Regional Geo-Strategic Challenges and Opportunities For China-Pakistan Cooperation

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK TANK
Working Paper: Regional geostrategic challenges and opportunities for China-Pakistan

cooperation.
Authors:
Owais Ahmed Ghani (former Governor Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) Senior Fellow
Mujahid Alam (Visiting Senior Advisor, UN Peacekeeping Department) Senior Fellow
Agha Ahmad Gul (Former Vice-Chancellor, University of Balochistan) Visiting Scholar
Ali Shah Senior Research and Policy Analyst
Printed in Pakistan by
The China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
National University of Sciences & Technology
H-12
Islamabad
www.nust.edu.pk
China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank, established on 16 January, 2012, is a trilateral collaboration
between the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Tsinghua
University, Beijing, and Southwest University of Political Science and Law (SWUPL),
Chongqing, China.
China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank, May 2013
All rights are reserved. For information and permission regarding the copyright contact ChinaPakistan Joint Think Tank.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors solely and do
not in any way reflect the views of the China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank or of the three
partner universities.
Cover and Layout design: Marketing and Communications Office, NUST
REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR
CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION
PRESIDENTS MESSAGE
Honorable Friends,
I am pleased to share with you the present Working Paper of the
China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank. This marks the beginning of a
series of analyses on various subjects of immediate relevance to
national development of Pakistan and China as well as regional
development based on a strong foundation of peace, stability and
prosperity. A multifaceted knowledge partnership between the National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad,
Tsinghua University, Beijing and Southwest University of Political
Science (SWUPL), Chongqing, China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank is
dedicated to extending the third mission of universities of contributing to economic growth and societal progress from the national
setting to the China-Pakistan bilateral relationship and regional cooperation. The Working Paper adopts a systemic approach to the
challenges to and the opportunities for broadening the bilateral cooperation. The Paper proposes a simple and workable framework
for ensuring peace in the region through broad-based China-Pakistan collaboration underpinned by mutual economic cooperation.
Also highlighted is the way in which other countries in the region
can benefit from this bilateralism between China as the worlds second largest economy and Pakistan as the indispensable geopolitical
actor in the region. I sincerely hope that this analysis will contribute
to changing the currently dominant zero-sum tendency of geopolitical analysis in favour of a win-win analytical trend that transcends
either-or way of looking at relations amongst nations.
Amer Hashmi
President
China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
CONTENTS
REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR

CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION
1. Executive summary
6
2. Introduction: The regional geopolitical dynamics
10
3. China and Pakistan: Mutual interdependence
12
4. Challenges as opportunities
13
4.1.
The US factor
13
4.2.
The Iranian factor
14
4.3.
The Afghan factor
15
4.4.
The Indian factor
16
4.5. Forging civil-military alliance in Pakistan for nation-building
17
4.6.
Limitations of bilateralism
18
4.7. Forging multilateralism
19
4.7.1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia

21
5. Proposed domestic strategy for China-Pakistan cooperation
23
6. Conclusion and recommendations

24
6.1.
Domestic front
25
6.2.
Regional front
25
6.3.
International front
26
6.4.
China-Pakistan front
26
Figure 1: The mega-region of China-Pakistan cooperation
28
Figure 2: Chinese Eurasian land bridges
29
References
29
CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER
1. Executive summary
1.
This Working Paper takes stock of the
geostrategic challenges and opportunities to
help Pakistan and China maximise their cooperation with a view to enhancing the possibilities for peace and development in South and
Central Asia. It aims to suggest ways that will
foster not only strategic cooperation between
China and Pakistan, but also across the region with all interested actors. In this regard,
the Paper has underpinned the importance
of increased economic cooperation between
China and Pakistan as the cornerstone of
both sustainable China-Pakistan relationship
and enhanced regional development.
2.
This analysis tries to envision a wide
area of cooperation embracing Central Asia,
South Asia and also the Middle East, in which
multiple complementarities between Pakistan
and other countries are highlighted. For ensuring peace and stability in the region, it argues, there is a need to recognise the active
and positive role that each country can play
in ensuring equality of status, prosperity, and
opportunity for progress and development
open to all countries. To this effect, it advocates that peace and stability can be ensured
through region-wide cooperation aimed at
broad-based economic development.
3.
For Pakistan, the goal is to ensure
peace, security, development and economic
growth inside and outside its borders by actively cooperating with its immediate neighbours and the region at large. China is the key
strategic and economic partner of Pakistan.
There is a need to underpin the bilateral strategic relationship with deeper economic cooperation for broadening and deepening areas
of mutual cooperation.
4.
With Iran, the existing relationship
needs to be transformed into one that is capable of maturely addressing international concerns and maximising the positive potential of
Iran for promoting peace in Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan may use
its traditionally good relations with the Middle-
Eastern Arab States and Turkey for promoting

peace and stability in the region and offsetting
the destabilising regional currents in the wake
of the Arab Spring.
5.
With Afghanistan, Pakistan requires
to mitigate the bilateral lack of trust that has
marred relations between the two neighbours.
There is a need to highlight cultural affinity,
common faith, geographic advantages, and
the mutual interests in socio-economic development shared by the peoples and governments of the two countries. The Paper advocates the development of strong relationships
with all the Central Asian Republics and the
establishment of ties based on common economic and political interests.
6.
With India, the Paper tries to highlight
both the need and the potential for fostering
peace simultaneously focusing on the tendency of the relationship to slide back into the
past stalemate that is governed by historic
baggage. It also stresses the adverse impact which Indian geopolitics can have on the
prospects for peace in the region.
7.
As a superpower with a global reach,
the US enjoys the status of a de-facto neighbour of every country in the international system. With the US, therefore, Pakistan needs
to chalk out a relationship based on consideration for each others concerns for furthering
regional cooperation.
8.
Russia is an important factor for the
promotion of regional peace and prosperity.
Deepening of economic relations with Russia
can contribute significantly toward the capacity of Pakistan to play an effective role in promoting cooperation in the region.
9.
The instinct for competition may be
judiciously transformed into an aspiration for
cooperation. The negative tendencies of competition also need to be curbed. There is partial convergence amongst various powers for
the goals of peace, prosperity and harmony in
the region. It calls for the creation of substantive convergence and consensus not only on
the shape of peace and stability but also on
REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION
the means employed for their achievement.

Win-win economic cooperation can be a way
forward in fostering substantial convergence
in the region.
10.
Chinas peaceful development model
is a positive factor for domestic and regional
peace, progress, and stability. With the US,
China seems set to continue the policy of
peaceful co-existence, mutual trade-based
interdependencies and pre-emption of misunderstandings. Given the peaceful tendency of
Chinese foreign policy, therefore, it is expected that China will not contribute to the destabilization of the evolving international system,
and will instead focus on ensuring that any
changes that may need to be made in the international system are in a positive direction
and contribute to peace.
11. With Russia, China appears to be
continuing the policy of pragmatic cooperation. This shall further find reinforcement due
to Chinas rising energy demands and Russias role as a major supplier of energy. This
mutual need-based cooperation shall in part
serve to increase Sino-Russian cooperation.
Sino-Russian cooperation will also focus on
the creation of a level playing field in the region to reduce the pressures for establishing
resident or non-resident hegemony in Central Asia. Chinas relationship with Iran will
similarly be motivated by the formers energy
scarcity and will be influenced by the tense
US-Iran relations. With Central Asian Republics (CARs) too, China is carrying on and will
continue to conduct a foreign policy based on
helping the development of the CARs in exchange for their oil and gas reserves.
12. With India, China appears to be engaging in a carefully orchestrated policy aimed
at encouraging India to be a positive player for
peace in the region that could persuade India
to moderate its geopolitical ambitions. Pakistan should think through the implications of
increased Sino-Indian trade and take advantage of its positive outcomes.
13. Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) is a significant multilateral platform that
has the potential to help China and Pakistan

achieve their strategic aims and also guarantee stability and peace in the region.
14.
The Paper highlights the fact that China-Pakistan cooperation in South and Central
Asia is the rational response to the regional
problems of war, terrorism, political instability,
economic stagnation, inter-state competition
and other related issues. China-Pakistan cooperation may help turn partial into substantive convergence through encouraging equal
and mutually beneficial broad-based cooperation amongst all players in the region.
15. A wide-ranging China-Pakistan cooperation promoting both bilateralism and multilateralism will serve to bring about regional
growth, peace, prosperity and harmony. Some
recommendations in this regard are indicated
below:
Domestic front:
16.
Actively pursue a policy of neutralising
militancy and associated extremist philosophies and ideologies, and implement socioeconomic development programs on a fasttrack basis in backward and underdeveloped
regions in the country to build social and political stability there.
17, Take all measures to achieve a stable and functional political system and culture
in the Country. A functional system shall be
clean and corruption-free, based on participatory involvement of the people coupled with
responsible interactive interdependence of
powers rather than unrealistic separation of
powers in the domestic polity.
18.
Improve governance by following universally acknowledged principles of administration to build a professional merit-based
bureaucracy and to define parameters of political oversight of government machinery.
19. Develop a new paradigm of government based on public-private partnership,
especially, in economic and social sectors.
Typically, a PPP shall consist of the provision
of public service jointly funded by government

and private business. However, it needs to be
pointed out that since many types of PPPs,
depending upon the predominance of public or private sector, are in existence it is advised to develop or select that form which is
a win-win option for the people, business and
government in Pakistan. In order for PPPs to
succeed, there needs to be present the ease
of doing business, transparency in public and
private transactions, strong regulatory capacity in the public sector, and fair, speedy and
strong dispute-resolution systems.
Regional front:
20. Open bilateral talks now with all Afghan ethno-political groups for building a
broad-based relationship with Afghanistan
in the post-US/NATO drawdown phase. This
should be carried out as a complementary
(not competitive) exercise in support of international efforts to build peace and stability in Afghanistan and restore normalcy in the
region. Historical Pak-Afghan relationship
should be made a basis for such an initiative.
This requires a separate bilateral effort in parallel to international efforts.
21.
Resume front-channel track-one talks
with India on all issues including Kashmir and
water resources.
22. Open a diplomatic initiative with all
regional countries (Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia,
CARs, Turkey, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, etc.) for taking them into confidence
regarding the proposed Pak-Afghan bilateral
talks and keeping them updated on it.
International front:
23.
Pursue an energetic diplomatic initiative to co-opt Saudi Arabia and Iran into efforts to diffuse tensions and prevent the exacerbation of the already dangerous sectarian
strife, including the Shia-Sunni schism, within
the Muslim countries. Pakistan is the worst affected in this regard and needs to focus its
energies in this direction.
24. Strengthen diplomatic relations with

EU countries to complement relations with the
US.
25. Open a focussed diplomatic initiative
with Russia with a view to getting over the
past and enabling the development of positive relationship between Russia and Pakistan leading to a wider regional cooperation.
China-Pakistan front:
26. Develop a broad internal consensus
on the proposed foreign policy and strategy of
Pakistan on China-Pakistan bilateral cooperation and take Chinese leadership into confidence. Establish comprehensive informationsharing mechanisms to keep them updated.
27.
The recent handing over of the Gwadar Port operations to China Overseas Port
Holding Company is a very encouraging development and must be followed up energetically.
28. Ensure peaceful environment for the
smooth Chinese management of the Gwadar
port to lead in time to city development, airport
and related infrastructure projects.
29. Pursue the Oil City Project, ship refueling and re-supplying Hub, and wet and dry
dock facilities for international shipping near
Gwadar Port.
30. Establish a special security plan and
infrastructure for the coastal belt of Pakistan.
31. Move forward on the energy, trade,
transport and industrial corridor plans including the expansion of Karakorum Highway.
32. Pursue development of dedicated industrial parks and special economic zones for
facilitating investment and joint venture industrial projects.
33. A large proportion of Chinese investments in Pakistan is concentrated in the public sector. More private sector investments
by China will help create a healthy balance
between public and private sector Chinese investments in Pakistan allowing China to compete healthily with countries like the US and
UAE which invest more in the private sector in
Pakistan as compared to China.
34. The 2006 China-Pakistan Five-Year
Development Programme for Trade and Economic Cooperation should be fully realised.
This means initiating bilateral projects in all
the sectors identified in the Development Programme i.e., Agriculture, Energy, Science and
Technology, Industry, Manufacturing, Minerals, ICT, Engineering Services, Technical
Cooperation, Education (setting up an Engineering University with Chinese support and
participation), and Infrastructure and Public
Works.
35.
Pakistans East-West and NorthSouth National Energy, Trade, Transport and,
Industrial Corridor complements the plans for
the development of Western China. The FiveYear Development Programme is a key to
unlocking the potential of this corridor for China-Pakistan economic cooperation and the
development of Pakistan and Western China.
Therefore, dedicated cooperation should be
initiated on this particular point.
36. Foreign-funded terrorism and militancy are real and present dangers to the stability of Pakistan and China as well as ChinaPakistan cooperation. China should enhance
Pakistans financial and operational capacity
to fight this menace and pacify Khyber Pakthukhwa (KPK) and Balochistan for increased
economic cooperation.
37. China-Pakistan cooperation should
prioritise balanced and mutually advantageous trade through the 2006 China-Pakistan
Free Trade Agreement.
38. Energy cooperation between China
and Pakistan should be increased as a prelude to the relocation of Chinese industry in
Pakistan and the integration of Pakistan in the
Global Production Networks (GPNs) of Chinese multinationals.
39. In the context of energy cooperation,

both countries should increase cooperation
on building more dams on the Indus River,
relocation of re-conditioned power plants to
Pakistan, and renewable energy projects between China-Pakistan should be encouraged
so that Pakistans energy shortages can be
dealt with to facilitate economic cooperation.
The sale of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan is
a welcome decision in this regard and should
be followed up with appropriate moves in energy cooperation between the two countries.
40.
Establish wider and deeper interaction
via think tank activity and academic contact
through increased University-to-University
cooperation. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
should increase joint activities between the
three collaborating universities i.e., Tsinghua
University, Beijing, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad,
and Southwest University of Political Science
and Law (SWUPL), Chongqing, China.
41. Develop a cadre of China experts in
Pakistans universities and think tanks. PhD
programmes in China Studies should be offered in all Pakistani universities. Higher Education Commission of Pakistan should take
necessary steps to introduce China Studies
and the formation of China experts in Pakistans higher education. Further, proper consultative mechanism should be devised for
linking these China experts with relevant policy making bodies in the government. NUST
can take the initial steps in this regard through
the China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank.
42. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
should also devise ways of cooperating actively with the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) and facilitating increased contacts between CAS and the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. This cooperation can find an immediate form in the setting up of the proposed and
agreed China-Pakistan Institute of Science
and Technology at NUST.
43. A six-monthly or annual publication/
journal should be inaugurated by the ChinaPakistan Joint Think Tank which: focuses on
China-Pakistan relations in a global context;

highlights avenues and innovative means of
economic and social collaboration; reports on
the activities of various China-Pakistan fora;
analyses world events with relevance for both
China and Pakistan and their relationship; and
advocates the regional peace and prosperity
dividends of China-Pakistan relations. The
role of chambers of commerce and industry
in China and Pakistan should be considered
and explored to initiate and promote this effort. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank should
devise a strategy for it.
44. Tsinghua-NUST-SWUPL should also
announce an Annual Recognition Award to
one Pakistani national and one Chinese national for their efforts every year in promoting
cooperation between the two countries, especially in science, technology, higher education
and business.
45. Contrary to the views of the Western
and Indian think tanks and analysts which
confuse the proper path forward for China-Pakistan cooperation by claiming that economic
cooperation shall gather momentum once
militancy and terrorism are completely curbed
in Pakistan, it must be emphasised that militancy and terrorism shall be defeated in Pakistan and stability secured in Xinjiang through
increased China-Pakistan economic cooperation conducted simultaneously with combating extremism, militancy and terrorism. All
that needs to be done to understand this truth
is to extend the logic of domestic development of unstable regions inside any country
- which dictates that combating destabilising
elements and development of disturbed regions go hand in hand - to relations between
countries where bilateral relations between
China and Pakistan will prove a critical help in
defeating terrorism inside Pakistan.
46.
The Working Paper has benefitted
from the views of Mr. Riaz Khokhar, former
Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, given during
three comprehensive consultative sessions
with the authors. These sessions, in which
Mr. Khokhar shared his vast diplomatic experience and his first-hand knowledge of the
1
10
subject, proved very helpful in terms of understanding the multiple dimensions of ChinaPakistan relationship and cooperation.
2. Introduction: The
regional geopolitical
dynamics
47. Pakistan is strategically located between the twin forces of competition and collaboration in the mega-region that embraces
Central Asia, South Asia, Middle East, and
Caucasus. Central Asia and South Asia form
two contiguous strategic sub-regions of this
mega-region1. Since the beginning of the 21st
century, these two sub-regions have formed
the focus of international politics as a result
of the US-NATO war on terror in Afghanistan,
the next-door presence of a rising China, a
post cold-war resurgent Russia, and the hegemonic pretensions of India. US war of terror
generally was seen in reality as the sole superpower usurping the strategic void available
in Talibans Afghanistan and thus trying to exude the strategic effects, including containment of China and driving a wedge between
China and Pakistan. Pakistan sits right in the
middle of this regional geo-political dynamics.
This dynamic force influences the complexion
of both the foreign policy and the national politics of Pakistan.
48.
The presence of big, middle and small
powers in the regional politics both presents
challenges and provides opportunities that
create a cauldron of conflicting interests making the region inherently unstable and vulnerable to manipulation. Since ancient times, the
region has been periodically agitated due to
the hegemonic struggles between powers.
Regardless of the size and magnitude of the
national power of the countries involved, it is
not possible for any country - not even the
big powers like the US, China and Russia - to
pursue its policies by acting unilaterally in the
region. This has led to working alliances between small and big powers based on mutual
interests and common vision for the region.
See figure 1 at the end of the paper.
49. Due to the constantly evolving configuration of forces in existence in the region
since the 1950s, China and Pakistan have
found it mutually beneficial to work together
for the greater prosperity and peace of the region. This has resulted in a durable bilateral
strategic relationship aimed at the preservation of mutual interests. Like all nation-states,
however, the two countries face challenges
intertwined with opportunities that simultaneously strain and strengthen the bilateral relations. And therefore, the primary challenge
that China-Pakistan cooperation faces in the
region is to correctly understand and deal
with the destructive and constructive currents
which run across the region. Common understanding of challenges and opportunities
needs to be forged between the two friends in
this regard.
50.
The conflicting and differing American
and Chinese notions of security are a potential
cause of instability in the region. The actions
considered defensive in nature by the Chinese are precisely those which are thought
by the Americans to be aggressive and vice
versa (Kissinger 2012). The different strategic interpretations will keep the possibility of
conflict alive. While it will hardly bring US and
China face-to-face and may even paradoxically result in increased cooperation between
the US and China to prevent such a face-off,
this difference of world-views can become difficult for their partners to handle, especially
Pakistan.
51. Related to this is the ever-alive possibility that there may after all be areas where
the US and China, despite their economic interdependence, may not reach convergence.
Given the dynamic nature of international system, it may not be advisable to pinpoint these
areas of non-convergence, but the principle
which will underpin this non-convergence
needs to be spelled out so that the subsequent identification of areas of non-convergence between the US and China becomes
convenient; any initiative or area developments which will lead to a qualitative leap in
Chinese power with the prospect of outdoing
US overall superiority in military and econom-
ic power will be a point of non-convergence

of interests and policies between the US and
China. If Chinas relations with other nations
are the occasion or decisive steps in its gaining the above-mentioned advantage over the
US, then those nations may witness themselves becoming involved in the great-power
proxy competition that may prove detrimental
to such nations and the regions where such
nations are located.
52.
The nature of Pakistans current relationship with both China and the US is very
interesting. Unlike the Cold War and AfghanSoviet conflict, where Pakistan was clearly allied with the US against the former Soviet Union, the situation today is markedly different.
Today, Pakistan enjoys a broad and durable
friendship with China and a critical but limited,
and at times troubled and defiant, alliance in
the war on terror with the US. Even during
the Cold War, Pakistan never compromised
its strong relationship with China at any cost
nor did it give up pursuing nuclear parity with
India. Occasionally, the interests of Pakistan
and USA have clashed in this war and the two
have been seen to work at cross purposes.
But this is no reason to believe that the US
and Pakistan cannot develop a greater understanding of their mutual interests in the region. Both China and the US need a strong relationship with Pakistan to further their goals
in the region. Parallel relationships with the
US and China is Pakistans biggest challenge
and opportunity. Just as nature is said to abhor vacuum, so does geopolitics discourage
parallelism2 and ambivalence.
Parallelism is used here to mean an equally cordial and strong relationship with two competing powers. Except the relation of
neutrality, this parallelism is usually short-lived and cannot be sustained over a long duration owing to the natural tendency of
nations towards competition.
2
11
3. China and
Pakistan: Mutual
interdependence
53. Pakistan is important for China because the latters geo-strategic needs in the
region, to an extent, are reliably provided for
by Pakistan. Pakistan is conscious of the fact
that China has always displayed a special
concern toward its neighbours. Pakistan, being a vital part of Chinas strategic periphery,
is, as always, fully committed to fully support
Chinas peaceful development policies and
prevent destabilization of Xinjiang from within
its borders by Uighur-related militancy. Pakistan also recognises that China should be
afforded a broad-based mutually beneficial
opportunity of leveraging Pakistans geopolitical position to make up for the limitations
imposed by its own geography.
54.
Relationship of China with Pakistan is,
therefore, very important because it enables
China to both limit the regional ambitions of
India and enhance its standing with India. The
purpose is not to antagonise India but direct
the potential force of regional relations to become advantageous for China and Pakistan.
Indias Pakistan obsession and its territorial
disputes, reinforced by Indian hegemonic aspirations, strengthen ties between China and
Pakistan so that Indias anti-Pakistan ambitions can be kept under check. It is important
to mention here that the US has not been interested in offering a credible security to Pakistan in this regard.
55. The rise of China compels Beijing to
influence the regional game to suit the needs
of its own development and security while
keeping a light security footprint. The regional
strategy, from Chinas viewpoint, consists in
creating a synergy of cooperation with the
Central Asian Republics and the surrounding
countries. China intends to establish a beneficial network of trade and energy coupled with
a focus on programmes for the domestic development of its regional partners.
3
12
56.
America, however, is focused on maintaining a situation in which it remains the predominant player in regional geopolitics in this
region. In this regard, it is determined to maintain a military presence in the area, especially
in Afghanistan. It is actively pursuing a strategic relationship with India to prop it up as a
regional power player with a view to checking
Chinas access to the Arabian Sea and the
Persian Gulf via Pakistan. This has also given
India a convenient umbrella to pursue its own
traditional hostile agenda against Pakistan.
Notwithstanding the alliance with Pakistan
in the war on terror, the US is employing all
means, both overt and covert, to pressure Pakistan into supporting its geo-political agenda
in the region and push Pakistan into accepting
a subordinate role to India. At the very least, it
seeks to keep Pakistan and Afghanistan in a
destabilised and anarchic state to achieve is
geo-political goals.
57.
Pakistan, in this situation, provides the
South Asian buttress to the positive geopolitical networking of China and Central Asia. It
can further contribute to the success of Chinese plans for the development of Central
Asia through its own domestic development
and increased trade, transport and energy
links with Western China, Iran, Afghanistan
and Central Asia.
58.
Pakistan stands to benefit and is,
therefore, deeply interested in enhancing the
overall effect of Chinas investments in Central Asia through the development of its national energy, trade, industrial, and transport
corridors leading to greater multi-faceted regional connectivity of which China will be one
of the key beneficiaries. As a consequence of
this development, Pakistan can also benefit
from connectivity to Chinese-built rail-based
land bridges linking Chinese cities of Shanghai and Chongqing to European ports like
Rotterdam and Antwerp (Engdahl 2012)3.
59. This connectivity, which would allow
China to cut a passage through land for the
movement of goods and services to and from
China, provides an alternative to US-dominated international waters. US domination of the
See Figure 2 at the end.
Strait of Malacca, through which 80% Chinese

oil supplies move, is a chokepoint for China
and a fact to be faced. Indian naval assertions
in the Andaman Sea at the northern ingress
into the Malacca Strait are a further extension of US strategy to control Indian Ocean
maritime lanes. Fortunately, Gwadar and Ormara in Pakistan provide the shortest and
most cost-effective oil supply routes from the
Persian Gulf to China in addition to providing
short and fast sea-borne access to Africa and
Mediterranean. Other strategic chokepoints
in the Indian Ocean like the Strait of Mandeb
and Strait of Hormuz also need a strong focus
along with the Strait of Lombak that mediates
between Java Sea and Indian Ocean.
60. A successful China-Pakistan symbiosis, as indicated above, would therefore
reconfigure the arena in South Asia, Central
Asia and Indian Ocean which would persuade
the US to be more accommodative towards
China-Pakistan synergy in the region and also
lead India to develop a more balanced and realistic relationship with its neighbourhood. It
will also give confidence to small states in the
region, especially, energy-rich CARs, who,
because of their experience with Soviet hegemonism, are intrinsically wary of big power
overtures. This confidence will make them
strong supporters and partners of ChinaPakistan cooperation when they would see a
functional and mutually beneficial China-Pakistan relationship which promotes rather than
diminishes Pakistans sovereignty.
61.
Kazakhstan, the biggest Central Asian
Republic, would naturally move to carve out
a position of pre-eminence in Central Asia, at
least, by trying to benefit from the space for
manouvre liable to be created by the competing policies and agendas of China, US and
Russia in the region. Kazakhstan is also the
biggest repository of oil and gas reservoirs in
Central Asia and is an important part in existing and future land bridges with Russia and
EU. Chinas investments in oil and gas supplies from Kazakhstan can benefit Pakistan
as well.
62.
Afghanistans continued status as a
key theatre of war has the considerable potential to change the precarious balance of military forces in the region in favour of the power
that more effectively influences Afghanistan,
both economically and militarily. Such a power
will be able to determine the extent and direction of regional integration which is naturally
influenced by Afghanistans geostrategic position. It will also influence Pakistans regional
policy significantly. In the present scenario,
the US is using its presence in Afghanistan to
reconfigure both Central Asia and South Asia
to suit the goal of American global predominance.
4. Challenges as
opportunities
4.1. The US factor
63.
The present US-NATO war in Afghanistan has already embroiled Pakistan since the
mid-2000s. The on-going US-NATOs Afghan
war against the Afghan Taliban is being used
to further rearrange geopolitical configuration
to the advantage of US-NATO. It is a foregone
conclusion that the US presence in Afghanistan will be redesigned to become an effective element of its strategy of encirclement of
China and Russia. The much-hyped US withdrawal will only be a drawdown in the number
of US troops on ground in Afghanistan. The
US shall continue to maintain a credible military presence in Afghanistan probably comprising ten to fifteen thousand Special Operations forces capable of dealing with both the
risks of propping up a weak Afghan government and regional terrorist threats (Sanger
2012). It will also readily facilitate huge reinforcements against any strategic ambitions
that may threaten US primacy in the region.
64.
An aspect of the current war in Afghanistan that escapes the attention of many is the
fact that, in many ways, this war is becoming
increasingly similar to the Opium Wars waged
by the European colonial powers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Over the past
13
decade, under US and NATO watch, Afghanistan has progressed from zero opium cultivation to becoming the worlds major supplier of
opium-based narcotics. Today, Afghanistan is
practically a narco-state supplying more than
90% of the worlds demand for opiates valued
at over US$40 billion annually, with around
US$60 billion generated in revenue for traffickers in 2009 from Afghan opiates (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2010,
2011). Narco-money is now providing huge
resources to terrorist outfits in this region as
well as non-accountable funds for hostile foreign intelligence agencies pursuing their subversive agendas in the region. It is puzzling
that US and NATO allowed this to happen
under their noses and that they have no visible plans, either short- term or long-term, to
tackle this narcotic menace. Afghanistan as a
narco-state is a sure recipe for a failed state
which will continue to feed criminality and instability into the region.
65.
US strategic outlook considers American intervention in the regions surrounding
China and Russia as the most credible guarantee for ensuring stability in the Sino-Russian
regional neighbourhood and believes that the
security of a number of weaker states located
geographically next to major regional powers
depends (even in the absence of specific US
commitments to some of them) on the international status quo reinforced by Americas
global pre-eminence (Brzezinski 2012). This
strategic mind-set is enough to put at rest any
false hopes regarding American intentions
to withdraw any time soon from Afghanistan
or from the region at large. The continued
presence of US military forces and bases in
Afghanistan is a sure recipe for continued
conflict and anarchy in the region which will
negatively impact all plans for peaceful economic development of the region. Such a situation poses the biggest challenge to ChinaPakistan cooperation. However, there is no
other viable option but to assiduously pursue
this cooperation, predominantly in the nonmilitary aspects, as a counterweight to American military presence in the region to be able
to create a strong basis for future peace in Afghanistan and the region.
14
66. Pakistan, therefore, faces multiple

geostrategic challenges in military and nonmilitary forms. As the most powerful country
in the current inter-state system, US shall try
to maintain its global supremacy at all costs.
Americas unparalleled economic supremacy in the world will increasingly come to be
challenged by China as it continues its rise,
though at present China is far behind the US.
America is already apprehensive of resurgent post-Soviet Russia, and, if past history
is any guide, the potential for competition will
be the dominant tendency in US-Russia and
Russia-NATO relations, the veneer of cooperation notwithstanding. This will recreate the
old Cold War dynamics where the US may
increasingly view China as a counter-weight
against Russia. This will create favourable
conditions for China and Pakistan. However,
the benefits of China-Russia-Pakistan nexus,
if it succeeds in developing, will be greater.
67. Nevertheless, America has always
perceived China warily. Chinas sustained
rapid economic development has driven it to
the top of US global security agenda and has
resulted in what has been termed the US pivot
to Asia. Perhaps the only other country that
is of an equally high concern to the American security establishment is Russia. The US
defence review, unveiled in January, 2012,
and titled, Sustaining US Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, poses
China as the ace US defence concern and
envisages US Defence posture will of necessity rebalance toward Asia-Pacific. This
review further states, China and Iran will continue to pursue asymmetric means to counter
our [American] power projection capabilities
... Accordingly the U.S. military will invest as
required to ensure its ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD)
environments. This Asia Pivot is designed to
curtail any future Russian movement in AsiaPacific as well.
4.2. The Iranian factor

68.
The real core of US animosity with Iran
is the latters courageous stand for its own independently defined ideals of social and po-
litical sovereignty without serving American

interests at the expense of its own welfare.
Iran is also projected as the biggest present
threat to the security of Israel, which, for all
practical purposes, is an extension of Americas security. Owing to a preponderance of
Zionist influence in American economic and
political spheres, the US considers any threat,
projected or real, to Israel as a threat to itself.
Pakistan, being the sole Muslim country with
operational nuclear capability, is also considered a potential threat in this regard by the
US. Therefore, any Iran-Pakistan symbiosis is
viewed with high discomfort and fear on the
Capitol Hill.
4.3. The Afghan factor

69. India will continue to undermine
any Pakistani effort to mend fences with Afghanistan. It was India which supported the
Northern Alliance (NA), even in the UN, while
Taliban ruled over 90% of Afghanistan. It is instructive to note here that it was India and the
Northern Alliance which assisted the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. It will suppress
any Afghan desire to normalise relations with
Pakistan through injections of newly accumulated Indian finance capital and contrived
evocation of the past friction between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The US war on terror
has provided an opportunity to India to consolidate its position in Kabul due to the domination of the Northern Alliance there. Regardless of the misguided convergence of Indian
and Afghan interests with regard to Pakistan,
Indias ability to influence Afghanistan will
prove less effective in the face of a sustained
Pakistani initiative to utilise cultural commonalities, locational complementarities, economic interdependence, and the re-emergence of
Taliban as responsible power sharers in a future Afghan dispensation.
70.
The attraction that Afghanistan should
feel in a good relationship with Pakistan has
been weakened by factors like the war on terror. Pakistans success lies in playing its part
for a peaceful Afghanistan and then making
it a durable ally of Pakistan which has not
historically been the case. Pakistan should,
therefore, seek to befriend the Northern Alliance and thus aim at the prevention of the
accumulation of second-order power in Indian
hands over Afghanistan by strengthening its
bilateral relationship with Afghanistan, by revitalising once-strong Pakistan-Iran relations
and by bringing Afghanistan closer to China.
71. The mutual advantages of a deeper
Pak-Afghan cooperation should be highlighted. Indo-Afghan relationship, mainly focused on the Northern Alliance, cannot be
half as useful to Afghanistan when the pashtuns, who form almost 50% of the population
of Afghanistan, rejoin governance and the
Northern Alliance shrinks to its due size in
politics. Also, Pakistan should stress the pros
of geographical contiguity in its dialogue with
Afghan leaders. A stable Pak-Afghan relationship can open the doors for accelerated development of Afghanistan, Central Asia and
Pakistan where Chinas involvement in this
process of integrated regional development
will act as a catalyst. This would dovetail ideally with Chinas own development as well.
This will also allow Pakistan to gain access
across the Wakhan Corridor, which separates
Pakistan from Tajikistan, for reaching out to
Central Asia and becoming a reliable partner
in Chinas developmental strategy in the region.
72. Pakistan should, therefore, expedite
socio-economic bridging with Western China
and build complementary bridges into Central
Asia both through Afghanistan and Iran to link
up with Chinas vision of progress for Central
Asia. Troubles in Xinjiang and Muslim-led terrorism will cause serious friction in the smooth
development of China-Pakistan strategic and
economic relationship. In fact, Pakistan fully
recognises that the development of a strong
economic relationship with China depends
on the formers ability to completely defeat
militancy, terrorism and foreign-funded secessionist insurgency in Balochistan and assist
China secure stability in Xinjiang, which is
a core Chinese national interest. Therefore,
Pakistan is fully committed to helping China
achieve stability in Xinjiang. The causes for
friction have been, and will continue to be, ad-
15
dressed with vigour.

73. Currently, the war in Afghanistan is
proving unwinnable and costly for the US-NATO which has prompted the US to announce a
withdrawal/drawdown by 2014. A post-exit or
post-drawdown scenario would mean considerable security challenges for Pakistan. Moreover, the ruling consciousness in the Afghan
Establishment and Government perceives
Pakistan as an adversary rather than an ally.
It will of necessity involve showing the actually desperate situation on ground in Afghanistan as under control and blaming Pakistan
for providing sanctuary and support to Taliban
so as to shift the responsibility for a failed military campaign from US-NATO squarely onto
Pakistan. This will exacerbate these adverse
perceptions even further. In order to deal with
adversarial Afghan perceptions, Pakistan
needs to promote a broad-based Afghan-led
consensus for peace in Afghanistan. Pakistans attempt at fostering Afghan-led peace
process will be facilitated by the fact that there
is a US-sanctioned realisation in Kabul that
Pakistan has a critical role to play to help the
reconciliation process between Taliban and
the current Afghan administration (Shaikh
2013).
74. One way of strengthening the desire
for a strong relationship with Pakistan in the
hearts of Afghans may be to bring order and
security to Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtun Khwa
(KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In order for Pakistan to reap the
maximum benefit from its relationship with Afghanistan, the Taliban (TTP) militancy needs
to be defeated followed by the reintegration
of the former Taliban militants into society.
As a part of this strategy, development must
take place on an emergency basis in FATA,
affected areas of KPK and Balochistan, more
quickly and more abundantly than it does in
Afghanistan. However, militancy in KPK and
Balochistan, fostered by foreign elements,
must end for this development strategy to be
successful.
75. The accelerated development of the
two provinces, and especially the whole Pak-
16
Afghan border belt, should take place on an

urgent basis. It is needed to develop physical and social infrastructures there like roads,
schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, etc.
The development of border-town markets
should be fast-tracked and be linked to the
national markets of both Pakistan and Afghanistan to allow Afghan traders to participate actively in these cross-border integrated
markets. Chinese support and investments
can prove crucial in this development strategy
but this is conditional upon the establishment
of peace and defeat of foreign-fomented terrorism.
76. The desire for participation in the
booming economy next-door can be a strong
motivation for Afghans to respond favourably
to sincere friendly overtures of Pakistan. Islamabad may also help rebuild dilapidated
higher educational infrastructure of Afghanistan and perhaps use the successful experience of Pakistans Higher Education Commission to rehabilitate Afghan higher education.
4.4. The Indian factor

77.
Pakistan needs to take special care of
Balochistan, Sind and KPK as they may be
vulnerable to external attempts at destabilisation. Pakistans nuclear capability should
deter India from military invasion aimed at
achieving strategic goals. However, Indian
Army Chief has been talking about limited
military incursions under nuclear umbrella.
This amply proves Indias covert involvement
in spreading anarchy inside Pakistan. Therefore, India is actively pursuing and supporting
terrorist and militant elements and fanning
ethnic and sectarian tensions inside Pakistan.
It is also actively teaming up with anti-Pakistan elements within and without in a campaign of vilification of Pakistan and its important national institutions, especially Pakistans
military and associated intelligence agencies.
78.
India is pursuing a two-pronged policy
consisting of encirclement and of destabilising
the core of Pakistans sovereignty from within.
The fact remains that peace in Balochistan
and KPK is not possible as long as the war
on terror continues and instability continues

to be fomented by foreign factors. The real
challenge is to counter all such efforts with
superior strategy executed with efficiency and
perseverance.
79. Apart from Kashmir and other unresolved issues, water is another contentious
problem between India and Pakistan. Shortage of water can have adverse socio-economic and geopolitical effects and, therefore,
needs to be addressed with urgency and firmness.
80. India is misusing its new-found post9/11 role in Afghanistan in two ways. First, its
economic assistance package to Afghanistan,
primarily run by the Northern Alliance and
Tajiks to the detriment of the majority of pashtuns, is geared to undermining Pak-Afghan
relationship and second, in Afghanistan, it is
using Afghan territory to coordinate destabilization and balkanization activities inside Pakistan.
81. Geopolitically, the emphasis of Indian diplomacy is on minimizing pro-Pakistan
goodwill among Pakistans neighbours and
other countries in the region. India shall continue to further its anti-Pakistan agenda by entering into extensive economic, defence and
cultural agreements with US, EU, Afghanistan, Iran, Central Asian Republics (CARs)
and Russia.
82. India shall continue to provide maximum possible support to secessionist, separatist, and ethnic movements. As mentioned
above, it is impossible to ignore the Indian
hand in the aggravation of the troubles in Balochistan and in Gilgit-Baltistan. In this regard,
Pakistan can learn from modern Chinese strategic thought which holds that external causes become operative mainly through internal
causes. Pakistan must seek internal stability by promoting equity-based development
in the country through an efficient system of
good governance. Domestic peace and harmony should be one of its top priorities.
83.
There is also a need to hold India in
tight embrace; so close that hurting Pakistan

would mean hurting themselves. This would
entail Pakistans highly pro-active participation in all the forums where India is active too
and engaging India on all fronts. This also
means close monitoring of Indian initiatives
because India will pursue multiple options to
weaken Pakistan and, more especially, undermine China-Pakistan relationship.
84. Pakistan should, therefore, not hasten in giving India the Most Favoured Nation
(MFN) status. India stands to gain more than
Pakistan in any bilateral trade partnership
since the former is a much bigger country
with the ability to completely paralyse domestic production in Pakistan through its exportbased economies of scale. Pakistan should
adopt a cautious trade policy based on a selective list of products with carefully workedout trade volumes in order to protect its domestic manufacturing base. It should be kept
in mind that Pakistan has a huge youth bulge
which is adding about 2 million youth per annum to the job market. Only the industrial sector is capable of absorbing this growing labour
force because the trade sector generates
comparatively less jobs. A mindless granting
of MFN status to India will also weaken Pakistans negotiating strength on other outstanding issues and disputes with India.
85. Pakistan should simultaneously establish strong regional trade and diplomatic
links with countries like Nepal, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and other Southeast
Asian nations in general in the same manner
as India is doing with Pakistans neighbours
and CARs. India shall invest in all opportunities to score against Pakistan. Its support for
Russias project to build a North-South Transport Corridor the competitor of Gwadar project through Iran is an example of it.
4.5. Forging civil-military

alliance in Pakistan for nationbuilding
86.
Given Pakistans history of strained
and hostile relationship between the political
17
leadership class and the military, it is imperative that measures be undertaken to dispel animosity and distrust between them and build a
harmonious political-military working relationship based on mutual respect and confidence.
This is perhaps Pakistans biggest internal
political challenge. In this respect, the ball
is firmly in the court of politicians because a
harmonious and beneficial political-military alliance is only possible if we have a competent,
honest and visionary political leadership interested in the welfare of people and interested
in building a sustainable civil-military alliance.
In the absence of a wise political leadership,
the task of building a civil-military alliance
would be very difficult, though not impossible.
Building this civil-military alliance in the absence of visionary political leadership would
be predicated on the Pakistan Armed Forces
volunteering to actively participate in suitable
nation-building activities on a non-political basis in addition to their overall defence responsibilities.
87. Pakistan, at the moment, is suffering
from a fragmentation syndrome in which the
various elements of power are neither unified nor optimally synchronized. State as a
mechanism of social cohesiveness has traditionally and historically performed the function of a machine that transforms capabilities
of a nation into national power. However, the
Pakistani state has not been able to perform
this function as a result of which different elements of national power like, geography,
natural resources, industrial capacity, military
preparedness, population, inter-class collaboration, social cohesion, national character,
diplomacy, national morale and government
(Morgenthau 1985) are at cross-purposes.
88.
As mentioned above, external causes
collude with internal causes to destabilise any
national polity. A strong civil-military relationship in this situation would be critical for putting our own house in order, improving governance and internal stability, for intensifying
China-Pakistan relationship and for building
the momentum necessary for Pakistan to realise its geopolitical advantages maximally. In
this regard, the deep bonds between China
18
and Pakistan, both in the civil and military sectors, could prove to be useful in catalysing a
positive movement in the desired direction.
4.6. Limitations of bilateralism

89. Pakistan can never become complacent in its friendship toward China. However,
Pakistans relationship with the US, if not
wisely conducted, may become a sticking
point in China-Pakistan friendship. Pakistan
has to remember that China-US relationship
plays itself out on two terrains i.e., economic
and strategic (Saunders 2005). The US enjoys a predominance on the military-strategic
terrain. China is gradually and surely witnessing expansion on the economic terrain though
still it is far behind the US .
90.
Pakistans continuing and prolonged
involvement as a front-line state in the war
on terror has the potential, from the Chinese
perspective, to upset the equilibrium that provisionally exists between the two terrains of
US-China relationship and embroil China into
a premature conflict in the region. An unpredictable situation would arise if Pakistan spirals out of control. This may either increase
cooperation or escalate tensions between US
and China.
91.
There is no doubt that China and Pakistan enjoy a strong strategic relationship
which translates into extensive military cooperation between the two countries yet one
must recognise the limitations of China-Pakistan military cooperation for two reasons.
92. First, although this cooperation can
prove to be a deterrence of sorts against, say,
Indian aggression, yet it cannot prove to be
much of a shield against the preponderant
American force projection capability. United
States possesses visible and durable superiority over China in some areas, particularly in
economy, technology and military. Industrial
production of the US which, in 2006, even after reduction and shift of industry overseas,
was twice the size of Japan and larger than
Japans and Chinas industries combined;
Americas oil production was third behind only
Saudi Arabia and Russia and natural gas production of America was second only to Russia
whereas China is heavily dependent on foreign sources of energy to fuel the extraordinary needs of its rapidly expanding domestic
economy; Americas population density was
one of the most favourable in the world at 31
per square kilometre way behind the world average of 49 per square kilometre while that of
China was 140; America is the only country
in the world that has absolute control of two
oceans whereas China does not enjoy this
two-ocean advantage (Friedman 2009: 1617)4.
93. Moreover, the technological edge of
America is unquestioned; while China is still
trying to catch up with the US in the field of
technology and busy building the tools of
asymmetric power projection, chances are
that America may have broken through the
known technological frontier such as the ability to militarise space, production of bionic
military capabilities through human-technological integration, natural disaster-activation
capabilities through seismic and meteorological manipulation, advanced forms of psychological warfare, cyber warfare, weapons
based on Nano-Bio-Information-Cognitive
technological convergence, etc. US defence
expenditure is also greater than the combined
military expenditure of the next ten economies
which include those of China, Russia and India (Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute 2012).
94. Second, China-Pakistan military cooperation is conditional and contingent on the
changing complexion of US-China relationship. It could be argued that this military cooperation was primarily initiated in a different
world environment of the Cold War when China was confronted with an India-Soviet axis,
on one hand, and Pacific US-Taiwan security
perimeter, on the other. The first thrust is long
extinct now but replaced to some extent by
a US-India axis; the second perimeter is unpredictable and potentially unstable owing to
US rebalancing of its force projection capabilities from the Atlantic to Pacific Ocean and
the potential for instability in South China Sea,
south of Taiwan. However, the trend of future

developments in this sphere may lead to outcomes in which US and China may reach
some sort of accommodation due to an overriding concentration of Chinese ability to claim
reintegration of Taiwan with China. The logic
of economic relations between China and Taiwan may also lead to some form of mutually
acceptable confederation which satisfies Chinese demands for reunification and Taipeis
insistence on autonomy.
95. Renegotiating a constructive, mature
and less ad-hoc relationship with the US will
help Chinese peaceful development. This
could even make it possible for China and
US to work together to counter the foreign
elements of destabilization in Pakistan, especially in Balochistan. Pakistan will thus benefit
from the peaceful rise of China and be afforded an opportunity to acquire regional prominence as a consequence of the rise of China
as a global superpower.
4.7. Forging multilateralism

96.
China has also expressed its interest
in South Asian cooperation and has shown
keen interest to cooperate with SAARC, since
2007 at least (Hailin 2009). This move to diversify its approach from one-to-one bilateralism to multilateral regional cooperation can
lead to more enhanced cooperation between
China and Pakistan if the two countries mutually reinforce each others regional outlook.
This can happen through Pakistans support
for SAARC membership of China and China
supporting SCO membership for Pakistan.
This bilateral reciprocity for furthering multilateralism will strengthen China-Pakistan relationship. Multilateral cooperation shall also
benefit China because countries, like individuals, thrive on the goodwill of their friends.
97.
China will be enabled to engage India
constructively through and in SAARC. This will
help in countering the growing Indo-US nexus
in the region and make the Indian Ocean less
contentious and provide a relatively smooth
sailing to the advancement of Chinese interests in the region. Pakistan can comple-
USA recorded a Gross National Income (GNI) of USD 14,645.6 billion in 2010 while China had a GNI of USD 5720.8 billion for
the same year (World Bank 2012). The difference was even greater in per capita terms for the same year; US had a per capita
GNI of USD 47,340 compared to USD 4270 of China (World Bank 2012).
4
19
ment Chinese efforts to engage with SAARC

through accentuating multilateral realism and
capitalising on the US acknowledgment of
the significance of Pakistan in Afghanistan
(Akram 2009). Chinas becoming a SAARC
member may also reinvigorate the grouping
that has been rendered ineffective due to Indian hegemonic ambitions, thereby helping it
get out of the rut of non-achievement in which
it seems to be perennially stuck due to Indian
intransigence.
98. The expansionist trend of Indian foreign policy, that the US is now trying to harness for its New Silk Route Initiative to be
used against China and help US further its
strategic aims in the region, can also be countered effectively through the SAARC membership of China and SCO membership of Pakistan. Otherwise, there is a possibility that this
Indo-US axis may become a future instrument
to challenge Chinese access to Central Asia,
Caucasus and beyond to Europe and help
in choking access to the Strait of Malacca
through the Andaman Sea.
99.
To dominate through conflict is NATOs speciality; and the absence of peace
in Afghanistan and the on-going problem of
isolation imposed on Iran increase the challenges for Pakistan, especially to its plans
for closer integration with the region. On the
other hand, US-NATO is bound by the logic of
its own interests to promote the economic development of the region which presupposes
enhanced trade in the region. But the aspirations of the countries and peoples inhabiting
the region may run counter to the underlying
realities of US-NATOs promotion of development.
100. As these contradictions play out, it will
be witnessed that NATO, which is essentially
a defence-based organisation, will find it harder to navigate peace than to act in conflict.
This is the gap where Chinas strategy and
resources for the development of the region
may also work in favour of peace.
101.
20
kistan with the framework for regional integration that can be utilized and influenced through
wise conduct and management of geopolitics.
The New Silk Road Initiative of the US State
Department should be viewed pragmatically
and if possible, co-opted constructively and
subordinated to China-Pakistan-led regional
integration.
102. 9/11 gave a license to the US to expand its global military reach, threat and application of force in the name of pre-emption
but the limits imposed by the very international Westphalian nation-state system which
the US dominates, have restricted its power to
redraw the geostrategic map to its preference.
So far, this dialectical relationship between
the logic of the system and the preferences of
the most powerful element in the system has
opened up a new field of action for emerging
global powers like China and regionally important players like Pakistan. This helps ChinaPakistan cooperation to improve its strategic
position by promoting peace and multi-polarity in the global inter-state system. China is already meaningfully utilizing this systemic limit
to the extension of US power not only in the
region but in the world at large by promoting
multilateral engagement to solve tensions in
the inter-state system.
103. Pakistan should follow Chinas lead
and pursue multilateralism to build protective relationships with countries in different
regions. It has already been pointed out that
building such multilateral relationships in
Southeast Asia and East Asia with countries
like Myanmar, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia
etc., will allow China-Pakistan cooperation to
deepen and provide a meaningful foil to aggressive Indian overtures towards Central
Asia. Using second-order neighbourhood relations with Central Asia, Southeast Asia and
East Asia would increase Pakistans geopolitical options. It shall also allow Pakistan to
escape the rough edges of American foreign
policy based on domination and subordination
to American interests.
This situation does provide China-Pa-
4.7.1.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia
104. A very interesting passage occurs in
Sun Tzus, Art of War which says,
Land that is surrounded on three sides by
competitors and would give the first to get it
access to all the people on the continent is
called intersecting ground (Sun Tzu translated by Thomas Cleary 1988)
105. The intersecting ground refers to
the intersection of various national arteries
that link together various highway systems
in the region. Central Asia is the intersecting ground of the regional geopolitics where
Chinese efforts will meet Russian attempts
to reassert dominance. Improved relations of
China and Pakistan with Russia will mean that
the immense energy resources of Russia will
support Chinas growth and not be used to undermine the latters position in the region.
106. China-Pakistan-Russia
cooperation will find suitable support mechanism in
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
SCO is significant as the first post-Cold War
multilateral platform created directly as a result of Chinese initiative. It is an example of
how China is building asymmetric power by
utilising concepts, institutions and things innovatively. Russia may be apprehensive of Chinese pro-active role in SCO, yet enough room
exists in that multilateral body to promote
China-Russia synergy. After all, pooling of
strengths economically in SCO is more realistic than pursing anti-NATO ambition like Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
107. SCO is a manifestation of Chinas
policy of Good Neighbourliness which is being used to deliver its New Security Concept
succinctly enunciated by China in its Four
Nos policy namely, no hegemony; no power
politics; no alliances; and no arms race and
is a means for providing economic cooperation, trade opportunities, energy transport and
meaningful security cooperation (Ramo 2004:
52).
108. As China continues to rise economically, its foreign policy has witnessed
increased confidence manifested in the shift
from non-interference to creative involvement; a shift from bilateral to multilateral diplomacy; a shift from reactive to preventative diplomacy; and a move away from strict
nonalignment toward semi-alliances (Baker
and Zhang 2012). SCO offers an appropriate
platform for Chinas policy of furthering semialliances or strategic partnerships that avoid
the burly posture but deliver the security of an
alliance. China-Pakistan horizontal integration of the region will neutralise the big-power
advantages of countries like Russia, US and
India and compel an equal participation in the
processes of regional, social and economic
development.
109. This horizontal integration will serve
as support for allowing China some respite
and breathing space to divert more focus towards tackling its internal disparities. China
has followed a conscious policy of first developing its coastal belt and only later re-directing resources such as the relocation of industry and the development of infrastructure
in its Central, Northern and Western regions5.
As a result, there are potential divisive and
centrifugal tendencies inherent in this gap in
development between the coastal belt and
the hinterland. This development gap must
be closed as soon as possible before it can
be misused by external forces. Pakistans National Trade Corridor Project can be a helpful factor in the rapid economic development
of Western China and can help secure China
against the foreign subversive manipulation of
internal regional disparities.
110. There is a risk often betrayed by the
western analysts (Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) 2011; The Christian Science Monitor 2011; Kocaman 2012;
Lillis 2012; Muckenhuber 2013) that attempts
may be made to enact a so-called indigenous
Central Asian or South Asian Spring within
Pakistan with a focus to thwart Chinese plans
for durable peace in the region. This could result in national fragmentation of Pakistan or
other Central Asian States along ethnic and
Former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, personally shared this information, as far back as December 1996, with his friend, Dr.
Akram Sheikh, former Chairman, Planning Commission of Pakistan, and currently the Professor Emeritus, National University of
Sciences and Technology and Co-Chair of its China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank, Islamabad.
5
21
sectarian lines and the creation of multiple

postage-stamp states in the region. This will
make the goal of the development of Western
China prohibitively costly.
111. Russia, however, may not tolerate
fragmentation in Central Asia and undertake actions analogous to that which Saudi
Arabia-led Peninsular Shield Force took to
stabilise Bahrain in 2011 during the spate of
Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East. China may also move to arrest the onset of any
South Asian Spring. But such developments
would entail the risk of a major confrontation
between military powers and therefore deter
such adventurism. The possibility, however,
should not be excluded from the strategic horizon of China and Pakistan.
112. Here, it would be instructive to quote
from Zbigniew Brzezinskis book, The Grand
Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, to understand the
American strategy to use conflict to prevent
competitors from gelling together:
113. In brief, for the United States, Eurasian geo-strategy involves the purposeful
management of geo-strategically dynamic
states and the careful handling of geopolitically catalytic states, in keeping with the twin
interests of America in the short-term preservation of its unique global power and in the
long-run transformation of it into increasingly
institutionalized global cooperation. To put it in
a terminology that hearkens back to the more
brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand
imperatives of imperial geo-strategy are to
prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the
barbarians from coming together (Brzezinski
1997).
114. This strategic thinking is specifically targeted at Russia, China, Pakistan and
Iran so there is a need to deepen cooperation amongst these countries. In this regard,
both China and Pakistan should understand
that their relationship to each other is unique
because of Pakistans near-complete identity
with Chinas interests and China may not be
22
able to develop a similarly strong relationship

with any other country in the region. Therefore, China-Pakistan cooperation should
thrive if it functions as the cornerstone of such
broad-based regional cooperation and acts as
force for emulation by other countries.
115. Pakistan has traditionally enjoyed a
strong relationship with Turkey. This relationship can allow Pakistan to broaden its geostrategic opportunities and reinforce the already
fast-developing China-Turkey relationship
manifested in the construction and diversification of Chinese-conceived Eurasian Land
Bridges that connect China to the vast Eurasian landmass via Turkey. Turkey has a central geopolitical location allowing it to move in
multiple directions. This geopolitical potential
of Turkey should be productively channelled
by a strong and mutually advantageous Turkey-Pakistan relationship that should enable
Pakistan both to benefit from these developments and also compensate for the restrictions resulting from its close relationship with
Iran due to fallout of US-Iran rivalry.
116. Seeing the development of China-Pakistan relationship with Russia, Central Asia,
Iran and Turkey may also arouse interest of
India in future in an alternative regional arrangement to the one currently conceived for
Central Asia by US-NATO. There is a strong
possibility that India may choose to opt out
of a US-NATO-led Central Asian game plan
because it may pit it against both China and
Russia as well as lessen its regional standing
in the eyes of other countries in the region.
117. The fact that Pakistan and India have
been approved to become full members of the
SCO along with Turkey as a dialogue partner,
spells the widening of SCOs scope to include
Middle East and its ability to formulate a Middle Eastern future different from the current
uncertainties that are emanating as a result of
US-Israel dominance, starkly manifest in the
region. SCO may even bring China, Pakistan,
India and Russia closer in terms of a common security and development vision. This
will form part of Chinas strategy to strengthen
its ties with important Eurasian states so as
to establish a series of bases of goodwill on

the Eurasian landmass that in time shall mature as concrete alternatives to the Americanled dominance of Eurasia. President Xi Jinpings first foreign visit to Russia and bilateral
agreements in the fields of energy, defense,
science, etc., are a step in the right direction
and may help in the normalisation of relations
between Russia and Pakistan as well.
5. Proposed domestic
strategy for ChinaPakistan cooperation
118. The domestic situation of Pakistan
offers ample avenues for China-Pakistan cooperation. Pakistan urgently needs Chinas
strategic and financial help in tackling the
ominous dangers of economic meltdown and
the forces of separatism and disintegration
being sponsored by hostile foreign forces,
especially in Balochistan and KPK. Pakistan
is fully aware of the problems in the country
and possesses the resolve and national will to
deal with its problems decisively. The following are the areas where Chinese investments
and cooperation can make significant contribution for a more stable and secure Pakistan:
Defeating the TTP-Militancy and Extremism decisively followed by social reintegration.
Establishing security and socio-economic
development security in Balochistan and
Khyber-Pakhtunwa (KPK) through assertive good governance.
Reforming Pakistans dysfunctional political system and promoting honest and
responsible governance and encouraging
political-military cooperation.
Reformation of elementary, secondary
and tertiary education systems and their
expansion to cover full population.
Resolving the energy crisis in the country
on an urgent basis to ensure energy security within 3-5 years.
Achieving food sovereignty through
land reforms, corporate farming projects
owned by farmer cooperatives and hi-tech
intensive farming.
Aggressively pursuing public health to
eradicate epidemics, infectious diseases
and raising the nutritional profile of the
public.
Devising an urbanisation and housing
policy for Pakistan to provide affordable
housing to people through public-private
partnerships.
Establishing science parks to promote innovation and technological development
for economic growth.
119. Investing in the above-mentioned areas will enable the utilization of a part of massive Chinese finance capital to build the social and physical infrastructures in Pakistan.
One outcome of improved national social and
physical infrastructures would be the facilitation of overland trade between China, Pakistan and the Middle East and Africa region
through reduction in transaction and transportation costs.
120. This investment will be a powerful
means of soft power projection for China. It
combines the profit motive, the security motive of a peaceful neighbourhood, and the
human development motive all into one comprehensive package. This comprehensive cooperation platform will address the criticisms
voiced internationally against Chinas allegedly narrow focus on exploiting resources of
under-developed countries without any concern for human development.
121. Pakistan also needs to learn from
Chinas experience in acquiring knowledge
of the varied aspirations and ambitions of
different social groups in a country and the
need to devise mechanisms to enable these
groups to realise their aspirations. Without a
comprehensive framework for social analysis
and strategic approach, governments lack the
self-knowledge to better ensure internal tranquillity and national socio-economic growth.
122. This lack of self-knowledge and internal tranquillity leads to exploitation by hostile external forces. Chinas focus on acquiring national self-knowledge is based on the
23
awareness of the inextricable relationship between domestic and foreign policies, on one
hand, and domestic society and international
society, on the other. The paramount importance of mastery over the domestic situation
has moulded the Chinese approach which
stresses the importance of resolution of three
interrelated internal challenges, namely, resources, especially, energy; environment;
and a series of paradoxes in the process of
economic and social development, such as
uneven development between the coastal
areas and the hinterland, the contradiction
between fairness and economic returns, rural-urban disparity, the wealth gap, and the
tension between reform and stability (Bijian
2005: 3). Pakistan and China can form a
joint framework for the management of social
forces which transcends national borders and
benefits the region at large.
123. There is also a pressing need to bring
the civil societies of China and Pakistan closer and expand people-to-people contacts
that would further strengthen government-togovernment relationship. This will allow China
and Pakistan to learn from the local and popular traditions of civic association and help in
the development of Chinas and Pakistans
soft power.
124. We should seek to align commonalities in the internal development of China and
Pakistan and put forward an approach of
cooperation that is aimed at overcoming the
problems of economic inequality, uneven,
development, urbanization, climate change,
poverty, etc., in both China and Pakistan. In
this regard, we need to learn from Chinas
concept of Three Represents which states
that the party and the state should represent
the most advanced productive, the most advanced culture, and the fundamental interests
of the majority of the Chinese people. The
theory of Three Represents exhibits an advanced Chinese understanding of the notion
of state and country. This notion sees country
as a unity of territory and people inhabiting the
country and, therefore, the concept of security
tries to ensure the protection of the territory,
utilize its resources, organize its national life,
24
and secure the maximum welfare of the people, all at the same time. In the absence of
such an understanding and approach, Pakistan will not be able to devise a mature geopolitical strategy. For instance, Gwadar Port
project, without a friendly and satisfied local
population, will not be able to contribute to
the prosperity of Pakistan. Now that the operations of the Gwadar port have been handed over to the China Overseas Port Holding
Company, it will become even more crucial to
ensure peace in Balochistan.
6. Conclusion and recommendations

125. It is important to note that Pakistan
has a versatile geopolitical potential which
can multiply opportunities for cooperation not
only with China but with other important regional players. However, China-Pakistan cooperation can provide a solid foundation for
the diverse partnerships that Pakistan can
and should build to attain strategic sustainability.
126. In response, the threat of Indian aggression, terrorism, religious and sectarian
extremism, domestic and regional destabilisation, and other such instruments shall be deployed by opposing global actors to negatively impinge upon China-Pakistan relationship.
Indias past conflicts with China and Pakistan
and ensuing tensions will also be exploited to
forestall any movement towards triangular understanding between these three countries.
127. The formation of a constructive triad
between China, Pakistan and India can help
the region tremendously. India, however, will
occasionally create contrived military showdowns with Pakistan just like the recent spate
of Indian-initiated violence across the Line of
Control early this year. The challenge for China, Pakistan and India would be to see if they
can transcend history.
128. Terrorism, if it remains unchecked,
can potentially unsettle western regions of
China and can be expected to create friction

between Beijing and Pakistan. So the challenge here is for Pakistan to combat terrorist
outfits in its area and defeat them to eliminate
this threat. This will also enable Pakistan to
draw Beijings attention to playing a part in addressing the regional causes that are seen to
promote terrorism aimed at Pakistan.
129. China is already actively pursuing a
peaceful and socio-economic developmental
solution to its ethno-religious troubles in Xinjiang which are causing frictions in PakistanChina cooperation. Pakistan will play a positive role in support of such efforts, especially
by ensuring the security and tranquillity in its
bordering regions with China and the Karakorum Highway communication line.
130. The idea is for Pakistan to use the
cushion provided by Chinas strategic support
to help resolve its issues of domestic security. China-Pakistan relations need to diversify
and fan out to include broad-based economic
cooperation, cultural exchanges, and, more
importantly, broad interaction and cooperation
between the political establishments of the
two countries to forge deeper understanding
and benefit from each others experiences.
131. Gwadar Project provides a crucial second sea access to China with significant benefits for Pakistan; therefore, its development
should be accelerated. The Chinese are well
aware of the significance of Gwadar and the
associated development of Pakistans physical and economic infrastructures through immediate Chinese investments will be beneficial for both countries in the larger scheme of
things.
132. A wide-ranging China-Pakistan cooperation promoting both bilateralism and multilateralism will serve to bring about regional
growth, peace, prosperity and harmony. Some
recommendations in this regard are indicated
below:
6.1. Domestic front:

133. Actively pursue a policy of neutralising
militancy and associated extremist philosophies and ideologies, and implement socioeconomic development programs on a fasttrack basis in backward and underdeveloped
regions in the country to build social and political stability there.
134. Take all measures to achieve a stable and functional political system and culture
in the Country. A functional system shall be
clean and corruption-free, based on participatory involvement of the people coupled with
responsible interactive interdependence of
powers rather than unrealistic separation of
powers in the domestic polity.
135. Improve governance by following universally acknowledged principles of administration to build a professional merit-based
bureaucracy and to define parameters of political oversight of government machinery.
136. Develop a new paradigm of government based on public-private partnership,
especially, in economic and social sectors.
Typically, a PPP shall consist of the provision
of public service jointly funded by government
and private business. However, it needs to be
pointed out that since many types of PPPs,
depending upon the predominance of public or private sector, are in existence it is advised to develop or select that form which is
a win-win option for the people, business and
government in Pakistan. In order for PPPs to
succeed, there needs to be present the ease
of doing business, transparency in public and
private transactions, strong regulatory capacity in the public sector, and fair, speedy and
strong dispute-resolution systems.
6.2. Regional front:

137. Open bilateral talks now with all Afghan ethno-political groups for building a
broad-based relationship with Afghanistan
in the post-US/NATO drawdown phase. This
should be carried out as a complementary
25
(not competitive) exercise in support of international efforts to build peace and stability in Afghanistan and restore normalcy in the
region. Historical Pak-Afghan relationship
should be made a basis for such an initiative.
This requires a separate bilateral effort in parallel to international efforts.
138. Resume front-channel track-one talks
with India on all issues including Kashmir and
water resources.
139. Open a diplomatic initiative with all
regional countries (Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia,
CARs, Turkey, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, etc.) for taking them into confidence
regarding the proposed Pak-Afghan bilateral
talks and keeping them updated on it.
6.3. International front:

140. Pursue an energetic diplomatic initiative to co-opt Saudi Arabia and Iran into efforts to diffuse tensions and prevent the exacerbation of the already dangerous sectarian
strife, including the Shia-Sunni schism, within
the Muslim countries. Pakistan is the worst affected in this regard and needs to focus its
energies in this direction.
141. Strengthen diplomatic relations with
EU countries to complement relations with the
US.
142. Open a focussed diplomatic initiative
with Russia with a view to getting over the
past and enabling the development of positive relationship between Russia and Pakistan leading to a wider regional cooperation.
6.4. China-Pakistan front:

143. Develop a broad internal consensus
on the proposed foreign policy and strategy of
Pakistan on China-Pakistan bilateral cooperation and take Chinese leadership into confidence. Establish comprehensive informationsharing mechanisms to keep them updated.
144. The recent handing over of the Gwa-
26
dar Port operations to China Overseas Port

Holding Company is a very encouraging development and must be followed up energetically.
145. Ensure peaceful environment for the
smooth Chinese management of the Gwadar
port to lead in time to city development, airport
and related infrastructure projects.
146. Pursue the Oil City Project, ship refuelling and re-supplying Hub, and wet and
dry dock facilities for international shipping
near Gwadar Port.
147. Establish a special security plan and
infrastructure for the coastal belt of Pakistan.
148. Move forward on the energy, trade,
transport and industrial corridor plans including the expansion of Karakorum Highway.
149. Pursue development of dedicated industrial parks and special economic zones for
facilitating investment and joint venture industrial projects.
150. A large proportion of Chinese investments in Pakistan is concentrated in the public sector. More private sector investments
by China will help create a healthy balance
between public and private sector Chinese investments in Pakistan allowing China to compete healthily with countries like the US and
UAE which invest more in the private sector in
Pakistan as compared to China.
151. The 2006 China-Pakistan Five-Year
Development Programme for Trade and Economic Cooperation should be fully realised.
This means initiating bilateral projects in all
the sectors identified in the Development Programme i.e., Agriculture, Energy, Science and
Technology, Industry, Manufacturing, Minerals, ICT, Engineering Services, Technical
Cooperation, Education (setting up an Engineering University with Chinese support and
participation), and Infrastructure and Public
Works.
152.
Pakistans
East-West
and
North-
South National Energy, Trade, Transport and,

Industrial Corridor complements the plans for
the development of Western China. The FiveYear Development Programme is a key to
unlocking the potential of this corridor for China-Pakistan economic cooperation and the
development of Pakistan and Western China.
Therefore, dedicated cooperation should be
initiated on this particular point.
153. Foreign-funded terrorism and militancy are real and present dangers to the stability of Pakistan and China as well as ChinaPakistan cooperation. China should enhance
Pakistans financial and operational capacity
to fight this menace and pacify Khyber Pakthukhwa (KPK) and Balochistan for increased
economic cooperation.
154. China-Pakistan cooperation should
prioritise balanced and mutually advantageous trade through the 2006 China-Pakistan
Free Trade Agreement.
155. Energy cooperation between China
and Pakistan should be increased as a prelude to the relocation of Chinese industry in
Pakistan and the integration of Pakistan in the
Global Production Networks (GPNs) of Chinese multinationals.
156. In the context of energy cooperation,
both countries should increase cooperation
on building more dams on the Indus River,
relocation of re-conditioned power plants to
Pakistan, and renewable energy projects between China-Pakistan should be encouraged
so that Pakistans energy shortages can be
dealt with to facilitate economic cooperation.
The sale of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan is
a welcome decision in this regard and should
be followed up with appropriate moves in energy cooperation between the two countries.
157. Establish wider and deeper interaction
via think tank activity and academic contact
through increased University-to-University
cooperation. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
should increase joint activities between the
three collaborating universities i.e., Tsinghua
University, Beijing, National University of Sci-
ences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad,

and Southwest University of Political Science
and Law (SWUPL), Chongqing, China.
158. Develop a cadre of China experts in
Pakistans universities and think tanks. PhD
programmes in China Studies should be offered in all Pakistani universities. Higher Education Commission of Pakistan should take
necessary steps to introduce China Studies
and the formation of China experts in Pakistans higher education. Further, proper consultative mechanism should be devised for
linking these China experts with relevant policy making bodies in the government. NUST
can take the initial steps in this regard through
the China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank.
159. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank
should also devise ways of cooperating actively with the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS) and facilitating increased contacts between CAS and the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. This cooperation can find an immediate form in the setting up of the proposed and
agreed China-Pakistan Institute of Science
and Technology at NUST.
160. A six-monthly or annual publication/
journal should be inaugurated by the ChinaPakistan Joint Think Tank which: focuses on
China-Pakistan relations in a global context;
highlights avenues and innovative means of
economic and social collaboration; reports on
the activities of various China-Pakistan fora;
analyses world events with relevance for both
China and Pakistan and their relationship; and
advocates the regional peace and prosperity
dividends of China-Pakistan relations. The
role of chambers of commerce and industry
in China and Pakistan should be considered
and explored to initiate and promote this effort. China-Pakistan Joint Think Tank should
devise a strategy for it.
161. Tsinghua-NUST-SWUPL should also
announce an Annual Recognition Award to
one Pakistani national and one Chinese national for their efforts every year in promoting
cooperation between the two countries, especially in science, technology, higher education
27
and business.
162. Contrary to the views of the Western
and Indian think tanks and analysts which
confuse the proper path forward for China-Pakistan cooperation by claiming that economic
cooperation shall gather momentum once
militancy and terrorism are completely curbed
in Pakistan, it must be emphasised that militancy and terrorism shall be defeated in Pakistan and stability secured in Xinjiang through
increased China-Pakistan economic coopera-
tion conducted simultaneously with combating extremism, militancy and terrorism. All
that needs to be done to understand this truth
is to extend the logic of domestic development of unstable regions inside any country
- which dictates that combating destabilising
elements and development of disturbed regions go hand in hand - to relations between
countries where bilateral relations between
China and Pakistan will prove a critical help in
defeating terrorism inside Pakistan.
Figure 1: The mega-region of China-Pakistan cooperation
Source: Based on http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/world_pol495.jpg
28
Figure 2: Chinese Eurasian land bridges
Source: http://www.larouchepub.com/lar/1998/lar_glazyev_2513/2LandBridgeColor.html
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CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK TANK

Working Paper: Regional geostrategic challenges and opportunities for China-Pakistan

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR

4.7.1 Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia

6. Conclusion and recommendations

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

Eastern Arab States and Turkey for promoting

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

the means employed for their achievement.

has the potential to help China and Pakistan

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

of public service jointly funded by government

24. Strengthen diplomatic relations with

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

39. In the context of energy cooperation,

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

China-Pakistan relations in a global context;

See figure 1 at the end of the paper.

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

ic power will be a point of non-convergence

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

See Figure 2 at the end.

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

Strait of Malacca, through which 80% Chinese

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

66. Pakistan, therefore, faces multiple

4.2. The Iranian factor

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

litical sovereignty without serving American

4.3. The Afghan factor

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

dressed with vigour.

Afghan border belt, should take place on an

4.4. The Indian factor

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

on terror continues and instability continues

There is also a need to hold India in

tight embrace; so close that hurting Pakistan

4.5. Forging civil-military

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

4.6. Limitations of bilateralism

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

south of Taiwan. However, the trend of future

4.7. Forging multilateralism

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

ment Chinese efforts to engage with SAARC

This situation does provide China-Pa-

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

sectarian lines and the creation of multiple

able to develop a similarly strong relationship

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

to establish a series of bases of goodwill on

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

6. Conclusion and recommendations

REGIONAL GEO-STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA-PAKISTAN COOPERATION

China and can be expected to create friction

6.1. Domestic front:

6.2. Regional front:

CHINA-PAKISTAN JOINT THINK THANK WORKING PAPER

6.3. International front:

6.4. China-Pakistan front: