Remedial Actions Enron had undertaken before it declared Bankruptcy:

By the end of 2000, Enron uses aggressive accounting to declare $53 million in
earnings for its Broadband services on a collapsing deal that had not earney any
profit.

By March, 2001, Enron transferred large portions of Enron Energy Services (EES)
business into wholesale to hide EES losses.

A little less than a month after the September 11, 2001 terrorism attacks on the
United States, Enron begin the process of selling its lower-margin assets in favor of
its core businesses of gas and electricity trading. This policy included selling Portland
General Electric to another Oregon utility, Northwest Natural Gas, for about $1.9
billion in cash and stock, and possibly selling its 65% stake in the Dabhol project in
India.

On October 12, 2001, Arthur Andersen who is the legal counsel of Enron ordered the
auditors to destroy all Enron files except its most basic documents.

On October 16, 2001, there had been restatements to its financial statements for
years 1997 to 2000 to avoid accounting violations.The restatements for the period
reduced earnings by $613 million, increased liabilities at the end of 2000 by $628
million and reduced equity by $1.2 billion. Almost $180 million was spent in
restructuring the companys troubled broadband trading unit.

On October 27, 2001, the company began buying back all its commercial paper,
valued at around $3.3 billion, in an effort to calm investor fears about Enron's supply
of cash. Enron financed the re-purchase by depleting its lines of credit at several
banks. While the company's debt rating was still considered investment-grade,
its bonds were trading at levels slightly less, making future sales problematic.

On November 2, 2001, Enron was able to secure an additional $1 billion in financing

from cross-town rival Dynegy but the news was not universally admired in that the
debt was secured by assets from the company's valuable Northern Natural Gas
and Transwestern Pipeline.

On November 7, 2001, there was a proposed buyout of Dynegy at a very low price of
about $8 billion in stock. Chevron Texaco, which at the time owned about a quarter of
Dynegy, agreed to provide Enron with $2.5 billion in cash, specifically $1 billion at
first and the rest when the deal was completed. Dynegy would also be required to
assume nearly $13 billion of debt, plus any other debt hitherto occluded by the Enron
management's secretive business practices, possibly as much as $10 billion in
"hidden" debt. Dynegy and Enron confirmed their deal on November 8, 2001.

Another major correction of Enron's earnings was announced on November 9, 2001,

with a reduction of $591 million of the stated revenue of years 19972000. The
charges were said to come largely from two special purpose partnerships (JEDI and
Chewco). The corrections resulted in the virtual elimination of profit for fiscal year
1997, with significant reductions for the other years. Despite this disclosure, Dynegy
declared it still intended to purchase Enron.

On November 19, 2001, Enron restates its third quarter earnings and discloses a
$690 million debt is due on November 27.

By mid-November, Enron announced it was planning to sell about $8 billion worth of

underperforming assets, along with a general plan to reduce its scale for the sake of
financial stability.

Enron was also then preparing for large-scale layoffs, primarily in Houston, where it
employs 7,500.

It also made an effort to talk with leading financial institutions to restart its huge
trading operations through a new joint venture. Under this strategy, the partnership
would use the institutions' financial strength to guarantee that Enron would pay its
bills, thus giving other energy traders confidence to resume doing business with
Enron. People close to the talks said that Enron's two leading banks, J. P. Morgan
Chase and Citigroup, were among the institutions discussing the joint venture. In an
interview yesterday, Jeff McMahon, Enron's chief financial officer, said that
establishing a joint venture makes the best sense for creditors. While Enron has a
large pipeline business and other tangible properties, its core energy-trading
operation was by far its most valuable franchise and the biggest generator of profits.
Enron said that it would provide the new operation with traders, technology and a
back office. Trades would be done through EnronOnline, the Internet platform that
was until recently the industry's largest market maker. Any joint venture would be
subject to the approval of a bankruptcy judge.

Its CEO Jeffrey Skilling, hid the financial losses of the trading business and other
operations of the company by the method of mark to market accounting. In such
case, the company, would build an asset such as power plant and immediately claim
the projected profits in its books even though it hadnt been realized. If the revenue
from the power plant were less than the projected amount, instead of taking the loss,
the company would then transfer these assets to an off-the-books corporation, where
the loss would go unreported. This type of accounting enabled Enron to write off
losses. The mark to market accounting led to schemes that were designated to hide
the losses and make the company appear to be more profitable than it really was.

Fastow and others at Enron orchestrated a scheme to use off-balance-sheet special

purpose vehicles (SPVs), also know as special purposes entities (SPEs) to hide
mountains of debt and toxic assets from investors and creditors. The primary aim of
these SPVs was to hide accounting realities, rather than operating results. The
standard Enron-to-SPV transaction occurred when Enron transferred some of its
rapidly rising stock to the SPV in exchange for cash or a note. The SPV would
subsequently use the stock to hedge an asset listed on Enron's balance sheet. In
turn, Enron would guarantee the SPV's value to reduce apparent counterparty risk.
Enron believed that its stock price would keep appreciating but eventually its stocks
declined. One major difference between Enron's use of SPVs and standard debt
securitization is that its SPVs were capitalized entirely with Enron stock. This directly
compromised the ability of the SPVs to hedge if Enron's share prices fell.

In 1998, A narrowly split board approved the Wessex deal, which formed the core of
Azurix Corp., to be run by Rebecca Mark, the hard-charging Enron executive who
had negotiated the Dabhol deal and other investments around the world. But if Azurix
was a prime example of Enron's sketchy investment strategy, it also demonstrated
how the company tried to disguise its problems with financial alchemy. To set up the
company, Enron formed a partnership called the Atlantic Water Trust, in which it held

a 50% stake. That kept Wessex off Enron's balance sheet. Enron's partner in the joint
venture was Marlin Water Trust, which consisted of institutional investors. To help
attract them, Enron promised to back up the debt with its own stock if necessary. But
if Enron's credit rating fell below investment grade and the stock fell below a certain
point, Enron could be on the hook for the partnership's $915 million in debt.
Sources:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enron_scandal
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/03/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-corpfiles-largest-us-claim-for-bankruptcy.html
http://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/business/worldbusiness/timeline-a-chronology-of-enroncorp.html
http://www.agsm.edu.au/bobm/teaching/BE/Enron/timeline.html
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2001-12-16/the-fall-of-enron