be reversed. Therefore, it should be expected that Sino-Indian agreements
will last forever or grow linearly, at a time of the US unilateral behavior and continuous military
power display, however, these partnerships may consolidate in the near future. [21] It is
because they only want to increase their energy and technology acquisition capabilities,
creating conditions for a rapid accumulation of power.
[22]
However, in order to rise as a great power, India needs more than economic assets and a
strong military; "infusions of the US technology and investments in infrastructure," as former
7 / 15

Indian envoy Lalit Mansingh told the press on July 14, are necessary for India to "become a
major global player." These Indian needs
along with concerns over the Indian Ocean's security
form the context that led New Delhi on June 29 to sign a 10-year defence agreement with
Washington.
[23]
However, the US fundamental interests in developing better relations with India are the
necessary containment of China, and New Delhi's help in the war against militant Islamic
groups
a need that is growing stronger due to the unstable political landscape in Pakistan.
[24]
The US would also like India's navy to serve as a bulwark against China as Beijing becomes
more active in the Indian Ocean.
Indian Navy may be asked to operate its vessels more frequently alongside the US Navy in
Asia. The purpose of these joint operations would essentially be military and the US wants India
to also sign up for the Proliferation Security Initiative. [25] Mr. Tellis's report had predicted that
a nuclear deal would "increase [India's] enthusiasm for taking part in counter-proliferation
activity in the Indian Ocean."
[26]
The joint statement though makes no direct mention of such cooperation yet it speaks of a new
"US-India Disaster Relief Initiative that builds on the experience of the Tsunami core group,"
with the real purpose of this initiative revealed by the apparently inappropriate sub-heading
under which it finds mention: For Non-Proliferation and Security.'
[27]
Also, there are some areas where the US Navy cannot operate, such as the Malacca Straits,
where India's presence might be seen as less threatening than that of the US. [28]
The US and India have signed a 10-year agreement to strengthen defence ties between the
two countries, ushering in a new era that reflects common principles and shared national
interests. [29]
Prior to the July 18, 2005 meeting between the US President George W. Bush and India's
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, a senior official commented that the two parties would talk
about "whatever is on their minds"; apparently, this turned out to be a lot. Some pursuits, such
8 / 15

as a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, did not come to fruition. Still, India
made major gains in one area of particular note: access to dual-use technology. Nuclear
technology will lift India's masses to a higher level of electricity and convenience. Rocket
technology will offer India's space program a giant leap forward.
[30]
India and the United States finally reached an unprecedented agreement on 2 nd March, 2006
that would provide the US nuclear power assistance to India while allowing the country to
substantially step up its nuclear weapons production.
[31]
What it entails is that India has agreed to take steps that will bring it into the international
non-proliferation mainstream. This includes placing its civilian nuclear facilities and programs
under IAEA safeguards, and also harmonizing its export control lists with those of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime.
However, though this deal is said to be of civilian use in nature yet the same equipment and
technology has another possible dual function: serving as a means to build a better bomb or a
longer range missile. India and the United States have charted a course toward transforming
India into a "major world power in the 21st century." While the joint US-India statement issued
on July 18 represents a significant step forward in strategic bilateral relations, it presents an
equally significant step backward in non-proliferation norms. [32] Though the National Security
Advisor, Stephen Hadley in a White House press briefing, said that:
What this means is that India, which has had a good record in safeguarding technology, but
has largely stood out from outside the global non-proliferation arrangements, is moving
inside those arran-gements. It is adopting practices and procedures, export controls and other
safeguards that are much more in line with the international community's efforts to police
proliferation and avoid proliferation.
The opening of civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India is very much in
our interest and India's interest; it's part of a new strategic relationship between India. But it has
also been the vehicle, to bring India under the same kind of set of international norms and
procedures that we all abide by. [33]
As of April 2005, India passed its Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems
(Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Bill to cover activities of its nationals, whether domestic or
[34] India continues its pursuit of technology to advance its nuclear and rocketry programs forward. The United States, for its part,
abroad.
9 / 15

has chosen to tread into the supplier territory that it once admonished Russia for entering.
[35]
One may well ask whether India has taken the
steps necessary to merit concessions in the domain of the "grand bargain" of signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.). India remains outside of the N.P.T., as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
[36]
Simultaneously to ponder about the US geo-interests in the region and the deal based relationship more it is pertinent to know that on July 5, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization issued a request for the United States to set a deadline for the withdrawal of American military personnel from the region. [37]
Though US
officials, rejected the request citing bilateral agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, yet the request seemed to confirm that US prestige in Central Asia is eroding and that Russia and China are teaming up to undermine US strategic position which is putting Washington on the defensive.
Moscow earlier played host to a June 22-23, 2005 gathering of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) states, where participants signed agreements providing for the deployment of a unified air defence system and the establishment of rapid reaction forces in Central Asia. [38]
Russian President Vladimir Putin
used the CSTO summit to criticize the US-led anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan, characterizing it as "very ineffective" and pointed out that Taliban insurgents remain active in Afghanistan and the country has again developed into a drug-trafficking hub.
[39]
Putin in his seventh state of the nation address since taking power in 2000 warned that the US-Russian arms race is not over and called for a strengthening of his nation's nuclear and conventional forces so Moscow can better resist foreign pressure. [40]
According to President Putin, Russia's military would work to strengthen both its nuclear deterrent and its conventional forces but without repeating "the mistakes of the Soviet Union and of the Cold War" by draining the country's resources, and said that his government would soon commission two nuclear submarines
equipped with the first new intercontinental ballistic missiles developed in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union and that land-based strategic forces soon would get their first unit of mobile Topol-M missiles.
[41]
Putin said that Russia's current defense research was focused on the development of modern
submarines, aircraft and high-precision weapons and warheads "whose trajectory could not be predicted by a potential enemy", and
added that the new weaponry would allow Russia to play a role in maintaining the strategic balance of forces in the world.
[42]
Analysts saw the speech as a signal to the West that Russia would not back down from promoting its interests abroad. Nikolai Petrov, a political analyst with the Moscow Carnegie Center commented:
"What we saw was a declaration that Russia is coming back as a global power and will pursue an aggressive foreign policy and it was clear that Putin sees the US as his major opponent." [43]
Strategic Appraisal
The technological advances have a significant impact on national power and on regional and international security, and can improve a states defence capabilities, so are not necessarily strategically stabilizing. They can undermine existing deterrence relationships or spur arms races between states. Indeed while military or
scientific organizations within a country may seek new military systems that they do not perceive to be destabilizing, such systems can be combined with technologies acquired by other organizations to have negative strategic implications. [44]
10 / 15

India is developing its nuclear forces after 1998 in somewhat more focused way and could field a technologically superior force over the next decade, which may not be strategically stabilizing, prudent decisions will be needed to prevent new technologies from destabilizing critical regional deterrent relationship. [45]
In a region faced with a variety of security concerns, it is important to understand the concern that drive strategic decision making and contribute to increased or decreased stability. [46]
The greatest concern from the stand point of stability is the issue of asymmetry in weapons capabilities , so in the US, decisions must
be made on the degree to which dialogue and cooperation to with countries in the region on these strategic and crisis management issues is in the long term interest of stability and non proliferation.
[47]
Although there is interest in not endorsing or enco-uraging the un-clear development in the region, the consequences of ignoring the stability concerns are equally high.
What, if anything, can be done to ameliorate the prevailing conditions in the region, the United States may have to adopt a more calibrated policy towards the region. [48]
nuclear stability in the region and maintain the global nuclear non use taboo.
Such calibration entails making available a range of technologies and processes to the two antagonists of the region to enable them to promote
[49]
There has been increased scepticism from nuclear experts and some members of Congress who are worried about the proliferation of nuclear technology US boosting India's nuclear weapons program while US have expressed concern that the deal, although limited to civilian sales, might indirectly aid India's weapons
program,
[50]
spurring an Asian arms race and encouraging other countries to seek exemptions from restrictions on nuclear trade. Some lawmakers said that they would consider modifications to ensure the deal did not allow India to expand its weapons program.
Jimmy Carter opines that during the past five years the United States has abandoned many of the nuclear arms control agreements negotiated since the administration of Dwight Eisenhower. The proposed nuclear deal with India is just one more step in opening a Pandora's Box of nuclear proliferation and so is a very
dangerous deal. He is very candid in his statement that knowing for more than three decades of Indian leaders' nuclear ambitions, I and all other presidents included them in a consistent policy: no sales of civilian nuclear technology or uncontrolled fuel to any country that refused to sign the NPT. [51]
According to
former President Jimmy Carter:
There was some fanfare in announcing that India plans to import eight nuclear reactors by 2012, and that the US companies might win two of those reactor contracts, but this is a minuscule benefit compared with the potential costs. India may be a special case, but reasonable restraints are necessary. The five original
nuclear powers have all stopped producing fissile material for weapons, and India should make the same pledge to cap its stockpile of nuclear bomb ingredients. Instead, the proposal for India would allow enough fissile material for as many as 50 weapons a year, far exceeding what is believed to be its current capacity.
So far India has only rudimentary technology for uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, and Congress should preclude the sale of such technology to India. Former senator Sam Nunn said that the current agreement "certainly does not curb in any way the proliferation of weapons-grade nuclear material." India
should also join other nuclear powers in signing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
[52]
Even under international rules, such sales are prohibited because India, which possesses a nuclear weapons arsenal, has refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the key international agreement preventing the spread of technology and materials that can be used to build weapons.
The Bush administration proposed, before the July 18th agreement, that India should stop producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Indians rejected that proposal and the Bush administration decided not to press it. So it's always been anticipated that India would go forward at certain reactors and continue
producing plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.
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Under the terms of the agreement, the US companies would be permitted to sell civilian nuclear power technology to India in return for India permitting international inspections of some of its civilian nuclear facilities. But facilities used for weapons production would remain off-limits. Indian officials have made clear that India
alone will decide which future reactors will be kept in the military category and exempt from any safeguards. All in all, 14 of Indias 22 nuclear facilities would be opened, but the precise terms of the agreement have not been finalized, and lawmakers, therefore, are particularly concerned that the safeguards in the agreement
Bush brought back from New Delhi appear to be weaker than expected, raising fears that India could build more nuclear warheads with minimal international monitoring.
Joseph Cirincione opines that the deal with India directly violates the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as several major US laws. But the so-called realists in the foreign policy establishments dismiss proliferation concerns, focusing instead on the need to forge strong ties with India. [53]
Whereas a special
legislation introduced in the US Congress to implement the deal by allowing India-specific waivers to US non-proliferation laws has met with a frosty reception from key members of the SFRC and their counterparts in the house of representatives international relations committee (HRIC).
[54]
But the administration is all up its way of finalizing it to an extent that Secretary Rice warned at the televised Congress hearings that if the deal fails to go through all the hostility and suspicion of the past would be redoubled.
[55]
The deal had not only opened a new market for American power reactor producers as well as those from other countries and would give the booming Indian economy a source of desperately needed energy, as well as recognition as a legitimate nuclear power.
The consequences, however, could be severe. Regionally, it could ignite a new nuclear arms race. Pakistan will not stand idly by, nor will China. [56]
What will Japan do, a country that signed the NPT, but now sees India reaping the benefits of standing outside the treaty?
Globally, the deal cripples the main diplomatic and legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. The United States is now trying to restrain the Iranian program by relying on the very treaty it has just weakened with the India deal. [57]
It is obvious that the US wants to draw closer to India because it fits well into larger geo-political designs: as a naval power in the Indian Ocean, a counterweight to China and simply as a good friend in that part of the world. The relationship with India is a strategic priority, says George Perkovich, author of "Indias Nuclear
Bomb". The President wants it. They are not going to trade an important relationship with a reliable India for a Pakistan that is a teetering mess."
[58]
Conclusion
The international community, rather than resisting the deal as a blow off to the NPT and further destabilizing the already unstable region has sided with the International Atomic Energy Agency and hailed the landmark Indo-US nuclear deal, with major powers including Britain and France saying the agreement would benefit
the non-proliferation regime. They totally ignore Article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which currently obliges the United States not to help a state's military nuclear efforts in any way if that state did not have a bomb before 1968. That's the rules. Violate them, as the United States is proposing to do by giving India
access to foreign uranium, settle for the meager nonproliferation commitments India has offered so far, and the nuclear rules will only be weakened even further. Probably they are all looking forward to exploiting the trade benefits on the similar lines in their own areas of influence.
Pakistan may be America's wartime ally but it is India that offers the prospect of long-term friendship. India's relationship with Washington has acquired a real depth; it has become strategic and not just tactical, like that of Pakistan. In the words of Lalit Mansing, Ambassador of India to the US, "stronger India-US relations
are an in escapable imperative for the future." [59] The emergence of terrorism as a major security threat to the United States created a situation where the primary national security interests of the two countries converged for fostering stability.
President Musharraf in his adress to the nation on 19 th September 2001 said, let us look at our neighbours. They have promised the US all cooperation. They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state. The cause effect of this warning was to get the country do whatever was required and possible to balance
against its adversary, India. This new realist pretext of becoming a vital US ally in a global war on terrorism seems to have failed. This is not the first time that the USA brought forward and used Pakistan as a frontline state and parted ways soon after the completion of their goals under the highlighted weight of altered
international conditions and irretrievable strategic divergences. So what good has brought Pakistan today again being party with Americans? The nuclear deal with India and empty promises to Pakistan?
The question is not only looking and searching for regional or extra-regional reliable partnership options but also that when our leadership will come out of the American Godfather influence? The questions obviously reflect the strategic culture of Pakistan and does explain that Pakistanis will work day and night to develop
responses and countervailing strategies to ensure even to the godfather that India alone is not the only emerging power of the region.
At the same time, when both the United States and India are formulating new approaches for dealing with a growing China and radical Islamic threat, the countries of Pakistan, China and Russia have valuable opportunities and reasons for enhanced cooperation. It is high time for the two to explore further the venues of
mutually beneficial strategic endeavours. It is in the better interest of the country to devote more resources for the national security programs of strategic importance particularly whose importance has tried to be jeopardised by this deal; secondly foreign policy should be completely overhauled to cater for the strategic
partnership needs of the country. A greater attention towards China, Russia, EU and in particular towards Middle East may help the country overcome its security and energy needs.
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Mainville, Michael. "Putin: Arms Race with US Not Over." THE WASHINGTON TIMES , 10 May 2006.
Mansingh, Surjit. "Commentary - India and the Us: A Closer Strategic Relationship?" Economic and political weekly 40, no. 22 (2005): 2221 (4 pages).
Mistry, Dinshaw. "Military Technology, National Power, and Regional Security: The Strategic Significance of India's Nuclear, Missile, Space, and Missile Defense Forces." In South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma : India, Pakistan, and China edited by Lowell Dittmer: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.
Novosti, RIA. 10 May 2006. Russia to Bolster Nuclear Forces. In, ISN SECURITY WATCH, www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID= 15796. (accessed 13 May, 2006).
Perkovich, George. "Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal." In Carnegie Nonproliferation/South Asia : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2005.
Rice, Condoleezza. Promoting the National Interest. Foreign Affairs 79, no. January-February (2000): pp 45-63.
Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul. "India and Pakistan: Nuclear-Related Programs and Aspirations at Sea." In South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China , edited by Lowell Dittmer: M.E. Sharpe, 2005.
Saalman, Lora. 05 August 2005. The Implications of the US-India Strategic Partnership. In, PINR, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_ report&report_id=341. (accessed 10 May, 2006).
Tellis, Ashley J. India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States . Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005.
VandeHei, Jim, and Dafna Linzer. "US, India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation
with Fuel Imports Allowed, Arms Program Could Grow." Washington Post 3 March, 2006 3 March, 2006, Page A01.
Varadarajan, Siddharth. "The Truth Behind the Indo-US Nuclear Deal." The Hindu July 29, 2005.
13 / 15

Weinstein, Michael A. 15 December 2004. Testing the Currents of Multipolarity. In, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report &report_id=246. (accessed 10 May, 2006).
White House Press Briefing with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley (as Released by the White House). In Federal News Service : Federal News Service, March 2, 2006 Thursday.
Wolfe, Adam, Yevgeny Bendersky, and Dr. Federico Bordonaro. 20 July 2005. India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power. In, PINR, http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report& report_id=330. (accessed 10 May, 2006).
[1]
Ashok Kapur, Regional Security Structures in Asia (Richmond: Curzon, 2002).
[2]
Ibid.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
George Perkovich, "Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal," in Carnegie Nonproliferation/South Asia (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2005).
[5]
Condoleezza Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," Foreign Affairs 79, No. January-February (2000).
[6]
Sidsharth Varadarajan, The truth behind the Indo-US nuclear deal, The Hindu, July 29, 2005
[7]
Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
[8]
Michael A. Weinstein, Testing the Currents of Multipolarity (15 December 2004 [cited 10 May 2006]); available from http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_ report&report_id=246.
[9]
Ibid.
[10] Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee said on May 31 that the naval base INS Kadamba in Karwar, Karnataka state will protect the country's Arabian Sea maritime routes. Kadamba will become India's third operational naval base, after Mumbai and Visakhapatnam. Six frontline Indian naval ships, including
frigates and destroyers, took part in the commissioning. Kadamba extends over 11,200 acres of land, along a 26-km stretch of sea front, and it will be the first base exclusively controlled by India's navy. Eleven ships can be berthed at Kadamba once the first phase of it is achieved; 22 ships after the second phase of
construction will be completed around 2007, according to INS Kadamba's first Commanding Officer Commodore K.P. Ramachandran as reported in the international media. Moreover, the new harbor is designed to berth ultimately 42 ships and submarines once completed. For details see: Adam Wolfe, Yevgeny Bendersky,
and Dr. Federico Bordonaro,
India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power (PINR, 10 May 2006 20 July 2005 [cited 10 May 2006]); available from http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_ report&report_id=330.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001).
[13]
Ibid.
[14]
Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, "India and Pakistan: Nuclear-Related Programs and Aspirations at Sea," in South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Dr. Federico Bordonaro, Great and Medium Powers in the Age of Unipolarity (PINR, 11 May 2005 [cited 10 May 2006]); available from http://www.pinr.com/ report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=297.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Surjit Mansingh, "Commentary - India and the US: A Closer Strategic Relationship?," Economic and political weekly 40, no. 22 (2005).
[21]
Bordonaro, Great and Medium Powers in the Age of Unipolarity.
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
Wolfe, Bendersky, and Bordonaro, India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Siddharth Varadarajan, "The Truth Behind the Indo-US Nuclear Deal," The Hindu July 29, 2005.
[26]
Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States.
[27]
Varadarajan, "The Truth Behind the Indo-US Nuclear Deal."
[28]
Wolfe, Bendersky, and Bordonaro, India's Project Seabird and the Indian Ocean's Balance of Power.
[29]
Anwar Iqbal, "Us, India Sign 10-Year Pact," Dawn 30 June 2005.
[30]
Lora Saalman, The Implications of the US-India Strategic Partnership (PINR, 10 May 2006 05 August 2005 [cited 10 May 2006]); available from http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=341.
[31]
Jim VandeHei and Dafna Linzer, "US, India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation
with Fuel Imports Allowed, Arms Program Could Grow," Washington Post 3 March, 2006 3 March, 2006.
14 / 15

[32]
Saalman, The Implications of the US-India Strategic Partnership.
[33]
White House Press Briefing with National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley (as Released by the White House), in Federal News Service (Federal News Service, March 2, 2006 Thursday).
[34]
Saalman, The Implications of the US-India Strategic Partnership.
[35]
Ibid.
[36]
Ibid.
[37]
Sergei Blagov, The Geopolitical Balance in Central Asia Tilts toward Russia (Eurasianet 11 May 2006 6 July, 2005 [cited 11 May 2006]); available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070605a.shtml.
[38]
Ibid.
[39]
Ibid.
[40]
Michael Mainville, "Putin: Arms Race with US Not Over," THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 10 May 2006.
[41]
Ibid.
[42]
RIA Novosti, Russia to Bolster Nuclear Forces (ISN SECURITY WATCH, 10 May 2006 [cited 13 May 2006]); available from www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm ?ID=15796.
[43]
Mainville, "Putin: Arms Race with US Not Over."
[44]
Dinshaw Mistry, "Military Technology, National Power, and Regional Security: The Strategic Significance of India's Nuclear, Missile, Space, and Missile Defense Forces," in South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China ed. Lowell Dittmer (M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
[45]
Ibid.
[46]
Sumit Ganguly and Kent L. Biringer, "Nuclear Crisis Stability in South Asia," in South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China, ed. Lowell Dittmer (M.E. Sharpe 2005).
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
Ibid.
[49]
Ibid.
[50] The deal endorses and assists Indias nuclear weapons program. US-supplied uranium fuel would free up Indias limited uranium reserves for fuel that would be burned in these reactors to make nuclear weapons. This would allow India to increase its production from the estimated 6 to 10 additional nuclear bombs
per year to several dozen per year. India today has enough separated plutonium for 75 to 110 nuclear weapons, though it is not known how many it has actually produced. For details see Cirincione in Carnegie analysis.
[51]
Jimmy Carter, "A Dangerous Deal with India," Washington Post March 29, 2006.
[52]
Ibid.
[53]
Joseph Cirincione, Oh Canada! (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 March 2006 2006 [cited 13 March 2006]).
[54]
Prawful Bidwai, Indo-Us Nuclear Deal Takes Flak, No Eject Option (April 8, 2006 [cited 12 May 2006]); available from http://www.antiwar.com/bidwai/?articleid=8826.
[55]
Ibid.
[56] Australia and China had already signed a

nuclear safeguards agreement on 3 April 2006 that will allow Australian
to export uranium to China on nuclear transfer and nuclear cooperation.
This Nuclear deal would lead to exports of 20,000 tonnes of uranium to
China each year, doubling Australia's current uranium exports. The deal
promises to be a sizable boon for Australia's uranium
industry.
[57]
Cirincione, Oh Canada!
[58]
Perkovich, "Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal."
[59]
Raj Bothra, ed., India-US Relations in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001 (American Association of Physicians from India (AAPI), 2002, pp 1-9).
15 / 15

The Geopolitical Dimensions of Indo Us Nuclear Deal

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Policy Perspectives , Vlm 3, No.2

Geopolitical Landscape and the Regional Security Structures