ISIDRO CARIO vs.

COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged
failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying
away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable
assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within
24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the
Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90
days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was
consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers
staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary
Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran,
Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation
of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to
SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission
on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently
for reasons completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it
earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR
continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of
law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative
charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is
empowered to investigate.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on
its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under
its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It
may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as
may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even
quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or
the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,
research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to
conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to
learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care
and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n
administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,
determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights
and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on:
settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or
with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To
determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To
pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate,"
cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers
in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights
had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the
merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the
teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act
of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue
those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may
properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope
of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of
Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education
himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service
Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

___
EPZA vs. Commission on Human Rights
G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992
Facts:
EPZA (petitioner) purchase a parcel of land from Filoil Refinery Corporation, and before petitioner
could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted
agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. EPZA paid a
P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among
them were private respondents (TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA). Ten years later, respondent
Teresita, Loreto and Pedro, filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint
complaint praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies". Alleged in their complaint was the
information that EPZA bulldozed the area with acts in violation of their human rights. CHR issued
an Order of injunction commanding EPZA to desist from committing such acts . Two weeks later,
EPZA again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles,
pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. CHR Chairman Mary
Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her first order and expanded it
to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates.
EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue
injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders, but same was denied by the Commission
(CHR).
Hence, EPZA, filed in SC this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the
issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in
excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. A temporary restraining order (TRO)
was issued ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the
questioned injunction orders.
In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of the restraining order.
The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution,
"is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others to provide
appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection.

not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.
The "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a
court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary
injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within
his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be
granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending
in an inferior court within his district." (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary
injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the
preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose.
__
Carpio v Exec Sec
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this
petition, questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, allegedly contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: The State shall
establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
ISSUEs:
Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control

Issue:

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

WON CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts
complained of.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano
vs. Silvosa, the power of control means the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. It is said to be at the very heart of
the meaning of Chief Executive.

Held:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction issued by the
respondent Commission on Human Right are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the TRO which this
Court issued is made PERMANENT.
In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., we held that the CHR is not
a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or
official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy
is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving
evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review
as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may

As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time
and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, the Presidents power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their
respective jurisdictions in the executive department.

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry,
local executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to
repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in
nature. His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the
constitutional principle that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.
__
NPC (NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION) vs DE GUZMAN
FACTS:
RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991.
RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 reads:
"SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. Compulsory retirement, for officer and
non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in
case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy
director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an
unextendible period of one (1) year.
Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private
respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have
reached the age of fifty-six.
Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of an ex
parte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of
retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are
also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:
"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition
period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the following
members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:
"a)Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity
of this Act.
"b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the
effectivity of this Act.
"d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the
effectivity of this Act."
Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the Philippine
Constabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the Integrated
National Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.
On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided in
Section 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age
sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for
the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.
Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunction. He
declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the present members of the
Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall
become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary
injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have
been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law
failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the
source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to
investigate the antecedents involved.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present
Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members and that
Section 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year
transition period.
HELD:

From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term INP
is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a
uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement
purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be
construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.
Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who
constitutes
the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,
"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the effectivity of this Act,
the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of the
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be a major service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National police, which is the civilian
component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police, shall cease to be the
national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be establish and constituted
pursuant to this Act."
It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the
members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to
categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the
local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was
already retirable at age fifty-six (56).
Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed
dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not
without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they
may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to
what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the
law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is
applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is
valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12
[1939]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is
hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
___
Himagan v People
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member
of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day
or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree
provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that an
imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the
case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can

stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals
with the time from within which the trial should be finished.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension
of accused be lifted?

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions.

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that
period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so
warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the
accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He
may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused
can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus.
___

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant
threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and
armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does
not violate the suspended policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.