Abortive Raid on Rabaul on 20 February, 1942

Introduction
Relevant information begins after the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) where
Japan beat the shit out of the Russians in in what might have been *the* most
decisive naval battle in recorded history at Tsushima straight, wiping out Russias
Baltic fleet for almost no losses themselves. In addition, a successful land campaign
in northern Korea and southern Manchuria cumulated in the hard won victory at
Mukden, where the Japanese again beat the Russians. In spite of impressive
victories, and overwhelming support from the United States and Britain, Japan was
secretly on the verge of collapse financially and from manpower, while Russia was
still stable. President Theodore Roosevelt was an advocate of Imperial Japan and
offered to broker peace between the two nations; the Japanese government
recognizing that if the war continued any longer that they would collapse and be
overwhelmed by the Russians, accepted. Russia at the time was suffering through
major civil strife (the 1905 revolution with bloody Sunday and the mutiny aboard
battleship Potemkin). Russia, while not wanting to continue the conflict, but
recognizing that if they did they would probably beat Japan in the long term, was
not willing to make great concessions for the Japanese. In the end, Japan won area
of influence over Korea (five years later they would annex Korea without any
international interference) as well as rights to railroads in Manchuria and the
southern half of Sakhalin island. However, a very important issue was left out of the
resulting peace treaty; monetary reparations from Russia. Japan had started the war
with a sneak attack against the Russian pacific fleet in Port Arthur, Manchuria and
Russia refused to pay reparations to the Japanese over the war. This was a serious
issue since Japan was on the verge of bankruptcy. Since continued war with Russia
was the worst-case scenario, the Japanese government reluctantly accepted, but
the civilian population was outraged. For the most part, they blamed the Americans;
they believed Roosevelt had conspired with Russia to save the country from having
to pay reparations and he had not supported his ally. This was the beginning of sour
relations with the United States of America and Imperial Japan.
At this time, Imperial Japan began viewing the US as a potential enemy in the
Pacific. Japan wanted to increase its influence in the Pacific and gain respect as a
first rate power. Various other events would strain the relationship with the US.
Japan entered World War 1 on the side of the Allied powers, and seized German
territory in Tsingtao, China (after a fairly bloody siege) and seized the German
territories in the Mariana Islands (excluding Guam which was a US territory),
Caroline islands (notably Truk Atoll), Marshall Islands (notably Kwajalein, Eniwetok,
Wotje, Majuro, Maloelap, and Jaluit Atolls) and the Palau Islands (notably Peleliu
island). The Americans viewed all these pacific bases as a future threat to their

supply lines to the Philippines and Guam. Then in 1915, Japan made its infamous
21 demands toward China. The demands essentially, would have established
China as a protectorate of Japan including but not limited to: complete control over
the Shandong province (which it had seized from Germany the previous year);
extend lease of the South Manchuria Railroad to 99 years, special commercial rights
in Manchuria and Mongolia, rights to settlers to move to this region,
extraterritoriality rights, rights to appoint administrative and financial officials to
local governments; China would be forbidden from ever conceding land to any other
power other than Japan; China was to hire advisors from Japan to take control of
their finances and Police, Japan could build three major railways as well as Japanese
schools in China, and they would gain further territory in China. These demands
were reduced under negotiations, and the end result was that Japan didnt get many
more rights than it already had.
These 21 demands enraged the United States, which almost two decades ago had
become the self-appointed watchdog of China. Favoring open-door policy, the US
took a strong dislike to Japans strongman and exclusionary policies in China which
would undermine US commercial interests in China. America was also becoming
weary of Japans growing military power. Then, during the Russian-Civil War, Japan
was the strongest advocate of a Siberian expedition. An international force
composing of forces from all major powers would land in Siberia ostensibly to help
the Whites Czech Legion escape Russia where they would be transferred to Europe
to help fight the Germans, though it was also supposed to heavily undermine and
pressure the Bolshevik government. It began in August 1918 and Japan supplied
overwhelmingly the largest force with 70,000 troops. Later the intervention was
called off, but Japan refused to withdraw from Siberia, instead attempting to seize
the region for itself. They would fight the Red Army and various other local militias
until 1920 when the small gain wasnt worth the enormous cost of maintaining such
a large force in the region and so they withdrew. All of this further pissed off the
United States, which saw Japan as overly aggressive.
On the Japanese side, they began to view the United States as hypocritical in its
policies toward Japan, and also completely racist. They looked down on Japanese
imperialist policies, but hadnt they seized their west from Mexico and Native
Americans? In addition, why was it that America could annex Hawaii and take over
Guam and the Philippines, but Japan was criticized for expanding their borders?
What about the Monroe Doctrine, where the US could send its military anywhere in
Latin America that tried to self-govern? America like other white Imperialist powers
of the day, were accepting of their own actions, but were hypocritical of Japans.
During the peace treaty ending World War 1, Japan attempted to add a clause that
stated no immigrants from any nation should face any discrimination in their
adopted country; a clause that the United States blocked from passing, which
greatly incensed the Japanese. Even worse, the United States passed a law
restricting Japanese immigration to California to almost nothing. The law was racist

and it was insulting to the Japanese and helped turn public opinion against America.
By far however, the roots of Japanese-American animosity leading up to World War 2
was the Washington Naval Treaty. Japanese desire to gain economic supremacy in
Asia and Americas desire to protect its own interests in Asia and long-term fear of
Japanese expansion was beginning to lead to an arms race between the two
countries. It was an arms race that had originally been a main factor in beginning
World War 1 in the first place, and the new world order with the newly created
League of Nations, sought to prevent any major wars from ever breaking out again
by establishing arms treaties. Essentially, the Washington Naval Treaty signed in
1922, was an agreement among world powers as to how many tons of each class of
warship they could keep.
Far from helping prevent a war, it would help lead up to World War 2 for the
Japanese. With the added tensions with the Americans, Japanese naval doctrine had
it that they needed to be at least 70% of the size of Americans navy in order to
have an adequate chance at defeating them in a naval war. However, Japan had an
economy only 18% the size of Americas; the amount of capital Japan would have to
put-out to reach even 70% of the US fleet would take up a majority of Japans GDP,
and take over a decade of mass-production due to limited industrial facilities. The
eventual terms agreed upon between the United States, Britain, and Japan on the
number of Capital ships was roughly 5:5:3 respectively. Japan believed it a great
insult that they could have only 60% of whatever the United States produced. Many
seemed to ignore the fact, that this arms treaty prevented the United States from
completely out-producing Japan and put Japan in a still fightable position with the
United States. They also ignored the fact that Britain had to guard three oceans,
and the United States two Oceans, and thus it was perfectly appropriate for those
two nations to have a larger navy than Japan, who had only the Pacific Ocean to
guard. While the Civilian government in Japan approved the treaty, there was great
resentment at this perceived racial and national insult.
Anyways, the Japanese realized that they could not win a protracted war with the
United States by any means; they believed that any eventual war with the United
States had to be won within a year or a year and a half through lightning campaigns
and decisive defeats inflicted on the Americans, which would hopefully give Japan
the position to negotiate a peace before their economy and military collapsed. In
1922 Japan had only 18% of Americans GDP and this severe disadvantage in
economy and industry led to this short-war doctrine in how to fight the Americans
should war ever break out; it was the only way Japan could prevail against America.
And so, it began to train and build its Navy with this all-out decisive battle in mind,
which they called kantai kessen. Since the treaty had America holding the numerical
advantage in capital ships by 5:3 to Japan, this was viewed as inadequate for an allout naval battle to crush the American Navy. So, the Imperial Navy began to invest
heavily in other smaller, cheaper, and more effective measures and technologies
that could sink American ships *before* the major battle. These included

investments in submarines, aircraft, and aircraft carriers. Now enters a man named
Yamamoto Isoroku.
Since warships in this age had a lot of metal armor that protected from to a large
extent from normal naval guns, Japan invested heavily in developing torpedos. In
fact, by world war 2 Japan would have the most effective torpedos of any world
power; torpedos could travel underwater (often unnoticed) where they would strike
below the surface of the ship and detonate blowing a huge hole that water would
pour into and sink the ship. The only issue was, torpedo boats would have to close
in very close to enemy capital ships to deliver torpedos; this made them vulnerable
to being sunk before reaching range and it was essentially a suicide mission. In
addition, once launched, torpedos couldnt be controlled and the enemy could have
the chance to dodge them. Yamamoto believed he had a solution in sinking US ships
before the great naval battle, by having twin-engined long-ranged aircraft deliver
these torpedos. Airplanes were exceptionally faster than torpedo boats; they were
smaller and way more maneuverable; they required a smaller crew and were at the
time extremely difficult to shoot down, and they could reach a target in a matter of
hours, instead of days.

Yamamoto, who would eventually become commander of the Imperial Japanese

Navy, and plan and order the attack on Pearl Harbor, spear-headed the
development of the Rikko. This was a Japanese abbreviation for Rikujo Kogekiki
(Land-Attack Bomber). Japanese differentiated between bomber and attack
aircraft in that bombers just carried bombs, while attack aircraft could carry
torpedos as well as bombs. Throughout the early 1930s Yamamoto led the
development of a twin-engine attack aircraft that could fly over 2000 nautical miles
at a fairly fast speed and deliver a torpedo against a warship. This succeeded
eventually in the Type 96 Rikko (G3M2 Nell bomber). Under the Americans War
Plan Orange, the US would send their Pacific Fleet out from Pearl Harbor to sail to
Guam and then to relieve or recapture the Philippines, which the Americans
assumed the Japanese would immediately capture in the event of war. The Japanese
through their excellent peacetime intelligence were well-aware of War Plan Orange,
and came up with their own countermeasure. They would have Rikko units stationed
in the Marshall Islands, which would launch massed air-attacks against the US
Pacific Fleet sailing west, and have their submarines sink ships and report on the

Americans movement as well. By the time the American fleet reached the Mariana
islands or an area near Japan, they would be weakened enough for the Main
Japanese fleet to engage them in an all-out Battleship duel where they would
hopefully wipe out the American fleet.
As time would go by, the Imperial navy wanted to improve upon the G3M2 (Allied
code-name Nell bomber). After much production and delays, finally in December
1940, about one year before the Pacific War broke out, the first Type 1 Rikko model
11s (G4M1 Betty Bomber) begin rolling off the assembly lines. The Japanese
designation was Type 1 Rikko, and these were viewed as a great improvement on
the previous Type 96 Rikko (G3M2 Nell Bomber). The plane could reach a maximum
speed of 265 mph and could fly 2315 nautical miles in combat overload condition.
This range is phenomenal; by comparison the German Heinkel HE 111 bomber
which was twin-engine and similar size had a range of 1491 miles, while the
American B-25 Mitchel bomber had a range of 1350 miles. This meant that the Type
1 Rikko could theoretically strike the Americans more than 1000 miles before the
enemy was even in range to launch a counterattack. However, this phenomenal
range came at a price. To achieve this range, the designers stuffed fuel tanks into
the bombers wings, and did not put in any armor protection or self-sealing fuel
tanks. The only thing separating hundreds of gallons of high-octane aviation
gasoline from enemy bullets was a few millimeters of aluminum skin of the wing
itself. The Japanese believed that their fairly fast bomber with protection from their
new Zero fighters would negate this danger; armor and self-sealing fuel tanks were
viewed as non-essential, as the added weight affected combat performance, and
most importantly for the Japanese, range. If shot in the wings (which were an easy
target for fighters) the Betty bombers had a tendency to immediately light on fire
and turn into a funeral pyre for their crews. Throughout the war they would be
nicknamed by the Americans one-shot lighter while the Japanese referred to it as
the Type one cigar. This is the G4M1 Betty bomber.

The renown expert on Japanese military aviation during the war, Tagaya Osamu,
describes the rationale behind the development of the Type 1 Rikko:
The use of conventional fuel tanks, fully internalized within the airframe,
would have left room for the installation of protective measures, but would also
have reduced fuel capacity below requirements. The navy, in its collective wisdom,
would not accept any shortfall in range or performance, and appeared quite willing
to take the risks inherent in the design. This was mute testimony to the extent to
which a tactical doctrine favoring attack at all costs pervaded in the Imperial Navy.
The IJN was loath to accept the 300-kilogram weight penalty which the installation
of rubber ply protection for the fuel tanks entailed. Ever focused on performance
and range in pursuit of the offensive, navy airmen refused to give up that weight in
bombs or fuel in exchange for a feature which many considered nonessential.
The Type 1 Rikko had a large spacious fuselage that provided plenty of room for the
crewmembers inside, unlike the cramped conditions of the American B-17 bomber.
There was a reason for the large cigar-shape fuselage, that earned her another
nickname from its crewmembers as hamaki (cigar). Its whole purpose for being
designed was to be used as a long-range torpedo bomber, and a wider designed
made its carrying of the Type 91 aerial torpedo more efficient. The Torpedo weighed
1,820 pounds; its length was 17 feet and 4 inches while its diameter was 17.7
inches. Its explosive charge weighed 331 pounds and it had a speed of 48 mph for a
maximum running distance of 2000 meters or one and a quarter miles. By
comparison, the 1949 pound US Mark 13 model 1 aerial torpedo was 13 feet 5
inches long with a diameter of 22.5 inches. It had a speed of 34.5 mph and an
explosive charge weighing at 392 pounds of TNT. It had a top speed of 34.5 mph but
a significantly higher range of 17,421 feet or 3.29 miles. US Torpedoes (aerial and
surface) were nevertheless very much inferior to their Japanese counterparts, not
only in performance, but in reliability as well. In mid-1943 a test of 105 of these
Mark 13 torpedoes found that 36% ran cold (the motor did not start), 20% sank
upon being dropped into the water, 20% ran off in erratic directions, 18% ran too
deep under the water, 2% ran on the surface, and only 31% gave a satisfactory run.
By comparison, the Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo had a near 100% reliability
rating, provided it was dropped at its assigned height and a low speed.
Type 91 Aerial Torpedo

At the outbreak of the war on 8 December, 1941 (Japanese time), the following is a
general graph of the Imperial Navys Rikko bomber strength:
21st Air Flotilla (Koku Sentai)
1st Naval Air Group (Kokutai): 36xG3M2 Nell bombers (located in Taiwan to
attack Philippines)
Kanoya Kokutai: 54xG4M1 bombers (3 Chutai (27 bombers) located in Taiwan.
3 Chutai (27
Bombers) located in Indo-China to attack
Singapore)
22nd Koku Sentai
Mihoro Kokutai: 36xG3M2 Nell bombers (located in Saigon, Indo-China to
attack Singapore)
Genzan Kokutai: 36xG3M2 Nell bombers (located in Saigon, Indo-China to
attack Singapore)

23rd Koku Sentai

Takao Kokutai: 54xG4M1 Betty Bombers (located in Taiwan to attack

Philippines)

24th Koku Sentai

Chitose Kokutai: 36xG3M2 Nell Bombers (located on Kwajalein Atoll, to attack
Wake Atoll)

To put this in perspective, the Japanese Navy began the war with approximately 252
active twin-engine bombers; of which a majority of them were the obsolete Type 96
Rikko (G3M2). Japan had begun the war with not even having been able to fully
upgrade their airplanes to the new Type 1 model (G4M1). Furthermore, those 252
Rikko had to fight the Americans, Dutch, British, and Australian forces throughout
the entire Pacific, and they wouldnt receive substantial reinforcements for over a
year. Japan, for all its major victories in the beginning, was obviously in serious
straights for maintaining a war with the United States. To put this into better
perspective in terms of aircraft strengths: from 1939 to 1945 Japan produced about
76,320 aircraft of all types. In that same time-period, the United States produced
324,750 aircraft of all types. In 1943 the United States produced 85,898 aircraft; in
one year produced more aircraft than Japan had built in six years. That number
increased to 96,318 in 1944 and it would have probably reached almost 120,000 by
1945 if the US had not have stopped production considerably when it was clear they
were going to win the war. To further expand on this disparity in forces, during the
war the US built 141 aircraft carriers to Japans seventeen; 10 battleships to Japans
two; 48 cruisers to Japans nine; 847 destroyers and destroyer escorts to Japans 63;
and 207 submarines to Japans 167. In Merchant ship production, Japan would build
a conglomerate total of 4,152,361 tons. In that same period, the United States
would build 33,993,230 tons of shipping. It should be clear now, that Japan could
only hope to win a short-war against the US, and hope that the anti-war sentiment
would grow strong enough in the country through successive losses that they would
negotiate a peace with Japan (like what happened in the Vietnam war). The Rikko
units were essential in helping to bring about these initial losses; as it was however,
Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku planned the attack on Pearl Harbor. As is well known,
after that accidental sneak attack (the Japanese tried to have a declaration of war
delivered a half-hour before the attack but it was tragically delayed), America was
pretty pissed off, and they would accept nothing less than the total surrender of
Imperial Japan as a sovereign nation.

Pacific War

The opening phase of the Pacific War is the largest coordinated mass-military
strike across the globe in military history. It is at testament to Japanese skill and
careful planning and dedication that the Japanese achieved such a high degree of
success during the opening months of the war. The war broke out on 8 December,
1941 and it was supposed to open with a raid against the Pacific Fleet. While the
Americans enjoyed an overwhelming economic advantage, this was a long-term
advantage that could only be brought into fruition after a year or two. In the shortterm, the Japanese held the advantage in ship numbers, training, aircraft types,
torpedos, and geography. While the Japanese still subscribed to the belief that
battleships were the most important naval warship, they nevertheless recognized
the immense importance that aircraft carriers would play; the war would be fought
over thousands of miles of Pacific Ocean, and a carriers ability to sail and launch
massed air-strikes against specific targets would prove to be a dangerous offensive
weapons, and it was just as dangerous to allow the Americans to have this
advantage. Since Japan was going to war to take the oil-rich resources in the
Netherland East Indies (modern day Indonesia), she would have to secure the British
naval base of Singapore on Malaya (modern day Malaysia) in addition to securing
the American islands in the Philippines to safeguard their rear. The Pacific Fleet
based in Pearl Harbor was the thorn in the plan; they could sail out and engage any
of the divided Japanese fleets in these operations. Thus Yamamoto wanted to knock
out the Pacific Fleet at the beginning of the war and sink the American aircraft
carriers so they couldnt counterattack.
America at the time had five fleet carriers: Enterprise, Saratoga, Lexington, Hornet,
and Wasp. Three of these would have been based at Pearl Harbor and the Japanese
planned to sink them at the opening phase of the war. Since aircraft carriers were
still new at the time, there was no right way to use them yet. The Americans
divided their carriers up singly into battle groups; while this made them safe from
all being wiped out at once, it also meant that the offensive power of each task
group was limited to the 80 or so aircraft on the carrier. Carriers at the time carried
three types of aircraft: fighters, dive-bombers, and torpedo bombers; the proportion
was divided roughly equally between the two. Thus, the offensive power of

American aircraft carriers was severely limited for the first six months of the war
due to this doctrine. The Japanese, however, grouped their six fleet carriers into a
single fleet meant to deal sledgehammer blows against whatever their target was
with their 350+ aircraft. The fleet was informally referred to as Kido Butai (mobile
fleet) and it was composed of fleet carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and
Zuikaku. In addition, Japan had a few light carriers in service which could carry on
average 30-40 aircraft. They were Ryujo, Zuiho, and Taiyo. Within six months, light
carrier Shoho would be completed, as well as auxiliary carriers Junyo and Hiyo (each
could carry about 50 aircraft). Kido Butai sailed to near Hawaii and launched a
massive air-raid that sank/heavily damaged Americas whole battleship line and
caused damage to other ships in addition to destroying 2/3 of the defensive aircraft
stationed on Oahu; they inflicted over 3500 casualties while suffering only 29
aircraft shot down and five submarines sunk. Tragically for the Japanese, none of the
American carriers were in the harbor and thus, for Yamamoto, it was a hollow
victory.
Simultaneously, Japanese Rikko bombers and Army Air Force units in Indo-China
began attacking targets at Singapore and the Malayan peninsular, beginning the
quick process of whittling down the British Air Force. A Japanese Division landed in
Thailand, and within a day the Thai government allied itself with Japan (a secret
agreement had been made beforehand with the Thai government to this effect).
Thailand would remain a sovereign government and would allow the Japanese to
use its land as a military springboard for future invasions. The Division moved south
and began marching south into Malaya, while a regiment landed on Kota Bharu
beach, Malaya and stormed ashore defeating the Indian troops defending it and
capturing the airfield. The Japanese Rikko units on Taiwan flew the long distance to
the Philippines, and through stupid misunderstandings, administrative errors, and
plain mistakes, the 1st Ku, Takao Ku, and Kanoya Ku caught most of the American
airplanes still on the runway at Clark Airfield. Following precise bombings and
strafing from the about 100 Zero fighters of the Tainan Ku and 3 rd Ku, the Japanese
wiped out 50% of the B-17 bombers on the island and similarly destroyed 1/3 of our
fighters on the island. The Japanese suffered just seven Zeros shot down, and two
bombers lost to a takeoff accident and a landing accident. Its especially delicious to
think about, when its considered that General Douglas McArthur in an interview
given to the Manila three days before the attack is quoted as saying, our greatest
defense here, is the inability of the Japanese to attack us. Of over nintety P-40
fighters, by 12 December, only about 20 would remain in service and within a few
days that would further decrease to ten. The bomber force would in addition be
beaten down to about ten B-17 bombers. On 10 December Japanese forces landed
in Aparri and Vigan in northern Luzon and completely demolished the main naval
base at Cavite Naval Yard, killing over 500; on 12 December the Japanese landed at
Legaspi in southern Luzon. The main Divisional landing occurred at Lingayen Gulf on
23 December and within days would completely push back the Filipino and
American defenders, effectively taking control of the main island of Luzon except for

the Bataan Peninsular, where the Americans would hold out for several months.
Until Bataan, all of this was accomplished with absolute minimal casualties.
Meanwhile, on 8 December Japanese air units based in Saipan island in the Mariana
islands attacked Guam, and on 10 December, a massive Japanese landing force
landed and Guam was surrendered by the American Marines with only a small fight.
Japanese Army air Units began assaulting Hong Kong as British and Canadian troops
fell back to the island and the IJA began its successive assaults on the city. After
intense fighting and a good fight put up by the Allies, the city and island fell on 25
December. On 8 December, the Chitose Ku based on Roi Island, Kwajalein Atoll in
the Marshall islands launched an air assault on Wake Atoll that destroyed seven out
of twelve of the American F4F Wildcat fighters, killed approximately 50 people and
destroyed many facilities on Wake. The Americans would repel a Japanese landing
attempt on 11 December sinking destroyers Hayate and Kisaragi in the struggle, but
the Japanese returned and on 23 December the Japanese stormed the atoll and the
Marines surrendered after a hard fight. Meanwhile, in Singapore on 10 December,
the British sent out their most modern battleship HMS Prince of Whales and the
battlecruiser Repulse to attempt to sink the Japanese invasion fleet. It was
discovered and the land based Kanoya Ku and Genzan Ku launched air assaults
against the British ships. In what would appear to vindicate the Rikko concept, these
bombers flew a long distance that Allied bombers couldnt yet fly, and with
torpedos sank previously thought unsinkable ships with minimal losses. It
astounded the world as it was the first time that air attacks alone had sank
battleships that were underway and not holed up in a harbor. The Japanese with
60,000 troops under the command of General Yamashita began an unstoppable
advance southward down the Malayan peninsular fighting British, Indian, and
Australian troops that were 120,000 men. In late February, the British surrendered
and Singapore belonged to the Japanese. Its still considered one of the great
military victories in recorded history. Soon Japan would begin its invasion of Burma
(modern day Myanmar) where they would again beat the British and take the
territory for themselves, shutting off the vital Burma Road where a lot of supplies
came in to Chiang Kai-Cheks Nationalist Forces in China. Also in the same time
period, Japanese Army and Naval units began landing and taking over Borneo
island, Jolo Island, and Celebes island in Indonesia, fighting the Dutch and British.
Finally, the same Army unit that seized Guam, was now on transports and on 23
January, the Nankai Shitai (South Seas Detachment) which was approximately 3500
men in strength landed and seized the vital city and anchorage of Rabaul, on New
Britain island in the Solomon Islands. This was a vital link to sever the supply and
communications route between Australia and the United States. Immediately, the
Japanese began to fortify Rabaul into a major military base to be used for future
offenses against the Australian controlled Port Moresby, New Guinea, and following
that, invasions of Samoa, Fiji, and New Caledonia. However, Japanese merchant
Marine was stretched super thin; they didnt have enough transports to move

troops, supplies, food, and resources from their newly captured territories. Thus it
took longer to provide supplies and equipment than it should have and there were
always shortages for the military in the Pacific. It would take months before there
was an adequate air force in Rabaul because of these shortage. For the time being,
the Yokohama Ku which was equipped with twenty-four Type 97 Kawanishi flying
boats (H6K4 codename Mavis) which were to be used for reconnaissance with
most being based at Rabaul. A flying boat that landed in water and had a range of
approximately 4000 nautical miles, it was a well suited recon aircraft for the south
pacific. In addition, on 27 January, fleet carrier Shokaku delivered sixteen A5M4
(predecessors of the famed Japanese Zero fighter) to Rabaul. They were two Chutai
from the Chitose Ku; they and their pilots were being transferred to Rabaul from
Tarao Island in the Marshall Islands, eventually going to be reassigned as the fighter
unit of the 4th Kokutai which would be created soon (more on that).
Type 97 Kawanishi Flying boat (Mavis flyingboat)

A6M2 (Zero Fighter)

Type 96 Kansen (A5M4 Claude fighter)

Raid Against Rabaul

While the Pacific Fleet was crippled at Pearl Harbor and would not be able to
mount any major offensives until August, 1942 the US Navy was not content to
simply wait around. While it wasnt much, they began to use their aircraft carriers in
mini-raids against Japanese possessions in the Pacific. Minor raids were conducted
against Kwajalein in February by the Enterprise, and against Wake Atoll byI forget.
The next raid was planned for Task Force 11, centered around aircraft carrier
Lexington to approach Rabaul and launch an air raid to sink Japanese ships and
destroy Japanese ground installations and aircraft. The Lexington carried 68 aircraft
and the Task force included four heavy cruisers, ten destroyers, and a fleet oiler.
Task Force 11 departed Fiji on 16 February for Rabaul; earlier that day a Hudson
recon plane had photographed Rabaul harbor and reported not many planes on the
airstrip. Thus, the Americans assumed they would be attacking a relatively
unprotected target.
Task Force 11
Aircraft Carrier: USS Lexington
Heavy Cruisers: USS Minneapolis
USS Indianapolis
USS Pensacola
USS San Francisco
Destroyers: Phelps, Dewey, MacDonough, Hull, Aylwin, Dale, Bagley,
Patterson, Clark, and
Drayton.
Japan had for a month planned to create a composite air unit to defend Rabaul and
launch raids against Allied bases in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, as well as
to guard the area against Allied ships. The sixteen A5M4 fighters ferried over on
Shokaku in late January were to form a temporary fighter unit. The A5M4 was a
fighter that saw active service in 1937 and throughout the China war, but was now
obsolete; Japan still couldnt supply even all of their front line units with the Zero
fighter. It was planned that eventually three chutai of Zero fighters (27 zeros) would
make up the fighter daitai. However, the main strength of the 4 th Ku was to be its
bomber daitai. The new unit was to be known as the 4 th Kokutai (henceforth Ill use
the Japanese abbreviation Ku). A kokutai was the standard Japanese naval air unit,
and it would be composed of between 3-6 Chutai (Companies). Each Chutai would
have nine aircraft, and three aircraft kept in reserve, and each Chutai was made up
of three Shotai (platoons) that were three aircraft. The 4 th Ku would have a fighter
daitai (roughly equivalent to an air battalion) of three chutai of fighters, and a
bomber daitai of three chutai. The bomber hikocho would be composed of twentyseven Type 1 Rikko bombers (henceforth Ill refer to the G4M1 Betty bomber by its
Japanese designation). One Chutai under the command of Lieutenant (Lt)Yamagata

Shigeo was transferred from the Chitose Ku; it had only flown the obsolete Type 96
Rikko (G3M2 Nell Bomber) and thus had to learn to fly the newer Type 1 Rikko. The
4th and 6th Chutai of the elite Takao Ku were transferred to the 4th Ku as well. The
other four Chutai of the Takao ku moved south on 31 January to begin bombing
operations against Java Island in Indonesia. The 4 th Kokutai was officially activated
on 10 February; Lt. Yamagatas chutai would continue for a few weeks undergoing
conversion training to the newer Type 1 Rikkos on Saipan, Mariana islands while Lt.
Miyake and Lt. Nakagawas Chutai departed Takao, Taiwan on 5-6 February and flew
to Peleliu, Palau Islands where they fueled up, and then continued on to Truk Atoll, in
the Caroline Islands arriving on 7 February.
While Japanese naval air units at the beginning of the war would suffer an attrition
rate close to 100% by the end of the war, the 4 th Ku was particularly heavy hit at a
time when the Japanese were conquering everywhere their ships, troops, and
airplanes went. Even before the 4th Ku was formed, tragedy struck Lt.Miyakes
Chutai shortly after arriving on Truk during a training flight. The planes were
practicing formation flying through heavy clouds, and one of the Type 1 Rikko under
his wing collided with Miyakes plane and both blew up in mid-air, killing both crews
including Lt.Miyake (15 crewmembers). A Lieutenant Seto Yogoro was immediately
transferred from the 1st Kus transportation unit, currently engaged in operations in
the Netherland East Indies (NEI). The 4 th Kokutai was officially activated as a unit on
10 February, 1942 with its commander being Captain Moritama Yoshiyotsu, a nonaviator who was in charge of the administrative affairs of the air unit. It was planned
that Lieutenant Shigeos Chutai on Saipan would continue for two weeks with their
conversion training, while Lieutenants Setos (formerly Miyake) Chutai and
Lieutenant Nakagawas Chutai would remain on Truk for a few days and then
transfer to Vunakanau airfield on Rabaul between 14-17 February.

For the first few days out of Fiji, Task for 11 benefited from long-ranged B-17
bombers from the 14th Reconnaissance Squadron flying patrol, giving them
notifications on Japanese activities in the area. Aboard Carrier Lexington, Vice
Admiral Brown and his staff put the final touches on their planned raid: they would
steam toward Rabaul for four days keeping clear of all islands to avoid detection.
They would launch their strike on the morning of 21 February, plentiful shipping
targets were expected. We planned a surprise attack from north of the Solomons,
with the planes approaching Rabaul over the intervening island of New Ireland and a
simultaneous cruiser bombardment of the ships in the harbor. Their launch would
be made from around 125 miles away from Rabaul at 0400 so that just at sunrise,
the strike force would arrive over Simpson harbor, Rabaul. The ambitious plan even
called for B-17 bombers to bomb Rabaul in coordination with the navy strike. The
bombers were scheduled to arrive in Townsville, Australia on 19 February and
launch a raid the following night. If all went according to plan, the bombers would
arrive over Rabaul at dawn on the 21st, the same time as Lexingtons aircraft. If it
could be assured that it was safe enough, two of the heavy cruisers and a destroyer
were to break off and head to Simpson harbor to bombard targets.
The plan unraveled even before Task Force 11 departed Fiji. Japanese listening
posts at Truk intercepted bits of the abnormally high message traffic between
admirals King, Brown, and Leary, enabling Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo
to issue alerts to *all* units in the South-Eastern Pacific area; to help ensure that the

high-priority targeted American carriers were found, even privates were notified of
this development. Since the Americans had made carrier raids in the previous two
weeks, the Japanese rightly assumed a carrier would be used against Japanese
bases in the South Pacific, most likely Rabaul. Between 14-17 February, the two
Chutai based at Truk flew in shotai groups to Rabaul, landing at Vunakanau airfield;
by the 17th there were 18xType 1 Rikkos on Rabaul. Then, on 19 February a
Japanese listening post South of Truk reported American destroyers in the area; it
proved to be a false alarm, but it prompted Rear Admiral Goto (commander of the
24th Air Flotilla or Koku Sentai) to order the Type 97 Kawanishi Flying boats of the
Yokohama Ku to all launch in the early morning for the sole purpose of finding the
American Task Force.

Flight Leader Lieutenant Commander Ito Takuzos Rikko, 4 th Ku on 20

February, 1942

At dawn on 20 February, three Type 97 Kawanishi flying boats took off from Simpson
Harbor, Rabaul and flew eastward. Each one had a crew of ten and they were to fan
out searching for signs of the expected American task-force. After several hours,
just as the plane piloted by Lt.Sakai Noboru approached its turn point, the
crewmembers spotted Admiral Browns Task Force 11. At 1030, Sakai radioed
Rabaul with the electrifying news that an enemy aircraft carrier and its force was
460 nautical miles NE of New Britain. Before Sakai had even spotted the Lexington,

however, the new CXAM search radar aboard it had already pinged his flying boat.
Soon, on the wooden flight deck of the USS Lexington, six F4F-3 Wildcat fighters
took off and formed up into two plane sections with the section leaders being:
Lt.Cmdr.John Jimmy Thach; Lt.Edward Butch OHare; and Lt.Onio Burt Stanley.
Radar, while still buggy and not entirely reliable onboard ships at this point in the
war, nevertheless gave the Americans an enormous edge. In addition, unlike
Japanese fighter pilots that had no radio within their aircraft, every American pilot
had a short-wave radio that linked to each other, and to their mother carrier. Thus,
the Combat Information Center (CIC) within the Lexington could feed updated
information on the location of Sakais flying boat to the six Wildcats in their air. Less
than 30 minutes after the radar picked up Lt.Sakais Flying boat, Lexingtons aircraft
would engage in their first combat with the Japanese of the war.

F4F-3 Wildcat fighter

The F4F-3 Wildcat, was the American Navies main fighter at the beginning of the
war. It was made by Grumman, and was generally inferior to the Japanese Zero;
though it was more than adequate to shoot down Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko bombers.
It had a maximum speed of 330 mph and a maximum service ceiling of 37,500 ft
above sea-level. While the Zero had a maximum range of 1930 miles, the Wildcat
had a range of only 845 miles. It was equipped with four .50 caliber machineguns,
which were devastating against the lightly armored Japanese aircraft. In my opinion,
it was an ugly aircraft, but as the events of the day would provide, it was good
enough.
Lieutenant Sakai had most likely witnessed Lexington launch its fighters from high
above the ocean, and was ducking his plane into cumulous clouds to try and use for
cover to escape the American fighters, while continuing to shadow the American
fleet to report on any course changes. Lieutenant Commander Thach and his
wingman, Ensign Edward Doc Sellstrom Jr, were 35 miles SW of Lexington, having
been guided there by the CIC looking for Sakais aircraft. According to Thachs own
account, Sakai had probably spotted his fighter first:
He flew into the clouds and we followed, hoping hed come out on the same

course on the other side. But he was a smart Jap. He turned inside the cloud, and
when we came out, the air was vacant. We went back into the cloud, flying on
instruments. There was a small opening in the cloud, and as I came into it, I looked
down and not more than a thousand feet below was a huge wing with a red disc. It
was my first sight of an enemy aircraft as close as that, and it nearly scared me to
death.
Sakai attempted to evade Thach by descending through the base of the cloud, but
the Kawanishi flying boat was simply too massive to escape detection. Bursting out
of the clouds at 1500 feet altitude, Sakai was in a bad way. The Kawanishi had a
higher flying altitude than the Wildcat and if he had been 20,000 feet up he could
have outran the fighter; the higher a plane flies the slower it will go generally.
However, at that low altitude the Wildcat could easily outrun him, and now he was
below the clouds and there wasnt any large cumulus clouds in front of him; he had
already gone through them. His only option was to fly as fast as he could and hope
that maybe his defensive gunners could shoot down or dissuade the Wildcats from
shooting him down. Thach and Sellstrom simply flew high above the Kawanishi
waiting until it was completely out in the open before diving down for a firing run.
Thach had practiced his firing runs for years, and his .50 caliber slugs slammed into
Sakais broad wing and into the fuel tanks in the wings causing vaporized gasoline
to stream out of the holes; seconds later a tracer round or incendiary round ignited
them and the entire right-wing of Sakais aircraft erupted into flames. Thach
watched as the Type 97 Kawanishi dropped its eight bombs (60 kg bombs), I could
see the Japs in the forward part of the plane stand up, but they seemed to make no
attempt to jump. The plane was almost completely engulfed in flames, and it hit the
water with a huge explosion. The time was 1112. About 30 miles away, the crew on
the Lexington could see the smoke rising far off and let out a cheer. The carriers first
victory.
Thirty minutes later, the CXAM radar detected another bogey, this time north of
the task force instead of west. The CIC led Lt.Burt Stanley and his wingman, Ensign
Leon Haynes, toward the blip. A short time later, Ensign Haynes spotted the target,
another Type 97 Kawanishi flying at 6000 ft; he signaled Stanley who in return
signaled his attack to the Lexington with a, Tally Ho!. Stanley was so nervous at
his first combat, that he forgot to switch on the master gun switch which acted as a
safety. When he squeezed on the trigger, his four .50 caliber machineguns failed to
shoot. After switching it on, he fired three bursts into the wing of the massive
Japanese plane. Warrant Officer Hayashi Kiyoshis plane began to burn slowly, but
the flames soon became more massive. It then pitched and fell to the ocean,
leaving a greasy black smoke trail; another ten crewmembers were killed. The large
explosion of it hitting the surface of the ocean was against witnessed on the
Lexington with the time being 1202. For only a few hundred rounds of ammunition,
two Japanese Type 97 Kawanishi flying boats had been indisputably shot down, with
20 men dead. However, before being shot down, Sakai had managed to radio the

location of Task Force 11, and so the Japanese now knew the location and heading
of Vice Admiral Browns flotilla. Now, it was time for the 4 th Kokutai to do exactly as
they had trained for years to do.
Rear Admiral Goto was inside his HQ in Chinatown, Rabaul going over the reported
sightings from Lieutenant Sakai. There had been no collaborating reports since
Sakais sighting (Hayashis plane had not yet sighted Task Force 11 when Haynes
shot it down), but Goto had made up his mind that it was worth sending a strike.
The information that Sakai had radioed before his death placed Task Force 11
aproximately five hours flying time from Rabaul, which was well within the range of
the Type 1 Rikkos of the 4th Kokutai. While Goto was determined to attack the
approaching Americans, Goto delayed giving the order in hopes that other
reconnaissance aircraft would give updated sightings. Over two hours later with the
radio remaining silent, Goto anxiously ordered the 4 th kokutai to attack the American
ships at 1310.
The situation was less than ideal. For one, the 4 th kokutai on Rabaul was under
strength. While Lieutenant Yamagatas Chutai on Saipan had completed their
hurried conversion training, they wouldnt arrive at Rabaul until the next day on the
21st. Worse still, since they had just arrived a few days prior and since Rabaul had
only been captured a month before, the Type 91 Aerial torpedoes that were badly
needed at this moment had not yet been shipped to Rabaul. The bombers could
only arm themselves with two 250 kilogram bombs (550 lbs) each. While torpedo
runs against ships were devastating and fairly accurate, level-bombing moving
naval ships was almost impossible for aircraft in this time period to do. The bombers
flying at a speed of over 200 mph would have to release their two bombs to hit a
target 105 ft wide from a minimum altitude of 10,000 feet; any lower and they
would be vulnerable to hundreds of machineguns on the American ships. In
addition, the American carrier would be moving at its top-speed of 33 knots (38
mph) and would be maneuvering wildly to throw off the bombardiers aim. While a
250 kg bomb on a wooden flight deck would be destructive to the carrier, it would
most likely take several to cripple the carrier, and it would be close to impossible to
land such a hit. To make matters worse, there were no fighters available to escort
the bombers to defend them from American fighters. The 4 th Ku was still primarily
armed with the obsolete A5M4 which did not have the range. While light carrier
Shoho had delivered six Zero fighters to Rabaul on 17 February, they could only
have the range to escort the bombers if they had external fuel-tanks and these had
not yet arrived on Rabaul. In short, the 4th Ku would have to make a very difficult
bombing-run against an American carrier with no fighters to defend them from
American fighters. Nevertheless, the men who were formerly of the Takao Ku were
legitimately the best trained aviators in the world and they knew it. They had
trained for years; most had combat experience in China and they had all been on
bombing-run after bombing-run against American targets in the Philippines. In spite
of the above listed disadvantages, the aircrews were excited and completely

confident that their fast bombers would succeed; the Japanese always succeeded in
their operations thus far and they saw no reason to doubt themselves now.
Prior to boarding their aircraft, Rear Admiral Goto had them gather around him
where he delivered an inspiring speech, I want you to crush the enemy fleet, which
is apparently a large one. Do not fear the enemy, however powerful he may be. Do
not underrate him, however small his force. Fulfill your task with coolness and
composure. The aircrews then boarded their Rikko, which still bore the kumogata
(cloud pattern) camouflage scheme left over from their campaign in the Philippines.
There was the pilot, and then the copilot, who sat next to each other in the cockpit.
The captain sat directly behind the pilot and in combat he would man the top
machinegun. Next was the navigator who sat on a stool at a table below the pilots
and the captain; when approaching the target he would move through the crawlpassage below the copilot to the nose of the bomber where he would then be in
charge of dropping either the torpedo or the bombs. Unlike the American and British
bombers where control of the plane could be temporarily transferred to the
bombardier so he could make minor adjustments to course to drop bombs
accurately, the Japanese bombardier lacked this and an interpersonel radio/phone,
and thus had to shout through a voice tube to the pilot, telling him the adjustments
he had to make. In case of fighter attack, the navigator/bombardier could also man
the bow machinegun. The radio operator would be seated next to the navigator on a
stool at a second table, with his radio located on the table. In combat, he would
man one of the waist machineguns. The engineer was to be able to make small
repairs of the plane and specialize in the engines. He would help keep lookout for
targets and enemy aircraft, and in combat he would man one of the waist
machineguns. Finally, there was the rear turret gunner who manned the 20mm
machine cannon that fired explosive rounds. This was an effective weapon; a few
hits would greatly damage or down a Wildcat and would be used to some effect in
the coming battle.

Cross-section model of a Type 1 model 11 Rikko

The only doorway leading in or out of the bomber was through a circular door that
blended in to the hinomaru (rising sun symbol) on the fuselage of the bomber. While
the Imperial Japanese Naval Air Force (IJNAF) never discouraged their crewmembers
from carrying parachutes, Japanese airmen made a personal decision to not carry
parachutes. To be shot down over enemy territory while having a parachute, would
imply that one was willing to risk capture, which death was preferable in the
Japanese military than to capture. For defensive armament, the Type 1 model 11
Rikko was armed with four Type 92 machineguns. These fired a 7.7mm round and
they were kept in drums; the weapon was a licensed copy of the British Lewis
Machinegun. In the cross-section model, you can make out the drum-magazines
hanging on the fuselage of the plane. There was one machinegun in the nose, one
on the top through a top-window/hatch just behind the cockpit area, and then two
machineguns located in blisters on the sides of the bomber. The 7.7mm round was
basically a hunting-sized round that while great for anti-personal combat, was
ineffective at shooting down heavily armored American fighters; its range was
limited and it had little stopping power. A 20mm automatic cannon was located in
the tail-end of the plane however. This was an effective weapon at stopping planes
as it fired explosive rounds. Any fighter trying to approach the bomber from the rear

would face this devastating weapon. Lastly, the Type 1 Rikko is unique in that it
featured a toilet for its crew when in this age, bomber crews had to go in a bag or
fighter pilots wore diapers. Located just behind the entrance hatch on the port side
was a pot-like toilet; at the bottom of the toilet was a small hole leading to the
outside where the fluids could drain out of the plane. A metal bar was placed
vertically from the floor to the ceiling for the crewmember to hold onto while
urinating, and a small window was located at eye-level so he could look outside
while peeing. The feces would remain in the toilet however (a larger hole would
create wind-resistance and reduce performance) and while the small hole would
help leak some of the smell outside the airplane, crewmembers still complained of
the stench and windows were often opened in the cockpit to help vent the plane.

4th Kokutai on 19 February, 1942 (Captain Moritama Yoshiyotsu)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Rikko Daitai (Lieutenant Commander Ito Takuzo)*Located Rabaul, New
Britain Island*
-1st Chutai (Lt.Yamagata Shigeo): 9xType 1 Rikko *On Saipan
training*
-2nd Chutai (Lt.Nakagawa Masayoshi): 9xType 1 Rikko
-3rd Chutai: (Lt.Seto Yogoro) 9xType 1 Rikko
Kansen Daitai (N/A)
16xA5M4 fighters
9xZero fighters
After Gotos speech, the crewmembers boarded their bombers and the
engines were warmed up. The hikotaicho (leader of the Rikko Hikocho) was
Lt.Cmdr.Ito Takuzo; he had graduated from Etajima Naval Academy and then the
Kasumigaura Naval Air Training School to become an officer in the naval air force.
He had extensive experience in flying reconnaissance seaplanes, but this was his
first time in land-bombers. He had a wife and a family in his home town of
Hiroshima and was by all accounts very close to them. He boarded bomber F-348.
Each bomber had a horizontal white band on their tail: no white band signified the
1st Chutai, one band signified the 2nd chutai, and two bands signified the 3 rd chutai.
The English F was the code letter for the 4 th Ku and was used to signify that the
bomber belonged to the 4th ku. Next to Ito sat the chutaicho (leader of a chutai)
Lieutenant Seto Yogoro, who commanded the 3rd chutai. However, since the
hikotaicho (Lt.Cmdr. Ito) was on board, that made it the command or 1 st Chutai
tactically; from now on Ill refer to 3rd Chutai as 1st Chutai as it was the command
Chutai for this mission. In front of them was CPO Watanabe Chuzo who manned the
senior pilots seat while FPO 2nd class Toyoda Minoru occupied the copilots seat.
During startup, one bomber from the 1st Chutai encountered mechanical problems
and thus it had to be left out of the mission; 1st Chutai would go into battle with
eight bombers instead of nine for a total of 17 bombers. All of Rabaul was made
aware of the approaching American carrier and all were excited over the bombers
taking off. At the makeshift POW camp for the former Australian defenders of Lark
Force, guards taunted them that the Japanese were going to sink their ships. As the
17 bombers taxied to the runway, they were thrilled to see hundreds of soldiers and
mechanics lining the runway. As the first bomber commenced takeoff at 1420, the
spectators took off their hats waving them, shouting Banzai! Banzai! In the words
of one survivor, Off we went, led by a unit commander and heartily seen off by
superiors and comrades. With the words, We wont fail you, we headed toward
mid-ocean. However, after the bombers flew past New Ireland island, they
encountered heavy rain-squalls above the open ocean. Because of the collision

some two weeks ago where they lost two bombers and their whole crews,
hikotaicho Ito made the decision to separate the two Chutai until the weather
cleared. Lieutenant Nakagawas nine plane Chutai went on a slightly different
heading than Setos Chutai and soon both Chutai were out of sight of each other.
Unknown to the Japanese, in what would prove a cruel irony, Vice Admiral Brown
had decided to cancel the raid. Brown realized that one or both of the Type 97
Kawanishis that he had just shot down had probably radioed the Japanese with his
position. With surprise gone, he decided justifiably to cancel the raid and he was
soon going to reverse his course. His second in command Ted Sherman wanted to
go through with the raid but he was overruled; as a concession however, Task Force
11 would continue to sail toward Rabaul as a feint for a few hours. Jimmy Thachs
Division of six Wildcats, that had engaged and shot down the Type 97 Kawanishis
had eventually landed back on Lexington, and the 2 nd Division of fighters led by
Lt.Cmdr.Donald Lovelace took off to fly Combat Air Patrol (CAP). As they were
preparing to land, the 3rd Fighter Division led by Lt.Noel Gayler were about to take
off at 1600. Just then, CXAM picked up a large contact 27 miles west of the carrier. It
shortly disappeared, only to reappear again at 1625, now 50 miles from the ship.
Five minutes later, a new plot showed the contact closing rapidly indicating that the
Japanese attack was inbound.

General quarters was sounded and sailors rushed to their battle stations. Aboard
Lexington, Captain Sherman ordered flank speed (top speed) which was 34 knots
(almost 40 mph). Lexington was protected with 12x5 inch guns mounted on
sponsoons along both sides of the hull. Close defense was handled by 1.1 inch
automatic cannons and .50 caliber machineguns. The two heavy cruisers and seven
destroyers formed a defensive ring around the carrier, but far enough away to allow

it to maneuver freely to avoid bombs; if the Rikko made it past the fighters they
would have to fly through a defensive net of anti-aircraft fire to get to the Lexington.
As Noel Gaylers 3rd Division of six F4F-3 Wildcat fighters took off, Lovelaces 2 nd
Division circled the carrier low on fuel, waiting to be allowed to land. Gaylers six
fighters climbed altitude heading toward the location of the incoming bombers as
directed by the CIC. The Division had taken off in haste and thus they were flying
only in their sections of two; they lacked the time to rendezvous in the air. Back on
Lexington, while Lovelaces planes circled above the carrier waiting to land, the
crews had more than twenty Douglas SBD Dive bombers loaded up with fuel and
bombs on the deck along with four additional F4F-3 fighters, in preparation for the
raid that was just aborted. With Lexington about to be under attack, they had to be
launched because if one bomb landed on the airplanes, all of their fuel tanks would
create an unstoppable fire and their bombs would explode from the heat destroying
Lexington. Since the process of launching all these airplanes would take time,
Lexington ordered Lovelaces Division, to Bolster Gaylers 3 rd Division in defending
Lexington, even though they were very low on fuel. While the four Wildcats on deck
were pushed to the front deck on Lexington to take off, Lt.Jimmy Thach and three of
his pilots from 1st Division manned them to be ready to take off.

USS Lexington

It was Nakagawas 2nd Chutai that found the Lexington first; after bad weather all
across the ocean it was around the Lexington that the weather finally became clear
for Nakagawas nine Type 1 Rikko. As the sun shown and brightly illuminated the
metal American warships, the Americans equally had no trouble spotting
Nakagawas bombers coming in miles away. Nakagawa instructed one of his
radiomen to notify 24th Air Flotilla (koku sentai) headquarters that they were
engaging the American ships; the message was sent approximately at 1635. The
Americans on the warships first spotted Nakagawas bombers while they were still
ten miles from the outermost ship. The nearest fighters were flown by Noel Gayler
and his wingman Ensign Dale Peterson. The Wildcat was very slow to gain altitude
and thus Gayler and Peterson had only a slight altitude advantage over the
bombers. Nakagawas Rikko were flying at 11,500 feet and they were coming in as
fast as they could, close to 260 mph. In the beginning of the war, the Japanese
formed a defensive formation that resembled a ragged V. High-level bombing was
inaccurate, even for the Americans, and thus the Japanese bombers had a system
where they closed up their formation very closely so all their bombs would saturate
a small area of land/water in the hopes of hitting their target. All bombardiers were
trained to watch the lead aircraft, in this case Itos lead Rikko. At the moment Ito
dropped his first bomb all of his command would drop their bombs. It was likely that

if Itos bombardier timed his drop and approach just right, that at least one of the
eighteen 250 kilogram bombs would strike the Lexington.
Typical V formation for Japanese bombers. The 4 th Ku would have been more V
shaped however.

Gayler and Peterson began a shallow dive coming in from the side of the Japanese
formation at 1639. The Japanese defensive gunners were the first to fire from their
waist blisters, with streams of glowing tracers flying past their planes. They were
diving at a fast speed and their front profile was very small to the Japanese
bombers, while their gunsights filled with the nearest bomber. In their firing pass
they both targeted the same bomber; they both scored lethal hits and the Rikko
burst into flames and skidded out of formation, in what would become a familiar end
for the Type 1 for the Japanese. In the span of two minutes, the other four Wildcats
of Gaylers formation reached the Japanese formation in their two man sections, and
another two bombers were shot down and crashed into the sea. By now, the 2 nd
Chutais remaining six bombers came within range of Task Force 11s Anti-Aircraft
guns. In World War 2, there were essentially two types of AA guns. Flak was long
range explosive shells fired from larger caliber artillery pieces. A fire control system
aboard the ship would calculate a planes speed, its height, direction, and predict
where the plane would be in the future. The American fire control system would
then automatically cut the fuse of the 5 shells so that it exploded right where the
plane was predicted to be; the shrapnel from the shells would scatter and if the
plane was nearby, damage it. This produced puffs of black smoke and because this
system made it very difficult to accurately target an aircraft, flak guns would
typically fire volleys at a general area to saturated a given space with as much flak
as possible in the hopes that some of the shells would hit a bomber. When the
enemy plane was close enough, the machineguns and automated cannons would
open up; they fired bullets and small explosive shells. While they were far shorterranged than the larger 5 guns, they could be aimed much faster and had a larger
rate of fire.
While the main batteries (battery being a term for a group of artillery pieces) from
the screening ships opened fire on Nakagawas approaching bombers, Lexington
turned into the wind to launch the last of her vulnerable Dauntless Dive-Bombers.

The 5 gunners had to hold their fire lest the muzzle blast cause any of the dive
bombers to lose control. Typically, at this point friendly fighters would pull back lest
they be shot down by friendly fire from the ships, but Gayler and his squadron
mates decided to ignore the black puffs of smoke bursting all around them and
continue to chase the Japanese bombers. At what may have been a critical moment,
Gayler and Peterson had managed to get into position for a second firing pass and
diving down their fire greatly damaged Nakagawas bomber causing it to fall out of
formation. Continuing through the Japanese formation they continued firing and
knocked another Rikko out of the air in flames. The loss of their lead aircraft-their
chutaicho-probably rattled the surviving bombers and threw off their aim because
they relied on the lead bomber to drop the first bomb before they themselves
dropped their bombs. As a result, the four Rikko still in formation flew over the
Lexington and continued for a ways before wheeling back around, regrouping their
formation and while it wasted several precious minutes, this time they would be
coming from astern of the Lexington, which presented a greater target than coming
from the side, as flying the length of a ship rather than its beam provided hundreds
of extra feet of ship to hit. Right as the four Rikko reached the bomb release point,
the last of the aircraft on Lexingtons flight deck had taken off and at that moment
the twelve 5 guns roared to life firing intense flak at the closing Rikko. At that
moment captain Sherman ordered a series of full rudder turns to spoil the Japanese
aim. It worked. The four Rikko dropped their eight 250 kilogram bombs and they fell
harmlessly into the sea having missed the Lexington. Now that each bomber was
1,100 pounds lighter from having dropped their bombs, they used the new burst of
speed to accelerate away from the deadly Wildcats and AA fire.
After only a few miles, one of the bombers was shot down by a Wildcat leaving just
three remaining, and they separated as they dived toward the ocean to gain speed
to hopefully outrun the Wildcat fighters. Two of the four Wildcats that had taken off
from Lexingtons flight deck were manned by Jimmy Thach and Doc Sellstrom,
having just reached combat altitude and they were giving chase to the three
remaining bombers. They were joined by most of the twelve pilots of the 2 nd and 3rd
Divisions. Having so far shot down six Japanese bombers, the Americans were
bloodthirsty and no longer afraid of their first combat. This caused them to let their
guard down and approach the Japanese bombers recklessly. Undoubtedly eager for
revenge for his fallen comrades, the 20mm rear gunner on one of the Rikko saw as
Lt.Howard Johnson fell directly behind his plane and directly in front of his sights.
Howards plane had already been damaged from defensive fire from one of the
fleeing bombers and he tried to keep pace, but his plane fell directly behind one of
them and at point blank range the tail gunner slammed a barrage of 20mm shells
into the fighter, wounding Johnson in the legs and knocking his engine out. He
bailed out and landed safely in the water and was picked up a few minutes later by
one of the screening destroyers. Ensign John Jack Wilson of the 3 rd Division also
made the mistake of trailing behind one of the bombers. As Thach keyed his radio to
tell him to dive away, the tail gunner also opened fire and destroyed Wilsons

canopy, most likely killing Wilson right then and there. His plane fell into the ocean
five miles from the Lexington; no parachute appeared. Thach in retaliation, dived
toward the offending bomber and shot it down engulfed in flames. He and other
squadmates together collectively then shot down another Rikko, one that had been
damaged by AA fire before and was flying slower than the last remaining Rikko of
the 2nd Chutai.
Meanwhile, nobody noticed as Lieutenant Nakagawas Type 1 Rikko, whom everyone
had just assumed crashed into the ocean, managed to regain control and make its
way toward the Lexington at wave-top height. It amazingly managed to make it to
within two miles of the Carrier before it was detected. It was obvious that the
wounded bomber was going to attempt to deliberately crash into the Lexington.
This was a common tactic for aviators of all nationalities when their plane was too
damaged to make it home; rather than crash needlessly into the ocean, Nakagawa
was going to try and take dozens of American sailors with him. This 20,944 pound
bomber flying at top speed carrying two 250 kilogram bombs and filled with highoctane gasoline would cause massive damage if it crashed into the Lexington.
Captain Sherman ordered the Lexington into a wide turn to present only the narrow
stern to Nakagawa; at 2500 yards away the machinegunners opened up on the
bomber as it approached, but it kept on coming. At of a mile, pieces of the
bomber began to fly off and as it closed in the engines were destroyed. Now the
bomber was gliding in with sheer momentum toward the carrier. Nakagawas
bomber managed to make it within a few dozen yards of the Lexington before its
momentum gave way and it crashed into the sea with a magnificent explosion. Of
the original nine Type 1 Rikko of Nakagawas 2nd Chutai, only one had managed to
escape the fighters and ships; it sped on back toward Rabaul. Twelve minutes had
elapsed since Gayler and Peterson had first opened fire on the bomber formation
and now there were plumes of smoke rising eerily from the graves of the eight
bombers and two Wildcats that had been shot down. Don Lovelace and his five
Wildcats desperately circled the Lexington waiting to land to refuel. Most of the
remaining Wildcats were miles away chasing the surviving Rikkos. It was mentioned
that one bomber escaped the fighters. It made it as far as eighty miles away when a
patrolling Dauntless SBD Dive bomber came across it and shot it down. Ultimately,
Lieutenant Nakagawas 2nd Chutai was completely annihilated, and with it 64
aviators and crewmembers that Japan could not afford to lose.
While the Wildcats were finishing off the remains of Nakagawas chutai miles from
the carrier, only one section flown by Butch OHare and his wingman Lt.Marion
Dufilho remained in orbit above the Task Force flying CAP, extremely unhappy that
they had been ordered not to engage the Japanese bombers. They were for the next
ten minutes or so, the only fighter cover over the Task Force. As if on cue,
Lieutenant Commander Itos eight Type 1 Rikko of the 1 st Chutai appeared. He had
initially led them too far north and by the time he had turned around and found Task
Force 11, the 2nd Chutai had already been wiped out. The Americans were actually

very fortunate; had the two Chutai attacked together in formation, they would have
overwhelmed the American fighter defense and might have carried through with a
flawless bombing run. As it was, coming in piecemeal was enough for the small
American contingent of fighters to pick them off. Either way, only a section of two
Wildcats stood in the way of Itos formation and the American aircraft carrier. Ito
first appeared on the radar at 1649. Minutes later, lookouts aboard the destroyer
USS Patterson made a visual sighting of Itos bombers, which were now only 10
miles from the outer screen. The CIC ordered OHare and Dufhilo to intercept Itos
formation; while going through their precombat checklist however, they were
dismayed to discover that none of Dufhilos guns worked. Apparently, the belt-fed
ammunition was stuck, which was a fairly common thing in early model F4F
Wildcats. While Dufhilo would faithfully remain at his section leaders side to help
attract defensive fire, OHare was the only one who could defend the Task Force
now. OHare had enough ammunition for eighteen seconds of firing time, and with
that he would have to attack eight bombers.
At 1704, as Itos bombers closed in on Lexington, CIC ordered all Wildcats in the air
to immediately return to the Lexington to fend off this bomber attack. The Lexington
turned north into the wind to recover Lovelaces Division, which further simplified
things for Itos bombers as they now wouldnt have to compensate for crosswinds
when aiming for the American carrier. Ito, tragically however, wasted valuable time
in wheeling his formation around in order to approach the American carrier from
astern. Because of this, OHare and his wingman were able to cut inside of the
bombers turns and gain distance to them. As he closed in some of the defensive
gunners opened fire on him, intent on shooting OHare down before he shot them
down. Ignoring this, OHare went for the rearmost Mitsubishi and pulled the trigger
aiming just in front of the bomber. It was a perfect deflection shot as the bomber
piloted by FPO 2nd class Kogiku Ryosuke careened out of formation with its starboard
engine trailing smoke. OHare then immediately targeted another bomber and got
the same result; vaporized gasoline began streaming out of its wing as FPO 1 st class
Maeda Kojis bomber also veered out of formation. OHare then pulled left to avoid
the two stricken bombers and then passed under the Rikko formation before
crossing to the opposite side and then rapidly climbing to reappearing at the left
side of the rearmost Japanese bomber still in formation. Aiming at the bombers right
engine, the bomber shuddered at the impact with its right engine damaged and its
left wing punctured with vaporized gasoline streaming out. It too fell out of
formation. OHare then targeted the next bomber in the line and fired at nearly
point blank range, and this bomber erupted into flames. In two brief firing passes,
OHare had managed to carve the Japanese formation down by half.
All who witnessed the spectacle were awed as hundreds of Japanese defensive
rounds were fired at OHare, leaving a grand pyrotechnic display as the red tracers
seemed to curve all around his plane, and as Japanese planes fell in flames around
him. Dufilho, although unable to fire, made several feints against the Japanese

bombers to help draw fire away from his section leader. However, OHares exploits
have been exaggerated, while he did manage to damage four out of eight Japanese
bombers, only his fourth victim fell in flames to the sea. The other three, in spite of
some severe damage, were managed to be brought back under control by their very
skilled pilots. Nobody seemed to notice as the Rikko piloted by Kogiku actually
managed to regain his place in the formation, bringing the number of bombers still
in formation to five. The Rikko piloted by Petty Officer Maeda managed to snuff out
his engine fire with a built-in carbon dioxide extinguisher (all the Rikko had these in
each engine, but they rarely managed to completely extinguish a flame), but he still
lagged behind due to the reduced speed of having only one engine operational. The
third damaged bomber, piloted by FPO 1st class Mori Bin was too crippled to regain
his place in formation, so he released his bombs into the ocean and withdrew from
the battle area, descending to just above the ocean as he attempted to escape. For
all this damage, OHares plane suffered only one bullet hole, which disabled his airspeed indicator.
As the 1st Chutai approached the American task force, burst of AA fire erupted
around it and OHares Wildcat. Two pieces of shrapnel pierced his plane, but he
continued to set up his third gunnery run. He fired a long burst into a Rikko piloted
by Lt.Mitani Akira, whose bomber burst into flames and plummeted into the ocean.
With Mitanis bomber out of the way, Lieutenant Commander Itos lead bomber was
now in perfect view and OHare fired a burst into the port engine of Itos plane. The
bullets hit with such tremendous kinetic force, that the fourteen-cylinder radial
engine was literally torn from its mountings on the wing, and thus the entire enginepropeller and all-tumbled crazily from the left wing and the bomber instantly spun
out of control from the shock. With about 40 rounds of ammunition left, OHare fired
his remaining ammunition into the Rikko piloted by PO Maeda. In a rare display of
durability, in spite of this additional damage Maedas bomber remained in the air,
though it was still lagging behind the main formation.
Because of OHares extraordinary gunnery skills, only three Type 1 Rikko of 1 st
Chutai remained in formation as they targeted the USS Lexington. Since Maedas
bomber was too far out of position due to his damage to bomb the Lexington, he
instead made his way to the heavy cruiser USS Minneapolis off the carriers port
bow, but both of his bombs missed. At 1709 just as the last of Lovelaces division
landed on the Lexington, the three Mitsubishi bombers arrived at their release point
and dropped their bombs. Captain Sherman ordered rudder hard over, and all six
bombs fell wide of the carrier, though one hit the water near enough to sprinkle the
flight deck with shrapnel. In spite of their skill courage, the Japanese had only
managed to sprinkle the flight deck of their target with bits of shrapnel. Of the three
bombers of 1st Chutai that attacked the Lexington, two were still relatively
unscathed; Kogikus bomber had been damaged earlier on by OHare but had
regained his position in the formation as mentioned. Soon however, about eight
miles from the Task Force, Doc Sellstron shot down the Rikko piloted by FPO 2 nd

Class Baba Tokiharu and it plunged into the ocean. Another bomber piloted by FPO
1st Class Ono Kosuke, was hit in the starboard engine by AA fire as the formation
fled the Task Force having missed it with their bombs. Several Wildcats chased him
and this resulted in a high speed gunfight as Ono tried to evade them at low
altitude. His bomber proved surprisingly rugged as it absorbed .50 caliber slugs to
both the right and left wing and left killed and wounded several crewmembers on
the bomber. Defensive fire from Onos bomber however, was no ineffective as one
bullet hit Noel Gaylers windscreen almost shattering the plexiglass forcing him, and
eventually the remaining Wildcats to withdraw.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant Edward Allen of Scouting Squadron 2, had already shot down
the sole remaining Rikko of the 2nd Chutai in his SBD Divebomber, when he came
across Moris crippled bomber. His bomber had been hit in OHares initial firing
passes and had dropped his bombs in the ocean and withdrew from combat as
mentioned. Allen gave chase to the lone Rikko intending to make a second kill that
day. Mori made no attempt to maneuver his stricken bomber; it would be a deathrace between the two bombers. While Moris Rikko was going flat out, Allens SBD
was 1-2 mph faster and over several minutes eventually gained range on Moris
bomber. Allen came from the left seeing that there was no defensive fire coming
from that blister and made his attack there. He pulled almost directly beneath the
bomber and positioned his SBD so that his rear gunner with the flexible mounted .
30 caliber machinegun could fire straight up into the belly of the Rikko at point
blank range. Allens rear gunner killed at least two of Moris crewmembers this way,
but despite the casualties and heavy damage Moris plane would not go down.
Eventually, Allen found himself 150 miles away from his carrier and reluctantly
withdrew, letting Mori and his surviving crew attempt to make it back to base on
their own.
If OHares gunnery was the most remarkable performance of the day, the
performance of Itos bomber would be a close second. As mentioned, OHares
gunnery had knocked his engine clean off of his port wing leaving a tangled metal
mess as his plane flung out of control to the ocean (the wreckage can be seen in the
photo below). Amazingly, in a superb display of piloting, the crew managed to gain
control of the bomber and then resumed the attack alone. Running on the power of
only one engine, and with a tangled metal mess where the port engine was
supposed to be, there was now a tremendous amount of drag to combat. The pilot
made a full opposite rudder and threw full power to the good engine; his
tremendous skill managed to barely keep the bomber aloft in the air. The crew knew
they were doomed; they couldnt produce enough power to keep the plane from
slowly descending to the ocean and they couldnt escape the AA fire. The crew
attempted a taiatari (body-crashing) just as Lieutenant Nakagawa had attempted to
do not a half hour prior. Itos heroic attempt was immortalized in film of his demise
taken on board the Lexington. Just as Nakagawas earlier attempt, Ito approached
Lexington from low altitude from the stern. However, as the Lexington veered away

from the bomber, the Rikko made no attempt to turn toward the American carrier;
keeping the plane flying just a minute longer was all the crew could manage. Facing
withering fire and being shot up, Itos bomber flew past the Lexington which had
maneuvered out of the way, and continued flying as far as it could before diving
down into the ocean less than a mile from the port bow. With the skies cleared of
attackers, the Wildcats one by one landed on the Lexington; OHare was targeted by
a .50 caliber machine gunner who shot as his fighter even as he landed, though
thankfully missed every shot. He was mobbed upon landing; all on board the
Lexington had witnessed him tearing into the 1 st Chutai.

Aftermath

A few hours after the attack, at approximately 1945, two damaged Type 1
Rikko from the 1st Chutai landed back at Vunakanau airfield, Rabaul. Only the planes
piloted by Petty Officers Kogiku and Maeda had managed to make it back to Rabaul
and land individually; they had somehow managed to find each other while flying
back and formed up, grateful that each wasnt the sole survivor. Petty Officer Mori,
in his crippled bomber managed to keep his airplane aloft somehow, and without
any maps (they had been blown away by AA fire) navigated his way hundreds of
miles back to Rabaul. The slightest deviation of course would have him not finding
Rabaul. Soon after night fell, because his fuel tanks had been ruptured, the fuel of
his Rikko ran out and thus Mori made a wheels-up water landing in the darkness
with the Rikko slamming into the water hard; he and a few survivors escaped the
sinking wreck and swam together not knowing where they were. Seeing a distant
light, they shouted wildly but received no reply. They then fired a signal flare and
the light drew nearer causing moments of apprehension. The crew had agreed
beforehand that if they were in enemy territory they would commit suicide. To their

great relief, they heard voices speaking Japanese and they were soon rescued.
Amazingly, their Rikko had gone down in Simpson harbor itself, only a few miles
short of Vunakanau airfield at Rabaul. The bomber piloted by Petty Officer Ono
limped away from the battle area with his right engine shot out and fuel leaking
from his left wing in addition to having several crewmembers dead. The Rikko was
still some two hundred miles short of Rabaul when the left engine quit from fuel
starvation, but at that very moment, like a blessing from heaven, an island
appeared. Ono had stumbled across the Nuguria Islands, a tiny atoll east of New
Ireland, and so he managed to ditch his bomber beside the beach and staggered
ashore. Islanders there offered coconuts and other food in exchange for cigarettes,
however, they were in no mood to eat after watching their comrades getting
massacred. The next day, a Type 97 Kawanishi flew by and dropped a parcel into the
ocean; it was lost but the survivors were relieved to know that their whereabouts
were known. A few hours later another Kawanishi appeared and this time the
package they dropped was received; it had food and a message saying that rescue
was on the way. Ono and the survivors spent the rest of the day cremating the dead
and they were picked up by boat on 22 February.
Possibly in an attempt to offset their catastrophic loss, the survivors at Rabaul
submitted grossly exaggerated reports of victory. Naval correspondent at Rabaul,
Miyake Toshio, spun this as a story of great victory for the news papers to print out
in Japan. The newspapers reported that an enemy aircraft carrier had been blasted
off New Guinea. The story claimed that ten American fighters had been shot down
in a spectacular air dual, during which some of the Japanese planes resorted to
fierce body-crashing tactics, severely damaging the aircraft carrier and causing it to
burst into flames. A cruiser was also claimed as sunk, while the Japanese losses
were halved with the admission that nine planes had failed to return. Over the
next few weeks, at least five more articles about the air battle appeared in Japanese
newspapers, each filled with dramatically glorious-and fictional-accounts of the
deaths of Ito, Mitani, Nakagawa, and Seto who had each crashed their planes into
the American carrier. The Johokyoku (Information Bureau) made absolutely certain
that the Japanese people were never made aware of what actually occurred in the
battle, that it had been an absolute disaster for the 24 th koku sentai, with almost the
whole of the 4th ku wiped out. Two Type 97 Kawanishi flying boats had been shot
down and of the original seventeen Type 1 Rikko sent out on the mission, only two
managed to return with damaged planes, while two others ditched in the sea each
with dead crewmembers. To make matters worse, a third Type 97 Kawanishi failed to
return from its patrol, likely lost due to mechanical malfunctions or the poor
weather. For managing to shoot down two F4F-3 Wildcats and not landing any hits
on the American aircraft carrier, the Japanese had sacrificed the lives of more than
120 highly trained aviators on 20 February, 1942. Included in this number was the
hikotaicho Lt.Cmdr.Ito Takuzo, and the two buntaicho, Lt.Nakagawa Masayoshi and
Lt.Seto Yogoro.

Despite the fact that the raid had been called off, the American crews on board the
Lexington had plenty to celebrate about. Fourteen pilots and one rear gunner were
officially credited with shooting down sixteen bombers and two flying boats. In
exchange, they had lost two Wildcat fighters and one pilot. The Navys highest
medal for combat valor, the Navy Cross, was awarded to seven pilots. The next
highest awarded, the Distinguished Flying Cross, was awarded to eight other pilots.
In the beginning of the war, to help keep up morale, the Americans handed out
medals left and right; these deeds wouldnt have warranted anyone other than
OHare and maybe Thach a medal had they occurred later in the war. Eventually,
OHare would get the Medal of Honor. Though he had only shot down two bombers
(Itos was finished off by Lexingtons AA fire; Kojiku and Maeda landed intact at
Rabaul, and Mori ditched his plane in Simpson harbor), his gallant defense had only
allowed three of the eight bombers to make their runs against the Lexington. He
was proclaimed the savior of the Lexington and the American media now had a
desperately needed hero in a war that they were losing every battle in thus far.
OHare would not survive the war; he was killed in late 1943 during a night
operation in the Central Pacific, while intercepting other Type 1 Rikkos heading
toward his Task Force. In honor of Butch OHare, his hometown of Chicago changed
the name of the local airfield to Orchart Depot to OHare International. In the
decades sense, of the millions that have used one of the worlds busiest airports,
precious few have ever knew who OHare was or his link to the obscure 4 th kokutai.
The day after the catastrophe, on 21 February the real 1 st Chutai under the
command of Lt.Yamagata flew in from Saipan to Vunakanau airstrip with ten Type 1
Rikko. With the two from the 3rd Chutai that managed to make it back from the
failed Lexington attack the previous day, and the one bomber that had to abort the
attack due to mechanical problems, the 4th kokutai had thirteen Type 1 Rikko,
though not all were operational yet. The combat damage still had to be repaired and
the rate of attrition would ensure at least one or two were always in need of repair.
In spite of the grievous losses, there could be no respite in this war. On 24 February,
Lieutenant Yamagata led nine Type 1 Rikko with an escort of eight Zeros on the
units first raid against Port Moresby, New Guinea. This would mark the long air-war
of attrition in New Guinea which it, and the American invasion of Guadalcanal in the
Solomon Islands in early August of that year, would bleed the Japanese naval air
units white during the next year. A war of attrition it would be. The Nakai Shitai
(south seas detachment) that had invaded Rabaul on 23 January, 1942 would
eventually be reinforced to include almost 13,000 troops. It would launch a
disastrous overland attack across the Owen Stanley mountain range in New Guinea
in an attempt to take Port Moresby from the Australians. Dying from disease,
infection, and starvation just as much as Australian bullets, they made it within
miles of the city before being forced to withdraw back across the mountains to
Buna-Gona. There, the Australians would counterattack, annihilating the remaining
unit. Less than 3% of the nankai shitai would be alive at the end of the war. On 7
May, 1942 the 4th Ku sortied again with twelve Type 1 Rikko, again to sink the USS

Lexington during the battle of Coral sea. Half of those bombers would be shot down.
On 7 August, twenty-seven Type 1 Rikko of various units attempted to sink American
aircraft carriers off Guadalcanal, they failed and four were downed. The next day
twenty-three Rikko attacked the fleet again, this time armed with torpedoes. Only
five severely damaged Type 1 Rikko managed to return to Rabaul. On 17 November,
1942 nineteen Type 1s attacked a US convoy off Lunga point, Guadalcanal and
fourteen were shot down. These were the severe losses that the Rikko units
suffered, and this was only 1942; they would increase and become worse as the war
dragged on.
While Japanese high command were disturbed by the high casualty rate suffered by
the 4th Ku on 20 February, 1942 they merely dismissed it as the result of sending
bombers to attack targets without fighter escort. Whatever time they would have
had to dwell on it and come up with solutions, immediately overshadowed when a
few days later, Singapore surrendered to the Imperial Japanese Army. The stirring
victories would only continue with the fall of the country of Burma in April and the
surrender of the American forces in the Philippines. Eventually Sumatra, Java, Timor,
and Carem were added to the major islands now under Japanese control bringing
the entire area now known as Indonesia firmly under Japanese control. Meanwhile,
Kido Butai raided Darwin, Australia and sank tends of merchant ships and destroyed
the bases full complement of war planes, in what has been likened as Australias
Pearl Harbor. The carrier task force next raided into the Indian Ocean, sinking the
British Carrier Hermes and two of their heavy cruisers with the most accurate divebombing attacks in military history; thus far not a single Allied person had even
seen the six fleet carriers. Until May 1942, Japan was winning the war badly, and
they saw little reason to give themselves serious self-criticism when they won
wherever they fought.
While the Rikko concept was undoubtedly completely obsolete in 1943, it was
perhaps still an effective tactic/doctrine during the time of Admiral Browns abortive
raid against Rabaul. While in the future, American anti-aircraft fire would be deadly
accurate, in the beginning stages of the war it was inaccurate. The only bombers
that the Americans managed to shoot down during the 4 th Kus attack were those
commanded by Lieutenant Nakagawa and Lieutenant Commander Ito, which were
already too damaged by fighter attacks to escape. Also, US Carrier doctrine at this
point was to operate carriers singly, thus no carrier could ever amass a large fighter
screen to defend itself against large scale air attacks. As it was, Admiral Brown not
losing his carrier Lexington had more to do with luck, than with the design flaws of
the Type 1 Rikko. It was fortunate to him the Type 91 Aerial Torpedoes had not yet
been delivered; if they had it is highly likely that Japanese would have scored at
least one hit, which would have possibly crippled the carrier and make it vulnerable
to successive attacks. Admiral Brown was lucky that Yamagatas Chutai was still
based on Saipan, leaving the 4th Ku at Rabaul under-strength. In spite of the fact
that almost the entire F4F Wildcat fighter complement on the carrier had been

thrown against Nakagawas chutai, four bombers out of nine still managed to make
it through the fighter screen and AA fire to drop their bombs against Lexington. If
Nakagawas and Itos Chutai had managed to stay together while flying toward the
Lexington, the American fighter defenses would have been overwhelmed, never
mind if Yamagatas Chutai had been present. Finally, the Americans were fortunate
that the Japanese Zero fighters had not yet received their external fuel tanks. Had
the Type 1 Rikko had fighter cover from their own fighters, which were superior to
the American Wildcat fighter, its likely only a few bombers would have been lost. As
it was, the Japanese failure during this raid had much more to do with events that
were beyond their immediate control, than to the superiority of American naval and
air doctrine. Literally everything had gone according to plan except for sinking the
carrier: the Japanese long-range reconnaissance had detected the American carrier
a day from launch point; the 4th Kokutai had managed to find the American Task
Force through hundreds of miles of open ocean, and they had succeeded in keeping
their formation to carry out bombing runs against the carrier. At this stage of the
war, the Japanese Rikko concept was still valid and deadly against the Allied navy,
and it would only be made obsolete and suicidal in the future.
While Japan thankfully lost the war, I cannot help but feel profound sorrow for the
loss of so many people in a completely futile war. Airmen with families who cared for
them; crewmembers who had aspirations for the future and good memories with
their comrades and friends being sacrificed by the hundreds to die a pointless death
where their bodies could never be recovered, in places that nobody has ever heard
of. For me, a newer generation, I feel a sense of duty that their struggle be
remembered by me, and by those that come after me. Not because Imperial Japan
was right to wage such a devastating war, but because these men had nothing to
do with the politics, and their suffering and deaths were just as tragic as the
American lives they themselves took. Being shot down in a Type 1 Rikko was not a
pleasant death. Assuming the initial barrage of bullets didnt kill you, your plane
would either explode outright, or be consumed in flames. The bullets would put
holes in the fuel tanks, and usually a tracer round or incendiary round would light
them on fire and soon the fuselage would be streaming with gasoline on fire,
coating everything in searing flame. The flames in the wing would almost
immediately burn away at the wires that controlled the ailerons and elevators which
would cause the plane to fall out of control. The G-forces of having the bomber
falling at hundreds of miles per hour spinning would throw you/pin you against
whatever surface happened to be in front of you, as burning gasoline poured all
over your body. The crewmembers could barely move from the G-forces as they
were literally burned alive in the minutes it took their plane to hit the ground or
ocean, mercifully killing them. I tried to write the following in a way that *might*
capture some type of interest, and maybe provide some insight into why this is a
passion for me to learn about.