8.

RULLODA vs COMELEC
FACTS: Romeo Rolluda and Remegio Placido are contending candidates for barangay
chairman. Romeo died and his wife (Betty) makes a letter-request to substitute her husband.
Betty won but Remegio was declared the barangay captain because Bettys votes were not
counted on the ground that her substitution was invalid.
ISSUE: WON the votes for Betty Rolludas be considered as basis of her winning
RULING: Yes. In our jurisdiction, an election means the choice or selection of candidates to
public office by popular vote through the use of the ballot, and the elected officials which are
determined through the will of the electorate.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. The winner is the candidate who has obtained a majority or plurality of valid votes cast
in the election. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who receive
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office. For, in all republican forms of
government the basic idea is that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.
Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if
they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in
any way not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results.

17. PARAS vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular barangay
election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25%
requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date.
To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition
for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.

ISSUE: WON the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the
recall election is for Barangay post.

RULING: NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election
one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the
proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer
tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.
It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to
construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the
same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

26. MARUHOM vs COMELEC

FACTS: Private respondent, knowing that he was cheated and the true winner for Mayor, filed
before this Honorable Commission a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner Abdulmadid
Maruhom as the duly elected Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest. In his answer petitioner
prayed to hold in abeyance further proceedings since the protest is ad cautelam or subject to
the petition filed before this Honorable Commission.
After the Revision Committee was directed by the respondent to commence the revision of
ballots, the petitioner Abdulmadid Maruhom thru counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the
protest on the grounds that (1) The ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested and
counter-protested precincts have been violated; (2) Automated counting of ballots does not
contemplate a manual recount of the ballots; and (3) Protestant is guilty of forum shopping
warranting summary dismissal of the petitioner of the protest.
Private respondent vigorously opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally argued that
the motion is clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision Committee has been
ordered to commence the revision of ballots and maintained that (1) The motion to dismiss is
not allowed in an election protest -xxxxxISSUE: WON a motion to dismiss, filed after an answer has been filed, is a prohibited pleading
in an election protest pending before the Regional Trial Court
RULING: Yes.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of a certain
pleading in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice
and procedure in all courts is vested in the Supreme Court.
The foregoing pronouncement, however, will not extricate petitioner from his predicament
because the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was based on the fact that the other
grounds relied therein was considered unmeritorious and not because the said motion is a
prohibited pleading in electoral protest cases. While the challenged COMELEC Resolution may
not have been entirely correct in dismissing the petition in this regard, the soundness of its
discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence to resolve the factual issues raised in
the controversy cannot be doubted.
Indeed, as reasoned by the COMELEC, the . . . Commission assumes the competence of the
trial court to handle electoral protest and cannot encroach on its original and exclusive
jurisdiction on electoral protest cases involving the contested mayoralty seat. To our mind, the
trial court should be allowed to resolve the case on the merits to be able to rule on the factual
and legal grounds raised by the petitioner as his defenses in his Answer. Should the petitioner
be dissatisfied with the outcome of the case in the lower court, he can still appeal, as his relief,
to this Commission within the reglementary period provided by law.

35. CANICOSA vs COMELEC

FACTS:
RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in Calamba,
Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers. On 15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and
Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of
votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered
voters voting, and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the
precincts to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer.
But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did
not justify a declaration of failure of election.
Indeed, the grounds cited by Canicosa do not warrant a declaration of failure of election.
ISSUE: WON the right remedy for Canicosa is to declare a failure of elections
RULING: NO. Canicosa bewails that the names of the registered voters in the various precincts
did not appear in their respective lists of voters. But this is not a ground to declare a failure of
election.
The filing of a petition for declaration of failure of election therefore is not the proper remedy.
The day following the last day for registration of voters, the poll clerk delivers a certified list of
voters to the election registrar, election supervisor and the COMELEC, copies of which are open
to public inspection. On the same day, the poll clerk posts a copy of the list of registered voters
in each polling place. Each member of the board of election inspectors retains a copy of the list
which may be inspected by the public in their residence or in their office during office hours.
Fifteen (15) days before the regular elections on 8 May 1995 the final list of voters was posted
in each precinct pursuant to Sec. 148 of RA No. 7166. Based on the lists thus posted Canicosa
could have filed a petition for inclusion of registered voters with the regular courts. The question
of inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters involves the right to vote which is not within the
power and authority of COMELEC to rule upon. The determination of whether one has the right
to vote is a justiciable issue properly cognizable by our regular courts.

44. BRILLANTES vs YORAC

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino appointed Comelec Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac
as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide,
who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December
1989 coup d etat attempt.
Petitioner Sixto Brillantes, Jr. questioned the appointment in view of the status of the COMELEC
as an independent constitutional body and and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section
1(2) of the Constitution that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes further argued that the
choice of the acting chairman should not come from the President for such is an internal matter
that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the president
violates the independence of the COMELEC as a constitutional commission. He cites the
practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief Justice in the
absence of the Chief Justice. No designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
The Solicitor General argues that no such designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme
Court because the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129 for the Court of Appeals. There is no such
arrangement, however, in the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by
the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative
expediency, to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC.
ISSUE: WON the designation of an Acting Chairman of COMELEC is unconstitutional
HELD: YES. The appointment of Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is
unconstitutional.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules
and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to
review on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that
discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of
the Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially temporary and therefore
revocable at will. No cause need be established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity,
the designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections may be
withdrawn by the President of the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on
Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not
available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation
of the President of the Philippines.

53. LDP vs COMELEC

FACTS: The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a registered
political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman,
Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of
candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara
had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced
leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary
General.
Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority
to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP
General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.
The next day, the LDP General Counsel filed a Second Urgent Manifestation disputing
newspaper accounts that Rep. Aquino had suspended Sen. Angara as Party Chairman.
ISSUE: WON only the Party Chairman has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the
official candidates of the party
RULING: YES. In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP,
contends that under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the
Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary
General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the question of
party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to ascertain whether the
candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not.
To resolve this simple issue, the COMELEC need only to turn to the Party Constitution. It need
not go so far as to resolve the root of the conflict between the party officials. It need only resolve
such questions as may be necessary in the exercise of its enforcement powers. The LDP has a
set of national officers composed of, among others, the Party Chairman and the Secretary
General.
The Party Chairman is the Chief Executive Officer of the Party, whose powers and functions
include:
(1) To represent the Party in all external affairs and concerns, sign documents for and on its
behalf, and call the meetings and be the presiding officer of the National Congress and the
National Executive Council.29
The Secretary General, on the other hand, assists the Party Chairman in overseeing the day-today operations of the Party. Among his powers and functions is:
(1)

When empowered by the Party Chairman, to sign documents for and on behalf of the
Party.

Respondent Commission on Elections is directed to recognize as official candidates of the

Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino only those whose Certificates of Candidacy are signed by
LDP Party Chairman Senator Edgardo J. Angara or his duly authorized representative/s.

62. AMORES vs HRET

FACTS:
Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioners Petition for Quo
Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva
(private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of
nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant
to Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and
his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to
be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva is eligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the party-list organization CIBAC.
RULING: NO.
The Court shall first discuss the age requirement for youth sector nominees under Section 9 of
RA No. 7941 reading:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one
(1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a
bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twentyfive (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than
thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains
the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of
his term. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must
be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector
nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers
ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

71. COQUILLA vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided
there until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US
Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar
which was approved in 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating
that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquillas certificate
of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a
material misrepresentation as he only resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was
proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: WON Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the
elections held on May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.
RULING:
No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is
whether the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy
for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of
candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation.

In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for
an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material
fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

80. TALAGA vs COMELEC

FACTS:
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo
(Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having
Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that
Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as
Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national
and local elections.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
Initially, Ramon filed his Verified Motion for Reconsideration. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00
a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending Motion for
Reconsideration. On the same date, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City
in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.13
On May 5, 2010, the COMELEC En Banc, acting on Ramons Ex parte Manifestation of
Withdrawal, declared the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution dated April 19, 2010 final and
executory.14 On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the
ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against
Castillos 39,615 votes.15

Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara Rubys proclamation.
ISSUE: WON there is a valid substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for Mayor of Lucena
City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
RULING: No.
Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution. The filing of a CoC
within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to be considered a
candidate in a national or local election.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy,33 there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear,
too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person
who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate.34
89. PEREZ vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC
a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had
not been a resident of the district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the
elections as required by Art. VI, 6 of the Constitution.
In his answer, private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an
apartment at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from public view because, at
that time, his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting.
The First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution, 11 dismissed the petition for
disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the
Third District of Cagayan.
ISSUE: WON Aguinaldo is a resident of Tuguegarao for more than 1 year
RULING:
Yes.
The meaning and purpose of the residency requirement were explained recently in our decision
in Aquino v. COMELEC, 16 as follows:

. . . [T]he place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e.,
his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the
purposes of election law.
In this case, although private respondent declared in his certificates of candidacy prior to the
May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan, the fact is that he was
actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11, 1998
elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he had been a
resident of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988
to 1998 and, therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao,
which is the capital of the province of Cagayan.
(residency depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case)

98. MARTINEZ III vs HRET

FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were
among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On
March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu,
filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate.
However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito
C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the
elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixtyseven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered
sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred
four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with
only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative which the Board of
Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another
congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated

May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance
with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still
included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five
thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on
the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of
determining the real intention of the voter.
The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and
declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu,
having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the
Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election
protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE: WON the votes for a nuisance candidate having a similar surname with a bona fide
candidate be counted in favor of the latter
RULING: Yes (as the Supreme Court ruled in this case).
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing
election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel
uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against
nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in ascertaining
the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments
declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by
such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put
the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and
delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are
held and the votes counted and canvassed.
Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in
appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray,
even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the
elections.

107. ALAUYA vs JUDGE LIMBONA

FACTS:
Alauya reported that numerous verbal complaints had been received against Judge Casan Ali Limbona
(Judge Limbona) for: (a) not reporting to his station at the SCC in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur; (b) having
filed a certificate of candidacy as a party-list candidate of the Development Foundation of the Philippines
(DFP) while serving in the Judiciary and while receiving his salary as a judge; and (c) obtaining from the
post office, without sufficient authority, checks representing benefits for court employees.
In a letter dated December 28, 1998 addressed to the OCA, Judge Limbona denied that he consented to
be a nominee of DFP in the May 1998 elections. To prove his point, he submitted the affidavit 7 of Datu
Solaiman A. Malambut, DFPs National President, admitting sole responsibility for his "honest mistake"
and "malicious negligence and act of desperation" in including the name of Judge Limbona among the
partys list of nominees.

The OCA disbelieved Judge Limbonas assertion that he did not consent to the inclusion of his name in
the certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC and that his inclusion was purely due to the
carelessness of the person who prepared the certificate. The OCA nevertheless took the view that a
positive identification of the judges participation in the filing of the certificate of candidacy was needed to
fully resolve the matter.

ISSUE: WON Judge Limbona committed gross misconduct for being a party-list candidate
RULING: Yes. When Judge Limbona was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold
the law, yet in filing a certificate of candidacy as a party-list representative without giving up
his judicial post, he violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that no officer or
employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbonas signatures on the certificate of
candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy, thus
negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a
partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the electorate for an elective
post.
For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post,
Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While we cannot interfere with Judge
Limbonas political aspirations, we cannot allow him to pursue his political goals while still on the
bench. We cannot likewise allow him to deceive the Judiciary. In light of the gravity of Judge
Limbonas infractions, we find OCAs recommended penalty of dismissal to be appropriate.
Under the Rules of Court, dishonesty and gross misconduct are punishable by dismissal.

116. MORENO vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the
ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already
granted probation.

Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take precedence
over the Probation Law because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to
those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even assuming
that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied
pardon of his previous misconduct.
ISSUE: WON the Probation Law is an exception to the prohibition under the Local Government Code
RULING: Yes. We agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the
Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which sets forth the
qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation
which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in its
terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of
such earlier statute. 17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of the
disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here correct. We
rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar
in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

125. SOBEJANA-CONDON vs COMELEC/BAUTISTA

FACTS:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944.
She became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
She filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra,
Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid.
She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of ViceMayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioners eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioners
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed
to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of
vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.
After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second division
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.
ISSUE: WON petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225
RULING:
R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.
The SC said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not oath before
any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.