Consolidated

Republic of the Philippines vs.
Salem Investment Corporation

Facts:
On 17 February 1983, Batas Pambansa 340 was passed authorizing the expropriation of parcels of lands in the names of Maria del Carmen Roxas de Elizalde and Concepcion Cabarrus Vda.
de Santos, including a portion of the land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, belonging to Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama covered by TCT 16913. On 14 December 1988, or 5 years
thereafter, Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama entered into a contract with Alfredo Guerrero whereby the De la Ramas agreed to sell to Guerrero the entire property covered by TCT 16213,
consisting of 4,075 square meters for the amount of P11,800,000.00. The De la Ramas received the sum of P2,200,000.00 as partial payment of the purchase price, the balance thereof to be
paid upon release of the title by the Philippine Veterans Bank. On 3 November 1989, Guerrero filed in the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City a complaint for specific performance (Civil Case
6974-P) to compel the De la Ramas to proceed with the sale. On 10 July 1990, while the case was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed the case (Civil Case 7327) for expropriation
pursuant to BP 340. Among the defendants named in the complaint were Milagros and Inocentes De la Rama as registered owners of Lot 834, a portion of which (Lot 834-A) was part of the
expropriated property. Upon the deposit of P12,970,350.00 representing 10% of the approximate market value of the subject lands, a writ of possession was issued on 29 August 1990 in favor
of the government. On 2 May 1991, Guerrero filed a motion for intervention alleging that the De la Ramas had agreed to sell to him the entire Lot 834 on 14 December 1988 and that a case for
specific performance had been filed by him against the De la Ramas. On 9 September 1991, the trial court approved payment to the De la Ramas at the rate of P23,976.00 per square meter for
the taking of 920 square meters out of the 1,380 square meters. Meanwhile, on 18 September 1991, the trial court rendered a decision in the case for specific performance upholding the
validity of the contract to sell and ordering the De la Ramas to execute the corresponding deed of sale covering the subject property in favor of Guerrero. The De la Ramas appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV-35116) but their petition was dismissed on 28 July 1992. They tried to appeal to the Supreme Court (GR 106488) but again they failed in their bid as their
petition for review was denied on 7 December 1992. Meanwhile, on 2 October 1991, Guerrero filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the just compensation for the land be deposited in court
pursuant to Rule 67, 9 of the Rules of Court. As his motion for intervention and omnibus motion had not yet been resolved, Guerrero filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus,
certiorari, and injunction with temporary restraining order (CA-GR SP 28311) to enjoin the Republic from releasing or paying to the De la Ramas any amount corresponding to the payment of
the expropriated property and to compel the trial court to resolve his two motions. On 12 January 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writ of mandamus. Nonetheless,
the De la Ramas filed on 17 March 1993 a Motion for Authority to Withdraw the deposit made by the Republic in 1991, which was denied on 7 May 1993. On 16 June 1993, the De la Ramas
filed a Motion for Execution again praying that the court's order dated 9 September 1991, approving the recommendation of the appraisal committee, be enforced. On 22 June 1993, the trial
court denied the motion of the De la Ramas holding that there had been a change in the situation of the parties, therefore, making the execution of 9 September 1991 Order inequitable,
impossible, or unjust. Thus, with the decision in the action for specific performance in Civil Case 6974-P having become final, an order of execution was issued by the Pasay City RTC, and as
a result of which, a deed of absolute sale was executed by the Branch Clerk of Court on 8 March 1994 in favor of Guerrero upon payment by him of the sum of P8,808,000.00 on 11 January
1994 and the further sum of P1,608,900.00 on 1 February 1994 as full payment for the balance of the purchase price under the contract to sell. The entire amount was withdrawn and duly
received by the De la Ramas. Thereafter, the De la Ramas sought the nullification of the 22 June 1993 order of the trial by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of Appeals.
This petition was, however, dismissed in a decision dated 29 July 1994 of the appellate court. Finally, on 5 April 1995, the Pasay City Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, declared Guerrero the
rightful owner of the 920-square meter expropriated property and ordered payment to him of just compensation for the taking of the land. This decision was subsequently affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. The De la Ramas filed a petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the legal interest should be 6% or 12%
Held:
The decision dated 18 September 1991 has long become final and executory. The decision therein ordered the De la Ramas to pay Guerrero, among others, the legal interest of the amount of
P2,200,000.00 from 2 August 1989 until the deed of absolute sale is executed in favor of Guerrero. Specifically, the court therein rationalized that (1) the legal rate of interest for damages, and
even for loans where interest was not stipulated, is 6% per annum (Article 2209, Civil Code); that (2) the rate of 12% per annum was established by the Monetary Board when, under the power
vested in it by PD 116 to amend Act 2655 (more commonly known as the Anti Usury Law), it amended Section 1 by increasing the rate of legal interest for loans, renewals and forbearance
thereof, as well as for judgments, from 6% per annum to 12% per annum; and that (3) inasmuch as the Monetary Board may not repeal or amend the Civil Code, in the face of the apparent
conflict between Article 2209 and Act 2655 as amended, the ruling of the Monetary Board applies only to banks, financing companies, pawnshops and intermediaries performing quasibanking functions, all of which are under the control and supervision of the Central Bank and of the Monetary Board. Thus, the court held therein that (1) the interest rate on the P2,200,000.00
paid to the de la Ramas by Guerrero at the inception of the transactions should be only 6% per annum from 2 August 1989, and as of 2 January 1994 this amounts to the sum of P583,000.00
and P11,000.00 every month thereafter until the deed of absolute sale over the property subject matter of this case is executed; that (2) the amounts payable by the de la Ramas to Guerrero
therefore stands at a total of P1,383,000.00. Offsetting this amount from the balance of P8,800,000.00, Guerrero must still pay to the de la Ramas the sum of P7,417,000.00; and that (3) since
Guerrero has already deposited with the Clerk of Court of the court the sum of P5,808,100.00 as of 11 January 1994; he should add to this the sum of Pl,608,900.00. The De la Ramas can no
longer question a judgment which has already become final and executory. Hence, they are already barred from questioning it in a proceeding before the Supreme Court.
Note: this case enunciated how expropriation should be initiated. SC ruled as follows:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxx
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property passes
to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered owner.
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.
https://z-1-lookaside.fbsbx.com/file/Consolidated.docx?tokentCtxvWTnADfp8OdMuMjc8UF9Z8j_mDm2f-JBB3C-fn7k1G-0SQ
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 1 of 33
Estate of Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

GR 137285, 23, June 2000
Facts:
On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation
proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008 square
meters, is registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said trial court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the
right of PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the said order was sought by the Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that said lot would only be
transferred to a private corporation, Philippine Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. In an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order
dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise agreement provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its
appeal from the Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez
agrees to waive, quitclaim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present. (2) That the
parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by
TCT No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However,
instead of being paid the just compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree that they will abide by
the terms of the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court of Appeals remanded
the case to the trial court for the approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the
Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the compromise agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered
owner of the covering TCT T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March 1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993." In the Order
dated 4 August 1997, the trial court annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the Estate. Disagreeing
with the said Order of the trial court, respondent PEZA moved for its reconsideration, which was denied in an order dated 3 November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the
instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-A that should be surrendered and returned to the
Estate. On 27 November 1997, PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997
of the trial court. Acting on the petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998, partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court regarding "the
peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot 1406- B" and instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination
of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate sought reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the appellate court in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the
Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of public use.
Held:
This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the
authority to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not
subject said order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by the Estate of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was
expropriated. This is evident from paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered by TCT T-113498 of
the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal clear from the contents
of the agreement that the parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to the Estate. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with
the issue of payment such that failure to pay by PEZA will also nullify the right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned
in the agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Since the compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406B and that the same was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by former President Ferdinand
Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for the
construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto." The authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in deciding for what public use the expropriated property
would be utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public purposes were even
reaffirmed by Republic Act 7916, a law amending PEZA's original charter. As reiterated in various case, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as
broad as "public welfare."
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 2 of 33
Expropriation Small property Owners
| January 29, 2001

City of Mandaluyong, petitioner
s.
v
GR. No. 137152
Aguilar, respondents
Nature of Case:
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the decision of the RTC dismissing amended complaint in SCA No. 1427 for expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in
Mandaluyong City.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the RTC decision.
Facts
Antonio, Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, and Rodolfo N. Aguilar, constructed residential houses several decades ago on a portion of the 3 lots located at 9 de Febrero
Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong. The Aguilars had since leased out these houses to tenants until the present. On the vacant portion of the lots, other
families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied. In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land reform under Proclamation 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos. As a result
of this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from the Aguilars, but the latter refused to sell.
On 7 November 1996, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaluyong, upon petition of the Kapit bisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the subject land, adopted
Resolution 516, Series of 1996 authorizing Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots and construction
of a medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of the land. On 10 January 1996, Mayor Abalos allegedly sent a letter to the Aguilars offering to purchase the said
property at P3,000.00 per square meter. On 4 August 1997, the City filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City a complaint for expropriation,
seeking to expropriate 3 adjoining parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,847 square meters in the names of the Aguilars, and praying that the fixing of just
compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter. In their answer, the Aguilars, except Eusebio who died in 1995, denied having received a copy of
Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. The prosecution filed motion for suspension of the accused public officials, and finding that said accused were charged under a
valid information, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending the said public officials from their respective public positions, or from any
other public office that they may be holding.
They alleged that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; that the subject lots are their only real property and are too small
for expropriation, while the City has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; and that the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because
the zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, the Aguilars prayed for damages of P21 million. On 5
November 1997, the City filed an Amended Complaint and named as an additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio Aguilar with
his heirs. The City also excluded from expropriation TCT N59870 and thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two (2) parcels
totaling 1,636 square meters. The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on 18 December 1997. On 17 September 1998, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the Amended Complaint after declaring the Aguilars as "small property owners" whose land is exempt from expropriation under Republic Act 7279.
The court also found that the expropriation was not for a public purpose for the City's failure to present any evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are
landless and homeless residents of Mandaluyong. The City moved for reconsideration. On 29 December 1998, the court denied the motion. The City filed a petition for
review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
(a) Whether the City has exhausted all means to acquire the land under the hands of private persons, but which is within the Areas for Priority Development (APD).
SUPREME COURT RULING
Presidential Decree (PD) 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then President Marcos in1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human communities
from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for public welfare.
Pursuant to this law, Proclamation 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the entire
Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This was amended in 1980 by Proclamation 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation 2284 which identified and
specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the
law. Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 7279, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered
or abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites
which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately- owned lands. Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate
from the other provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of RA 7279. Thus, lands for socialized housing under RA 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. Among these
modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture agreement; (7)
negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted;
and (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be made subject to the modes and conditions set
forth in the next provision. In other words, land that lies within the APD may be acquired only in the modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10. Herein, the City claims that it
had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for socialized housing under RA 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing under said law. It,
however, did not state with particularity whether it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law states
"expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted."
The City alleged only one mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. The City, through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from the Aguilars but the latter refused to sell.
As to the other modes of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution 516, Series of 1996 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the
expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking,
donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the law.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 3 of 33
Doctrine:
Power of Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 142304
June 20, 2001
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

vs.
OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA, ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents.
Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated November 16, 1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000, of the Court of Appeals reversing the order, dated December 15,
1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila and perpetually enjoining it from proceeding with the petitioner's complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282.
Facts:
On 21 December 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila's First District in Tondo, covered by TCTs 70869,
105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters, and was in the name of Feliza de Guia. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo
De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia, in turn one of the heirs of Feliza de Guia. On 29 July 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT 217018 was
issued. The property was subsequently sold on 24 January 1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT 226048 was issued. On 26 September 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint
for expropriation (Civil Case 94-72282) with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCTs 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201,
105202, and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. On 12 November 1997, the Serranos filed a
consolidated answer, praying the exemption of Lot 1-C from expropriation. Upon motion by the City, the trial court issued an order, dated 9 October 1998, directing the City to deposit the
amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After the City had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated 15 December 1998, directing the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City. The Serranos filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On 16 November 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
holding that although Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of RA
7279, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in 59-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation, and thus enjoined the City from
expropriating Lot 1-C. In its resolution, dated 23 February 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 44 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) denied two motions for
reconsideration filed by the City. The City filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA 7279, 9-10 have been complied with.
Held:
Rule 67, 2 provides that "Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession
of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of
the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall
be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly
submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties." Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation
sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. Herein, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the
writ of possession. The distinction between the Filstream and the present case is that in the former, the judgment in that case had already become final while herein, the trial court has not gone
beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. Whether the City has
complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of
this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings
consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just
compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 4 of 33
Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001]
Facts:
Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino, South Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586, TCT T-22121 of the Registry
of Deeds, South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981, Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a
24,660 square meter portion thereof. De Onorio's husband agreed to the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the government for the area taken after the processing of
documents by the Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA then paid De Onorio the amount of P4,180.00
as Right-of-Way damages. De Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for damages to crops and improvements which
she suffered as a result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property. The same year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement (financial
assistance) pursuant to Executive Order 1035, 18. De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of her property, but Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De Onorio filed on 10
December 1990 a complaint against Eslaban before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her
property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs. Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the property of De
Onorio and that NIA paid a certain landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban interposed the defense that:
(1) the government had not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for it irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters; and (3) that De Onorio was not
entitled to compensation for the taking of her property considering that she secured title over the property by virtue of a homestead patent under Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October 1993,
the trial court rendered a decision, ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation for the questioned area of
24,660 square meters of land owned by De Onorio and taken by the NIA which used it for its main canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993, the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals which,
on 31 October 2000, affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA filed the petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the valuation of just compensation is determined at the time the property was taken or at the time the complaint for expropriation is filed.
Held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deeds and the
corresponding certificate and owner's duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as conclusive and
indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings. The only servitude which a private
property owner is required to recognize in favor of the government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government canal or lateral thereof where
the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the registration of the land in
order that the registered owner may be compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has been registered under the
Land Registration Act, proper expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation paid to the registered owner thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on 6 October 1981, several years after the property had been registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been filed
and just compensation
paid to the owner thereof before it could be taken for public use. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it
is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received therefor." Further, just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, there are instances where the expropriating agency takes over
the property prior to the expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of eminent domain. The value
of the property, thus, must be determined either as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 5 of 33
Basis of Valuation for Just Compensation

Section 19 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code)
CITY OF CEBU vs. SPOUSES DEDAMO
The City of Cebu, petitioner,
vs.
Spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo, respondent
G.R. No. 142971
May 7, 2002
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13 of Cebu City.
FACTS:
The City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondent spouses on 17 September 1993. The petitioner alleged that the property will be used for the construction of a public
road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. Based on the
amended assessment submitted by three commissioners (appointed by the parties and the court), the trial court fixed the amount of P20,826,339.50 for just compensation.
Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation based on the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994. Instead, according to the
City of Cebu, just compensation should be determined as of the date of filing of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
RTC: Directed petitioner to pay respondents just compensation which was computed based on the value of the property at the actual time of taking.
CA: Decision of RTC is AFFIRMED in toto.
SC: Decision of CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No. Applicable law is Section 19 of RA 7160 which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.
The petitioner misread the ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. CA. The High Court did not categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. It is explicitly stated in the decision that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the
complaint, the rule admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment on the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 6 of 33
Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

Vs.
City of Manila
Brief:
Before us are the following consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes: a petition for review of the decision] of the Court of Appeals dated
January 27, 1998 which ordered the condemnation of petitioners properties and reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9, dated October 3, 1995 dismissing the
complaint of respondent City of Manila (City) for expropriation, and a petition for certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a resolution
dated August 19, 1998 which issued a temporary restraining order against the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, not to (disturb) the occupancy of Dr. Rosario Abiog, one of
the members of SBMI, until the Supreme Court has decided the Petition for Review on Certiorari and a resolution dated December 16, 1998 enjoining petitioners from disturbing the physical
possession of all the properties subject of the expropriation proceedings.
Facts:
The records show that Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square
meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and
leased by different tenants, among whom are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). Petitioners leased to
respondent Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters[7] and to respondent Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the
same consolidation plan, with an area of 112 square meters.[8]
On November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina
Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said respondents. In Civil Case No. 142851-CV, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, rendered a decision dated May 9, 1994 against respondent Abiog. In Civil Case No. 144205-CV, the MTC of Manila, Branch 3, issued
judgment dated May 4, 1995 against respondent Maglonso.
Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the same were deniedby the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to
the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in 1998.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against respondents Abiog and Maglonso, respondent City filed on April 25, 1995 a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation)
of the properties of petitioners at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso and
members of respondent SBMI.
The complaint alleged that, on March 10, 1995, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties for
P10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. Respondent City prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on the current tax
declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the deposit with the trial court of the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid value.
On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties (including as well as representing herein respondents Abiog and
Maglonso), filed a motion for intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for injunction. Respondent SBMI alleged that it had a legal interest over the subject matter of
the litigation as its members were the lawful beneficiaries of the subject matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting the
occupants of the subject properties. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an order dated June 2, 1995 on the ground that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote,
conjectual (sic), consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that may or may not be granted.
Issue of the Case:
Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the manner there property were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.
Actions of the Court:
Trial Court
The Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed.The trial court held that expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners were in fact willing to sell the subject properties
under terms acceptable to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for reconsideration was denied.
CA
The Orders appealed from are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the lower court to determine specifically the amount of just compensation.
SC
The petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 132431, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 137146, the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated August 19, 1998 and December 16, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Court Rationale:
The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the present case. In Filstream V. CA, the court held that the Sections 9&10 of the Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the
exercise to the power of eminent domain, especially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same.
Private lands rank last in order of priority for purposes of socialize housing . In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 7 of 33
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of often times helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when
their property is forcible taken from them from public use. Herein, the city failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements with the requirements of Section 9&10 of RA 7279. The city
neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the CA , the city in its pleadings failed to show its
compliance with the law. The CA was likewise on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the Reyeses.
NHA vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo

National Housing Authority, petitioner
vs.
HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO, COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ISAIAS DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, and PASCUAL Y.
ABORDO, Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City,respondents
GR No. 154411
June 19, 2003
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Nature of the Case:
Petition for review
Brief:
Petitioner filed a petition for review to annul the Writ of Execution of expropriating the properties of the respondents (to be used for a socialized housing project) because the just
compensation is unconscionable and cannot afford by the beneficiaries. SC denied the petition.
Facts:
Petitioner NHA filed with the RTC of Cebu City an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Engracia Urot and the Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo for the
purpose of developing a socialized housing project. The Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that they were waiving their objections to petitioner's power to expropriate
their properties. The Court then declared that the petitioner has the right to expropriate the properties of the defendants and appointed commisioners to determine a just compensation. The
commisioners recommended that the just compensation of the subject properties be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter. The trial court rendered Partial Judgment adopting the
recommendation. Both parties filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the just compensation has no basis and support. But both motions were denied by the RTC but it granted
petitioner's prayer for the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19 for expropriation. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, the trial court issued an Entry of Judgment over the
partial judgment as modified by the Omnibus Order. Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for Execution which was granted. CA on the other hand, dismissed the petition for certiorari
filed by petitioner on the ground that the Partial Judgment and Omnibus Order became final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal the same. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for a Clarificatory Ruling were also denied.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to dismiss complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the
unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries can not afford which was denied. The same was also denied upon filing it to the CA. Sheriff
served on petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued by RTC to enforce the Partial Judgment and the Omnibus Order. Respondent sheriff served on the Landbank a
Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of petitioner.
Thus this petition for review.
Actions of the Court
RTC: Denied
CA: Denied
SC: Denied
Issues:
1. Whether the State can be compelled and coerced by the Courts to exercise or continue with the exercise of its inherent power of eminent domain.
2. Whether Writs of Execution and Garnishment may be issued against the State in an expropriation wherein the exercise of the power of eminent domain will not serve public use or
purpose.
Ruling:
1. Yes. The state can be compelled and coerced by the court to continue exercise its inherent power of eminent domain since the NHA does not exercise its right to appeal in the
expropriation proceeding before the court has rendered the case final and executory. Respondent landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation case. Petitioner cannot
be permitted to institute condemnation proceedings against respondents only to abandon it later when it finds the amount of just compensation unacceptable.
2. Yes. Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled corporations and non-corporate agency as in this
case NHA, although considered public in character, are not exempt from garnishment. Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from garnishment or
execution. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief to restrain respondent from enforcing the Notice of Levy and Garnishment against its funds and properties must, therefore, be denied.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 8 of 33
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in affirming the trial courts Order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss the expropriation proceedings is AFFIRMED. Petitioners prayer for injunctive relief against the levy and garnishment of its funds and personal properties is DENIED. The Temporary
Restraining Order dated is LIFTED.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

G.R. No. 146733
January 13, 2004
FACTS:
This case is a consolidated petition of one seeking review of the decision of CA modifying the decision of RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, and another for mandamus to compel the
RTC to issue a writ of execution and to direct Judge Caspillo to inhibit. Feliciano F. Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 hectare land. Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform for P14.9 million. DAR offered P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco
rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary
administrative proceeding. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the
property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries. On April 13, 1993, Wycoco filed the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City
against DAR and LBP. On March 9, 1994, the DARAB dismissed the case on its hand to give way to the determination of just compensation by the RTC. Meanwhile, DAR and LBP filed their
respective answered that the valuation of Wycocos property was in accordance with law and that the latter failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not participating in the summary
administrative proceedings before the DARAB which has primary jurisdiction over determination of land valuation. On November 14, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present evidence in support of the land valuation in as much as it is of public knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold in
Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at P142,500.00
per hectare or a total of P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest. The DAR and the LBP filed separate petitions before the Court of
Appeals. The petition brought by DAR on jurisdictional and procedural issues was dismissed. This prompted Wycoco to file a petition for mandamus before this Court praying that the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City be executed, and that Judge Caspillo be compelled to inhibit himself from hearing the case. The petition brought by LBP on both substantive
and procedural grounds was likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals modified its decision by deducting from the compensation due to Wycoco the amount
corresponding to the 3.3672 hectare portion of the 94.1690 hectare land which was found to have been previously sold by Wycoco to the Republic. LBP contended that the Court of Appeals
erred in its ruling.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case acting as Special Agrarian Court.
2. Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, whether or not the compensation arrived at supported by evidence.
3. Whether or not Wycoco can compel DAR to purchase the entire land.
4. Whether or not the awards of interest and damages for unrealized profits is valid.
HELD:
1. Yes, the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court, acquired jurisdiction of the case. Sections 50 and 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988) provides:
Section 50.Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Section 57.Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act.
2. No, the compensation arrived is not supported by evidence. In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of
agricultural lands without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 3. Judicial Notice. When Hearing
Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if
such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. The trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis. Only
the market value was taken into account in determining the just compensation. Since other factors were not considered, thecase was remanded for determination of just compensation.
3. No, the DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The power to determine whether a parcel of land may come within the coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately 10 hectare portion of the
entire land which was found to be not suitable for agriculture is no justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole area.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 9 of 33
4. Yes, Wycocos claim for payment of interest is partly meritorious. The trust account opened as the mode of payment of just compensation should be converted to a deposit account. The
conversion should be retroactive in application in order to rectify the error committed by the DAR in opening a trust account and to grant the landowners the benefits concomitant to payment
in cash or LBP bonds. Otherwise, petitioners right to payment of just and valid compensation for the expropriation of his property would be violated. The interest earnings accruing on the
deposit account of landowners would suffice to compensate them pending payment of just compensation.
The award of actual damages for unrealized profits should be deleted because Wycoco failed to show proof of loss. Wycocos petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 146733 was dismissed. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, acting as Special Agrarian Court cannot be enforced because there is a need to remand the case to the trial court for determination of
just compensation. Likewise, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo was denied for lack of basis.
Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

Vs.
City of Manila
Brief:
Before us are the following consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes and Edmundo Reyes: a petition for review of the decision] of the Court of Appeals dated
January 27, 1998 which ordered the condemnation of petitioners properties and reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9, dated October 3, 1995 dismissing the
complaint of respondent City of Manila (City) for expropriation, and a petition for certiorari alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a resolution
dated August 19, 1998 which issued a temporary restraining order against the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, not to (disturb) the occupancy of Dr. Rosario Abiog, one of
the members of SBMI, until the Supreme Court has decided the Petition for Review on Certiorari and a resolution dated December 16, 1998 enjoining petitioners from disturbing the physical
possession of all the properties subject of the expropriation proceedings.
Facts:
The records show that Jose B. L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes are the pro-indiviso co-owners in equal proportion of 11 parcels of land with a total area of 13,940 square
meters situated at Sta. Cruz District, Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24359 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila. These parcels of land are being occupied and
leased by different tenants, among whom are respondents Abiog, Maglonso and members of respondent Sampaguita Bisig ng Magkakapitbahay, Incorporated (SBMI). Petitioners leased to
respondent Abiog Lot 2-E, Block 3007 of the consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Psd- 328345, with an area of 191 square meters[7] and to respondent Maglonso, Lot 2-R, Block 2996 of the
same consolidation plan, with an area of 112 square meters.[8]
On November 9, 1993 and May 26, 1994, respectively, Jose B.L. Reyes and petitioners Heirs of Edmundo Reyes filed ejectment complaints against respondents Rosario Abiog and Angelina
Maglonso, among others. Upon his death, Jose B.L. Reyes was substituted by his heirs. Petitioners obtained favorable judgments against said respondents. In Civil Case No. 142851-CV, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila, Branch 10, rendered a decision dated May 9, 1994 against respondent Abiog. In Civil Case No. 144205-CV, the MTC of Manila, Branch 3, issued
judgment dated May 4, 1995 against respondent Maglonso.
Respondents Abiog and Maglonso appealed the MTC decisions but the same were deniedby the RTC of Manila, Branch 28, and the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, respectively. Their appeals to
the Court of Appeals were likewise denied. As no appeals were further taken, the judgments of eviction against respondents Abiog and Maglonso became final and executory in 1998.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the two ejectment cases against respondents Abiog and Maglonso, respondent City filed on April 25, 1995 a complaint for eminent domain (expropriation)
of the properties of petitioners at the RTC of Manila, Branch 9. The properties sought to be acquired by the City included parcels of land occupied by respondents Abiog, Maglonso and
members of respondent SBMI.
The complaint alleged that, on March 10, 1995, respondent City thru City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre, Jr. sent the petitioners a written offer to purchase the subject properties for
P10,285,293.38 but the same was rejected. Respondent City prayed that an order be issued fixing the provisional value of the property in the amount of P9,684,380 based on the current tax
declaration of the real properties and that it be authorized to enter and take possession thereof upon the deposit with the trial court of the amount of P1,452,657 or 15% of the aforesaid value.
On May 15, 1995, respondent SBMI, a registered non-stock corporation composed of the residents of the subject properties (including as well as representing herein respondents Abiog and
Maglonso), filed a motion for intervention and admission of their attached complaint with prayer for injunction. Respondent SBMI alleged that it had a legal interest over the subject matter of
the litigation as its members were the lawful beneficiaries of the subject matter of the case. It prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the petitioners from ousting the
occupants of the subject properties. The trial court denied the motion for intervention in an order dated June 2, 1995 on the ground that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote,
conjectual (sic), consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right that may or may not be granted.
Issue of the Case:
Whether there is violation of due process against the Reyeses in the manner there property were expropriated and condemned in favor of the City of Manila.
Actions of the Court:
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 10 of 33
Trial Court
The Citys complaint for eminent domain was dismissed.The trial court held that expropriation was inappropriate because herein petitioners were in fact willing to sell the subject properties
under terms acceptable to the purchaser. Moreover, respondent City failed to show that its offer was rejected by petitioners. Respondent Citys motion for reconsideration was denied.
CA
The Orders appealed from are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the lower court to determine specifically the amount of just compensation.
SC
The petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 132431, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 27, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In G.R. No. 137146, the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated August 19, 1998 and December 16, 1998 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
Court Rationale:
The Filstream case is substantially similar in facts and issues to the present case. In Filstream V. CA, the court held that the Sections 9&10 of the Republic Act 7279 are limitations to the
exercise to the power of eminent domain, especially with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquire the same.
Private lands rank last in order of priority for purposes of socialize housing . In the same vein, expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only after the other modes of acquisition have
been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of often times helpless owners of private property against violation of due process when
their property is forcible taken from them from public use. Herein, the city failed to prove strict compliance with the requirements with the requirements of Section 9&10 of RA 7279. The city
neither alleged in its complaint nor proved during the proceedings before the trial court that it complied with said requirements. Even in the CA , the city in its pleadings failed to show its
compliance with the law. The CA was likewise on this specific jurisdictional issue. This is a clear violation of the right to due process of the Reyeses.
Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
GR 106804,
12 August 2004
Ponente: Carpio, J
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review before the Supreme Court
BRIEF
This is a petition for review of the 30 March 1992 Decision and 14 August 1992 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No. 16930. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No. T552.
FACTS
Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide.NPC is
authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located
in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709.
NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances:
First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.
Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property. On 23 October 1979, the trial court
ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this
first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions
of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.
Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition.
NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092. NPC immediately deposited
P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the
5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the
lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages.
Issue: Whether NPC had taken the entire property of Pobre and must pay just compensation for the whole property considered part of the expropriation instituted by NPC.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Yes. Issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. RTC issued its Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration.
The trial court found the following badges of NPC's bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five years to pass before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation case; (2) NPC did not act on
Pobre's plea for NPC to eliminate or at least reduce the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out Pobre's Property for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other
properties which were not affected in their entirety by NPC's operation.
The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450 for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest this valuation. Since NPC was
in bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics to prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on the P3,448,450 from 6 September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded
Pobre attorney's fees of P150,000.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 11 of 33
CA: Yes. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the appellate court deleted the award of attorney's fees because Pobre did not properly plead for it. The Court
of Appeals denied NPC's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August 1992.
SC: NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner
because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resortsubdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter
Property.
In United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed
complete. Such taking is thus compensable.
In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand
payment of just compensation. This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
n this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute
expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just
compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the
provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPC's taking of Pobre's
property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process.
From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobre's entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation
of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious
to Pobre's repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.
Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National
Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporation's payment of the full
amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate
and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000, respectively. No costs.
EMINENT DOMAIN
Republic of the Philippines v. Lim
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendant-appellant
vs.
VICENTE LIM, plaintiff-appellee
G.R. No. 161656
June 29, 2005
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez
NATURE OF THE CASE
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 12 of 33
Petition for Review

BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the ruling of Regional Trial Court denying contention of the petitioner Republic that it has
retained the ownership the contended lot despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation.
FACTS
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu involving Lots 932 and 939
of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of
13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14,
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. On September 6,
1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos- Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI
an action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property.
On November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the
phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of
the Republics failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of
sale in favour of the Republic.
They appealed the CFIs decision to the SC. The latter held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just compensation by
the Republic.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976 and the Title was issued in his name.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against the petitioner.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to
possession.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and sustained the RTC Decision. CA assailed that This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or
more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss.
Petitioner, through the OSG, filed with the SC alleging that the Republic has remained the owner of Lot 932.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
ACTION of the COURTS

RTC: Rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff-appellee
CA: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED in toto. Petitioner is MR is DENIED with FINALITY.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to
ours, where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio
Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the peoples right, will not stand still in the face of the Republics oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case.
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in
cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right
to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment.
To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 13 of 33

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
The Republics motion for reconsideration is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed.
The exercise by local government units of the Power of Eminent Domain

G.R. No. 155746
October 13, 2004
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners,

vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Cebu, and the CITY OF CEBU, respondent.
Nature of Case:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City upholding the validity of the City of Cebus Ordinance No. 1843, as well as
the lower courts order dated August 26, 2002 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 14 of 33
FACTS
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale
of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary
to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for
politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of the land owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws
RTC: Petition dismissed.
SC: Constrained to nullify the subject ordinance.
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative
acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics
supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the
City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain
is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must
be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 15 of 33
AIR TRANSPORATION OFFICE vs GOPUCO

(Power of Eminent Domain)
G.R. No. 158563, June 30, 2005
Second Division
Chico-Nazario,J
Nature of the Case: Instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction on the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I
Brief:
Respondent issued Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" to the petitioner of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties
amounting to P5,140.31.
FACTS:
Respondent Apolonio Gopuco, Jr. was the owner of a lot located in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City.
National Airport Corporation (NAC) informed the owners of the various lots surrounding the Lahug Airport that the government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.
Some owners agreed to sell their lands with the assurance that they would be able to repurchase the same when these would no longer be used by the airport. Respondent refused to do
so.
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), formerly NAC filed a complaint with CFI of Cebu for for the expropriation of Lot No. 72 and its neighboring realties. The complaint was
granted by the CFI who ordered the ff:
. Declared the expropriation is justified and in lawful exercise of the right of //eminent domain.
2. Declaring a balance of P1,990 in favor of Apolonio Go Puco, Jr. with legal interest from November 16, 1947 until fully paid;
3. Ordering the landowners to deliver the TCTs and transfer the ownership to the petitioner.
No appeal was taken so the decision of the CFI becomes final and executory, hence, the title was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.
Upon opening of the Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA), the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by Pres. Cory.
Gopuco wrote to the Bureau of Air Transportation seeking the return of his lot and offering to return the money previously receive.
RA 6958 was enacted transferring the assets of the Lahug Airport to MCIAA.
Respondent filed an amended complaint for recovery of ownership of his lot against the Air Transportation Office considering that the original purpose for which the property was
expropriated had ceased or otherwise been abandoned. He also alleged that they were assured that the expropriated lots would be resold to them for the same price in the event that the
Lahug Airport would be abandoned.
ISSUE: WON the private property expropriated for a particular public use be returned to its former owner when that particular public use is abandoned?
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: The complaint is DISMISSED and ordered the herein respondent to pay the MCIAA exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.
Court of Appeals: REVERSED the decision. The petitioners were ordered to reconvey Lot No. 72 to Gopuco upon payment of the reasonable price and deleted the award to the petitioners of
exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.
Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

Supreme Court: The decision of the CA is REVERSED.
RATIONALE:
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 16 of 33
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the
nature of a forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as expropriation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist;
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner. In the present case,
Gopuco failed to present any evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in his favour, neither he is not a party to the compromise agreements, thus, he cannot legally invoke the same.
Valid and Definite Offer - Eminent Domain
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., vs MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, respondent.
G.R. No. 152230
August 9, 2005
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review of CA decision and resolution
BRIEF
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA and its Resolution, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed the order of the RTC of Pasig, Branch
160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property.
FACTS
On April 1993, ordinance was approved by Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire a portion of the property of Ching
Cuancos and appropriate its fund.
Municipality filed a complaint against Ching Cuancos for expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code). Municipality alleged that
it notified Ching Cuancos, by letter, of its intention to purchase the portion of their property for public use as an access road but they refused to sell the portion.
Ching Cuangcos claimed that they had sold the property to JILCSFI since February 1993. It was purchased for the purpose of constructing a school building and a church as worship center.
ISSUES of the CASE
(1) whether the respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the
complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be used for public purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites for an easement for
right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may be dispensed with.
RTC: declared Municipality (now City) of Pasig has the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject property
CA: denied motion for reconsideration, affirmed RTC order
SC: granted Petition. The Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the
refiling thereof.
COURT RATIONALE
Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope
It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent
domain appertains to every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the
taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution
provides that [p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against the
arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the
fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 17 of 33
(a) The offer to buy private property for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be executed and payment forthwith made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the purpose of reaching an
agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the sanggunian duly chosen as its
representative, shall participate in the conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to pay for the purchase
of the property involved.
It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement. Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement will result in the
dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed
for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action.
In the present case, the only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the
signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. It is merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a conference to discuss
the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to both parties and not a valid and definite offer.
Public Necessity
The contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship and a school
for its members is rejected. It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public use to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use
to which the resources of the individual may be devoted for whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use.
The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under
the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken
unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. Government may
not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular
inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process. An ocular inspection is part of the
trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no
probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must be rejected.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss
the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling thereof.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 18 of 33
Republic v. Gingoyon GR 166429, 19 December 2005

Facts:
This case is a motion for reconsideration for a previous decision of the SC. In the assailed decision of the SC, it ruled that PIATCO should be justly compensated before the Government can
take over the NAIA Terminal 3. Now, the Government is arguing that PIATCO should not be paid because it has pending obligations with Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka)
and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) Corporation for services rendered by the said corporations in building the Terminal. It argues that the said corporations still has pending liens on the Terminal.
The situation the Republic now faces is that if any part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO, and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations
directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished,
and PIATCO on the other hand, ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets gratuitously.
Issue:
Should the Government pay PIATCO just compensation before taking over the Terminal?
Held:
Yes.
The Court is wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. Certainly, whatever claims or purported
liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 have not been judicially established. Neither Takenaka norAsahikosan are parties to the present action, and thus have not
presented any claim which could be acted upon by this Court. The earlier adjudications in Aganv. PIATCO made no mention of either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no
declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is indeed any right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the
courts of the land.
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that PIATCO, as builder of the facilities, must first be justly
compensated in accordance with law and equity for the Government to take over the facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in its 19 December 2005 Decision.
While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by a London court in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this
foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its
promulgation is not yet conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. It is likewise
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such obligations, yet unproven, could serve to overturn the
Decision mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02 Billion Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the facilities. This directive enjoining payment is
in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974, and under the mechanism established by the law the amount to be initially paid is that which is provisionally determined as just compensation. The
provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.
There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating to the airport facilities may be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such
claims involve factual issues, they must first be established by the appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded any respect by or binding force on this Court.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 19 of 33
Masikip v. City of Pasig G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be expressly provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the sports development and recreational activities of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there
was genuine necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in
government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional
limitations. LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor
and landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property
There is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The
records show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (NIA) vs. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 20 of 33
GR NO. 185125, 15 JANUARY 2012

Facts:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the RTC of Kabacan a complaint for
Expropriation of a portion of 3 parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 sqm. For its Malitubog-Marigado irrigation project. The committee formed by the RTC pegged the fair market
value of the land at Php 65.00 per sqm. It also added to its computation the value of the soil excavated from portions of the 2 lots. RTC adopted the findings of the committee despite the
objections of NIA to the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land. NIA, through Office of the SolGen, appealed to the CA which affirmed with
modifications the RTCs decision. CA deleted the value of the soil in determination of compensation but affirmed RTCs valuation of the improvements made on the properties.
Issue:
Whether the excavated soil should be included in computation of just compensation
Ruling:
Petition denied.
There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the RTC did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil
has no value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the owner of the land actually loses. Such value
could only be that which prevailed at the time of the taking.
In NAPOCOR vs. Ibrahim, the SC held that rights over lands are indivisible. The conclusion is drawn for Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides: The owner of the land is the owner of
its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject
to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. Thus, ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
Hence, CA correctly modified the RTCs decision when it ruled it is preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the value of land but also for the soil excavated from such land
when such excavation is necessary phase in the building of the irrigation projects. The NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment and is of no concern to the owner of the
landowner who has been paid the fair market of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. To sanction the payment of
the excavated soil is to allow the landowners to recover more than the value of the land at the time of the taking, which is the true measure of the damages, or just compensation, and would
discourage the construction of important public improvements.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 21 of 33
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner

vs.
MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO, represented by VICENTE, HERMINIA and FRANCISCO, all surnamed SAN PEDRO, respondents
G.R. No. 170945
September 26, 2006
Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the Court is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 72860, and its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
FACTS
Under Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose Transmission Line and Tower, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for an easement of right
of way over her property, Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and covered by Tax
Declaration.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then processed. However, the NPC Board of Directors approved Board
Resolution No. 97-2468 stating that it would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the agricultural portion
On January 15, 1998, the NPC filed a complaint for eminent domain in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). During the pre-trial on January 25, 1999, the parties agreed that the only issue for
resolution was the just compensation for the property. The court appointed a committee of commissioners to ascertain and recommend to the trial court the just compensation for the properties,
composed of Atty. Josephine L. Sineneng-Baltazar, the Clerk of Court, as chairperson; and Engr. Oscar C. Cruz, Provincial Assessor of Bulacan, and Atty. Henry P. Alog of the Litigation
Department of NPC to serve as members-commissioners thereof
ISSUE (Police Power-related)
Whether ruling of RTC and CA based on the majority report [on the subject property's just compensation] is exorbitant and devoid of factual and legal basis
Whether petitioner shall pay only an easement fee to respondent's heirs
ACTIONS of the Court
RTC:
Rendered judgment declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz [Lot 2076 (agricultural) @ P499/sqm;
residential portion of property @ P800/sqm].
CA: Dismissed the appeal of NPC and ruled that the July 12, 1999 majority report [recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz] was based on uncontroverted facts, supported by
documentary evidence and confirmed by the commissioners' ocular inspection of the subject properties
SC: Appeal is denied and ruling of CA is affirmed.
COURT RATIONALE
In the Majority Report [recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz], the commissioners found that the property was located in a highly-developed area and was accessible through an allweather road. The lone fact that there was no available sales data on properties within the vicinity of respondent's land for 1996 and 1997 and that the BIR zonal value was P60.00 per sq m for
residential and P30.00 per sq m for agricultural did not proscribe the commissioners and the trial court from making their own reasonable estimates of just compensation, after considering all
the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities.
Conformably with the rulings of this Court, the majority report took into account the most profitable likely use of the remaining area; and the size, shape, accessibility, as well as listings of
other properties within the vicinity.
The easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary use and makes the instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72860 is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 22 of 33
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some portions of their properties. Attached to the complaint is was Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of
Mandaluyong, which was created to appraise the properties that would be affected by the construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted their report dated January 8, 1998,
and recommended the fair market value of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m., the Commissioners took into consideration the following factors:
property location, identification[,] neighborhood data, community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the gross negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming the amount fixed by the trial court based on the report of the board of commissioners.
HELD:
There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to reconsider the assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the reglementary period. These procedural devices (reconsideration
and appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted plain, speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in the CA Decision. Petitions must be filed within
60 days. In the present case, the Petition was filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. The request was predicated on the
conclusion that the "compensation costs as recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in the above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that the "move
will hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the proceedings and stop the running of interest. The more critical issue is the determination of the amount of just compensation for
the expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers that the values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported by sufficient evidence. Leca, alleges that the
fair market value ascribed to its property was not sufficient. As both the Republic and Leca correctly pointed out, however, the Commissioners' Report relied heavily on newspaper
advertisements of offers of sale of properties in the vicinity. It must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner Leca is distinct and separate from and will in no way affect the settled rights
and interests of the other parties that did not appeal the judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper
determination of the amount of just compensation
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 23 of 33
Eminent Domain: Concept of Determination of Just Compensation

REPUBLIC (DPWH), petitioner vs.
ISMAEL ANDAYA, respondent
GR No. 160656
June 15, 2007
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
BRIEF:
This is an appeal for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 33 for the enforcement of
easement of right of way.
FACTS:
The Republic or State is enforcing its power by issuing a writ of possession on the property of Ismael Andaya for the easement of right of way (60 meter limit). The easement is for planned
construction of concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project.
Both parties, appealed the expropriation proceedings to CA. The petitioner contested the awards of severance damages and attorneys fees while Andaya is demanding for just compensation
for his entire property because the taking of easement would rendered the remaining property as unusable and uninhabitable.
ISSUE:
Whether Andaya is entitled to just compensation for the remaining area of his property not subject to easement of right of way.
YES, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more or less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also
when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.
Using this standard of taking, there is no doubt that there was also taking of the remaining area of Andayas property. The Board observed and the court affirmed that the nature and effect of
the floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the property and turn into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from
the Agusan River.
The Constitution states, that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation case, an essential element of due process is that there must be
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Section 9, Article III of the Constitution mandates, that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Although the State needs only 10 meter easement equivalent to 701 square meters, it is also settled that the State should not be liable for the 3,742 sqm. , which constitute the difference
between tis area of 701 sqm and the 4,443 sqm to which it is fully entitled to use as easement, free of charge under Section 112 of the Public Land Act.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the decision of the RTC of Butuan City is AFFIRMED with modification. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for the
determination of the final just compensation of 5,937 sq. meters with interest of 6% per annum from the date of writ of possession or actual taking until fully paid.
G.R. No. 161219
October 6, 2008
MARINDUQUE MINING AND INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION and INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the 27 February 2003 Decision and 17 November 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72402. In its 27 February 2003
4
5
Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders of Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte,
Branch 1, Iligan City (trial court), and ordered the trial court to give due course to respondent National Power Corporation's (NAPOCOR) appeal. In its 17 November 2003 Resolution, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation and Industrial Enterprises, Inc. (petitioners).
The Facts
6
On 1 June 1999, NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners for the construction of the AGUS VI Kauswagan 69 KV Transmission Line Project. NAPOCOR sought to
expropriate 7,875 square meters of petitioners' property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-955 and T-956.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim and alleged that the expropriation should cover not only 7,875 square meters but the entire parcel of land. Petitioners claimed that the
expropriation would render the remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for whatever purpose.
9
10
In its 5 December 2001 Decision, the trial court fixed the fair market value of the 7,875-square meter lot at P115 per square meter. The trial court also directed the commissioners to submit a
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 24 of 33
report and determine the fair market value of the "dangling area," consisting of 58,484 square meters, affected by the installation of NAPOCOR's transmission lines.
11
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 4 February 2002, the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion.
12
In its 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision, the trial court declared that the "dangling area" consisted of 48,848.87 square meters and fixed its fair market value at P65 per square meter. The
trial court ruled that petitioners are entitled to consequential damages because NAPOCOR's expropriation impaired the value of the "dangling area" and deprived petitioners of the ordinary use
of their property.
13
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated 24 June 2002, the trial court denied the motion for being moot and academic because on 2 April 2002, NAPOCOR filed a
14
Notice of Appeal of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision.
On the other hand, petitioners moved for the execution of the trial court's 5 December 2001 Decision and 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision. In its 26 April 2002 Order, the trial court
partially granted petitioners' motion and, on 2 May 2002, issued the writ of execution for the 5 December 2001 Decision.
On 29 April 2002, petitioners filed a "motion to strike out or declare as not filed the notice of appeal dated April 2, 2002; to declare the supplemental decision as final and executory; and to
15
issue the corresponding writ of execution thereon." Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR violated Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court because NAPOCOR filed and served the notice of
appeal by registered mail. According to petitioners, NAPOCOR had all the vehicles and manpower to personally serve and file the notice of appeal.
NAPOCOR opposed petitioners' motion and alleged that its legal office is "severely undermanned" with only one vehicle and one employee, acting as secretary, handling 300 active cases in
Mindanao. NAPOCOR also added that it was highly irregular for petitioners to question its mode of service and filing only at this stage of the proceedings because since the inception of the
case, NAPOCOR had resorted to registered mail instead of personal service.
In its 15 May 2002 Order, the trial court granted petitioners' motion and denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal. The trial court gave more credence to petitioners' allegations and declared that
NAPOCOR's explanation was a "patent violation" of the Rules. The trial court considered the notice of appeal as not filed at all and, since the period of appeal had already expired, declared its
19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision final and executory.
16
NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 June 2002 Order, the trial court denied NAPOCOR's motion.
On 23 August 2002, NAPOCOR filed a special civil action for certiorari with a prayer for a temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. NAPOCOR argued that the trial court
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused its discretion when it denied NAPOCOR's notice of appeal of the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision on the sole ground that it
was not filed and served personally.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its 27 February 2003 Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in NAPOCOR's favor and set aside the trial court's 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders. The Court of Appeals also ordered the
trial court to give due course to NAPOCOR's appeal. The Court of Appeals declared that the trial court acted whimsically and capriciously when it denied the notice of appeal and declared the
19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision final and executory. The Court of Appeals noted that service by registered mail was previously resorted to by both parties and yet, this was the first time
petitioners questioned NAPOCOR's mode of service. The Court of Appeals added that the trial court should have given due course to NAPOCOR's appeal because of the large amount of
public funds involved considering the significant disparity between the area sought to be expropriated and the "dangling area." The Court of Appeals also said that the Rules should be liberally
construed to effect substantial justice.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 17 November 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the trial court's issuance of the 15 May 2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders was attended with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision is not final and executory.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On NAPOCOR's failure to comply with Section 11,
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
Petitioners maintain that the trial court had the "wide latitude of discretion" to consider the notice of appeal as not filed at all because NAPOCOR failed to comply with the Rules.
On the other hand, NAPOCOR argues that the Rules allow resort to other modes of service and filing as long as the pleading was accompanied by a written explanation why service or filing
was not done personally. NAPOCOR maintains that it complied with the Rules because the notice of appeal contained an explanation why NAPOCOR resorted to service and filing by
17
registered mail - due to lack of manpower to effect personal service. NAPOCOR also insists that petitioners are estopped from questioning its mode of service and filing because since the
inception of the case, NAPOCOR had resorted to registered mail and yet, petitioners only raised this issue when the notice of appeal was filed.
Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules, personal service of pleadings and other papers is the general rule while resort to the other modes of service and filing is the exception. When recourse
18
is made to the other modes, a written explanation why service or filing was not done personally becomes indispensable. If no explanation is offered to justify resorting to the other modes, the
discretionary power of the court to expunge the pleading comes into play.
19
20
In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, we ruled:

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and theprima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.
21
In this case, NAPOCOR complied with the Rules. NAPOCOR's notice of appeal sufficiently explained why the notice of appeal was served and filed by registered mail - due to lack of
22
manpower to effect personal service. This explanation is acceptable for it satisfactorily shows why personal service was not practicable. Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly considered
the importance of the issue involved in the case. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the 15 May
2002 and 24 June 2002 Orders.
On NAPOCOR's failure to file a record on appeal
Petitioners maintain that NAPOCOR's appeal should be dismissed because NAPOCOR failed to file a record on appeal and consequently, it failed to comply with the material data rule.
23
NAPOCOR argues that in this case the filing of a record on appeal is "superfluous" because the trial court had nothing else to resolve as the 19 March 2002 Supplemental Decision finally
disposed of the case. Moreover, NAPOCOR states that petitioners only raised this issue in petitioners' comment before the Court of Appeals.
24
No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or the Rules of Court so require. The reason for multiple
25
appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a
record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the
jurisdiction of the trial court.
26
Jurisprudence recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint for expropriation because there are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first stage is concerned with the
27
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The order of
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 25 of 33
28
expropriation may be appealed by any party by filing a record on appeal. The second stage is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property
29
30
sought to be expropriated. A second and separate appeal may be taken from this order fixing the just compensation.
In this case, since the trial court fully and finally resolved all conceivable issues in the complaint for expropriation, there was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal. In its 5
December 2001 Decision, the trial court already determined NAPOCOR's authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and fixed the just compensation for the property sought to be
expropriated. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration. But after the trial court denied the motion, NAPOCOR did not appeal the decision anymore. Then, in its 19 March 2002
Supplemental Decision, the trial court fixed the just compensation for the "dangling area." NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration and the trial court denied the motion. NAPOCOR then
filed a notice of appeal. At this stage, the trial court had no more issues to resolve and there was no reason why the original records of the case must remain with the trial court. Therefore, there
was no need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal because the original records could already be sent to the appellate court.
Moreover, petitioners did not raise this issue in their "motion to strike out or declare as not filed the notice of appeal dated April 2, 2002; to declare the supplemental decision as final and
executory; and to issue the corresponding writ of execution thereon" before the trial court. It is settled that an issue not raised during the trial could not be raised for the first
time on appeal as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
31
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 February 2003 Decision and 17 November 2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72402.
SO ORDERED.
Expropriation - Unlawful Detainer
GR. No. 189239
| November 24, 2010
Spouses Abad, petitioner

vs.
Fil-Homes Realty, respondents
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on the decision of the Court of Appeals for revoking and setting aside the RTCs decision and reinstating with modification the MeTCs decision.
Dispositive: The Supreme Court dismissed denied the petition for review.
Facts
Fil-Homes filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners. Respondent alleged that since 1980, they have made demands for petitioners to vacate, but they
went unheeded. Petitioners countered that there is no possession by tolerance for they have been in adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the lots for
more than 30 years; and that respondents predecessor-in-interest, Pilipinas Development Corporation, had no title to the lots. During the pendency of the case, the city
of Paranaque filed a case of expropriation. A writ of possession was granted to the city.
The respondent won in the unlawful detainer case, but the RTC reversed the ruling upon appeal reasoning that there was no "tolerance" on the part of Respondents. On
appeal of the Respondents to the CA, it upheld the decision of the MeTC. Thus, the current petition.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
(a) Whether the petitioner can claim any rights over the lots on the basis of the issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings by the City.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 26 of 33

MeTC
Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants Leticia and Ervin Abad et. als. Ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them
to VACATE andSURRENDER possession of the premises.
RTC
- Reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint.

Petition is devoid of merit.
As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage
in expropriation.
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the
issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property
owners the final just compensation.
There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City's possession of the lots respecting petitioners claim that they have been named
beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so.
Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the basis of the ordinance. Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that
they are automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they can be considered to be beneficiaries.
Doctrine:
Power of Eminent Domain
G.R. No. 156684
April 6, 2011
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents
Brief:
The petitioners appeal the adverse decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 and resolution promulgated on January 17, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the
order issued in their favor on February 19, 2002 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 214, in Mandaluyong City (RTC). Thereby, the CA upheld Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, adopted by
the City of Mandaluyong (City) authorizing its then City Mayor to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the parcel of land registered in the names of the petitioners.
Facts:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of
their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families. Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of income.
On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the
necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
The petitioners became alarmed and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and
without force and effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making
a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature.
Issue:
Held:
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. In this regard,
Section 19 of The Local Government Code clearly provides, viz:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in
Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, a case in which the Municipality of Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled
so:
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 27 of 33
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed "through the law conferring the power
or in other legislations." In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
"Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose,
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power
of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government
fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first
requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent
domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which had provided that a mere resolution
would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for expropriation was filed,
explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a
resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the
Sanggunian members.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress
did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "
[l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from
this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language from
"resolution" under BP 337 to "ordinance" under RA 7160 demands a strict construction. "No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the
Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation."
Verily, there can be no prohibition against a procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is
20
made to secure the prompt adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating
21
the taking of private land intended for public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of
eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the
remedy of prohibition become available.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners property
was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the filing of a verified
complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the petitioners as the
owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of eminent domain.
Stages in Action for Expropriation
Proper Remedy (Certiorari vs Ordinary Appeal)
REPUBLIC vs. LEGASPI
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES), petitioner,
vs.
RODOLFO L. LEGASPI, SR., QUEROBIN L. LEGASPI, OFELIA LEGASPI-MUELA, PURISIMA LEGASPI VDA. DE MONDEJAR, VICENTE LEGASPI, RODOLGO LEGASPI II, and
SPOUSES ROSALINA LIBO-ON and DOMINADOR LIBO-ON, respondents
G.R. No. 177611
April 18, 2012
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review Under Rule 45
BRIEF:
This is an appeal assailing the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals denying for lack of merit the Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, thru the University of the
Philippines Visayas (UPV), for the nullification of the orders issued by the RTC.
FACTS:
In December 1978, Rosalina Libo-on sold her property to the UPV which the latter immediately took possession in line with its educational development plan and stated building therein road
networks, infrastructure, and school facilities. However, Rosalina informed UPV that she is rescinding the sale of the property because she is no longer the owner of said property having
conveyed the same thru barter to the other respondents herein on September 1978. Said property was already subdivided and separately registered under the name of Legaspi, et al.
UPV thereafter filed a complaint for eminent domain against Legaspi et al. after efforts to negotiate with respondents failed. The RTC issued an order of condemnation on 3 out of the 10
parcels of land in upholding the right to expropriate of UPV. An order fixing the just compensation was subsequently issued by the RTC on the 3 expropriated properties. The condemnation
proceedings continued for the other 7 parcels of land.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 28 of 33
On November 2003, the RTC issued a condemnation order the last 7 properties EXCLUDING the area occupied by Villa Marina Beach (VMB). UPV filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that the exclusion of VMB area from the condemned lots if bereft of legal basis and contrary to the evidence presented in the case. Om the other hand, the respondents also filed their
MR alleging that the 7 lots ordered for expropriation are occupied by VMB. The RTC then issued the order denying the MR of petitioner herein and granted the manifestation of the
respondents thereby denying expropriation of the 7 properties.
UPV filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 before the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedures, the proper remedy from the assailed orders was an ordinary appeal which, once lost, cannot be substituted by a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether an ordinary appeal, under Rule 67, can be substituted by a Rule 65 petition and mandamus.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT

RTC: Dismissed the complaint for eminent domain based on MR filed by respondents.
CA: Denied petition under Rule 65.
SC: Decision of CA was REVERSED, Order of RTC NULLIFIED and remanded case to RTC for proper resolution.
Governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings for expropriation consist of two stages: (1) condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a
public purpose or public use; and (2) determination of just compensation.
In the case at bench, the RTC split the determination of UPVs right of expropriation over the ten lots. Without any appeal having been perfected on the 3 lots subjected for expropriation, the
RTC order attained finality and left no more question as to the propriety of the acquisition of said lots for public purpose. Accordingly, the RTC correctly went on to issue the order fixing the
just compensation.
Although certiorari cannot be generally used as a substitute for a lapsed appeal, the rule had been relaxed on a number of occasions, where its rigid application will result in a manifest failure
or miscarriage of justice. The High Court has allowed the issuance of a writ of certiorari despite the availability of appeal where the latter remedy is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy
and sufficient or there is need to promptly relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal. Indeed, certiorari and appeal are not mutually
exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion or when public welfare so requires.
Petitioner has more than amply demonstrated that the RTCs issuance of the assailed orders was attended with grave abuse of discretion. In the context of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To Supreme Courts mind, the grave abuse of discretion imputable
against the RTC was manifested as early in the assailed 17 November 2003 order, without giving any rationale therefor, and while it upheld the petitioners right of expropriation over the
remaining 7 lots, it excluded the area occupied by VMB Resort owned and operated by respondent Rodolfo Legaspi Sr. No less than the Constitution mandates that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The RTC likewise gravely abused its discretion when, in total disregard of
the evidence on record, it issued the second assailed order which reconsidered its first assailed order and altogether denied petitioners right of expropriation over the remaining 7 lots.
WHEREFORE, premised considered, the CAs Decision dated 26 April 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered NULLIFYING the assailed orders dated 17
November 2003 and 31 May 2004 and directing the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 38, to resolve the case in compliance with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution and in
accordance with the evidence on record.
Just Compensation
NPC vs. YCLA Sugar Dev't Corp
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner
vs.
YCLA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent
GR No. 193936
December 11, 2013
Ponente: Reyes, J.
Nature of the Case:

Petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45
Brief:
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 29 of 33
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to annul and set aside the the CA decision affirming the RTC's decision in fixing the amount of just compensation
at P1,000.00 per sq m of the respondent's properties subject for expropriation.
Facts:
NPC is a government owned and controlled corporation created for the purpose of undertaking the development of hydroelectric power throughout the Philippines. It is thus authorized to
exercise the power of eminent domain to carry out the said purpose. Respondent YCLA Sugar Devt Corp is the registered owner of three parcels of land situated in Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro. In order to complete its 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera, NPC had to construct transmission lines that would traverse several private properties,
including the said parcels of land owned by YCLA. Accordingly, NPC filed a Complaint for expropriation with the RTC against YCLA and several other individuals. The NPC sought the
expropriation of a portion of the parcels of land owned by the said defendants for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the construction of
transmission lines. The portion of YCLAs properties that would be affected by the construction of NPCs transmission lines has an aggregate area of 5,846 square meters. YCLA filed its
Answer alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright due to NPCs failure to allege the public use for the intended expropriation of its properties.
The parties moved for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. Meanwhile,
the RTC, acting on NPCs urgent ex- parte motion, issued a writ of possession placing NPC in possession of the properties sought to be expropriated. Board of Commissioners fixed the
amount of just compensation of the subject properties at P500.00 per sq m. YCLA objected to the amount claiming that the amount of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sq m
considering the improvements in their properties. Amount for just compensation was redetermined after YCLA, upon the court's order submitted supporting documents on its position on the
proper valuation of the subject properties. Its motion, asking the RTC to direct the Board of Commissioners to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject properties and, thereafter,
amend/revise the Board of Commissioners Report was granted. The Board of Commissioners submitted its second Report fixing the just compensation of the at P1,000.00 per sq m. The RTC
rendered a Decision which adopted the report and recommendation of the Board of Commissioners.
NPC appealed to CA contending that the amount of just compensation is too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands at the time it
instituted the action for expropriation. But the CA affirmed the RTC's decision.
Thus, thus petition.
Actions of the Court
RTC: Denied
CA: Denied
SC: Partially granted
Issue:
Whether the RTC and the CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation of the subject properties.
Ruling:
No.
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word "just" is used to
intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The
constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by
the government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the
institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
In this case, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of Commissioners Report which was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection of the subject properties. However, the
recommendation as to the amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped the attention of the lower courts is that the
prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on
December 2, 1997.
Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commisioners merely alleged that its members arrived at the amount ofP1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on
actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed. However, the Report is not supported by any corroborative documents
such as sworn declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report submitted by the Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in
character. Considering that the legal basis for the determination of just compensation for the subject properties is insufficient, the respective Decisions of the RTC and the CA should be set
aside. It is unsupported by any documentary evidence and its recommendation as regards the amount of just compensation.
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Decision of the RTC of Calapan
City, Oriental Mindoro are hereby SET ASIDE. This case is remanded to the trial court for the proper determination of just compensation, in conformity with this Decisi
G.R. NO. 172551 : JANUARY 15, 2014
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. YATCO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Yatco Agricultural Enterprises (Yatco) was the registered of owner of a 27-hectare parcel of agricultural land (property) in Calamba, Laguna. On April 30, 1999, the government
placed the property under the coverage if its Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the property at P1,126,132.89. Yatco did not find the valuation acceptable and thus elevated the matter to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), which then conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
The PARAD valued the property at P16,543,800.00, using the property current market value. LBP did not move to reconsider the PARAD ruling. Instead it filed with the RTC-SAC a petition
for the judicial determination of just compensation.
RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200 per square meter based on the RTC branch 35 and 36. RTC-SAC did not give weight to the LBP evidence in justifying its
valuation, pointing out that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and failed to consider the valuation in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
The CA dismissed LBP appeal.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 30 of 33
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the property was proper?
HELD: The RTC-SAC determination of just compensation for the property was not proper.
Civil law : determination of just compensation under the DAR
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a judicial function. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests the RTC-SAC the original and exclusive power to determine just
compensation for lands under CARP coverage. To guide the RTC-SAC in the exercise of its function, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the factors required to be taken into account to
correctly determine just compensation.The law (under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657) likewise empowers the DAR to issue rules for its implementation.The DAR thus issued DAR AO 598incorporating the law listed factors in determining just compensation into a basic formula that contains the details that take these factors into account.
That the RTC-SAC must consider the factors mentioned by the law (and consequently the DAR implementing formula) is not a novel concept. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,
we said that the RTC-SAC must consider the factors enumerated under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657, as translated into a basic formula by the DAR, in determining just compensation.
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, we again affirmed the need to apply Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO5-98 in just compensation
cases.There, we considered the CA and the RTC in grave error when they opted to come up with their own basis for valuation and completely disregarded the DAR formula. The need to apply
the parameters required by the law cannot be doubted; the DAR administrative issuances, on the other hand, partake of the nature of statutes and have in their favor a presumption of legality.
Unless administrative orders are declared invalid or unless the cases before them involve situations these administrative issuances do not cover, the courts must apply them.
The RTC-SAC adopted Branch 36 valuation without any qualification or condition. Yet, in disposing of the present case, the just compensation that it fixed for the property largely differed
from the former.Note that Branch 36 fixed a valuation of P20.00 per square meter; while the RTC-SAC, in the present case, valued the property at P200.00 per square meter. Strangely, the
RTC-SAC did not offer any explanation nor point to any evidence, fact or particular that justified the obvious discrepancy between these amounts.
In ascertaining just compensation, the fair market value of the expropriated property is determined as of the time of taking. The ime of takingrefers to that time when the State deprived the
landowner of the use and benefit of his property, as when the State acquires title to the property or as of the filing of the complaint, per Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note and clarificatory reminder, we agree that the LBP is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all private lands acquired for agrarian reform
purposes. But this determination is only preliminary.The landowner may still take the matter of just compensation to the court for final adjudication.
National Power Corporation vs. Judge Angas, GRs 60225-26, 8 May 1992
Facts:
National Power Corporation filed a complaint of eminent domain for 2 lands in the regional trial court.I t was condemned and the just compensation was fixed at 6%. One
of the respondents (sittie batara)then filed an ex-parte motion for execution praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands
expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the
petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June15, 1979. Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of
money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents(Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), filed with the trial court an ex-parte motion in Civil
Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly
"authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest
allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at12% per annum." The other respondent (Batara) then followed and asked the court for
the same. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration arguing that the decision is already final and executory and cannot be modified. The court said that it merely amplifies its decision
and set the legal interest into 12% and denied the reconsideration. Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads: By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1of Act No. 2655, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent(12%)
per annum.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6%
legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum?
Held:
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of
the Usury Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No.416, should be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, following
the principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where general terms follow the designation of particular things or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will be
construed to comprehend those things or persons of the same class or of the same nature as those specifically enumerated. Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar. Said law reads: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs a delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the
legal interest, which is six percent per annum. The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree No.116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise
known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay
in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
As for private respondents' argument that Central Bank Circular No. 416 impliedly repealed or modified Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, suffice it to state that repeals or even
amendments by implication are not favored if two laws can be fairly reconciled. The Courts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication, and they will not
make such an adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arrive at another result by any construction which is just and reasonable. Besides, the courts will not
enlarge the meaning of one act in order to decide that it repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an adjudication of repeal by implication unless
it is inevitable and a clear and explicit reason therefor can be adduced. They contemplate different situations.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 31 of 33
Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Philippine Constitution
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
National Power Corporation v. Henson,
GR No. 129998,
December 29, 1998
Ponente: Third Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review before the Supreme Court
BRIEF
The case is an appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, San Fernando, Pampanga, in a special civil action for eminent domain, ordering the National Power Corporation (NPC) to pay respondents landowners/claimants just compensation for
the taking of their five (5) parcels of land, with an area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00, per square meter, with legal interest from September 11, 1990, plus costs of the proceedings.
FACTS
On 21 March 1990, the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint for eminent domain, later amended on 11 October 1990, for the taking for public use of 5 parcels of land, owned or claimed by Lourdes Henson (married to Eugenio Galvez),
Josefina Henson (married to Petronio Katigbak, Jesusa Henson, Corazon Henson (married to Jose Ricafort), Alfredo Tanchiatco, Bienvenido David, Maria Bondoc Capili (married to Romeo
Capili), and Miguel Manoloto, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 squaremeters, for the expansion of the NAPOCOR Mexico Sub-Station. On 28 March 1990, NAPOCOR filed an urgent
motion to fix the provisional value of the subject parcels of land. On 20 April 1990, Henson, et. al. filed a motion to dismiss. They did not challenge NAPOCOR's right to condemn their
property, but declared that the fair market value of their property was from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter. On 10 July 1990, the trial court denied Henson, et. al.'s motion to dismiss, but
the court did not declare that NAPOCOR had a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square
meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of Henson, et. al.'s property, to be deposited with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. NAPOCOR deposited the amount on 29 August 1990.
On 5 September 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor of NAPOCOR, and, on 11 September 1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed NAPOCOR in possession of the subject
land. On 22 November 1990, and 20 December 1990, the trial court granted the motions of Henson, et. al. to withdraw the deposit made by NAPOCOR of the provisional value of their
property amounting to P5,831,100.00, with a
balance of P690,900.00, remaining with the Provisional Treasurer of Pampanga. On 5 April 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing 3 commissioners to aid the in the reception of
evidence to determine just compensation for the taking of subject property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their
individual reports. However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the reports. On 19 May 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the amount of just compensation to be
paid by the NAPOCOR for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 squares meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal interest thereon computed from 11 September 1990, when NAPOCOR
was placed in possession of the land, plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings. In due
time, NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 23 July 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of P20,000.00 as
attorney's fees was deleted. NAPOCOR filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the determination of the court of the just compensation or the provisional value to be awarded to the owners of the property would be valid without hearing on the report of the
Commissioners.
RTC: Yes. The amount fixed by the court was valid even without the hearing of the reports of the Commissioners. The trial court fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter,
which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village Subdivision.
CA: Affirmed the judgment of the RTC.
SC: Modified the decision of the RTC and CA. The Court fixes the amount of P375.00, per square meter, as the just compensation to be paid to respondents for the taking of their property.

The parcels of land sought to be expropriated, however, are undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson family, all the other
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 32 of 33
landowners were admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been reclassified as residential. The nature and
character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just compensation to the landowner. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to
help it determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market value of subject land in an amount equal to the
value of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the commissioners
(Commissioner Mariano C. Tiglao fixed the fair market value at P350.00 per square meter, while Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza fixed it at P375.00 per square meter, and Commissioner
Victorino Oracio fixed it at P170.00 per square meter). Commissioner Atienza's recommendation appears to be the closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully developed
subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the taking of
such raw land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial court subject of the appeal are hereby MODIFIED. No costs in all instances.
08/09/2016, 3:54 PM
Page 33 of 33

Consolidated

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Consolidated

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Republic of the Philippines vs.

Salem Investment Corporation

Estate of Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone

Expropriation Small property Owners

| January 29, 2001

June 20, 2001

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,

Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28 June 2001]

Basis of Valuation for Just Compensation

Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

NHA vs. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FELICIANO F. WYCOCO

Estate of the heirs of The late Justice Jose B.L. Reyes

Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

NATURE OF THE CASE

Petition for Review

ACTION of the COURTS

SUPREME COURT RULING

The exercise by local government units of the Power of Eminent Domain

October 13, 2004

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO and URSULA LAGCAO, petitioners,

SUPREME COURT RULING:

AIR TRANSPORATION OFFICE vs GOPUCO

Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

SUPREME COURT RULING

Republic v. Gingoyon GR 166429, 19 December 2005

Masikip v. City of Pasig G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (NIA) vs. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN

GR NO. 185125, 15 JANUARY 2012

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner

LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC

Eminent Domain: Concept of Determination of Just Compensation

G.R. No. 161219

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, we ruled:

Expropriation - Unlawful Detainer

GR. No. 189239

| November 24, 2010

Spouses Abad, petitioner

ACTIONS of the COURT

- Reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents complaint.

SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners,

ACTIONS OF THE COURT

Nature of the Case:

Eminent Domain, Just Compensation

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi