Mabanag v Vito

78 Phil. 1 Political Law Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory

Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were suspended
by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their
seat in the lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They argued that
some senators and House Reps were not considered in determining the required vote (of
each house) in order to pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were
already entered into the Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was
passed but it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because
the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from each
House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue
by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory,
for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways
specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no signs
of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects
of an authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the
rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the
journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have
been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to
understand that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses, signed
by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the

Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or printed
by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers
and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts
and of the due enactment thereof.
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by
the legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.

Astorga v Villegas

The Legislative Department Journal;When to be Consulted

In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or
managers of business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act
No. 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the
city police force who had been assigned to then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga
(assigned under authority of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition for
Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board to comply with
the provisions of RA 4065 (filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition of
RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of
Manila) because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this
said law passed the 3rdreading in the lower house as House Bill No. 9266, it was sent to
the Senate which referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments
and Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the
bill was referred back to the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen.
Tolentino made significant amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate.
The bill was then sent back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the latter.

The bill was sent to the President for approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found
out however that the copy signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong version. It was in fact the
version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino
and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate president and the
President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their signatures that they affixed on
the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and that the withdrawal of the
concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bills due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: No. The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary
record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and
is subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. The SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific
facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.

Morales vs Subido

26 SCRA 150 Political Law The Legislative Department Journals vs Enrolled Bill
Enrique Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three
years but does not possess a bachelors degree. Morales was the chief of detective bureau
of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his
career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of the former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of
Manila. Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of Civil Service, approved the designation of
Morales as acting chief but rejected his appointment for failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position. Instead,
Subido certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. No person may be
appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with rank of captain or
its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain
and/or higher.
Nowhere in the above provision is it provided that a person who has served the police
department of a city can be qualified for said office. Morales however argued that when
the said act was being deliberated upon, the approved version was actually the following:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelors
degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation or police department of any city and has held the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city or who has served as officer of the Armed Forces for at
least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by
Congress but when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made
in the provision was the insertion of the phrase or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record. Morales went on to support his case by producing copies of certified
photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by an employee in

the Senate bill division, and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being
deliberated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon
the journals, to look searchingly into the matter.
HELD: No. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the
Philippines shows that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in
slip form by the Bureau of Printing. The SC cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover
what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands
that the SC act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to
as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise the SC would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in
the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process.
The SC is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly
requires must be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a
legislative act may be affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a
question which the SC can decide upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at
bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the SC holds is that with respect to matters not
expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any
discrepancy.

Vinzons-Chato vs. HRET

G.R. No. 199149 : January 22, 2013
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and ELMER E. PANOTES, Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 201350 : January 22, 2013
ELMER E. PANOTES, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, Respondents.
PERLAS -BERNABE, J.:
FACTS:
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato (Chato) renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as
representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte, composed of the seven
(7) Municipalities of Daet, Vinzons, Basud, Mercedes, Talisay, San Vicente, and San Lorenzo,
with a total of 205 clustered precincts. She lost to Elmer E. Panotes (Panotes) who was
proclaimed the winner on May 12, 2010 having garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against
Chato's 47,822 votes, or a plurality of 3,885 votes.
Chato filed an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
assailing the results in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes.
Panotes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and prayed that a preliminary hearing
be set in order to determine the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the
elections. In its resolution, the HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots
relative to the protest. Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by Protestee of
the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images reiterating the lack of legal basis for the decryption
and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had been conducted showing
that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved. The HRET denied Chatos
motion. HRET declared that, although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections
are the best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded
as the equivalent of the original ballots. Chato filed a motion for reconsideration but the
HRET denied the same.
Chato then moved for the revision of the ballots in all of the protested clustered precincts
arguing that the results of the revision of twenty-five percent (25%) of the precincts indicate
a reasonable recovery of votes in her favor. She filed a second motion reiterating her prayer
for the continuance of the revision. The HRET denied the motion.
However, on March 22, 2012, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution No. 12-079 directing the
continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining seventy-five percent (75%) protested
clustered precincts, or a total of 120 precincts. Panotes moved for reconsideration but the

HRET denied the same.

Hence, Panotes filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not HRET gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 12-079?
HELD:
The HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No. 12-079.
POLITICAL LAW: HRET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of its members
It is hornbook principle that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to review decisions and
orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral
tribunals exercise of its discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined
as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary
manner, where the abuse is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.
To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an
intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its
evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it.
In the main, Panotes ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the HRET in ordering
the continuation of the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% of the protested clustered
precincts.
The Constitution mandates that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members. By employing the word sole, the
Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election
contests involving its members is intended to be its own full, complete and unimpaired.
There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing, as
in this case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that constitutes a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error,
manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor.
DISMISSED.

Guingona vs Gonzales

HRETs Composition Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC
senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed
to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the
CoA.
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.

Neri vs Senate

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication
(DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion
Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others,
the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor

of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to

information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such

contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.

SCB vs Senate

SCB Philippines vs Senate Committee on Banks,

Financial Institution and Currencies en banc
G.R. No. 167173 December 27, 2007
FACTS:
SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila
for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799).
Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent
Committee then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB
stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative
inquiry, thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with
the inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the
judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
RULING:
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as
initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the
illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx",
and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of
legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent in the future."
The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component,
cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may or may not
be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt, the
committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even
there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating
amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to
address or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation,
although it may include in its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons
who may appear liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in
such Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the
courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.

Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

DECISION
(En Banc)

OZAETA, J.:

I.

THE FACTS

The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve
was the apparent irregularity of the governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that
only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The
Senate sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at
the expense of the government.

Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions,
was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he
gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.

Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was committed to the custody
of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter
filed a petition for habeas corpusdirectly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his
detention.

II.

THE ISSUE

1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session?
3.

May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]

1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00.

Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly investing either House
of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse
must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.

xxx

xxx

xxx

[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be
disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner,
requires the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for
the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to
whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it
is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is
impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show
that every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.

xxx

xxx

xxx

If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate
legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment.

2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session.

We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt
to the end of every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of
that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the
legislative body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted
committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to
any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to
enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical
to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is
a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress. . . There is no limit as to time to the Senates power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right against selfincrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the
[P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latters verbal instruction, we
find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might
incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge
of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the
witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional
provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for
such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on
his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question.

Senate vs Ermita

495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Question Hour
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as
the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to
investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the NRP. The
investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military
officials to speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and
some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due to pressing matters that
need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the
senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and
arrangements were already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464
which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers
who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine
National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are
covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the
President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing
the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee
then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing
proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President Arroyos order
barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval,
Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made
to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged
that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the
provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21
of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony
to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power

is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of
inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely
related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of
the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of
legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer
specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be
summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was
thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each
other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One
specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is
to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance
of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the
highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to
secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section
1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the
department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently
made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated
in Arnault.

Read full text

NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking
Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and
jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited
to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

Tolentino vs Finance

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue
Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as
the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6
of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
1streading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed
its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only
the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco
even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such
consolidation was consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means,
according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than
having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice
of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino
concerns a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant
difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

Araullo vs Aquino

Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Realignment

Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment

hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish

growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a
certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth
was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by
Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the
President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to
an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by
the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the
Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other
instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was
not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings
should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to
it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has

definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However,
the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Belgica vs Ochoa

710 SCRA 1 Political Law Constitutional Law Local Government Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork
Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from Congressional Pork Barrel to the
latest Priority Development Assistance Fund orPDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act(GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:

a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40 million for hard
projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for
soft projects (scholarship grants, medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT
development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard projects, P100
million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard projects,
P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide forrealignment of funds whereby certain cabinet
members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the
request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The socalled presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the
Malampaya Gas Project this has been around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social
Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about
1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July
2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the
corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had
been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are
being used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An audit was
then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the
exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before
the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because
it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of
the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws this includes the GAA
to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the
pork barrel system, whats happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of separation
of powers. (Note in the older case ofPHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel,
then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to
get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does
grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and
initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for
it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local
matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out
a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within
the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to
which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of
legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,

nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto
items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being
undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is approved, the legislator can now
identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the
president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
approval of the GAA again, Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their
Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and
policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the
members of the house of representatives, whats happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles
with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary to the State policy embodied in
the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good if thats all that is happening under the pork
barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of
legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriationmade
by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund,
as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCORs earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Gonzales vs Macaraig, Jr

Political Law Veto Power Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto of
Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez averred
the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she
vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto
power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine
of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested
with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that
should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed by the
President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, and
Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not provisions in the budgetary sense of
the term, they are inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the Presidents veto power.