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2ac Link Answer Options

2AC Generic
Non unique and turn- US containment policy is a failure now, engagement key to
peaceful relations
Mendis and Wang, PhDs, 16
(Patrick, Rajawali senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Governments Ash Centre for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard. He
served as a Pentagon professor and US diplomat during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and is currently serving as a commissioner to the
US National Commission for Unesco, an appointment by the Obama administration. Joey, defense analyst and a graduate of the Naval War
College, the National Defense University, and the Harvard Kennedy School. He has written a number of works on national and international
security, and has received two consecutive awards from the Royal United Services Institute for his essays.
http://www.scmp.com/print/comment/insight-opinion/article/1938610/why-us-will-gain-nothing-seeking-contain-china 4-27)
In the midst of escalating tensions between the US and China , particularly in the East and South China seas, serious

questions are being raised about the future of peace , security and prosperity in the region. Reflecting on these tensions, we
need to return to the founding principles that originally brought wealth and mutual prosperity to both
nations. Much has been written about Chinas peaceful rise. And with this meteoric rise there has been
an increase in military modernisation and its assertiveness. This has raised concerns among Chinas neighbours regarding its
intentions. Beijing, for its part, has not helped to clarify these intentions. Instead, President Xi Jinping () muddled the situation when he
declared that China would not pursue militarisation of the South China Sea, then proceeded to install surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody
Island in the Paracels and conduct exercises to shoot down unmanned aircraft. It has created not only a credibility issue but also elevated concerns
about his ability to command the military. For its part, the US has responded to Chinas rise by blowing the dust off of

the old containment playbook of the former Soviet era and modifying it with an element of economic
engagement. This congagement (containment and engagement) would seek to contain China militarily while
continuing to engage it economically. China wants peace and prosperity in the region. Yet, its actions create precisely the opposite
conditions. Washington claims it welcomes Chinas peaceful rise. Yet, it treats China like a parvenu that
doesnt fit into the American-led world order. Therefore, Beijing continually needs to be humbled. If
Washington really wants peace and prosperity in the region, words must be matched by deeds. Cold-war
mindsets like mutually assured destruction will not work in the more nuanced Sino-American relationship . The
Chinese experience, beginning with colonial America, has been more a case of economic engagement that
worked towards mutually assured prosperity. Washington should continue to focus on building much needed trust, promoting
fair competition and ... paving the road towards mutually assured prosperity Americas commercial venture with China goes back to the
founding of the nation, when the American revolutionary war privateer, Empress of China, made its maiden voyage from New York harbour in
December 1784 to Canton (now Guangzhou) with a cargo of Spanish dollars, ginseng, furs, lead and wine, returning home the following May
with tea, silk and porcelain. Since the reform and opening up in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping (), Chinas significance to the

world economy has increased significantly. Chinas fixation with the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and
other sea lines of communication is not without cause; its export economy survives by these trade routes.
And any disruption to these routes would have a significant impact not only on Chinas economy but also
the global economy. Recognising this fact and the potential disruption to the US economy, Washington
should not only support Beijing in maintaining a healthy trade relationship, but continue to focus on
building much needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-based
institutions, and paving the road towards mutually assured prosperity. Washington and Beijing are
currently pursuing over 80 bilateral dialogues. These initiatives should continue to promote cooperative
efforts that serve both nations, rather than viewing the dynamics of this relationship as zero-sum. It is time to
return to the vision of US Founding Fathers of a commercial nation that is a shining city upon a hill. The rise of China is a fait
accompli. To suggest that the US should contain China and, if necessary, go to war is, in the words of
former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, as dangerous as it is wrong . It makes even less sense when the
US is borrowing money from China, in the form of Treasuries, to finance that possible conflict .
Containment is a policy with numerous contextual elements that cannot
simply be transferred from the Soviet era. The US attempts to contain China may make
it a self-fulfilling prophecy. China is not the new Soviet Union. In time, Chinas peaceful rise will show its true
colours. It is not clear whether its current behaviour is a product of regional hegemonic aspirations or
simply manifesting its internal contradictions, factions and rivalry in the one-party system. The question
of who can contain China is one that only the Chinese can answer for themselves. In the meantime, the
US needs to remain vigilant and engage. In the end, China has to capitalise on its soft power, with its

Confucian ethics and cultural heritage from which Americas Founding Fathers once sought inspiration.
Beijing should promote peaceful relations with its neighbours, influence potential allies and return to its
official policy of a peaceful rise with clarity in words and consistency in actions. Thats quintessentially
living in harmony with the Tao the Chinese Way.

2AC Allied Support


No allied support for containment
Friedberg, PhD Harvard, 15
(Aaron L, Prof of Politics and international affairs @Princeton, The Debate Over US China
Strategy Survival | vol. 57 no. 3 | JuneJuly 2015 | pp. 89110)

Elsewhere in the world, although concern over China is growing, there is no appetite for a fullblown rivalry. Aside from bigger defence budgets and less trade and investment, a shift toward
containment would provoke fears of war. All parties would suffer in such a conflict, but Chinas
Asian neighbours have reason to fear that they would suffer more than most. Even if American strategists
concluded that it was necessary, the democratic countries that are its principal strategic partners in Asia
are simply not ready to abandon engagement and sign on to a policy of
containment. (107)

2AC Congagement
The affirmative isnt appeasement- it combines engagement with SQ balancing- this
is the best approach
Friedberg, PhD Harvard, 15
(Aaron L, Prof of Politics and international affairs @Princeton, The Debate Over US China
Strategy Survival | vol. 57 no. 3 | JuneJuly 2015 | pp. 89110)

What this leaves, then, is a strategy that combines continued attempts at engagement with expanded and
intensified balancing. Unlike containment, which would likely be both extremely costly and
highly controversial, such an approach has the very important virtue of being feasible in light of
current political and economic constraints. Unlike offshore balancing, it would not rest on unrealistic and
potentially dangerous assumptions about the behaviour of third parties. And, in contrast to enhanced
engagement, reassurance or a notional grand bargain, it is rooted in a realistic appreciation of the likely
extent of Chinas ambitions, given its recent achievements and current momentum. Better balancing is not
a perfect strategy, and arguing about how it should be adjusted at the margins is not as stimulating as
debating the merits of bold new alternatives. But in the real world of practical
policymaking, it remains the best available alternative.(107)

2AC Feasibility
Containment advocates make flawed assumptions about China- effective
containment isnt politically feasible
Friedberg, PhD Harvard, 15
(Aaron L, Prof of Politics and international affairs @Princeton, The Debate Over US China
Strategy Survival | vol. 57 no. 3 | JuneJuly 2015 | pp. 89110)
In contrast to the unduly optimistic assessments of Beijings interests and intentions that underlie most proposed strategies for dealing with China,
the assumptions underpinning a policy of pure containment are unnecessarily bleak. While it may
eventually become far more tense and polarised than it is today, the

relationship between the United States and China


remains mixed, containing important areas of actual or potential cooperation, as well as intensifying
competition. Abandoning attempts at engagement would create the selffulfilling prophecy that critics of balancing have long and generally wrongly warned against; it
would be tantamount, as Otto von Bismarck put it in opposing proposals for preventive war, to committing suicide for fear
of death. Even if they wanted to shift towards a policy of pure containment , barring some major discontinuity,
American leaders would find it extremely difficult to do so. Current budgetary constraints
are neither permanent nor insurmountable; the United States can certainly afford to fund a far more vigorous military
competition with China than the one it is conducting today. Without an obvious breakdown in relations, however,
forging a political consensus to support the required increase in expenditures would likely prove
impossible. The fact that powerful and influential groups and individuals in American society remain
deeply committed to preserving the best possible relations with China and opposed to any measures that, in their view,
might damage them, will make the task of mobilising support even more difficult. (1067)

2AC First Step


-Plan is a first step to establish trust crucial to transition to post US dominance
BOP in asia collapse of hardline approach inevitable
Swaine, PhD Harvard, 15
(Michael D, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-chinabalance-of-power/i7gi, 4-20)
These obstacles clearly indicate that Washington and Beijing are not about to undertake , much less reach, a formal

grand bargain type of agreement to establish a new regional security environment anytime soon .4 Such
a fundamental shift in policies and approaches can only occur gradually, in
stages, and over an extended period of time. But it can only begin if elites in
Washington, Beijing, and other Asian capitals seriously examine the enduring trends under
way in Asia and accept the reality of the changing power distribution and
the need for more than just marginal adjustments and assurances. Only then will
they undertake a systematic examination of the requirements of a stable balance of power over the long term, involving a serious consideration of
the more fundamental actions. Such an examination and acceptance must initially occur domestically, then among

allies and protectorates, and finally via a bilateral U.S.China strategic dialogue aimed at developing understandings
about the process and actions required. Such understandings must provide for ample opportunities and means for both sides to assess and evaluate
the credibility and veracity of the actions of the other side. If such understandings can be reached regarding the overall need for
strategic adjustment, then

the specific concessions to minimize potential instabilities and arrangements for


meaningful cooperation, involving Korea, Taiwan, and maritime issues within the first island chain, will
become much more possible. In particular, a strategic understanding designed to achieve a
peaceful and stable transition to a genuine balance of power in the Western Pacific could make Beijing
more likely to pressure or entice North Korea to abandon or place strong limits on its nuclear weapons
program and undertake the kind of opening up and reforms that would almost certainly result eventually
in a unified peninsula. While difficult to envision at present, such a shift in Chinese policy is certainly possible, given the obvious
incentives to do so. While South Korea might also resist movement toward a nonaligned status in a
postunification environment, the obvious benefits that would result from a stable balance of power, if
presented properly, could very likely overcome such resistance . Regarding Taiwan, if both U.S. and
Chinese leaders can convince Taipei of the benefits of the kind of mutual assurances and restraints
necessary to neutralize the crossstrait issue, none of which require the U.S. abandonment of the island,
these possible adverse outcomes of the proposed or ongoing shift, including any resort to nuclear
weapons, would almost certainly be avoided. As for Japan and the U.S.Japan alliance, in the past, many observers viewed a
muchstrengthened alliance and a stronger Japan as either a major provocation to Beijing not worth the cost or as a largely unfeasible option for
Tokyo, given domestic political and economic constraints. However, as with the Taiwan and Korea cases, if viewed as a requirement for the
creation of a bufferlike arrangement basic to a stable balance of power in the first island chain, and if limited in scope and purpose, such a
calibrated strengthening would almost certainly prove acceptable to Beijing, and eventually necessary for Tokyo, particularly considering the
unpalatable alternatives. Unfortunately, there is no magic formula or technique that

will guarantee or facilitate the transition to a new security environment


based on a stable balance of power. It will require courageous and farsighted leadership in
all relevant capitals, some significant risk taking (especially in the domestic political arena), and highly effective diplomacy. But the
alternative, involving current attempts to sustain American predominance in the Western Pacific while
muddling through by managing various frictions with Beijing in a piecemeal and incremental manner and
cooperating where possible, will likely prove disastrous. And a much delayed attempt to
transition to a more stable balance, perhaps as a result of a clear failure of the
existing strategy, will simply make the process more difficult . Ultimately, the choice
facing policymakers in the United States, China, and other Asian powers is whether to deal forthrightly and sensibly
with the changing regional power distribution or avoid the hard decisions that Chinas rise poses until
the situation grows ever more polarized and dangerous. There are no
other workable alternatives.

2AC Spillover
Engagement with China spills over establishing a new collaborative framework for
tackling a host of global problems- it provides the crucial political capital
Rudd, Former Aussie PM, 2015
(Kevin, PhD Focus in Chinese/China History, U.S.-China 21 The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under
Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf April)
Both the realist and constructive dimensions of this proposed framework for U.S.-China relations are
designed to be dynamic, not static. As political space begins to open up in the
relationship over time, as a result of progress in any of the collaborative diplomatic and
economic initiatives listed above, accrued political capital should be deployed to
deal with new challenges arising from developments in the international
community. It should also be deployed to deal with some of the older, more realist problems
endemic to the bilateral relationship that had hitherto been seen as too difficult to address. The key ingredient,
however, is the gradual development of a stock of strategic trust based on
what the U.S. and China are able to achieve cooperatively. This brings us to the question
of whether an overall common strategic purpose is to be served by the U.S.-China relationship, and if so, given the vast differences between the
two countries and their different expectations of the international system, what that common purpose or mission might be. De minima, one

common purpose is clear: to avoid conflict and war , and against the benchmark of the cautionary tales of Thucydides
Trap, this would be no small achievement. However, another common ambition might be the
preservation of a functioning global order itself that is capable of effective
global decision-making and dispute resolution . China has a deep philosophical reservation, born of
millennia of historical experience, of chaos under heaven (tianxia daluan ). Whereas historically this has applied to Chinas domestic
arrangements to preserve the unity and good government of the empire, Chinas

now unprecedented global engagement


creates a new imperative for order in the international domain as well. Chinese interests are now at stake
in every region in the world. In some cases, these are not marginal, but, in fact, are core interests of the Chinese state, such as a
functioning global energy supply and distribution system. Try as China might, it will be in no position to rely on
unilateral diplomatic or military effort to guarantee Chinese energy interests . This therefore points to
Chinas broader need for an effectively functioning global order for the
future, given Chinas expanding global interests and its inability to secure those interests by purely
national means. Securing a stable, effective global order for the future, and avoiding global chaos under
heaven of the type offered by the proliferation of non-state actors such as ISIS, may well constitute the
beginnings of a common strategic purpose for China and the United States for the future. This may be
able, over time, to transcend the considerable ideational divide that at present
separates them on the question of precisely what sort of order that should
be. Furthermore, if the preservation and evolution of a functioning order could become an animating vision
for the future of U.S.-China relations, not only could it provide a global dividend to the rest of the
international community, it could also provide an even deeper momentum for managing the more basic
tasks confronting the bilateral relationship: i.e. avoiding conflict; managing ideational differences on
democracy, human rights and the rule of law; as well as the range of bilateral, regional and global
problem-solving referred to above. This question on future Chinese and American collaboration in defending and enhancing the
global order is discussed further in the conclusion of this summary report.(34-6)

2AC Unique Moment


Xi Jinping gives the US a unique moment to pursue engagement- hes willing to
make strategic concessions
Rudd, Former Aussie PM, 2015
(Kevin, PhD Focus in Chinese/China History, U.S.-China 21 The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under
Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf April)
Three concepts define how Xi Jinpings leadership differs from that of his predecessors: his personal authority; his
deep sense of national mission; and an even deeper sense of urgency. Xis audacious leadership style sets him apart
from the modern Chinese norm. Both in personality and policy, he represents one part continuity and two parts
change. Xi is the most powerful Chinese leader since Deng (Deng Xiaoping ), and possibly since Mao (Mao Zedong
). Whereas his predecessors believed in , and by and large practiced, the principle of collective leadership, Xi
Jinping is infinitely more primus than he is primus inter pares. As a Party blue blood, he also exudes a selfconfidence that comes from someone utterly comfortable with the exercise of political power. Xi is driven
by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive role that he is to play in bringing about two great
historical missions for his country: first, national rejuvenation, thereby restoring Chinas place as a respected great power in
the councils of the world; and second, saving the Communist Party itself from the cancer of corruption, thereby securing
the partys future as the continuing political vehicle for Chinas future as a great power. Xi is both a Chinese nationalist and a Party loyalist. He is
deeply and widely read in both international and Chinese history, including an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the Communist Party
itself. His core, animating vision centers on his concept of the China Dream (zhongguomeng ) which in turn has two objectives: to
achieve a moderately well-off China (xiaokang shehui ) by 2021 when the Party celebrates its centenary; and a rich and powerful
(fuqiang ) China by 2049 on the centenary of the Peoples Republic. Realizing

the China Dream, according to Xi,


requires a second phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting
deeper market reforms to achieve his national objectives, while implementing new restrictions on
individual political freedom. In fact, he sees this as the essence of the China Model (zhongguo moshi )
in contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited to China.1 For Xi, China must seize
the moment of extended strategic opportunity, following ten wasted years when necessary reforms were
postponed, and corruption allowed to run rampant. Chinas domestic policy needs are now integrally bound up with the countrys foreign
policy direction. In Xis worldview, an increasingly rich and powerful China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. No longer
will China hide its strength, bide its time, and never take the lead (taoguang yanghui, juebu dangtou ), Deng Xiaopings
foreign policy mantra for decades. China

must now pursue an activist (fenfa youwei ) foreign policy that


maximizes Chinas economic and security interests, and one that begins to engage in the longer-term
reform of the global order. Xi speaks for the first time of Chinas grand strategy needing to embrace a
new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao
), in order to craft a new type of great power relations (xinxing daguo guanxi ) with the United
States.2 Xi, in short, is not a status quo politician. He is the exact reverse. And in pursuing his sense of national mission and
personal destiny, he is prepared to take calculated risks in a traditionally risk-averse Communist Party
culture. Xi Jinpings sense of personal and national urgency is animated by a formidable, Confucian work ethic, which he also expects of his
Party colleagues and policy advisors. He is results-driven. He is frustrated by the interminable processes of the
Chinese bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is very much
a man in a hurry. For these several reasons, Xi, unlike his predecessor, has the personal authority and
policy flexibility to be a potentially dynamic interlocutor with the United States, albeit always within the
framework of his nationalist vision for Chinas future, and his definitive conclusions concerning the continuing role of Chinas one-party state.
When, therefore, Xi uses the term win-win (shuangying ) to describe his desired relationship with the U.S.,

it should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda . Xi does see


potential value in strategic and political collaboration with the U nited States. In short, there is still reasonable
foreign and security policy space for the U.S. administration to work within in its dealings with Xi Jinping,
although it is an open question how long it will be before policy directions are set in stone, and the
window of opportunity begins to close. I argue that Xi is capable of bold policy
moves, even including the possibility of grand strategic bargains on

intractable questions such as the denuclearization and peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. It is up to America to use this space as
creatively as it can while it still lasts. (10-12)

Link Answer Extensions

Congagement Possible
Containment/Engagement is a false dichotomy rooted in flawed realist approach to
IR
Eisenmen, PhD, 16
(Joshua, assistant professor at the University of Texas at Austin's Lyndon Baines Johnson School of
Public Affairs and senior fellow for China studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington,
DC, https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/756 1-21)
The time has come, as John Podesta, former chief of staff to President Clinton has said, to "move beyond the 'engage and
hedge' framework for China policyan approach openly premised on mistrust and
suspicionto a strategy that maximizes opportunity," while "managing risk .19 The problem is
that the U.S. China policy has been captured by the dichotomous
framework of realism, sliding back and forth between engagement and
containment; a policy many call congagement. Yet, given the complexities of the U.S.China relationship, international relations theory is insufficient and produces flawed
comparisons between China and previous rising powers, e.g. Sparta, World War I Germany, or World War II Japan.
To improve U.S. policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict requires going beyond
simplistic applications of international relations theory. It means opening the 'black box' of
China's policymaking process to understand why it makes the decisions it does and how this process has
and is changing. Unfortunately, barriers continue to prevent the U.S. from better understanding and responding to China. Most importantly,
Friedberg identified a "yawning ideological chasm" that inhibits the success of U.S.' engagement, arguing that: "The very different domestic
political regimes of the two pacific powers" make the liberalization of the Chinese political system essential for "a true trans-Pacific entente."
CPC repression inhibits change in China and presents "a significant additional impetus to rivalry.20

Cooperation Spillover
Despite strains cooperation still possible under Xi- alterantive is war
Shambaugh, PhD Michigan, 15
(David, professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University in
Washington DC,[1] as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1819980/fundamental-shift-china-and-us-arenow-engaged-all-out?page=all , 6-12)
Also high on the agenda at present is the real need to forge practical cooperation on a number of so-called
"global governance" issues, including North Korea, Iran, Islamic State, Afghanistan, counterterrorism,
anti-piracy, climate change, maritime security, economic stability, energy security, sea-lane security, and
setting global rules for cyber activity. To date, China has been extremely reluctant to collaborate openly with
the United States on such global governance issues, but now it possibly seems more feasible . This is
because President Xi has personally endorsed more "proactive diplomacy" by
China in the global governance arena. This won't solve the problems in US-China relations, but it will help.
The upcoming Strategic and Economic Dialogue and Xi's September state visit to Washington are golden opportunities to discuss these issues, try
to forge tangible cooperation, and arrest the negative dynamic in the relationship. The question is whether it will be temporary again, or a real
"floor" can be put beneath the relationship. If the past is any indicator, we should not expect too much. What worries me is that in this
increasingly negative and suspicious atmosphere, "tests of credibility" will increase. The best we can probably hope for over the next two to three
years - as President Obama becomes a lame duck and the election cycle stimulates more heated rhetoric about China - is tactical management of
the relationship, with sensitivity to each side's "red lines" and "core interests", while hoping that no "wild card" events occur. This could include
another military incident in the air or at sea, or renewed tension over Taiwan. Even the current situation in the South China Sea has real potential
to haemorrhage, as China is not going to stop its island-building activities and hence will not meet American demands that it do so. Or if China,
having fortified the islands, proclaims an air defence identification zone over the South China Sea. What is Washington to do then? The potential
for military confrontation is not insignificant. So, looking to the future, the key responsibility for both countries is to

learn how to manage competition, keep it from edging towards the conflictual end of the spectrum,
while trying to expand the zone of practical cooperation. Neither country has any playbook
to guide such a relationship. Henry Kissinger envisions what he calls "co-evolution" between the two powers, but even he concludes that this will
require "wisdom and patience". But it is not at all clear to me that the respective political cultures and existing political systems, national
identities, social values, and world views will afford such a strategic grand bargain today. Thus, these two great nations

are likely to find it increasingly difficult to coexist - yet they must.


However fraught, this is a marriage in which divorce is not an option.
Divorce means war.

Uniqueness

AT: China Rise


China cant challenge the US no matter how fast it grows
Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16
(Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, May/June,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S
0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)
After two and a half decades, is the United States run as the worlds sole superpower coming to an end? Many say yes, seeing a rising

China ready to catch up to or even surpass the United States in the near future. By many measures, after all, Chinas economy
is on track to become the worlds biggest, and even if its growth slows, it will still outpace that of the United States for many years. Its coffers
overflowing, Beijing has used its new wealth to attract friends, deter enemies, modernize its military, and aggressively assert sovereignty claims
in its periphery. For many, therefore, the question is not whether China will become a superpower but just how soon. But this is wishful, or

growth no longer translates as directly into military power as it did in the


means that it is now harder than ever for rising powers to rise and established ones to fall. And
Chinathe only country with the raw potential to become a true global peer of the United Statesalso faces a more daunting
challenge than previous rising states because of how far it lags behind technologically . Even
though the United States economic dominance has eroded from its peak, the countrys military superiority is
not going anywhere, nor is the globe-spanning alliance structure that constitutes the core of the
existing liberal international order (unless Washington unwisely decides to throw it away). Rather than expecting a power
transition in international politics, everyone should start getting used to a world in which the U nited States remains
the sole superpower for decades to come.
fearful, thinking. Economic
past, which

AT: Rise Fast/Impacts Short Term


No chance of rapid China rise- obstacles too great
Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16
(Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, May/June,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S
0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)
In the 1930s alone, Japan escaped the depths of depression and morphed into a rampaging military machine ,
Germany transformed from the disarmed loser of World War I into a juggernaut capable of conquering Europe, and the Soviet Union recovered
from war and revolution to become a formidable land power. The next decade saw the United States own sprint from military

also-ran to global superpower, with a nuclear Soviet Union close on its heels. Today, few seriously anticipate another world war, or
even another cold war, but many observers argue that these past experiences reveal just how quickly countries
can become dangerous once they try to extract military capabilities from their economies. But what is taking place
now is not your grandfathers power transition . One can debate whether China will soon reach the
first major milestone on the journey from great power to superpower: having the requisite economic resources. But a giant economy
alone wont make China the worlds second superpower, nor would overcoming the next big hurdle,
attaining the requisite technological capacity. After that lies the challenge of transforming all this latent
power into the full range of systems needed for global power projection and learning how to use them .
Each of these steps is time consuming and fraught with difficulty . As a result,
China will, for a long time, continue to hover somewhere between a great power and a superpower. You might call
it an emerging potential superpower: thanks to its economic growth, China has broken free from the great-power pack, but it still has a long
way to go before it might gain the economic and technological capacity to become a superpower. Chinas quest for superpower

status is undermined by something else, too: weak incentives to make the sacrifices required. The U nited
States owes its far-reaching military capabilities to the existential imperatives of the Cold War. The country
would never have borne the burden it did had policymakers not faced the challenge of balancing the Soviet Union,
a superpower with the potential to dominate Eurasia. (Indeed, it is no surprise that two and a half decades after the Soviet Union collapsed, it is
Russia that possesses the second-greatest military capability in the world.) Today, China faces nothing like the Cold War

pressures that led the United States to invest so much in its military. The United States is a far less threatening
superpower than the Soviet Union was: however aggravating Chinese policymakers find U.S. foreign policy, it is unlikely to engender the level of
fear that motivated Washington during the Cold War. Stacking the odds against China even more, the United States has

few incentives to give up power, thanks to the web of alliances it has long boasted . A list of U.S. allies
reads as a whos who of the worlds most advanced economies, and these partners have lowered the price
of maintaining the United States superpower status. U.S. defense spending stood at around three percent of GDP at the end of
the 1990s, rose to around five percent in the next decade on account of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has now fallen back to close to three
percent. Washington has been able to sustain a global military capacity with relatively little effort thanks in part to the bases its allies host and the
top-end weapons they help develop. Chinas only steadfast ally is North Korea, which is often more trouble than it

is worth.

AT: China Rise- GDP


GDP is deceptive- overstates Chinas parity with US
Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16
(Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, May/June,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S
0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)

Precisely because the Chinese economy is so unlike the U.S. economy, the measure fueling
expectations of a power shift, GDP, greatly underestimates the true
economic gap between the two countries. For one thing, the immense destruction that China
is now wreaking on its environment counts favorably toward its GDP, even though it will reduce
economic capacity over time by shortening life spans and raising cleanup and health-care costs. For
another thing, GDP was originally designed to measure mid-twentieth-century manufacturing economies,
and so the more knowledge-based and globalized a countrys production is, the more its GDP
underestimates its economys true size. A new statistic developed by the UN suggests
the degree to which GDP inflates Chinas relative power. Called inclusive wealth, this
measure represents economists most systematic effort to date to calculate a states wealth. As a UN report
explained, it counts a countrys stock of assets in three areas: (i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings,
machines, and equipment), (ii) human capital (skills, education, health), and (iii) natural capital (sub-soil
resources, ecosystems, the atmosphere). Added up, the United States inclusive wealth comes to almost
$144 trillion4.5 times Chinas $32 trillion.The true size of Chinas economy relative to the United
States may lie somewhere in between the numbers provided by GDP and inclusive wealth, and
admittedly, the latter measure has yet to receive the same level of scrutiny as GDP. The problem with
GDP, however, is that it measures a flow (typically, the value of goods and services produced in a year),
whereas inclusive wealth measures a stock. As The Economist put it, Gauging an economy by its GDP is
like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet. Because
inclusive wealth measures the pool of resources a government can conceivably draw on to achieve its
strategic objectives, it is the more useful metric when thinking about geopolitical competition.
But no matter how one compares the size of the U.S. and Chinese economies, it is clear that the United
States is far more capable of converting its resources into military might. In
the past, rising states had levels of technological prowess similar to those of leading ones. During the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, for example, the United States didnt lag far behind the United
Kingdom in terms of technology, nor did Germany lag far behind the erstwhile Allies during the interwar
years, nor was the Soviet Union backward technologically compared with the United States during the
early Cold War. This meant that when these challengers rose economically, they could soon mount a
serious military challenge to the dominant power. Chinas relative technological backwardness today,
however, means that even if its economy continues to gain ground, it will not be easy for it to catch up
militarily and become a true global strategic peer, as opposed to a merely a major player in its own
neighborhood.

AT: China Rise- Military


No chance China reaches parity with the US
Rudd, Former Aussie PM, 2015
(Kevin, PhD Focus in Chinese/China History, U.S.-China 21 The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under
Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf April)
Notwithstanding this gradual shift in the global distribution of economic power, over the course of the
same decade the United States will nonetheless remain the dominant regional and global military power,
and by a massive margin. While Chinas increasing defense spending will continue to close the gap, there
is no serious prospect of it reaching military parity with the U.S. before mid-century, if at al l. China, like the
rest of the world, will remain justifiably mindful of Americas overwhelming military power. This is a core assumption in Chinese
strategic thinking. (1)

No China Rise- Tech


Tech gap too large for China Rise
Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16
(Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, May/June,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S
0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)
In forecasts of Chinas future power position, much has been made of the countrys pressing domestic challenges: its slowing economy, polluted
environment, widespread corruption, perilous financial markets, nonexistent social safety net, rapidly aging population, and restive middle class.
But as harmful as these problems are, Chinas true Achilles heel on the world stage is something else: its low level

of technological expertise compared with the United States. Relative to past rising powers, China
has a much wider technological gap to close with the leading power. China may export container after container of hightech goods, but in a world of globalized production, that doesnt reveal much. Half of all Chinese exports consist of what
economists call processing trade, meaning that parts are imported into China for assembly and then
exported afterward. And the vast majority of these Chinese exports are directed not by Chinese firms but by corporations from more
developed countries. When looking at measures of technological prowess that better reflect the national origin
of the expertise, Chinas true position becomes clear. World Bank data on payments for the use of
intellectual property, for example, indicate that the United States is far and away the leading source of
innovative technologies, boasting $128 billion in receipts in 2013more than four times as much as the country in
second place, Japan. China, by contrast, imports technologies on a massive scale yet received less than $1 billion in receipts in 2013 for the
use of its intellectual property. Another good indicator of the technological gap is the number of so-called triadic patents, those registered in
the United States, Europe, and Japan. In 2012, nearly 14,000 such patents originated in the United States, compared with
just under 2,000 in China. The distribution of highly influential articles in science and engineering those in
the top one percent of citations, as measured by the National Science Foundation tells the same story, with the United States accounting
for almost half of these articles, more than eight times Chinas share. So does the breakdown of Nobel Prizes in Physics,
Chemistry, and Physiology or Medicine. Since 1990, 114 have gone to U.S.-based researchers. China-based researchers have
received two.

Tech gap locks in US military Dominance- China has no hope of catching up


Brooks and Wohlforth, PhDs, 16
(Stephen G, Associate Professor of Government @Dartmouth, William C, Daniel Webster Prof of Government @Dartmouth, May/June,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-13/once-and-future-superpower?cid=nlc-fatoday20160520&sp_mid=51424540&sp_rid=c2NvdHR5cDQzMUBnbWFpbC5jb20S1&spMailingID=51424540&spUserID=MTg3NTEzOTE5Njk2S
0&spJobID=922513469&spReportId=OTIyNTEzNDY5S0)
The technological and economic differences between China and the United States wouldnt matter much if all it took to gain superpower status
were the ability to use force locally. But what makes the United States a superpower is its ability to operate globally,

and the bar for that capability is high. It means having what the political scientist Barry Posen has called
command of the commonsthat is, control over the air, space, and the open sea, along with the necessary
infrastructure for managing these domains. When one measures the 14 categories of systems that create
this capability (everything from nuclear attack submarines to satellites to transport aircraft), what emerges is an overwhelming
U.S. advantage in each area, the result of decades of advances on multiple fronts. It would take a
very long time for China to approach U.S. power on any of these fronts, let
alone all of them. For one thing, the United States has built up a massive scientific and industrial base.
China is rapidly enhancing its technological inputs, increasing its R & D spending and its numbers of graduates with degrees in science and
engineering. But there are limits to how fast any country can leap forward in such matters, and there are

various obstacles in Chinas waysuch as a lack of effective intellectual property protections and inefficient methods of allocating
capitalthat will be extremely hard to change given its rigid political system. Adding to the difficulty, China is chasing a moving target. In
2012, the United States spent $79 billion on military R & D, more than 13 times as much as Chinas
estimated amount, so even rapid Chinese advances might be insufficient to close
the gap. Then there are the decades the United States has spent procuring advanced weapons systems ,
which have grown only more complex over time. In the 1960s, aircraft took about five years to develop, but by the 1990s, as the number of parts

and lines of code ballooned, the figure reached ten years. Today, it

takes 15 to 20 years to design and build the most


advanced fighter aircraft, and military satellites can take even longer. So even if another country managed to build
the scientific and industrial base to develop the many types of weapons that give the United States
command of the commons, there would be a lengthy lag before it could actually possess them . Even
Chinese defense planners recognize the scale of the challenge. Command of the commons also requires
the ability to supervise a wide range of giant defense project s. For all the hullabaloo over the evils of the military-industrial
complex and the waste, fraud, and abuse in the Pentagon, in the United States, research labs, contractors, and
bureaucrats have painstakingly acquired this expertise over many decades, and their Chinese counterparts
do not yet have it. This kind of learning by doing experience resides in organizations, not in individuals.
It can be transferred only through demonstration and instruction, so cybertheft or other forms of
espionage are not an effective shortcut for acquiring it. Chinas defense industry is still in its infancy, and as
the scholar Richard Bitzinger and his colleagues have concluded, Aside from a few pockets of excellence such as ballistic missiles, the
Chinese military-industrial complex has appeared to demonstrate few capacities for designing and
producing relatively advanced conventional weapon systems. For example, China still cannot mass-produce
high-performance aircraft engines, despite the immense resources it has thrown at the effort, and relies instead
on second-rate Russian models. In other areas, Beijing has not even bothered competing. Take undersea warfare. China is poorly equipped for
antisubmarine warfare and is doing very little to improve. And only now is the country capable of producing nuclear-powered attack submarines
that are comparable in quietness to the kinds that the U.S. Navy commissioned in the 1950s. Since then, however, the U.S. government has
invested hundreds of billions of dollars and six decades of effort in its current generation of Virginia-class submarines, which have achieved
absolute levels of silencing. Finally, it takes a very particular set of skills and infrastructure to actually use all these

weapons. Employing them is difficult not just because the weapons themselves tend to be so complex but
also because they typically need to be used in a coordinated manner. It is an incredibly complicated
endeavor, for example, to deploy a carrier battle group; the many associated ships and aircraft must work together in real time. Even systems that
may seem simple require a complex surrounding architecture in order to be truly effective. Drones, for example, work best when a military has
the highly trained personnel to operate them and the technological and organizational capacity to rapidly gather, process, and act on information
collected from them. Developing the necessary infrastructure to seek command of the commons would take any

military a very long time. And since the task places a high premium on flexibility and delegation, Chinas
centralized and hierarchical forces are particularly ill suited for it.

AT: Chinese Growth Not Sustainable


6% growth is sustainable- doom prophets wrong
Rudd, Former Aussie PM, 2015
(Kevin, PhD Focus in Chinese/China History, U.S.-China 21 The Future of U.S.-China Relations Under
Xi Jinping Toward a new Framework of Constructive Realism for a Common Purpose
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Summary%20Report%20US-China%2021.pdf April)
On the sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese national power, on balance we should
assume a Chinese growth rate in the medium to medium-high range (i.e. in excess of 6 percent) as probable for the
period under review. This takes into account both official and unofficial statistics on the recent slowing of the
rate. It also takes into account lower levels of global demand for Chinese exports, high levels of domestic
debt, the beginning of a demographically driven shrinking in the labor force, continued high levels of
domestic savings, at best modest levels of household consumption, an expanding private sector still
constrained by state-owned monoliths, and a growing environmental crisis . But it also takes into account
the vast battery of Chinese policy responses to each of these and does not assume that these are by
definition destined to fail. Furthermore, if Chinas growth rate begins to falter, China has sufficient fiscal and
monetary policy capacity to intervene to ensure the growth rate remains above 6 percent , which is broadly
the number policy makers deem to be necessary to maintain social stability. It is equally unconvincing to
argue that Chinas transformation from an old economic growth model (based on a combination of high levels of state
infrastructure investment and low-wage, labor-intensive manufacturing for export), to a new model (based on household consumption, the
services sector and a strongly innovative private sector) is also somehow doomed to failure. This is a sophisticated policy
blueprint developed over many years and is necessary to secure Chinas future growth trajectory through
different drivers of demand to those that have powered Chinese growth rates in the past. There is also a
high level of political backing to drive implementation. The process and progress of implementation has
so far been reasonable. Moreover, to assume that Chinas seasoned policy elites will somehow prove to be
less capable in meeting Chinas next set of economic policy challenges than they have been with previous
sets of major policy challenges over the last 35 years is just plain wrong . China does face a bewildering array of policy
challenges and it is possible that any one of these could significantly de-rail the Governments economic program. But it is equally true that

Chinese policy elites are more sophisticated now than at any time since the current period of reform
began back in 1978, and are capable of rapid and flexible policy responses when necessary. For these reasons,
and others concerning the structure of Chinese politics, the report explicitly rejects the China collapse
thesis recently advanced by David Shambaugh. It would also be imprudent in the extreme for Americas
China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) policy assumption that China will either
economically stagnate or politically implode because of underlying contradictions in its overall political
economy. This would amount to a triumph of hope over cold, hard analysis.

Impact Defense

Japan Wont Prolif


No scenario for Japanese Prolif the costs are too high
Tatsumi et al, Stimson Center East Asia Program Senior Associate, 14
(Yuki and Henry Stimson, Naval Post Graduate School Lecturer, Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear
and Security Policy, DOA: 9-21-15,
Abe has also forthrightly pushed to bring Japans nuclear reactors back on line, and has aggressively pushed for the export of nuclear
power technology, including to aspiring nuclear-weapon power India. By the end of February 2014, Abe had gone so far as to announce a draft of a revised
Basic Energy Plan that described nuclear power as an important baseload electricity source and more concretely established the governments openness to restarting
off-line nuclear plants and building new ones.63 This reverses former Prime Minister Kans determination to take and keep all of Japans nuclear plants offline (a
policy not supported uniformly within Kans DPJ government or by his DPJ successor Noda, but not as formally and emphatically discarded by them). Abe also
appears buoyed by an apparent rise in nationalism and security-mindedness among the Japanese public at large. In the 2012 Lower House election that brought Abe
and the LDP back to power, the LDP was not the only winner. The even more avowedly nationalist Japan Restoration Party nearly won enough seats to overtake the
DPJ as the LDPs main challenger (although both the DPJ and JRP finished similarly far behind the LDP). Maritime disputes with China over the Senkaku / Diaoyu
islands and with South Korea over Takeshima / Tokdo have encouraged a spike in xenophobically tinged nationalism against these two countries, to such a degree as
to prompt violent incidents against ethnic Korean residents of Japan.64 Meanwhile, nuclear-test and kinetic provocations on the part of North Korea have made
Japanese citizens more amenable to the idea of a more robust defense against that country a sentiment that Abe, with his personal history of hardline stances against
North Korea, is particularly well positioned to take advantage of. And while such sentiments are nominally directed at North Korea, they may be exploited to push for
advances in defense capabilities that are in practice directed at China as well (or, to echo the terms used above, the high salience of North Korean provocations helps
propel securitycapability expansions that would otherwise be of low salience to the public, even though the latter might have proceeded with relatively little
opposition in any case precisely because of that lower salience). 65 An

observer would be forgiven for observing this policy record


and extrapolating it to expect Abe eventually, in the later portions of his likely extended time in office, to push, slowly but
surely, for expansion in Japans nuclear weapons capabilities. But it seems more likely that
the opposite pattern will hold. It is precisely because Abe holds so many comparatively ambitious
security policy goals that he is unlikely to push for what would be extremely ambitious steps towards
establishing greater nuclear autonomy. The public-support threshold that a nuclearexpansion effort would need to clear is extremely high. In isolation, when asked in opinion polls
whether one is comfortable with the notion of considering a move toward autonomous nuclear-weapons capability, Japanese citizens might be more positive than
before. But in practice, public

comfort with nuclear weapons would first require the public to collectively achieve
comfort with at least four inter-related intermediate steps , each of which itself would constitute a major transformation: 1) Article 9 of
the Constitution, through which Japan now renounces the right to wage war, would need to be amended; 2) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no possession or
manufacture of nuclear weapons, nor permitting their introduction into Japanese territory), which are not law but have taken on the de facto weight of law (as have
their counterpart Three Principles of Arms Exports noted above), would need to be abandoned; 3) the Self Defense Forces would need to be permitted to acquire
offensive capabilities, thus breaking from their history of possessing only (or at least maintaining that they possess) exclusively defense-oriented capabilities; 4)
and, finally, more amorphously and perhaps most difficult the Self Defense Forces would need to earn widespread trust as a professional military organization,

Any
one of these objectives would consume practically all of a Japanese
administrations political capital. Indeed, Abe has already begun to spend political capital on Constitutional revision, which in
something that even the SDFs widely-praised performance in the humanitarian assistance operation following the 3/11 disasters is still far from producing.66

most contexts other than nuclear weapons policy would represent any administrations crowning achievement, not simply an intermediate step. In Japan, even firmly
establishing that nuclear weapons are a legitimate option would qualify as significant. The

political capital involved in


making significant steps toward nuclear weapons capability would simply
be too great. Besides this basic budgetary limit on political ambition, one can point to other conditions that
will likely discourage Abe from pursuing politically driven steps away from the nuclear status quo. Economics also plays a role. First, that
Abe has been able to pursue his securitypolicy goals without debilitating legislative and public pushback
thus far is largely due to the fact that his economic program was rolled out first, and, much more important,
that this program has actually proven successful. This is perhaps the first time in two decades that Japanese citizens have viewed an

economic upturn not as a temporary fluctuation or as artificially manufactured through government stimulus unsustainable over the long term, but, rather, as the result
of systematic and durable economic policy. That said, Abes

economic success over his first year or so of this second term is


by no means guaranteed to last. If the current comparatively high economic tide were to recede, and if Abe were thereby left stranded with only
revisionist security policy to his name, public patience with his priorities might quickly grow thin.67 At the same time, a nuclear weapons program (as
opposed to, say, the export of nuclear technology) is itself a direct drain on the treasury, even in an economy as large as
Japans, and, given the existence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is likely to be viewed by many as an
extravagance.68 Finally, Abes recent political history, for him more than for other LDP leaders, discourages costly moves away from the nuclear status quo.
More than any other LDP prime minister again, since at least his grandfather Kishi in the 1950s Abe has hard personal experience with the dangers of over-reliance
on security policy as a signature legislative achievement. And Abes visit to Yasukuni Shrine and heavy-handed passage of state secrets legislation in December
2013 has already dealt him his first acute drop in Cabinet support. At the same time, as a well-established security hard-liner (again, by Japanese standards, at least),

Abe has no need to go out of his way to prove his bona fides in this regard. If anything, Abe

has a need to avoid confirming some of the


publics perception of him as an extreme hawk. If Japanese citizens were to trust any leader with taking
steps away from the nuclear status quo, it would more likely be someone other than him. He has retained the
support of most citizens, but he has also conditioned them to be on guard for extremism. This also applies, in a weaker form, to parliamentarians within Abes own
LDP. The LDPs current leaders below and beyond Abe do, as a group, focus more on defense issues than their predecessors. Ishiba Shigeru is chief among these,
having been one of the few politicians in either party to have long concerned himself with defense and foreign policy issues rather than more voter-friendly domestic
concerns; others include Koike Yuriko and Ishihara Nobuteru. But the LDP remains a broad center-right party, with significant portions resistant to nuclear weapons
either on principle or for the expense they would entail. The LDP is also a party whose rank-and-file members are comparatively well empowered, in contrast to the
DPJs backbenchers.69 They enjoy bases of electoral support independent of the central party apparatus and have greater ability to foment intra-party dissension. The
need to avoid antagonizing parliamentarians applies more strongly, meanwhile, to the LDPs coalition partner Koumeitou (the Clean Government Party).

Koumeitou is a layBuddhist party that began as a peace-promoting member of the anti-LDP opposition.
Though Koumeitou has shifted to the right over the last three decades and, in the last decade or so, has done so precisely to make itself a palatable coalition partner
for the LDP an issue as salient and extreme as nuclear weapons might well test that partys ability to compromise. This is likely even more true of Koumeitous rankand-file voters than of its party organization and leadership and the LDP values Koumeitou more for its ability to deliver votes to LDP candidates than for its
legislators contributions to parliamentary majorities (with the notable exception of possible Constitutional revision, in which Koumeitous delegation would be
necessary for the LDP to achieve super-majority support). The LDP will almost certainly regress to the mean in its vote support at the next election, at which time
Koumeitous cooperation will become even more valuable. It should be noted that the need to rely on coalition partners to form a government and make policy is one
that now applies across the political spectrum in Japans increasingly fragmented party system. And the

more such veto players whose buy-in


is required for policy change, the less likely policy change becomes , especially when it comes to the
dramatic change that a departure from Japans nuclear status quo would represent .70 It should also be noted that Abe
represents a particularly aggressive brand of security policymaking even within the LDP. Given his current popularity, and the fact that no
national election is likely to be called again until the summer of 2016, Abe is likely to remain in office for
a considerable length of time by Japanese standard s, bucking the recent trend of single-year prime ministers (a trend that Abe himself
kicked off, as noted above). But there is no particular reason to think that he is representative of a new breed of LDP leaders. When he is eventually
replaced, the likelihood that that new LDP chief will pursue revisionist nuclear policy should grow even
smaller. The LDP has always granted more deference to bureaucratic opinion. It was the precedent of such LDP deference that made the DPJ appear politically
activist toward traditional bureaucratic policymakers. It is true that the notion of enhanced leadership by politicians (seiji shudo) had first been made by LDP
administrations, pre-dating the DPJs rule. Some argue that the trend toward politicians leadership was originally set when Prime Minister Hashimoto first
established legislation to reorganize the ministries in 1998. Abe himself during his first term in 2006-2007, sought to enhance policymaking capacity among the prime
ministers staff by increasing the number of special assistants to the prime minister (shusho hosakan) and establishing a Japanese-style national security council.
However, when

it comes to security policy, we should expect the LDP to concentrate its political-influence
efforts on more electorally lucrative domestic sectors such as construction and agricultur e, especially under future
prime ministers who, unlike Abe, dont happen to have made their political reputations on hardline security stances. Also, bureaucrats themselves may grow more
willing and better able to resist the new politicization of security policymaking as time passes.

Japan Cant Prolif


Japan lacks the technical capabilities to develop the bomb anyways
Furukawa et al 12 (Katsuhisa Furukawa is former Fellow of Research Institute of Science and
Technology for Society, of Japan Science and Technology Agency. Peter R. Lavoy is Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, and Director of the Global Center for Security Cooperation, Defense
Security Cooperation Agency. Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats. Palo Alto, CA, USA: Stanford
Security Studies, 2012. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 15 July 2015. Copyright 2012. Stanford Security
Studies.)
The 2006 study also suggested that any

Japanese effort to construct a nuclear weapon would confront several


challenges. First, given that a fairly limited domestic reserve of natural uranium exists in Japan, it would
be vulnerable to an embargo of fissile materials that could jeopardize any nuclear weapons program .
Second, the Japanese scientific and academic communities tend to be populated by pacifists , despite the
countrys general shift toward becoming a normal country. A majority of the Japanese universities and academic societies still embrace the
principle of avoiding involvement in military-related research. Third, selecting the location for nuclear weapon production

facilities would surely be a painstaking process for any Japanese government. The political power of local governments is
expanding relative to the national government. Even the selection of a location for a radioactive waste storage site has
been stalled for several decades. Local activism has been energized following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
accidents. In terms of potential delivery system, Japan has the H11 A and H2 -B rockets, which could be converted into intercontinental
ballistic missiles. The H2 -B launch vehicle is a two-stage rocket that uses liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as propellant. It also has four strapon solid-fuel rocket boosters that can be used to extend its range or payload. The satellite launch systems employed on the rockets are based on
technologies that could serve as the basis of a warhead bus, although Japanese scientists and engineers have apparently never explored this
application. Japan also has not undertaken a serious examination of a nuclear-tipped cruise missile. The

Japanese military also lacks the intellectual and operational infrastructure needed for a viable nuclear
arsenal. It has never articulated a nuclear doctrine or a unified command and control system for nuclear operations. For its part,
the government also lacks a stringent legal framework to protect classified information related to a nuclear weapons program.
Additionally, no effort has been made to develop an intelligence system or information protocols to support
nuclear operations.

Prolif Isnt Destabilizing


Proliferation isnt inherently destabilizing asia specifically
Sundstrom 15 (Ian Sundstrom is a surface warfare officer in the United States Navy and holds a
masters degree in war studies from Kings College London, An East Asian Arms Race: Does It Even
Matter? January 16, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/)
It is difficult to say whether there is an ongoing arms race in East Asia. Some take it as a given that China and the United States are engaged in an
arms race, and that the U.S. is losing. Others argue that Chinas increased defense spending will lead the rest of the region to follow suit, or that
Chinas development of MIRVed nuclear missiles will spark a regional nuclear arms race. Still others note that most of the regions defense
budgets were at 25 year lows as a percentage of GDP in 2014 while Chinas defense spending continues to increase. Whatever the case may be,

most observers treat the concept of an arms race in Asia as self-evidently negative. But is that truly the
case? Must an arms race have negative consequences for regional security and stability? Historical evidence and
logic say no. Arms races do not lead inevitably to conflict. There are two fundamental
requirements before states enter into wars: capability and intent . The first comprises military forces, economic
wherewithal, and demographic factors, among other components. It is the means of war, money and guns. The second is the desire to embark
upon war. It consists of a grievance, opportunity, or other cause de guerre, and the belief that war is the only, or even just the best, option
available to achieve the desired outcome. An arms race involves only the capability side of the equation. Looking at

the historical record demonstrates that the relationship between arms races and eventual war is
not cause and effect. The classic case is the Anglo-German naval buildup before the First World
War. The two countries did indeed rapidly expand their navies, and in the end they did go to war, but there was no obvious intention for war
between the two countries. Circumstances outside their control, separate from the arms race a rigid alliance structure, sudden assassination, and
widely-held belief in the social virtues of armed conflict led Europe to war. Another interesting example is the interwar naval

arms treaties involving the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan. Those countries actively limited their naval
construction programs in the belief that naval armaments had been a factor in the rush to war in 1914 and correspondingly that preventing any
change in the naval balance would relieve pressure. In the end, the treaties were broken by the Japanese because they were intent on imperial
expansion and the three powers went to war. The final classic example is the nuclear arms race between the Soviet

Union and the United States. In this case, a rapid arms buildup from the 1950s onward, spurred by such mistaken beliefs as the
Missile Gap on the US side, did not result in war between the two states. As early as the 1960s, both sides had the ability to quite literally
eliminate the other from the face of the Earth with their nuclear arsenals, but that did not change the situation. Neither side had any

intention of engaging in either a nuclear or massive conventional war with the other. From these three examples it
is clear that a simple argument that arms races lead to war is incorrect.

No impact to Asian prolif allies will be responsible


Sapolsky et al., MIT Security Studies former director, 14
(Harvey and Christine Leah, Let Asia Go Nuclear, DOA: 12-30-15,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259, llc)
Americas policy of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to be more nuanced. What works for the United States
in the Middle East may not in Asia. We do not want Iran or Saudi Arabia to get the bomb , but why not Australia, Japan,
and South Korea? We are opposed to nuclear weapons because they are the great military equalizer, because some countries may let them slip into the hands
of terrorists, and because we have significant advantage in precision conventional weapons. But our opposition to nuclear weapons in Asia
means we are committed to a costly and risky conventional arms race with China over our ability to
protect allies and partners lying nearer to China than to us and spread over a vast maritime theater. None of our allies in Asia possess nuclear weapons. Instead,
they are protected by what is called extended deterrence, our vaguely stated promise to use nuclear weapons in their defense if they are threatened by regional nuclear
powers, China, North Korea and Russia. We promise, in essence, to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo, Washington for Canberra, and Seattle for Seoul, as preposterous as
that might seem. In order to avoid such a test of our will, the United States attempts to contain China in particular, but others as well, via a conventional force buildup
the so-called pivot to Asia. We station tens of thousands of troops in Japan and South Korea, and are expanding our presence in Guam, Australia, Singapore, and the
Philippines. The conventional challenge is Chinas ability to deny access for US forces in or near the island chains that are our Asian allies and that at the same time
guard China. As

Chinas military grows the access issue becomes more problematic because of Chinas ability
to saturate the zone with missiles and aircraft that can threaten our military presence. The Air-Sea Battle operational concept, a costly
networking of missile defenses, long-range-strike capabilities and naval forces has been the US militarys response. Billions are being spent by the
United States to assure our Asian allies of our will to protect them conventionally as well with extended nuclear deterrence. But there is a
better, cheaper way to provide security in Asia. We should encourage our allies to

acquire their own nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons Australia, Japan and the others would
have the capability to protect themselves from bullying. Nearly all of the allies are rich enough and technologically advanced enough
to acquire and maintain nuclear forces. And those who are notthe Philippines, for examplelose much of their vulnerability once the focus shifts away from

weapons helped prevent the Cold War from turning hot. In Asia
they can stop a conventional arms race that is forcing the United States to invest in weapons that can block the
Chinese military on its doorstep, thousands of miles from our own. Let our Asian allies defend themselves with the weapon that is
the great equalizer. Tailored proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is not the Middle East.
Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even Taiwan are strong democracies. They have stable political
regimes. Government leaders are accountable to democratic institutions. Civilian control of the military is
strong. And they dont have a history of lobbing missiles at each other they are much more risk-averse
than Egypt, Syria or Iran. Americas allies would be responsible nuclear weapon states . A
conventional defenses of the island chains. Nuclear

number of Asian nations have at one time or another considered going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S. Defense Department encouragement in the
1960s. They chose what for them was the cheaper alternative of living under the US nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees provided by the United States, coupled
with the US Navy patrolling offshore, have allowed our allies to grow prosperous without having to invest much in their own defense. Confident that the United States

It is time to give
them a dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that is to stop standing between them and
their nuclear-armed neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of having their own nuclear weapons. The waters of the Pacific under
protects them, our allies have even begun to squabble with China over strings of uninhabited islands in the hope that there is oil out there.

those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a fortune.

Credibility doesnt matter


Perceptions of US credibility dont spill over to cause proliferation
Walt 15 (Stephen M. Walt, the Robert and Rene Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, January 6, 2015. The
Credibility Addiction. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:UUohn0SMU10J:foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/06/the-credibilityaddiction-us-iraq-afghanistan-unwinnable-war/+&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us)
Unfortunately, this obsession

with credibility was misplaced. For one thing, a states


reputation for being tough or reliable didnt work the way most foreign-policy elites thought it did.
American leaders kept worrying that other states would question the United States resolve and capability
if it ever abandoned an unimportant ally, or lost some minor scrap in the developing world. But as careful
research by Ted Hopf, Jonathan Mercer, and Daryl Press has shown, states do not judge the
credibility of commitments in one place by looking at how a country acted
somewhere far away, especially when the two situations are quite different . In fact, when the United States
did lose, or when it chose to cut its losses and liquidate some unpromising position, dominos barely fell and its core strategic
relations remained unaffected. In other words, how the United States responds to a challenge in
Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa tells you nothing about how it would or should respond somewhere
else, and other states understood this all along. When trying to figure out what the United States is going to do, other
states do not start by asking what the United States did in some conflict on the other side of the world.
Instead, they ask whether it is in Americas interest to act in the situation at hand. And guess what? This
implies that U.S. commitments are most credible when the American interest is obvious to all . I mean, nobody
really doubts that the United States would fight like a tiger to defend its own soil, right? Exaggerated worries about U.S. credibility had a number
of unfortunate consequences. They encouraged American leaders to act in places that didnt matter, in order to convince others that it would also
act in places that did. Squandering resources on marginal conflicts undermined confidence in U.S. protection, however, because it consumed
resources that could have been committed elsewhere and it sometimes made a war-weary American public even less interested in far-flung
foreign adventures. Ironically, misguided efforts to bolster U.S. credibility may have

weakened it instead. The credibility obsession also made it easier for U.S. allies to free-ride
(something they were already inclined to do), because they could always get Uncle Sucker to take on more burdens by
complaining that they had doubts about American resolve. I dont blame them for trying this ploy, but I do blame American
officials for falling for it so often. In fact, had allies been a bit less confident that the United States was going to
protect them no matter what, these states might have been willing to spend more on their own
defense and been more attentive to Washingtons wishes . If the goal is retaining U.S. influence and
leverage, what really matters is whether other states have confidence in
Americas judgment. If they believe that the United States is good at weighing threats soberly and rationally, and if they are
convinced that Washington can set clear priorities and stick to them, then U.S. allies can calibrate their
actions with ours and will be more inclined to follow the U.S. lead. If allies and adversaries believe the
United States understands what is going on in key regions and has a clear sense of its own interests, then
they will know that the United States wont be buffaloed into unwise actions by self-serving allied
whining, or provoked into overreactions by enemies eager to drag us into another costly quagmire. By
contrast, if American leaders panic at every sign of danger and treat minor problems as mortal
threats, then other states will be less inclined to trust Washingtons views on these
matters and be more inclined to follow their own counsel. When Washington goes to war on the basis of cooked intelligence, worst-case
assumptions, and unsurpassed hubris, then other countries will be warier the next time we try to get them to line up alongside us. If the United
States keeps throwing soldiers lives and billions of dollars into unwinnable conflicts, confidence in our political systems ability

to make rational decisions will decline even more. If foreign powers believe U.S. policy is driven
more by domestic politics than by strategic imperatives, theyll view us with barely veiled contempt and
meddle even more in our porous political system. If foreign leaders pay close attention to the bluster and balderdash that pass
for strategic debate in official Washington, theyll have reason to wonder if the self-appointed Leader of the Free World really knows what it is
doing. And of course, when they see a lengthy series of costly screw-ups (Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Ukraine, etc.), they will be
more inclined to think for themselves than to trust Washingtons guidance. What Im suggesting, in short, is that successful diplomacy

depends less on endlessly reaffirming our will or resolve, and more on building confidence in the

analytical capacity of the American foreign-policy community and the judgment of top U.S. officials. And thats not
surprising, either. Diplomacy is mostly about persuasion; it is ultimately about convincing others to do what we want. They are more likely to
accept our recommendations when we can tell a truly convincing story, i.e., one that has the merit of being true. And that means that
credibility isnt the key to a successful foreign policy , especially when it becomes a reflexive
tendency to respond to any and all challenges with threats, bluster, and the use of force. If America still wants other states to follow our lead,
what really matters is judgment: analyzing issues intelligently, setting clear and sensible priorities, and being willing to
rethink a course of action in response to events. New York Yankees pitcher Lefty Gomez famously said that it was better to be lucky than good.
He was probably right, but its even better to be lucky andsmart. And both matter more than being mindlessly predictable. Or, to paraphrase Walt
Whitman, a foolish credibility is the hobgoblin of small minds.

2AC Asian Hegemony Impact


Asian hegemony is unsustainable, and undesireable
Swaine, PhD Harvard, 15 [Michael D, expert in China and East Asian security studies and a Senior
Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-forstable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi, 4-20]
While continued American predominance cannot, at present, be justified on the basis of a Chinese drive for predominance, what of the
widespread argument in U.S. policy circles that such predominance is necessary regardless of Chinese intentions, as the best possible means of
ensuring regional (and global) order? While deeply rooted in both American exceptionalism and beliefs about the benefits of hegemonic power in
the international order, the notion that unequivocal U.S. predominance in the Western Pacific constitutes the only

basis for longterm stability and prosperity across the AsiaPacific is a dangerous,
increasingly obsolete concept, for several reasons. First, it is inconceivable that Beijing would accept
the unambiguously superior level of American predominance that the many proponents of this course of action believe is
required to ensure longterm regional stability in the face of a rising China, involving total U.S. freedom of action and a clear ability to prevail
militarily without excessive costs in any conceivable contingency occurring up to Chinas mainland borders. The United States would never
tolerate such predominance by any power along its borders, and why should an increasingly strong China? Given Chinas expanding interests and
capabilities, any effort to sustain an unambiguous, absolute level of American military superiority along Beijings
maritime periphery will

virtually guarantee an increasingly destabilizing and


economically draining arms race, much greater levels of regional polarization and friction than at
present, and reduced incentives on the part of both Washington and Beijing to
work together to address a growing array of common global challenges . U.S.
efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in Chinas backyard will further stoke Beijings
worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures,
ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and Chinas general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar
order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of longterm vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense
of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regionalsecurityrelated issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the
fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic

criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power
continues to grow, bolstering Chinese selfconfidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain
predominance along Chinas maritime periphery would become a matter of political
survival for future Chinese leaders. Second, and equally important, it is far from clear that American military
predominance in the AsiaPacific region can be sustained on a consistent basis, just as it is virtually impossible that China could
establish its own predominance in the region. Two Carnegie reports on the longterm security environment in Asia, Chinas Military and
the U.S.Japan Alliance in 2030 and Conflict and Cooperation in the AsiaPacific Region,2 concluded that, while the United States will
remain the strongest military power on a global level indefinitely, Washington will almost certainly
confront increasingly severe, economically induced defense spending
limitations that will constrain efforts to decisively keep well ahead of a
growing Chinese military and paramilitary presence within approximately 1,500 nautical miles of the Chinese coastline,
that is, the area covered by the socalled first and second island chains. This will occur despite Washingtons repeated assertion
that the rebalance to Asia will sustain Americas predominant position in the region . Moreover, such largely
economic constraints will almost certainly be magnified by the persistence of tensions and conflicts in other parts of the
world, such as the Middle East and Central Europe. These events are likely to complicate any U.S. effort to shift forces (and resources) to the
AsiaPacific.