Republic

SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court,
disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was amended to
include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of
the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was

granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him
in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag
was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to
admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in
the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of
several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he
claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the
time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention
his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket
below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by
the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also
said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the
watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did
not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing
that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial
judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the

opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful
pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or
expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of
this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the
accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later
nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC
authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to
the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that
particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular
operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim
that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found
in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The
decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this
after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the
search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

A Yes, sir.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by
boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one
saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks
before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with
respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9.
For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984,
did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?

A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for
security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

ATTY. LLARIZA:

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming
with drugs?

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25,
1984?

A Marijuana, sir.
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was
received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject
mentioned in your intelligence report?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

A No, more.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
Q Why not?
A Yes, sir.
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June
23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming.
Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a
search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere
lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is
still a government of laws and not of men.

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was
a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless
arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless
searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed,
as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics
agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the
accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years
of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without
charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of
arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and
the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own
words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty.
The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if
his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It
is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was
not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals.
The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their
intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of
the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As
Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free
society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

The information against accused-appellants reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant
is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy
with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found
in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana which are prohibited.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

The antecedent facts are as follows:

EN BANC
G.R. No. 133917

Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the

accusation against them.6Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S.
Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.

February 19, 2001

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA
@ "BOBOY", accused-appellants.

Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine
National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he
came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996.
SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer
pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accusedappellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest.
Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge
of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the
society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those
values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. 1
For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias "Boboy," guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them to
suffer the supreme penalty of death.

At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an

information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time
that morning.9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched
the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1
Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the
house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At
that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." 11 SPO1

Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were
accosted.12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant
Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina.
Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will
settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court. 17A
motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied.
Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint
memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any
evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence
through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of
the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of
Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are
sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection
under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for
by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the
entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila,
for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate
action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.19

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules
of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants
contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN
SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS
NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC.
8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he
prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated
upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution
provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.21

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article
III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and
so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.23
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in
plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures;24 and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search). 25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede
the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed. 26 As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest
of escaped prisoners ).27
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that
the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by

the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. 28 This brings us to the issue of whether or not
the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal
knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed
in People v. Doria,30probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief
of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the
accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the MNWilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as
the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to
side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning,
as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable
cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been
inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also,
in People v. Encinada,33the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act
of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1.nt

Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was
attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and
Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'" 35 In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the
Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime
had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. 36
It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving
very fast" - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner
was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and
from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale
bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have
been visible to Yu.37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify
their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to
be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that
accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request
of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the
"suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is
an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect

an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did
not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of
accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned
Mula's name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer
while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded
SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the latter
was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With
respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen
him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants
even before the arrest, to wit
"QWhen you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person
and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another
person?
ABecause I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and
Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon.
He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is
Nazario Molina"39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1
Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was
not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the
arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity,
and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant
Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus,

lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers.
Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the
consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show
any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode
the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to
appellant under such bare circumstances."40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts
for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights
and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends
even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias "Bobong"
and
Gregorio
Mula
y
Malagura alias "Boboy",
areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the

necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a
plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and
"A-2," 4 while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a
search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. 5

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997

SAMMY
MALACAT
y
MANDAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was
charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 2 as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep,

At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its
witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer;
and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated
National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at
about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot
patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two
groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted
at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These
men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast." 6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both
groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men,
who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and
apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X"
mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report
that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of
Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990,
likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade.
The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his

companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further
admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon
Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a
commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions
approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
from petitioner. 9
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a
certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith,
Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to
remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite
Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions
even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled
confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and
booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the grenade to the
Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit
for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it
was inadmissible in evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included,
among other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March
1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO
Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the
subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During
the preliminary examination of the grenade, he "[f]ound that [the] major components
consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present," and concluded that the
grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a certification
stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July
1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening
of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after,
several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched
petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was

arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was
accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he
allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then
inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who
shot me." Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in
Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and
guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the
grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a
"stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 15 Probable
cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however,
the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have
been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
"[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant,
threatens the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as
petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
"reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an
officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover
evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to
a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police
investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that
sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial
court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under
Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE
(1) DAY OFRECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30)
YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.

On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was

appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of
Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. 21
In his Appellant's Brief

22

filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSEDAPPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of
the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People
vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized,
inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court
and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting,
first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade
was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that
the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue. Further,
respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand
grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause for the arrest as
petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade and
in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza
Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic
activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not
mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site

especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an unlicensed

grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire
belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb
threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the
latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a
reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and
dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for
Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming numerous
others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there
was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in
saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind of proof
necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of everyday life on which a
reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which
petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at]
the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the
police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of
terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a
bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they
conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the
person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in
Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns
the following errors:

1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL

COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE
VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity
of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of
Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the evidence for the prosecution
merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that come (sic)
nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities between his case
and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals
miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged
decision..
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the
penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully
possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the
penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg.
129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII
of the Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life

imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section
5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's
decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals
and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the
petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the
Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the
parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution
failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in
and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade
he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an
"X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this
claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer
Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer
Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on
19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received
was the very same grenade seized from petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared
that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated from
petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo,
and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner.
Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of
evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was
with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow
officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow
officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then
unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity

to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have
been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution, which provide as follows:

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest.
No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist
petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the
investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid
as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and
search of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are
found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . .

Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk"
with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his
arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and
of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in
terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their
allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these
cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In
this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be
made the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the
arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which the
latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or
property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or
that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means
of escaping or committing violence. 38

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just
been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a
"limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman
and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment . . . 39
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," 40it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience
and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the
general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the
recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported
by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly
chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise
diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search
petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim
that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the
affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5)
other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast"
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir. 42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged

grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications
as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner
was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the
trial court:

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet
aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging
object in [sic] his person.43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of
Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY
MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from
detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87059 June 22, 1992

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on
the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his
warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as
evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of
the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly
received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that
was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police
District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspiciouslooking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later
narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw
two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They
approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accusedappellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in

the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote
and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the
Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the
arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The
defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential

Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one
(1)
Serial No. 8720-T

cal.

38

"S

&

W"

bearing

without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen
from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to
Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating
the articles stolen from him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort
to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed
instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest. 3
The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C
and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the
principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was
sentenced
to reclusion
perpetua. 4

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article
III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not
applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the
seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at
all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour
and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the
morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly
after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the
shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his
being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree
with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a
penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining
the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of
the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at
least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary
as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting
officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could

On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why
his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the
telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending
crime.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of
the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the
arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish.
In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before
him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to
contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we
subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently
established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By
no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down
a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers.
He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense
in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short,
there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed
with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not
been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and
neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only
later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the
robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal
possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this
only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he
was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let
alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was
involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the
fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v.
Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with
a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime?
There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be
observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest
must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case
of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched
just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting
officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the
ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the
firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most
important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote
(which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accusedappellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but
did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was
acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her
representation even more commendable.

The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it
happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their
disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible
the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very
cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of
the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed
to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accusedappellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained
for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128587

March 16, 2007

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18,
RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this
Court via this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated
13 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos.
96-149990 to 96-149992, entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen,

granting private respondent Lawrence C. Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting

him of the three (3) charges filed against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990
for Violation of Section 16, Article III in relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2) Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No.
96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in relation to R.A. No. 7166
(COMELEC Gun Ban).

loaded magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which
is a public place, on the date which is covered by an election period, without first securing
the written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as provided by the
COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act 7166.

The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:

During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and
instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by
the police operatives. Thus, the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered
for him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases followed.

Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):

That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known
as SHABU contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately
29.2941 kilograms, containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug,
without the corresponding license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one
loaded magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine
loaded with ammunitions without first having secured the necessary license or permit
therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one

Contrary to law. 4

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local Government, namely,
Captain Margallo, Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal,
arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly known as
shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck,
alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment
operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested
while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company.
Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they
were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not
disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. 6 They also
disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of
17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa
Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light
on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito
Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same
under surveillance.

Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of
17 May 1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the
apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness)
together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang,
introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that
he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car.7 When frisked, there was found inside the front right
pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic
Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the
operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in
the amount ofP650,000.00; (c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an
unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang
was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to
Evidence.9 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation 10 to the effect
that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two
cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the
Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, 11 praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and
search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang
filed an Amplification12 to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February
1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition13 alleging that the warrantless search was legal
as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the
defense to present its evidence.

WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the

accused is acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of
Comelec Gun Ban, for lack of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms and the two unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one
Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated in favor of the government and the branch
clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to the Dangerous Drugs Board in
Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and Explosive Units, PNP,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge of PARAC,
Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the confiscated
amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered
owner, David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court
erred I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2,
ARTICLE III OF THE CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF
ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A
LAWFUL ARREST.
lII

On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the
herein assailed Resolution14 granting Wangs Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of
all charges for lack of evidence, thus:

XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE

SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV

XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS

SUBMISSION AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND
HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY
THE PROSECUTION AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition,
required the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from
notice. Private respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, 18 which the Office of
the Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions. 19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda, 20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial
courts resolution granting Wangs demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the
charges against him without violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy; and (b) whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2,
paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by
mere filing of a notice of appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this
Court. Then, too, it bears stressing that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a
part of due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in
the manner provided for by law (Velasco v. Court of Appeals 21). Although Section 2, Rule
122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any party may appeal, the right of the
People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly made subject to the prohibition
against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that appeal in criminal cases
throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the appellate court, that is

why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double
jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused
after an acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this
general rule, however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan 22 presents one exception to the rule on
double jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments
on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder
cases to the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as
mandatorily required by the known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive
jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed by military men) made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court, which is the
very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote, "jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be
much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual
cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public
respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive
arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those
categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed
against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make
him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and
opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial
of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to
stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and
equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools
of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of
repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial

justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or
redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused
before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to
due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious
assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial
of the century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.

Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People
vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of
the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.

1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked

against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal
where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
due process. As the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,

Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
a criminal case by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly
recent case of People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial courts decision which granted the
two separate demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of
court, resulting in their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency
of evidence. In resolving the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the
occasion to explain:

Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case,
its right to due process is thereby violated.

The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:

The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts
are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process
raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416
Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).

In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy

faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case,
verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases
of United States v. Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v.
Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental
philosophy behind the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As succinctly observed in Green v.
United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy
(Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx

The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held
in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan:

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is " filed after the
prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant
of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused
in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there. (Italics in the
original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court,
in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) which reversed the accuseds acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by
the accused with leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and
authenticity of certain letter marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively
identified therein petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a
petition for certiorari, sustained the CAs power to review the order granting the demurrer
to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving
accuseds demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there
is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial
court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the
dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his
own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus
in People v. Velasco:

The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the
citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the
concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the AngloAmerican system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant
is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent
against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined
exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a
desire to know the exact extent of ones liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jurys leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent
proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accuseds right against double jeopardy, even an
appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance
when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was
denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while
certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
(Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial
courts granting an accuseds demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void
judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or
set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of
the accused against double jeopardy is not violated.

Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the
Court in the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 raising a pure question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the
distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:

rendition of the judgment or order complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original
parties to the action. In contrast, the parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved
party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial
agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court
so declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari
may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from
the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished

Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which
shall be explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not
deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice
would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action
of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower
court -- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of
judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and
power of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in
accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower
courts. An appeal is thus a continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is
an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the

As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from
the said notice of judgment or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served
within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely
filed motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the
petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order,
or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from
the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the
motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and
adequate remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before
appealing a judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon
demurrer to evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in
double jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case,
this petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal

order of the trial court by appeal without violating private respondents right against
double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari,
which definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail
on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and
the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted
as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful
arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. 26However, if there
are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the
accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto27 without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar,
the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all
the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the
inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial
courts ratiocination is quoted as follows:

Pistol that the accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket
of his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an
outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done
by the accused. The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the
accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see him in possession thereof
immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were
not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo
handgun was underneath the drivers seat of the car. The police officers had no
information, or knowledge that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere suspicion
that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel
and SP03 Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONELS TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination

The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his
warrantless arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as
asserted by the defense.

Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?

Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a
person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it, and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being transferred from one
confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when the accused
was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was
about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and
searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his
arrest. Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he
had just committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up

xxx xxx xxx

A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.

Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?

A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street,
Ermita, Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the
accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we
have previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in
Ermita, Manila.

A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and
likewise when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white
crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?

xxx xxx xxx

A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at
the place under the seat of the driver.

Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?

Q. Then what happened?

A. We waited for him.

A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?

Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?

A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory
examination.

A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.

Q. Did you come to know the results?
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.

A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November
15, 1996).

Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?

ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS

A. That was when the accused arrived.

Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on
May 16, 1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?

Q. How many of your approached him.

A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to
open the back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency,
is it not?

Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not?

A. Yes, Sir.

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
A. I supposed, Sir.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not?
Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the
Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your
companions look for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio, is it not?

A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996)

A. Yes, Sir.

PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION

Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence

Wang, is it not?

Q. What is you role or participation in this case?

A. Yes, Sir.
Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time
searched the BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.

SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBALS TESTIMONY

A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him,
Mr. Witness?

xxx xxx xxx

A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside
his car.

Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not?

xxx xxx xxx

A. He was outside, Sir.

Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell
us the antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?

Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it
not?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.

A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?

A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.

COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?

COURT: The same date?

A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.

A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck
mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.

COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of
the shabu?

COURT: Why were these people, arrested?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

A. For violation of R.A. 6425.

COURT: What was the information?

COURT: How were they arrested?

A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.

A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another
previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.

COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.

COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?

COURT: When?
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2
Vergel de Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested
they divulged the name of the source.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the
name of the person from whom they get shabu.
COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them
call Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another
supply of shabu.

A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996.

COURT: At what place?
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa
Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: What happened during the stake out?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car
together with his driver.

COURT: So there was an entrapment?

COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?

A. Yes, Your Honor.

A. Probably, Sir.

COURT: What did you do?

A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside
the compartment of the car.

Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover
that Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were
confiscated from the three men that you have arrested?
A: Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?

Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also
these two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?

A. We approached him.

A: Yes, Sir.

COURT: What happened when you approached him?

xxx xxx xxx

A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.

Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your
team?

COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do
with that?

A: Yes, Sir.

A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one
who inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 1524, December 16, 1996).

Q: You were present while they were investigated?

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT

xxx xxx xxx

COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has
gathered that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team
arrested. One of whom is a police officer.

Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them
at the time of the (their) arrest?

A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated
from them?

A: I was the one whom investigated them.

A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working
for the accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu
scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is
scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.

A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?

A: No, Sir.

A: No, Sir.

Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from
searching his car?

xxx xxx xxx

A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the
matter concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you
and did your team suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead
(led) to the arrest of Redentor and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was
carrying a gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun
is when he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed
to me the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do
something unlawful or illegal?

Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and
the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did
not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5,
Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional
right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the
search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental
search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence
thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of
evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch
as it has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated
drugs and unlicensed firearms in the accuseds possession had been validly made upon
probable cause and under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the
accused must necessarily have to be regarded as having been made on the occasion of
the commission of the crime in flagrante delicto, and therefore constitutionally and
statutorily permissible and lawful."28 In effect, the People now contends that the
warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case falls under an
exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and seizure,
the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
cars trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a
matter of credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in
an appeal of a criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in
the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding
upon the Court. Since a dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not
subject to appeal and reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest
preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court. The only legal basis for this Court to
possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to

evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a warrantless
arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless
arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully
effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based
on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect
was the author of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case
is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer.291awphi1.nt
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa

Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives
arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee.
He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is
clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was
arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu.
Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu
they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duos declaration that there will be a
delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day, May 17, which is only a few
hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria
Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said
apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence
Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish
the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph
(b) of Section 5.
And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless
arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is
likewise unlawful.
In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana
found in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been
illegally seized, in disregard of the Bill of Rights:
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so

subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification of the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officer (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
The Peoples contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and
seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an
otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his
arrest and the search on his person and belongings. 32 The implied acquiescence to the
search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33 Moreover, the continuing objection to
the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters
Wangs claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of
order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think
it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 34
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 170180

November 23, 2007

the

Philippines
COURT

ARSENIO
VERGARA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

VALDEZ, Petitioner,

DECISION

CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with
the prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay,
La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo
Ordoo (Ordoo), who arrested petitioner.

TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only
ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.1 Any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
principles of government.2
On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the
Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March
2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165) 5 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as
maximum and ordering him to pay a fine ofP350,000.00.6
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A.
No. 9165 in an Information7 which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of
La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the
necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.

Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was conducting
the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La
Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight
from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,
seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly
attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him
to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred by
Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly contained a
pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in
newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for
further investigation.9
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On crossexamination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of Mercado. 10 Nonetheless, he
claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of
his bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was
ordered by Mercado to open petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.11
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic
chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from
petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of
the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic bag, tested positive of
marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination, however, that he had knowledge neither
of how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the said substance reached
the police officers. Moreover, he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of
the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenses sole witness, he testified that at
around 8:30 p.m. on 17 March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-oy,
Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the

house of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brothers house. As he
was walking, prosecution witness Ordoo, a cousin of his brothers wife, allegedly
approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was going to
his brothers house. Ordoo then purportedly requested to see the contents of his bag
and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After
inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by
thetanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they
reached their destination.13
Petitioner maintained that at Mercados house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to
be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been
threatened with imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner
declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the instant offense.
Although petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out the contents of his
bag at his friends house, he averred that it was one of the tanod who did so at Mercados
house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana for the first time. 14

crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven
by accused-appellant Valdezs own testimony.16
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime
charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first
time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him by the
barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag that followed
was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana leaves
purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear
showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could have
affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. 17
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court
finds and so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.

e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w

II.

Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
RTC rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered
him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.15

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his
active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed
to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his
arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person.18Petitioners warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of

Appeals.1wphi1 On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision.
The Court of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity
in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part,
agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed
further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of
no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized
prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the

However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is

indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified
only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. 19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its
totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked
to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to
the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag.

He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he
saw it for the first time at the barangay captains house.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case on the
general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners arrest stands
out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on
which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of
these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus,
nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. 20 The tanod did not have probable
cause either to justify petitioners warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.21 Here, petitioners act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural

as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away
as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate
to charge the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the
barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption
from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect
that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later
tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is
not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to ones consciousness of
guilt.22 Of persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v.
Shabaz23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances
because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and under the circumstances of this
case, petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a
nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase in his presence therein,
connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused
to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any
deprivation of his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that
allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its
application cannot be extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law." 25
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious,
cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate
his warrantless arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct
under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they
have been harboring based on petitioners behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation,
following Terry v. Ohio,27 must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons
outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.28
Accordingly, petitioners waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the
marijuana leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him as they were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As
we pronounced in People v. Bacla-an

A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and
seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2)
seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and
frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless
arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.30

was already under the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him
when the search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the
specific words spoken by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that
petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all
within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. 33 As a result, petitioners lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right
or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. 34

When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante
delicto committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest.

III.

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless
search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We
are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals 31
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination
are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or
secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State
which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 32
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on conflicting
testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner

Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit
of an unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the
marijuana leaves purportedly taken from petitioners bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must
concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. 35 The existence of dangerous drugs is a
condition sine qua non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the
very corpus delicti of the crime.36
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure to prove that
the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized
from the accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug
when nagging doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen
examined and established to be the prohibited drug. 38 As we discussed in People v.
Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution to have failed in establishing all the
elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the
proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any
apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should,
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his representative,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt whether what was

submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was actually recovered from
appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed
by the police officers.

The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the
chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the
existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied." 42We cannot agree.

In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from
the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of
the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish
the identity of the corpus delicti.

To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioners testimony that
the marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full
context.43 Contrary to the Court of Appeals findings, although petitioner testified that the
marijuana was taken from his bag, he consistently denied ownership
thereof.44Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership of the seized drugs
before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.

The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed
to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to
observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of
inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus
delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions failure to
indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only
show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police
station. The Joint Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they confiscated the
marijuana leaves which they brought to the police station together with petitioner.
Likewise, the Receipt41 issued by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt
of the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioners bag
was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The
prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the
discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic
chemist, that he did not know how the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it
reached the police authorities or whose marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the
marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the police officers who
conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is
fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the
chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first allegedly
discovered until they were brought for examination by Laya.

The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction
with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the
chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper
exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the
evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and
preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody.
This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the
very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the
prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45 Among
the constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded
is the presumption of innocence. This elementary principle accords every accused the
right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this
"[c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or
fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense."46 Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or more
inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible
with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the
evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a
judgment of conviction.47

Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 48 and
"one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who
become addicted to it "not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they
become a grave menace to the safety of law-abiding members of society," 50whereas
"peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction." 51 Indeed, the havoc created by the
ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be underscored
enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the
hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an
accuseds right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary and neither can it
shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the
presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove
all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in
petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the
highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused
persons brought before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here,
we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to certain
material issues in the determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the
fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be
"[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 52 In the same vein, let this serve as an
admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties
with commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the
law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio
Vergara Valdez is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is
being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of
the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days
from notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182348

loaded with four (4) live ammunition, which are high powered firearm and ammunition
respectively, without first securing the necessary license to possess or permit to carry
said firearm and ammunition from the proper authorities.
Criminal Case No. 6518

November 20, 2008

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
CARLOS DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the November 29, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 entitled People of the Philippines v. Carlos Dela Cruz which
affirmed the September 16, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 77
in San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case Nos. 6517 (Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition) and 6518 (Possession of Dangerous Drug). The RTC found accusedappellant Carlos Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On November 15, 2002, charges against accused-appellant were made before the RTC.
The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6517
That, on or about the 20 th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then a private citizen, without any lawful authority, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control One (1) Gauge Shotgun marked ARMSCOR with Serial No. 1108533

That on or about the 20th day of October 2002, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province
of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly have in his possession, direct custody and control one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic bag weighing 49.84 grams of white crystalline substance, which gave
positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 1
Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002,
an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that
wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias "Boy Bicol" was at his nipa hut hideout in San
Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol
by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted "Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may
warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.)" Upon
hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accusedappellant was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a
police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended
accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale,
drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr.
put the markings "CVDC," the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing the
seized drug.
Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout
was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for examination and tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted
for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.
According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicol's house having been
asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicol's motorcycle. While accused-appellant was there,
persons who identified themselves as police officers approached the place, prompting

accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down when gunshots rang. The buybust team then helped him get up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and
finding shabu and firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer. 2 When he asked the
reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was a companion of Boy
Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and drugs seized were found in his possession
and testified that he was only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house. 3
The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but
convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court based on insufficiency of evidence hereby ACQUITS accused
CARLOS DELA CRUZ Y VICTORINO in Criminal Case No. 6517 for violation of P.D.
1866 as amended by RA 8294.
In Criminal Case No. 6518 for Possession of Dangerous Drug under Section 11,
2nd paragraph of Republic Act 9165, the Court finds said accused CARLOS DELA CRUZ
Y VICTORINO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and is hereby sentenced to Life
Imprisonment and to Pay a Fine of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.4
On December 7, 2005, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the RTC Decision.
In his appeal to the CA, accused-appellant claimed that: (1) the version of the
prosecution should not have been given full credence; (2) the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possession of an illegal drug; (3) his arrest
was patently illegal; and (4) the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the
illegal drug allegedly in his possession.
The CA sustained accused-appellant's conviction. 5 It pointed out that accused-appellant
was positively identified by prosecution witnesses, rendering his uncorroborated denial
and allegation of frame-up weak. As to accused-appellant's alleged illegal arrest, the CA
held that he is deemed to have waived his objection when he entered his plea, applied for
bail, and actively participated in the trial without questioning such arrest.

On the supposedly broken chain of custody of the illegal drug, the appellate court held
that accused-appellant's claim is unpersuasive absent any evidence showing that the
plastic sachet of shabu had been tampered or meddled with.
On December 20, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA Decision.
On June 25, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so
desired. The parties later signified their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the
records already with the Court.
Accused-appellant presents the following issues before us:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
III.THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF
HIS ARREST
IV.THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II, RA 9165 DESPITE THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE
ILLEGAL DRUG ALLEGEDLY FOUND IN HIS POSSESSION
Accused-appellant claims that the presence of all the elements of the offense of
possession of dangerous drug was not proved beyond reasonable doubt since both
actual and constructive possessions were not proved. He asserts that the shabu was not
found in his actual possession, for which reason the prosecution was required to
establish that he had constructive possession over theshabu. He maintains that as he
had no control and dominion over the drug or over the place where it was found, the
prosecution likewise failed to prove constructive possession.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has merit.
The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.6 On the third element, we have held that the possession must
be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the possession
or control of said articles.7 Considering that as to this knowledge, a person's mental state
of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that:
Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions
with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of
mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior
or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its
existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular
case.8
The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside the
nipa hut at the time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol
inside the nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his
firearm at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he
was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia,
ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted that he knew what the
content of the seized plastic bag was.9
Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of
the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant.
The two buy-bust team members corroborated each other's testimonies on how they saw
Boy Bicol talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they
testified, was the same table where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This
fact was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant exercised dominion and
control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this too broad an application of the
concept of constructive possession.

In People v. Torres,10 we held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even
when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the master's
bedroom of his house.
In People v. Tira,11 we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife for
illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their bed was
found to be concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held that the wife cannot feign
ignorance of the drugs' existence as she had full access to the room, including the space
under the bed.
In Abuan v. People,12 we affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive
possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her
bedroom.
In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs
since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these
drugs were found.
In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the
owner of the nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have
dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or
occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the
operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. But in spite
of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs, the trial
court declared the following:
It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that
the shabuwas on the table with other items that were confiscated by the police
operatives. The court [surmises] that the accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang
hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught red-handed with prohibited items and
dangerous [drugs].13
The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution's evidence, that accusedappellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy
Bicol's nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drugdealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found
inside a room with shabu, not as the room's owner or occupant but as a guest. While he

allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to
produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used.

court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting
Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense.

The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a
showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellant's guilt

beyond reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession
by accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it
unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.

Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol's nipa
hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
on warrantless arrest provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.--A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.14
Accused-appellant's act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been
sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to
adequately prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accusedappellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecution's charge was weak
absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The CA Decision dated November 29, 2007 in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02286 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Carlos
Dela Cruz isACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165 in Criminal Case No. 6518
of the RTC, Branch 77 in San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.

That on or about August 13, 2001, in the Municipality of Gonzaga, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control
and custody one (1) brick of Marijuana fruiting tops weighing 831.91 grams wrapped in a
newspaper which gave POSITIVE results for the tests of marijuana, a prohibited drug, the
said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for any person to, unless
authorized by law, to possess or use any prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon the other hand, the accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 081344 for violation of Section 16, Article III of the same law reads:

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170837

September 12, 2006

THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
DEXTER TORRES y DELA CRUZ, appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Dexter Torres was charged with violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6425, as amended, for unlawful possession of 831.91 grams of marijuana fruiting tops, a
prohibited drug; as well as Section 16, Article III of the same law for illegal possession of
0.26 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known
as shabu.
The indictment in Criminal Case No. 08-1334 for violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A.
No. 6425 reads:

That on or about August 13, 2001, in the Municipality of Gonzaga, province of Cagayan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control
and custody two (2) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substances with a total weight of 0.26 gm. which substances gave POSITIVE
results to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug, commonly
known as Shabu, the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is prohibited for
any person to possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or
prescription.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The two (2) criminal cases were jointly tried at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri,
Cagayan, Branch 8. Dexter pleaded not guilty to both charges. 3
The case for the prosecution is as follows:
In the early afternoon of August 13, 2001, operatives of the Second Regional Narcotics
Office led by PSI Teodolfo M. Tannagan, SPO4 Abelardo M. Lasam, SPO1 Jessie O.
Liwag and PO2 Tirso T. Pascual, as members, and a back-up team from the Gonzaga
Police Station, armed with a search warrant issued by Executive Judge Jimmy Henry F.
Lucson, Jr. of the RTC of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, raided the house of Dexter Torres
located at Salvanera St., Barangay Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan. The team was joined
by the two barangay councilmen, Edward Sagnep and Ernesto Vivit.

Just before searching Dexter's house, SPO4 Lasam presented the search warrant and
introduced the raiding team to Henny Gatchalian, Dexter's sister, and Dexter's children.
When asked where the owners of the house were, Henny responded that her brother and
his wife had just left. In their presence and that of the two kagawads, the team searched
the master's bedroom and found the following stashed inside the second deck of a
wooden cabinet: 1) a brick of dried suspected marijuana wrapped inside newsprint; 2)
two plastic sachets of suspectedshabu; 3) three pieces of aluminum foil; 4) a colored
green plastic lighter; and 5) a small transparent plastic bag. The raiders then prepared an
inventory4 of the articles seized, a copy of which was handed to Henny. After photos of
the confiscated articles were taken, they were placed in a plastic bag and turned over to
SPO4 Lasam, who submitted the same to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office 2, Camp
Alimanao, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for forensic examination.5

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the following

results:

That same afternoon, Kagawads Edward and Ernesto both signed a certification 6 as to
the conduct of the search, certifying, among others, that it was conducted in an orderly
and peaceful manner; no unnecessary force was employed; nobody was hurt; and
nothing was taken without proper receipt. Henny, however, refused to sign the
certification.

Exh "B-B1" contains Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx 7

PSI Forensic Chemist Maria Leonora C. Camarao examined the substance seized from
Dexter's house which tested positive for marijuana and shabu. On the witness stand,
Maria confirmed her Physical Science Reports, hereunder reproduced as follows:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh "A" one (1) brick of suspected Marijuana fruiting tops with weight of 831.91 grams
wrapped with newspaper print and masking tape with markings and further placed in one
(1) brown long envelope with description. xxx
Exh "B-B1" Two (2) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets wrapped with
masking tape with markings, containing white crystalline substances with total weight of
0.26 gm and further placed in one (1) cellophane with description. xxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drugs. xxx
F I N D I N G S:

Exh "A" gave POSITIVE result to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug. xxx
Exh "B-B1" gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. xxx
C O N C L U S I O N:
Exh "A" contains Marijuana, a prohibited drug. xxx

On December 5, 2002, the prosecution formally offered its exhibits, which included the
brick of marijuana leaves and fruiting tops weighing 831.91 grams (Exhibit "A"); and
the shabu which weighed 0.26 grams (Exhibits "B" and "B-1"). Thereafter, the prosecution
rested its case.8
Dexter, through counsel, objected to the offer of evidence on the ground that the same
were "confiscated not from [his] possession as he was then staying in Laoag City." 9
The defense consists of the testimonies of Dexter himself, his sister Henny Gatchalian,
and his relative, KagawadErnesto, are predicated on denial and frame-up.
The defense version is as follows:
Thirty-eight-year old Dexter eked out a living as a carpenter. He averred that weeks
before his house was searched, he was already in Gabu, Laoag City, working in a house
construction project of his sister-in-law Rema Pentigrado. He left for Gabu, Laoag City on
July 28, 2001 with his wife. After entrusting his children to the care of his father, and his
sister Henny, he padlocked his place and gave the key to his sister. He declared that he
only came to know of the incident from Henny when he and his wife arrived home from
Gabu, Laoag City.10
Kagawad Ernesto, aged 65 years, Dexter's kin, narrated that on August 13, 2001 he was
at his house. A policeman from the Gonzaga Police Station arrived and asked him to be a
witness in a raid that lawmen would conduct in Dexter's residence. He acceded.

However, upon reaching the premises, he found out that the search had already been
conducted. He was informed that a brick of marijuana had been found inside the house,
but he did not see it. Later, upon the prodding of the police, he signed a confiscation
receipt without reading its contents.11
Henny, aged 35 years, recounted that at about 1:00 p.m. of August 13, 2001, she was at
her father's house when a number of policemen arrived. They asked her to open the
door, and as she was forced to do so, she accompanied the police to the neighboring
house and unlocked the place. Inside, she was placed in one of the rooms and was
ordered not to move a muscle. Thereafter, the policemen ransacked the cabinets, chests
and drawers. Meanwhile, she remained confined in the room, without a clue as to what
was taking place. After the search, the policemen brought her out of the house and
showed to her the shabu and marijuana which the police claimed to have found inside the
house. She denied signing anything save the search warrant. Henny, however, told the
court that it was Dexter's mistress, not his wife, that her brother brought to Gabu, Laoag
City.12
On November 14, 2003, the RTC rendered a joint decision convicting Dexter of the
offenses charged. The falloreads
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Dexter Torres y De La Cruz "GUILTY" beyond
reasonable doubt in both cases and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos in
Criminal Case No. 08-1334 and, the indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos in
Criminal Case No. 08-1344.

I.
II.

The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the search warrant issued
against herein appellant was validly and lawfully implemented.
The court a quo erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant for the
crime charged has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. 14

The appeal was transferred to the CA for appropriate action and

disposition per Resolution15 of this Court dated April 6, 2005, in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Mateo.16
On July 28, 2005, the judgment of conviction was affirmed, but was modified as to the
penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 08-1344. In disposing the appeal, the CA gave
short shrift to Dexter's claim that the two-witness rule under Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court was violated. Emphatically pointing out that at the time of the
search, Henny was living in Dexter's house, and therefore a lawful occupant, it held that
the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of a lawful occupant of the searched
premises. Citing People v. Simon,17 and considering that only 0.26 grams of shabu was
involved, the appellate court reduced Dexter's sentence to an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor to four (4) years and two (2) months of prison correccional.
The petitory portion of the CA decision reads
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 08 of Aparri, Cagayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 08-1334 and 08-1344 is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Dexter Torres y Dela Cruz is
hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to suffer:
(1) the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) in Criminal Case No. 08-1334; and

With costs.
SO ORDERED.13
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi cum frame-up of the accused and upheld in
favor of the prosecution the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.

(2) an indeterminate sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months

of prison correccionalin Criminal Case 08-1344.
SO ORDERED.18
Dexter sought reconsideration, which the CA denied.19

Dexter appealed his conviction to this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 162542-43, praying
for the reversal of the judgment. He claimed that the search warrant had been unlawfully
implemented and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He assigned the following errors purportedly committed by the trial court:

Unfazed, Dexter, now the appellant, appealed anew to this Court, adopting by way of
manifestation the same arguments before the CA.20

Appellant insists that the items seized from his house are inadmissible as evidence,
being the fruits of an illegal search. He maintains that the manner of search conducted in
his residence had failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly
Section 7), Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses.
No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter,
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Appellant argues that Henny is not a "lawful occupant" of the house as contemplated in
the above section. And even if she is one, her presence did not cure the illegality of the
search since she was prevented by the police from actually witnessing the search as it
was being conducted. He points out that her sister was confined by the police in one of
the rooms of the house while the simultaneous search was going on in the other portion
thereof. Moreover, though the raiding party had summoned two barangay kagawads as
witnesses, the police were already through searching the house when Kagawad Ernesto
arrived. In other words, the latter, too, had failed to witness the search. 21
The appeal is not meritorious.
Contrary to appellant's claim, Henny and Barangay Kagawad Ernesto were present when
the lawmen searched his house. The illicit drugs and paraphernalia were found in the
master's bedroom stashed inside the second deck of a wooden cabinet. This is clear from
the positive and categorical testimony of PO2 Tirso Pascual, a member of the raiding
team:
FISCAL :
Q What did you do when you arrived at the house of the accused at Salvanera St.
Paradise, Gonzaga, Cagayan?
A SPO4 Lasam, the officer on the case who was handling the Search Warrant, informed
the persons present at that house of the purpose of the members, Sir.

Q Who were in their house at that time?

A His sister, Henny Gatchalian and some of his children, Sir.
xxx
Q And after informing the sister of the accused of your purpose, that is to serve the
search warrant against her brother, what did you do?
A In the presence of the barangay kagawad and the sister of the accused, we
began to search the house, Sir.
Q And were you able to discover anything inside the house of the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What were you able to find out inside the house?
A During the conduct of the search, we were able to recover one brick form of dried
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper, placed inside a wooden cabinet particularly at the
second deck of the wooden cabinet, Sir.
Q Aside from that, what did you see inside the house?
A While conducting the search, we recovered two transparent plastic sachet containing,
which we believe to be shabu and some other materials such as lighter, aluminum foils,
Sir.22
xxx
COURT:
Q Where was Henny Gatchalian at the time of the search?

Q By the way, was the accused present?

A Always beside us, Your Honor.

A Dexter Torres was not present, Sir.

Q You mean Henny Gatchalian was also inside the house?

A Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Sir.

FISCAL:

Q: The house of your father is situated about 200 meters away from the house of Dexter
Torres, is it not?

Q So there were five of you inside the house?

A: Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q: And according to you at that time, you were staying in the house of your father-in-law?
Q You, Liwag, councilmen Sagnep and Vivit and Gatchalian?
A: I was not staying in the house of my father, Sir.
23

A Yes, Sir.

Q: Because you were then staying in the house of Dexter Torres?

PO2 Pascual's above testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Jessie Liwag, likewise a
member of the raiding team that searched the house of the appellant. 24 Besides, Henny
and Kagawad Ernesto, were not the only witnesses to the search; Kagawad Edward
Sagnep was also present during the entire search. This is evinced by the testimonies of
PO2 Pascual and the certification signed by the two Kagawads.
The RTC and the CA correctly rejected the testimonies of defense witnesses Henny
and Kagawad Ernesto for being biased and riddled with inconsistencies. We are in full
accord with the following encompassing disquisition of the appellate court:
We note, however, that her credibility is adversely affected by the inconsistencies in her
statements. She could not even exactly say where she was staying before the police
arrived to conduct the search. Thus, the transcript of her testimony provides as follows:
FISCAL NELJOE CORTES: You do not own a house in Gonzaga?
Witness GATCHALIAN: We only stay in the house of my parents-in-law, Sir.
Q: You stated while ago that you were then in your house when they conducted the
search?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you likewise stated that your house is situated beside the house of Dexter Torres

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And as a matter of fact, you were in the house of Dexter Torres when the police
arrived, is it not?
A: I was in the house of my father, Sir.
Q: So you now agree with me that in August 2001, you were staying in the house of your
brother Dexter Torres?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Did you not state a while ago that you are staying in your brother's house?
A: Yes, Sir, but when the police conducted the search, I was in the house of my father.
Q: Again, you seem not to be telling the truth?
A: Why not, Sir.
Q: A while ago also you stated that you are staying in the house of your father-in-law,
which is about 200 meters away?
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: So at that time you were staying in three houses, in the house of your brother, in the
house of your father-in-law and in the house of your (father)?

Q: You were told that the document that you were asked to sign is a Confiscation
Receipt, meaning, the items you enumerated therein were actually taken as a result of
the search?

A: I am not staying in the house my father-in-law, Sir.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: So your statement earlier that you are staying in your father-in- law's house is not
correct?

Q: And you signed that document because you know for a fact that the items were
actually recovered inside the house of the accused?

A: No, Sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the house that you are referring to in your direct examination is actually the house
of your father or the house of Dexter?

Q: And that is the truth?

A: (I) was only told by Dexter that I will just clean the house if he leaves the place, Sir.

A: Yes, sir.

Consistent with the trial court's own findings as between the testimony of Gatchalian and
the testimonies of the police officers, this Court finds the testimonies of the police officers
more credible. Aside from the principle that testimonies of police officers deserve full faith
and credit given the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly, we note
that the prosecution witnesses gave consistent and straightforward narrations of what
transpired on August 13, 2001. The police officers have consistently testified that
Gatchalian was then in the house of the accused-appellant when they arrived thereat,
and that she was with them when they conducted the search inside the house.

As correctly pointed out by the trial court:

The presence of barangay council members Edward Sagnep and Ernesto Vivit during the
search was also sufficiently established. These barangay officials even affixed their
signatures on the confiscation receipt issued by PO3 Jessie Liwag that contains a
statement that the seized properties were found in the presence of Brgy. Kag. Edward R.
Sagnep and Brgy. Kag. Ernesto Q. Vivit.

The afore statements of this defense witness clearly established the fact that, there was
nothing irregular in the execution of the search warrant. It also establishes the material
fact that, what was claimed to have been recovered, seized and confiscated from the
cabinet located in one of the rooms of Dexter's house, to wit: dried marijuana, two (2)
plastic sachets of shabu, lighter, match box, and aluminum foils are true. True, because
Ernesto Vivit, a witness to the search and a barangay councilman signed the confiscation
receipt voluntarily because he knew for a fact that said items were actually recovered
from the house of the accused."
Even defense witness Henny Gatchalian mentioned in her testimony that Ernesto Vivit
was with the policemen when they conducted the search. 25

Barangay kagawad Ernesto Vivit's retraction and assertion that he was not really present
when the policemen searched the house of the accused-appellant fail to persuade.
During cross-examination, Vivit, a relative of the accused-appellant, even testified in
court:

More importantly, it is now too late in the day for appellant to object to the admissibility of
the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. Though he seasonably objected
after the prosecution formally offered its evidence, his objection was not based on
constitutional grounds, but rather on the ground that he was not in actual possession of
the premises at the time the search was conducted. 26

FISCAL NELJOE CORTES: You were required to sign a confiscation receipt?

In the case of Demaisip v. Court of Appeals,27 we held:

A: Yes, sir.

At any rate, objections to the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the
evidence obtained thereby were deemed waived when no objection to the legality of the
search warrant was raised during the trial of the case nor to the admissibility of the
evidence obtained through said warrant.
Indeed, the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures, like any other
right, can be waived and the waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.28
Hard to believe is appellant's insinuation that the evidence for the prosecution were
planted. His very conduct following his arrest would belie this allegation:
First. He failed to complain about this matter when he was apprehended nor bestirred
himself to bring it up during his preliminary investigation. He could not even identify the
person, the policeman or policemen who allegedly planted the evidence. In fact, it was
only during this appeal that appellant accentuated this alleged frame-up.
Second. The appellant failed to inform his counsel of the alleged planting of evidence by
the policemen; if he had done so, for sure, the said counsel would have prepared his
affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for the suppression of the things/articles
seized by the policemen.
Third. We find it incredible that the policemen planted said evidence in full view
of Kagawad Edward, whose presence during the search was undisputed. This is so
because the policemen could be prosecuted for planting evidence and, if convicted,
sentenced to death under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7659:
SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and Members of
Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. The maximum penalties
provided for [in] Sections 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of
the said offenses are government officials, employees or officers, including members of
police agencies and the armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting"
any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections

14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the immediate vicinity of
another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein
provided.
The incantation of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard line of defense
in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While such defense
cannot and should not always be considered as contrived, nonetheless, it is generally
rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers are, after all,
presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official functions, in the
absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are motivated by illwill.29
Appellant next submits that his absence during the search coupled with the fact that he
was not caught in possession of the illicit drugs and paraphernalia are circumstances
sufficient enough to exonerate him.30
We are not persuaded.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the
following: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge
that the said drug is a regulated drug.31
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows: (a) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely or consciously possessed
the prohibited drug.32
The fact that appellant was not in his residence when it was searched nor caught
in flagrante delicto possessing the illicit drugs and paraphernalia does not dent the case
of the prosecution. As a matter of law, when prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a
house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular person, the
presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law,
and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict. Otherwise stated, the finding of
the illicit drugs and paraphernalia in the house owned by the appellant raised the
presumption of knowledge and, standing alone, was sufficient to convict. 33

This Court, in People v. Tira,34 ruminated on the juridical concept of "possession" under
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and the evidence necessary to
prove the said crime. The same principle applies to prohibited drugs.
x x x This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if
his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located,
is shared with another.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of
non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn
therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of
the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the
same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place
over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence
of any satisfactory explanation.
In the instant case, appellant failed to present any evidence to rebut the existence
of animus possidendi over the illicit drugs and paraphernalia found in his residence. His
claim that he was not aware that such illegal items were in his house is insufficient. We
have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a
witness. Mere denial, just like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings of truth on one
hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. 35 Moreover,
his defense of frame-up, as we said, is a common and standard line of defense which is
invariably viewed with disfavor, it being capable of easy concoction and difficult to
prove.36Considering that no clear and convincing evidence was presented to prove such
allegation, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, 37 as well as
the principle that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, especially when
affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great respect and are accorded the highest

consideration,38 must prevail over the appellant's imputation of ill-motive on the part of the
policemen who conducted the search.
The RTC and the CA, in Criminal Case No. 08-1334, correctly meted against appellant
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the P500,000.00 fine. The crime of violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, for illegal possession of 831.91 grams
of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Considering
that there are no qualifying circumstances, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the
penalty ofreclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court, however, will modify the penalty the CA imposed upon the appellant in
Criminal Case No. 08-1344.
Under Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of less than 200 grams of regulated drug, in this case shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of
the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE
PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25

grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellant is only 0.26
grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should have been sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its
medium period, as minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium
period, as maximum, for violation of Section 16 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.
In view of the quantity of shabu confiscated in this case, the CA correctly deleted the
penalty of fine imposed on appellant, as the second paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No.
6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides only for the penalty of
imprisonment.
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, increased the penalty for illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu to
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty years and a fine ranging
from three hundred thousand (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00). However, since this law is not favorable to appellant, it cannot be given
retroactive application in the instant case. This is the mandate of Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads:
ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication
of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
The same law also changed the penalty for illegal possession of 500 grams or more of
marijuana to life imprisonment to death, and a fine ranging from P500,000.00
to P10,000,000.00. Obviously, the amendment of the penalty from reclusion perpetua to
life imprisonment to death in R.A. No. 9165 cannot, likewise, be applied retroactively to
the present case since it would also be unfavorable to appellant.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 08-1334, the appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ORDERED to
pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 08-1344, the appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and is SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty from Four (4) months
and One (1) day of arresto mayor, in its medium period, as minimum to Three (3) years
of prision correccional, in its medium period, as maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

G.R. No. 139615

May 28, 2004

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
AMADEO TIRA and CONNIE TIRA, appellants.

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 46,
finding appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 16, in relation to Section 20, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, sentencing
each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering each of them to pay
a fine of P1,000.000.2
The Indictment
The appellants Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira were charged in an Information which
reads:
That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
control and custody the following:
- Three (3) (sic) sachets of shabu
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
EN BANC

of

the

Philippines
COURT

- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue

- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams
- Six disposable lighter

- One (1) roll Aluminum Foil

- Several empty plastics (tea bag)
- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations believed to be
proceeds of the contraband.
without first securing the necessary permit/license to possess the same.
CONTRARY to SEC. 8 in relation to Sec. 20 of RA 6425, as amended. 3
The Case for the Prosecution4
In the evening of February 24, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog received a verbal
instruction from the Chief of Police Superintendent Wilson R. Victorio to conduct
surveillance operations on the house of Amadeo Tira and Connie Tira at Perez Extension
Street because of reported rampant drug activities in the said area. Manibog formed a
team composed of SPO1 Renato Cresencia, PO3 Reynaldo Javonilla, Jr. and PO3 Efren
Abad de Vera to conduct the ordered surveillance.
At around 8:00 p.m., the group, clad in civilian clothes, arrived at Perez Extension Street.
As they stationed themselves in the periphery of a store, they observed that more than
twenty persons had gone in and out of the Tira residence. They confronted one of them,
and asked what was going on inside the house. The person revealed that Amadeo Tira
sold shabu, and that he was a regular customer. The group went closer to the house and
started planning their next move. They wanted to pose as buyers, but hesitated, for fear
of being identified as PNP members. Instead, they stayed there up to 12:00 midnight and
continued observing the place. Convinced that illegal activities were going on in the
house, the policemen returned to the station and reported to P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio.
After hearing their report, P/Supt. Victorio instructed his men to make an affidavit of
surveillance preliminary to an application for a search warrant. 5
On March 6, 1998, SPO3 Asidelio Manibog, PO3 Efren Abad de Vera, SPO1 Renato
Cresencia and PO2 Reynaldo Soliven Javonilla, Jr. executed an Affidavit of Surveillance,
alleging, inter alia, that they were members of the Drug Enforcement Unit of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, and that in the evening of February 24, 1998, they confirmed reports of

illegal drug-related activities in the house of the spouses Amadeo and Connie Tira. 6 On
March 6, 19987 Police Chief Inspector Danilo Bumatay Datu filed an Application for a
Search Warrant in the Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, attaching thereto
the affidavit of surveillance executed by his men and a sketch of the place to be
searched.8
Satisfied with the testimonies of SPO3 Manibog, PO3 de Vera, SPO1 Cresencia and PO2
Javonilla, Jr., Judge Aurora A. Gayapa issued a search warrant commanding the
applicants to make an immediate search of the Tira residence at anytime of the day or
night, particularly the first room on the right side, and the two rooms located at Perez
south, and forthwith seize and take possession of the following items:
1. Poor Mans Cocaine known as Shabu;
2. Drug-Usage Paraphernalia; and
3. Weighing scale.9
P/Sr. Inspector Ludivico Bravo, and as head of the team, with SPO3 Cariaga, PO3
Concepcion, Cario, Galima, Villaroya, Andaya, SPO1 Mario Tajon, SPO1 Asterio
Dismaya, SPO1 Renato Cresencia, and PO3 Reynaldo Javonillo were directed to
implement the search warrant.10 They responded and brought Barangay Kagawad Mario
Conwi to witness the search.11 At 2:35 p.m. on March 9, 1998, the team proceeded to the
Tira residence. The men found Ernesto Tira, the father of Amadeo, at the porch of the
house. They introduced themselves and told Ernesto that they had a warrant authorizing
them to search the premises. Ernesto led them inside. The policemen found the newly
awakened Amadeo inside the first room12 of the house.13 With Barangay Kagawad Conwi
and Amadeo Tira, the policemen proceeded to search the first room to the right (an inner
room) and found the following under the bed where Amadeo slept: 14
1. 9 pcs. suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride placed in heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets
2. roll aluminum foil
3. several empty plastic transparent

4. used and unused aluminum foil15

a. Three (3) sachets of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride approximately 0.5

grams;

5. disposable lighters
6. 1 sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira16
They also found cash money amounting to P12,536 inside a shoulder bag placed on top
of the television, in the following denominations:
1 pc. -P1,000.00 bill
4 pcs. - 500.00 bill
52 pcs. - 100.00 bill
36 pcs. - 50.00 bill
100 pcs. - 20.00 bill
53 pcs. - 10.00 bill
1 pc. - 5.00 bill
1 pc. - 1.00 coin17
The policemen listed the foregoing items they found in the house. Amadeos picture was
taken while he was signing the said certification. 18 Ernesto (Amadeos father), also
witnessed the certification.
A joint affidavit of arrest was, thereafter, executed by SPO3 Asidelio Manibog, SPO1
Mario C. Tajon, SPO1 Asterio T. Dismaya, SPO1 Renato M. Cresencia and PO3
Reynaldo S. Javonilla, Jr. for the apprehension of Amadeo Tira and Nelson Tira who were
brought to the police station for custodial investigation. The articles seized were turned
over to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Urdaneta Sub-Office, for examination. 19 In turn, a
laboratory examination request was made to the Chief of the Philippine National Police
Service-1, Sub-Office, Urdaneta, Pangasinan for the following:

b. Six (6) opened sachets of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride (SHABU)

residue;
c. Twenty-four (4) pieces of dried marijuana leaves sachet; and
d. One (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride
confiscated from the possession of Nelson Tira.20
On March 10, 1998, P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio executed a Compliance/Return of Search
Warrant.21
On March 17, 1998, the PNP Crime Laboratory Group in Physical Science Report No.
DT-057-98 reported that the test conducted by Police Superintendent/Chemist Theresa
Ann Bugayong-Cid,22 yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
marijuana. The report contained the following findings:
"A1 to A3, "B1 to B6," "E" POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu), a regulated drug.
"C" and "D1 to D4" POSITIVE to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONCLUSION:
Specimens A1 to A3, B1 to B6 and E contain methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu)
and specimens C and D1 to D24 contain marijuana.23
A criminal complaint was filed by P/Supt. Wilson R. Victorio against Amadeo Tira and
Connie Tira on March 10, 1998 for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. 24 After
finding probable cause, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rufino A. Moreno filed an
Information against the Tira Spouses for illegal possession of shabu and marijuana, in
violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 6425. 25 A warrant of arrest
was issued against Connie Tira on May 13, 1998. However, when the policemen tried to

serve the said warrant, she could not be found in the given address. 26 She was arrested
only on October 6, 1998.27

inventory of the items seized was made afterwards, which was signed by Capt. Bravo
and Ernesto Tira.40

During the trial, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the Tira residence. 28

Alfonso Gallardo, Amadeos neighbor, testified that he was the one who constructed the
Tira residence and that the house initially had two rooms. The first room was rented out,
while the second room was occupied by the Spouses Amadeo and Connie
Tira.41 Subsequently, a divider was placed inside the first room. 42 He also testified that his
house was only three (3) meters away from that of the Tiras, and that only a toilet
separated their houses.43 He denied that there were many people going in and out of the
Tira residence.44

The Case for Accused Amadeo Tira29

Amadeo Tira denied the charge. He testified that he was a furniture delivery boy 30 who
owned a one-storey bungalow house with two bedrooms and one masters bedroom.
There was also another room which was divided into an outer and inner room; the latter
room had no windows or ventilation. The house stood twenty meters away from Perez
Extension Street in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and could be reached only by foot. 31 He
leased the room located at the western portion to his nephew Chris Tira 32 and the latters
live-in-partner Gemma Lim for four hundred pesos a month. 33 Chris and Gemma were
engaged in the buying and selling of bananas. He denied that there were young men
coming in and out of his house.34
In the afternoon of March 6, 1998, he was in his house sleeping when the policemen
barged into his house. He heard a commotion and went out of the room to see what it
was all about, and saw police officers Cresencia, Javonilla and Bergonia, searching the
room of his nephew, Chris Tira. He told them to stop searching so that he could contact
his father, Ernesto, who in turn, would call the barangay captain. The policemen
continued with their search. He was then pulled inside the room and the policemen
showed him the items they allegedly found.35
Barangay Kagawad Mario Conwi testified that on March 9, 1998, while he was at Calle
Perez, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Capt. Ludivico Bravo asked to be accompanied to the Tira
residence. Capt. Bravo was with at least ten other policemen. As they parked the car at
Calle Perez, the policemen saw a man running towards the direction of the ricefields.
Kagawad Conwi and some of the policemen chased the man, who turned out to be
Nelson Tira. One of the policemen pointed to a sachet of shabu which fell to the ground
near Nelson. The policemen arrested him and proceeded to the house of Amadeo Tira to
serve the warrant.36 When they reached the house, the other policemen were waiting. He
saw Amadeo and Connie Tira sitting by the door of the house in the sala. Thereafter, he
and the policemen started the search. 37 They searched the first room located at the right
side (if facing south),38 and found marijuana, shabu, money and some paraphernalia. 39 An

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court rendered judgment on September 24, 1998, finding Amadeo Tira guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana and 1.001
gram of shabu. The decretal portion of its decision is herein quoted:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt
accused AMADEO TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and
shabu weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Sections 16 and 20, of Republic
Act 6425, known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act
7659. The Court sentences Amadeo Tira to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
a fine of P1,000,000.00.
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which forms part
of the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram are
hereby forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter and the aluminum foil
are likewise forfeited in favor of the government.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered to
transmit the person of Amadeo Tira to the National Bilibid Prison with proper escort within
fifteen (15) days upon receipt of this Order.45

The trial court upheld the validity of Search Warrant No. 3 issued by Judge Aurora
Gayapa. It found Amadeos defense, that the room where the items were seized was
rented out to the couple Cris Tira and Gemma Lim, unsubstantiated. It held that Amadeo,
as owner of the house, had control over the room as well as the things found therein and
that the inner room was a secret and practical place to keep marijuana, shabu and
related paraphernalia.46
Amadeo appealed the decision.47

rooms. The policemen found and seized articles in the room occupied by one of their
boarders. They arrested Amadeo, and her brother-in-law, Nelson Tira, and brought them
to the police station. The boarders, however, were not arrested.
Joy Fernandez, a neighbor of the Tiras, lived approximately ten meters away from the
latter. Since they had no television, she frequently went to her neighbors house to watch
certain programs. In the afternoon of March 9, 1998, she was at the Tira residence
watching "Mirasol," while Connie was in the kitchen nursing her baby. Suddenly, about
five or ten persons ran inside the house and handcuffed Amadeo Tira. 52

The Case Against Connie Tira

The Ruling of the Trial Court
After her arrest, Connie filed a motion to quash search warrant, 48 alleging that the police
officers who applied for the said warrant did not have any personal knowledge of the
reported illegal activities. She contended that the same was issued in violation of Section
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, as the judge issued the search warrant without
conducting searching questions and answers, and without attaching the records of the
proceedings. Moreover, the search warrant issued was in the nature of a general warrant,
to justify the "fishing expedition" conducted on the premises.
On October 26, 1998, the presiding judge ordered Judge Aurora A. Gayapa to forward
the stenographic notes of the applicant and the witnesses. 49 Connie was arraigned on
November 9, 1998, pending the resolution of the motion. She pleaded not guilty to the
charge of illegal possession of shabu and marijuana. 50 The trial court thereafter issued an
Order on November 11, 1998, denying the motion to quash. 51 It did not give credence to
the allegations of Connie Tira, and found that Judge Gayapa issued the search warrant
after conducting searching questions, and in consideration of the affidavit of witness
Enrique Milad.

The trial court found Connie Tira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of
807.3 grams of marijuana and 1.001 gram of shabu. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING beyond reasonable doubt
accused CONNIE TIRA for Illegal Possession of Marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and
shabu weighing 1.001 gram penalized under Article III, Section 16 and 20, of Republic
Act 6425, known as [the] Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act
7659, the Court sentences Connie Tira to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a
fine ofP1,000,000.00.
The amount of P12,536.00 is hereby forfeited in favor of the government which forms part
of the fine; the marijuana weighing 807.3 grams and shabu weighing 1.001 gram are
hereby forfeited in favor of the government; the disposable lighter and the aluminum foil
are, likewise, forfeited in favor of the government.

Connie testified that she was engaged in the business of buying and selling of fruits,
while her husband was employed at the Glasshouse Trading. One of the rooms in their
house was occupied by their three boarders, two male persons and one female.

The Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) is hereby ordered to
transmit the person of Connie Tira to the National Bilibid Prisons with proper escort within
fifteen (15) days upon receipt of his Order.53

In the afternoon of March 9, 1998, she and her husband Amadeo were in their house,
while their boarders were in their respective rooms. At 2:30 p.m., she was in the kitchen
taking care of her one-year-old child. She had other three children, aged eight, four, and
three, respectively, who were watching television. Her husband Amadeo was sleeping in
one of the rooms. Suddenly, five policemen barged into their house and searched all the

The trial court did not believe that Connie Tira had no knowledge, control and possession
of the shabu and marijuana found in the first or inner room of their house. It stressed that
Connie and Amadeo Tira jointly controlled and possessed the shabu and marijuana that
the policemen found therein. It ratiocinated that it was unusual for a wife not to know the

existence of prohibited drugs in the conjugal abode. Thus, as husband and wife, the
accused conspired and confederated with each other in keeping custody of the said
prohibited articles.54The court also held that Connie Tiras flight from their house after the
search was an indication of her guilt. Connie, likewise, appealed the decision. 55
The Present Appeal
In their brief, the appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira assigned the following errors
committed by the trial court:
I.

contend, they should have been acquitted of the crime charged. The appellants further
assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they owned the prohibited drugs, and that
the same were in their possession and control when found by the policemen. They insist
that it cannot be presumed that they were in control and possession of the said
substances/articles simply because they owned the house where the same were found,
considering that the room was occupied by Chris Tira and his live-in partner, Gemma Lim.
The appellant Connie Tira avers that she never fled from their house after the policemen
had conducted the search. Neither was she arrested by the policemen when they
arrested her husband.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

DESPITE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE
THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

The appeals have no merit.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS
ILLEGALLY MADE.

Contrary to the appellants claim, appellant Amadeo Tira was present when the policemen
searched the inner room of the house. The articles and substances were found under the
bed on which the appellant Amadeo Tira slept. The policemen did not find the said
articles and substances in any other room in the house:

III.

ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT AMADEO TIRA IS GUILTY AS

CHARGED, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN HIM AND HIS WIFE CONNIE TIRA.56

The Court shall resolve the assigned errors simultaneously as they are interrelated.
The appellants contend that the search conducted by the policemen in the room occupied
by Chris and Gemma Lim, where the articles and substances were found by the
policemen, was made in their absence. Thus, the search was made in violation of Section
7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

Q So when you reached the house of Amadeo Tira at the Tiras compound, you saw the
father and you told him you are implementing the Search Warrant and your group was
allowed to enter and you are allowed to search in the presence of Amadeo Tira?
A Yes, Sir.
PROS. DUMLAO
Q In the course of your search, what did you find?

SEC. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two witnesses.

No search of house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence of
the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.

WITNESS:

The appellants posit that the articles and substances found by the policemen in their
house are inadmissible in evidence, being the fruits of a poisonous tree. Hence, they

A Under the bed inside the room of Amadeo Tira, Sir

A We found out suspected marijuana leaves, Sir.

Q Where, in what particular place did you find?

Q What else did you find aside from marijuana leaves?

1 roll of aluminum foil

A We also find suspected sachet of shabu, Sir.

several empty plastic; several used

Q What else?

and unused aluminum foil

A Lighter, Sir.

one (1) sachet of shabu confiscated from Nelson Tira; and

COURT:

P12,536.00 cash in different denominations proceeds of the contrand (sic).

Q If that shabu will be shown to you, could you identify the same?

COURT:

WITNESS:

Q Where did you find the money?

A Yes, Sir.

Q About the marijuana leaves, if shown to you could you identify the same?

A Near the marijuana at the bag, Sir.

A Yes, Sir.

Q About the money, could you still identify if shown to you?

PROS. DUMLAO:

A Yes, Sir.

Q What else did you find out aside from the marijuana leaves, shabu and lighter?

Q When you found shabu, lighter, marijuana, and money, what did you do?

A We marked them, Sir.

A I have here the list, Sir.

Q All of the items?

One (1) brick of marijuana

A Only the marijuana, Sir.

24 pcs. tea bag of marijuana

Q What mark did you place?

9 pcs. sachets of suspected "shabu"

A My signature, Sir.57

6 disposable lighters

PROS. TOMBOC:

Q Can you mention to the Honorable Court those items that you searched in the
house of Connie Tira and Amadeo Tira?

Q And when you were allowed to enter the house, did you notice who was
present?
A I noticed the presence of Connie Tira, Sir.
Q When you said Connie Tira, is she the same Connie Tira the accused in this
case?
A Yes, Sir, she was taking care of the baby.
Q Who else?
A We also noticed the presence of Amadeo Tira, Sir.
Q What was he doing there?
A He was newly awake, Sir.
Q Upon entering the house, what did you do?
A We entered and searched the first room, Sir.
Q What did you find out?
A Shabu and Marijuana and paraphernalia, Sir.
Q Are you one of those who entered the house?
A Yes, Sir.

A As per in (sic) our records, we found three (3) sachets containing suspected
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" residue; one (1) brick of suspected
dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 750 grams; twenty-four (24) tea
bags containing dried marijuana leaves; six (6) disposable lighter; one (1) roll
aluminum foil; several empty plastics (tea bag); several used and unused
aluminum foil; and cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different
denominations believe[d] to be proceeds of the contraband, Sir.
Q You said you recovered one (1) brick of marijuana leaves, showing to you a
(sic) one (1) brick suspected to be marijuana leaves, is this the one you are
referring to?
A Yes, Sir, this is the one.58
Appellant Amadeo Tira was not the only witness to the search; Kagawad Mario Conwi
and Ernesto Tira, Amadeos father, were also present. Ernesto Tira even led the
policemen inside the house. This is evidenced not only by the testimony of Kagawad
Conwi, but also by the certification signed by the appellant himself, along with Kagawad
Conwi and Ernesto Tira.59
The trial court rejected the testimony of appellant Amadeo Tira that the inner room
searched by the policemen was occupied by Chris Tira and his girlfriend Gemma Lim with
the following encompassing disquisition:
The defense contention that a couple from Baguio City first occupied the first room, the
Court is not persuaded because they did not present said businessmen from Baguio City
who were engaged in vegetable business. Secondly, the same room was rented by Chris
Tira and Gemma Lim. Chris Tira and Gemma Lim, engaged in banana business, were not
presented in Court. If it were true that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim were the supposed
lessees of the room, they should have been apprehended by the searching party on
March 9, 1998, at about 2:30 p.m. There was no proof showing that Chris Tira and
Gemma Lim ever occupied the room, like personal belongings of Chris Tira and Gemma
Lim. The defense did not even show proof showing that Chris Tira reside in the first room,
like clothings, toothbrush, soap, shoes and other accessories which make them the

residents or occupants of the room. There were no kitchen plates, spoons, powder, or
soap evidencing that the said room was occupied by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim.
Amadeo Tira contended that Chris Tira and Gemma Lim are engaged in banana
business. There are no banana stored in the room at the time of the search and both of
them were out of the room at the time of the search. And why did not Amadeo Tira supply
the police officers of the personal identities and address where they could find Chris Tira
and Gemma Lim at the time of the search. If they were banana dealers, they must be
selling their banana in the market and they could have pointed them in the market. 60
We are in full accord with the trial court. It bears stressing that the trial court conducted
an ocular inspection of the house of the appellants, and thus, had first hand knowledge of
the layout of the house. Besides, the testimony of the appellant Amadeo Tira, that the
inner room was occupied by Chris Tira and Gemma Lim who were not there when the
search was conducted, is belied by the testimony of the appellant Connie Tira that the
room was occupied by two male and one female boarders who were in the room when
the policemen searched it. Thus:
Q You said that while taking care of your baby, several policemen barged [sic] your
house?

Q So, at that time where were those boarders?

A They were inside their room, Sir.
Q How many of them?
A Two (2) male persons and one woman, Sir.
Q And do you know their whereabout[s], Madam Witness?
A No more, Sir.
Q When did they leave, Madam Witness?
A At that time, they left the house, Sir.
Q They were not investigated by the police?
A No, Sir.61

A Yes, Sir.
Q And they proceeded to your room where your husband was sleeping at that time?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And it is in that room where your husband was sleeping and where those articles were
taken?
A No, Sir.
Q Where are (sic) those things came (sic) from?
A At the room where my boarders occupied, Sir.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the only occupants of the house when the
policemen conducted their search were the appellants and their young children, and that
the appellants had no boarders therein.
Before the accused may be convicted of violating Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the essential elements of the crime, viz: (1) the actual possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and, (3) the accused freely or consciously possessed the said drug. 62
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has knowledge
that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal
intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused
had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law,

includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession
exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the
accused.63 On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.64 Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary.65 The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and
dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.66
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of
non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. 67 Such fact of possession
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference drawn
therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the
existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drug.68 Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character
of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the
same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous drug is in the house or place
over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence
of any satisfactory explanation.69
In this case, the prohibited and regulated drugs were found under the bed in the inner
room of the house of the appellants where they also resided. The appellants had actual
and exclusive possession and control and dominion over the house, including the room
where the drugs were found by the policemen. The appellant Connie Tira cannot escape
criminal liability for the crime charged simply and merely on her barefaced testimony that
she was a plain housewife, had no involvement in the criminal actuations of her husband,
and had no knowledge of the existence of the drugs in the inner room of the house. She
had full access to the room, including the space under the bed. She failed to adduce any
credible evidence that she was prohibited by her husband, the appellant Amadeo Tira,
from entering the room, cleaning it, or even sleeping on the bed. We agree with the
findings and disquisition of the trial court, viz:
The Court is not persuaded that Connie Tira has no knowledge, control and possession
of the shabu and marijuana (Exhibits "M," "N," "O" and "P") found in their room. Connie
Tira and Amadeo Tira jointly control and possess the shabu (Exhibits "M" and "N") and
marijuana (Exhibits "O" and "P") found in the room of their house. It is unusual for a wife
not to know the existence in their conjugal abode, the questioned shabu and marijuana.
The husband and wife (Amadeo and Connie) conspired and confederated with each

other the keeping and custody of said prohibited articles. Both of them are deemed in
possession of said articles in violation of R.A. 6425, Section 8, in relation to Section 20.
The Crimes Committed by the Appellants
The trial court convicted the appellants of violating Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of
Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that
the appellants should be convicted of violating Section 8 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG. We find and so hold that the
appellants are guilty of two separate crimes: (a) possession of regulated drugs under
Section 16, in relation to Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for their
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug; and, (b) violation of
Section 8, in relation to Section 20 of the law, for their possession of marijuana, a
prohibited drug. Although only one Information was filed against the appellants,
nevertheless, they could be tried and convicted for the crimes alleged therein and proved
by the prosecution. In this case, the appellants were charged for violation of possession
of marijuana and shabu in one Information which reads:
That on or about March 9, 1998, in the Municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
control and custody the following:
- Three (3) pieces (sic) sachets of shabu
- Six (6) pieces opened sachets of shabu residue
- One (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves weighing 721 grams
- Twenty-four (24) tea bags of dried marijuana leaves weighing 86.3 grams
- Six [6] disposable lighter
- One (1) roll Aluminum foil
- Several empty plastics (tea bag)

- Cash money amounting to P12,536.00 in different denominations believed to be

proceeds of the contraband.

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

without first securing the necessary permit/license to posses[s] the same.

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, in relation to Sec. 20 of R.A. 6425, as amended." 70
The Information is defective because it charges two crimes. The appellants should have
filed a motion to quash the Information under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Court before their arraignment. They failed to do so. Hence, under Rule 120, Section 3 of
the said rule, the appellants may be convicted of the crimes charged. The said Rule
provides:
SEC. 3. Judgment for two or more offenses. - When two or more offenses are charged in
a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court
may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose on him the
penalty for each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each
offense.
The Proper Penalties On the Appellants
The crime of violation of Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, for illegal
possession of 807.3 grams of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Considering that there are no qualifying circumstances, the appellants
are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code and are ordered to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of
the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:
QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY
Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is only
1.001 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum, for
violation of Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, appellants Amadeo and Connie Tira are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 8, Article II of Rep. Act No. 6425,
as amended, and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
ORDERED to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00. The said appellants are, likewise, found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425,
as amended, and are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum, to Three (3)
years of prision correccional, in its medium period, as maximum.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Search Warrant No. 98-62.4 The public prosecutor conformed to the motion. Thus, the
motion was granted and bail was fixed at P60,000.00.5
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

The MTC found probable cause against Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and recommended the filing of an Information against her. It
ordered the elevation of the records to the RTC for further proceedings.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168773

On November 12, 1998, an Amended Information was filed in the RTC of Dagupan City,
charging Abuan with violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The
inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

October 27, 2006

ELIZA
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ABUAN, petitioner,

DECISION

That on or about 8:45 oclock in the morning of May 6, 1998 at Brgy, Lasip,
[M]unicipality of Calasiao, [P]rovince of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously has in her possession, custody and
control of the following to wit:
Fifty seven (57) small heat-sealed plastic
hydrochloride (shabu) weighing5.67 grams.

sachets of

met[h]aphetamine

one (1) roll aluminum foil and assorted plastic (luminous) sachets.
CALLEJO, SR, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 and Resolution 2 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof. The CA affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 41, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D, convicting Eliza T. Abuan of
violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
The Antecedents
A criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan
charging Abuan with violating R.A. No. 6425, as amended. On May 8, 1998, she filed a
motion to quash the criminal complaint, praying that pending the resolution of her motion,
she be allowed to post bail without waiving her right to question her arrest and assail

without authority to possess the same.

CONTRARY to Art. III, Section 16 of R.A. 6425, as amended. 6
During the arraignment on November 12, 1998, the accused, assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.7 During the pre-trial on November 19, 1998, Abuan
rejected the prosecutions proposal for her to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 9862, and that, in the enforcement thereof, 57 sachets of shabu were found in her house
and later confiscated by the policemen. 8 She maintained that the warrant was invalid and
that any material allegedly confiscated from her house was inadmissible in evidence.
The court set the initial presentation of evidence by the prosecution on December 3,
1998. However, on said date, accused filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, alleging that
there was no probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62; the
applicant, Cesar Ramos, had no personal knowledge of his claim that she had in her
possession methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and other drug paraphernalia;

Marissa Gorospe was a fictitious person, and her testimony was fabricated to convince
the Executive Judge to make a finding of probable cause required for the issuance of a
search warrant; and the Executive Judge failed to ask searching questions and elicit from
"Gorospe" the particularity of the alleged paraphernalia in Abuans possession. Abuan
asserted that since the search warrant is void, whatever evidence was discovered as a
result of the search conducted based on the warrant was inadmissible in evidence. 9
Instead of allowing the accused to present her evidence in support of her motion, the
court declared that any such evidence may be adduced at the trial. 10

including teenagers, arrived in the house of Abuan and bought the substance. 19 During
her visits, she observed that Abuan placed shabu inside plastic bags. She also saw
weighing scales and paraphernalias used in sniffing shabu. Being a mother herself, she
did not want teenagers and her children to become drug addicts. 20 Gorospe identified and
affirmed the truth of the contents of her deposition. 21
The Executive Judge found probable cause and issued Search Warrant No. 98-62 which
reads:
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

The Case for the Prosecution

GREETINGS:
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 5, 1998, SPO2 Marcelino Gamboa and SPO2 Beliguer de
Vera of the Calasiao Police Station received information from a confidential informant that
Abuan was conducting illegal drug activities in her house at Barangay Lasip, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Acting on the said information, Gamboa and de Vera conducted
surveillance-monitoring operations on her residence, three times for more than an hour.
They saw more or less 20 people who were coming in and out of Abuans house.
According to the informant, these people were drug addicts, 11and Abuan was a known
drug pusher.12 On the same day, the officers, through SPO3 Cesar Ramos, applied for a
warrant13 with Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos of the RTC in Lingayen, Pangasinan,
to search the house of Abuan for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), weighing scale,
aluminum foil, and burner.
The application was docketed as Search Warrant No. 98-62. To establish probable cause
for the issuance of a search warrant, Ramos presented their informant, Marissa Gorospe,
who was subjected to searching questions by the Executive Judge. 14

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath

thru searching questions on the applicant, SPO3 Cesar A. Ramos, PNP, and his
witnesses that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is in
possession without any authority to do so in violation of R.A. 6425 of the
following:
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu)
Tooter
Weighing Scale
Aluminum Foil
Burner

Gorospe testified that she was a resident of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan.
She knew Abuan because they were employed as dealers of Avon Cosmetics. Abuan
was a prominent personality in Barangay Lasip.15 Her unnumbered house is a green
bungalow-type, cemented and decorated with ornamental plants up front. She visited
Abuan in her house at least three to four times a week. 16 She first came upon the drugs in
Abuans house when the latter invited her to a "jamming" and drinking session. She
refused because she had to go home toBarangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan, a
place of considerable distance from Calasiao.17 Abuan then suggested that they use
the shabu that she kept inside her bedroom instead. Abuan kept a substantial amount of
shabu in her house and sold it. 18 The informant further narrated that several people,

which she keeps and conceals in her house premises at Brgy. Lasip, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to make an immediate search at any time of
the day or night and take possession of the above-described properties and bring
them to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
This Search Warrant shall be valid only for ten (10) days from its issuance,
thereafter, the same shall be void.22

On May 6, 1998, police operatives composed of Col. Fidel Posadas, Major Froilan Perez,
SPO2 Gamboa, SPO2 Madrid, SPO2 de Vera, PO2 Tomelden, PO2 Rosario, PO3
Ubando, PO1 Moyano and PO3 Vallo went toBarangay Lasip to enforce the search
warrant. However, before proceeding to Abuans residence, the policemen
invited Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag and Kagawad Miguel Garcia
of Barangay Lasip to witness the search.
Upon arriving at the premises, Officers De Vera, Gamboa and Garcia and Mangaliag
entered the house; the rest of the policemen remained outside. Mangaliag introduced the
police officers to Abuan who presented Search Warrant No. 98-62 to her. Abuan read the
warrant and permitted the officers to conduct the search. 23
De Vera, Mangaliag, Gamboa and Garcia entered the bedroom and found 57 sachets of
suspected shabu, one roll of aluminum foil and assorted luminous plastic sachets in the
drawer just beside Abuans bed.24 The police officers confiscated all these and brought
them, along with Abuan, to the police station where an inventory of the items was made.
Mangaliag and Garcia affixed their signatures on the inventory/receipt, 25 but Abuan
refused to sign it.26
The police officers prepared a certification of orderly search which Garcia and Mangaliag
also signed. Abuan likewise refused to sign the certification. 27 The police officers
requested the PNP Crime Laboratory Unit of Lingayen, Pangasinan to conduct a
laboratory examination on the confiscated substance. 28 According to the laboratory
examination conducted by P/Supt. Theresa Ann Bugayong CID, Regional Chief Chemist,
the 57 sachets of the suspected shabu weighing 5.67 grams gave positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. 29
After presenting its witnesses, the prosecution offered in evidence Search Warrant No.
98-62, the Receipt of the Property Seized, the Physical Science Report and the articles
confiscated from Abuans house.30 However, Abuan objected to the admission of the
search warrant and the articles confiscated based thereon on the ground that the warrant
was issued without probable cause.31 The court admitted the documentary evidence of
the prosecution subject to the comment or objection interposed by accused and the
eventual determination of their probative weight. 32
The Case for the Accused
Abuan testified that she was jobless in 1998. Her parents and her sister Corazon
Bernadette sent her money from Canada once or twice a month to support her and her

daughters. It was her father who spent for the education of her daughters. 33 She was
married to Crispin Abuan, a policeman, but they separated in 1997. 34 She did not know
any person by the name of Marissa Gorospe. She did not work for Avon Cosmetics nor
used any of its products.35
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 6, 1998, she was with her two daughters, 21-year old Ediliza
Go and 9-year old Mae Liza Abuan. 36 They were still in bed inside their room. Suddenly,
four armed men barged into their house and declared a raid. 37 About eight to ten others
were outside her house. She inquired if they had a search warrant but she was not
shown any.38 The men searched her house for about 10 to 15 minutes and turned up with
nothing.39Some of the men went out of the house and boarded a jeepney. The men
outside again went into the bedroom and came out with "powder placed in a plastic." 40 At
this instance, Barangay Captain Bernardo Mangaliag was brought to the scene and was
shown the "powder substance" recovered from her bedroom. She refused to sign the
inventory and receipt of the property seized and the certification of orderly search.
However, Mangaliag signed the same.41
She declared that the sachets/substances which the policemen claimed to have found in
her house were merely "planted" to implicate her. The raid as well as the charge against
her were instigated by her brother Arsenio Tana, who was enraged when she refused his
demand to entrust the properties of the family to the care of his son. It appears that Tana
carried out his threat to have her house raided since the policemen did come to her
house on May 6, 1998.42 Her brother was by the gate of her house at the time of the raid.
Abuan also testified that, during the raid, she saw Tana talking to the police officers who
arrested her. Abuan also declared that the money kept inside a box in her room
amounting to P25,000.00 (US$1,100.00) given by her sister Corazon Bernardino had
gone missing after the raid. 43 She did not file any charge for the loss of her money
because she was scared. She did not know who took it.
Barangay Captain Robert Calachan of Barangay Sapang, Manaoag, Pangasinan and
Mercedes Carvajal, an employee of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan holding the position of
team leader, testified for accused.
Calachan declared that he was born in Barangay Sapang and never left the place. He
was familiar with the residents of the small barangay.44 He issued a certification45 stating
that "as per record of this barangay, a certain Marissa Gorospe is not a resident of
this barangay." Before he signed the certification, he inquired from the barangay

members if they knew a Marissa Gorospe, and he was told that no one by that name was
a transient.46
Carvajal, for her part, testified that, based on the certification dated November 12, 1998
of Dagupan City Avon Branch Manager Gigi dela Rosa, "Marissa Gorospe is not a
registered dealer of Avon Dagupan Branch based on our records." She did not know any
Avon Cosmetics employee or dealer named Marissa Gorospe in Pangasinan. She further
testified that she had been a team leader/dealer of Avon Cosmetics for 21 years already,
and that Abuan was not such a dealer/employee. On cross-examination, she declared
that she was a team leader of Avon Cosmetics (Dagupan Branch), and thus had no
participation in the preparation of the certification of Gigi dela Rosa and was not in a
position to know if the certification was correct.
On March 28, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused guilty of the
charge. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Section 15 (sic), Article 6425, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of PRISION CORRECTIONAL.
The prohibited drug and paraphernalia seized from the accused are hereby
confiscated in favor of the government and should be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board for disposition in accordance with law.

application of the police for a search warrant, its issuance and implementation were valid,
regular, and in accordance with the requirements of the law and Constitution. 48 The trial
court declared that Gorospe may have lied about her address and being a dealer of Avon
Cosmetics; however, it does not necessarily mean that she was a fictitious person. It
explained that Gorospe may have lied "a little" in order to conceal herself for her
protection, but the rest of her testimony constituted sufficient evidence of probable cause.
Abuan filed her motion for reconsideration dated April 16, 2001, which the court denied in
an Order49 dated May 10, 2001. She appealed the decision to the CA, where she averred
that:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT CONSIDERED THE
ALLEGED SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA AS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED THEREBY DISREGARDING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHOBITION AGAINST "FRUITS" OF THE POISONOUS
TREE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AND GRAVELY MISAPPRECIATED THE
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE GLARING
DISCREPANCIES
IN
THE
TESTIMONIES
OF
THE
SUPPOSED
EYEWITNESSES.

SO ORDERED.47
The trial court declared that the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de Vera
should be accorded great weight and credence as they testified positively regarding what
transpired during the raid. In contrast, the testimony of accused was self-serving,
negative and feeble. She failed to prove that it was her brother who manipulated the
unfortunate events. Neither was she able to prove ill motive on the part of the police
officers who conducted a search in her house; hence, the presumption is that they
regularly performed their duties. The failure of the accused to present her two daughters
as witnesses amounted to suppression of evidence, giving rise to the presumption that if
they had been presented, their testimonies would be adverse to her.
On the issue of the validity of the search warrant, the court ruled that there was probable
cause for its issuance. The proceedings conducted by the Execute Judge relative to the

Abuan insisted that the applicant failed to show probable cause for the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 98-62. "Marissa Gorospe" is a fictitious person whose alleged
testimony is fabricated and was used by the police officers to convince the Executive
Judge that there was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant when, in fact,
there was none. The Executive Judge failed to ask Gorospe searching questions.
Consequently, Search Warrant No. 98-62 is void and the substances and paraphernalia
confiscated by the policemen are inadmissible in evidence. She further claimed that the
testimonies of De Vera and Gamboa were pockmarked with inconsistencies and as such,
the trial court should not have given them probative weight.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the trial court merely
confirmed Executive Judge Ramos finding of probable cause. Besides, appellant failed to
file a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 98-62, hence, was estopped from assailing it

and the search and seizure conducted thereafter. The OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Demaisip v. Court of Appeals.50 It likewise claimed that the inconsistencies adverted to
by appellant pertained merely to collateral matters and were not determinative of her guilt
or innocence. As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution, her defenses could not
prevail over the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

II THE CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT WAS DEEMED WAIVED AFTER ARRAIGNMENT.

The CA rendered judgment affirming the RTC decision. The fallo of the decision reads:

IV THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER.56

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated
March 28, 1001 in Criminal Case No. 98-02337-D of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41,
Dagupan City convicting Eliza T. Abuan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

Petitioner avers that the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge was void because
the circumstances leading to its issuance were not based on probable cause but on mere
fabrications. She points out that according to Gorospe, she became acquainted with
petitioner and visited her in her house because of their employment with Avon Cosmetics.
However, considering that she and Gorospe were never employed by Avon Cosmetics
and were not even acquainted, such testimony is false. Thus, the search warrant should
be declared invalid as it is based on the testimony of a fictitious person, a "planted
witness" with a fabricated testimony and, consequently, any evidence discovered on the
basis thereof should be suppressed and excluded in accordance with Section 3(2), Article
III of the Constitution. Petitioner points out that with the inadmissibility of the shabu and
other paraphernalia, the appellate court should have acquitted her of the charges by
reason of the prosecutions failure to prove the commission of the crime beyond
reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.51
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of
Abuans guilt for the crime charged. The alleged discrepancies in the testimonies of
Gamboa and de Vera were peripheral matters. Moreover, Abuans failure to assail the
legality of the search and seizure conducted by the policemen before her arraignment
was equivalent to a waiver of her right to assail the search warrant. The CA cited the
ruling of this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals.52
Abuan filed a motion for reconsideration, 53 reiterating her argument that the search
warrant is not valid. She also argued that she did not waive her right to assail the validity
of the search warrant at her arraignment and during the trial. She maintained that the CA
should not rely on the evaluation by the RTC of the witnesses credibility, and that the
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were on material relevant
details.
54

The appellate court denied the motion in a Resolution dated May 26, 2005 on its finding
that no new and substantial matter was presented to warrant reconsideration thereof. 55
In the instant petition, Abuan, now petitioner, asserts that
I THE CA GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID DESPITE
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.

III THE CA ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SHABU AND OTHER PARAPHERNALIA

ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM THE PETITIONER AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

Petitioner insists that, based on the records, she sought to suppress the search warrant
throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. She rejected the prosecutions offer to
admit the validity of the search warrant and even filed a motion to suppress the search.
She was thus not proscribed from filing her motion to suppress the search warrant even
after the arraignment.
In its Comment,57 the OSG maintains that the search warrant is valid. It insists that the
CA correctly ruled that the requisites of a valid search warrant were present, noting that
the Executive Judge conducted searching questions and answers on the person of
Marissa Gorospe. It asserts that, in applying for a search warrant, a police officer need
not possess personal knowledge regarding an illegal activity; it is the witness who should
possess such personal knowledge, and upon whose testimony under oath probable
cause may be established. In this case, it was Gorospe who narrated, under oath and
before the judge, her personal knowledge of (petitioners) criminal activities. 58
The OSG maintains that petitioner in effect waived whatever objections she had
regarding the validity of the search warrant. It points out that she never questioned the

warrant before the court which issued the same, never questioned nor moved for the
quashal of the warrant before her arraignment. And while petitioner was allowed to
present evidence on the alleged invalidity of the search warrant, this did not cure her
omission or inaction in raising the issue at the proper time.
In her Reply,59 petitioner declares that a close scrutiny of the judges investigation of
Gorospe would reveal that her personal circumstances are pivotal in her acquisition of
personal knowledge regarding the alleged possession of shabu by petitioner. If these
personal circumstances are fabricated, then such "personal knowledge" regarding the
possession bears no credit.
Petitioner likewise maintains that contrary to the allegations of the OSG, she did not
waive her right to question the validity of the warrant. She could not have done any better
under the circumstances at that time because all the evidence against Gorospe was
made known and available to her only after her arraignment.
The Court is tasked to resolve the following threshold issues: (a) whether petitioner
waived her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the admissibility of the
substances and paraphernalia and other articles confiscated from her house based on
said warrant; and (b) whether the prosecution adduced evidence to prove her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioner Did not Waive Her Right to File a Motion
To Quash Search Warrant No. 98-62 and for the
Suppression of the Evidence Seized by the Police Officers
Section 14, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file. A
motion to quash a search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may be
filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has been instituted. If no
criminal action has been instituted, the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court
that issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to resolve the motion and a

criminal case is subsequently filed in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the
latter court.
The Court ruled in the Malaloan case that the motion to quash the search warrant which
the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress the resolution of the
court not on the motion to quash the search warrant and to suppress evidence shall be
subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 60 A motion to quash a
search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the
place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant.61 Section 7, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the court may hear the
motion, as follows:
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record, the court may hear the matter
on affidavits or depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions.
In the present case, petitioner reserved her right to question Search Warrant No. 98-62
when she filed her motion for bail in the RTC. The public prosecutor conformed to the
motion. During pre-trial in the RTC, petitioner rejected the prosecutions proposal for her
to admit the validity of Search Warrant No. 98-62, insisting that it was void. In her motion
to suppress, petitioner averred that the search warrant is void for the following reasons:
lack of probable cause; failure of the Executive Judge to ask searching questions on
Gorospe; and the evidence seized by the police officers on the basis of the search
warrant are inadmissible in evidence. She likewise prayed that the search warrant be
nullified, and that the evidence seized by the policemen on the basis of said warrant be
suppressed.62
Petitioner was ready to adduce evidence in support of her motion, but the court declared
that this should be done during the trial. Petitioner thus no longer assailed the ruling of
the trial court and opted to adduce her evidence at the trial. She likewise objected to the
admission of the search warrant and the evidence confiscated by the police officers after
the search was conducted. It bears stressing that the trial court admitted the same and
she objected thereto. It cannot, therefore, be said that petitioner waived her right to assail
the search warrant and object to the admissibility of the regulated drugs found in her
house.

On the second issue, the trial courts ruling (which the appellate court affirmed) that the
prosecution adduced evidence to prove petitioners guilt of crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt is correct.
Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 reads:
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
The elements of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are as follows: (a) the
accused was in possession of the regulated drugs; (b) the accused was fully and
consciously aware of being in possession of the regulated drug; and (c) the accused had
no legal authority to possess the regulated drug. 63 Possession may be actual or
constructive. In order to establish constructive possession, the People must prove that
petitioner had dominion or control on either the substance or the premises where
found.64 The State must prove adequate nexus between the accused and the prohibited
substance.65 Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or aminus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden of evidence is shifted to
petitioner to explain the absence of aminus possidendi.66
We agree with the trial courts finding that, indeed, petitioner had in her possession and
control 57 small, heat-sealed sachets of shabu weighing 5.67 gm when Search Warrant
No. 98-62 was served on her. As testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the
police officers, in the presence of Garcia and Mangaliag, found the said substances in a
drawer in her bedroom. Petitioner likewise failed to present any legal authority to justify
her possession of the regulated drug found in her bedroom.
The mere denial by petitioner of the crime charged and her bare claim of being the victim
of a frame-up by de Vera and Gamboa cannot prevail over the positive and steadfast
testimonies of the police officers. Their testimonies were corroborated by the
inventory/receipt of property, stating that, indeed, 57 small heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) weighing 5.67 grams were found in
a drawer in petitioners bedroom. The police officers are presumed to have performed
their duties in good faith, in accordance with law. Absent any clear and convincing
evidence that such officers had ill or improper motive or were not performing their duties,
their testimonies with respect to the surveillance operation, the implementation of search

warrant, and the seizure of the regulated drug in the house of petitioner must be
accorded full faith and credence. 67 Like alibi, the defense of denial and frame-up had
been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor. Denial is a negative of self-serving
defense, while frame-up is as easily concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecutions for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. 68 For the defense
of frame-up to prosper, the evidence must be clear and convincing. 69
It bears stressing that the policemen saw to it that the search of petitioners house was
conducted with the assistance and in the presence of Barangay Captain Mangaliag
and Kagawad Garcia. They testified that the regulated drugs confiscated by the
policemen were found in the searched premises. Petitioner failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that the policemen and the barangay officials had any improper
motive to frame her and falsely ascribe to her the crime of violating R.A. No. 6425, as
amended.
Except for her bare testimony, petitioner failed to prove that her brother Arsenio Tana
instigated the policemen to secure Search Warrant No. 98-62, conducted a search in her
house, "planted" the drugs in her bedroom and stole money from her. Petitioner failed to
make such a claim when she was arrested and brought to the MTC for preliminary
investigation. She also failed to file any criminal complaint against the policemen and her
brother Arsenio Tana for filing the fabricated charge against her and for "planting"
evidence in her house. It was only when she testified in her defense in the trial court that
she alleged, for the first time, that the charge against her was instigated by her brother, in
cahoots with the policemen. We quote with approval the disquisitions of the OSG on this
matter:
SECOND: The police officers who testified had not proven bad or ill motive to testify
against accused.
The suspicion of accused that it was her brother who manipulated the events in her life is
unsubstantiated and too far-fetched to happen and is, therefore, unbelievable.
The presumption, therefore, is that said police officers performed their official duties
regularly (People v. Cuachon, 238 SCRA 540).
THIRD: The testimony of accused is too self-serving. It is uncorroborated.
According to her, the intrusion into her house by the police was witnessed by her two
daughter (sic). However, she did not present them as witnesses.

In the case of her daughter Ediliza, she was already twenty years old at the time so that
she was already mature for all legal intents and purposes. In the case of her daughter
Mae Liza, who was nine years old, there was no reason why she could not articulate
what she personally saw and experienced, if what she would be made to state was true.
The inability of the said accused, therefore, to present her two daughters is tantamount to
a suppression of evidence, thus raising the presumption that if they were presented, their
testimonies would have been adverse to her.
Furthermore, it has been [the] consistent ruling of the Supreme Court that a plain denial
or negative testimony, if unsubstantiated by a clear and convincing testimony, cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses (People v. Amaguin, 229
SCRA 155).
FOURTH: The other defense of accused is that it was unlikely for her to have engaged in
pushing or peddling drugs for a living because she had to set a good example of decent
living for the sake of her two beautiful daughters and good neighbors. Furthermore, she
did not have financial problems which could have pushed her into the drug business
because her sister Corazon Bernardino had been regularly sending her money.
The aforecited unlikelihood perceived by accused could not prevail over the affirmative
testimonies of policemen Gamboa and de Vera who positively declared that they found
57 sachets of shabu in her room.70

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Thus, any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.71
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure enumerate the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, thus:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except
upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant, record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

Search Warrant No. 98-62

Is Valid; the Articles, Paraphernalia and Regulated
Drugs Found in Petitioners Bedroom and Confiscated
by the Police Officers are Admissible in Evidence
We agree with the ruling of the CA affirming, on appeal, the findings of the trial court that
based on the deposition and testimony of Gorospe, there was probable cause for the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 98-62 for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425, as amended.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must
examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he
or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and
the things to be seized.72
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular
affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause.
However, great deference is to be accorded to the Judges determination. 73 The

affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is presumed to be

valid.74
Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by Judges in a
common-sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the
midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate specificity
have no place in this area.75 The Judge in determining probable cause is to consider the
totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid
formula,76and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. 77 Probable
cause exists if a practical, common-sense evaluation of the facts and circumstances
show a fair possibility that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location. 78 There
must be a factual showing sufficient to comprise probable cause of particular facts and
circumstances so as to allow the Judge to make an independent evaluation of the matter.
It is sufficient if the information put forth in the affidavit/deposition or testimony of the
affiant/deponent are believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant/deponent as
true.79 Sufficient information must be presented to allow a Judge to determine probable
cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated contention of
others.
The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de
novo determination of probable cause but only to determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the records supporting the Judges decision to issue the search
warrant.80 The reviewing court is simply to ensure that the Judge had a substantial basis
for concluding that probable cause existed, 81 and once ascertained that the Judge had
substantial basis for concluding that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing,
the determination of probable cause must be upheld. In the absence of any showing that
the Judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so
conducted on the affiants/deponent before him, there is no basis for doubting the
reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions. 82
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search
warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the
police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents
clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant
made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition
or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such
evidence must focus on the state of mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious
of the falsity of his assertion or representation. 83The requirement that a search warrant
not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his
informant are able to use deliberately falsehood allegations to demonstrate probable

cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that the ploy
succeeded.84 However, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police
officer or government informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police
officer or government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth in his or her affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof
are sufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack
of probable cause.85
The evidence presented by petitioner that Gorospe was not a resident or transient
of Barangay Sapang, even if true and credible, is not at all material or necessary to the
determination of probable cause. Whether petitioner and Gorospe were dealers of Avon
Cosmetics as of May 5, 1998 may be relevant to the issue of whether there was factual
basis for the finding of probable cause by the Executive Judge against petitioner;
however, petitioners evidence to prove his claim is tenuous and does not warrant the
quashal of Search Warrant No. 98-62 and the suppression of the evidence seized after
the enforcement of the search warrant.
The evidence petitioner presented to disprove the testimony of Gorospe that they were
dealers of Avon Cosmetics are her (petitioners) testimony and that of Carvajal. The
certification purportedly signed by dela Rosa, the Branch Manager of Avon Cosmetics
Dagupan Branch, is hearsay because she did not testify. Carvajal admitted that she was
not in a position to confirm the veracity of the contents of the certification:
PROSECUTOR JAIME DOJILLO
ON CROSS-EXAMINATION
q What is your position at Dagupan Avon Cosmetics?
a Team Leader, Sir.
q Do you have any participation in the preparation of this certification?
a None, Sir.
q So, you had not in position to know the truth of this certification, hence, you were not
the one who prepared the same?

a Yes, Sir.86
Carvajal was merely one of many team leaders of Avon Cosmetics in Dagupan City. She
did not testify nor did petitioner adduce evidence that Gorospe was not such a dealer in
places other than Dagupan City or Pangasinan for that matter. In fine, petitioner failed to
adduce competent and credible evidence that Gorospe was not a dealer of Avon products
in the branches of Avon Cosmetics other than Pangasinan. Other than the denial of
petitioner and the testimony of Carvajal, petitioner failed to present evidence that she was
not a dealer of Avon Cosmetics. On the other hand, the testimony of Gorospe before the
Executive Judge was corroborated by the testimonies of police officers Gamboa and de
Vera.
In the present case, the Executive Judge found probable cause after conducting the
requisite searching questions on Gorospe for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. The trial court reviewed the testimony of Gorospe before the
Executive Judge87 and confirmed that, indeed, there was probable cause against
petitioner for violation of said crime. The finding of the Executive Judge was corroborated
by the testimony of police officers de Vera and Gamboa, who, in their surveillance
operation, partially confirmed Gorospes claim that, indeed, people had been going to the
house of petitioner to buy shabu. The findings of the trial court were, in turn, affirmed by
the CA.
The well-entrenched rule is that the findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate
court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and
convincing evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and
circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. In this case, petitioner failed to
establish any such circumstance.
The trial and appellate courts ruled that petitioner possessed 5.67 gm of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and sentenced her to an indeterminate penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional. The penalty imposed by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is incorrect.
As the Court ruled in People v. Tira:88
Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of
possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of
the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:

QUANTITY

IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams

prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams

prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams

reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams

reclusion perpetua

Considering that the regulated drug found in the possession of the appellants is
only 1.001 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional.
Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day ofarresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum, for
violation of Section 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. 89
The penalty imposed in the Tira case is the correct penalty, which should likewise be
imposed against petitioner herein.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25726 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to penalty.
Petitioner is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to three (3) years
of prision correccional in its medium period as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On appeal is the June 6, 2005 Court of Appeals Decision 1 affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Pampanga, Branch 59 convicting herein appellants
Zeng Wa Shui (Zeng) alias "Alex Chan," and Maribel Lagman (Maribel) of violation of
Republic Act (RA) 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659.
Culled from the 7-volume trial court records of the case are the following facts:
After receiving reports of clandestine operation of shabu laboratories in Pampanga, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted in January 1996 surveillance of a
piggery farm in Porac which was reportedly being used as a front therefor.
From the surveillance, it was gathered that three Chinese nationals, namely Zeng Wa
Shui (Zeng), Li Wien Shien (Li) and Jojo Gan (Gan) occupied the farm, and Maribel
frequented the place while Zeng and Li would go over to her rented house in 2609 San
Francisco, Balibago, Angeles City which she was sharing with her Chinese common-law
husband, Jose "Bobby" Yu.
In the early morning of March 14, 1996, two NBI teams, armed with search warrants,
simultaneously raided the Porac farm and the Balibago residence.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 168695*

December 8, 2008

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
MARIBEL LAGMAN and ZENG WA SHUI, appellants.
DECISION

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

The search of the farm, covered by Search Warrant No. 96-102, yielded no person
therein or any tell-tale evidence that it was being used as a shabu laboratory. Only pigs in
their pens, and two (2) containers or drums the contents of which when field-tested onthe-spot by NBI chemist Januario Bautista turned out to be acetone and ethyl, 2 were
found.
The leader and members of the raiding team thereupon brought their vehicles inside the
farm and closed its gates, expecting that the suspected operators would arrive. At around
10 a.m., a car driven by Li arrived and entered the premises after the NBI operatives
opened the gates.
A search of Lis vehicle, a blue Toyota Corolla sedan, yielded a digital weighing scale and
a packet with crystalline substance weighing approximately 317.60 grams which when
field-tested by NBI Chemist Januario Bautista, was found positive for shabu.

At around 12:00 noon, Zeng arrived at the farm on board an L-300 Mitsubishi van bearing
a blue drum containing liquid which, when field-tested on the spot also by NBI Chemist
Bautista, was found positive for shabu.3
With respect to the search of the Balibago residence by the other NBI team by virtue of
Search Warrant No. 96-101, since Maribel was out, she was fetched from her place of
business. They found two padlocked rooms inside the house, but with Maribel claiming
that she did not have any keys thereto, the team forcibly opened the rooms which yielded
18 big plastic containers containing liquid substance, 30 sacks containing a white
powdery substance, 10 plastic containers also containing a white powdery substance,
plastic gallons, a refrigerator, a big blower, pails, plastic bags, a big glass flask, and a .25
caliber handgun.
The liquid substance contained in 6 of the 18 plastic containers was subjected to a
chemical field-test and was found positive for shabu. The contents of the drums turned
out to be alcohol solvents; the powder in the sacks was determined to be ephedrine
hydrochloride; and the liquid in the 10 plastic containers was determined to be sodium
hydroxide. These chemicals are used in the manufacture of shabu.
Two separate informations against Maribel were thus filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Angeles City, the first for possession of 527 kilograms of shabu in liquid form,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-377, and the second for possession of 1,615
kilograms of ephedrine hydrochloride, a controlled substance, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 96-378. Thus she was charged as follows:
Crim. Case No. 96-377:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Angeles City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in her possession approximately 527 kilograms of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 96-378:

That on or about March 14, 1996 in Angeles City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in her possession approximately 1,615.0 kilograms of Ephedrine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On the strength of the confiscated regulated substances found in his vehicle, Li was
indicted before the RTC of Angeles City, in Criminal Case No. 96-379, for violation of
Section 16 vis--vis Section 2(e), (f), (m), Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act, viz:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Porac, Pampanga and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession approximately 317.60 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a regulated drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
And Zeng was indicted in Criminal Case No. 96-380, for violation of Article I vis--vis
Section 21 also of the Dangerous Drugs Act, viz:
That on or about March 14, 1996 in Porac, Pampanga and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession approximately 78 kilograms of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a regulated drug in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The cases were consolidated in Branch 59 of the Angeles City RTC.
Maribel disclaimed knowledge that regulated substances and paraphernalia were being
kept in the padlocked rooms in the house which she had since 1994 been sharing with Yu
who had disappeared. She averred that it was Yu who placed the containers and sacks in

the rooms which he padlocked in November 1995 and January 1996, telling her that they
were fertilizers and restaurant items belonging to a friend who was to pick them up; that it
was Yu who shouldered the rent of the house and provided the household expenses; and
that Yu was away most of the time because he was based in Manila and would only go to
the house once a month for a three-day visit.
Maribel admitted that Zeng had gone to her house for a visit, and that she was twice
brought by Yu to the piggery in Porac to meet his other Chinese friends. She denied,
however, any knowledge of Yus activities, averring that she was not home most of the
time as she was tending to a store at the public market which she co-owns with her
mother.
Li denied knowledge of or involvement in the alleged operation of the shabu laboratory.
He even denied knowing Gan and averred that he only went to the farm to buy piglets.
Zeng denied knowing Maribel or Li. He admitted knowing Gan, however, and having gone
to the piggery four times as Gan wanted to hire him as manager of the piggery.
By Decision4 dated July 20, 1988,5 the trial court acquitted Li but convicted Zeng and
Maribel, imposing upon them the death penalty and ordering them to pay a fine
of P1,000,000 and P2,000,000, respectively.
Zeng and Maribel appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Zeng contended that the alleged shabu found inside the blue plastic container was
inadmissible in evidence, it having been illegally obtained; and that the prosecution failed
to prove a basic element of the crime charged that he did not have authority to possess
those substances.
For her part, Maribel insisted that the evidence seized by virtue of the search warrant was
not admissible against her as the warrant did not specifically state her name; and that the
prosecution failed to prove her actual or constructive possession or intent to possess the
substances. She reiterated her claim that she had no knowledge that dangerous
drugs/substances were being kept in the locked rooms of her house, she having believed
her common-law husbands above-stated explanation.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Maribels and Zengs conviction by Decision 6 dated June 6,
2006, and denied Maribels motion for reconsideration by Resolution 7 dated March 30,
2007; hence they interposed the present appeal.
Maribel faults the appellate court for affirming that Search Warrant No. 96-101 is valid
and the pieces of evidence seized by virtue thereof are admissible; for ruling that she had
constructive possession of the substances found in her rented house; and for failing to
consider the documentary evidence she submitted, such as her loan applications and
Deed of Sale of her car which, to her, proves that she had no knowledge of the drug
syndicates operations; otherwise, there would have been no need to borrow money or
sell her car.
Zeng, on the other hand, insists that the 78 kilograms of methamphetamine hydrochloride
in liquid form contained in the blue plastic container was illegally obtained and was not
even formally offered in evidence, hence, the same should have been excluded; that the
prosecution failed to prove that he had no authority to possess the
allegedshabu confiscated from his person; and that the conclusion that the liquid contents
of the blue plastic drum is methamphetamine hydrochloride is erroneous, no quantitative
test as to its purity having been conducted.
The petition fails.
The essential elements of the crime of illegal possession of regulated drugs are the
following: 1) the actual possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
or consciously possessed the said drug.8
[Illegal possession of regulated drugs] is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is
not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the
intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not
only actual possession, but alsoconstructive possession. Actual possession exists when
the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by
a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which,
standing alone, is sufficient to convict.10
Maribel failed to present any convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of knowledge
and possession of the regulated substances and paraphernalia found in her residence.
As tenant of the house, she had full access to, full control of and dominion over the
rooms.

the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted."
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Contrary to Maribels contention, the aforementioned Rule does not require that the
search warrant should identify with particularity the person against whom it is directed. It
suffices that the place to be searched andthings to be seized are described. The pertinent
portion of Search Warrant No. 96-10111 reads:
xxxx

On why she did not even check the rooms, if what were stored therein in November 1995
and January 1996 were indeed fertilizer and restaurant paraphernalia which the alleged
owners would allegedly pick up anytime, and why she did not have keys thereto,
assuming that indeed she had none, she proffered no explanation.
As for Maribels argument that there would have been no need for her to borrow money
or sell her car if she was involved in the operations of a drug ring, the same is a non
sequitur. In any event, it does not suffice to rebut the presumption of her constructive
knowledge and possession of the regulated substances.

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SA

Renato M. Vaflor of NBI and his witness that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that Violation of Sec. 14-A of RA 6425 as amended has been committed
or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that @ROMEO/JOSEPH/TITO YU/ALEX CHAN @ APE" and/or OCCUPANTS
of 2609 San Francisco Street, Angeles City has in his/their possession or
control the following:
a. Methylamphetamine (Shabu) in liquid or crystal form;

Respecting her contention that Search Warrant No. 96-101 is invalid for not having
identified her with particularity, the same does not lie. Under Sec. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court, the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant.
A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined by the judge or such other responsible officer
authorized by law after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing theplace to be
searched and the things to be seized.
Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to

b. Phenyl-2-Propanone, Ephedrine, Pseudo-ephedrine, foremic acid,

Benzylmethylketone and ethanol;
c. Weighing scale, burner, graduated cylinder, beakers, glassware,
melting point apparatus, titration apparatus, refrigerators, freezers.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the wording of Search Warrant No. 96-101 sufficiently complies with the
requirement for a valid search warrant as it describes the place to be searched and the
items to be seized.
As for Zengs arguments, they are a mere rehash of those already raised before the
appellate court. As correctly held by the appellate court, the testimonies of five members
of the NBI raiding team that a blue drum containing liquid was found in the van driven by
Zeng -- which liquid, when field-tested, was found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride

-- deserves full faith and credence, absent any showing that these officers were not
properly performing their duty or that they were inspired by any improper motive.
As to the contention that the blue drum was not included as subject of Search Warrant
No. 96-102, hence, illegally obtained, the same fails. No doubt, the Constitution prohibits
search and seizure without a judicial warrant, and any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The prohibition is not
absolute, however. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The search made on the van driven by Zeng falls within the purview of the "plain view"
doctrine.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position
to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
may be introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject
to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Search Warrant No. 96-102 named Zeng, a.k.a. "Alex Chan," as one of the subjects
thereof. When he arrived in his L-300 van at the piggery during the NBIs stakeout, he
came within the area of the search. The drum alleged to have contained the
methamphetamine was placed in the open back of the van,13 hence, open to the eye and
hand of the NBI agents. The liquid-filled drum was thus within the plain view of the NBI
agents, hence, a product of a legal search.

Zengs claim that the prosecution failed to prove that he had no license or authority to
possess methamphetamine hydrochloride likewise fails. The general rule is that if a
criminal charge is predicated on a negative allegation, or that a negative averment is an
essential element of a crime, the prosecution has the burden to prove the charge.
However, this rule is not without exception.
Where the negative of an issue does not permit of direct proof, or where the facts
are more immediately within the knowledge of the accused, the onus probandi
rests upon him. Stated otherwise, it is not incumbent upon the prosecution
to adduce positive evidence to support a negative averment the truth of
which is fairly indicated by established circumstances and which, if untrue,
could readily be disproved by the production of documents or other
evidence within the defendants knowledge or control. For example, where
a charge is made that a defendant carried on a certain business without a
license (as in the case at bar, where the accused is charged with the sale of
a regulated drug without authority), the fact that he has a license is a matter
which is peculiarity within his knowledge and he must establish that fact or
suffer conviction.14 (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the negative averment that Zeng had no license or authority to
possess shabu could have easily been disproved by presenting a copy of the license or
authority or any other document evidencing authority to possess it. This he failed to do.
As to Zengs contention that no quantitative examination was conducted to establish
the purity of the methamphetamine hydrochloride contained in the drum, which should
have been the basis of determining the imposable penalty per Dangerous Drugs Board
Resolution No. 3, dated May 9, 1979, requiring that both qualitative and quantitative
examination should be done on seized drugs, the same fails too.
The NBI forensic chemist already testified that the liquid contained therein, when
subjected to laboratory examination, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Such finding is presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the container
unless proven otherwise.15 No contrary proof was presented by Zeng, however.
More importantly, what the Dangerous Drugs Act punishes is the possession of the
dangerous or regulated drugs or substances without authority. Whether the
substance is pure or unadulterated is not material; hence, quantitative examination of

the substance to determine its purity is not indispensable for conviction. Neither does it
affect the penalty imposed, for any person who unless authorized by law
possesses shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride, shall be punished with reclusion
perpetua to death; and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos if two hundred (200) or more grams thereof are found in his possession. 16
Zeng was found by the trial court to have possessed 78 kilograms of shabu without
mitigating or aggravating circumstances; thus, the Court imposed the correct penalty of
death and a fine of P1,000,000.00.
However, in view of the enactment on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philipines, the death penalty can no longer be

imposed. Appellants must thus be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Appellants Maribel Lagman and Zeng Wa Shui are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay aFINE of Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) Pesos and One Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos, respectively.
SO ORDERED.